Political Reflection Vol. 2 | No. 2 by CESRAN International

June-July-August 2011 | Vol. 2 | No. 2

LITICAL

“Advancing Diversity”

REFLECTION Quarterly

ISSN 2042-888X

The Revolt in North Africa in Global Perspective | By Prof. Bülent Gökay What to Expect from Turkey‟s New Secular Leadership? | By Dr. H. Akın Ünver Reintegrating the Taliban after the Death of Osama bin Laden | By Prof. Alpaslan Özerdem An Analysis of Chinese Naval Deployments in International Waters | By Dr. Jean-Paul Gagnon Interview with Prof. Gerd Nonneman | By Rahman Dağ

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Senior Contributors Can ERBİL (Dr.) Kurtulus GEMİCİ (Dr.) Bülent GÖKAY (Prof.) Ayla GÖL (Dr.) Bayram GÜNGÖR (Prof.) Alpaslan ÖZERDEM (Prof.) Inderjeet PARMAR (Prof.) İbrahim SİRKECİ (Prof.) Talat ULUSSEVER (Dr.) H. Akın ÜNVER (Dr.) Contributors

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June-July-August 2011

POLITICAL REFLECTION

Contents World Stories

Africa Review The Revolt in North Africa in Global Perspective: How Neoliberal Policies Triggered Widespread Poverty and Unemployment, and Perhaps an Arab „Caracazo‟

By Prof. Bülent Gökay

Turkey Review What to Expect from Turkey‟s New Secular Leadership?

By Dr. H. Akın Ünver

Commentary Reintegrating the Taliban after the Death of Osama bin Laden

By Prof. Alpaslan Özerdem

Interview with

Prof. Gerd Nonneman

By Rahman Dağ

Commentary The Death of Osama Bin Laden: Islamophobia Goes to America By Dr. Ayla Göl

Caucasus Review Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict in the Scope of Accelerating Iran-Armenian Relations

By Zaur Shiriyev

June-July-August 2011

POLITICAL REFLECTION

Contents Commentary 37

The Mediterranean Climate Change Initiative: 59 Realism or Idealism? By Dimitris Rapidis

Keynote Lecture 39

Palestine Refugees in Today‟s Middle East By Mr Filippo Grandi

Global City Analysis 45

CAIRO “Ready to change its fortune…”

62 By Fatih Eren

China Review 50

Rare Metals Industry and Pollution: Assessing Chinese Authoritarianism in the 21st Century

By Nicholas Miller and Antony Ou

An Analysis of Chinese Naval Deployments in International Waters: Is There a Significant Policy Change with the PRC‟s Recent Deployment of Ships to the Gulf of Aden? By Dr. Jean-Paul Gagnon

Eurasia Review 59

The First Ten Years of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) By Prof. Richard Rousseau

Film Review 65

Spirited Away: A Glance at Hayao Miyazaki

By Enes Erbay

Recent Books

WORLD STORIES | By Aksel Ersoy

TURKEY Worries grew over press freedom in Turkey when more journalists were arrested and charged with involvement in a coup plot. The European Union and others expressed concern; the government said the arrests were not a response to critics in the media. (17.03.2011)

LIBYA America, Britain and France attacked Libyan airfields, military centres and tanks with aircraft and missiles after the UN Security Council passed a resolution providing for a no-flying zone. Rebel troops fighting to topple Colonel Muammar Qaddafi broke out of their enclave around Benghazi but struggled to advance towards Tripoli, the capital. (23.03.2011)

MEXICO The United States‟ ambassador to Mexico resigned, after WikiLeaks published cables in which he criticised the government‟s approach to fighting organized crime and the potential presidential candidates of the ruling party. (27.03.2011)

LAMPEDUSA More than 250 migrants were reported to have drowned after a boat that set off from Libya carrying 300 odd people, mostly from Bangladesh, Chad, Cote d‟Ivoire, Nigeria, Somalia and Sudan, sank off the Italian island of Lampedusa. (06.04.2011)

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GERMANY The disaster in Japan revived German concerns over nuclear power. Angela Merkel announced a three month moratorium on a plan to extend the lifespan of the country‟s 17 nuclear power plants, and said that seven facilities built before 1980 would be temporary shut. The European Union announced plans to test the safety of all nuclear plants in the 27 member states and China suspended approvals for new nuclear facilities. (20.03.2011)

PALESTINE One person was killed and 30 injured by a bomb left at a bus stop in Jerusalem, the first such attack in the city for more than six years. This came after Israeli jets launched air raids in the Gaza Strip in retaliation for the heaviest barrage of mortars and rockets fired into Israel by Palestinian militants for two years. (25.03.2011)

Political Reflection | June-July-August 2011

WORLD STORIES | By Aksel Ersoy

JAPAN Japan raised the severity level at the Fukushima nuclear power plant to seven, the highest on the accepted inter national scale. Only the Chernobyl accident 25 years ago ranked as high. The government said the new assessment reflected the accumulated radiation that has escaped the plant, not a sudden deterioration. Total radiation emissions have been a tenth of Chernobyl‟s so far, with no radiation linked deaths. (14.04.2011)

KAZAKHSTAN Kazakhstan re-elected Nursultan Nazarbayev as its president with 99.5 % of the vote. Mr Nazarbayev is popular among his countrymen but the near-perfect result is an embarrassment for the foreign governments that applauded him for calling the election. Even an opposition candidate voted for him. (08.04.2011)

FRANCE

CHINA A month long confrontation at Kirti monastery in a Tibetan part of China‟s Sichuan province, erupted in violence following the death of a young monk who had set fire to himself. More than 300 Buddhist monks were forcibly removed from monastery, to undergo “patriotic re-education”. Chinese authorities blamed the monks for starting the disturbance. (25.04.2011)

PAKISTAN After a decade long manhunt Osama bin Laden was killed in a daring raid. A two year intelligence effort led American special forces to a compound in the Pakistani city of Abbottabad, just north of Islamabad, where they shot al-Qaeda‟s leader. His body was buried at sea to prevent jihadist from creating a shrine. With Mr bin Laden found to have been living comfortably in an urban area, some concluded that he had been sheltered by elements of the Pakistani security services. The Americans did not notify Pakistan about their operation for fear that it would be compromised. (02.05.2011)

Political Reflection | June-July-August 2011

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Compiled by Aksel Ersoy from Different World News Sources

A ban on wearing the Islamic face covering veil in public came into force in France. There were several arrests following protests, and one woman was fined 150 euro for sporting the garment. (15.04.2011)

AFRICA REVIEW

The Revolt in North Africa in Global Perspective: How Neoliberal Policies Triggered Widespread Poverty and Unemployment, and Perhaps an Arab „Caracazo‟ By Prof. Bülent Gökay*

On 17 December 2010, a 26-year-old man named Mohammed Bouaziz poured petrol over himself and set his own body alight in front of the office of the regional governor. This incident came after police had smashed his fruit cart – his only means of survival despite his university degree with an MBA from an elite university.

the aftermath, life turned upside down in Tunisia and the fire that Bouaziz lit burned until it engulfed the entire country from town to town. He died an agonising death from his injuries, after three weeks in the hospital, triggering protests which led to the downfall of President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali. Soon protests spread to Egypt, Yemen, Libya and other parts of Arabic North Africa, the Middle East and some Gulf States.

Western-friendly regimes. The uprisings have come from a complex mix of economic problems involving the sharp rise in food prices and high youth unemployment, together with a widespread hatred of autocratic and corrupt regimes. All these factors have combined in different ways in various countries, leading to a strong popular anger. Of course we cannot deny the fact that people in one country have drawn, and will continue to draw, inspiration and strength from the mass protest movements in others. The partial successes in Tunisia and Egypt detonated similar movements elsewhere, but they did so only in countries with similar historical legacy – the same sharp socio-economic polarities between rentier rulers

Bouaziz‟s plight echoed the hapless fate of so many thousands and thousands of young Tunisians, Egyptians, Libyans and other unemployed youth in North Africa – all seduced by the promises of higher education yet frustrated and thwarted by the visionless, un-productive, corrupt power elites of

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Political Reflection | June-July-August 2011

The Revolt in North Africa | By Prof. Bülent Gökay

policies of its regimes plus neoliberal policies imposed by the global financial bodies. The country‟s economy has suffered disastrously under IMF and World Bank-imposed restructuring process.

The most obvious common feature of the three principal storm centres so far – Tunisia, Egypt and Libya – is a far-reaching program of neo-liberal restructuring, which has been imposed by the IMF and put into practice by the regimes with similar devastating results.

In the 1990s, Egyptian authorities were forced to cut food subsidies and ”restructure” the economy towards service sectors and tourism. As a result, since the year 2000, Egypt has suffered from many food riots as the country once self-sufficient in food has now become dependent on food imports, mainly from the US. The IMF-imposed policies have also led to the Egyptian people being exposed to sharply rising food prices as financial markets have moved to speculating on commodities.

and marginal street labour. And, also, where the autocratic rulers were deeply integrated and subordinated to global economic interests and military networks. Most of the North African economies where the revolts are taking place are structured strictly on ”rents” from oil, gas, minerals and tourism – which provide most of the export earnings and state revenues. These sectors are export enclaves employing a tiny fraction of the labour force, defining a highly specialised economy. They have no links to a diversified domestic economy because all finished manufactured goods as well as financial and high-tech services are imported and controlled by multi-nationals. The most obvious common feature of the three principal storm centres so far – Tunisia, Egypt and Libya – is a farreaching program of neo-liberal restructuring, which has been imposed by the IMF and put into practice by the regimes with similar devastating results. These include privatisation, mass poverty, growing youth unemployment, the lack of opportunities for university and college graduates, falling real wages and the accumulation of vast amounts of wealth in the hands of the country‟s top ruling families and their cronies. World Bank reports show that 40 per cent of the Egyptian population, more than 30 million people, live in poverty. Egypt‟s economy has been ruined largely by a combination of the self-destructive

Political Reflection | June-July-August 2011

A large section of desert farm land, once used to produce food, has been now transformed into tourist resorts – controlled by a small elite and foreign companies. As a result, the country‟s economy is no longer geared towards Egypt‟s natural strengths of agriculture and manufacturing – with the disastrous consequence of widespread poverty and rising unemployment. The Egyptian government and its reforms were applauded in Washington by the World Bank, IMF and US officials. Egypt was even given the ”top reformer” award by the IMF and the World Bank. The IMF Country Report on Egypt, published in April 2010, is a clear indication to how firmly the country‟s economy has been controlled by international finance. It praised tight fiscal and monetary responses imposed in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, with the objective of reducing the fiscal deficit. Following that, inflation has risen beyond 13 percent in recent months, creating extreme difficulties for millions of Egyptians. The report claimed, just months before the recent popular upheaval, that ”the near-term macroeconomic outlook appears favourable”. Tunisia‟s dismal economic environment too was a direct result of its increasingly neo-liberal policy toward foreign speculators. Of the five countries covered by the World Bank‟s Investment Across Sectors Indicator, Tunisia had the fewest limits on foreign investment – allowing for an unprecedented level of free trade. Not surprisingly, those foreign speculators did not bring productive investment or more jobs either.

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The Revolt in North Africa | By Prof. Bülent Gökay

ring private sector development and attracting foreign investment. All three countries – Egypt, Tunisia and Libya – began to take their orders from IMF manuals in the late 1990s, and since then their autocratic rulers have been consistently praised by the governments of France and the US as well as the IMF and bond markets.

El Caracazo is associated – in Spanish-speaking countries – with the beginning of the Latin American revolt against neoliberal restructuring. And it marked the start of the end of Latin American ancien régime. Some 22 years after Latin America‟s El Caracazo, it seems today the whole region of North Africa is entering the beginnings of the era of the political awakening.

Viewed against this background, the revolts in North Africa assume a much broader significance. They are not merely political responses for more democracy, but direct popular reactions to widespread economic misery, rising food prices and high youth unemployment. In this sense, the North African revolts are a clear expression of people‟s rejection of neoliberal policies imposed by the IMF and World Bank.

Indeed – the insatiable hunt for great deals, by banks, hedge funds, or private equity funds, had the opposite effect: organised labour was fiercely suppressed; the public education and the health care systems were gutted by a combination of neglect and privatisation; much of the population suffered stagnant or falling wages relative to inflation. In September 2010, the IMF recommended to the Tunisian government the removal of remaining subsidies as a means to achieving fiscal balance. The neoliberal economic policies imposed by the government were hailed as prudent and wise. As a result, the sudden surge in food prices opened a new phase of the process of widespread impoverishment in the country. Similarly, the IMF commended Libyan authorities on 28 October 2010, for efforts to enhance the role of the private sector in the economy. The IMF report also noted that “progress” had been made in reducing civil service employment, pointing out that of the 340,000 public services employees transferred to a central labour office for retrenchment, about one quarter had found other sources of income. It called for the retrenchment program to be accelerated. As recently as 9 February, just a week before the uprising against Gaddafi started, the IMF praised the ambitious program to privatise banks and develop the nascent financial sector. It also mentioned that structural reforms in other areas and farreaching laws passed last year boded well for foste-

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Therefore, what we are seeing in Libya and the rest of the North African Arab world today is quite similar to the 1989 Venezuelan Caracazo, which was triggered by a new round of sweeping neoliberal reforms imposed by the IMF – including the slashing of state subsidies on essential items such as fuel, after several years of increasing poverty and social unrest. El Caracazo, the Revolutionary Turning Point, was a massive revolt of urban poor in Venezuela against the established corrupt regime and the neo-liberal economic shockpolicies. It was this movement that led directly to a process of widespread change in the whole continent for the next ten years. Therefore, El Caracazo is associated – in Spanish-speaking countries – with the beginning of the Latin American revolt against neoliberal restructuring. And it marked the start of the end of Latin American ancien régime. Some 22 years after Latin America‟s El Caracazo, it seems today the whole region of North Africa is entering the beginnings of the era of the political awakening. The whole region is experiencing an Arab version of Revolutionary Turning Point against decades of plunder, exploitation, neoliberal privatisation and ruthless restructuring in the hands of the IMF, World Bank, and their own despot rulers. Note: * Bülent Gökay is Professor of International Relations at Keele University.

Political Reflection | June-July-August 2011

Advancing Diversity

POLITICAL REFLECTION “Quarterly news-Magazine”

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TURKEY REVIEW

What to Expect from Turkey’s New Secular Leadership? By Dr. H. Akın Ünver*

urkey‟s opposition Republican People‟s Party (CHP) has been undergoing an important and profound transformation since May 2010, which began with the resignation of Deniz Baykal, the party‟s chairman for more than 15 years, as a result of sex scandal allegations. Following Baykal‟s resignation, Kemal Kilicdaroglu was elected as the new chairman of the CHP. A former deputy chairman, he rose to fame after a series of public debates in 2008 in which he successfully challenged two senior members of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) on corruption allegations. In fact, Kilicdaroglu was such a popular figure within the party, that during the CHP rally on May 22, 2010, he was elected to chairmanship by winning 1189 votes out of a possible 1197. About 6 months later on November 3, Kemal Kilicdaroglu made his first major overhaul of the party‟s leadership by reassembling the Central Executive Committee (CEC) with younger and lesser known members; a move, which was interpreted as the „revolution of the RPP progressives‟. On December 18, following the intensification of the disputes between the CHP‟s „old guard‟ and the „progressives‟, the party undertook an extraordinary general meeting, which took a further step towards the complete rectification of the party assembly along progressive lines, furthered

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with yet another change in the party‟s CEC on December 25. What caused the change? While the CHP was founded by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in 1923 as the political flagship of Kemalist ideology, it has undergone several periods of transformation through its history. Most notable of these changes was Ataturk‟s successor Ismet Inonu‟s attempts in reformulating CHP as a center-left party and Inonu‟s successor Bulent Ecevit‟s further expansion of this definition into the discourse of „Kemalist social-democratic party of the disaffected‟ from 1973 until the military coup in 1980. After the closure of all political parties following the 1980 military junta, CHP leadership that had sympathized with Ecevit‟s idea of a center-left social-democracy had established two separate parties that had later merged into the Social-Democratic People‟s Party (SDPP) in 1985; perhaps not surprisingly, led by Ismet Inonu‟s son, Erdal Inonu. However, CHP had re-emerged in 1992 under the leadership of Deniz Baykal and had merged with the SDPP; yet, Baykal‟s reformulation of the CHP had less to do with Bulent Ecevit‟s social-democracy and more to do with the CHP‟s transformative-secularist wartime identity of the 1920s. Under Deniz Baykal, CHP‟s

Political Reflection | June-July-August 2011

Turkey’s New Secular Leadership| By Akın Ünver

main agenda changed into actively polarizing the electorate along „secular vs. Islamist‟ lines and thereby monopolizing the „secularist‟ votes. Especially after the election of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and its skill in attracting the disaffectedunderprivileged electorate led the CHP to be widely perceived as an elitist party; especially through the first half of the AKP‟s tenure, voting behavior became a class issue in Turkey.

Although CHP‟s votes had increased, it did not cover the fact that it had been consistently losing elections. The old CHP leadership was becoming increasingly unpopular among the electorate because of this performance, and when it was in the opposition, it seemed unable to pose a serious check and balance against the ruling AKP. Furthermore, the „old guard‟ was perceived to be stifling the party of young blood, thus turning away younger secularists who turned either to apathy or even voted for AKP. Therefore, both the voters and the party membership demanded a structural change and fresh blood to take over the party leadership.

It was this polarizing and elitist discourse of the CHP that had alienated the electorate in general, which caused Baykal and his old comrades-in-arms to grow increasingly unpopular vis-a-vis the AKP. Gradually the mocking term „CHP-style opposition‟ What do the „new secularists‟ offer? became the dominant and predictable characteristic of Baykal-era opposition politics, which basically Kemal Kilicdaroglu‟s election can be regarded as implied arguing the exact opposite of what the AKP the yearning of the CHP supporters for the 1970s‟ proposed, regardless of what the policy offered. Ecevit social-democracy, during which the party had This in turn, rendered Baykal‟s CHP to be a „nonsealed its only two election victories since 1950. To functionally ideological‟ party, aiming to highlight its that end, Kilicdaroglu‟s first move was to eliminate ideology as a tool of electothe „old guard‟ from the ral polarization, damaging Central Executive Commit“It was this polarizing and elitist its credibility as a policytee and Party Assembly, as formulating party in the long well as to change the party discourse of the CHP that had run. As a result, the CHP program and bylaws – albeit alienated the electorate in general, failed to win any elections with great controversy and since its re-emergence in difficulty. Second, Kilicdawhich caused Baykal and his old 1995, adding to the alienaroglu adopted a new makecomrades-in-arms to grow tion and frustration of the over, making some recent party supporters. Since forpublic appearances with the increasingly unpopular mer chairman Deniz Baykal distinguishable hat and blue vis-a-vis the AKP.” and his comrades-in-arms shirt, characteristically worn took over the leadership in by Ecevit in the 1970s, as a 1992, CHP consistently lost general and local elecclear signal of the future direction the party is heations and remained in the opposition (in the 1999 ded towards. elections it couldn‟t even get into the parliament). While the CHP could barely pass the 10% threshold Ideologically, the most striking feature of the new through the 1990s crowded political scene, singleparty assembly is the absence of „old Kemalists‟ – party government of the AKP forced the old leaderthose that define Kemalism as it was formulated ship to re-construct their agenda around the disduring the early republican wartime period, which course of a resistance against political Islam, thereemphasized rigidly secularist-nationalist modernizaby adopting the policy of active polarization of the tion over democratization and representation. More electorate along „secular versus Islamist‟ lines and specifically, this implied the construction of the increasing its votes considerably as a result. In „citizen‟ along an early-20th century Franco-German 2002 and 2007 general elections, CHP had remodel in which social and political influence of reliceived 19.39% and 20.88% of the votes respectivegion was minimized and an overarching ethnoly, while in the local elections of 2004 and 2009, it linguistic identity would constitutionally and legally got 18.38% and 23.11% respectively; latter being override other ethno-linguistic and religious identithe highest percentage of vote Baykal leadership ties. ever received. Nonetheless, such increase in votes was hardly due to CHP‟s increasing electoral cam34 members of the old party assembly were not paign performance, but rather a result of a much included in the election list and another 12 of the old less crowded political scene with three main parties. members included in the list were not elected,

Political Reflection | June-July-August 2011

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Turkey’s New Secular Leadership| By Akın Ünver

