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VOL. 3 - NO. 1 SPECIAL ISSUE: CHINA and The WORLD

2012

WORLD STORIES

NEWS OF CHINA 2011

DOMESTIC ANALYSIS

POLITICAL REFLECTION 28

“ADVANCING DIVERSITY”

Russia and China: Reconciliation or Strategic Friendship? BY LIN REN

Asia’s New Great Game? The Geopolitics of the South China Sea BY TILMAN PRADT

China’s Aid Program in Africa: A Primer BY SAM BYFIELD

ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS?

The Cosmopolitanisation of Cartography? Raising the Specter of Legitimacy in Geography BY DR JEAN-PAUL GAGNON

China as a Law-Ruled State: From Top-Down Rhetoric to Bottom-Up Expectations BY ANNA KLOEDEN New Regulations Governing Social Organizations in China: A Civil Society on the Rise? BY KOSTANTINOS D. TSIMONIS

An Interview with Professor Sonny Lo:

34 48

China in the 21st Century: Is Global Leadership Possible? Sustainable Development, Political Legitimacy and Foreign Policy BY GEORGI IVANOV The Case for Li Yuanchao as Premier BY NICHOLAS MILLER Return to Countryside: A New Attempt of Rural Financial Transformation BY JIAN GAO

Political Reflections in Hong Kong BY DR JEAN-PAUL GAGNON 64

Cross-Strait Relations and HK BY MATTHEW KENNEDY

The Impact of Renminbi (RMB) Appreciation on the Hong Kong Property Market BY SUNNY LAM

CULTURAL ANALYSIS Bitter Love: A Silenced Movie of China and Its Implication BY ANTONY OU

Kang Youwei’s (1858-1927) Study and Vision of the Chinese Calligraphy BY MASSIMO CARRANTE

RECENT BOOKS

CHINA AND THE WORLD Sino-Indian Relations: Competition or Cooperation? BY ANANYA CHATTERJEE

WORLD STORIES | BY AKSEL ERSOY

25.11.2011 | South Korea

South Korea’s national assembly ratified a free-trade agreement with the United States, four years after the two countries first signed the deal and a month after it

was approved by Congress. Despite a projected boost to the Korean economy and, the prospect of closer ties with America at a time of worsening relations with North Korea, the agreement was strongly resisted by the opposition. One assembly member disrupted the vote by letting off a tear-gas canister.

19.11.2011 | Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan’s long-serving president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, called a parliamentary election for January. The vote was supposed to usher in a multiparty system,

though the only other party expected to join the race is sympathetic towards Mr Nazarbayev. The president brought forward the date of the election, he said, in anticipation of a global economic crisis; politicians shouldn’t be campaigning at such a time, apparently.

11.11.2011 | Japan

Japan released the captain and crew of a Chinese fishing boat, three days after they were arrested for entering Japanese coastal waters. A similar case last year in

disputed waters sparked a diplomatic confrontation, but China called this incident a “regular fishery case” and accepted Tokyo’s handling of it.

4.11.2011 | Kyrgyzstan

Kyrgyzstan’s first presidential election as a parliamentary democracy was won by Almazbek Atambayev, leader of the Social Democratic Party. He will replace Roza

Otunbayeva, the country’s interim president, who took office after a coup unseated her predecessor in 2010. True to her word, Ms Otunbayeva did not run for re-election. The new president-elect announced plans to close a large American military base.

28.10.2011 | Thailand

Authorities in Thailand gave people five days off work to allow residents of Bangkok to leave the capital ahead of expected flooding. The government had already

imposed rationing on food. Hundreds of people have been killed by the deluge in other parts of the country and thousands of factories closed.

26.10.2011 | Vietnam

Vietnam confirmed that the last rhinoceros in the country was killed earlier this year, most likely by poachers. It was the last of its kind to have lived on the Asian

extinction, because of deforestation and illegal trade in wild-animal parts.

24.10.2011 | Malaysia

The Malaysian government promised to repeal the Internal Security Act, a draconian law that allows the authorities to detain people charged with a crime indefinite-

ly and without trial. In Singapore former political prisoners urged their government to follow suit.

22.10.2011 | Tibetans

China again accused the Dalai Lama of encouraging Tibetans to commit suicide. The latest claim came after the exiled Tibetan spiritual leader offered prayers for

eight monks and a nun who have set themselves on fire to protest against Chinese rule in Tibetan parts of Sichuan province. China said the self-immolations were “terrorism in disguise”.

08.10.2011 | Haiti

Haiti got a new prime minister, at last. Having rejected the first two nominees proposed by Michel Martelly, who took office as president in May, the country’s Sen-

ate approved Garry Conille for the job. Aid donors had become increasingly alarmed by the lack of a government. Mr Conille has worked for Bill Clinton in his role as a UN envoy to Haiti.

WWW.CESRAN.ORG/POLITICALREFLECTION

Compiled by Aksel Ersoy from Different World News Sources

mainland; a few dozen remain on Java. Other species of large mammals in Vietnam are in imminent danger of

NEWS OF CHINA 2011 | BY KOSTANTINOS D. TSIMONIS

Chen Wei:

PLA:

On December 23rd, Sichuan

In January the PLA

dissident Chen Wei (photo),

tested

42, received a sentence of 9

China’s first home-

years of imprisonment for

grown

allegedly

Fighter,

attempting

successfully Stealth the

J-20.

“subvert state power”. Chen

Although the fight-

has published 26 essays in

er will not be opera-

China and abroad calling for

tional

any

time

constitutional democracy and an end to the CCP’s au-

soon, Taiwan mili-

thoritarian rule. He has also signed the “Charter 08”, a

tary experts have

political manifesto for democratic reform that was co-

raised their concern

authored by the imprisoned dissident and 2010 Nobel

about the prospect of the PLA’s air supremacy and its

Peace Prize Winner Liu Xiaobo.

increasingly sophisticated war machinery.

Wenzhou train accident: On July 23rd, a collision involving two high speed trains resulted in 40 deaths and many injuries, raising concerns on the safety of China’s latest fleet of bullet trains. Initially the government wanted to hastily wrap-up the story, blaming the collision to a lightning that supposedly struck one of the trains, issuing directives to limit media coverage, and speedily concluding the rescue operations. However, the cover-up attempt sparked public outrage among online communities and invited criticism by media outlets, even those state-controlled.

Mai fangzi:

Ai Weiwei:

Limits on home pur-

The Chinese artist Ai Weiwei

chases and require-

has become an icon for critics

ments

high

of the CCP and proponents of

down-payments in

free speech, as he continuous-

order to qualify for

ly exposes the party’s authori-

mortgages

tarianism

for

have

hypocritical

brought

China’s

stance in a wide range of is-

property

bubble

sues.

Weiwei has

also

under control dur-

gained the support of netizens throughout the country,

ing 2011, with pric-

who in an act of defiance in November collected dona-

es only marginally

tions to help the artist pay what they perceive as a po-

increasing and in

litically motivated fine imposed by the Chinese authori-

some cities even dropping in comparison to last year.

and

ties on the charge of tax evasion.

POLITICAL REFLECTION | SPECIAL ISSUE 2012

NEWS OF CHINA 2011 | BY KOSTANTINOS D. TSIMONIS

South China Sea:

One anniversary, two mean-

Tensions over the unresolved

ings:

South China Sea dispute have

Celebrations for the 100th anni-

remained high throughout

versary of the 1911 revolution

2011 as Beijing feels threat-

took place in both sides of the

ened by the renewed interest

Taiwan straights but with mark-

of the US in the region that

edly different content and mean-

the PRC leadership interprets

ing. In Taiwan the “100th anniver-

as a plan to contain China. In November, Secretary Clin-

sary of the Republic of China” was

ton signed an agreement with her counterpart from the

celebrated lavishly with large public events and pa-

Philippines to increase defense cooperation between

rades. In the Mainland, CCP leaders commemorated the

the two countries, while President Obama attended the

“100th anniversary of the Xinhai revolution” in small-

ASEAN Summit and announced plans for an expansion

scale events, carefully designed not to outshine the 90 th

of US military cooperation with Australia.

anniversary of the founding of the CCP.

Ethnic Tensions: In December new clashes between Uyghurs and Han Chinese in Urumqi resulted in Hu Jintao skipping the G8 Summit in Italy in order to deal with the crisis. Previous clashes in Xinjiang last July left 20 dead. On the Tibetan “front”, 2011 marked the 60th anniversary of the annexation of Tibet by the PRC and 12 monks set themselves on fire protesting against Chinese rule. In December, Tibetan students of the Chengdu Railroad Engineering School were attacked by their Han classmates who were allegedly angry over the preferential treatment given to minority groups.

The CCP turns 90: The

Com-

On September 21st months of

munist Party celebrated

fruitless peaceful petitioning es-

the 90th anniversary of

calated on an uprising in the vil-

its founding with large-

lage of Wukan in Guangdong

scale

Chinese

The Wukan incident:

commemorative

when disgruntled villagers vio-

events, extravagant TV shows with plentiful revolution-

lently ousted local officials accusing them for illegal land

ary kitsch, and smaller interventions in everyday life

sales. The protesters took the administration of the vil-

such as billboards, flower displays, videos in the sub-

lage in their hands, set up barricades and elected a 13-

way, banners on popular websites etc. Throughout the

member village committee. Initially the government

country, students and employees in state-owned en-

responded violently to the first ever fall of CCP local au-

terprises and the government were mobilized to watch

thority during a rural protest, abducting 4 village repre-

a new propaganda movie on the CCP’s founding titled

sentatives, one of whom died in custody, and forming a

“The Beginning of the Great Revival”.

blockade of the village using riot police.

WWW.CESRAN.ORG/POLITICALREFLECTION

NEWS OF CHINA 2011 | BY KOSTANTINOS D. TSIMONIS

Haimen:

Leadership

Between December

reshuffle

20th

ahead of 2012

22nd

villagers

of Haimen went on

transition:

protest against local

In the second

government plans to

half

expand a coal-fired

China initiated

power plant that has already caused environmental deg-

the very secre-

2011

radation in the area, reducing the villagers’ annual fish

tive process of

catch. A police crackdown followed, reportedly leaving

reshuffling ministers, chiefs of agencies, provincial gov-

between 1 to 6 villagers dead and around 200 injured.

ernors and top economic officials ahead of the power

On December

21st,

Zhou Yongkang, China’s Security

transition in 2012. The changes will be concluded in the

Chief, commented that authorities “should enforce the

18th Party Congress next year and then be rubber-

law in a civil manner to avoid further disputes”.

stamped by the NPC annual session in 2013.

Intellectuals and protest: Despite accusations for conformism, Chinese intellectuals last year took the lead in advocating reforms and protesting over local issues. Their criticism was directed on issues such as the railway management system and the College Entrance Exam, while in November professors in Yangtse University publicly protested against a highly polluting steel plant. In the same month, one of China’s most prominent legal scholars, Professor addressing a gathering of more than 50 legal scholars.

State of the

Local elections:

Internet:

Approximately

On April 5th,

independent candi-

China

dates

an-

140

throughout

nounced the

the country decided

establish-

to stand in local

ment of the

elections for peo-

State Internet

ple’s congresses dur-

Information

ing 2011. Many of

Office (SIIO),

them were harassed

the government’s latest Internet surveillance agency. In

and threatened by

December, new regulations by the SIIO stipulated that

the

microblog users are now obliged to provide their real

order to withdraw

identities.

their candidacies.

authorities

POLITICAL REFLECTION | SPECIAL ISSUE 2012

Compiled by Kostantinos D. Tsimonis from Different World News Sources

Jiang Ping (photo), warned that China is increasingly resembling a dictatorship while

DOMESTIC ANALYSIS | BY DR. JEAN-PAUL GAGNON*

The COSMOPOLITANISATION Of CARTOGRAPHY Raising the Specter of Legitimacy in Geography

ntroduction

This work is about arguing that the maps of the world should be reconsidered in a global dialogue: in a process that opens the dispute of boundaries between union-states, regions, zones, or other similar geo-political terms. David Marquand, in his important opus The End of the West (2011) reminds us that West and East perhaps never existed and in the case wherein we are told that they do, have, and are: such are parochial and illegitimate claims. We shall have to put the (Indian) inventors of Arabic numerals in our pantheon alongside the Greek inventors of geometry, and Ibn Rushd alongside Aristotle. We shall have to abandon our self-centred and patronizing belief that democracy and free discussion were exported to a backward “East” by a progressive “West,” and reconstruct our mental WWW.CESRAN.ORG/POLITICALREFLECTION

universe to take account of the indigenous Indian tradition of public reasoning and religious toleration that long antedated the “Western” presence in the subcontinent. More generally, we shall have to recognize that the familiar “Western” narrative of global history, in which uniquely precious and, in evolutionary terms, uniquely successful “Western” values moulded the modern world in our greatgrandparents’ image, is a parochial distortion of a far more complex truth. (Marquand, 2011: 176-77) His argument, I feel, is important because it challenges what many in this world have come to take for granted. In the case of this paper, it is the maps we are familiar with, the design of the globe that we have on our desks or which are offered to our children, which are parochial and relics of imperial abuses. This discussion is a needed one, as we have for example, no clear indication as to where Europe stops and that indigenous peoples for example have not had the inclusive and legiti8

DOMESTIC ANALYSIS | BY DR. JEAN-PAUL GAGNON

mate chance to contest the territorial boundaries which often split their nations. It is an attempt to bring a democratic legitimacy to cartography which is patently lacking. This will be done firstly by discussing in a broad and simple way why current maps are parochial and relics of imperial domination. We will then follow this argument up with another broad argument detailing how we could begin a global dialogue designed to spark debate over maps and to form a call for the democratic reform of cartography. Essentially, it argues that we must give people and groups a chance to define their boundaries and not have them imposed on us by those holding the Maxim Gun. Lastly, we will engage this discussion in relation to China’s territorial claims.