“Another important aspect of the new CHP party assembly is a distinct lack of nationalist hard-liners…”

meaning that 46 out of 80 members (more than half) of the old assembly, that were associated with old Kemalism were taken out. These include very influential and symbolic figures that became almost synonymous with the old CHP, such as Onder Sav, Sahin Mengu and Oya Arasli – Onder Sav for example, was a protégée of Ismet Inonu himself. Although many of them can be regarded as „Kemalists‟, 34 members retained from the old party assembly can be seen closer to the 1970s CHP led by Bulent Ecevit, who had attempted to reconstruct the party‟s image as a „social-democrat alternative for the disaffected‟. Therefore, much of the 34 retained members (at least in terms of image) were intra-party opposition to the „old Kemalists‟ and had sympathized more with the 1970s‟ „center-left‟ image of the party. 10 of the 46 new members of the party assembly come from social-democratic activism, either by playing an active role at the political level, or as leaders of labor unions and associations. On the other hand, inclusion of more socialdemocrats into the party assembly seems to be balanced by 11 pro-business figures that come from a background of international trade, industry and private enterprise. Another important aspect of the new CHP party assembly is a distinct lack of nationalist hard-liners; only 3 party members (Suheyl Batum, Nuran Yildiz and Mehmet Farac) are known to be such. While Suheyl Batum was in the CEC as the vice-chairman after the first party revision, he was later demoted to the position of „director of electoral and legal affairs‟ and was replaced by a social-democrat Gursel Tekin after the revision of December 25, 2010. Individually, some of the higher-profile members of the new party assembly (that are also in the party‟s Central Executive Committee) give a clearer perspective on CHP‟s main agenda. Binnaz Toprak for example, a professor of sociology, was the director

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of a high-profile 2006 TESEV public opinion study, which had demonstrated that Islamist reactionism was not a real threat in Turkey (only 8% of the respondents had demanded a Sharia law in Turkey and the study had marked a 9% decrease in women using headscarf) but she had nonetheless observed a pattern of „neighborhood pressure‟ (a term coined earlier by another Turkish sociologist, Prof. Serif Mardin) that explained increasing grassroots conservatization of the Turkish society. While Prof. Toprak had previously declared her support for the AKP‟s social policy, she had also explicitly conveyed that she was „worried‟ not because that the „AKP would render Turkey more Islamist‟, but because under the AKP, opposition and dissent was becoming increasingly marginalized and „otherized‟, causing problems for the level of democracy in Turkey. Prof. Toprak‟s involvement in the CHP can be interpreted as the party‟s attempt in re-defining its secularist opposition, away from a polarizing/fearbased discourse into a more rational interpretation emphasizing the quality and practice of democratization. Another symbolic figure in the new party assembly is Sezgin Tanrikulu, a Kurdish rights advocate and a lawyer, who had sued the Turkish state at the European Court of Human Rights for the malpractice of the security forces during an intervention to the 1996 Diyarbakir prison revolt, which resulted with the death of 10 Kurdish inmates and had managed to win a compensation for the relatives of the deceased. Tanrikulu‟s involvement in the party assembly can be interpreted as CHP‟s departure from its statist position with regard to the Kurdish question and adopt a more human rights based perspective on the matter. Furthermore, Tanrikulu is known for his support for the „Ergenekon‟ legal case; in an interview to Turkish daily Taraf, he had defined the case as a “struggle for democracy” – a 180-degree opposite view to the general consensus within the old CHP. Another notable figure in the new party assembly is Dr. Faruk Logoglu, (not in the party CEC) a prominent diplomat served as the Ambassador of Turkey in Washington DC from 2001 to 2005. Having been re-arranged in December 2010, the new composition of the Central Executive Committee on the other hand, can be interpreted as a further purge of the old guard and their replacement by younger, comparatively more social-democrat leaning and libertarian figures. Indeed, some influential members of the new CEC, such as Gursel Tekin (considered by many as the „second man‟ of the new CHP – replacing Onder Sav; the party‟s

Political Reflection | June-July-August 2011

Turkey’s New Secular Leadership| By Akın Ünver

longest serving vice-chairman), Sezgin Tanrikulu (human rights advocate) and Izzet Cetin (workers‟ unions and syndicates leader) come from a background of active involvement in social-democratic politics and associations. Inclusion of such former social-democrat activists into the highest echelons of the party decision-making at the expense of the older members, (generally accused of being „political elitists‟) the new leadership seems to be prioritizing on connecting the party with the disaffected segments of the population; rural electorate and the blue-collar workforce that have been throwing their lot in with the ruling AKP since 2002. The new CEC consists of 17 members, of which only 4 are parliament members. In the new CEC, economic planning was transferred to a former Undersecretary of Treasury, Faik Oztrak, whereas Osman Koruturk, a retired senior diplomat and formerly the special envoy to Iraq, was appointed in charge of foreign policy planning. Only one member of the old CEC, Erdogan Toprak was retained as the press and public relations director of the party.

monthly payment will be transferred to the bank account of what CHP defines as the “family member who knows the needs of the family best”; which will be a female member of the household. This way, the new CHP aims to give poor households a chance to spend based on their real needs; a criticism of the AKP‟s policies of distributing certain freebies before the elections. All aid will be transferred through the state-agency „family insurance fund‟. A further extension of this initiative is a specific program directed towards the economic amelioration of the predominantly Kurdish areas of the south-east, in a program called the „regional development and democracy‟ project. Within the general framework of CHP‟s civil society initiatives, some of its main priorities are listed as:

While this change is interpreted by some as the social-democratization of the CHP leadership by coming down off its „high horse‟, critics argue that the new leadership has become more „technocratic‟; especially in the party assembly. Such critics point to the overwhelming majority of experts, academics and specialists within the new party leadership, which makes the party look more like a European Commission experts‟ panel, rather than a representative political party; a configuration that may render RPP unable to connect with the society at large.

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New CHP‟s aims and support

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Ending the civil-society‟s dependence on government funds Introducing a law that will facilitate the participation of civil-society leaders in democratic decision-making processes Eliminating bureaucratic hurdles against the freedom to establish associations, also introducing tax exemption to civil-society organizations Introducing courses in schools, teaching and promoting civil-society and organizations Encouraging female participation and promoting affirmative action in civil-society participation

Also, the new CHP leadership wasted no time to prepare a draft new Constitution, whose 26 articles were amended as a result of the public referendum that had taken place in September 2010. Rather than directly challenging the AKP‟s plans for a new Constitution, CHP‟s then vice-chairman Suheyl Batum had indicated that CHP would only “offer guidance” to the AKP, emphasizing that the preparation of a new Constitution should be a non-partisan issue, necessitating the cooperation of all political parties.

Concrete manifestations of the new CHP‟s policy outlook came in a series of public initiatives. The first of these initiatives is a welfare program called the „family insurance‟, which, according to Kemal Kilicdaroglu is “one of the most important projects” of the new CHP. According to the plan, which was introduced on March 8, party volunteers will prepare a „national poverty inventory‟ through a door-byHigh initial support, recently wavering door survey, making a list of the households that are Although the new leader“...critics argue that the new in real need. Those houseship had met with support holds with an income of initially, this support seems leadership has become more less than minimum wage to be wavering more recent„technocratic‟; especially in will be assigned a monthly ly, as the electorate is beaid on par with the minithe party assembly.” ginning to expect more conmum wage – and this crete policy positions from

Political Reflection | June-July-August 2011

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Turkey’s New Secular Leadership| By Akın Ünver

of trust towards CHP‟s ability to solve the Kurdish problem and the headscarf controversy; 71.9% of the respondents stated that „Kilicdaroglu cannot resolve the Kurdish question‟ – 62.8% had conveyed their belief that he will not be able to resolve the headscarf issue in a survey conducted by the same group in May 2010.

“CHP‟s new leadership change can be seen as the manifestation of the party‟s understanding that discourses of social engineering end up creating resentment in a democratic political system.” the party. Public opinion surveys conducted right after the election of Kemal Kilicdaroglu to chairmanship initially showed that this leadership change was well-received. In a poll conducted by the Istanbulbased polling organization SONAR, in May 30, 2010, CHP emerged as the most popular political party by 32.48%, followed by the ruling AKP, which got 31.09% of the respondents‟ vote. This poll was particularly important, because right after the leadership change, CHP had emerged as the most popular party in any poll for the first time since 2002. In another poll, conducted by MetroPoll in May 2010, 52.3% of the respondents claimed that the leadership change benefited the CHP, while in another question, 63.6% of the respondents declared their support for the change in CHP leadership and their replacement with new figures. Among those that had claimed they have never voted for the CHP, 22.5% stated that they would vote for the CHP for the first time, after the election of Kemal Kilicdaroglu as the chairman. However, due to an increasing politicization of newly emerging polling organizations and polls themselves, such figures need to be analyzed in comparison to other polls in different polling periods. For example, another survey in July 2010, this time conducted by Andy-Ar, yielded less flattering results for CHP (26.8%), which trailed the AKP at 41.9%. Furthermore, support for the new CHP leadership seems to be wavering as time goes by and the party elite seems to be lacking consensus on two of the most pressing policy issues facing Turkey 6 months prior to the general elections: the Kurdish question and the headscarf debate. This electoral perception gained more ground as Kilicdaroglu keeps avoiding making statements on the party‟s position with regard to these two questions in his party rally speeches and press releases. In a more recent MetroPoll December 2010 survey, the ruling AKP emerged as the most popular party by 37.3%, while the CHP followed by 30.1%. Furthermore, while 41.3% of the respondents defined Kilicdaroglu as a „more successful leader than Deniz Baykal‟, respondents of the same survey expressed their lack

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What can the new leadership do? The changes CHP has been going through since May 2010, may be interpreted by some as an „intraparty revolution‟ by the pragmatist-progressives against the more ideological old guard. However, although CHP‟s long presence in the opposition has been characterized as a leadership problem, according to the critics, CHP‟s main problem is its inability to go through a structural identity shift and to locate itself on a democratic political continuum. Debates on the „secularist change‟ must understand that the party was not established as an „ordinary political party‟, but rather as a political tool of a socially tranformative-reformist mentality, which traces its intellectual roots deep into the late-18th century Ottoman Empire. Therefore, the CHP never saw itself as a standard political party functioning in a democratic political system, but rather as an extension of a „sacred social mission‟. CHP‟s new leadership change can be seen as the manifestation of the party‟s understanding that discourses of social engineering end up creating resentment in a democratic political system. To that end, Kilicdaroglu in person appears to understand why exactly CHP has to change away from a „party of coercive modernization‟; at least so far his actions and speeches point towards this direction. However, some segments of the party‟s membership and the electorate still see CHP as a transcendental political presence and the continuity of a long reformist tradition. Furthermore, Kilicdaroglu seems to be purposefully avoiding making references to two of Turkey‟s deepest identity problems in his speeches; the Kurdish question and the headscarf problem. Therefore, it remains to be seen whether the CHP can re-define itself ideologically within a democratic political system, its outlook towards the Kurdish and the headscarf questions and how successfully Kilicdaroglu can rally party members and the electorate around this new identity. Note: * Dr. Unver is the Ertegun Lecturer of Modern Turkish Studies at the Department of Near Eastern Studies, Princeton University.

Political Reflection | June-July-August 2011

COMMENTARY

Reintegrating the Taliban after the Death of Osama bin Laden

sama bin Laden, al-Qaeda leader, was killed by US forces in Abbottabad, near Islamabad, Pakistan on 2nd May 2011. Nearly 10 years after the 9/11 terrorist attacks coordinated by al-Qaeda, this was “the most significant achievement to date” in the war against terror as pointed out by the US President Barack Obama [1]. There has been worldwide jubilation, particularly in the US and Secretary-General of the UN, Ban Ki-moon expressed his delight as follows: „Personally, I am very much relieved by the news that justice has been done to such a mastermind of international terrorism. I would like to commend the work and the determined and principled commitment of many people in the world who have been struggling to eradicate international terrorism.[2]‟ Since his death there has also been worldwide media frenzy and speculation about the way the operation was undertaken, how he was killed and whether or not his body was disposed in the ocean. There are also a series of

Political Reflection | June-July-August 2011

By Prof. Alpaslan Özerdem*

questions about the possible implications of his death on a number of global security issues such as possible immediate revenge attacks by al-Qaeda against Western targets around the world; the future of al-Qaeda and whether or not it would continue to pose a security threat to the West; the withdrawal date of Western forces from Afghanistan; and the links and future of cooperation between the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan. It is in such a context that the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme (APRP) Review Conference took place in Kabul on 10-11th 2011. The significance of this conference is that in postOsama bin Laden Afghanistan; the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of the Taliban that the APRP aims to achieve will now have a stronger message for what it represents for the future of peace in the country. The APRP was initiated by the consultative Peace Jirga in July 2010, and its main objective is to create reintegration opportuni-

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Reintegrating the Taliban | By Alpaslan Özerdem

ties for those Taliban members if and when they Peace Committees in 28 provinces; a comprehensidecide to stop fighting and return home. However, ve outreach campaign to involve various groups as pointed out in my Afghanistan article in one of from Ulemas, influential persons, women and youth the previous issues of Political Reflection, the groups to community leaders; a stronger level of APRP is based on a number of major assumptions coordination among security ministries (i.e. Defensuch as the willingness of the Taliban to stop fighce, Interior) and line ministries (i.e. Agriculture, Pubting in return of an amnesty and financial reintegralic Works, Rural Rehabilitation, Labour, etc.); and tion benefits. The argument used by the internatiofinally wider community mobilisation through an nal community to explain why it is possible to attract improved level of trust between people and governsome elements of the Taliban in such a reintegrament. Overall, the programme has so far demobilition process is to some extent, quite sound. It is sed 1,100 Taliban members and negotiations with argued that within the Taliban there are a number of nearly other 2,000 combatants of different ranking sub-groups such as those „ideological‟, are ongoing. However, as pointed out in the backg„opportunistic‟, „criminal‟, „poor‟ and „vulnerable‟ Taround document of the APRP Review Conference, liban. For the APRP, the approach to the ideological the „programme execution has been slow as comgroup which is formed by the Taliban high compared to the urgency of the needs of the provinces mand and those combatants fighting for jihad and and communities, especially in areas where reintegother identity related issues, ration has intensified in recent will be centred on political months.‟ Therefore, the Renegotiations and grievance view Conference that was at“The impact of Osama bin resolution, while the APRP tended by all major donor coconsiders the livelihoods geuntries which so far disbursed Laden‟s death on the Taliban neration type programmes as $ 133 million (i.e. Japan, UK, and Afghanistan will be seen its main approach for the otUS, Denmark, Finland, Austraher Taliban sub-groups. It is lia, UAE) and various organiover the next few months, but expected that even political sations working on APRP what is already evident is negotiations may take a while (UNDP, USAID, IOM, World to settle and complete, in the Bank, ISAF, etc.) and a numwhat the APRP has so far short-to-medium term there ber of Ministers, Governors, achieved since its inception would be a real chance to and representatives of other almost a year ago.” convince other Taliban gronational authorities, aimed to ups to give up their weapons identify key challenges and for financial incentives. The programmatic shortcomings. APRP also argues that most of the Taliban members are Considering that it was afterall actually home based and a donor conference, the distheir participation into fighting is almost like seasocussions and dialogue between the central and pronal employment. Therefore, the tangible peace divivincial representatives were considerably candid dends would likely to be a significant enticement for and open. A number of issues that emerged from them. In fact, regardless of whether they are homethese discussions can be summarised as follows. based or not or they would need a political approFirst of all, the High Peace Council that has the full ach rather than a more humanitarian and developresponsibility for the peace process in the country ment based assistance, the death of Osama bin and headed by Professor Rabbani, dedicated its Laden may still have a significant impact on all of efforts to re-assure the donor community, particuthese possibilities, as it is expected that the relatilarly the US that the APRP process and negotiationship between al-Qaeda and the Taliban is likely ons with the Taliban does not mean readiness to to change and possibly weaken in coming days. sacrifice all has been achieved so far in terms of human, civic and women rights in the country. RabThe impact of Osama bin Laden‟s death on the Talibani defined the approach as the Afghan governban and Afghanistan will be seen over the next few ment‟s „flexibility for its own people‟ rather than a months, but what is already evident is what the weakness towards the Taliban. He identified the APRP has so far achieved since its inception alAPRP as a way of dealing with the root causes of most a year ago. The Joint Secretariat for APRP the Taliban‟s insurgency, and he stated that „if nelists them as follows: the establishment of Provincial gotiations are what required for peace then it needs

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Political Reflection | June-July-August 2011

Reintegrating the Taliban | By Alpaslan Özerdem

to be done for the people of Afghanistan‟. Furthermore, according to Rabbani, the death of Osama bin Laden gives a new hope for peace in the entire region and the APRP and negotiations with the Taliban are particularly timely now.

ught that the APRP could turn into more broken promises. The Governor of Faryab‟s criticism was even more striking for the future of APRP. He pointed out that those who went through the APRP process so far „had no positive experience and shared these experiences with others‟, discouraging them from participating in the process. Overall, the donor community and Joint Secretariat of APRP had a „reality check‟, as rightly pointed out by Michael Keating, Deputy Special Representative of SecretaryGeneral of the UN Mission in Afghanistan.

The second prominent issue in the discussions underlined an intractable problem of Afghanistan, which is the divide between the capital, Kabul, and the provinces. In other words, the way that the provinces feel left out by the central government emerged as a significant issue from those comments made by almost all provincial governors attended to the conference. For example, the Governor of Kunduz complai...the Governor of Kunduz ned that the reaction by complained that the reaction Kabul to a world event by Kabul to a world event such such as the recent tsunami in Japan would be alas the recent tsunami in Japan most instantaneous, but a would be almost instantaneous, but a crisis in a province in Afghanistan might go on crisis in a province in Afghanistan for four months before the might go on for four months before the Afghan government knows about it or undersAfghan government knows about it or tands it!

“

understands it!”

The third issue that was again pointed out by provincial governors was the way the APRP initiatives would need to deal with real problems of the rural population. The Governor of Badghis identified them for his province as security, reconstruction and tribal unity. His people were suffering in the hands of ideological Taliban, drug smugglers, and poorly trained and uncoordinated security forces, but more importantly he prioritised the provision of clean and safe water, electricity and accessible road infrastructure as what the people of Badghis would really need in terms of peace dividends. The Governor of Uruzgan also described the security needs from a much wider perspective, including the need for livelihoods, social justice and basic services. Fourthly, the governors from various provinces complained that for a number of years now they have been making many promises as to what would be described as potential peace dividends such as the above mentioned infrastructure provisions and employment opportunities. However, they said that they knew they could not keep them as they tho-

Political Reflection | June-July-August 2011

Overall, the discussions at this donor conference pointed out that for the APRP to be successful a number of prerequisites should be ensured: first, solutions for sustainable reintegration need to be tailor-made to the needs of people and utilise all possible opportunities to liaise with communities; second, there should be a clear and effective dissemination of information on APRP, particularly in inaccessible, rural areas; third, with vocational training courses it is important remember that such opportunities cannot manufacture jobs so building skills set should be undertaken in line with market demand – giving particularly priority to construction and cash crop agriculture sectors; enable the meaningful participation of youth and women in all aspects of APRP initiatives; fourth, engage religious and spiritual leaders such as the Ulema of districts; and finally, it is critical that both civil society and the media play a key role in the implementation of programmes as effective community mobilisation will be one of the most critical aspects in the successful implementation of APRP. Notes: * Alpaslan Özerdem is Professor of Peacebuilding at Coventry University. 1) http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada13256676 2) http://unama.unmissions.org/Default.aspx? tabid=1741&ctl=Details&mid=1882&ItemID=13422

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JOURNAL OF

CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION AND SECURITY Peer-reviewed Academic journal By CESRAN (Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis) www.cesran.org/jcts

he Journal of Conflict Transformation and Security (JCTS) provides a platform to analyse conflict transformation as the processes for managing

change in a non-violent way to produce equitable outcomes for all parties that are sustainable. SecuEditor-in-Chief Prof. Alpaslan Ozerdem, Coventry University, UK Managing Editor Dr. Rebecca Roberts, Coventry University, UK Assistant Editors

rity is understood as encapsulating a wide range of human security concerns that can be tackled by both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ measures. Therefore, the Journal’s scope not only covers such security sector reform issues as restructuring security apparatus,

Mr. Richard Slade, Coventry University, UK

reintegration of ex-combatants, clearance of explo-

Mr. Husrev Tabak, UCL, UK

sive remnants of war and cross-border manage-

Book Review Editor

ment, but also the protection of human rights, jus-

Ms. Sukanya Podder, University of York, UK

tice, rule of law and governance.

Editorial Board Prof. the Baroness Haleh Afshar, University of York, UK | Prof. Bruce Baker, Coventry University, UK | Dr Richard Bowd, UNDP, Nepal | Prof. Ntuda Ebode, University of Yaounde II, Cameroon | Prof. Scott Gates, PRIO, Norway | Dr Antonio Giustozzi, London School of Economics, UK | Dr Cathy Gormley-Heenan, University of Ulster, UK | Prof. Paul Gready, University of York, UK | Prof. Fen Hampson, Carleton University, Canada | Prof. Mohammed Hamza, Lund University, Sweden | Prof. Alice Hills, University of Leeds | Dr Maria Holt, University of Westminster, UK | Prof. Alan Hunter , Coventry University, UK | Dr Tim Jacoby, University of Manchester, UK | Dr Khalid Khoser, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Switzerland | Dr William Lume, South Bank University, UK | Dr Roger Mac Ginty, St Andrews' University, UK | Mr Rae Mac Grath, Save the Children UK Somalia | Prof. Mansoob Murshed, ISS, The Netherlands | Dr Wale Osofisan, Help Age International, UK | Dr Mark Pelling, King's College, UK | Prof. Mike Pugh, University of Bradford, UK | Mr Gianni Rufini, Freelance Consultant, Italy | Dr Mark Sedra, Centre for Int. Governance Innovation, Canada | Dr Emanuele Sommario, Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna, Italy | Dr Hans Skotte, Trondheim University, Norway | Dr Arne Strand, CMI, Norway | Dr Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, University of Po, France | Dr. Mandy Turner, University of Bradford, UK | Prof. Roger Zetter, University of Oxford, UK

JOURNAL OF CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION AND SECURITY (JCTS)

Call For Contributions

Journal of Conflict Transformation and Security (JCTS) is for academics, policy makers and practitioners to engage in discussions on a wide range of peace, conflict and human security related issues in a multidisciplinary forum with contributions from political science, security studies, international relations, development studies, post-conflict reconstruction studies, economics, sociology, international law, political history, and human geography. As an international refereed e-journal, edited by a group of acclaimed scholars indicated in the Editorial Board, the Journal of Conflict Transformation and Security is published at its own website http:// www.cesran.org/jcts. It welcomes submissions of articles from related persons involved in the scope of the journal as well as summary reports of conferences and lecture series held in the social sciences. Submissions in comparative analysis, with case studies and empirical research are particularly encouraged. Prospective authors should submit 5.000-10.000 word articles for consideration in Microsoft Wordcompatible format. For more complete descriptions and submission instructions, please access the Editorial Guidelines and Style Guidelines pages at the CESRAN website: http://www.cesran.org/jcts. Contributors are urged to read CESRAN’s author guidelines and style guidelines carefully before submitting articles. Articles submissions should be sent in electronic format to: Prof. Alpaslan ÖZERDEM - Editor-in-Chief - alpozerdem@cesran.org Publication date:

Spring issue — April Autumn issue — October

INTERVIEW

Interview with

Prof. Gerd Nonneman* By Rahman DaÄ&#x;**

irst of all, I think, the reason of Arab uprising should be questioned. From your point of view, what is the fundamental reason for Arab insurgency from Morocco to Bahrain? Is it only because of the worse social and economic condition of local people or is there something more?

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Political Reflection | June-July-August 2011

Prof. Gerd Nonneman

Gerd Nonneman: There is no question at all in my mind that the causes are a combination of grievances, first, over poor economic conditions, second, over the lack of human dignity and room for expression that came with authoritarian regimes, and third, the extent of corruption and misallocation of resources that those same regimes were responsible for. Three key things enabled it to happen. The first was a spark that had to be struck and reported on: the suicide of the Tunisian market seller became that spark. The second was the widespread availability of communications networks, both internal and external. Internally, such things as Facebook were important; externally, the key role was initially played by Al-Jazeera, and this was built upon by other Arab and international networks. The third was the wil-

Interview with Gerd Nonneman | By Rahman Dağ

lingness of traditional external supporters of these governments to criticise and then drop them. Any ideas that these events might have been somehow caused by external forces or conspiracies, are without foundation, even if some may afterwards have tried to make the most of the events. It seems that Bahrain and Libya is occupying a central place on the discussion on Arab insurgency and its causes and possible effect on the Middle East. What do you think about what makes them so special? Is it because of the level of violence in these countries or there is something more political concern on them? Gerd Nonneman: Bahrain and Libya are not the only ones at the centre of attention: so are Syria and Yemen. The reason is fairly obvious: they're the cases that have most recently featured serious violence and may put into question the wider success of the Arab Spring. There are also serious wider security questions raised by all these cases: in Bahrain because of the impact on the GCC states and the country's role as a US base; in Yemen because of the fear of state collapse; in Libya because of the effect on Egypt and Tunisia as well as on immigration to Europe; and in Syria because of the impact on Lebanon and the Arab-Israeli theatre. In terms of Bahrain, there is a common debate as to being a centre of cold war between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Do you think that the only problematic issue is the rule of Sunni government over majority Shiite population? Is not there a global perspective on this issue? For instance, power struggle between Iran and the USA in the region?

“The geopolitical landscape is certainly shifting to some extent, and relations between Western states and many in the Middle East - whether reformers or non-reformers - will be affected, albeit not in any drastic way.”

Gerd Nonneman: Clearly Bahrain does play a role in both these cold wars, but the Saudi and US reactions have nevertheless been different. Saudi Arabia simply wasn't willing to accept any apparent challenge to monarchy or even the least hint of Iranian influence. Hence the hardline reaction. This clashed with the US, which did want to see genuine reform in Bahrain, both because they do not believe that Iran was behind the upheaval, and because they felt it was the best way to avoid medium term instability. The difficulty for the US, of course, was that in this case Bahrain also is a hard-to-replace base for regional and even wider operations, including for repairs etc. Also, there is a realisation that a majority of the Sunni population probably do not share the agenda of the protesters, so it is not a clear-cut regimes versus the people scenario. For both these reasons, US and Western condemnation of Bahrain have been more restrained than in other cases. It might come to you really strange but if somebody asked you about possible emergence of religiously conservative and democratic Middle Eastern powers against the conservative and democratic Western powers what would your answer be? One of them is originally coming from the Islamic civilization and the other one from Christian civilization. Gerd Nonneman: The geopolitical landscape is certainly shifting to some extent, and relations between Western states and many in the Middle East, whether reformers or non-reformers, will be affected, albeit not in any drastic

Political Reflection | June-July-August 2011

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Interview with Gerd Nonneman | By Rahman DaÄ&#x;

way. The reformers , whether or not Islamist movements gain a measure of power, will be more willing to challenge Western policies or preferences that don't fit their own preferences. Pro-Western non-reformers will treat the West with less deference too, but in this case because they will see them as less of a reliable partner than in the past. But that does not mean that previously pro-Western states will simply turn around: basically positive relations will remain in existence, even if they will be attenuated and less 'taken for granted.' However, it is by no means so very likely that one would get a united 'conservative' Islamist style of government in any of these states. As you know, as soon as an insurgency erupted in an Arab country, the main concern of some countries in the Middle East and the western counties commences to articulate a danger of that political Islam or radical Islamic groups would take the power in these countries. Do you agree with this concern or not? Could you please explain why? Gerd Nonneman: While it is likely that Islamist groups and parties of different types will get a greater role in politics and government, I do not think that this is a serious reason for concern for the outside world, nor that a coherent Islamist 'control' of government is at all likely. None of them played a significant role in the Arab Spring, the agendas were set elsewhere, they are for the most part willing to play the political game, and they are in any case not united internally. Paranoia about Islamist take-overs, and policies based on such fears, are the one thing that can produce self-fulfilling prophecies in this regard. Continuation of apprising within the Arab World led some scholars to think about the changes in political map in the Middle East. Do you think it is possible after nearly a hundred years experience of current borders? And what might be possible result of these discussions for several states whose artificialities are still the subject of many academic works? Gerd Nonneman: If you mean changing borders or new states, I do not believe this is at all likely. Adjustments in levels of autonomy is a possibility, as is the way border issues are treated, for instance the new Egyptian attitude to the Gaza border. But there is no appetite for major changes to the map, either locally or internationally. Do you have a belief that all these uprisings or insurgencies or whatever it can be called would bring democracy to the Middle Eastern states? As it is known that most of the Arab states are still ruled by authoritarian monarchs or dictators and these states mostly have good relations with the Western powers which on the contrary advocates democracy. If their democratization is completed or they become more or less democratic states, do you think that the relationships between the Middle Eastern and the Western states would change? If you do, in which ways, positive or negative? Gerd Nonneman: I do think varieties of 'democracy or let us call it 'pluralist, participatory and accountable politics' are likely to emerge, although the process is likely to be in fits and starts and may take a long time to see full frui-

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â&#x20AC;&#x153;Pro-Western non-reformers will treat the West with less deference too, but in this case because they will see them as less of a reliable partner than in the past.â&#x20AC;?

Political Reflection | June-July-August 2011

Interview with Gerd Nonneman | By Rahman Dağ

tion. For the remainder of this question I would point to my previous answer to preceding question. I would like to just add: in many ways it may end up being more, not less, comfortable for many Western democracies to deal with these countries: the need to deal with them positively even though they were autocracies was always something of an embarrassment. Of course it may mean having to become more accepting of local perceptions over issues such as Palestine, but that will in the end be a positive, for instance, it is likely to cause hand-wringing mainly in the US, The Netherlands and Germany, not so much elsewhere. What do you think are/can be the implications of uprisings in the Middle East for oil prices and the economies of Middle eastern countries? Gerd Nonneman: For oil prices, I think very little indeed. Policies have been driven mainly by interest and the market, even under Saddam or Qaddhafi. Temporarily, of course, some disruption or nervousness may cause price rises, but that will settle. All emerging governments will be equally interested in maintaining long-term oil markets. On the domestic economies, though, there may be an effect. In the short term, of course, again disruption is already occurring. But in the medium and longer term, more legitimate and less kleprocratic regimes can only be good for the economy. What do you think about the possibility of an economic integration among countries in the region after the regime change in some of the countries? Gerd Nonneman: I doubt that very much, just as has never happened in the past under a variety of regimes. The state, and locally-defined identities and interests, have, if anything, grown even stronger. And of course the thing is that one will oin some ways have another strong division, between more democratic regimes and the remaining autocracies. It is worth noting in any case that the most advanced kind of economic integration thus far has taken place among the autocratic monarchies of the GCC.

“Policies have been driven mainly by interest and the market, even under Saddam or Qaddhafi. Temporarily, of course, some disruption or nervousness may cause price rises, but that will settle.”

As you know that in the 1973 war with Israel, Arab states used the oil power against industrial Western powers. Do you think whole of the revolts in the Middle East could result in an unintentional oil crisis in the world? In other words, what result will the revolts bring to the world in the realm of political economy? Gerd Nonneman: No, I don't think there will result an oil crisis - other than short-term spikes due to uncertainty. The rest of the asnwer would be almost the same with the second previous question but it can be generally said that there certainly won't-would not be a new edition of the oil weapon. Notes: * Prof. Gerd Nonneman is Associate Fellow in Middle East and North Africa Programme at Chatham House. ** Rahman Dağ is Doctoral Researcher at the University of Exeter.

Political Reflection | June-July-August 2011

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GLOBAL ANALYSIS Editor-in-Chief: Ozgur TUFEKCI King‟s College London, UK Managing Editor: Husrev TABAK University College London, UK Book Review Editor: Kadri Kaan RENDA King‟s College London, UK Associate Editors: Emel AKCALI, Dr. Central European University, Hungary Mitat CELIKPALA, Assoc.Prof. Kadir Has University, Turkey Bayram GUNGOR, Prof. Karadeniz Technical University, Turkey Editorial Board: Sener AKTURK, Dr. Harvard University, USA | William BAIN, Dr. Aberystwyth University, UK |Alexander BELLAMY, Prof. University of Queensland, Australia | Richard BELLAMY, Prof. University College London, UK | Andreas BIELER, Prof. University of Nottingham, UK | Pınar BILGIN, Assoc. Prof. Bilkent University, Turkey | Ken BOOTH, Prof. Aberystwyth University, UK | Stephen CHAN, Prof. SOAS, University of London, UK | Nazli CHOUCRI, Prof. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA | John M. DUNN, Prof. University of Cambridge, UK | Kevin DUNN, Prof. Hobart and William Smith Colleges, USA | Mine EDER, Prof. Bogazici University, Turkey | Ertan EFEGIL, Assoc. Prof. Sakarya University, Turkey | Ayla GOL, Dr. Aberystwyth University, UK | Stefano GUZZINI, Prof. Uppsala Universitet, Sweden | Elif Ince HAFALIR, Assist. Prof. Carnegie Mellon University, USA | David HELD, Prof. London School of Economics, LSE, UK | Raymond HINNEBUSCH, Prof. University of St Andrews, UK | Naim KAPUCU, Assoc. Prof. University of Central Florida, USA | Fahri KARAKAYA, Prof. University of Massachusetts Dartmouth, USA | Abdulhamit KIRMIZI, Dr. SOAS, University of London, UK | Cécile LABORDE, Prof. University College London, UK | Ziya ONIS, Prof. Koc University, Turkey | Alp OZERDEM, Prof. Coventry University, UK | Oliver RICHMOND, Prof. University of St Andrews, UK | Ian TAYLOR, Prof. University of St Andrews, UK | Murat TUMAY, Dr. Selcuk University, Turkey | Talat ULUSSEVER, Assist. Prof. King Fahd University, Saudi Arabia | Ali WATSON, Prof. University of St Andrews, UK | Stefan WOLFF, Prof. University of Birmingham, UK | Hakan YILMAZKUDAY, Assist. Prof. Temple University, USA | International Advisory Board: Yasemin AKBABA, Assist. Prof. Gettysburg College, USA | Mustafa AYDIN, Prof. Kadir Has University, Turkey | Ian BACHE, Prof. University of Sheffield, UK | Mark BASSIN, Prof. University of Birmingham, UK | Mehmet DEMIRBAG, Prof. University of Sheffield, UK | Can ERBIL, Assist. Prof. Brandeis University, USA | Stephen Van EVERA, Prof. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA | John GLASSFORD, Assoc. Prof. Angelo State University, USA | Bulent GOKAY, Prof. Keele University, UK | Burak GURBUZ, Assoc. Prof. Galatasaray University, Turkey | Tony HERON, Dr. University of Sheffield, UK | John M. HOBSON, Prof. University of Sheffield, UK | Jamal HUSEIN, Assist. Prof. Angelo State University, USA | Murat S. KARA, Assoc. Prof. Angelo State University, USA | Michael KENNY, Prof. University of Sheffield, UK | Gamze G. KONA, Dr. Foreign Policy Analyst, Turkey | Scott LUCAS, Prof. University of Birmingham, UK | Christoph MEYER, Dr. King‟s College London, UK | Kalypso NICOLAIDIS, Prof. University of Oxford, UK | Bill PARK, Mr. King‟s College London, UK | Jenik RADON, Prof. Columbia University, USA | Ibrahim SIRKECI, Prof. Regent‟s College London, UK | Claire THOMAS, Dr. University of Sheffield, UK | Brian WHITE, Prof. University of Sheffield, UK | M. Hakan YAVUZ, Assoc. Prof. University of Utah, USA | Birol YESILADA, Prof. Portland State University, USA |

COMMENTARY

The Death of Osama Bin Laden: Islamophobia Goes to America1 By Dr. Ayla Göl*

t was a bullet that killed a terrorist and revived a presidency. On the morning of May the second 2011, the world woke up to the breaking news of Osama Bin Laden's (OBL) death. He was murdered in a top-secret operation by the elite US Navy Seal Team Six with two shots - a „double tap‟ maneuver - once in the torso and then in the head to ensure the enemy‟s death [2]. “We got him!”, President Barak Obama added as he heard what he had long wanted to hear: „Geronimo EKIA‟ („Enemy Killed in Action‟). The enemy was, of course, OBL, America‟s Public Enemy Number One and, since 9/11, the personified embodiment of „Islamic terrorism‟. The US Special Forces captured him in a fortified compound locally known as „Waziristan Mansion‟, in the military garrison town of Abbottabad, in North-West Pakistan. Curiously, he was not hiding in a „cave‟ in the mountainous area of Tora Bora in Eastern Afghanistan, as the world had been led to believe. Indeed, „Waziristan Mansion‟ was located just one kilometre away from the Pakistani Military Academy and about 100km (62 miles) from the capital Islamabad [3]. Pentagon officials and the US media claimed that OBL‟s body was „buried at sea‟ following the Muslim practice of

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burial within 24 hours and to prevent his grave becoming a shrine, while Obama hailed the operation as “the most significant achievement to date in our nation‟s effort to defeat al-Qaeda” [4]. Although there is no question that OBL‟s death has brought to an end an 11-year-old man hunt and is the beginning of the end for the so-called War on Terror (WOT), the defeat of al-Qaeda is far from being any closer. Achieving the latter is far more complicated than killing Bin Laden and requires a new set of strategies. Four of them will be discussed here: The first strategy consists in ending the „war on terror‟ rhetoric and policy. Since the Bush administration launched the WOT in order to combat alQaeda‟s the terrorist activities, the exhausted and age-old discourse of a „clash of civilisations‟ between the West and the Rest resurfaced with specific reference to Islam. Yet for many of us in the Muslim world, the ideologies and terrorist activities of al-Qaeda under the leadership of OBL did not at all reflect how true Muslims should act and live. A faith of peace and love for the overwhelming majority of Muslims, Islam is nevertheless all too often portrayed as „uncivilised‟, „traditional‟, „irrational‟,

Political Reflection | June-July-August 2011

The Death of Osama Bin Laden | By Dr. Ayla Göl

„violent‟, and „alien‟ by Orientalist and essentialist understandings that are deep-seated and centuriesold [5]. Influenced by these assumptions, much of the current literature and debate continues to adopt a rather simplistic and stereotypical view of Islam as a violent, irrational, and backward religion that has the potential to turn its believers into potential terrorists (such as OBL himself). Hence, the US-led WOT can be identified as the continuation of such orientalist, ethnocentric and cultural biases that characterize the relationship between the West and the East - or the „Orient‟ or „Islamic world‟ - in the form of violent conflicts between „us and them‟. Such simplistic views impede the understanding of WOT by creating a „false-consciousness‟ for nonMuslims – „us‟ - as rational, non-violent, and peaceful beings in the West, while alienating the dedicated (and diverse) followers of Islam worldwide - them - as irrational and violent. Although it seems that the Obama administration stopped using the „War on Terror‟ expression at the level of policy and rhetoric, the idea of being „at war with Al-Qaeda‟ has never been abandoned and indeed it has recently been used to justify the killing of OBL [6]. Reactions to his death varied from the celebrations and chanting of Americans, to the condemnations for the way he was killed and „buried at sea‟ by his followers and ordinary Muslims. There were also Osama some critical voices in the Bin Laden West. Hence, the US Special Forces‟ operation has raised many questions about the legality of the killing and the handling of his burial among Muslims and nonMuslims alike. The second strategy requires a comparative and critical approach to understanding „religious terrorism‟ in the contemporary world. In the post 9/11 era, it has become fashionable to attribute terrorism to „religion‟ or „religious extremism‟ (Islam especially) while the majority of a burgeoning literature on „religious terrorism‟ contains almost nothing about „Christian terrorism‟, „Jewish terrorism‟, or „Hindu terrorism‟. By singling out Islam as a „violent‟ religion, mainstream understandings of terrorism and counter-terrorism do more harm than good in ex-

Political Reflection | June-July-August 2011

plaining the new set of challenges of global affairs. A critical study of terrorism must therefore contextualise the particular historical, political, social, and ideological power structures that lead an individual or a group to use force and violent tactics (See Critical Terrorism Studies, 2009) [7]. Without engaging with contextual dimensions, any study is bound to fail to understand the complex realities of international terrorism and, particularly, so-called „Islamic terrorism‟[8]. A careful student of Middle Eastern politics and „Islamic terrorism‟ can easily identify historical, social and political connections between key regional events and Super-Power involvement during the Cold War – links that led precisely to the rise of the monstrous OBL phenomenon. The first chain of regional events unfolded in 1979 with the rise of Islam as a revolutionary and political force in Iran. Afterwards, the unprecedented impact of the Iranian Revolution of 1979 on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan led to the rise of mujahedeen in the 1980s as well as the Taliban in the 1990s. “The first time Bin Laden had seen the Tora Bora caves, he had been a young mujahedeen fighter and a recent university graduate with a degree in civil engineering. It had been some 20 years before, during Washington's first Afghan war - the decade-long, C.I.A.-financed jihad of the 1980‟s against the Soviet occupation” [9]. For those who had heeded these warnings, the „West‟s road to 9/11‟ was paved with the consequences of short-term planned policies to gain wider geopolitical interests [10]. However, those who ignored these warnings found an easy answer: Islam was, for them, the primary referent in the theory and praxis of political violence and terrorism. This is not only based on an implicit assumption that Islam – in all its complexities, contradictions and cultural differences, as well as in its different political trajectories – is monolithic and homogenous, but also obscures a better understanding of the diversities and complexities of religiously-motivated terrorist acts. From Afghanistan

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The Death of Osama Bin Laden | By Dr. Ayla Göl

to Turkey via Pakistan, Muslim societies are neither unique in terms of religious beliefs, nor homogeneous in terms of a mythical „Islamic identity‟ that would transcend the cultural, national, and regional differences of Asia, the Middle East and North Africa. The third strategy, I suggest, questions the implications of the OBL‟s killing in the long term. The US‟s supposed „Islamic burial‟ of OBL at sea raises an interesting question: why was the Obama administration afraid of his body? How can a dead person be a threat? Washington‟s explanations that such a burial was meant to prevent OBL‟s grave from becoming a shrine for his followers actually exposes a considerable level of ignorance about Islam and Muslim traditions. As a Saudi, Osama bin Laden belonged to the Wahabi tradition of Islam, the followers of which do not actually build or visit shrines (the practice of visiting shrines is more common in the Sufi branch of Islam). Moreover, according to Muslim scholars, Bin Laden‟s burial was completely unjustified because while “sea burials are permissible for Muslims in extraordinary circumstances”, OBL‟s death was not one of them [11]. Moreover, according to Islamic belief, “the land and the sea belong to God, who is able to protect and raise the dead at the end of times for Judgment Day”, therefore it would not be a significant concern to his followers where exactly his body was buried [12]. Islamic scholar Montasser el-Zayat stated that although the reason behind American fears of creating a shrine to OBL is understandable, they made a „strategic mistake‟. Put it simply, “they don‟t want to see him become a symbol, but he is already a symbol in people‟s hearts” [13]. Furthermore, the killing of OBL might serve to incite new fervour and “may further provoke militant calls for revenge attacks against American targets” in the long term [14]. Therefore, Bin Laden is likely to be regarded as a martyr in the hearts and minds of his followers [15]. The last but not the least significant strategy focuses on the implications of OBL‟s death in the long term relations between the West and the Islamic world. In fact, the handling of OBL‟s body and US fears of creating a shrine for his followers reflect widespread Islamophobic anxieties in American “...the killing of OBL might serve to incite new fervour and “may further provoke militant calls for revenge attacks against American targets” in the long term.”