Francis Fukuyama

The Imperial History of Maps Depending on climatic conditions, huntergatherer societies have a population density from 0.1 to 1 person per square kilometre, while the invention of agriculture permits densities to rise to 40-60 per square kilometre. Human beings were now in contact with one another on a much broader scale, and this required a very different form of social organization. – Francis Fukuyama, The Origins of Political Order, 2011 A new work by Francis Fukuyama has established a logical understanding of the way in which human beings probably came to organize themselves politically through evolutionary terms. Should we consider Locke, Hobbes, and Rousseau for example, their conceptions of the social contract began with the heuristic device of a “blank slate.” From this blank slate (or state of nature) human beings were theorised to have joined for a variety of reasons. Fukuyama takes the aforementioned evolutionary approach and argues rather that it is perhaps improbable to trace wherein we exactly developed our methods of socio-political organization (those parameters which even underpin hunter-gatherer humanoids). Rather, we were perhaps born into already established systems and contributed to them over millions of years.1 Because of this potentiality, we perhaps never had a chance in our history to collectively decide in non-violent democratic processes not only how we should like to organize ourselves politically, or what our deepest desired long-term goals are, but also (for the purposes of this paper) how our union-states or nation-states are bounded territorially. This discussion has a variety of comparative examples to support it. One of those can perhaps be the way in which nation-states were formed from the inception of the Treaty of Westphalia (or earlier during the Qin Dynasty in 221 BCE China, see Fukuyama 2011 for more). We need only ask if individuals and groups informing a variety of premodern ethnicities were present when not only Europe but parts of Asia and Africa were being

POLITICAL REFLECTION | SPECIAL ISSUE 2012

DOMESTIC ANALYSIS | BY DR. JEAN-PAUL GAGNON

territorially defined in imperialist discussions. It is common knowledge at this stage that they were not. When the union-states and, in much more limited circumstances, nation-states, in North America, Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Asia-Pacific, and so forth were territorially determined, this was not done in a manner that could be considered democratic or republican. There was little to no inclusion of local populations in this decision making and as commonly known, many indigenous nations had and continue to suffer because of this. Such is perhaps commonly seen with the difficulties Palestinians have in forming their own sovereign state: normatively and consistently blocked for the most part by a minority of individuals within the current and previous Israeli administrations. This might also be said in reference, but not limited, to the Kurdish Nation, the Welsh, Cornish, Scottish, Corsican, Aboriginal and Torres Straight indigenous and a wide variety of indigenous Americans. It is, of course, an anachronism to expect that referenda, “town hall meetings,” polling, and other such practices would have been held during the mapping of the world and other regions therein. From the Middle Ages onwards to perhaps even post-modern times (some argue this period began in post-war Europe) democracy and republicanism were not normative and might even be said to be in the practical minority today despite the amount of rhetoric these two bodies receive. Both realpolitik and soft-power were mechanisms by which empires expanded to try and perhaps fulfil the material and power desires of the autocratic polities and cultures found during those times (like Great Britannia, Imperial France, Portugal, Spain, Belgium, the USA, China, Russia and so forth). This discussion is purposefully broad to convey this message. Even a cursory glance at various bodies of literature dealing with the history of geo-politics will add robust evidence to this argument. The point is that in majority (at least to my paltry knowledge) this argument is not typically

WWW.CESRAN.ORG/POLITICALREFLECTION

made. Yes, certainly, we have a great deal of separatist contestations in many union-states by ethnic nations seeking recognition and some greater degree of sovereignty and or autonomy. But what we do not have are the much “higher” politics of individuals and groups throughout the world challenging the way in which the world is territorially depicted. Where, in fact, has our say been in the way our countries look on a map? If we are an oppressed peoples, like indigenous Americans, 2 or the Naga of India: where is our right to distinguish our boundaries in discussion with other citizens and not those with the Maxim Gun (e.g. sometimes violent state governments)? Democratising Maps This is why I would like to call for a democratisation of maps using cosmopolitan theory. It is increasingly evident that union-states and whatever nation-states might be left are losing their terri-

Via international non-governmental organizations, indigenous organizations, national organizations, and supranational bodies, we might have the capacity to form an international movement of solidarity for the cosmopolitan democratisation of cartography in order to give legitimacy to what we see visually in geo -politics. torial legitimacy. It makes greater sense to let ethnic nationalities determine if they wish to separate than to try and keep them within a bounded territory through violent means (see Chechnya for an example). For one, it may for the most part diminish or remove the impetus for violence. For two, it may add another sovereign trading partner and player on the international scene. And for three it will be a step supporting democracy over autocracy. But how could we go about doing this? Is it not a bit dreamy? I reason that the answer lies in our budding international civil society. Via international non-governmental organizations, indige-

DOMESTIC ANALYSIS | BY DR. JEAN-PAUL GAGNON

nous organizations, national organizations, and supranational bodies, we might have the capacity to form an international movement of solidarity for the cosmopolitan democratisation of cartography in order to give legitimacy to what we see visually in geo-politics. Another question concerns the solidarity of “what.” To contextualise the spectre of legitimacy we must throw our support and solidarity behind the premise that democracy is part of the human story. That it is not something that must be exported, but it is something that humans have had since arguably pre-modern (if not pre-human) times. For a great example of this I encourage the reader to investigate Fukuyama’s (2011) work The Origins of Political Order, or an interview I conducted with Benjamin Isakhan (2011) or his latest edited volume the Secret History of Democracy (2011). If we understand democracy as a pre-modern and post -modern probability and as something of a natural predisposition for social organization (a.k.a politics and governance) then the spectre

must be that of global or cosmopolitan democracy. Addressing China3 With the aforementioned points made, we would do well to begin discussing cases. And in this instance, I should like to address China and formally challenge its claim to territorial sovereignty. This extends not only to Taiwan, Macau, Hong Kong, and Tibet, but also to Inner Mongolia, the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, and all other regions within “mainland China”. For a country that maintains it is a socialist democracy, where in fact is the legitimacy of democracy in this State? Surely any boasted “victory” stemming from 1949 and the violence over the Chinese plurality that then ensued concerning the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution cannot convey legitimacy. Those living within the “Greater China Region” must have the opportunity opened to them to discuss and decide if and how they want to be a part of the current PRC. In this regard, none of what we see on the map has any meaning. Without legitimacy, the boundaries of China are emptied of significance. They in turn become symbols of illegitimacy and must come to be challenged. China’s territorial lines are a visual depiction of boundaries that were established through dynastic and ideological empire: one that secured not the consent of the plurality but rather the fear and bloodshed of a great number of individuals – further entrenching evolutionary autocracy.

DOMESTIC ANALYSIS | BY DR. JEAN-PAUL GAGNON

People in Greater China, as well as those throughout this world, must come to think of their countries in this manner. We must come to terms with evolutionary autocracy and realize that rarely (if ever) in human history have we established periods wherein there was a complete and demonstrable process of pluralistic, transparent and accountable involvement of people concerning questions of “national” importance: in other words, deciding on a matter central to everyone in a manner that established a democratic legitimacy. With this heuristic device employed, it is reasonable to say that the plurality of nations that have become absorbed by illegitimate imperialist Chinas (over time) have the right to reconsider their role in the union-state. Collectively, the Chinese plurality has the right to call into question the union-state itself as little if any of it is democratically legitimate. Will Tibet, Inner Mongolia and the Xinjian Autonomous Region want to be part of the PRC or will they wish to form (or rather reform) their own sovereign states as they come to recall the independence of their nations lost to violent absorption? Will this be mirrored by Macau, Hong Kong and the separate/inseparate Republic of China? It is hoped that we may one day come to answer these questions. And to be fair to those that hold the PRC near and dear, this argument can be made concerning any other union-state (not just China) and this article is not meant to lambast a geopolitical space that has made many important and significant achievements through time and space. The PRC is but one example in a world filled with examples and we would all do well to start thinking of our geo-political spaces in this way. Conclusion The aforementioned will certainly take a great deal of time, but time is of course a necessary component of communication (which in itself is a parameter of democracy preferably designed to trump violence). I should like to ask for greater minds to comment on this paltry piece

WWW.CESRAN.ORG/POLITICALREFLECTION

which will undoubtedly allow me to create a much stronger call for solidarity and a more robust argument. Notes: * Dr. Jean-Paul Gagnon is a social and political theorist with a Ph.D. in political science. He completed his doctorate at the Queensland University of Technology under the aegis of Australia’s prestigious Endeavour Award. 1.

This point forms the argument of “evolutionary autocracy.” We and our ancestors have, over millions of years, been born into already established systems wherein we (in most cases) did not have an equal voice to contest the telos of our times. Democratic legitimacy is a method to break this time-bound autocratic norm.

When “America” is used in this article, it is referring not to the USA but to the majority of the “Western” hemisphere.

Although I have taken China as a case for discussion, we may use this argument on any other union-state in this globe.

Works Cited Fukuyama, Francis. 2011. The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Isakhan, Ben and Stephen Stockwell (eds). 2011. The Secret History of Democracy. London: Palgrave MacMillan. Isakhan, Benjamin. Interviewed by: Jean-Paul Gagnon. 2011. “An Interview with Dr. Benjamin Isakhan: On the Alternative Histories of Democracy,” Journal of Democratic Theory, 1(1): 19 -26. Marquand, David. 2011. The End of the West: The Once and Future Europe. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

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Ulrich’s Periodicals Directory

ISSN: 2041-1944 Editor-in-Chief: Ozgur TUFEKCI King’s College London, UK Managing Editor: Husrev TABAK University of Manchester, UK Book Review Editor: Kadri Kaan RENDA King’s College London, UK Associate Editors: Emel AKCALI, Dr. Central European University, Hungary | Mitat CELIKPALA, Assoc.Prof. Kadir Has University, Turkey Bayram GUNGOR, Prof. Karadeniz Technical University, Turkey Editorial Board: Sener AKTURK, Dr. Harvard University, USA | William BAIN, Dr. Aberystwyth University, UK |Alexander BELLAMY, Prof. University of Queensland, Australia | Richard BELLAMY, Prof. University College London, UK | Andreas BIELER, Prof. University of Nottingham, UK | Pınar BILGIN, Assoc. Prof. Bilkent University, Turkey | Ken BOOTH, Prof. Aberystwyth University, UK | Stephen CHAN, Prof. SOAS, University of London, UK | Nazli CHOUCRI, Prof. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA | John M. DUNN, Prof. University of Cambridge, UK | Kevin DUNN, Prof. Hobart and William Smith Colleges, USA | Mine EDER, Prof. Bogazici University, Turkey | Ertan EFEGIL, Assoc. Prof. Sakarya University, Turkey | Ayla GOL, Dr. Aberystwyth University, UK | Stefano GUZZINI, Prof. Uppsala Universitet, Sweden | Elif Ince HAFALIR, Assist. Prof. Carnegie Mellon University, USA | David HELD, Prof. London School of Economics, LSE, UK | Raymond HINNEBUSCH, Prof. University of St Andrews, UK | Naim KAPUCU, Assoc. Prof. University of Central Florida, USA | Fahri KARAKAYA, Prof. University of Massachusetts Dartmouth, USA | Abdulhamit KIRMIZI, Dr. SOAS, University of London, UK | Cécile LABORDE, Prof. University College London, UK | Ziya ONIS, Prof. Koc University, Turkey | Alp OZERDEM, Prof. Coventry University, UK | Oliver RICHMOND, Prof. University of St Andrews, UK | Ian TAYLOR, Prof. University of St Andrews, UK | Murat TUMAY, Dr. Selcuk University, Turkey | Talat ULUSSEVER, Assist. Prof. King Fahd University, Saudi Arabia | Ali WATSON, Prof. University of St Andrews, UK | Stefan WOLFF, Prof. University of Birmingham, UK | Hakan YILMAZKUDAY, Assist. Prof. Temple University, USA | International Advisory Board: Yasemin AKBABA, Assist. Prof. Gettysburg College, USA | Mustafa AYDIN, Prof. Kadir Has University, Turkey | Ian BACHE, Prof. University of Sheffield, UK | Mark BASSIN, Prof. University of Birmingham, UK | Mehmet DEMIRBAG, Prof. University of Sheffield, UK | Can ERBIL, Assist. Prof. Brandeis University, USA | Stephen Van EVERA, Prof. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA | John GLASSFORD, Assoc. Prof. Angelo State University, USA | Bulent GOKAY, Prof. Keele University, UK | Burak GURBUZ, Assoc. Prof. Galatasaray University, Turkey | Tony HERON, Dr. University of Sheffield, UK | John M. HOBSON, Prof. University of Sheffield, UK | Jamal HUSEIN, Assist. Prof. Angelo State University, USA | Murat S. KARA, Assoc. Prof. Angelo State University, USA | Michael KENNY, Prof. University of Sheffield, UK | Gamze G. KONA, Dr. Foreign Policy Analyst, Turkey | Scott LUCAS, Prof. University of Birmingham, UK | Christoph MEYER, Dr. King’s College London, UK | Kalypso NICOLAIDIS, Prof. University of Oxford, UK | Bill PARK, Mr. King’s College London, UK | Jenik RADON, Prof. Columbia University, USA | Ibrahim SIRKECI, Prof. Regent’s College London, UK | Claire THOMAS, Dr. University of Sheffield, UK | Brian WHITE, Prof. University of Sheffield, UK | M. Hakan YAVUZ, Assoc. Prof. University of Utah, USA | Birol YESILADA, Prof. Portland State University, USA |

DOMESTIC ANALYSIS | BY ANNA KLOEDEN*

CHINA AS A LAW-RULED STATE: FROM TOP-DOWN RHETORIC TO BOTTOM-UP EXPECTATIONS

hat is the role of law in maintain-

between rule of law and economic development,

ing spaces of order in modern

democracy and human rights. The ‘law and order’

Chinese society? In 1996, Jiang

meta-narrative is visibly played out in Party dis-

Zemin adopted a new official

course, Five Year Plans, Constitutional evolution

policy of ruling the country in accordance with

and the astounding pace of development of the

law, and establishing a socialist law-ruled state

formal legal system. The thickest descriptions and

(yifa zhiguo, jianshe shuhui zhuyi fazhiguo), a policy

predictions of the story are those that also take

that is now incorporated into the PRC Constitu-

into account trends and trajectories in popular

tion. Such law-lauding ideology and rhetoric has

and Party legal consciousness and ideology.1

been increasingly evident in China since the end of the Cultural Revolution, and in conjunction

The basic distinction made in studies of the role of

with decades of rapid and prolific legal institution-

law in maintaining order is between rule by, and

building, has provided rich fodder for ample

rule of, law:

scholarship and discourse on the trajectory of China’s legal system, and the nature of rule and order in modern Chinese society.

Whereas the core of rule of law is the ability of law and legal system to impose meaningful restraints on the state and individual

The main empirical issues addressed in this field

members of the ruling elite, rule by law refers

include the retreat of the Party-state; the evolu-

to an instrumental conception of law in which

tion of the legislature, judiciary, legal profession

law is merely a tool to be used as the state

and administrative law regimes; and the nexus

sees fit.2

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DOMESTIC ANALYSIS | BY ANNA KLOEDEN

In China, the distinction has proved difficult

the lenses of globalisation, modernisation, and

to make empirically (which is nicely reflected

economic development. Opinions diverge in

in the lack of a linguistic distinction, both

the literature on whether and to what extent

concepts generally translated as fazhi, literally

the Chinese polity possess a notion of law that is

‘law-ruled’). While generally scholars are in

consistent with that required by rule of law.

agreement that the direction of legal reform

Alford, for example, argues that ‘the principal

over the last three decades has been away

state architects of China’s post-Cultural Revolu-

from rule by man and towards rule by law, the

tion

law

reform

project

have

undertaking’. 3

genuine

extent to which rule of law is emerging empirical-

ambivalence toward their

Dowdle,

ly, and its optimal nature and role in the Chinese

on the other hand, argues that any such

context, are matters of much debate in the litera-

ambivalence ‘manifests itself in practice, not

ture.

conception. Normatively, the Chinese, including the leadership, are overwhelmingly consistent in

The focus of most studies of Chinese law and

proclaiming the supremacy of law over other

order has been fixed on the most visible manifes-

forms of political authority and over private inter-

tation of the working out of that nexus,

ests’.4

namely institution-building, rhetoric and policy at the central/top level of the Party-state. The rule of law question has been asked through

However, the ‘top-down’ approach, predicated on these meta-narratives, and focusing on official, state-endorsed conceptions of law and order, must be supplemented by increased attention to the experiences and expectations relating to law

A Mosaic Law by Frederick Dielman

and order (which I will broadly term ‘legal ideology’) of citizens in society. Traditional and historical cultural factors, in which Chinese conceptions of law and order are grounded, have been discussed in depth in the literature, 5 but tend, like the rule of law debate generally, to be examined at the level of the elite polity. If, as Peerenboom argues, rule of law is a function of both institution-building and legal culture, the question must be asked: to what extent is central law-lauding rhetoric penetrating local spheres in which ‘law’ (fa) is traditionally regarded as an inferior means of social ordering than ‘reason’ (li)? To what extent are Beijing’s winds of change, including the state’s ‘verbal homage to the sanctity of law’,6 penetrating the local sphere and popular ideology? A useful case through which to examine the local state-society interface is that of grassroots, citizen -led NGOs. China’s NGO sector has been steadily growing in size, visibility and power since 1978, accompanied by a dramatic increase of state 15

POLITICAL REFLECTION | SPECIAL ISSUE 2012

DOMESTIC ANALYSIS | BY ANNA KLOEDEN

oversight and ostensible regulation of the sector.

At this local interface between state and society,

Through the promulgation, beginning in 1989

ordinary

with

bring

the

regulations

‘Social

Organisa-

citizens

their

own

and

government

traditions,

officials

histories

and

tions’ (shehui tuanti), of a number of new laws

expectations about law to their engagement

relating to charities and NGOs, the Chinese gov-

with the legal system and the officials who

ernment has evinced its concern with maintain-

represent it. In the case of the underground

ing tight control over the newly emerging state-

Catholic church and its unregistered/quasi-legal

society relationship. While NGOs are increasingly

charities, most players demonstrate deftness

seen as indispensable to economic and social de-

at functioning in the absence of legally defined

velopment, they are also seen as potentially

relationships,

threatening for the civic organisation and

disciplinarian-type

agendas they

represent.7

and

negotiating

paternalistic/

interactions

with

local

Accordingly, although

officials. In fact, the local picture painted therein

laws provide a pathway to recognition and

is one in which law is not supreme, either in

legal status for NGOs, in practice such registration

practice or rhetorically, and many features

is difficult to obtain. For example, a recent study by Ashley and He of Beijing NGOs found

...most NGOs in China today are not registered with the Ministry of Civil Affairs (at the end of 2008 there were approximately 415 000 registered NGOs in China, of an estimated two to eight million in total).

that registration status is in practice ‘limited to [government-organised NGOs] and similar organisations with continued close government ties’.8 It remains the case that most NGOs in China today

are not registered

with

the

Ministry of Civil Affairs (at the end of 2008 there were approximately 415 000 registered NGOs in China, of an estimated two to eight million in total).9

of even a thin conception of rule of law are Existing ‘civil society’ literature tends to focus

missing. The ‘real’ rules of engagement between

on registered NGOs at the state-dominated

grassroots charities and the state are more to do

end of a spectrum of autonomy, simplistically

with attaining legitimacy, garnering supportive

assuming that ‘[unregistered] grassroots NGOs …

connections, and ‘giving face’ to local govern-

do not encounter too much interference from

ment by treading politically-contentious lines

the

directly

(such as evangelism and drawing attention to

controlled in any way by the government

gaps in government provision of welfare) careful-

in the absence of registration,10 there being

ly.

government’,

and

are

not

a supervision gap which allows for greater NGO freedom. However evidence from the author’s research on charitable organisations run by the underground Catholic church of Henan province suggests that, on the contrary, at the local interface between state and society, oversight and control are at times also very much evident, but in much more veiled, and less formal/policy-centric ways than we see centrally.

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Above all, the dominant expectation regarding law at this local level is not that law will be impartially,

consistently

and

unambiguously

defined and applied, but rather than flexible norms will govern individualised, paternalistic relations with the state. This is not widely regarded as problematic, or in fact widely regarded at all, due to a lack of esteem for the notions of ‘law’ and ‘legality’ as intrinsically/

DOMESTIC ANALYSIS | BY ANNA KLOEDEN

ideologically valuable. It may be surprising, from

China’ (1999) 11 Cultural Dynamics 237; Thomas Stephens, Order and Discipline in China: The Shanghai Mixed Court 1911–27 (Asian Law Series, University of Washington Press, Seattle 1992).

a Western law-centric perspective, that the picture that emerges from this particular (non) legal ideology is not one of ‘lawless chaos’. 11 Instead, the local snapshot is one imbued with themes of paternalism, game-playing, give-and-

Peerenboom (2002) 8.

take, suspicion and subordination. Above all, it

William Alford, ‘A Second Great Wall? China’s Post-Cultural Revolution Project of Legal Construction’ (1999) 11 Cultural Dynamics 193, 198.

Michael Dowdle, ‘Heretical Laments: China and the Fallacies of ‘Rule of Law’ (1999) 11 Cultural Dynamics 287, 301.

The most seminal works include Peerenboom (2002) and the 1999 special edition of Cultural Dynamics, with contributions from (inter alia) Alford, Hintzen, Turner, Dowdle, Defoort and Peerenboom, and Liang.

Peerenboom (2002) 217.

Qiusha Ma, ‘The Governance of NGOs in China since 1989: How Much Autonomy?’ (2002) 31 Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 305, 311.

Jillian Ashley and Pengyu He, ‘Opening One Eye and Closing the Other: The Legal and Regulatory Environment for “Grassroots” NGOs in China Today’ (2008) 26 Boston University International Law Journal 29, 55.

China NPO Website <http:// www.chinanpo.gov.cn/web/listTitle.do? dictionid=2201> accessed 30 November 2009;

10.

Tony Saich, Governance and Politics of China (Palgrave MacMillan, Hampshire 2004) 232.

11.

Compare with Hintzen (1999) 169, arguing that the picture that emerges on examining the social realities behind ‘China’s vociferous legal aspirations’ is ‘one of lawless chaos, where status, connections and money set the ‘real’ rules’.

is one of order – not, admittedly, a type of order associated with rule of law and its threshold requirements such as predictability and certainty, but order nonetheless. Chinese and foreign scholars alike have put forward a vast array of opinions and descriptions, from conservative to liberal, on how the macro legal culture of China continues to be shaped by the winds of change blowing from Beijing and (purportedly) throughout China. But further empirical studies and examination of the law-order nexus locally is required to better understand the extent to which such winds have penetrated notions and ideas about law and order in Chinese culture and society. By moving in this way from the macro to the micro, texture and distinction is added to our understanding of the ideologies and traditions in which ‘law and order’ concepts in China continue to be grounded today, and a contribution will also, reflexively, be made to the bigger picture themes of rule of law and legal consciousness. Notes: * Anna Kloeden is a PhD candidate in law at the University of Oxford. 1.

See, for example, Randall Peerenboom, China’s Long March Toward Rule of Law (CUP, New York 2002) especially Chapters 2–3; Geor Hintzen, ‘The Place of Law in the PRC’s Culture’ (1999) 11 Cultural Dynamics 167; Zhiping Liang, ‘Tradition and Change: Law and Order in a Pluralist Landscape’ (1999) 11 Cultural Dynamics 215; Karen Turner, ‘The Criminal Body and the Body Politic: Punishments in Early

POLITICAL REFLECTION | SPECIAL ISSUE 2012

DOMESTIC ANALYSIS | BY KOSTANTINOS D. TSIMONIS*

NEW REGULATIONS GOVERNING SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS IN CHINA: A CIVIL SOCIETY ON THE RISE?

n November 22, 2011 Chinese media reported that the Guangdong provincial government published the ‘Plan Concerning Further Fostering and Regulating Social Organizations of Guangdong Province’, which contains new provisions governing the establishment of social organizations in the province. According to the new regulations, to come into effect on July 1, 2012, social organizations may directly apply to civil affairs departments for registration without the requirement set by the ‘dual registration system’ of first securing sponsorship by a state agency or organization. Eliminating dual registration is an important departure from the status quo. Under this system social organizations are required to register and receive periodic inspections by the local civil affairs departments, and seek the professional sponsorship of a state agency or organization in a related policy area. The sponsoring unit is allowed significant involvement in the social organization’s internal operation and decision-making. This system has prevented many organizations from registering, as either due to their “sensitive” area of work or the weak social capital of founding members with local authorities, they do not

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succeed in securing such a sponsorship. Consequently, this policy has either driven most of the social organizations underground or has led them to use a loophole in the system and register as business units, a practice that exposes them to taxation. It comes to no surprise that the dual registration system is often presented as the most clear indication that social organizations in China lack autonomy. Therefore, initial reactions to the announcement of the changes in Guangdong province have been very positive. Scholars in the mainland argue that if this provincial level legislation finds its way to national level policy, it will signal a “breakthrough” for the development of “civil society” in China, as the requirement of securing institutional patronage will be removed from the equation between state and social organizations. For academics outside China who work on statesociety relations, the new regulations in Guangdong and their possible adoption as a national policy will inform the ongoing discussion on the form and direction of state-society relations in the PRC. In the last 30 years since the initiation of the reforms, sociologists, political scientists and area studies scholars and students, have been preoccupied with a series of interrelated questions: Is

DOMESTIC ANALYSIS | BY KOSTANTINOS D. TSIMONIS

China developing a civil society that will eventually challenge the Party-state? Can the social environment as developed after the reforms, sustain a civil society that will begin from sectorial demands and eventually push for liberalization and political reform? Is, perhaps, the concept of corporatism closer to describing the direction of social organization in China as Unger, Chan and other scholars have argued1? So far, the regulatory framework has hindered this discussion as the very visible top-down authoritarian dynamic has distorted actual trends on the ground. If the state’s immediate grip on social organizations in the form of the sponsorship requirement is removed, the actual structural configuration between state and society will be unveiled, allowing researchers to examine how social organizations are utilizing the freed social space to advance their aims and influence policy making. Are they going to break free and even antagonize state authority or they will remain directed to the state, largely seeking cooperation in exchange of its assistance and resources? Ultimately, the prospect of removing the dual registration system could permit a more convincing answer to whether a civil society or a corporatist arrangement is actually present or not. In fact, this discussion exceeds the confines of academic life. How one perceives the future directions of China’s sphere of social organization has repercussions for: (a)

Prof. Roy Bin Wong

Lenin

foreign policy making, by fueling or diffusing arguments on China’s “peaceful evolution”; (b) international bodies and NGOs seeking to fund impactful projects and social organizations in China; (c) China itself, as projecting an image of “normality” is essential in the way it is perceived abroad either as a “threat” and the authoritarian “other” or as a “partner”; and (d) the social organizations in China themselves that will operate in a new institutional context. Thus, for academics and policy-makers alike, the removal of restrictions in the operation of social organizations, such as the dual registration system, could signal a “moment of truth”. Are we to expect the slow rise of a civil society in China? The answer given here to this question is a negative one. By applying concepts such as ‘civil society’ and ‘corporatism’ that are so heavily associated with western historical experience we may obscure more than we actually explain as we adopt a certain agenda of what to look for and how to interpret it. Wong2 alerts us to this danger saying that “even as Chinese historical changes are separated from European developments, they are reunited as functional equivalents to European changes”. Consequently, our understanding of social developments in China remains implicitly defined by European experiences. In the Chinese experience of state-society relations we can identify elements of Leninist organization; corporatism in its state or societal forms; and even characteristics associated with civil society. If this coexistence of such a plethora of trends seems “contradictory” to us, this is because we expect to see something else, something more familiar. Wong’s remark that “the modern world is filled with states but the ones we have today still bear the marks of the different paths they have travelled” serves as an important guide in how we approach state-society relations in China and elsewhere.

DOMESTIC ANALYSIS | BY KOSTANTINOS D. TSIMONIS

The discussion on social organizations in China initially developed within a framework constructed around civil society-centred explanations that have exhibited serious empirical limitations. For example, why in the context of marketization, many social organisations in China continue to seek the state’s recognition and patronage rather than pursuing independence? And how can the ambiguously named Government Organized NGOs (GONGOs) be approached by social scientists trained in the works of de Tocqueville or Habermas? In this discussion, the preoccupation with civil society in the 80s and 90s gave its turn to ‘corporatism’, a concept that captures some of the institutional arrangements at place, yet only partially. What we may identify as ‘corporatist arrangements’ can be approached as state responses in old problems with deep roots in China’s late imperial past. The 1998 regulations on the registration of social organizations are direct ascendants of similar attempts by the Nationalist state, that in turn reflect the Chinese experience of state making since the late empire and its central concern with penetrating local society in order to finance the modernisation program and retain social order. The late imperial state had to rely on the local gentry and its institutions in order to finance its attempt to meet the challenge of imported ‘modernity’, its guns, trains and ideas. Its Nationalist successor aspired to penetrate local rural and urban society to an unprecedented degree as a means of extraction or resources and for social control. The Chinese state today is trapped between opposing social dynamics of market reform and its continuing attempt to hold a (much more pluralistic) society under control and in line with its developmental and political goals. The enduring feature in all historical phases is that the ability of the state to penetrate society depends on the state’s “capacity to create new organizations in the localities and influence, if not control, those that are non-governmental”3. But does this process need to create patterns of state-society relations that are identical with western experiences and the ways they have been codified in concepts like ‘corporatism’ and ‘civil society’?

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Acknowledging variation in historical experiences can explain phenomena such as the ‘Government Organized NGOs’, and the shifts and “contradictions” in the orientation of China’s social organizations between greater ‘relevance’ to the social groups they target, or ‘loyalty’ to the state, that cannot be captured by ‘corporatism’ and ‘civil society’, unless we redefine the content of these concepts. Saich4 examining the development of social organizations argues that both ‘civil society’ and ‘corporatism’ when applied in

The Chinese state today is trapped between opposing social dynamics of market reform and its continuing attempt to hold a (much more pluralistic) society under control and in line with its developmental and political goals.

the Chinese context, have serious explanatory limitations; he describes, instead, a symbiotic relationship, and multiple models of state-society relations that are operating at the same time. The picture that Saich presents is that of a continuous process of negotiation that takes place within the state (as broadly defined to include party organs, state agencies and the mass organizations), and between state and society. Dickson5 also disagrees with arguments that see corporatism as a process of decay of the Leninist political system either through a transformation from state to societal corporatism6 or as a tendency of civil associations evolving to the direction of civil society. 7 According to Dickson, the transformation from state to societal corporatism is the outcome of political reform, not the dynamic behind it, hinting that democratization is a prerequisite to societal corporatism rather than the opposite. Instead, he identifies simultaneously practiced ex-

DOMESTIC ANALYSIS | BY KOSTANTINOS D. TSIMONIS

clusionary and inclusionary policies within state corporatism that may account for trends identified by scholars without “stretching the concept of societal corporatism beyond recognition”. Yiyi Lu, in her recent book8 has argued very convincingly that careful empirical research shows a social reality that exceeds the analytical capacity of the western-centric concepts of civil society and corporatism. According to her analysis, social organisations in China exhibit more autonomy than imagined under the corporatist prism while simultaneously they are more directed to the state than western civil society organizations. Lu described the relation of social organisations to the Chinese state as “depended autonomy”. The difficulty of capturing social realities in China by using west-centric models becomes more apparent when attempting to interpret conditions observed on the ground. During fieldwork in north China, I visited an “NGO” that operates in the area of migrant workers’ welfare. The organization succeeded due to the devotion, skills and passion of its founder, a migrant worker himself, who started by establishing a hotline for legal issues, offering advice on workers regarding China’s labour law. After a few years of operation the organisation expanded by opening a community centre offering classes and after-school care for children of migrant workers, followed by the establishment of an additional recreation and education centre within an industrial park. In each step, the founder was very careful to include the local state agencies in his initiatives in order to gain support, a strategy that secured him great autonomy, despite setting up a Party, Workers

Union, Youth League and Women’s Federation branch within his organisation. The founder gained financial support and accepted material contributions from local authorities in the form of facilities and equipment that made the expansion of the organisation’s services and presence possible. More importantly, the official backing it received from one of China’s major mass organizations enabled the organisation to present itself as an advocate of the rule of Chinese labour law, fending away suspicions from factory owners. The latter now often require its assistance in order to educate the workers on their lawful rights and thus prevent them from making demands that transcend the legal obligations of the employer. The organization educates Chinese migrant workers on their rights on a daily base, making a valuable and immediate contribution to raising their level of awareness on legal affairs. In addition, it is building a community of migrant workers by offering welfare and recreational services. Part of the organization’s success was that it consciously pursued the state’s help, accepting its penetration by agencies and mass organizations, but simultaneously maintained a very high degree of autonomy in terms of its operation, internal organisation and activities. Thus, while the organisational setting is antithetical to a ‘civil society’ entity, the high degree of autonomy of the organization does not fit a corporatist model either. This is only one example of many similar cases recorded by scholars working on state-society relations in China who argue that a close relationship with the state is a strategy often pursued by social organizations that seek access to resources and official sanctioning of their work in order to be more effective and autonomous9. The above argument against interpreting statesociety relations under the distortive lenses of ‘civil society’ or ‘corporatism’, reorients the explanatory framework of the new changes in the dual registration system from the ‘grand theory’ level to more immediate interpretations. The new guidelines are simultaneously a recognition and a very pragmatic answer to the failure of the current registration policy for social organizations. From the state’s perspective the current frame-

A Chinese Migrant Worker

DOMESTIC ANALYSIS | BY KOSTANTINOS D. TSIMONIS

work is counterproductive in two ways. First, the registration regulations drive social organizations underground, to a level that state agencies cannot monitor or control. It is estimated that more that 3 million non-registered NGOs operate in the mainland presently for which the authorities know little or nothing about, approximately 10 times more than the registered ones. My own research on the Communist Youth League has revealed that communication with its own approximately 3 million branches -a large number of which is only nominally active- is hardly maintained, while CYL Committees throughout the administrative hierarchy of the PRC are in the dark regarding the exact number of youth social organizations operating informally. Second, in the context of the state’s “declining capacity to implement policy consistently”10 towards a society that is demanding more state attention in the form of welfare services in order to ameliorate the inequalities created by marketization, the social functions of these social organizations are often welcomed by local authorities. These social services are targeted on groups under heavily moralistic institutionalized prejudice, such as the case of AIDS-related NGOs and those operating in the field of sex workers, or those gaining increasing public and official sympathy such as welfare services for children of migrant workers. Therefore, by removing the “bottleneck” of official sponsorship, state authorities will not only benefit from the social welfare functions of these organizations, but will also get a better access to them, as the latter will seek registration in order to start operating openly, making themselves known. In addition, the Guangdong guidelines should be viewed in comparison to other local and national state initiatives in the field of governance of social organizations. In 2008 Shenzhen was the first city in China to abolish the dual registration system for social welfare and charity organizations, which now only have to register with the Civil Affairs departments, a decision that was regarded as experimental and served as a blueprint for future policy changes. Then, in April 2010, the central government, in an attempt to control the inflow

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of donations from foreign institutions, enforced stricter regulations regarding foreign money transfers to Chinese social organizations. Next, in February of 2011 Beijing municipal government allowed industry and commerce, charities, welfare and social services’ organizations to register directly with the civil affairs departments without the requirement of dual registration. This announcement was followed by reports on the press last summer regarding discussions for an eminent nationwide elimination of the

It is estimated that more that 3 million nonregistered NGOs operate in the mainland presently for which the authorities know little or nothing about, approximately 10 times more than the registered ones.

dual registration requirement in 2012. Therefore, the recent Plan by the Guangdong provincial government, falls in line with an attempt to streamline the operation of social organizations by making use of their social work capacities, exposing them by ‘luring’ them over ground, and devising new ways to influence their activities and growth. The new Guangdong Plan also permits the establishment of more than one business associations for the same industry from the prefecture (diji) to the township level (xianji). Furthermore, it stipulates that the sponsorship units formerly offering ‘professional management’ will now be in charge of ‘professional guidance’, a term that remains unclear as of its exact content. The above are indications of the CCP’s careful and pragmatic approach regarding the governance of social organizations, that solves the problems of current regulations and partially harmonizes law with social reality.