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society and administration. Unlike other phobias such as the fear of spiders (Arachnophobia) the fear of heights (Acrophobia) and the fear of England or English culture (Anglophobia), the fear of Islam (Islamophobia) is a special form of „social anxiety‟ that is “increasingly used to refer to religiouslymotivated hostility directed at Muslims” [16]. While Europeans historically had a longer and closer engagement with Muslims as immigrants and minorities of the colonial and post-colonial period the American engagement with Muslims is relatively new. In contemporary politics, „Islamophobia‟ was introduced to Britain by the publication of the Runnymede Trust‟s report in 1997 [17]. It highlighted eight main „closed views‟ of Islam that characterised Islamophobia in Britain as follow: i. ii.

iii. iv.

v. vi. vii.

viii.

Monolithic: Islam is seen as a „monolithic bloc, static and unresponsive to change‟. Separate: Islam seen as separate and other – (a) not having any aims or values in common with other cultures; (b) not affected by them; and (c) not influencing them. Inferior: Islam seen as inferior to the West – barbaric, irrational, primitive, sexist. Enemy: Islam seen as violent, aggressive, threatening, supportive of terrorism, engaged in „a clash of civilisations‟. Manipulation: Islam seen as a political ideology, used for political or military advantage. Criticism of West rejected: Criticisms made by Islam of „the West‟ rejected out of hand. Discrimination defended: Hostility towards Islam used to justify discriminatory practices towards Muslims and exclusion of Muslims from mainstream society. Islamophobia seen as natural: Anti-Muslim hostility accepted as natural and „normal‟ [18].

The overall intention of the report was twofold. First, it challenged „Islamophobic assumptions that Islam is a single monolithic system without internal development, diversity and dialogue‟. Second, it drew „attention to the principal dangers which Islamophobia creates or exacerbates for Muslim communities, and therefore for the well-being of society as a whole‟ [19]. Similar views have become more widely accepted in Europe as a whole after the publication of the EUMC (European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia) Islamophobia reports of 2001, 2003 and 2005 [20]. Until 2001, American

Political Reflection | June-July-August 2011

The Death of Osama Bin Laden | By Dr. Ayla Göl

society was not engaged in similar concerns about Islam and Muslims. Within the last decade, especially after the 9/11 and 7/7 terrorist attacks, European and American political discourses and anxieties about Islamophobia converged in the perception of Islam as a new and existential threat to Western interests, and have found a common response in the „war on terror‟. However, it is important to note that these contemporary Islamophobic assumptions are historically embedded within Orientalist discourses [21]. Therefore, a miscalculated short term policy (such as killing the enemy in action) might have stronger implications in the long

term and might even backfire on America, something which has already been seen in Bin Laden‟s curious transition from young mujahedeen involved in a CIA-supported war, to US Public Enemy Number One. While Washington‟s mission to kill OBL may have been successfully accomplished, its objective of defeating Al-Qaeda has only just begun. Unless the US tackles the „real threat‟ – those Orientalist and Islamophobic assumptions that reproduce and exacerbate the Muslim/Western divide – it will be a difficult mission to accomplish. This is much more challenging, unfortunately, than firing a single bullet at an unarmed man.

Notes: * Director, Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence (CSRV); Lecturer in International Politics of the Middle East and Islamic Studies; Department of International Politics; Aberystwyth University. 1) Some parts of this extract are taken from, “the Editor‟s Introduction: Views from the „Others‟ of the War on Terror”, Special Issue, Critical Studies on Terrorism, Vol.3, No.1, April 2010, pp. 1-5; and Ayla Göl, „The War on Terror and the Rise of Neo-Orientalism in the 21st Century‟, e-IR <http://www.e-ir.info/? p=3505. 2) http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-13257330 3) http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-13332623 4) http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-13256676 5) E. Said, Orientalism: Western conceptions of the Orient. New York, NY: Random House, 1978; Culture and Imperialism. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993; Covering Islam: How the media and the experts determine how we see the rest of the world. London: Vintage, 1997. 6) http://richardjacksonterrorismblog.wordpress.com/ See, „Interview: The War on Terror after bin Laden‟, 10 May 2011 7) R. Jackson, M. Breen-Smyth, and J. Gunning, Critical terrorism studies: A new research agenda. London: Routledge, 2009. 8) Amir Taheri, 1987. Holy terror: The Inside story of Islamic terrorism. London: Sphere books. 9) http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/11/magazine/11TORABORA.html 10) D. Carlton, 2005. The West‟s road to 9/11: Resisting, appeasing and encouraging terrorism since 1970. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 11) http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/8488906/Osama-bin-Laden-dead-Islamicscholars-criticise-bin-Ladens-sea-burial.html 12) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/05/02/osama-bin-laden-sea-burial-muslim-scholars_n_856315.html 13) Ibid. 14) Ibid. 15) http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/8488906/Osama-bin-Laden-dead-Islamicscholars-criticise-bin-Ladens-sea-burial.html 16) K. Zebiri, „The Redeployment of Orientalist Themes in Contemporary Islamophobia,‟ Studies in Contemporary Islam, 2008:10, 4-44. 17) Islamophobia: A Challenge For Us All, http://www.runnymedetrust.org/uploads/publications/pdfs/ islamophobia.pdf 18) Ibid. 19) Ibid. 20) Zebiri, op. cit., p.13. Based on the EUMC‟s expertise, the Fundamental Rights Agency has been set up on 1 March 2007. See http://www.fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/about_fra/who_we_are/origins/ origins_en.htm; http://www.youth-against-racism.net/files/youth/ EUMC_Fight_against_Antisemitism_and_Islamophobia.pdf 21) Zebiri, op. cit.

Political Reflection | June-July-August 2011

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JOURNAL OF GLOBAL ANALYSIS (JGA) CALL FOR CONTRIBUTIONS

Journal of Global Analysis endeavours to become the foremost international forum for academics, researchers and policy makers to share their knowledge and experience in the disciplines of political science, international relations, economics, sociology, international law, political history, and human geography. Journal of Global Analysis is an interdisciplinary refereed e-journal, edited by a group of international scholars indicated in the Editorial Board and International Advisory Board. The journal is published at its own web site http://www.cesran.org/globalanalysis. Journal of Global Analysis welcomes submissions of articles from related persons involved in the scope of the journal as well as summary reports of conferences and lecture series held in social sciences. Prospective authors should submit 4.000 - 15.000 articles for consideration in Microsoft Wordcompatible format. For more complete descriptions and submission instructions, please access the Editorial Guidelines and Style Guidelines pages at the CESRAN website: http:// www.cesran.org/globalanalysis. Contributors are urged to read CESRAN’s author guidelines and style guidelines carefully before submitting articles. Articles submissions should be sent in electronic format to:

Ozgur TUFEKCI - Editor-in-Chief - oztufekci@cesran.org Husrev TABAK - Managing Editor - husrevtabak@cesran.org K. Kaan RENDA - Book Review Editor - kkrenda@cesran.org

Publication Date:

Winter issue — January 01 Summer issue — July 01

CAUCASUS REVIEW

Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict in the Scope of Accelerating Iran-Armenian Relations By Zaur Shiriyev*

t present, the international community‟s preoccupation with Middle East Unrest overshadows a new trend in IranianArmenian political relations affecting the South Caucasus. The officials and former civil servants of Iran have frequently made statements in support of IranianArmenian diplomacy. In these statements they express anxiety, about the armament of the region in particular and that Azerbaijan-Armenian conflict will result in a new war. In statements made by third parties, there are accusations that Azerbaijan is developing its military industry [1]. At that stage, the efforts of the Iranian officials to demonstrate political support to Yerevan with their statements [2] and speeches with uncertain political motives, geopolitical benefit perspective, are seen in the foreground. Iranian-Armenian relations reveal that Yerevan has a specific status in its foreign policy concept and regional policy pursued by Tehran after the Islamic revolution of 1979. This distinct status is not about historical foundations and rationality of relations between two states; on the contrary, it is about shaping and development of relations contradicting both Iran‟s foreign policy concept and its national interests. In particular, the two states‟ relations went upscale after 2008 August Russia-Georgia war, which resulted in recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by Russia. Russia changed the vector of its military power, as the result the relations

Political Reflection | June-July-August 2011

between official Tbilisi and Moscow were complicated. This development resulted in the closure of the Georgian “door,” which is the only one way out for Armenia. Namely, the start of the Turkish-Armenian normalization process was directly connected with the plan of the official Yerevan to free itself from the position of “geopolitical pincers” and to prevent the impact of global economic crises to the country through foreign investments. According to Armenian sources, the Yerevan spends significant amount of efforts in developing its relations with Iran and this is the one of the main strategic aim of Armenian foreign policy [3]. The data of 2009, Iran had a 4.7% share in exports and 4.9% share in imports of Armenia, which ranked it respectively 9th and 6th among other trade partners of Armenia [4]. In short, Iran‟s export to Armenia less than a 0.05% share in Iran‟s GDP. It means that the importance of Armenia‟s market for Iranian economy is about one hundred fifth of one percent, i.e. it even does not have any statistical significance. Thus, in the current situation intensification of Iran‟s relations with Armenia cannot be considered efficient based on economic indicators as above mentioned, at the same time, in the regional situation, it seems unreasonable that Iran interferes into domestic affairs of Azerbaijan when the latter‟s policy is to build close neighborhood and friendship with the official Tehran. Iran, which did not achieve expected economical benefits in the Iranian-Armenian relations and whose plans to get

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Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict | By Zaur Shiriyev

political power over Yerevan through economic support disappeared, stepped into a new in “quality” stage of its relations with the official Yerevan. One may argue that, the Nagorno-Karabakh problem and magnitude of national revival movement among Azerbaijanis in the south made Iran and Armenia strategic partners. Thus, the scope of NagornoKarabakh conflict in the relations between Iran and Armenia becomes an interesting issue. In its foreign policy principles, Iran claims to be the leader state of the Islamic world, but it becomes evident that the policy pursued by Iran with regards to the conflict issues of the Islamic world is in contradiction with its ideological and doctrinal principles. If we proceed from the claims of the Sunni world that the leadership of Iran in the Islamic world is real only for the Shia, then it also becomes clear that Iran‟s leadership in the Islamic world is paradoxical.

ties by Armenia after the official visit of Iran‟s foreign minister Ali Akbar Vilayati to Baku for mediation in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in December 1991 and the occupation of the Shusha city by Armenian forces while the leadership of Azerbaijan was negotiating with Armenia in Tehran laid down the foundations of this disloyalty [5]. Second, even though Iran does not want the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to turn into the active military operations, it is interested in the maintenance of the status quo from two aspects:

1. It is taken into consideration that as long as the conflict continues, it will have a negative effect on the economic development and the strengthening of statehood of Azerbaijan. To put it in the words of Zbigniew Brzezinski, former U.S. national security advisor: “If Azerbaijan achieves a political stability and economic development it needs, Iranian Azerbaija“One may argue that, the NagornoFrom this standpoint, Iran, nis will fight for the realizaKarabakh problem and magnitude of which indicates the issue tion of the idea of „Great of “Palestine” as the chief national revival movement among Azerbaijan‟” [6]. From this factor of an Islamic solistandpoint, even though it Azerbaijanis in the south made Iran darity in its foreign policy, does not impose any danand Armenia strategic partners. Thus, is, in reality, aiming at ger, the “preventionism” of the scope of Nagorno-Karabakh gaining political benefit – official Tehran shows that it conflict in the relations between Iran creating an anti-American considers the weakness of a view in the Arab world by and Armenia becomes an Muslim state as its reason symbolizing this problem. for existence (raison d‟être), interesting issue.” But it is not obvious that which is contrary to its ideoIran is interested in resolulogical foreign policy princition of the problems of the Muslim world. The paraples. dox in official Tehran‟s policy becomes more evident with regards to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. 2. One of the issues discussed within the resolution On the one hand, in their statements Iranian officials consider Nagorno-Karabakh as the territory of Azerbaijan, while on the other hand, they try to portray the conflict as the war between Azerbaijan and Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh. Even though they declare that Nagorno-Karabakh is a historical territory of Azerbaijan, in practice, they want the problem to remain in the present condition without turning into the conflict. Especially, against the background of the declarations of Iran defending the interests of official Yerevan in the NagornoKarabakh conflict, Iran‟s role in resolution of the conflict is interesting. Since 1991, Iran‟s position on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has been as follows: First, Iran strengthened Armenia with its economic aid during the period of the conflict and turned a blind eye to the occupation of the Azerbaijani territories. The continuation of the occupational activi-

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package is the deployment of the peacekeeping forces of the West, to be more precise, of the third party in the region after the signature of a political agreement. In the case of peacekeepers, Iran, which is concerned about the deployment of the USA in the region, opposes the realization of this idea through various means and emphasizes this as a threat to its national security [7]. Third, the “neutrality” of official Tehran raises suspicion, which has been claiming to be interested in mediation of the settlement of the NagornoKarabakh conflict since the middle of 2010. Especially, Iran‟s military cooperation with Armenia and the nature of the signed agreement gives rise to this. Thus according to the memorandum of cooperation in the areas of defense and security signed between Armenia and Iran in Yerevan in 2002, the two sides are mutually cooperating starting from

Political Reflection | June-July-August 2011

Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict | By Zaur Shiriyev

“

er. To put it in the words of Tatul Hakobyan, the expert on foreign policy of the “Civilitas Foundation” of Armenia: “In 1992-1994 the official Tehran was the main supporting point for Armenia in its integration into the world at most difficult times” [9] and today the peaceful efforts of official Tehran can be evaluated as attempts to help Armenia to overcome difficult situation.

...it becomes clear that there are no diplomatic grounds for the recent efforts

Iranian

officials

promote the negotiations on the

resolution

the

Nagorno-Karabakh

problem between the parties to the conflict as a „neutral‟ power.” exchange of students of military schools to the establishment of joint enterprises that will produce products for defensive purpose. Under the agreement signed between the ministries of defense of Iran and Armenia, the two states will cooperate on the provision of the home front. According to the experts, the agreements signed in the field of defense are directed straight against Azerbaijan [8]. Under such conditions, it becomes clear that there are no diplomatic grounds for the recent efforts of Iranian officials to promote the negotiations on the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh problem between the parties to the conflict as a “neutral” pow-

At the same time, the fact that Iran turns a blind eye to trafficking in drugs and human beings within the occupied territories of Azerbaijan is the display of creation of “gray zones”. 132 km of the border between Azerbaijan and Iran, which is under the de facto control of Armenia, has been actively used for production, transit of and trafficking in drugs, arms and human beings, illegal migration, concealment of terrorists, money laundering and other dangerous types of international crimes. All of these factors make it possible to say that Iran adheres to a “twofaced” position on the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Iran‟s policy, groundless claims and declarations with regard to the conflict show that official Yerevan prefers the logic of the proverb “enemy of my enemy is my friend”.

Notes: *Zaur Shiriyev is a foreign policy analyst at Center for Strategic Studies. Ideas expressed here reflect the personal views of the author and do not represent the views of any institution. Email: zaur@caucasusweekly.com 1) Former Iranian Ambassador to Armenia: Azerbaijan appeared in isolation, Panarmenian, 09 September 2010, http://www.panorama.am/en/politics/2011/02/09/ ambassador-iran/ 2) These statements are outburst of interference into internal affairs of Azerbaijan. See: Former Iranian Ambassador to Armenia: Azerbaijan appeared in isolation http://www. panorama.am/en/politics /2011/02/09/ ambassador-iran/; Azerbaijan‟s accumulation of weapons unpleasant, Iranian ambassador says http:// news.am/eng/news/47316.html 3) “Agenda for Armenian Foreign Policy 2009-2010”, Yere-van, Armenia, 2009, s.38, http://www.acgrc.am/ Agenda%20 for%20Armenian%20Foreign%20Policy%202009-2010.pdf 4) Export and import of the Republic of Armenia by countries, 2010, http://www.armstat.am/file/ doc/99461633.pdf 5) http://library.aliyev-heritage.org/az/6163780.html 6) Zbigniew Brzezinski. The Grand Chessboard American Primacy And It‟s Geostrategic Imperatives, 1998, p.143 7) Tehran says will oppose „American forces‟ in Karabakh, http://www.armenianow.com/karabakh/23799/ iran_karabakh_us_peacekeepers 8) Shabanov Gunduz, Iran: Policy Versus National Interests, http://www.525.az/view.php? lang=az&menu=10&id=26015 9) Harout Ekmanian, Armenia-Iran Relations in Light of Recent Developments, 24 November 2010, http:// www.armenianweekly.com/2010/11/24/ekmanian-armenia-iran-relations-in-light-of-recent-developments/

Political Reflection | June-July-August 2011

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COMMENTARY

The Mediterranean Climate Change Initiative: Realism or Idealism? By Dimitris Rapidis*

egional strategic cooperation has the exceptional advantage of bringing together states and policy makers that share common concerns, ponder upon same risks and challenges, and aim at bridging differences in a more active and efficient manner. While international organizations and fora, like the United Nations with its Committees or the European Union, are said to embed the idea of global governance, they can hardly address crucial issues efficiently. The major element of this systemic problem is that global governance is faced with asymmetries of culture, different priorities, and conflicting interests. Bilateral relations or at least relations engaging states from the same area are said to be more efficient, fastpaced and prolific as common interests, risks and challenges are better addressed and shared amongst the participating

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members. For instance, the European Union was functioning much better before the last two enlargement processes than it does today; by the same token, enhanced bilateral and regional cooperation is much more preferred than it used to be in the past, with latest example the joint initiative of Turkey and Brazil on May 2010 to guarantee the production of fuel swaps for civilian use and power generation on behalf of Iran, the nuclear program of which is still contested by the United States and the major European countries. That said, regional cooperation seems to be further advanced as a formula of closer partnership and coordination when significant and binding decisions and commitments are missing by the international community. The Mediterranean Climate Change Initiative, officially triggered on October 2010 in Athens, seems to

Political Reflection | June-July-August 2011

Climate Change Initiative | By Dimitris Rapidis

be a great opportunity for dealing with this hot issue: the effort of a group of geographically and geopolitically adjacent states, including Greece, Turkey, Israel and Cyprus, to deal with crucial environmental issues that primarily concern their own sea. The idea was initially captured by the Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou and his Turkish homologue Recep Tayyip Erdogan whose eagerness upon environmental protection and green growth made them urged for close cooperation amongst the countries of the Mediterranean to tackle the repercussions of climate change and establish a low-carbon, resource-efficient and climate-resilient set of regional economies. Whereas this initiative seems to be sincerely ambitious, what would be its real scope and the prospective outcome of this cooperation? From a realistic point of view, we could argue that it is a difficult task to achieve as the current economic downturn may hinder investments in green economy. Another impediment of success could be the turbulence occurring in the international chessboard linked with the conflicting interests upon energy issues mainly surfaced by the United States, China and Russia. All three are endeavoring to control and regulate the future of energy partnerships and lower the expectations for green and sustainable development in order to secure their own interests. This triangle could merge as a major threat for any initiative whereas the power these actors are exerting can sweep any regional development. Nonetheless, despite the fact that Greece, Spain and Portugal are the countries facing the most striking

The idea was initially captured by the Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou and his Turkish homologue Recep Tayyip Erdogan whose eagerness upon environmental protection and green growth made them urged for close cooperation amongst the countries of the Mediterranean to tackle the repercussions of climate change and establish a low-carbon, resource-efficient and climate-resilient set of regional economies.