DOMESTIC ANALYSIS | BY KOSTANTINOS D. TSIMONIS

In conclusion, the new regulations will consist a ‘breakthrough’ only to the degree that they will allow existing underground organizations in the field of social work to come to the surface and new ones to start their operation with less red tape in their registration process. However, the actual impact of these changes is far from certain as the conservative reflexes of bureaucracies tend to dilute institutional reforms, while social organizations, as the case of last year’s changes in Beijing demonstrated, remain vigilant and apprehensive of new state regulations. Ultimately, despite the gradual abolishment of the ‘dual registration system’ there is no indication of a swift in the priorities of the local and central state on the one hand, and social organizations on the other. State and society relations in the PRC will continue to develop in a symbiotic context that is malleable to the center’s political priorities and pressure from the base, yet it is very unlikely that a ‘civil society’ mirroring western historical experience is on the rise.

3. 4.

Notes:

* Konstantinos D. Tsimonis is a PhD candidate at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. His doctoral research is on China’s mass organisations and their potential as political representation mechanisms, using the Communist Youth League as a study case. During 6 years of study and work for various organisations in China, he has published on current Chinese affairs, North Korea, social research methods and modern Chinese literature (translation). 1.

Unger, Jonathan and Chan, Anita, ‘China, corporatism, and the East Asian Model’ The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs No 33 (Jan 1995) ; Jonathan Unger (ed.), Associations and the Chinese State: Contested Spaces (M.E. Sharpe Inc: New York, 2008) Wong, Roy Bin, China Transformed: Historical change and the Limits of European Experience (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997)

6. 7.

8. 9.

10.

Ibid:192 Saich, Tony, ‘Negotiating the State: The develoment of Social Organizations in China’ The China Quarterly No161 (March 2000) Dickson, Bruce J., ‘Cooptation and Corporatism in China: The logic of Party Adaptation’ Political Science Quartery Vol 115, No 4 (winter, 2000-1) Unger and Chan, op. cit. White, Gordon ; Howell, Jude and Shan Xiaoyuan, In Search for civil society (Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1996) Lu, Yiyi, Non-govermental organisations in China (Routledge: London, 2009) See characteristically the book of Lu Yiyi in which she analyzes similar centripetal dynamics at play in the case of 55 Chinese “NGOs”, that inform their relation to the party-state. Saich, op. cit. p. 133

References:

II. III.

IV.

VI.

VII.

Dickson, Bruce J., ‘Cooptation and Corporatism in China: The logic of Party Adaptation’ Political Science Quartery Vol 115, No 4 (winter, 2000-1) Lu, Yiyi, Non-govermental organisations in China (Routledge: London, 2009) Saich, Tony, ‘Negotiating the State: The development of Social Organizations in China’ The China Quarterly No 161 (March 2000) Unger, Jonathan and Chan, Anita, ‘China, corporatism, and the East Asian Model’ The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs No 33 (Jan 1995) Unger, Jonathan (ed.), Associations and the Chinese State: Contested Spaces (M.E. Sharpe: New York, 2008) White, Gordon ; Howell, Jude and Shan Xiaoyuan, In Search for civil society (Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1996) Wong, Roy Bin, China Transformed: Historical change and the Limits of European Experience (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997)

POLITICAL REFLECTION | SPECIAL ISSUE 2012

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By CESRAN (Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis)

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Editorial Board Prof. the Baroness Haleh Afshar, University of York, UK | Prof. Bruce Baker, Coventry University, UK | Dr Richard Bowd, UNDP, Nepal | Prof. Ntuda Ebode, University of Yaounde II, Cameroon | Prof. Scott Gates, PRIO, Norway | Dr Antonio Giustozzi, London School of Economics, UK | Dr Cathy Gormley-Heenan, University of Ulster, UK | Prof. Paul Gready, University of York, UK | Prof. Fen Hampson, Carleton University, Canada | Prof. Mohammed Hamza, Lund University, Sweden | Prof. Alice Hills, University of Leeds | Dr Maria Holt, University of Westminster, UK | Prof. Alan Hunter , Coventry University, UK | Dr Tim Jacoby, University of Manchester, UK | Dr Khalid Khoser, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Switzerland | Dr William Lume, South Bank University, UK | Dr Roger Mac Ginty, St Andrews' University, UK | Mr Rae Mac Grath, Save the Children UK Somalia | Prof. Mansoob Murshed, ISS, The Netherlands | Dr Wale Osofisan, Help Age International, UK | Dr Mark Pelling, King's College, UK | Prof. Mike Pugh, University of Bradford, UK | Mr Gianni Rufini, Freelance Consultant, Italy | Dr Mark Sedra, Centre for Int. Governance Innovation, Canada | Dr Emanuele Sommario, Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna, Italy | Dr Hans Skotte, Trondheim University, Norway | Dr Arne Strand, CMI, Norway | Dr Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, University of Po, France | Dr. Mandy Turner, University of Bradford, UK | Prof. Roger Zetter, University of Oxford, UK

DOMESTIC ANALYSIS | BY GEORGI IVANOV*

CHINA IN THE 21 CENTURY: IS GLOBAL LEADERSHIP POSSIBLE? ST

Sustainable Development, Political Legitimacy and Foreign Policy

hina’s rising star on the world stage is accompanied by significant economic challenges that bring extensive domestic and foreign political implications. To ensure its growth and stability, China must turn to sustainable development, which, accompanied by rising personal wealth, will cause problems for the current one-party political system in China. Beijing must adjust to allow more political pluralism if it hopes to gain the internal political legitimacy to be a global leader in legitimating a multilateral foreign policy in the context of an increasingly multipolar world.

The 21st century is witnessing the decline of the United States as the foremost power in the world, and the gradual emergence of a multipolar order with China at the top, on track to becoming the world’s economic powerhouse. The purpose of this paper is to provide an overarching survey of China’s future role in the world, in parallel with some of the challenges it faces in the coming years and decades. The central theme is going to talk about sustainable development and the corresponding need for China to provide both political leadership and the lead in materializing policies that respect and work with the natural environment, rather than destroy it. At stake is the idea and vision that will replace the American-led world order since the end of the Cold War and it may very well fall to China to provide the needed leadership and insight.

WWW.CESRAN.ORG/POLITICALREFLECTION

Why is China important? Since the death of Mao Tse Dong in 1976, China began a gradual opening to world markets, in a framework that combined strong political control of economic policy with a capitalist-influenced model of production and demand. For over three decades now, China has grown at astounding annual rates and has effectively become the second largest economy in the world after the United States1. Alongside, it has overtaken America as the biggest exporter and consumer of energy 2. In the foreseeable future, we are going to witness America’s gradual decline from the world stage, to be taken up by China in the 21st century. America came to the fore after World War II largely due to the fact that it was the only intact economy not destroyed and decimated by war. However, today

DOMESTIC ANALYSIS | BY GEORGI IVANOV

we live in a unique time â&#x20AC;&#x201C; our world is bigger and more connected than anytime in recorded history. China is becoming a central engine that must not only provide economic leadership, but also a vision for the world with the political will to carry it out. Sustainable Development On a world scale, fossil fuels continue to be the primary method of meeting the energy needs of major countries. One exception is France, whose energy mix is heavily favoured towards nuclear power. However, since sustainable development became a mainstream phrase in the 1980s, the ecological footprint of human activity has become an important consideration for projects both in developed and developing countries. The first step in sustainable development lies in developing power generation techniques that minimize the reliance on fossil fuels. In the first decade of this century, we have seen several major milestones achieved toward renewable energy production. In absolute numbers, the growth of solar and wind investment has been startling, but relative to overall world energy production, still retains a very small share3. Policy-wise, Europe is a leader in encouraging the development of renewable energy: by 2020, 20% of power generated in the EU must come from renewable sources 4. While Chinaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s investment in renewable energy is greater than that of any other country, it is still only having a small impact on the overall energy mix of the country and it is necessary for Beijing to implement a long-term focus in this regard5. However, the emissions of CO2 emitted by China in the coming years are set to increase, and that must be taken into account when talking about renewable energy targets.6

Policy-wise, Europe is a leader in encouraging the development of renewable energy: by 2020, 20% of power generated in the EU must come from renewable sources.

Sustainable development extends beyond power generation. It also encompasses industrial capacity, particularly capital-intensive industries, such as mining and heavy industry. As the worldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s manufacturing center, emissions and waste products from factories in China are a growing environmental and health problem. Polluted air in cities, acidified soil, unacceptably quality of drinking water and the negative impact on groundwater and rivers are fundamental challenges for Beijing to address, if it has any pretensions for becoming a superpower in this century7. Carbon neutrality is a term that refers to developing manufacturing processes that ideally have a net emission of no sulphur and carbon-based gases. On a practical level, it means developing means of scrubbing emissions for harmful gases, storing them underground or developing links with other industries that might have a use for these waste products; they are not limited to gaseous emissions, but also solid waste products that can be used in different manufacturing processes. An additional challenge that comes to China with a rapidly growing economy is increased prosperity. While a new wealthy class of industrialists, bankers and other professionals is taking shape in China, the average person will also feel the effects of a more powerful economy: better wages and a higher level of consumption of both goods and services. When talking about 1,3 billion people, one needs to consider the kind of demand increased consumption will create on existing infrastructure, energy usage, the surrounding natural environment, and the global impact it might have from additional imports as demand for more and different kinds of goods increases. The response by the Chinese government can take a number of dimensions: from slowing the growth of incomes, and thus, demand, to creating a culture in the general population that is sensitive to environmental issues, or promoting goods and services that are construed with an appreciation of minimizing their ecological impact. In essence, the role of the government is central in creating a hybrid of these policies that will give priority to ecologically-sensitive consumption habits and the goods and processes that will support them.

POLITICAL REFLECTION | SPECIAL ISSUE 2012

DOMESTIC ANALYSIS | BY GEORGI IVANOV

Overall, the premise of this section is as follows: the first tier of China’s coming global role is found in encouraging and implementing sustainable development. The three main themes are an emphasis on emission-free power generation (wind, solar, nuclear), reforming heavy industry and capital-intensive activities to ultimately achieve carbon neutrality, and finally encouraging ecologically-friendly habits in a large population that will, on average, become increasingly wealthier in this century and consumer more as a consequence. China must consider these three areas very carefully, because they can set the paradigm for environmental global leadership by the Celestial Empire. Implications of Economic Growth for Internal Political Challenges and Foreign Policy The growing affluence of China is going to bring with it a set of political problems that the country’s one-party rule will find increasingly difficult to confront. The first challenge is that the average person will have the ability to increasingly question the existing order, catalysed by greater personal wealth. In other words, democratic tendencies in a population are correlated with increased economic means and this development will come to odds with the paradigm of one-party rule in China. The effective question is qualitative: can pluralism exist in the context of a charismatic or one-party political system? The historical precedents point to a negative answer: the USSR, for instance, or Franco’s Spain, show that this kind of regime does not stand the test of time and once collapsed, is replaced by imperfect, nascent pluralism. The trouble for China’s Communist Party is that economic growth has the potential to hasten the demise of its political legitimacy. The historical experience of the last major democratic throes in China is not flattering: the forceful suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen Square uprisings raised questions about Beijing’s ability to deal with large -scale protest8. Dealing with dissent is crucial for political legitimacy, because a regime that does WWW.CESRAN.ORG/POLITICALREFLECTION

not have ability to change in the long run is not sustainable. In other words, China needs to find a different, peaceful means of handling difference of opinion and dissent in order for the current regime to maintain political legitimacy. Domestic political legitimacy, gained through wider spaces for public discussion, participation and influence in the political process, will be crucial if Beijing is to have a more influential global role in turn. There are several political reasons for this: one is that predictable domestic politics with conflict management methods that do not involve military means give China the ability to pro-

The trouble for China’s Communist Party is that economic growth has the potential to hasten the demise of its political legitimacy. The historical experience of the last major democratic throes in China is not flattering: the forceful suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen Square uprisings raised questions about Beijing’s ability to deal with large-scale protest

mote political predictability in other conflictprone areas of the world, such as the Middle East or conflict-ridden areas of Africa without being perceived as hypocritical. The second reason is the heightened trust credit it would receive from other major international partners on issues related to a wide variety of policy types: security cooperation, environment, economic and trade relations and peace promotion. Chinese foreign policy will operate in a multipolar world.9 With the gradual exit of the United States as the dominant power in international relations, there is no single power to replace it that can exercise the kind of political, economic and military dominance that the United States did for the second half of the 20th century. In effect, we are seeing the formation of several power centres in the 30

DOMESTIC ANALYSIS | BY GEORGI IVANOV

world, of which China will be likely the most powerful, but not the dominant one. Decisions in a multipolar world are taken in a multilateral manner. The unique circumstances of our world that I mentioned in the first paragraph – population and interconnectivity – will mean that the problems we face in the world will be global in nature, and so will their solutions. This is precisely the challenge to Chinese foreign policy: if America set global paradigms according to its own prisms in the 20th century, China has to invent the prisms of effective multilateralism in the 21st to a much higher degree than any country has up until this point in history that also converge its national interests with those of other countries to equivalent depths – also a practice without precedent in history in the perceived complexity it will have when applied to the modern international system. However, to meet the above goal, Chinese politics have to mature to a higher level, to match the accelerating economic influence of the country. The challenge there, as also mentioned above, is to bring about effective domestic pluralism in the medium to long term, if a multilaterally-based leadership on foreign policy is going to have any credible legitimacy on the international stage. One might ask why cannot tight political control,

tied with gradual economic liberalization, as is the current trend in China, not produce an outcome that would make China a world leader in producing a style of effective foreign policy that is comprehensive, robust and multilateral in nature and make it a global trend of foreign policy design? The answer is straight-forward and complex at the same time: this kind of foreign policy requires a culture of nuanced decision-making that is hard to find in the current behaviour of Chinese domestic, let alone foreign policy. Contemporary practices of Chinese domestic and foreign policies are not encouraging: the imprisonment of political dissenters10, a more confrontational military presence in Southeast Asia11, and shaky and unstable relations with some regional powers – such as Japan and India – need to be resolved before China can effectively begin to think about a global presence in political, and not just economic terms.12 The point of this section is simple: China will have the economic might to be one of the global leaders in a multipolar world, and perhaps the most influential one, as the United States gradually declines over the 21st century. Yet, to become that leader, a political maturation is required that would enhance the political legitimacy of the Communist Party in China through much greater political pluralism and from there, give Chinese foreign policy both the culture of nuance and the needed legitimacy to become an effective multilateral leader in the emerging multipolar world. Conclusion To sum up the paper, China’s economic growth makes it one of the engines of the global economy and it gives Beijing an enhanced position in global affairs. Yet, a focus on sustainable development through the implementation of environmentally-friendly electricity production capacities and vast industrial reform that will not only make industry cleaner, but also sustain its rate of growth, must become the two main policy objectives if China’s economic experiment is to be sustainable in the long term. The more important

POLITICAL REFLECTION | SPECIAL ISSUE 2012

DOMESTIC ANALYSIS | BY GEORGI IVANOV

consideration concerns the political implications of China’s more influential global position, because it is happening in a time of increasing pressures to open up space for political pluralism, which has the potential to overwhelm the current regime. Combined with the two unique aspects of our world, in terms of population and interconnectivity, the challenge is doubled when Chinese foreign policy is taken into consideration, because it will have to function in a multipolar world; in that world, the legitimacy of foreign policy is derived from the domestic political legitimacy of the regime. The reason is that China will never be able to replicate American unilateralism of the post-war period – the world is simply too big and complex now. To function in a multipolar world then, Chinese foreign policy needs to learn to be grounded in popular public legitimacy and have a nuanced approach to global problems and solutions that involves negotiating and convincing a number of international partners. Much of this attitude can be learned through opening up space for pluralism domestically, and it is the only way for China to mature politically to have the foreign policy needed in a multipolar world – thus the imperative for Beijing to focus not just on growing the economy, but also to vastly improve its political sophistication as soon as possible.

site

http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/

package/index_en.htm 5.

Harvey, Fiona. (2010, November 29). China Surges Ahead on Clean Energy Investment. Financial Times.

Grumbine, R. (2007). China’s Emergence and the Prospects for Global Sustainability. BioScience, Vol. 57, No. 3 (March 2007), pp. 249255. P.252

Harris, Paul and Udagawa, Chihiro. (2004). Defusing the Bombshell? Agenda 21 and Economic Development in China. Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 11, No. 3 (Aug., 2004), pp. 618-640. P. 619

The British Broadcasting Corporation. (1989, June 4). 1989: Massacre in Tiananmen Square. The British Broadcasting Corporation.

Kampf, David. (October 20, 2009). The Emergence of a Multipolar World. Retrieved October 23, 2011, from Foreign Policy Association

Website

http://

foreignpolicyblogs.com/2009/10/20/theemergence-of-a-multipolar-world/ 10.

Foster, Peter. (November 5, 2010). Chinese Artist Ai Wei Under House Arrest. Retrieved October 23, 2011, from The Telegraph Web-

Notes:

site

* Georgi Ivanov is a graduate student in political

worldnews/asia/china/8112700/Chinese-

science and international affairs at Carleton Uni-

artist-Ai-Wei-Wei-under-house-arrest.html

versity in Ottawa, Canada. 1.

Weitz, Richard. (March 16, 2010). Global In-

The British Broadcasting Corporation. (2011,

sights: China’s Military Build-up Stokes Re-

Febraury 14). China overtakse Japan as

gional Arms Race. Retrieved October 23,

World’s Second-Biggest Economy. The British

2011, from World Politics Review Website

Broadcasting Corporation.

http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/

Oster, Shai and Swarts, Spencer. (2010, Jul

articles/5283/global-insights-chinas-military-

18). China Tops U.S. in Energy Use. The Wall

buildup-stokes-regional-arms-race

Street Journal. 3.

11.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/

12.

Miks, Jason. (November 4, 2009). To Balance

Al-Jaber, Ahmed et al. (2011). Renewables

China, India Turns to Japan. Retrieved Octo-

2011: Global Status Report. REN21. P.18

ber 23, 2011, from World Politics Review

European Commission. (2010). The EU Cli-

Website

mate and Energy Package. Retrieved August 25, 2011, from European Commission Web-

WWW.CESRAN.ORG/POLITICALREFLECTION

http://

www.worldpoliticsreview.com/ articles/4553/to-balance-china-india-turnsto-japan

DOMESTIC ANALYSIS | BY NICHOLAS MILLER*

THE CASE FOR LI YUANCHAO AS PREMIER

he Central Committee met over the

nese news sources have described Li as one of Chi-

weekend of October 15, 2011 to de-

na’s most ‘unconventional leader’, ‘independent

termine how the upcoming succes-

minded’, and known for strong ‘forward thinking’

sion during the 18th Party Congress

concerning how China should be governed. Li Yu-

in 2012 should occur the current candidate to suc-

anchao has the most hands on experience

ceed Hu Jintao is Xi Jinping with Li Keqiang, one of

amongst the elites in implementing policies for the

the Vice-Premiers is believed to succeed Wen Jia-

problem areas that the CCP need to manage in the

bao as the Premier at the 12th National People’s

21st century. During his reign as Jiangsu Party Boss

Congress in 2013.

he improved Party relations with the people, curbed corruption, implemented inner-party de-

There has been less focus by the media and China

mocracy on a provincial level, improved the condi-

Watchers on who will succeed Wen Jiabao as Prem-

tions of migrant workers, and brought greater gov-

ier. While Li Keqiang is considered to be the front-

ernment attention to the dangers of environmen-

runner and is the current ‘senior’ Vice Premier, I

tal pollution.

contend that Li Yuanchao, former party boss of Jiangsu Province and current head of the Organiza-

Nothing is ever certain in Chinese politics. One of

tions Department, still has an equally suitable can-

the more recent examples of what China Watchers

didate for the position of Premier. Mainland Chi-

thought was a certain event that did not go as pre-

WWW.CESRAN.ORG/POLITICALREFLECTION

DOMESTIC ANALYSIS | BY NICHOLAS MILLER

dicted was the failure of Xi Jinping to be promoted

that the Party must work to ensure better treat-

to Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commis-

ment and more resources need to given to migrant

sion (CMC) during the Fourth Plenum of the 17 th

workers. Wen also commented that the govern-

Party Congress in September of 2009. Though the

ment must do more to curb environmental pollu-

Party gave no reason as to why he was passed over

tion and incorporate green development into Chi-

for promotion it left analysts wondering that per-

na’s ‘rise’. This shows the prescience of Li Yu-

haps there was infighting amongst the elites and

anchao’s policies in Jiangsu Province as he sought

that Xi could be experiencing a fall from grace.

to widely improve the lives of migrant workers and

Eventually Xi was promoted to the Vice-Chairman

spur greater environmental reform since 2002. Li’s

17 th

policies seem to have taken greater notice by high-

CPC in 2010. It should be noted that a military lead-

er Party officials otherwise he would have never

ership position is not a requited position for one to

been promoted to the Organizations Department

become Party Secretary. China Watchers inferred

during the last Party Congress.

position of the CMC at the Fifth Plenum of the

the importance of this position because Hu Jintao held this position before he was made Party Secre-

It is standard procedure for the state media not to

tary and it was believed that Xi would follow Hu’s

speculate about the upcoming succession or reveal

path. The Party’s failure to promote Xi’s only high-

information about the inner workings of the Polit-

lights the unpredictability of accurately forecasting

buro. This is done to prevent outsiders from seeing

elite level politics and how ‘certainties’ can be

any public displays of internal fighting. While China

wrong.

analysts have more information at their disposal today the CCP still remains determined to keep

In May and June 2010 there were widespread

outsiders always uncertain about what happens

worker strikes and migrant unrest throughout sev-

behind the closed doors of the Politburo.

eral provinces. Premier Wen Jiabao highlighted Li Yuanchao - The Dark Horse Li Yuanchao was born in Changzhou City, Jiangsu Province in 1950. His father was Li Gangcheng, a veteran

Communist

official,

while his mother was Lu Jiying, was a revolutionary veteran, whose first husband, Li Chaoshi, was a general in the Red Army who was executed by the Kuomintang (KMT) in 1931. By

birth

Yuanchao

should be considered apart of

‘princeling’

which

faction,

comprised

elites who are descended

POLITICAL REFLECTION | SPECIAL ISSUE 2012

DOMESTIC ANALYSIS | BY NICHOLAS MILLER

from important Party officials but since Li’s career

China’s leaders are aware that China’s economic

was advanced through the Chinese Communist

rise is threatened by worsening environmental pol-

Youth League (CCYL) this puts him a member of

lution. A Chinese governmental report that was

‘populist’ faction. The populists are elites that rose

released in February 2010 showed that the water

from more humble backgrounds and have ties to

pollution throughout China in 2007 was more than

the CCYL and Hu Jitano, who previously ran the

two times greater than what officials originally had

CCYL in the 1980s.

originally reported. China’s leaders have begun stressing the importance of sustainable develop-

Like a majority of today’s elites within China Li

ment and now China is one of the world’s leaders

Yuanchao was sent to work as a laborer during the

in the development of green technology.

Cultural Revolution. After the revolution he received a Bachelor’s Degree in Mathematics from

Li Yuanchao is one of the few provincial leaders to

Fudan University in Shanghai in 1982, a Master’s

make explicit calls to change how the government

Degree in Economic Management from Beijing University in 1990, and a PhD in Law from the Central Party School in 1995. Li’s political career started in 1983 when his first patron, Chen Pixian, the former Party Secretary of Shanghai, recommended him to Hu Yaobang to serve as CCYL Secretary in Fudan University. By the end of 1983 Li was made Vice Minister of the CCYL Central Committee.

Li’s political career started in 1983 when his first patron, Chen Pixian, the former Party Secretary of Shanghai, recommended him to Hu Yaobang to serve as CCYL Secretary in Fudan University.

During Li’s tenure as Deputy Party Secretary of Jiangsu Province in 2000 and Party Secretary of Jiangsu Province in 2002 he implemented a variety

stands on protecting stability throughout the

of political and administrative reforms such as

country. In 2005, he commented that some

‘service-orientated government’, fuwuxing zhengfu,

leaders were too ‘concerned with stability’,

in which the public evaluated government leaders

taiping guan, and that the government’s policies

and those who received the lowest evaluations

were making minor incidents into major ones.

were either demoted or fired. His reforms im-

Li stated that China’s leaders lacked the courage

proved Jiangsu standing from the 5th most peti-

to pursue bolder reforms. Widespread social unrest

tioned province to 23rd in 2006.

and riots in Tibet and Xinjiang show that Li Yuanchao’s criticisms of the Party’s approach to

In 2002 Li called for a greater focus on sustainable

social stability were justified, though the CCP’s

development that balances growth of urban areas

response after the 4th Plenum was to reassert the

with environmental protection. In 2007 rapid algae

status quo on ethnic minorities and make it illegal

growth caused by pollution threatened Lake Tai, Li

to discuss independence or separatism from the

ordered it to be cleaned under the strictest guide-

PRC.

lines, which cost Nanjing’s GDP to drop 15% that year. The Jiangsu Provincial Government closed

Yu Jianrong, of the Chinese Academy of Social Sci-

2,150 chemical factories by 2008 and allocated be-

ences, who is regarded as the leading expert on

tween 10%-20% of the city and county revenues

the problems of peasants and migrant workers, has

towards environmental protection.

reported to the central leadership that rural prob-

WWW.CESRAN.ORG/POLITICALREFLECTION

DOMESTIC ANALYSIS | BY NICHOLAS MILLER

lems need to be urgently addressed if the Party

endemic corruption. Whoever is appointed within

wishes to prevent social unrest on an unprecedent-

the ‘fifth generation’ leadership at the 18th Party

ed scale. Li Yuanchao has an advantage over

Congress and 12th National People’s Congress will

other candidates in that he has extensive

have to meet the challenges needed to keep Chi-

experience in improving the migrant situation.

na’s economic rise secure.

Jiangsu Province has over twelve million migrant workers, or 16% of the Province’s population of

Notes:

76 million people. In 2006 the Jiangsu Provincial Government began to set up free vocational

* Nicholas J.S. Miller is a PhD candidate at the

training schools and by 2011 all migrant workers

University of Sydney.

are to be trained in other skill areas, and migrant children will be allowed access to educa-

This article is an abridged version of my

tion, which was not normally allowed within

Master Thesis in International Relations for

Chinese law.

Flinders University titled, “The CCP Leadership Succession After Hu Jintao in 2012.”

Li’s has the experience in handling a wide range

This article originally appeared in The Dip-

of the problems China will need to tackle if it is

lomat as “The Case for Li Yuanchao” on Nov

to sustain its economic growth. Though he is not

30, 2011, http://the-diplomat.com/china-

considered a front-runner to succeed Wen Jiabao

power/2011/11/30/the-case-for-li-

in the estimations of most China Watchers,

yuanchao/

his

overall

practical

experience

precisely

what the ‘fifth generation’ leadership need for the

‘Richard

McGregor

and

Mure

Dickie,

CCP maintain its power throughout the 21 st

“China’s Political Rising Star: Li Yuanchao”,

century.

Financial Times, 15 March 2007; Wong Wah, “China’s Rising Star”, Asia Times, 04 February 2006

The 18th Party Congress in 2012 and the 12 th National People’s Congress in 2013 are going to be major tests for the CCP’s ability to secure

Vice Premier Candidates for the 2008 Chi-

an orderly political succession. While Li Yuanchao

nese government ”, Association for Asian

may not be the front-runner in the race for the po-

Research,

sition as Premier but China Watchers should not

October

2005,

http://

www.asianresearch.org/articles/2719.html.

ignore his chances for success. Li Yuanchao’s past success in lessening corruption, improving the ac-

Joshua Li, “Who Will succeed Wen Jiabao?

Alice Miller, “The Case of Xi Jinping and the

countability of the government to the people, ad-

Mysterious Succession”, China Leadership

dressing environmental pollution, and migrant

Monitor, No. 30, 2009, p. 1-9.

worker issues are all challenges that need to be addressed and his current position of head of the

James Mulvenon, “The Best Laid Plans: Xi Jinping and the CMC Vice-Chairmanship

powerful Organizations Department shows that

that Didn’t Happen”, China Leadership Mon-

the elites within the CCP have tremendous faith in

itor, No. 30, 2009, p. 1-7.

his abilities. 6.

John Garnaut, “China’s land disputes at

If China wants to continue its rise throughout the

crisis point as revolutionary turmoil beck-

21st century it will have to address growing eco-

ons, says professor of disenfranchised”,

nomic and social inequalities, ethnic tension, and

Sydney Morning Herald, 1 March 2010.

POLITICAL REFLECTION | SPECIAL ISSUE 2012

DOMESTIC ANALYSIS | BY JIAN GAO*

RETURN TO COUNTRYSIDE: A NEW ATTEMPT OF RURAL FINANCIAL TRANSFORMATION

n July 2009, the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) issued a threeyear plan1 on the development of New Rural Financial Institutions. The plan proposed to set up 1294 New Rural Financial Institutions including 1027 Village Banks by the end of 2011. According to the plan, 75.2% of the proposed New Rural Financial Institutions would be set up in the area where agriculture plays an essential role in local economy, 65.9% in the Central and Western provinces and 35.7% in the poor area. It is remarkable that the rural and underdeveloped areas have been put in the privileged position in this financial arrangement. To make sure that fund could flow between the developed and underdeveloped, rural and urban area, the plan required that the promoters who intend to create a new institution in urban or other developed area have to set up a counterpart in the ru-

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ral or other underdeveloped area simultaneously. However, this plan is not the beginning of the Rural Financial Transformation. The transformation in fact has been carried out from December 2006 when the CBRC decided to set up experimental rural financial institutions in Sichuan, Qinghai, Gansu, Neimenggu, Jilin and Hubei Provinces. The first list experimental institutions included 21 Village Banks, 10 Rural Mutual Cooperatives and 5 Loan Companies. In 2007, the experiment was extended to 23 provinces. By June 2009, 118 New Rural Financial Institutions had been established, which were composed of 100 Village Banks, 11 Rural Mutual Cooperatives and 7 Loan Companies, of which 87 were in Central and Western area. Regardless of the aggressive plan of 2009-2011, the progress from December 2006 to July 2009 of the Rural Financial Transformation was also conspicuous.