Political Reflection | June-July-August 2011

aspects of financial instability inside the European Union, all three seem to be bound to develop an alternative model of growth. In addition, states of North Africa like Libya with great natural resources potential (i.e. gas) can trigger joint ventures and cooperate towards creating an axis of trust and mutual development. Needless to say that the Mediterranean Sea itself possesses great natural benefits such the waves and the relevant conditions bearing solar and wind energy that could serve as alternative, costefficient sources of energy. From an idealistic point of view, we could say that this initiative by itself is characterized by the perception of common challenges and concerns by all participating members. It can be similar to other fora such as the G20 or G8 that gather the attention of the international community and attempt to address hot topics of our era. Furthermore, the fundamental asset pertaining this action is that all parts involved share similar views of a culture that was interactively developed throughout the centuries in the wider region. In this respect, both the Arab world and South Europe being considered as economically week peripheries can build upon this project and gain significant geopolitical leverage. This is regarded as a considerable prerogative in the midst of a more and more unequal world, where fluctuations in power and influence are dramatically and roughly changing. All things considered, the Mediterranean Climate Change Initiative is both realistically and idealistically invested with hope. What is left to be seen is the breadth and proportions that this process will take. Political decisiveness would eventually play the most important role as all states of the region are simultaneously faced with severe problems of macroeconomic stability and sporadic social unrest. Otherwise, in case this opportunity is missed, one more challenge will fall into arrears. Note: * Dimitris Rapidis, MSc., has studied Political Science at the Universities of Athens and Geneva. He is currently working as Political Analyst at the Greek Politics Specialist Group, a think-tank based at the Bournemouth University and member of the UKâ&#x20AC;&#x;s Political Science Association, and he is the founder of CivilAthens, an independent, non-profit group working upon immigration issues and environmental protection based in Athens, Greece.

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KEYNOTE LECTURE

Palestine Refugees in Today’s Middle East By. Mr Filippo Grandi*

olleagues of Coventry University and the Centre for Peace and Reconciliation Studies, Vice-Chancellor, Ladies and Gentlemen:

I am grateful for this opportunity to exchange ideas on some of the issues that are current to the Middle East and to the Palestinian refugees whose protection and care constitute the mission of UNRWA, the agency I head. I offer special thanks to my friend Professor Özerdem for his invitation. To say that we are witnessing momentous and historic events in the Middle East is to state the obvious. To even the most casual observer, it is clear that developments in the region go beyond whatever we may define as “ordinary” or “normal”. It is equally obvious that at this point in time, less than five months since Mohamed Bouazizi set himself ablaze in Tunisia, the waves of change do not show sign of exhaustion. Living, as I do, in the Middle East, you feel in the midst of a high-energy vortex in which social, economic, political, military, religious and demographic forces are colliding, unleashing new – or hitherto suppressed – extraordinary dynamics. Current events are often tragic, gripping to observe and dramatic to describe. They are work -in-progress whose outcomes and concluding scenarios are at this stage literally impossible to predict.

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I said that I live in the Middle East. I should add, to be precise, that I live in a special place of the Middle East – in East Jerusalem, the occupied putative capital of the unborn Palestinian State. I have lived there for almost six years, witnessing several rounds of fruitless negotiations on matters underpinning the Israeli – Palestinian conflict, and the alternating fortunes of Palestinian hopes: hope for a reversal of settlement expansion, as demanded by the international community; hope for the end of the occupation and of its harsh apparatus, including the Gaza blockade; hope for Palestinian reconciliation to be achieved; hope for “final status issues” to be seriously addressed and resolved, for the Palestinian state to be born and for peace to finally come for Israelis and Palestinians; and among those issues, hope for a just solution – at long last – to the old, difficult and tragic plight of Palestinian refugees. But as we sadly know, Jerusalem – a city of faith that continues to be a spiritual reference for millions – in these past years has become, instead, the capital of dashed hopes. The Israeli-Palestinian peace process has languished for years. The Palestinian refugee question – one of its “final status” issues – is unresolved now as it was just after refugees fled their homes more than 60 years ago. In Jerusalem, one cannot avoid the sensation of being in a pond of stagnant political water, while all around the region is alive with waves – waves that carry both op-

Political Reflection | June-July-August 2011

Palestine Refugees | By Mr Filippo Grandi

portunity and risk, but which have injected a feeling of dynamic movement and of momentous promise. Yet, it would be superficial to think of the situation of Palestinians, including of refugees, as insulated from the regional situation. On the contrary, there are key links that must be highlighted if one is to understand the current context. The agreement signed today in Cairo by the Palestinian movements Fatah and Hamas, moving towards a national unity government and seeking to hold free and fair elections within a year, is one dramatic example of these links. The split, lasting four years, seemed destined to persist despite the deep and growing anger it has generated among most Palestinians, and despite the damage done to the Palestinian quest for self-determination. We must hope, as many have said, that reconciliation will not only be durable, but that it will also constitute a contribution to peace. We can be sure, on the other hand, that this first step towards Palestinian reconciliation is also the result of momentous changes in the region. With this in mind, I believe that it is crucial to seek in the elements of the regional situation the understanding and conviction we need to rekindle the peace process, and to ensure that the refugee question, long marginalized, be restored at the centre of the political and legal debate, through real efforts to bring it to a positive conclusion. I would like to highlight just three features which I consider central to the current regional context, and which we can relate to the question of Palestinian refugees. The first is the “transnational factor” - the ability of current trends to have an impact beyond borders. This dynamic is fuelled by the universal appeal of demands for social and economic opportunity, claims for human rights and political representation, and calls for greater individual freedom – all of them made “viral”, so to speak, by modern communication technology. Events have shown that wherever these factors exist and are not adequately addressed, the spiral of change may be triggered. This gives cause for uncertainty, and hope, across the region as well as further afield. The second feature worth highlighting is the “youth factor” – the centrality of young people as leaders of change in the Middle East. The statistics are wellknown and quite striking. Thirty-five percent of the regional population is below the age of 15 - about

Political Reflection | June-July-August 2011

double that of Europe and North America. At the high end is the occupied Palestinian territory, where youth account for approximately 45 percent of the population. But statistics only tell one aspect of the story. One must look at other features of the “youth factor”, especially the contrasting but co-existing indicators of high literacy and high unemployment, and, in parts of the region, pockets of significant poverty and issues of democratic governance, by both of which the young feel, and are, particularly affected. Against the backdrop of the region‟s oil wealth and the middle- or high-income status of many countries, these elements have interacted with the demographic dominance of youth to ignite a movement of surprising energy and appeal. The increasingly self-aware youth of the region are staking their claim for recognition as a constituency to be reckoned with – a constituency whose appeals must be answered.

The Palestinian refugee question – one of its “final status” issues – is unresolved now as it was just after refugees fled their homes more than 60 years ago.

A third feature of contemporary regional developments is the “dignity factor”. I suggest that reclaiming the basic dignity of people‟s lives represents the deeper significance, the true core of the demands which we hear in the Middle East and North Africa for better socio-economic conditions, for an end to corruption in public life, and for genuine political representation of all sections of the population. In other words, poverty, the lack of opportunities, and the severe human rights deficit in the region have been identified above all as the antitheses of human dignity – a powerful contrast that speaks volumes about the depth and strength of the „Arab Spring‟. Ladies and Gentlemen, This is an appropriate juncture at which to turn more directly to the Palestine refugees whose assistance, protection and well-being constitute the mission of UNRWA. How, if at all, are refugees in the region affected by current developments? In

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Palestine Refugees | By Mr Filippo Grandi

what ways, if any, are refugees impacted by the features I have identified – the “transnational factor”, the “youth factor” and the “dignity factor”? It is my belief that the situation of Palestine refugee tightly intersects with all three factors in compelling ways that suggest parallels between the refugees‟ right to just and durable solutions and the aspirations of Middle Eastern peoples for greater freedoms.

For example, a 2010 UNRWA study showed that refugees in the West Bank experience higher levels of poverty, unemployment and food insecurity than non-refugees. Palestinian refugees are thus a complex and complicated transnational issue, fraught with the problems affecting young people in the region, and in which the “dignity factor” plays a key role. In particular, among refugees, the thirst for dignity is as strong in their contemporary experience of suffering as is their collective memory of exile.

If I may take the features in turn, Palestine refugees are a significant constituency and substantial reservoir of human capital across the region. In a real It is important to recognize that the three factors sense, they are a classic transnational presence affect refugees in diverse ways in the areas where and in the Agency‟s areas of operation in Jordan, they live. In Jordan and Syria, which have generSyria, Lebanon, the West Bank and Gaza, those ously hosted Palestinians for decades, refugees registered with UNRWA have enjoyed the benefits are currently around 4.7 of relative stability and ecomillion strong. The refunomic rights, including acgees carry demographic cess to the employment weight by virtue of their market. Refugees in Jor...a 2010 UNRWA study showed that numbers and regional disdan enjoy the privileges of refugees in the West Bank experitribution, and, more imspecial categories of Jorportantly, are key contribdanian nationality, even ence higher levels of poverty, unemutors to society and develthough those residing in ployment and food insecurity than opment. The refugees camps face higher levels of non-refugees. also wield moral power, by socio-economic hardship. virtue of their longIn both countries, and esunresolved plight and the pecially in Syria (where the intense empathy for them current, difficult situation in across the Middle East. some areas has compelled The facts of their protracted dispossession and exus to close schools and health centres) recent ile, now more than six decades long, serve as a events have generated a heightened state of anxieglaring example of unresolved injustice, long prety in refugee communities. Wherever conflict and dating the unrest sweeping the region. confrontation occur, refugees are particularly vulnerable to the direct or collateral effects, along with The youth factor is pre-eminent in refugee commuthe communities that host them. nities, with some 50 percent of the population below the age of 25. Moreover, refugees embody the Palestine refugees in Lebanon have inherited a legcomplex realities of the region. Like many uprooted acy of suffering, including armed conflict and dispeople, they have a passion for knowledge – and crimination, that afflicts them to this day. There are, thanks to their access to education, and abundance however, signs of positive change. Amendments to of talent, many have achieved social mobility. Their Lebanon‟s labour code last year granted Palestine arc spans generations and borders in unlikely ways. refugees the right to work. These amendments are Working with Palestinian refugees is a diverse exa positive first step in helping refugees in Lebanon perience: I meet many in overcrowded shelters, expand their opportunities and improve squalid livliving in dispiriting conditions, but I often encounter ing conditions. But they must be implemented, and others who pursue advanced study on scholarship so long as the refugees cannot enjoy the right to at the best foreign universities. I have met with a work fully and freely, and begin to exercise other few refugees who have provided my organization human rights - without prejudice to the rights they with management advice, after building successful enjoy as refugees - they will remain an underclass business ventures themselves. Yet, many suffer in Lebanon, a fragile state in which poverty and disproportionately from unemployment and poverty. marginalization carry serious risks of instability.

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Political Reflection | June-July-August 2011

Palestine Refugees | By Mr Filippo Grandi

But it is in the occupied Palestinian territory, comprising the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and Gaza, that refugees face the most fraught conditions under the harsh rubric of the Israeli occupation, now in its forty-third year. In Gaza, in the past few years, the closure of borders and severe restrictions on the movement of people and goods have posed serious challenges to the 1.5 million residents, some 70 percent of whom are refugees. We welcomed in mid-2010 the Government of Israel‟s decision to ease the blockade by improving access for a variety of consumer goods, and some construction materials for a tightly controlled number of internationally funded and supervised projects. The situation remains, however, unsustainable as the blockade still hampers our ability to carry out reconstruction projects with the urgency that is required. More importantly, the blockade has almost wholly isolated Gaza

But it is in the occupied Palestinian territory, comprising

the

West

Bank,

including

East

Jerusalem, and Gaza, that refugees face the most fraught conditions under the harsh rubric of the Israeli occupation, now in its forty-third year. from the outside world, caused a dramatic deterioration of public services and infrastructure, suffocated its formal economy, and given birth to one of the highest unemployment rates in the world. The population, of which almost half is youth under the age of 18, has been forced into the dangerous indignity of dependence on humanitarian aid. This is why I have no choice but to repeat what we have been saying for the past four years: the blockade must be lifted. In the West Bank, many Palestinians, refugees and non-refugees alike, continue to experience severe restrictions on movement and fundamental freedoms. We are particularly concerned by the sustained pace with which home demolitions, evictions, permit denials and other forms of unacceptable pressure on Palestinian homes and properties are proceeding, notably in East Jerusalem, while at the same time Israeli settlements continue to expand on occupied land. This is a source of grave suffering for many already vulnerable to poverty and the daily humiliations from the occupation. It generates multiple situations of displacement among refugees

Political Reflection | June-July-August 2011

already dispossessed, including rural and herder communities, while denying fundamental human rights to those affected. The Separation Barrier and its associated regime of draconian restrictions permanently disrupt normal life for many Palestinians, placing impediments to their enjoyment of normal social and family interactions. I observe this first hand every day, given that access limitations are especially severe for Palestinians from the West Bank entering Jerusalem, historically their economic, social and cultural centre. In short, nowhere else in the Middle East is human dignity trampled upon as gravely as it is in the occupied Palestinian territory. Ladies and gentlemen: This outline of the regional situation indicates that some of the defining factors of the “Arab Spring” help understand the key features of the Palestinian refugee situation. In addition, and worryingly so, we must not forget that refugees experience a particular form of vulnerability emanating from their condition of exile and from the absence of a political solution to their plight. Throughout my years of work with refugees worldwide, I have observed this vulnerability, and I believe that it is a critical element of crises and conflicts which is too often overlooked. In the present circumstances of a region in transition, we have observed instances where refugees‟ exposure to risk has been heightened. There is the possibility that confrontation and conflict flowing from recent events could trigger humanitarian emergencies where none existed before, or cause deterioration in the socio-economic conditions of refugees. As any population in exile, refugees also become and feel particularly exposed in situations of crisis and are often victims of undeserved blame. There are concerns that the stable relations they enjoy with host communities could be rendered precarious. These eventualities would be a powerful destabilizing factor across the region. Against this backdrop, we at UNRWA are firmly committed to maintaining our humanitarian and human development mission whatever the prevailing situation. This is very important at this complicated juncture. If adequately supported, UNRWA, through its services to refugees, can continue to be a positive, constructive influence across the region.

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Palestine Refugees | By Mr Filippo Grandi

We offer primary education to around five hundred thousand refugee children across the region, using a curriculum that is enriched with courses and materials on human rights, tolerance and conflict resolution. We provide vocational training courses to over six thousand young refugee men and women eager to improve their chances for economically stable, self-reliant lives. We run comprehensive primary health care facilities that protect and promote the basic health of refugee families. We help build and maintain the homes of refugees and the infrastructure in refugee communities, and we manage a modest social safety-net programme that concentrates on supporting with food aid and cash assistance a small proportion of refugees worst afflicted by poverty. Through our microfinance service, we offer credit and advice to help refugees cope with economic upheavals and establish and sustain their own business enterprises, while contributing to the economic strength of the communities in which they live. When need be, we are on the frontlines. In situations of violence and armed conflict, UNRWA offers courageous, principled interventions that help save lives and mitigate the effects of armed conflict. You may remember the pictures from the war in Gaza, two years ago, including UNRWA‟s brave staff providing assistance under fire. Our emergency responses include a recovery role beyond the immediate cessation of hostilities. We reconstruct refugee homes, schools and health care facilities destroyed during armed conflict and serve as a catalyst for a return to normalcy. And whenever appropriate, we call attention to the rights to which Palestine refugees are entitled under international law, and encourage States and other political actors to discharge their obligations in that regard. What I have always found unique and especially appealing in UNRWA‟s work is its ability – and I do not say this lightly – to make a substantive difference in the daily lives of millions of people, through direct and concrete

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interventions. This ranges from teaching in schools to providing short-term employment in Gaza to negotiating access to health facilities in situations of war and occupation. Our work is not difficult to describe – it is practical and straightforward – but it has allowed us to remain a key strategic partner to positive forces across the region, helping to promote the understanding and dissemination of United Nations values, including tolerance for diversity and opposing views, peaceful resolution of disputes and respect for human rights and dignity for all. That is why we believe that we continue to be relevant, and to deserve support. Somehow, through our work in schools and clinics, and with the poor, and speaking out for the rights of refugees, we have been addressing since a long time ago, and for the population in our care, some of the key elements of today‟s regional crisis. And yet, it is also beyond doubt that there are inherent limitations to our work, many of which have actually been brought into sharp relief by recent events in the region. It is interesting to note that in a regional context where state authorities are being challenged to deliver on their promises to their people, UNRWA has not been spared by the refugees it serves. Refugees are becoming more and more assertive in calling UNRWA itself to account. Insufficient resources and the lack of political progress, however, do not allow us to respond satisfactorily to the demands.

Mr. Filippo Grandi

Take, for example, recent incidents in the West Bank, Lebanon and Jordan where our health staff have been confronted by refugees angered by inadequate levels of care. In Lebanon in recent weeks the protests have been larger and more vociferous. Refugees have been complaining angrily about poor living conditions and inadequate coverage of hospital care And in Gaza, recent protests were triggered by slow progress in reconstructing destroyed buildings. These protests are understandable and justified. For many years, the Agency‟s work has been impeded by a chronic finan-

Political Reflection | June-July-August 2011

Palestine Refugees | By Mr Filippo Grandi

cial crisis. In spite of the continuing generosity of some donors, including, very prominently and commendably, the United Kingdom, our income consistently falls well behind the levels required – to ensure the quality of programmes that refugees deserve. The impact of UNRWA‟s work is also inevitably limited by the inconclusive search for a negotiated solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In all conflicts, and especially in protracted ones, humanitarian, development and political actors seeking peaceful solutions must reinforce each other. This constructive interplay between conflict-solving actors has been constrained in the occupied Palestinian territory. While humanitarian and development work has proceeded in earnest for decades, there has been little progress in addressing by political means the root causes of the conflict, including achieving a just and lasting solution to the plight of refugees. The failures in the quest for peace detract from the full effectiveness of our work and they frustrate our ability to make a real difference to the dignity and well-being of refugees. These failures call to mind the transnational factor, the youth factor and the dignity factor because taken together, these features show the parallels to which the reality of the refugee situation mirrors the circumstances of the Arab street. Given the transnational significance of the refugee issue, can we continue to ignore the strategic weight of the refugee constituency and fail to account for refugee concerns in calculating national and international priorities? In light of the strength of the “youth factor”, can we continue to turn a blind eye to the risks posed by the too many young refugees who are literate, yes, but unemployed, poverty-stricken and frustrated? And given the cumulative effects of decades of exile in wretched conditions, how best can we respond to the Palestine refugees‟ calls to be afforded the ultimate guarantee of human dignity, namely to benefit from a just and lasting solution to their plight and to be reconciled with their national identity in a state of their own? Ladies and gentlemen: I suggest that if there is an overarching highlight of regional events, if there is a single aspiration that captures the essence of demands heard in public squares and spreading through the internet, it is the quest for justice based on human rights and international law. The language of international law –

Political Reflection | June-July-August 2011

including its social and economic dimensions, and fundamental freedom – may not be precisely articulated on the placards of protestors, yet it is – in a deep sense – the true source of the calls for change which echo throughout the region. Viewing current developments through the prism of justice allows us to recognize the relevance of the international rule of law as the ultimate underpinning for the demands which have been put to their leaders – and indeed, to all of us – by the courageous young people in the streets of Tunis and in Cairo‟s Tahrir Square. It allows us to invoke the shared responsibility of individual states and the international community to promote the peaceful realization of these demands. And it also enables us to acknowledge the inalienable and allencompassing character of the demands, making them applicable to all who are deprived, marginalized or dispossessed. Bringing these and other perspectives of justice into play also helps illuminate the dynamic of opportunities presented by the current regional context. UNRWA takes the view that the current circumstances contain valuable opportunities to explore and address issues of justice that have been outstanding for far too long. We also believe that the regional events illustrate how these opportunities may be grasped. If youth and other previously marginalized groups are demanding attention to their particular concerns, then let us likewise take the bold step of bringing the Palestinian refugee question to the fore alongside other final status issues constituting the elements of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. And if, following years of enforced silence, ordinary people are finding their voice on the Arab street, then let us also grant to Palestinian refugees the license and channels to express their interests and make informed choices about their future – a future that must be inscribed in a negotiated search for peace, and that will only be accepted – and can only be acceptable – if it is realized within a just and lasting solution to their long exile. Note: * Mr. Filippo Grandi is Deputy CommissionerGeneral of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)

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COMMENTARY

CAIRO “Ready to change its fortune…” By Fatih Eren*

airo, the capital city of Egypt, who is under strong global impact has been examined in this volume.

Egypt is a transcontinental country which is located at the intersection of the North Africa and the Southwest Asia. The country has a 80 million population in total and about 20 million of this population is living in Cairo city. The globalisation(better to say westernisation) process of Egypt started in 1979 (i.e. Camp David Accords). After this date, the country turned its face from the North(communist bloc) to the West (US and EU). In this westernisation process which has been going on for the last 30 years, Egypt became very close to the United States (US) and the European Union(EU) politically and financially, but it moved away from the countries of the North Africa and the Middle East, which are actually the places much more similar to the Egypt than US and EU in socio-cultural terms. US and EU financially and politically supported the Egypt government in a systematic and regular way during this 30-year period (e.g. The US Agency for International Development (USAID) has provided $1.3 billion financial aid to the Egyptian government every year since 1980 to support economic growth and to establish security in the country. Again, EU provided €558 million to the government between 2007-2011 under the Eu-

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ropean Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) to support political and economical reforms in the country. EU has just declared that they are going to provide an additional €449 million financial aid to Egypt for the same purposes under the same program between 2011 and 2013). The year 2007 became an important date for Egypt in terms of coming closer to the western world. Egypt became the first country in the Middle EastNorth Africa Region (MENA) which signed the

The Coat of Arms in Egypt

Political Reflection | June-July-August 2011

Cairo | By Fatih Eren

government was overthrown in a social explosion in 2011. This social explosion (i.e. Revolution in Cairo at the beginning of Feb 2011) showed that the Egyptians were not happy about the present order and progress of the country. They considered all these liberal economic and political reforms as a part of an imperialist process towards the country and wanted to stop this unfair globalisation process with a social revolution. After the overthrow of the government in Feb 2011, the dictatorial regime in Egypt was finalized and the country took an important step towards democracy. Which social values and ideas have played a key role in the Egyptians‟ revolution?

Egypt map OECD‟s Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises. After 2007, Egypt applied many new financial and economical liberal reforms in the context of this decleration and as a result the country passed to a full open economy. The OECD‟s Regulatory Restrictiveness Index score for Egypt was 0.191 in 2006 and it became 0.104 in 2010 (On a scale where 0 denotes a fully open economy and 1 a totally closed one). This score is close to the scores of some developed countries such as Japan, Denmark and South Korea in this index. This means that Egypt‟s less developed economy (the 26th biggest economy of the world in 2010 according to IMF data) is now competing with the world‟s most developed countries on equal terms in the global economic system. The Egyptian government, which opened the door of the country fully to global investors, was insistently trying to attract foreign investments into the country‟s all economic sectors (i.e. Agribusiness, Communication & Information Technologies, Education, Financial, Healthcare, Logistics& Transportation, Petrochemicals, Renewable Energy, Retail, Textile and Tourism) via PublicPrivate Partnerships, Privatisations and Foreign Direct Investments recently. However, the

Political Reflection | June-July-August 2011

The Egyptian body politic who performed the revolution, mainly wanted to change 3 important things in Egypt. Firstly, they wanted to change the established imperialist order in the country (antiimperialism). The idea of „the resources of Egypt belong to Egyptians‟ stands behind this demand. Secondly, they wanted to make Egypt free about all decisions regarding the future of the country (freedom). The idea of „Egypt must be governed directly by Egyptians from Egypt in democratic ways‟ stands behind this demand. Thirdly, they wanted a fair distribution of national revenues and wealth among the Egyptian society (social justice). The idea of „Egypt must be a social welfare state and all people of the country must benefit from public services and aids with justice‟ stands behind this demand.

2011 Egyptian Revolution in Cairo’s Tahrir Square

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Cairo | By Fatih Eren

Therefore, the existing privatization program can be reviewed by the government in the light of anti-imperialist values in the new era. However, it is not very rational to stop all privatizations in the country because the Egyptian cities need the support of the private sector very much today. For example, Cairo needs substantial infrastructural investments (i.e. telecommunication, transport, electricity, water, sanitation and so on) very much at the moment. Everybody in Cairo knows that the Informal settlements and squatters in Cairo local government can not subsidize all these infrastructural I can say that the ongoing westernisation process investments with its own public resources stand will be questioned and reviewed in the following alone; so the financial power, know-how and experiyears in the context of the new social values and ence of the private sector is required for the realisaideas which are anti-imperialism, freedom and sotion of these investments. In this situation, I can say cial justice in Egypt. So the question here rises: that the majority privatizations may be decreased “How these new ideas and values would affect the significantly in Cairo but minority privatizations may future urban developments and planning policies in be continued in the city in the next years. It means Cairo which is the cultural and political centre of the that the local government will only allow the sale of country.” less than %51 shares of the public economic enterprises to private companies in the prospective privatizations. In this way, the majority share and the The impact of global concern for Cairo: Analysis managerial authority of the public enterprises can The new social values and ideas can affect Cario in continue to stay in the hands of the local governthree ways in the first place. ment, not in the hands of the private companies. Thus, the infrastructural investments may continue Firstly, the new Egyptian government may revise in the city with the support of the private sector but the privatisation program which is still in force in the the final decision for the distribution of public recountry in the next years. Cairo is the most affected sources in the privatized public enterprises may be city from this program in the country. made by the local government. The prices of the delivery of public services and the living costs in the A nationwide privatisation program has been apcity can be maintained low in this way. plied systematically since 1990 through many institutions in the country (i.e. The Ministry of Public Secondly, the local city government may revise the Enterprise (MPE), The Ministerial Privatization current housing policy in Cairo due to new social Committee (MPC), The Public Enterprise Office values and ideas in the next years. Today, the 70% (PEO) and so on). Many public economic enterprisof the city population is living in informal settlements es in Cairo were privatized in the context of this proand squatters. The reason for this situation was the gram. However, the local residents of the city have problematic housing policy that was followed by the reacted angrily to the full acquisitions of local public local government in the last 3 decades (i.e. reenterprises by private companies (mostly foreign strictions towards the private sector players with companies) because they considered that after therespect to the entrance of the local housing market, se acquisitions the prices of public services would the efforts of the local government to develop social be increased dramatically in the city. In addition, houses in the city with only public capital). The New many Egyptian people named this program as a Urban Communities Authority (NUCA) was estab„plan to sell Egypt‟. lished in 1979 under the structural body of the Min-

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Political Reflection | June-July-August 2011

Cairo | By Fatih Eren

istry of Housing. The first objective of NUCA was to limit the development in the Nile delta and to promote new developments out of the old Cairo. The second objective of NUCA was to provide costeffective housing units in a healthy and sustainable environment to low-income families in the city. NUCA developed many new towns in the suburbs of the city to achieve these objectives (e.g. Orabi, New Heliopolis, Al-Badr and so on). However, NUCA couldnâ&#x20AC;&#x;t achieve its objectives in these new towns because the houses in these new towns were not affordable for 15 million residents from low-income class in Cairo. The residents had no financial power to buy a house from these new towns or to live in the houses as lease holders paying the mid-cost of living in these new towns. Therefore, these people preferred to build informal settlements and squatters mostly on the private agricultural lands and to live close the Nile delta in the old Cairo in the last 30 years. Unfortunately, today, people from lowincome class are still building squatters especially on the desert land in Cairo! (no public services exist in the desert). More importantly, 2 million people are living in the cemeteries of the city in despair (e.g. city of the dead). This fact is evidence that a new social housing policy is a huge necessity for the city because people in Cairo need affordable houses, urgently.

There would be some invisible benefits of these rehabilitation and regeneration projects to the city in addition to their visible benefits (affordable housing units). For example, the security of neighbourhoods in the informal settlements is very low today because of the absent of authority in these areas. The approximately 80% of young people who are living in these areas are using narcotic drugs including marijuana, hashish and pills. These neighbourhoods were seen as illegal by the local government up to now so no public services was delivered to these areas. For example they are now deprived of many public services such as electricity, sanitation, garbage collection and so on. People living in these areas were caught diseases like Hebatit B and C because of these deprivations. I should say that the only way to promote the revenues of the local government to regeneration and rehabilitation projects in the informal settlements is the application of democracy at urban level in Cairo. If the city governors ask their inhabitants â&#x20AC;&#x17E;what is important for you (what kinds of urban projects do you want primarily), urban projects towards lowincome families will probably be settled in the front rank of the list. We all know that democratic local gov-

City of the Dead, Cairo

Political Reflection | June-July-August 2011

Therefore, in the new era, in the light of social justice value, many social house units can be built in the city with the support of the private sector. These affordable houses will probably be built on informal settlements and squatters through urban rehabilitation and regeneration projects because of the strict urban growth limitations towards agricultural lands around the city. A construction amnesty regarding the informal settlements and squatters may also be discussed in the next years because the emergence of these illegal developments is an inevitable consequence of wrong housing policies and weak urban governance in Cairo.

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Cairo | By Fatih Eren

ernance is not an obstacle for the continuation of luxury mega projects in the city because the investors, developers and users of luxury mega projects are the people who do not need public resources for the realisation of their projects in any case. The country can take an important step forward to become a social welfare state thanks to run social democracy in Cairo. Thirdly, the content and context of free zones in the city may be reconsidered due to the new social values and ideas in the next years. There are 2 free zones in Cairo at the moment (i.e. Nasr city public free zone and the tenth of Ramadan public free zone). The quality of the infrastructure is very high in these zones and they are also managed very well. These zones actually were established for two main purposes: to attract foreign capital and to increase export trade in the city. These zones have achieved their first purpose; they attracted many global investors into the city because incentives towards global investors were wonderful in the zones (i.e. no private and public tax, very low land rental and utility rates, etc.). However, these zones could not achieve their second purpose; they did not play an important role to increase export trade in the city. In contrast, they strongly encouraged import trade up to now (The trade deficit of Egypt was $6.7 billion in 2010). Therefore, in the new era, in the light of antiimperialist and social justice values, the city governors can reconsider this one-way working trade system (only from the world to Cairo, not from Cairo to the world). The local residents of Cairo earn nearly nothing from these zones. More importantly, these zones are working against local manufacturers supporting import trade but limiting export trade. In this context, the prices of land rentals and the rates of utilities towards the companies operating in these zones can be increased; also some corporate and private taxes can be requested from these companies for the city‟s benefit in the next years. The companies do not leave these zones after the increases of taxes, land rentals and the rates be-

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Cairo‟s rich architectural heritage cause of the unique and significant geo-political location of Cairo. The revenues which will be gained from the increases can be used to support local manufacturers to export their products to other countries. In conclusion, Cairo which was always an important and lively city throughout the history (the Kingdom of Egypt, the Roman Empire, the Byzantine Empire, the Islamic period) is ready to be a glorious city once again in this global age, based on the values of freedom and social justice. The beautiful girl of the Nile River can give „culture‟ and „civilization‟ lessons to the world again in the future as experienced in the past. Note: * Fatih Eren is Doctoral Researcher in Department of Town and Regional Planning, University of Sheffield. E-mail: trp07fe@sheffield.ac.uk

Political Reflection | June-July-August 2011

CHINA REVIEW

Rare Metals Industry and Pollution: Assessing Chinese Authoritarianism in the 21st Century By Nicholas Miller* and Antony Ou**

conomic Progress, Political Stability and Environmental Degradation in China

It is common sense amongst political analysts that China in the 21st century is no longer a Communist nation. Deng Xiaoping, the secondgeneration leader of the Chinese Communist Part (CCP), famous proclaimed, “Only (economic) development makes hard sense”. Economic progress was the first priority of the post-Mao China. In fact, CCP has always been embracing a very rigid type of state-capitalism (as a means to achieve democratic socialism, according to the CCP) that has focused on the encouragement of foreign investment and manufacturing exports to the rest of the world by compromising some of the basic rights its own peasants since 1978 after the Great Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). As a result, China is now the second largest economy and is the world‟s fastest growing economy. It has been sustaining an average growth rate of 9.4% for the past 30 years [1]. While China‟s economic rise is to be commended the CCP elites have been growing concerned about how to properly manage the stark economic gap between rich and poor (Gini coefficient in 2010: 0.47). Although, Deng was aware that eventually, China would become an egalitarian society by “letting some people grow rich first”, we never know when and how such an ideal can be realised. Like any developmental state, the insurmountable accumulation of wealth is concentrated in a handful of the central and local Politburo members (and their relatives) and localized capitalists. The Party keeps

Political Reflection | June-July-August 2011

maintaining its political stability and legitimacy in the eyes of the people by retaining its high economic growth rate. However, without a greater control of the widespread corruption the CCP knows it risks losing the support of the people. Economic progress has led to irreversible environmental degradation throughout the country. No country in history has ever faced the environmental problems like China now faces in the 21 st century. More than 30% of fresh water of China is now considered undrinkable by the CCP , which affects over 500 million people who are now unable to gain access to clean and safe water. Environmental pollutions of various kinds have caused a wide range of diseases that include: respiratory problems, cardiovascular damage, heavy metal poisoning, and cancer. According to the Ministry of Health, cancer has become China‟s leading cause of death and this is a direct resulted of the rampant pollution within China. Environmental pollutions have also increased the rate of social instability throughout the country. Riots and social conflicts are only going to increase in the foreseeable as long as the local Chinese authorities continue to condone irresponsible but preventable landfills and industrial waste dumping. Chinese Rare Earth Industry and Consequences In 1992, during his political tour in Southern China, Deng proudly said, “'The Middle East has its oil, China has rare earth.” Rare earth metals (fifteen lanthanoids plus scandium and yttrium) are the black diamonds of China. In fact, since the 1980s, China has

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Rare Metals Industry and Pollution | By N. Miller

dominated the market by providing over 97% of the world‟s supply, while Inner Mongolia accounts for 40% of the global production (See the map for Chinese regions of rare earth metals production). In the fall of 2010 there was the concern amongst the West over halting of rare earth metals to Japan and the United States from China. For the United States rare earth minerals are needed for a wide array of technology. There were calls from the politicians within the United States and Europe to find alternate sources of rare earth minerals to ease the West‟s reliance on China [2]. However, while China has been able to corner the market on rare earth and establish a strong dominance in its supplies it is not without a cost. The environmental toll has created a source of social instability causing great concern for the CCP that it has begun to impose further regulations on the mining of the rare earth to minimize its environmental impact. The rising pollution concern has been exacerbated because of illegal mining practices and over exporting of the minerals [3]. In the rare earth mining process it is common for numerous rivers to be come polluted during the extraction with heavy metals, ammonia, and radioactive elements. The lax enforcement in the mining has lead to greater concern for the CCP to enact stricter regulations on the mining practices in an effort to curb the protests against the various mining projects throughout the country. The village of Shangmankeng in Guangdong province serves an excellent case study of the struggles that China is facing with the environmental damage from the mining. Villagers blame the local officials, corporations, and organized crime in allowing the illegal mining operations continue. The water reservoir that is used for their rice crops and fish as no longer viable as it has become tainted with uranium and an assortment of heavy metals. The government then had the villagers moved because of the pollution and if they returned to their home village Triad members attacked them [4]. Chan Yu-fai who manages water quality testing for the Hong Kong branch of Gre-

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Rare Earth Metal Production from 1950-2006 (China’s Rare earth Dominance: http://www.wikinvest.com/wiki/China% 27s_Rare_Earth_Dominance)

enpeace has raised further concerns about the pollution level as Hong Kong frequently buys its water supplies from Heyuan‟s province Dongjiang River, which had now become too polluted from an excessive amount of uranium and rare earth mineral run off. In 2008 462 illegal mines were closed 220 were rare earth mines [5]. Though what happened in Shangmankeng village and Dongjiang River should not be considered isolated incidents, rather they are common occurrences throughout all of China. In Baotou, Inner Mongolia the pollution has killed their lakes from a rare earth mineral mine 100 miles away from the city. While the local council paid the residents compensation for their loss of income they were warned that the water needed for irrigation was no longer fit for human or animal consumption nor could it be used for irrigation. In the workshops that process the rare earth minerals the workers are frequently offered no protective clothing as they handle the chemicals [6].

While polluting plants have been closed villagers comment that they often continue to operate at night under protection of the local CCP leaders and the mafia as the business was too worth too much for it be permanently shut down. Companies have been allowed to pollute and harm their workers because of the lax environmental standards and cheap labour costs in China has made mining rare earth minerals impossible for other countries to compete. Dudley Kingsnorth, an Rare Earth Metals Production Distribution of China Australian expert on mi(Source: APN News: http://apnnews.com/2011/03/30/huge-rarening, stated that the Chineearth-deposit-discovered-in-china/)

Political Reflection | June-July-August 2011

Rare Metals Industry and Pollution | By N. Miller

se companies could operate at a third of the cost of other mining companies because of their lax standards. He estimated that it would take at least ten years before China could reach Australian level mining regulations [7].

fely feed its people or irrigate its crops let alone the unknown health burden that the country is facing in the future because of the lax environmental regulation [9]. Conclusion

Environmental protests are rising throughout China as more people are voicing their concerns about the environmental pollution [8]. The growing social instability over environmental damage is of concern to the CCP and while there have been efforts to improve the mining procedures into a more sustainable practice for China. It is unknown whether the fiats handed by the central government will be properly enforced at the local level. Without the proper enforcement throughout all levels of government and only targeted attack on corruption within the Party the illegal mining will continue and will only impede the Party‟s ability to sustain its economic growth. Achieving China‟s impressive economic growth will be meaningless if the government will be unable to sa-

Leung Man-to, a Hong Kong cultural commentator, argues that for most of the general citizens of China, they never ask for a full-fledged democracy. They only humbly request for a “ordinary” society. By “ordinary” it means a society that cherishes justice and minimal standard of due process. In other words, even if economic stability is guaranteed in the next 20 years, there is a growing political and social pressures among Chinese citizens are inevitable. Such pressures are further compounded by the deterioration of citizens‟ habitats since by any standard, any “ordinary” society should obviously ensure the rights to breathe fresh air and drink clean water.

Notes: * Nicholas J.S. Miller graduated in 2010 from Flinders University in Adelaide, Australia with a concentration in International Relations. E-mail: nicholasjsmiller@gmail.com ** Antony Ou is a PhD Researcher of University of Sheffield, the China Review editor of Political Reflection Magazine, and the China Representative of CESRAN. His monograph, Just War and the Confucian Classics: A Gongyangzhuan Analysis, has been published and is available at amazon.com. E-mail: ouantony@gmail.com | Twitter: https://twitter.com/ouantony | Douban: http://www.douban.com/ people/ouantony/ | Sina Weibo: http://t.sina.com.cn/ouantony 1) For a general review of the Chinese economy since 1949, please see China Focus, CESRAN, under the section of Economy: http://cesran.org/index.php? option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=261&Itemid=283&lang=en 2) Judy Dempsey, “Germany to Raise Alarm Over China Rare Earth Restrictions at G-20,” The New York Times, 21 October 2010.; Judy Dempsey, “Decline in Rare-Earth Exports Rattles Germany,” The New York Times, 19 October 2010.; Tiffany Hsu, “As China slashes exports of rare earth elements, U.S. mine digs for more,” Los Angeles Times, 20 February 2011.; Keith Bradsher, “Taking a Risk for Rare Earths,” The New York Times, 8 March 2011. 3) “China may further tighten environmental standards for rare earth production,” Xinhua, 07 November 2010.; “China to control rare earth extraction, pollution,” Reuters, 7 January 2011. 4) “South China Villagers Slam Pollution from Rare Earth Mine,” Radio Free Asia, 22 February 2008. http:// www.rfa.org/english/news/china_pollution-20080222.html 5) “South China Villagers Slam Pollution from Rare Earth Mine,” Radio Free Asia, 22 February 2008. 6) Lindsey Hilsum, “Chinese pay toxic price for a green world,” The Sunday Times, 6 December 2009. 7) Lindsey Hilsum, “Chinese pay toxic price for a green world,” The Sunday Times, 6 December 2009. 8) Malcolm Moore, “China‟s Middle-Class Rise Up in Environmental Protests,” The Telegraph, 23 November 2009.; Austin Ramzy, “China Environmental Protests Gather Force,” Time, 23 November 2009.; a more updated list on environmental protests can be found at The Wilson Center - http://www.wilsoncenter.org/ index.cfm?fuseaction=topics.item&news_id=237983&topic_id=1421#protests 9) “Rare Earth Mining Zones Aim For Sustainable Use,” Xinhua, 11 February 2011.; “New Standards for Rare Earth Sector,” China Daily, 7 January 2011.; “Rare Earth industry to be regulated,” Global Times, 15 February 2011.; Keith Bradsher, “In China, Ilegal Rare Earth Mines Face Crackdown,” The New York Times, 29 December 2010.; “China cap emissions for rare earth miners,” Agence France Presse, 1 March 2011.