DOMESTIC ANALYSIS | BY JIAN GAO

In the statement of the three-year plan, one fact was particularly highlighted, which was the poor coverage of the financial institution in rural area. It was reflected by two issues: the first is that there were still 1424 townships which hadn't been covered by any financial institutions by 2008; the second is it was still difficult for rural residents and enterprises to gain loans. Why has the financial supply in rural area been not able to meet their demand? Is this situation a newly emerged problem or a long-term dilemma? To answer these questions, we should throw light on the financial scheme in rural area. Financial Scheme in Rural Area before and after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis By 1997, the rural financial structure was composed of four parts: the Big Four State-owned Commercial Banks, the Rural Credit Cooperatives, the Postal Savings Bank and Rural Cooperative Foundations. During the period of late 1970s to mid-1990s, with the deepening reforms in Chinese economy, the county territory economy in China had experienced rapid growth which was not only revealed by its proportion within the whole economy, but also characterized by a variety of growing financial bodies within the county territory. In addition to the Rural Credit Cooperative and local branches of the Big Four Banks, varied types of Rural Cooperative Foundations had

played an active role in meeting the financial demand of rural people and enterprises. In 1992, there were 17,400 Rural Cooperative Foundations set in township and 112,500 set in villages2. During the period from 1993 to 1996, different types of foundations continued booming under the policy supports of central government. By the end of 1996, just before the central government ordered emergent shutdown of the Rural Cooperative Foundations, the number of foundations at township level was up to 21,000. However, in the wake of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, abrupt changes in the rural financial arrangements had taken place. Although Chinese government boasted their success in fighting against the crisis, the rural financial scheme in fact had suffered immense setback. In this year, due to the financial crisis and the following deflation in Chinese economy, the Central Financial Work Conference decided to contract the branches of the Big Four Banks at the county and the township. According to the transformation plan produced in June1998, all the branches with average savings below 500, 000 yuan per staff should be closed; branches with average savings between 500,000 and 1,000,000 yuan per staff should be closed selectively and branches with savings between 1,000,000 and 1,500,000 yuan per staff should be combined. In the three years between 1998 and 2001, the Four Stateowned Commercial Bank had closed 44,000 branches within China mainland. All the closed branches were located in rural area under the county-level. Furthermore, the Big Four Banks have taken back the authority of loan from countylevel branches. From then on, the major

DOMESTIC ANALYSIS | BY JIAN GAO

business of the Big Four Banks in rural area has become absorbing savings, which caused the ongoing flow of fund from rural area to the developed and urban area. At the same time, to avoid the risks involved with the rapid development in the unofficial financial market, the People’s Bank of China and Ministry of Agriculture made the decision to close all the Rural Cooperative Foundations. The order was issued in 1999. The sudden shutdown has caused credit crash and the run on bank in spite of the rescue from central government. To meet the debts, the burden had to be transferred to the public finance of local government, which eventually were passed on to local people. Why reform? From mid-1990s, the policies in industrial structure and strategies have been skewed in favour of urban and developed area, and the county territory economy has fallen into recession as a result. This situation has been worsening since the funds were continuously extracted to the major cities and industrial area. This unidirectional flow of money left a growing financial gap in the county territory economy, which has brought about the prosperity of underground financial market in rural area. As far as local people concerned, the supply of underground financial market has been usually not reliable and more expensive than that of official financial institutions. On the other hand, due to its illegal identity, the underground financial market has usually been beyond the regulation of financial regulatory authority as well as the control of monetary policy. It would very likely increase the risk of government failure in Macro Economic Control. Another context that has to be taken into consideration is the cancellation of agricultural tax since 2005. The influence of this reform is never defined to the alleviation of farmers’ economic burden, but concerns the relationship between the government and the people. The agricultural tax as well as various levies attached has developed in-

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dividual farmers’ awareness of their linkage with the country while the government could keep their control on grassroots by collecting the tax. When all these charges were abolished, the local governments, including the county and lower level governments, had no longer direct connections with their people, and the shrinkage of local financial income resulted from this transformation has also triggered the retreat of governance from grass roots society. Under the above context, the extension of New Rural Financial Institutions could not only be a measure to meet the increasing demand for financial service in rural area, but also be a governmental strategy of the return to rural society. If we turn to review the practice of this movement, we can find this three-year plan is not entirely market -oriented, but in some sense governmentoriented. Though the main components of the New Rural Financial Institutions, Village Banks, were claimed to be run as a profitable institution, they are in reality subject to the admission control which requires the promoters to set up at least one Village Bank in rural or underdeveloped area while creating a Village Bank in urban or developed area. Notes: * Jian Gao is a PhD student in Economic and Social History, School of History, Classics and Archaeology, University of Edinburgh. 1.

China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) on the development of New Rural Financial Institutions 2009-2011: Question and Answer Session 银监会有关部门负责人就发布《新型农村金融机构2009年-2011 年工作安排》答记者问http:// www.songyang.gov.cn/zwgk/ xxgk/00266401_1/03/0302/201109/ t20110927_89598.htm

Wen Tiejun. “Rise and Fall of the Rural Cooperative Foundations (Nongcun Hexuo Jijinhui de Xingshuaishi 农村合作基金会的兴衰史)”. Zhongguo Laoqu Jianshe, 2009 (9).

ISSN: 2045-1903

CALL FOR CONTRIBUTIONS Journal of Conflict Transformation and Security (JCTS) is for academics, policy makers and practitioners to engage in discussions on a wide range of peace, conflict and human security related issues in a multidisciplinary forum with contributions from political science, security studies, international relations, development studies, post-conflict reconstruction studies, economics, sociology, international law, political history, and human geography. As an international refereed e-journal, edited by a group of acclaimed scholars indicated in the Editorial Board, the Journal of Conflict Transformation and Security is published at its own website http://www.cesran.org/jcts. It welcomes submissions of articles from related persons involved in the scope of the journal as well as summary reports of conferences and lecture series held in the social sciences. Submissions in comparative analysis, with case studies and empirical research are particularly encouraged. Prospective authors should submit 5.000 - 10.000 word articles for consideration in Microsoft Word -compatible format. For more complete descriptions and submission instructions, please access the Editorial Guidelines and Style Guidelines pages at the CESRAN website: http://www.cesran.org/jcts. Contributors are urged to read CESRAN’s author guidelines and style guidelines carefully before submitting articles. Articles submissions should be sent in electronic format to:

Prof. Alpaslan ÖZERDEM - Editor-in-Chief - alpozerdem@cesran.org Publication date:

Spring issue — April Autumn issue — October

CHINA AND THE WORLD | BY ANANYA CHATTERJEE*

SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS: COMPETITION OR COOPERATION?

espite protests by the Chinese government, the Tibetan spiritual leader Dalai Lama went ahead with plans to visit a heavily militarized Tibetan Buddhist area in northeast India in November 2009, which is the focus of an intense territorial dispute between China and India. Dalai Lama had re-iterated that he did not want to be the cause for escalation of tensions between India and China, the former being his host for past six decades. This visit had ignited the Sino-Indian border dispute and could risk making this region the proxy battleground where both India and China seek to proclaim their respective sovereignty. Dalai Lama’s recent visits and public appearances in different non-political events in India have once again irked the Chinese officials who believe that India is inciting anti-Chinese sentiments leading to cancellation of high-profile talks at the governmental levels. Tension had slowly been building up between the two Asian giants, with media commentators further inciting the divergence of opinions. There have been wide-spread speculations regarding Chinese intentions to wage war on India, which is unlikely in the current scenario. Reports had also appeared in Chinese state media alleging that India was moving troops and fighter aircraft to the northeast, specifically into Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh.

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The Sino-Indian border dispute continues to remain a cause of slightly greater concern as the two countries have been in mutually antagonistic and unchanging positions for decades. There also seems to be a lack of genuine diplomatic initiative to resolve the tension and a growing differential in comprehensive national power which increasingly favours China.1 Meeting his Chinese counter-part, Wen Jiabao on the sidelines of the ASEAN Summit in Hanoi on 28 -29 October, 2010, the Indian Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh set the tone by commenting that “China’s rise is a fact of life”, implying that China has to be engaged, and not contained, thoughtfully and imaginatively; China needed to be respected and not suspected, trusted and not doubted. Referring to Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh, the Indian Foreign Secretary Ms. Nirupama Rao said that dealing with a “peaceful rise of China requires close analysis, study and understanding”. 2 But the world has taken little notice of the rising border tensions and sharpening geopolitical rivalry between the two giants that represent competing political and social models of development. Even though China and India have more than 20years track record of cooperation, both countries have ample justification for being cautious. On the one hand, US hegemony and greater US in-

CHINA AND THE WORLD | BY ANANYA CHATTERJEE

volvement in Asia may push the two neighbours toward even more cooperation. On the other hand, the degree to which one nation perceives the other as a threat could encourage closer ties with the United States. According to the United States National Intelligence Council Report on emerging global trends, by 2015, international community will have to confront the military, political and economic dimensions of the rise of China and India. How these two countries manage their relationship will have a tremendous impact on peace and stability in the regional and, increasingly, global context. Against this backdrop of a changing international environment, the two Asian powers find themselves locked into what Barry Buzan has called the â&#x20AC;&#x153;security complexâ&#x20AC;? within which they are expected to manage their rivalry and develop ties of cooperation.3 Historical evidence shows that although China has been a major security concern for India, the Chinese were less wary of India and concentrated more on the pattern of superpower rivalry existing between the United States and the former Soviet Union during the Cold War.

Barry Buzan

After years of cold peace, mistrust and hostility since the Sino-Indian border clashes in 1962, the demands of realpolitik and pragmatism in policymaking transformed one of Asia's most important relationships - bilateral ties between India and China. The end of the Cold War witnessed the development of two defining characteristics in the security environment of the AsiaPacific region: First, the United States has become the only superpower in the world today. It is also the most important external power in Asia, and plays a key role in Asian security; Second, old rivals,

China and India have emerged as strong regional powers, as evidenced by impressive economic growth, the development of nuclear arsenals, and demonstrated ambitions for respective influences in the Pacific and South Asian regions. While Chinaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s role as an economic and geostrategic player is more widely recognized, India is slowly emerging as a regional competitor to be taken seriously. China and India, the two largest developing countries in the world, have a commonality of history, culture, economy and social characteristics, despite certain irreconcilable differences. Each is concentrating its resources to expedite internal economic development, carries out an independent foreign policy and strives for a peaceful international environment. China is a big power in East Asia while India is a big power in South Asia. Each enjoys advantages and influence in their respective regions. In spite of sharing a glorious civilizational past and having never fought a single war until their emergence as modern states, security competition between India and China is inevitable as their economies grow. However, the positive note is that this security competition does not have to be conflictual. The contemporary picture in China-India relations today is that both nations are engaged in attempting to put the past behind and forge new relationships based on the emerging global strategic realities. Trade and economic ties have grown exponentially in the last few years and leaders of both the countries have expressed determination to find solutions to the China-India boundary dispute which have distorted relations in the past. The changing reality of India-China ties is clearly reflected in economic issues which are increasingly becoming the most vital component of official discourse and academic enquiry both in the Western countries, as well as, in India and China. As a result of this growing interest amongst experts and officials of both these countries, India-China economic engagement has since come to be recognized as one of the most reliable CBM (confidence-building measure) in the trajectory of India-China political rapprochement.

POLITICAL REFLECTION | SPECIAL ISSUE 2012

CHINA AND THE WORLD | BY ANANYA CHATTERJEE

The post-Soviet world system has been characterized by the opening up of geographical boundaries of the different nations in the overall perspective of economic integration. The Cold War rivalry between two divergent political systems is no more the parameter for choice of allies. The confrontational diplomacy has been replaced by consensus and engagement. The new mood of engagement between India and China has been influenced by the developments in the international sphere, which would shape their domestic and foreign policies in the days ahead.4 China and India has embarked on what can be broadly described as the path of â&#x20AC;&#x153;cooperative securityâ&#x20AC;?.5 The concept of cooperative security derives from the liberal traditionalist paradigm offering a new approach to managing security dilemmas that states face in regional and global contexts. This approach is founded on two essential arguments. First, threats to security are no longer solely military. They are increasingly diverse and multidimensional ranging from economic underdevelopment and trade imbalances, irregular migration of people and uncontrolled population growth, human rights abuses and drug trafficking, conflict over access to natural resources and environmental degradation and the most effective being the threat of terrorist attacks from unidentified elements in society. Second, the management of these emerging security issues require multilateral efforts through the processes of discussion, negotiation and cooperation between both the governmental (track I approach) and non-governmental (track II approach) actors. The divergences and convergences in Sino-Indian interests reveal that India and China are two major powers in Asia with global aspirations and certain specific, significant conflicting interests given their historical legacies. As a result, some amount of friction in their bilateral relationship is inevitable. Though competition between the two emerging Asian giants is not ruled out, their relationship should be sustained for developing a meaningful positive relationship and contentious bilateral issues should not deter the process.

WWW.CESRAN.ORG/POLITICALREFLECTION

While the prospect of a better economic interaction has brought two countries closer in recent years, external factors play a viable role in determining the future course of their relationship. The relations of the two Asian powers with the U.S. and Russia, the former Cold War adversaries, have a decisive impact on the future evolution of SinoIndian relations. It is inevitable that their efforts will be affected by the policies of the great powers that play a decisive role in the international sphere. India will be closer to the US for defend-

The post-Soviet world system has been characterized by the opening up of geographical boundaries of the different nations in the overall perspective of economic integration. ing their shared values of democracy, freedom and pluralism and maintaining its policy of broadbased engagement with the United States particularly in view of the terrorist attacks. Similarly, India will be steadfast on its relation with Russia based on its historical, friendly ties which will further strengthen through economic and military cooperation. Thus, while in the Cold War, ties with the superpowers strained Sino-Indian relations; now balancing Indiaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s relationship with each of them will determine its relations with China. Both China and India rely heavily on Russian military technology and equipment for modernization of their defence systems. There has been evidence that the Chinese military is engaged in a modernization programme although it is very paradoxical given the fact that China is keen to develop community-building exercises with its neighbours to foster a peaceful regional environment for overall growth and prosperity. The U.S. Defence Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld speaking to Asian defence ministers at an annual security conference about a Pentagon report on China in

CHINA AND THE WORLD | BY ANANYA CHATTERJEE

2005 highlighted that “China appears to be expanding its missile forces, allowing them to reach targets in many areas of the world, not just the Pacific region, while also expanding its missile capabilities. Since no nation threatens China, one must wonder: Why this growing investment?”6 Chinese analysts have argued, Beijing's increased defence spending is in line with the country's economic growth and the spending is needed to modernize a force that is well behind in technology, hardware and logistics. The government officials have stressed that China has no intention of threatening its neighbours or disturbing regional stability as part of its “peaceful development” strategy.7 Its mission, they say, is to develop a credible deterrent such that Taiwan does not declare independence. As Mr Jaswant Singh, Leader of the Opposition, Rajya Sabha (India’s Upper House of Parliament) can be quoted in a dialogue of the Brookings Leadership Forum of the Brookings Institution, Washington DC, on May 31, 2005 that “the People’s Republic of China is currently so engaged with the great issues like economic modernization that confront them as a country, that there is no free play available to engage in conflict. It has always been China’s strategic philosophy that if your adversary is humbled without conflict, then that is a much better way to humble.”8 Although the Chinese military build-up is not directly targeted towards India, India needs to prepare itself to face any such challenges, in the view of Chinese military preparedness. The possibility of a Sino-Indian arms race can disrupt the strategic stability of the Asian security system and jeopardize the achievements in the economic sphere. However, the Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to India in April 2005 had signalled a significant shift