Political Reflection | June-July-August 2011

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About the CESRAN | Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis The CENTRE FOR STRATEGIC RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS (CESRAN) is a private, non-political, non-profit, internet-based organization of scholars who are interested in world politics, and enthusiastic about contributing to the field of international relations as not only academics, but also practitioners. The underlying motive behind the foundation of the CESRAN is a need to bridge the gap between the students of international relations and practitioners of international politics. In this regard, the main ideal is gathering people, who come from different backgrounds and have different perspectives, around the CESRAN in order to yield fresh and illuminating insights as to how the international relations is carried out in a globalizing world. To this end, the CESRAN aims at establishing and maintaining close contact with and between politicians, bureaucrats, business people, and academics that would lead to the development of better policies. We invite anyone who shares these interests to become a member and participate in our activities.

Email: info@cesran.org

Members of the Executive Board of the CESRAN: Özgür TÜFEKÇİ, Chairman (King’s College London, UK) Alper Tolga BULUT, Vice-Chairman (University of Houston, USA) Kadri Kaan RENDA, Vice-Chairman (King’s College London, UK) Aksel ERSOY, Member (University of Birmingham, UK) Ali Onur ÖZÇELİK, Member (University of Sheffield, UK) Hüsrev TABAK, Member (University College London, UK) Abdullah UZUN, Member (Karadeniz Technical University, Turkey)

Members of the Council of the CESRAN: Prof. Mark BASSIN (Södertörn University, Sweden) Prof. Bülent GÖKAY (Keele University, UK) Prof. Bayram GÜNGÖR (Karadeniz Technical University, Turkey) Prof. Alp ÖZERDEM (Coventry University, UK) Mr Bill PARK (King’s College London, UK) Prof. İbrahim SİRKECİ (Regent’s College, UK) Prof. Birol YEŞİLADA (Portland State University, USA)

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CHINA REVIEW

An Analysis of Chinese Naval Deployments in International Waters Is There a Significant Policy Change with the PRC‟s Recent Deployment of Ships to the Gulf of Aden?

By Dr. Jean-Paul Gagnon*

The

central aim of this paper is to try and understand the significance of China‟s recent naval activity off the coast of Somalia. To do this, we will first examine the extant literature concerning previous naval deployments. Secondly, we will scrutinize the Gulf of Aden deployment to a greater degree. Finally, we will comparatively analyse these deployments to see if there are any significant differences. The importance of conducting this investigation lies with the potential to contribute to a body of knowledge: that of the PRC‟s shifts in foreign policy. We might gain a better understanding of how China has used its navy in foreign policy and perhaps what this means for the future of international security, political economy, and humanitarianism with the growth of the Beijing Consensus.

Political Reflection | June-July-August 2011

Historical Deployments into “Blue Water” Lo (1955) argues that, for one, previous understandings of China as being a land-based country with weak naval power is largely a misrepresentation of history. This argument, as will come to be seen, could also be used today as several publications in the literature depict China‟s navy as being comparatively weak to the USA‟s. I do not feel that China‟s main purpose is the global domination of this world‟s “blue water” but rather the protection of her strategic interests, the furthering of her humanitarian and diplomatic goals, and the desire to participate at the global scale more effectively in many ways (trade, development, research and security for example) [1]. This however, is not meant to reflect any naiveté on my part as we are all aware of the PRC‟s dealings with Tibet, Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan (I am critical of the PRC in all of these situa-

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Chinese Naval Deployments | By Jean-Paul Gagnon

tions) as well as her imperialist and often hawkish history. What is meant to be said is that perhaps any fear-mongering in the literature (a Europe or USA versus China approach, see Kristof, 1993, for an older example) is misplaced and parochial, but that is an argument for a separate forum. Our focus here is to try and explore China‟s previous naval deployments so as to gain a sense of this country‟s foreign policy themes when it comes to the navy. To get back on track with Lo (1955), he argued that “China was a naval power during the late Sung, Yüan and early Ming periods” which went beyond “coastal wars [designed] to carry out invasions of Korea and Indo-China…” (Lo, 1955: 489). We see that, at least during the Southern Sung period (early 12th century) the Sungs had a navy capable of patrolling and protecting her territory between the Han and Yangtze rivers. This navy apparently held support from the population it protected and drew extensively not from land-men, but sea-farers from a sea-going merchant class. But this was a considerable amount of time ago and probably does not reflect modern events very well.

This type of regional focus was apparently still being conveyed in the 1980s as can be seen in this quote: The author [Howarth, 2006] notes that the Commander-in-Chief of the PLA Navy from 1982 until 1988, Liu Huaqing played a very important role in naval modernization. In the 1980s, when setting up the blueprints for PLA Navy‟s modernization, Liu determined that PLA Navy should aim to be capable of controlling the “first chain of islands” by the year 2000, the first phase of the strategy for PLA Navy‟s development, and the “second chain of islands” by 2020. The third phase of Liu‟s maritime strategy was to create a blue-water navy capable of exercising a global influence [not domination] by 2050. (Lijun, 2006) But as can now be seen with PLAN‟s (People‟s Liberation Army Navy) activities in the Indian Ocean, Huaqing‟s aims are perhaps ahead of schedule. It seems that analysts outside of China also may have underestimated the PRC‟s capacity for rapid naval development. Rae (1993) for example stated

“The most significant conseShould we skip ahead to The doctrinal underpinnings quence of Liang‟s mission was an undertaking by Peking to 1909, we see that the of China's naval modernisapurchase warships in the Unit“decrepit imperial Chinese tion programme are lowed States valued at $15,000,000 government announced… level warfare, the developand to request the services of the impending departure for ment of rapid deployment American naval officers in a Europe and the United forces, and the pursuit of a model squadron” States of a naval commisblue water navy status. The sion” (Braisted, 1968: 51). objective underpinning this This apparently led to ecoemphasis is the protection nomic contracts between the USA and China conof China's claims to sovereignty over disputed cerning the sale from the former and delivery of namaritime areas. (Rae, 1993:53) val materiel to the latter. “The most significant consequence of Liang‟s mission was an undertaking by Although much of this can be said to have hapPeking to purchase warships in the United States pened, we see that the PLAN is now operating stravalued at $15,000,000 and to request the services tegically in blue water for purposes that might be of American naval officers in a model squadsaid to be beyond concerns over sovereignty. Theron” (Braisted, 1968: 53). The turbulence of the se two quotes might give us an indication of what 1911-1912 revolution in China did affect relations some of the purposes and intents of the PLAN are. between the USA‟s sanctioned companies, like They also give us an indication of how China used Bethlehem Steel, selling goods but did not apparand wished to use its navy: for strategic local deently shift the reason the former or succeeded Pefence and eventually blue water operability. But king governments wanted a navy: it was to try and this, it appears, has changed. We see for example strengthen the sovereignty of China most likely that China‟s need for natural resources, especially against the USA, rapidly industrialising Japan, Korare metals, is growing and that its economy is inrea, Russian growth in the “East,” and European creasingly dependent on these resources. Perhaps powers encroaching in Indo-China [2]. It would, of this provided the incentive for PLAN‟s deployment course, do little if nothing to fight dissent within Chito the Gulf of Aden. The PRC needed its sea lanes na. protected from pirating. It needed to show other African states its commitment to their security, and

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Political Reflection | June-July-August 2011

Chinese Naval Deployments | By Jean-Paul Gagnon

as Antony Ou suggested in personal correspondence, perhaps China needed to deploy because traditional “blue water police” (USA and Britain) were overcommitted elsewhere which left a gap to fill. To finish and bring us up to date on possible reasons for PLAN‟s modernisation and current actions, O‟Rourke (2009) is central. O‟Rourke argued that as of 2009 deliberations concerning the USA‟s need to counter the growth of PLAN were very much underway. This report indicates that PLAN is perhaps not seeking to develop a fleet the size of the USA‟s, but rather develop a strategic, small and technologically cutting-edge fleet which could do immense damage to US ships: including perhaps the greatest fear, bringing down an aircraft carrier. This O‟Rourke says, would be a “national catastrophe” (O‟Rourke, 2009: 20) and is perhaps one reason why PLAN may not be developing in what might be called the “traditional” sense. Why build massively expensive ships which would risk the loss of large numbers of life and perhaps be contrary to the strategy of the “Beijing Consensus”? The Gulf of Aden Deployment It appears that this deployment of ships to the coast of Somalia and along the trade routes of goods through other high risk pirating areas is an unprecedented move. Going beyond much of the literature focusing on the security threats of the PLAN‟s growth, Guoxing (1998) argues that China‟s policy in the South China Sea (and perhaps now elsewhere) is not simply its desire to defend its sovereign territories and interests. It is also the development of a navy that “has sought to adopt a conciliatory and flexible attitude, which includes „shelving

Pirating Zones in the Indian Ocean

the disputes and working for joint development‟, and the peaceful settlement of these disputes…” (Guoxing, 1998: 101). Some might ask how the PLAN could contribute to development, and I think the answer lies specifically with the geopolitics of the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Should we take Figures 1 and 2 into consideration, and the circled regions within them (commonly known high risk pirate zones) [3] we can see that much of China‟s trade necessarily traverses some risky waters. Whether boats are transporting goods from east Africa, western Latin America, or Australia, there are Somali, Burmese, and Samoan/ Tongan/Papua New Guinean pirates to contend with. We should also consider that other countries dependent on sea trade face the same difficulty which is an area the PLAN could assist in: simply keeping pirates at bay by policing trade routes could have positive impacts on economic development. This could significantly improve the development of countries trading through their ports and might be a big factor for PLAN‟s deployment off the coast of Somalia and in the Arabian Gulf. Illustrating this potential new change of policy are two quotes. The first concerns China‟s UNSC (United Nations Security Council) vote supporting naval deployment off the coast of Somalia. The second is probably the most important as it shows that there are growing calls (thought to be unprecedented) within the PRC for offshore support for their navy. 1)

The United Nations Security Council has unanimously voted to allow countries to send warships into Somalia‟s territorial waters to tackle pirates...China, Vietnam and Libya

One Pirating Zone in the Pacific

Chinese Naval Deployments | By Jean-Paul Gagnon

said they voted for the measure because it only applies to Somalia, and does not affect the sovereignty of other countries (Africa Research Bulletin, 2008: 17583) 2)

Due to self-imposed policy, the People's Republic of China (PRC) does not base military forces in foreign countries, and PRC officials have used this as evidence of China's peaceful development. However, China's growing global economic and political interests are causing Beijing to take a more nuanced approach to its policies regarding the deployment and employment of military force. Specifically, the ongoing deployment of People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) warships to the Gulf of Aden, now in the sixth rotation of combatants, to guard international shipping against pirates operating from the Horn of Africa has highlighted the need for shorebased logistics support for PLAN forces operating in the Indian Ocean. Over the past year, public statements by Chinese academics and government officials have indicated that there is a debate going on in China over the need to establish some sort of overseas infrastructure to support deployed naval forces. Rear Admiral Yin Zhou (Retired), chairman of the Chinese Navy Informatization Experts Advisory Committee, opined during an interview on China National Radio in December 2009 that China requires a "stable and permanent supply and repair base." (Kostecka, 2011: 59)

Conclusion As can be seen, China‟s navy or the People‟s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is apparently in a phase of expansion. McVadon (2006) argues that the PRC is both trying to have a more sophisticated navy to act as a deterrent (a US technique during the Cold War) and to apparently deter Taiwan‟s movement toward independence which the PRC considers to be a threat to Chinese sovereignty [4]. While the capability to thwart Taiwan‟s aspirations of independence remained central, he revised the definition of the navy‟s „offshore defence‟ strategy to encompass not only coastaldefence missions, but also what could be termed as „sea-denial‟ missions far into the ocean. Since then, Chinese naval strategists have articulated a broad range of objectives: to provide greater defensive depth for China‟s coastal cities; to pro-

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tect its maritime rights and interests; and to defend its sea lanes, particularly those across the Indian Ocean which provide a crucial gateway for energy imports and commercial exports. Together, these strategic themes have been translated into new doctrines to conduct either singleservice operations, like anti-ship or sea-traffic defence, or joint deployments, such as antisurface operations. These were encapsulated in the New Generation Operations Regulations in 1999. (Nicoll and Delaney, 2008: 1) Erickson (2008) also argues that the growth and maturation of the PLAN largely concerns the protection of its sea-going trade routes: especially in the Indian Ocean which was seen to be a widely held opinion in the literature (see Kaplan, 2009, [5] for one example or the quote above for another). We also covered the argument that the PLAN might currently be, or could eventually be, a useful tool for development and humanitarian aid à la Beijing Consensus. Most importantly, we saw in a rather brief discussion, that this deployment of the PLAN to the Gulf of Aden is perhaps the most significant move in the history of Chinese naval activities (or what I have come to call “Ou‟s Hypothesis”). Traditionally, the navy was probably concerned solely with the strategic interests of its coastal waters, of defending its sovereign territory, of keeping its imperialistic options open with concern to indochina, Korea, Japan and eventually the Indian Ocean. This was not only a matter of security, but also of trade. However, perhaps due to the speeding of globalization and the recent sustained high growth of the Chinese economy, the PLAN is operating far from its territorial waters. It is perhaps doing so not only for security and trade, but also for humanitarian and diplomatic reasons. We also see, perhaps for the first time publicly, the intention to have support for its navy in international waters outside of Chinese territory which is something that might eventually come to compromise the sovereignty or security of countries near these bases. To end, it appears that “Ou‟s Hypothesis” has proven correct and that we are entering a new phase of the PLAN. I feel that China does not have an intention to follow the militarization path of the USA which is increasingly proving highly unpopular and the PLAN might be said to be trying to help humanity through its own methods of development. But there is, as perhaps always, the dark side of the coin that we must consider. Will this new PLAN seek to defend the PRC‟s unethical dimensions of

Political Reflection | June-July-August 2011

Chinese Naval Deployments | By Jean-Paul Gagnon

trade which some argue are at the expense of human rights and democratization in Africa for its own domestic needs?

Erickson, Andrew S. 2008. “The Growth of China‟s Navy: Implications for Indian Ocean Security.” Strategic Analysis. 32(4): 655-676.

Notes:

Guoxing, JI. 1998. “China Versus South China Sea Security.” Security Dialogue. 29: 101-112.

* Dr. Jean-Paul Gagnon is a social and political theorist with a Ph.D. in political science. He completed his doctorate at the Queensland University of Technology under the aegis of Australia‟s prestigious Endeavour Award. 1) Cole (2001) supports this argument. 2) Wright (2008), Richards (2002), Naranarayan (1981), Downs (1968) and Xi (2010) remind us of the British and American opium trade in China and its neighbouring regions. The memory of the opium wars and popular opposition to opium in China could have been a factor in wanting to strengthen China‟s navy: water travel was the primary method of entry and departure of opium. 3) See ICC (2011) for high-risk pirating zones. 4) We also learn, from the same source, that China is not only developing but diversifying its nuclear submarines. For example two classes of nuclear submarines, the Jin and the Shang, are both in service where “from a few years ago…serving on troubled Chinese nuclear submarines was thought by some to be as much a joke as a job” (McVadon, 2006:103). 5) Kaplan (2009) convincingly notes the growing importance of understanding the geopolitics of the Indian Ocean. With the rise of China and India, as well as the central importance of Africa and Latin America for rare metals and natural resources, it seems reasonable that we should heed to this call. Works Cited: Africa Research Bulletin. June, 2008. “Somalia: Navies to Tackle Pirates.” Pp. 17583-17584. Braisted, William R. 1968. “China, the United States Navy, and the Bethlehem Steel Company, 19091929.” Business History Review. 42. Cole, Bernard D. 2001. The Great Wall at Sea: China‟s Navy Enters the Twenty-First Century. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press. Downs, Jacques M. 1968. “American Merchants and the China Opium Trade, 1800-1840.” Business History Review. 42(4): 418.

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Howarth, Peter. 2006. China‟s Rising Sea Power: The PLA Navy‟s Submarine Challenge. London: Routledge. International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). 2011. “Piracy Prone Areas and Warnings.” Online Source: http://www.icc-ccs.org/home/piracy-reportingcentre/prone-areas-and-warnings. Accessed 31/03/2011. Kaplan, Robert D. 2009. “Center Stage for the Twenty-First Century: Power Plays in the Indian Ocean.” Foreign Affairs. 16. Kostecka, Daniel J. 2011. “Places and Bases: The Chinese Navy‟s Emerging Support Network in the Indian Ocean.” Naval War College Review. 64(1): 59-77. Lijun, Sheng. 2006. “China‟s Rising Sea Power: The PLA Navy‟s Submarine Challenge. By Peter Howarth. London and New York: Routledge, 2006. Hardcover: 198pp.” Contemporary and South East Asia: A Journal of International & Strategic Affairs. 28(3): 528-30. McVadon, Eric A. 2006. “China‟s Maturing Navy.” Naval War College Review. 59(2): 90-107. Naranarayan, Das. 1981. “Opium War.” China Report. 17(3): 57. Nicoll, Alexander, and Jessica Delaney. 2008. “China‟s Navy: Drive for Modernisation.” IISS Strategic Comments. 14(1): 1-2. O‟Rourke, Ronald. 2009. “China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities – Background and Issues for Congress.” Congressional Research Service. Richards, John F. 2002. “The Opium Industry in British India.” The Indian Economic and Social History Review. 39(2-3): 149. Wright, Ashley. 2008. “Opium in British Burma, 1826-1881.” Contemporary Drug Problems. 35: 611 -646. Xi, Gao. 2010. “The Truth and Evils of Opium: The Anti-Opium Activities of British Missionary to China John Dudgeon (1837-1901).” Frontiers of History in China. 5(3): 453.

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EURASIA REVIEW

The First Ten Years of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) By Prof. Richard Rousseau*

en years after its establishment on June 15, 2001, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), successor to the original Group of Five (Shanghai Five), is still in a state of flux. Its continued existence though has resulted in it becoming largely entrenched in the political-economic landscape of Central, South and East Asian countries [1].