Wen Jiabao

in relations between the two nations after more than five decades of mutual distrust and suspicion. The statement signed during this visit emphasized that the two countries would promote diplomatic relations, economic ties and work jointly to address global challenges and threats. 9 China and India have agreed that an all-round expansion of economic cooperation between the two countries constitutes an important dimension of their deeply entrenched relationship and that they should make joint efforts to increase bilateral trade volume surpassing the $61.7 billion achieved in 2010. Both the leadership in New Delhi and Beijing are displaying greater caution and pragmatism in managing the differences and working on common causes of concerns and interests. Therefore, there continues to remain the possibilities of both cooperation and competition between the two countries and the decision-making processes of their political regimes will play a critical role in formulating the future agenda of India-China relations. Many seem to believe that the American President Obama´s recent visit to India is the indicator of the forging of a strong alliance against China. Both China and India being more than 3,000 years old as nations and with more than 2,000 years of recorded contacts between them do not necessarily need to tread that path. Both have respected and trusted each other from the ancient times. Chinese society believes in maintaining order, given Confucianism’s influence and the majority Hindus of India is influenced by the concept of “Basudaiva Kutumbakam” (universal brotherhood). Therefore, it is also imperative to look at what concepts and notions shape the societal perceptions in these two countries, as the government and its policies are nothing but the reflection of the society. It is acceptable, that as two neighbours, India and China will have their differences and they will give vent to their dissatisfaction and at times may pose to threaten each other to appease a small segment of their nationalist population, it is how-

POLITICAL REFLECTION | SPECIAL ISSUE 2012

CHINA AND THE WORLD | BY ANANYA CHATTERJEE

ever unlikely that either one of them would enter into a serious strategic alliance against the other. As Professor Chellaney continues to re-iterate10 that if relations with China need to improve, India must have an honest and open debate on its diplomatic and military options. Zeng Jianhua, Director of Asian, African and Latin American Affairs at the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs (CPIFA) has also emphasized on the role of nongovernmental exchange, culture and media in deepening mutual understanding; how to deal with trade frictions; and how to enhance bilateral ties between China and India.11 In the second session of the Carnegie Europe Roundtable Series, Carnegie’s Ashley J. Tellis explained how SinoIndian relations have changed and their bilateral relations are now defined by a complex balance of competition and cooperation that Tellis characterized as co-engagement.12 It is understandable that the coming decades will witness growing interaction between the two countries on a variety of issues than ever before. The main concern is whether those areas, in which interaction is mutually beneficial, such as increased trade, will remain unaffected by competition over more contentious issues such as both countries’ quest for energy security.13 It remains to be seen if China and India are destined for conflict or cooperation in the transitional multi-polar world order. Notes: * Ananya Chatterjee is a PhD candidate at the University of Reading. 1.

Clarke, Ryan, “Sino-Indian Strategic Relations: Constrained Competition, Constrained Cooperation”, EAI Background Brief No. 612, East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore, 1 April 2011, available online at http://www.eai.nus.edu.sg/ BB612.pdf accessed on 10th July 2011 Das, R.N., “Fresh Impetus to Sino-Indian relations”, Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, November 1, 2010 retrieved from http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/ FreshImpetustoSinoIndianRelations_rndas_011110 on 30th November 2010

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Buzan, Barry, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, 2nd ed., Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 1991,p.209

Panda, Snehalata, “Sino-Indian Relations in a New Perspective”, Strategic Analysis, January-March 2003, 27:1, Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis, New Delhi

Sidhu, Waheguru Pal Singh & Yuan, Jingdong, China and India: Cooperation or Conflict?, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 2003, p.115

Mazzetti, Mark, “Chinese Arms threaten Asia, Rumsfeld says”, Los Angeles Times, June 4, 2005 available at http:// www.globalsecurity.org/org/ news/2005/050604-china-asia.htm

Ibid

Singh Jaswant, “India-U.S. Strategic Partnership: Perceptions, Potential and Problems”, A Brookings Leadership Forum, The Brookings Institution, Miller Reporting Co., Inc., Washington DC, , May 31, 2005

Embassy of the Peoples’ Republic of China in India, “ China, India agree on Strategic Partnership”, Xinhuanet, Beijing, April 13, 2005 available online at http:// www.chinaembassy.org.in/eng/ssygd/ zygx/t191496.htm

10.

Chellaney, Brahma, “Sino-Indian border tensions: Let the Facts Speak for Themselves: Setting Boundaries” DNA, Oct 4, 2009 retrieved from http:// www.dnaindia.com/opinion/mainarticle_setting-boundaries_1295064 on 30 November 2010

11.

Shen, Li, “Developing Sino-Indian Relations”, china.org.cn, March 25, 2010, retrieved from http://www.china.org.cn/ opinion/2010-03/25/ content_19684860.htm on 30th November 2010

12.

Tellis, Ashley J., “India and China’s RiseCompetition and Cooperation?”, Carnegie

CHINA AND THE WORLD | BY ANANYA CHATTERJEE

Endowment for International Peace, January 16, 2008, available online at http:// www.carnegieendowment.org/events/? fa=eventDetail&id=1172 13.

Price, Gareth, “China and India: Cooperation and Competition”, Asia Programme Briefing Paper, ASP BP 07/01, Chatham House, May 2007 available online at http:// www.chathamhouse.org.uk/ files/9174_bpchinaindia0507.pdf

zygx/t191496.htm retrieved on 30th November 2010 VI.

Mazzetti, Mark, “Chinese Arms threaten Asia, Rumsfeld says”, Los Angeles Times, June 4, 2005 available at http:// www.globalsecurity.org/org/ news/2005/050604-china-asia.htm

VII.

National Intelligence Council, “Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue about the Future with Nongovernmental Experts”, is available at http://www.dni.gov/nic/ PDF_GIF_global/globaltrend2015.pdf accessed 16th July 2011

VIII.

Panda, Snehalata, “Sino-Indian Relations in a New Perspective”, Strategic Analysis, 27:1, Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis, New Delhi, January-March 2003

IX.

Shen, Li, “Developing Sino-Indian Relations”, china.org.cn, March 25, 2010, retrieved from http://www.china.org.cn/ opinion/2010-03/25/ content_19684860.htm on 30th November 2010

XI.

Sidhu, Waheguru Pal Singh & Yuan, Jingdong, China and India: Cooperation or Conflict?, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 2003

XII.

XIII.

Tellis, Ashley J., “India and China’s RiseCompetition and Cooperation?”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 16, 2008, available online at http:// www.carnegieendowment.org/events/? fa=eventDetail&id=1172

References:

Buzan, Barry, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post Cold War Era, 2nd ed., Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 1991

II.

III.

IV.

Clarke, Ryan, “Sino-Indian Strategic Relations: Constrained Competition, Constrained Cooperation”, EAI Background Brief No. 612, East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore, 1 April 2011, available online at BB612.pdf Das, R.N., “Fresh Impetus to Sino-Indian relations”, Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, November 1, 2010 retrieved from http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/ FreshImpetustoSinoIndianRelations_rndas_011110 on 30th November 2010 Embassy of the Peoples’ Republic of China in India, “ China, India agree on Strategic Partnership”, Xinhuanet, Beijing, April 12, 2005 available online at http:// www.chinaembassy.org.in/eng/ssygd/

POLITICAL REFLECTION | SPECIAL ISSUE 2012

CHINA AND THE WORLD | BY LIN REN*

RUSSIA AND CHINA: RECONCILIATION

STRATEGIC FRIENDSHIP

eed to Re-conciliate: From Brothers to Foes

The postwar period has witnessed an unbreakable Sino-Soviet brotherhood after their joint victory in the anti-imperial Japan. The key words that have described the bilateral relations were: ideological soul mates, peers and allies. The Soviet Union and its Marxist-Leninist ideology was the model of the newly established People's Republic of China. Yet, the turning point of the bilateral relations has happened in the late 1950s/1960s. The former close friends have entered a longlasting deteriorating trend of bilateral relations afterwards. It started with the end of the 1950s and worsened in the 1960s. The cold war setting pushed the Soviet to integrate China into the camp against the U.S. hegemony, which was reflected in the attempting project of establishing long-wave radio stations in China and joint fleet in 1958. The crack between the two has originated ever since. After it has been refused, the Soviet Union has withdrawn the large amount of Soviet skilled experts from China and tore up 243 bilateral contracts. China has gone through huge losses and difficulties due to the crash of the bilateral relations. The summit of worsening relations took place in 1969, when the Soviet armed conflict

WWW.CESRAN.ORG/POLITICALREFLECTION

provoked Treasure Island. Massed troops also appeared on the long and disputed territory line. Why and how does the reconciliation carry out between the two? What factors work in the case of Sino-Russian rapprochement? Researches on reconciliation have devoted to finding out through what lane former hostile countries could overcome the â&#x20AC;&#x153;zero-sum gameâ&#x20AC;? and arrive at a healthy bilateral relationship. Substantive reconciliation between former hostilities requires countries to learn how to live together with each other not only without emerging conflicts but also get convinced that the counterpart is not a threat. The social-psychology serves as an important foundation of a stable peace, which avoids certain domestic backlash. Therefore, the former questions could be transferred to: Have the SinoRussian government as well as their societies prepared to a substantive reconciliation? Government-to-Government Reconciliation in Complexity The normalization of relations between the two parties was initiated since the late 1980s. Deng Xiaoping showed an open attitude to end the past and have a new start with the bilateral relations. The summit meeting was realized in 1989,

CHINA AND THE WORLD | BY LIN REN

which marked the rapprochement. In the 1990s, Moscow and Beijing have shown an accommodating attitude to each other. The start of reconciliation is nothing about economics or other ends but the political needs. The changing international environment and the reassessment of strategic arrangement could explain the more and more frequent political interaction: Yeltsin visited Beijing in 1992 and 1996, while Jiang Zemin visited Moscow in 1994, 1995 and 1997. A series of accommodating policies could be marked by easing the territorial conflict between the former antagonistic countries. Moscow decided to withdraw its troops from Mongolia and accomplished the whole process in 1992, and ever since 1995 Russia reduced 150,000 troops from the Far East. The two parties have also agreed on some essential issues in the domestic, regional and international level: on the Taiwan, Tibet, and Chechnya issue; to reach a consensus on joint anti -terrorism; to carry out further cooperate in the field of trade, economy, and military. The convergence of interests has served as one of the main force of conducting reconciliation between Russia and China, while divergence between interests could prohibit deepening reconciliation. Two great powers attract great attentions in many fields, such as geopolitics, energy, and economy. The bilateral relations have been complex, while the driving force of further reconciliation is therefore not straightforward. China has been one of the largest energy consumers, while Russia has been one of the largest

CIS Leaders

producers of oil and gas. A 1,000km oil pipeline bridged eastern Siberia of Russia and Chinaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s main oil base-Daqing in 2010. Encouraging cooperation in this sphere is expected. Yet, in the energy sphere, Russia and Chinaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s interest is far more complicated than matching. Russia wanted to sell its gas to China, while China demanded the oil from Russia. The non-complimentary relations in the energy sphere have kept Sino-Russian economic integration at a moderate degree. The two went through a long and tough negotiation but without agreement on the price and volume of the gas. Russia requires amounting amount of investment, while China needs an affordable price. But, this process cannot be reversed. Interest convergence and divergence exists also in the strategic arrangement of the two countries in Central Asia. Both China and Russia have a significant strategic interest in Central Asia. China has more than 3,000 km long common border and Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and three Central Asian countries. Several cross-border ethnic groups live along these borders. The emerging East Turkistan problem bothers China as well. A stable Central Asia backups the economic development in western China. CIS countries were the Russian former sphere of influence. It has always been on the priority agenda of Moscow. At the initiative stage of reconciliation, Russia participated in a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) delegation. Moscow also coordinated China with the CIS countries. With the coordination of Yelstin, China and CIS countries have agreed on the force reduction, limitation of resorting to force, and no serious military activities within 100km of the common border in 1996. These accommodating policies have brought credibility, which contributed to the further reconciliation. Nonetheless, the conflicts in the area of resources, trade and energy have brought instability of Sino-Russian strategic arrangement in this area. Putting the interest under an institutional framework is necessary, which could limit conflict and identify com-

CHINA AND THE WORLD | BY LIN REN

mon interest. Under this background, China and Russia initiated the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Unprepared Societies ? Reconciliation is beyond conflict resolution. In order to bring about a stable peace and eradicate zero-sum perception, a substantive reconciliation calls for a fundamental change of the social psychology. As a result, researchers found it is necessary to study reconciliation through socioeconomic aspects. Are the two societies prepared for a substantive reconciliation? The serious Pass-control to Chinese tourists mirrors certain tension between the two societies, especially in the Far East area. Except for the positive image of Russia/Russian in Chinese media, the people from Far East fears that the Chinese are out to trick Russians through unfair trade, steal their resources, and expand to their territory through legal and illegal migration. Despite the strategic friendship at the governmental level, there has been a domestic backlash at the Far East district. The immature of reconciliation is mirrored by the negative perception towards Chinese that held by the Far East Russian. The Russian society in the Far East has not yet given up the hostile perception of China’s intention. Uncertainty: Questions about Where the Bear is heading for? Both China and Russia have gone through great transactions in the post-Cold War period. The two have chosen different paths and arrived at different results. In the term of economic development, the current history has witnessed a great success of the “China Model”: the annual growth rate of GDP has remained around 10%. China gradually gains confidence on the world stage. On the contrary, Russia has a long history of ego-searching after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The Russian economy has stagnated comparably, though before the financial crisis in 2008, the mounting energy price had

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contributed to the economic growth. The democratization was also questioned by the Western media. Where should the bear heading for in a dramatically changing world? “Swing back into Washington’s fold”? Or engage itself more into the Eastern, especially cooperate more with China? The bear has shifted its position on and on. Yeltsin put emphasis on the relations with China due to the geopolitical concern. Yet, after Putin came to power, the West turned to be overweighing especially after 911, while amid the “colorful revolution”, Moscow denied its former decision.

Except for the positive image of Russia/ Russian in Chinese media, the people from Far East fears that the Chinese are out to trick Russians through unfair trade, steal their resources, and expand to their territory through legal and illegal migration.

In sum, Moscow swayed its attention due to the strategic arrangement. Beijing feels a psychological blockade fueled by the shifting position of Russia. As a result, the substantive reconciliation surpasses the strategic friendship. The bear and the dragon have transcended the former hostility to a certain degree, but are still distant from arriving at a substantive reconciliation. Note: * Lin Ren is a PhD candidate of Center for Global Politics, Free University Berlin. The draft of this article is based on my presentations, the feedback contributed by the other participates and the further discussion at the 11th annual Aleksanteri Conference: “The Dragon and the Bear: Strategic Choices of China and Russia”.

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CHINA AND THE WORLD | BY TILMAN PRADT*

ASIA'S NEW GREAT GAME? THE GEOPOLITICS

OF THE

he power struggle between the British Empire and Russian Empire for influence in Central Asia during the 19th century was afterwards coined as the Great Game. In this strategic rivalry, Afghanistan played a key role because the British feared that the Russians would use Afghanistan as a base for forthcoming invasions into the then British colony India. The recent statements of US and Asian policy-makers might suggest that a new Great Game is underway, this time in the area of the South China Sea. The South China Sea (SCS) is the semi-enclosed sea from the south of China to the north of Indonesia and from the east of Malaysia to the west of the Philippines. The territorial demarcations are disputed for decades as are the questions of sovereignty over the islands and islets which are located within the SCS. Several claimants such as Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan, the Philippines, and China currently possess islets in the SCS and question each otherâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s rights to do so. This situation has only marginally changed during the last twenty years, upgrading of military outposts on the islets being the notorious exception.