The SCO acts as a regional security organization, whose members include China, Russia and the four Central Asian republics (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan), covering an area of 30 million square kilometers with a population of 1,455 billion people, or one quarter of the worldâ&#x20AC;&#x;s total population. It is governed from Beijing and it operates in a highly diverse political environment. Its activities are highly diverse. It also serves as a forum for maintaining relations with other major Asian countries in various spheres. It has accepted a few new members since 2001. Mongolia has held observer status since 2004, and India, Iran and Pakistan became also observers the following year. Diplomats from Afghanistan and Turkmenistan regularly attend its conferences as guests, while Belarus and Sri Lanka are also now affiliated with the organization as dialogue partners. In recent years the SCO has developed relations with regional and international institutions, such as the European Un-

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ion, the Commonwealth of Independent States, the association of South East Asian Nations, the Collective Security Treaty Organization and others. The SCO has also an observer status at the UN General Assembly [2]. The SCO is more than an instrument for the consolidation of political and economic relations of its member states; the organization represents a Chinese attempt to create a system of regional cooperation that it can use to further its foreign policy objectives in its neighborhood. As it operates in an area with amble room to engage in strategic maneuvers, the SCO is seeking ways to enhance its already considerable sway by admitting new members, discussing how to deal with the war in Afghanistan and developing energy cooperation. These issues continue to be high on its current discussion agenda. The future will demonstrate whether or not it will have to adopt an operational plan agreed upon by both Russia and China in order to fulfill its ambitious program. The delicate balance of interests between Moscow and Beijing significantly affects the groupâ&#x20AC;&#x;s ability to act in a concerted fashion and an incisive way. Origin and mission The Shanghai-based inter-governmental body has continually sought to expand on its founding pur-

Political Reflection | June-July-August 2011

SCO | By Prof. Richard Rousseau

pose since its establishment ten years ago. It has proved its ability to effectively act as more of an inter-regional cooperation mechanism than the Group of Five (China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) ever did. Although the Group of Five‟s work basically hinged around strengthening border security, the SCO soon put forth a more comprehensive and integrated form of collaboration. Its Charter of Establishment, signed as a treaty in 2002 in St. Petersburg, and the nature of the organization as defined under international law, detailed its prerogatives, the main ones being the maintenance of security and stability in spheres of political, economic and cultural relations between its members [3]. Combating terrorism, separatism and fundamentalism – threats shared by individual countries – are objectives high on the agenda of the SCO. This was demonstrated in 2004 with the establishment of the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS), which became a permanent body aimed at developing common strategies in these areas. There are also coordination programs in the spheres of trade, technology, tourism, transport and energy. These activities are funded internally, which helps to ensure the dominance of China and Russia, the two wealthiest countries within the group. They continue to be the main financial contributors to the organization (it is estimated that Beijing and Moscow have donated funding amounting to $900 million and $500 million, respectively). The summit held in Tashkent in June 2004 saw the establishment of a General Secretariat for the organization, which, in addition to the RATS, has fostered greater institutional development of the SCO as a whole. As a result, the organization is now equipped with coordination and representation mechanisms, enabling the organization to function during intervals between meetings and the various forums organized by its constituent groups [4].

Partner and Guest Attendance. However, the SCO has not added one full-fledged member since its establishment in 2001. Only Mongolia has a real opportunity of being granted full membership status any time soon. One of the most difficult questions at present is how to deal with the possible accession of India and Pakistan. This question is being held in abeyance, though there is a shared desire amongst members to accept the simultaneous entry of these two countries. Part of the problem is that longstanding IndoPakistani friction over the contested region of Kashmir might impact the stability of the SCO were India and Pakistan brought into its realm. This is a simmering issue, and further discussion and debate would be moot if Beijing were not significantly involved in it, as China, which controls part of the Aksai Chin and Shaksgam districts, would eventually force the members to take one side or the other in the territorial dispute. This would negatively affect the cohesion, operational efficiency and external perception of the organization as a whole. Furthermore, the fact that India and Pakistan are de facto nuclear powers, although they have not signed the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), is incompatible with the objectives underlying the SCO‟s desire to enhance regional security and, in particular, promote disarmament and arms control agreements. Another point of contention is the status of the Islamic Republic of Iran within the organization. Alt-

Obstacles to enlargement The accession of new members continues to remain one of the most controversial issues the SCO executive faces. Many countries, each having their own unique features and interests, wish to negotiate their accession to the organization on terms which best suit them. The status within the organization can vary: full Member, Observer (created in 2008), Dialogue

Political Reflection | June-July-August 2011

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SCO | By Prof. Richard Rousseau

hough it has not made a formal application for SCO membership, since 2007 the Iranian government has been claiming that it is no longer satisfied with mere Observer status. However, the extension of full participation in the SCO to a country under active UN sanctions would doubtless hinder the SCO‟s activities and cause disagreements with the international community. In this sense, the SCO‟s hesitation to accept Iran as a new member should be interpreted as a clear sign that the SCO wants first and foremost to be perceived by the international community as a credible and responsible regional player. The participation of Iran in the SCO would also make the organization appear more anti-American, making it more difficult for it to confirm its stated neutrality. Therefore, rather than expanding the membership in order to face the problem of managing new regional threats, the SCO decided to offer varying levels of participation in the organization (the Observer group, SCOAfghanistan Contact Group and the Dialogue Partner are some examples). Such status designations promote the maintenance of mutually beneficial relationships with all those countries and stakeholders interested in the SCO, whilst at the same time enabling it to sidestep the difficulties of managing larger full participation [5].

matization of its involvement in the region. In 2005 the protocol for the establishment of a SCOAfghanistan Contact Group was signed to promote initiatives aimed at reconstruction, peacekeeping and fighting terrorism. In 2009, at the Moscow SCO conference (at which, for the first time, Western observers were involved, in particular representatives of NATO, the EU, the OSCE and the U.S.), the organization presented itself as the essential mediator for encouraging dialogue with the Taliban in Afghanistan. The last two years have witnessed the closest cooperation to date between NATO and the SCO. However, the impression of a majority of members is that the interest of the SCO to be active in Afghanistan was primarily prompted by a unilateral Russian initiative. In 2009, Moscow has certainly taken advantage of holding the SCO Presidency to reassert its presence in South Asia. The prospects of building a bridge between the SCO and Euro-Atlantic institutions (the EU and NATO), actually provides Moscow with a unique opportunity to truly emphasize its geopolitical importance, and thus increase its prestige within in the SCO at the same time. However, any involvement of the SCO in the Afghan conflict would at variance with the organization‟s official aims and objectives.

The Afghan issue The common interest in establishing a peaceful Afghanistan has offered an excellent opportunity to boost the active participation in the affairs of the players most vulnerable to the effects of the crisis in that country, i.e. its Central Asian SCO member neighbors. The socio-political instability in Afghanistan, which increases the export of crime and terrorism and stimulates drug trafficking in its border areas, has actually led to the SCO‟s further legiti-

“

The prospects of building a bridge between the SCO and Euro-Atlantic institutions (the EU and NATO), actually pro-

vides Moscow with a unique opportunity to truly emphasize its geopolitical im-

Energy Cooperation

portance, and thus increase its prestige

Another sector offering great potential for cooperation is the energy sphere given Central Asia‟s abun-

within in the SCO at the same time.”

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There is no permanent military structure within the SCO that can be made available to member countries; it has therefore no an autonomous capacity to take military action (it should be noted that its frequent military exercises are purely for demonstration purposes). Moreover, a deep internal split exists over whether the organization should develop such a force. Beijing, which is now actually leading the group, favors a less restrictive type of partnership arrangement. Other members of the SCO, such as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, appear to be much more concerned about and actively preoccupied with their own internal security than with the level of security abroad. However, the desire to work with NATO on specific security projects in the Central Asian region, reaffirmed in final declaration of the June 2010 summit in Tashkent, is still a positive sign when it comes to openness to dialogue on security matters [6].

Political Reflection | June-July-August 2011

SCO | By Prof. Richard Rousseau

dant gas, oil and petroleum reserves. A multi-lateral organization exercising legitimate joint control over these sources and working together to coordinate their exploitation might seriously influence the global balance of power. The opportunity – already identified in 2007 by the then Russian President Vladimir Putin – of creating a unified energy market through the conclusion of preferential agreements between SCO member countries has long been of interest to Moscow and Beijing. Moreover, joint development of energy resources by Russia, China and Central Asian countries could be beneficial to all stakeholders: it would make them energy self-sufficient and more resilient to external factors. Strategically, such integration would provide an additional incentive for the development of the SCO and give it greater influence at the international level. At present, however, the every country for itself principle prevails. For instance, in the energy sector the interests of Central Asian countries are far from always coinciding and China, which seeks at all costs to maintain its growth rate, gives top priority to its own selfinterest by applying a form of pressure and penetration that leaves no room for developing coordinated policies [7]. Internal Dynamics: the Chinese Leadership The potential of the SCO is compromised by its inability to act in a methodical and coordinated manner. Lack of cohesion amongst its members and the ambiguity of its policy have led to what otherwise was favorable external conditions turned into missed opportunities. The SCO could not put forth a common view even in the face of the crisis in Kyrgyzstan in 2010, when its only contribution, quite negligible, was to send observers to monitors the constitutional referendum held in the aftermath of the uprising. While, at the ninth SCO summit held in Tashkent in 2010 its leaders proclaimed it had become an “effective organization committed to stability and prosperity in the region,” its subsequent actions proved devoid of any content. What‟s more, China has largely delegated to the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in Moscow the practical implementation of the initiatives necessary to normalize the situation Kyrgyzstan. Such empirical evidence suggests that this lack of response in the face of what is happening in one of its member states demonstrates that the organization is inefficient [8].

Political Reflection | June-July-August 2011

“

The potential of the SCO is compromised by its inability to act in a methodical and coordinated manner. Lack of cohesion amongst its members and the ambiguity of its policy have led to what otherwise was favorable external conditions turned into missed opportunities.”

The two pillar-based governance of the SCO limits its practical ability to take any meaningful action. For instance, the highly dynamic approach of Russia, now ready to assume major responsibilities in the political-military sphere, is ill-matched with the approach of offering low-profile assistance, mainly focused on economic cooperation, favored in Beijing. Moscow wants to transform the SCO into a collective security force but it still lacks clear direction in how best to achieve the aim of economic integration. In China‟s view, however, the alliance is a vehicle with which Beijing can extend its political and economic influence to Central Asia, i.e., to the countries its main partner is seeking to isolate in order to restore an all-encompassing control over former Soviet republics. Sino-Russian bilateral relations are therefore a source of potential destabilization for the SCO, which is partially contained by their primary common goal of maintaining the regional status quo. The preservation of Russia‟s control over the postSoviet republics is off-set and balanced by China‟s desire for economic growth, both objectives being furthered by a policy of mutual restraint. However, such internal contradictions prevent the SCO from defining a clear strategic vision and obtaining unanimous consent from the membership. Preference has so far been afforded to the Chinese organizational model over the Russian one, making the SCO unwilling (despite Russia‟s intentions) to develop as an approximate form of Asian NATO [9]. Future Prospects Regardless of the obvious potential the group holds, based on population, territorial size, resources and economies of its current and prospective members, and the geopolitical significance this

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SCO | By Prof. Richard Rousseau

international coalition has, many large questions remain about the actual capacity of the SCO to fulfill its intended program. (The notion of its role in the international system is still rather indistinct and matters are complicated by the incomplete sharing of strategic objectives by its members, which in turn waters down the implementation of pragmatic and beneficial multilateral cooperation. The imbalance in its internal policy in favor of Beijing leads it to take a less proactive approach to economic cooperation, which creates fundamental weaknesses for the organization as a whole [10].

A new dynamic within the SCO could only develop following a substantial reconfiguration of the relations between Moscow and China, as the “convergences and differences” in Sino-Russian relations are currently fully manifested in the structure, development direction and work of the organization. However, its future orientation and effectiveness will largely depend on the degree of mutual trust and understanding that its two main partners are able to achieve and how effectively they will be are able to balance the needs of other members with those of aspiring members.

Notes: * Richard Rousseau is Professor of International Relations at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy in Baku and contributor to Global Brief, World Affairs in the 21st Century. 1) Sean Yom, The Future of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Harvard Asia Quarterly (VI.4), Autumn 2002. 2) Roger N. McDermott, The Rising Dragon: SCO Peace Mission 2007, Occasional papers, The Jamestown Foundation, October 2007. 3) Shanghai Five Expands to Combat Islamic Radicals, Jane‟s Terrorism & Security Monitor, July 1, 2001; Dmitri Kosyrev, Globalism Triumphs in Shanghai Organisation Summitry, CDI Russia Weekly, May 29, 2003. http://www.cdi.org/russia/259-17.cfm 4) The SCO‟s Ambitious Aims, Jane‟s Intelligence Digest, June 25, 2004; Robert Karnoil, Shanghai Cooperation Organization – Partners in Peace, Jane‟s Defence Weekly, July 27, 2005; Sergei Blagov, CIS, Shanghai Group Herald Cooperation Deal, Eurasia Daily Monitor, April 19, 2005; SCO Seeks New Integration Models, RIA Novosti, Aug. 10, 2005. 5) Joseph Ferguson, The Ural Summits: BRIC and SCO, Eurasia Daily Monitor, June 22, 2009. 6) John Hill, China, Russia Rethink Shanghai Grouping, Jane‟s Intelligence Review, Jan. 1, 2003; Alexander Yakovenko, Spirit of Shanghai: From Settling Border Issues to Multilateral Regional Cooperation, RIA Novosti, Aug. 10, 2005; Stephen Blank, The Shanghai Cooperation organization: Cracks Behind the Facade, Eurasia Insight, June 21, 2006. 7) Sergei Blagov, Shanghai Cooperation Organization Eyes Economic, Security Cooperation, Eurasia Daily monitor, October 31, 2005; Sergei Blagov, Russia sees SCO as Potential Energy Cartel, Eurasia Daily Monitor, December 5, 2006; Erica Marat, SCO Summit Focuses on Energy Cooperation, Eurasia Daily Monitor, August 17, 2007. 8) Beijing‟s Central Asia Strategy, Jane‟s Intelligence Digest, Oct. 3, 2003; Marat Yermukanov, Beijing Moves to Increase Influence in Central Asia, Eurasia Daily Monitor, July 7, 2005; China, Kazakhstan May Sign $10 Billion Accord for Oil, Bloomberg, April 11, 2009; Kyrgyzstan unrest timed to coincide with SCO summit | Features, RIA Novosti, June 15, 2010. 9) John Hill, China, Russia Rethink Shanghai Grouping, Jane‟s Intelligence Review, Jan. 1, 2003; Sergei Blagov, Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit Suggests New Russia-China Links, Eurasia Daily Monitor, July 6, 2005; Geo-Political and Geo-Strategic Designs of China and Russia in Central Asia: Implications for USA and Rest of the Region, Kyrgyzstan Development Gateway, Aug. 17, 2005; Russia unveils new national security strategy, People's Daily Online, May 15, 2009. 10) Shanghai Five Expands to Combat Islamic Radicals, Jane‟s Terrorism & Security Monitor, July 1, 2001; Alexander Yakovenko, Spirit of Shanghai: From Settling Border Issues to Multilateral Regional Cooperation, RIA Novosti, Aug. 10, 2005; Kathy Gannon, Replay of the Great Game in Central Asia, The Moscow Times, Aug. 18, 2005; Erica Marat, Afghanistan: NATO Out, SCO In? Eurasia Daily Monitor, May 20, 2011.

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Political Reflection | June-July-August 2011

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FILM REVIEW

Spirited Away: A Glance at Hayao Miyazaki By Enes Erbay*

“For the people who used to be 10 years old, and for the people who are going to be 10 years old” is the definition of the movie Spirited Away by its director Hayao Miyazaki.

pirited Away (the original title: Sen to Chihiro no kamikakushi) is Hayao Miyazaki‟s animation which was made in Japan in 2001. The movie made a huge success all over the world and became the most watched movie ever in Japan. The success brought several awards such as the Golden Bear in the 52nd Berlin Film Festival and the Best Animation Oscar in the 75th Academy Awards.

Spirited Away is about Chihiro‟s journey to be a grown up and to learn the responsibility of standing on her feet alone while experiencing the magic of love with Haku. The 10 year old Chihiro and her family have to move to another city due to the change in her father‟s career. When Chihiro and her family are on a trip to their new home, they experience many exciting events. After they lost their way in jungle, they find a tunnel which connects the real world to the world of souls. When they go through the tunnel, they find their selves in a world of wonders: A bathhouse designed for gods... Chihiro‟s parents turn into pigs because of their humanistic weaknesses and of their greed. This place was designed for only gods. In the world of Yumama, the owner of the bathhouse, people who do not work have been transformed into animals. So, Chihiro has to impose herself and get a job in the bathhouse to save her parents afterwards. Of course for a price: she has to abandon her name. Miyazaki explains Spirited Away: “Film is based on a bathhouse where most of the gods visit. I always had some weird feelings about Japanese bathhouses. So that is why I always wanted to make a film about bathhouses and I thought it would have been funnier if the bathhouse is only for gods. I think the Japanese gods are going to the bathhouses just like us to get rest. They want to stay there longer but when the weekend finishes they have to go back to their routines. Because I believe that they are busier than other times nowadays.”

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Political Reflection | June-July-August 2011

Spirited Away | By Enes Erbay

Absentation of elders/parents Miyazaki‟s cinema is identified as „modern day far eastern fairy tale‟. It is also possible to make more complex identification as most parts of the Spirited Away is based on the function of “absentation of elders/parents”. However, the roles within the characters change a lot during the movie (e.g. the roles changes between Chihiro, Haku and Zeniba). Chihiro becomes victim in some parts of the movie and Haku helps her. Haku was a victim and Chihiro helped her while Zeniba was villain and transformed into a donor character at the end. It can be said argued that only some characters‟ role is steady within the story. Chihiro is not a typical type of Miyazaki character. Normally he employs more positive and irregular characters in his other movies but in this one Chihiro is a little girl from present age without a perfect character. He accepts this as a challenge to himself because he says that using these kinds of characters is harder than the other ones. So, that is why the roles between characters in the story changes a lot and that makes it more complicated and harder to figure out with Proppian theory. The common points in Miyazaki‟s movies Like Spirited Away, Miyazaki‟s animations are representatives of Japanese mythology and Japanese fairytales. All his movies are full of mythological metaphors such as people turning into animals, use of crows, use of flying objects, use of gods and so on... Here are the main things that we can see common in Miyazaki‟s cinema: Flying Scenes: One of his biggest hobbies is vintage planes. His father was a manager in a plane factory during the World War II. Also in Japanese mythology it is very common to see flying people, flying objects and such. Optimism and Pessimism: His main characters are mostly optimist characters such as Chihiro in this movie. On the other hand he tries to discover the dark parts of human beings within his other characters in his movies. Female Characters: In most of his movies his main character is a female character. For instance; Laputa, Kiki, Mononoke, Totoro, Nausicaa, Chihiro etc. Miyazaki thinks that male characters move and attack with their animal instincts when they face a dangerous situation. However, female characters understand the situation and reacts in more mature way. Also, as a man he always finds women‟s attitude and behaviours more powerful. Due to this, he choose female leading characters most of the time. Pigs: Pig is a quite powerful figure in Japanese fairytales. Miyazaki has a personal interest on Pigs and you can see a lot of examples of pigs in his movies such as Chihiro‟s parents turning into pigs in Spirited Away. Note: * Enes Erbay is an M.A. Student in Directing: Film and Television at the University of Westminster.

Political Reflection | June-July-August 2011

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Political Reflection | June-July-August 2011

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RECENT BOOKS regional, and international levels. Importantly, attention is also paid to the areas where substantial improvements are needed. The current crisis heightens the relevance of these lessons. Lessons from the Asian Financial Crisis will be invaluable to those studying international relations, international finance, international economics and East Asian studies.

Karl Marx: His Life and Work Author: Otto Rühle ISBN: 978-0-415-67650-2 First published in English in 1929, this is a reissue of Otto Rühle's comprehensive biography of Karl Marx. Written by a leading Marxist and key figure within the German Labour movement, this is an exceptionally detailed and well-researched study which sets Marx's life and work firmly within its social and historical context before examining in depth the major events of his life and the writings for which he has become such an influential figure in modern political philosophy. The final chapter offers an appraisal of both the man and his work, as Rühle summarises why he believes Marx was a genius.

The Economics of UN Peacekeeping Author: Nadege Sheehan ISBN: 978-0-415-56746-6 Peacekeeping is a security concept that is very representative of the current interventionism, multilateralism, human rights, and humanitarian ideas. UN peacekeeping plays an important role in international security and includes various activities that go beyond the original roles assigned to UN armed forces (e.g. humanitarian aid, election supervision, disarmament, mine clearance, civilian protection, and peacebuilding). The problem is to define the economic efficiency of these operations and to develop some recommendations in the context of an economic globalization process. Although UN peacekeeping has shortcomings, it must be considered essential for organizing and defending the world politico-economic order. UN peacekeeping is a political activity, but its production strongly depends on nations‟ economic considerations. Governments make political decisions that also take into account the economic gains they expect to obtain from their contribution to any specific mission. With low means and inadequate strategies to meet the challenges, UN peacekeeping must pay particular attention to resolving the problems of free riding and of prisoner‟s dilemma in contributions that delay deployments and create significant financial problems. Understanding how peacekeeping can be most cost-effectively carried out, while considering the importance of legitimacy in interventions, is essential. This book believes that regional organizations can ease the UN‟s financial responsibility by managing conflicts in their regions. But, to be most effective, they must involve the UN in their interventions. This book also emphasizes UN peacekeeping trust funds as the key to better financial effectiveness. It strongly recommends that NATO be empowered by the UN with the role of global peace police, and proposes the establishment of a UN high-ranking team of international specialists in peacekeeping issues. This research should be of interest to students and researchers looking at international and political economics, as well as international relations, defence, security and peace studies.

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Political Reflection | June-July-August 2011