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SOUTH CHINA SEA

There are different reasons for the importance of these areas in the SCS, substantial fish stocks, existing and assumed energy resources (e.g., oil and gas resources) and highly frequented sea lanes are the main causes for interest. The various fish stocks in the SCS build the economic basis for millions of fishermen in the littoral states, furthermore, the fish catch plays a pivotal part in the nutrition of the people living in this area. The demarcation of waters and the possession islets are important means to claim fishing rights in the area. In the SCS are already various offshore oil extracting enterprises taking place, most of them near the coasts of China, Vietnam, and Malaysia. In the disputed area of the Spratly Islands are further oil reserves expected, thus the littoral states try to ensure their claims to participate in the subsequent exploitation of the oil fields.1 Last but not least, the SCS is one of the busiest routes of global merchant ships, roughly half of the annual trade shipping is passing through the bottleneck at the entrance to the SCS, the Strait of

CHINA AND THE WORLD | BY TILMAN PRADT

Malacca. These sea lanes possess further significance since the majority of Chinese and Japanese imported oil is transported via the SCS. An interruption of these pivotal bloodlines would have significant consequences for the world's second and third biggest economy, respectively. But since the majority of European-Asian trade is shipped through these waters, not only the littoral states have an interest in these busy sea lanes.2 Combined, the economic and strategic importance of the SCS makes it a hotspot of geopolitics. Its mixture of energy resources and strategic sea lanes has a high potential for conflict but surprisingly, the region and its conflicts waned from the headlines of international newspapers and the mindfulness of geopolitical strategists. Over the last ten years, the several efforts to fight terrorism in the Middle East and Central Asia gave China free rein to arrange the relations to its south-eastern neighbours. But since 2010, the conflict over sovereignty rights and territorial waters in the SCS is gaining

new attention. When Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that the free passage through the sea lanes of the SCS was an US national interest, she provoked harsh reactions from Beijing.3 The Chinese view the SCS as their territorial waters and try to prevent any interference of external actors. They see it as a litmus test for SinoAmerican relations whether the Americans interfere in these disputes or accept Chinese regional leadership. The recent visit of President Barack Obama at the 2011 meeting of the East Asia Summit (EAS), the first time that America attended the Summit, further bewildered the Chinese policymakers. President Obama used the opportunity to suggest that America might play a mediatory role in the dispute over the contested areas and that the right to free passage was in the interest of all states.4 These statements probably worried Chinese strategists who expected Beijing on the right track to gain influence on the region in general and on the SCS in particular. In the afterwards of the terrorist attack of 9/11, American foreign policy was focused on the war on terror. This maxim included a shift of attention towards the source of Islamist terror in Afghanistan and adjacent territories. The beginning of the Second Gulf War against Saddam Hussein's Iraq in 2003 attracted further American attention and forces, thus the Chinese felt encouraged to expand their participation and influence in the Southeast Asian region. During the past ten years, China participated in various organisations in the region, ranging from political (ASEAN, EAS) over security related (ARF) to economic organisations (APEC). In view of the lingering territorial disputes in the SCS, China pursued a policy of bilateral negotiations with other claimants. Overall, Beijing early promulgated the idea of shifting the sovereignty question for the time being and to jointly develop the energy resources of the region. The intentions behind this proposal were doubted and the conducted Joint Seismic Under-

CHINA AND THE WORLD | BY TILMAN PRADT

taking during 2005-2008 between Vietnam, China, and the Philippines seems to yield a point to its critics.5 China's growing assertiveness in the region is causing apprehensions among its smaller neighbours but also beyond the Southeast Asian region. The announcement of President Obama to deploy American forces to the Australian base Darwin is only the latest move of security developments in the region. The smaller states of ASEAN are upgrading their armies, especially their navies and air forces for several years now, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the region has become a hot spot of global arms purchases.6 But besides the US, even India might feel tempered to engage in the area. The Indian oil company ONGC Videsh Limited is developing Vietnamese oil fields, exploration of the Lan Tay field started in 2003. Now, first reflections are underway whether the Indian navy should be prepared to protect Indian assets in the SCS.7 In an article for the 2011 November issue of the Foreign Policy, Secretary of State Clinton declared the beginning of America's Pacific Century. In a preannouncement of President Obama’s attendance at the East Asia Summit she wrote: “Our focus on developing a more results-oriented agenda has been instrumental in efforts to address disputes in the South China Sea.”8 This surely incurred Beijing’s displeasure. The following statements of President Obama at his Asia tour in November 2011 and the subsequent initiation of a military base in Darwin further illustrate the new American dedication to developments in the Southeast Asian region. The strategic importance and especially the sea lanes of the region are a vital interest of American foreign policy and it is to be seen how Beijing will react on this interference in its perceived regional affairs. In a response to newly US interest in the

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region, China’s Premier Wen Jiabao stated that the disputes should be resolved by “relevant sovereign states” and that “external forces should not use any excuse to interfere”. 9 Hence, are we attending the beginning of a new round of The Great Game in Asia, this time in the location of the SCS? As this text briefly surveyed, there are various interests at stake and several big and great powers involved, arguably too many for such a small area (especially, when concentrating on the bottleneck of the SCS, the Strait of Malacca). But by analyzing the motivations behind the big players’ engagement (i.e., the United States, China, and India) there is reason to believe that a potentially tragic zero-sum Great Game is still avoidable.

...the US is mainly interested in the security of the sea lanes and its guaranteed free passage, therefore President Obama’s push on the littoral states to solve their SCS disputes.

First, the US has not a real interest in permanently (and substantially) upgrading its military presence in the region. Given the still severing US budget situation and the persistent security situation in the Middle East and Central Asia, policy-makers in Washington are trying to reduce its forces deployed to foreign areas not to enlarge them by opening up a new theatre. Plus, the US is mainly interested in the security of the sea lanes and its guaranteed free passage, therefore President Obama’s push on the littoral states to solve their SCS disputes. The US is not interested in confronting China directly but to put pressure on Beijing to be more conciliatory in case of the SCS disputes. The deployment of US Marines to Darwin is merely presenting the stick not using it (imagine

CHINA AND THE WORLD | BY TILMAN PRADT

Beijing’s reactions to the US establishing a military base in Vietnam).

(Erickson, 2009)

(Cerojano, 2010)

Beijing, on the other hand, will now take pains to somehow ease the situation in the SCS and to regain trust among its neighbours of the ASEAN. China has to accept that the US will now sit at the table of future rounds of territorial discussions and China no longer can use its relative power in bilateral negotiations with small ASEAN states. This is probably hard to swallow for Chinese policy-makers given their repeatedly stated premise that the SCS disputes shall be solely discussed among the regional states concerned. But in this changed situation, the continued refusal to accept multilateral discussions will provoke further military build-up and confrontation in the SCS.

(Grammaticas, 2011)

(Lim, 2010) and

SIPRI (2010): New SIPRI data on international arms transfers reflect arms race concerns, online: http://www.sipri.org/media/ pressreleases/2010/100315armstransfers (accessed on December 10, 2011)

(Gupta, 2011)

(Clinton, 2011)

(BBC, 2011)

Finally, India got only involved because of perceived Chinese assertiveness in the Indian Ocean. India’s military build-up and assumed ambitions towards the SCS is a response to China’s actions in what India perceives as its territorial waters. A reciprocal withdrawal will avoid future naval confrontations among the two Asian heavyweights. In the past, China avoided to confront the US directly in upcoming controversies. This time, the conflict is located too close and strategically too important for Beijing to be simply ignored. The South China Sea will be the theatre of future trial of strength between the US and China, a struggle for diplomatic influence and economic cooperation in the first act. The US has played its performance well so far, it remains to be seen what China chooses as an adequate answer. A new Great Game in the South China Sea is still avoidable but it needs commitment not power play.

References I.

BBC. (2011, November 18). Wen warns US on South China Sea dispute.

II.

Cerojano, T. (2010, September 19). Obama, ASEAN to call for peaceful end to sea spats. The Guardian.

III.

Clinton, H. (2011). America's Pacific Century. Foreign Policy.

IV.

Emmers, R. (2010). Geopolitics and Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia. London + New York: Routledge.

Erickson, A. S. (2009). Maritime Security Cooperation in the South China Sea Region. In S. Wu & K. Zou (Eds.), Maritime Security in the South China Sea - Regional Implications and International Cooperation (pp. 51-80). Farnham: Ashgate.

VI.

Grammaticas, D. (2011, November 18). Obama stirs up China's sea of troubles. BBC News.

VII.

Gupta, R. (2011, October 23). South China Sea Conflict? No Way. The Diplomat.

VIII.

Lim, T.-W. (2010). Oil and gas in China: the new energy superpower's relations with its region. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing.

Notes: * Tilman Pradt is a PhD candidate at the Freie Universität of Berlin. 1.

(Emmers, 2010)

POLITICAL REFLECTION | SPECIAL ISSUE 2012

CHINA AND THE WORLD | BY SAM BYFIELD*

CHINA’S AID PROGRAM IN AFRICA A

PRIMER

ver the past decade China has emerged as a major donor of international aid. China’s aid program has effectively been regarded as a state secret, and accordingly analysis of China’s aid program has often lacked in nuance and tended towards hyperbole. This article will provide an overview of the nature and purposes of China’s aid program, and how it contributes to China’s own foreign policy and domestic economic development. It concludes that cooperation between other major aid donors and China is essential to break down mistrust and increase the effectiveness of global efforts to reduce poverty. The first White Paper on China’s aid program was released in 2011. The White Paper noted that from 2004-2009 China’s aid program increased by roughly 30 percent each year. In 2009 China provided over 250 billion yuan (around $US 40 billion) in aid, consisting of approximately 41% in

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grants, 30% in interest free loans, and 29% in the form of concessional loans. The White Paper notes that China’s aid focuses on agriculture, economic infrastructure, public facilities, education, health care, and, increasingly, climate change. While China itself is still a developing country, this level of expenditure establishes it as a major global aid donor. In a similar, though perhaps more overt way to the aid programs of other countries, China’s aid program is based on both China and the recipient country benefiting (particularly economically) and is closely tied into China’s broader foreign policy aims. China’s aid has served as a tool to dissuade governments from providing diplomatic recognition to Taiwan, discourage governments from supporting Japan for a seat on the UN Security Council, enhancing its global diplomatic presence and creating warmer relations with developing countries to garner support for China’s poli-

CHINA AND THE WORLD | BY SAM BYFIELD

cies in international fora. Some commentators have noted that China’s aid program also serves its own development needs, facilitating the export of raw materials to China, and requiring that 50% of project materials and services are sourced within China. This contrasts with the aid programs of the United States, United Kingdom, Australia and most other major aid donors, which are generally removed from their own economic development aims. Many Chinese funded public works – like stadiums, bridges or dams — tend to be highly visible and offer tangible benefits; and such activities are often announced at bilateral summit meetings, acting as a powerful symbol of friendship between China and other countries. Accordingly, Chinese aid can be seen not only as serving ‘hard’ diplomatic and security interests, but also as an example of Joseph Nye’s notion of ‘soft power’.

Joseph Nye

China’s aid to Africa, which has increased substantially over the past few years, illustrates many of these points. The White Paper indicated that for the 2009 fiscal year, nearly half (46.7 per cent) of Chinese aid was committed to Africa. Chinese aid in Africa can be viewed as contributing to the diplomatic objective of forging friendships with ‘non-aligned’ nations and competing with Taiwan for diplomatic recognition. On this point China has been successful, with only four countries in sub-Saharan Africa still maintaining official relations with Taiwan.1 By the same token, however, China is hardly unique in linking international development assistance to broader foreign policy objectives. China’s aid program in Africa is also widely seen as focusing on its objective of securing oil, minerals and broader trade opportunities for its growing economy. An article in the Economist noted that ‘China has become the continent’s most important trading partner after America; trade between Africa and China has surged from just over $6.5 billion in 1999 to $107 billion in 2008.’2 African oil reportedly accounts for 80 percent of China’s trade in the region and about one third of its oil imports. China’s aid projects are often backed by the natural resources of recipient countries. In war torn Angola, for instance, reconstruction was helped by oil-backed loans from Beijing, under which Chinese companies have built roads, railways, hospitals, schools and water systems. Nigeria took out two similar loans to finance projects that use gas to generate electricity. As a 2010 article in Foreign Affairs noted, in poor, oilrich countries, which are often cursed by their mineral wealth, ‘resource-backed infrastructure loans can act as an ‘agency of restraint’ and ensure that at least some of these countries’ natural resource wealth is spent on development investments.’3 This leveraging of natural resources in Africa closely resembles the relationship between Japan and China in the 1970s and 1980s, where China leveraged its natural resources to receive loans and access to much-needed infrastructure and modern technology.

POLITICAL REFLECTION | SPECIAL ISSUE 2012

CHINA AND THE WORLD | BY SAM BYFIELD

Critics – particularly in Western media – have highlighted a number of perceived weaknesses of China’s approach to aid in Africa. Chinese aid is often made available quickly and easily, without the social, political and environmental safeguards and bureaucratic procedures that major OECD donors and multilateral financial institutions typically impose. A recent Human Rights Watch report on Chinese-run copper mines in Zambia illustrates these concerns, finding that Chinese-run companies regularly flout labor laws and regulations, and have consistently poor health and safety standards. This is a point the White Paper recognises: ‘China still has a long way to go in providing foreign aid. The Chinese Government will make efforts to optimize the country’s foreign aid structure, improve the quality of foreign aid, further increase countries’ capacity in independent development, and improve the pertinence and effectiveness of foreign aid.’ China’s relative newness in the business of giving aid partly explains some of these limitations, as does China’s quite small aid bureaucracy – there are only around 70 professionals in the Ministry of Commerce’s Department of Aid to Foreign Countries, and 100 in China Eximbank’s Concessional Loan Department.4 It should be remembered that such criticisms – about environmental sustainability, or human rights, for instance – are in essence the same criticisms made about China’s domestic development. As one Economist article notes, ‘Chinese expatriates in Africa come from a roughand-tumble, anything-goes business culture that cares little about rules and regulations. Local sensitivities are routinely ignored at home, and so abroad.’5 In contemplating the Human Rights Watch report on Zambia, it should be remembered that China’s own mines are considered to be the most dangerous in the world – it’s not so much a case of double standards, but of an overall lack of capacity. It’s realistic to expect that as China’s own governance and project management capacity improves, so too will its approach to the delivery of aid.

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To an extent, this is already happening. Chinese banks have recently begun to require more elaborate environmental impact appraisals for loans, which are often contracted out to European firms. Increasingly as well, Chinese aid projects in Africa are staffed primarily by Africans, not Chinese. There are also areas in which China is seen to be ahead of more established donors. For instance, the terms of Chinese loans are often better than those deals from Western companies. Congolese President Joseph Kabila has pointed out that a $3 billion joint mining venture in the DRC provides his government with a 32 percent share, compared with the 7 to 25 percent share that is typical of mining deals with other companies.6 The ability of developing countries to absorb the increases in Chinese aid has been questioned,

...the terms of Chinese loans are often better than those deals from Western companies. Congolese President Joseph Kabila has pointed out that a $3 billion joint mining venture in the DRC provides his government with a 32 percent share, compared with the 7 to 25 percent share that is typical of mining deals with other companies. including gin Africa. This is an issue commonly discussed in international development, though there appears to have been more public criticism of China’s aid program in this area. There have been reports in Africa of Chinese infrastructure projects falling apart or being washed away, of classrooms with no students to fill them, and health clinics with no supplies. The level of Chinese aid as a proportion of GDP, and therefore the ability of countries to service their loans, has also been questioned. This concern has also been raised in the Pacific. In 2009, China’s loans to Tonga were equivalent to 32 percent of GDP, while in Samoa and Cook Islands the figure was 16 percent.7 While the issue of new debt

CHINA AND THE WORLD | BY SAM BYFIELD

burden is a real one, another way of looking at this issue is that as Chad’s Finance and Budget Minister has noted, ‘We borrow for our industrialization projects and the debt will be repaid from their profits.’8 In international development circles ‘partnership’ is an important buzzword. It even has its own Millennium Development Goal (MDG 8). As the role and influence of emerging aid donors like China and Brazil continues to grow, and economic problems continue to impact the West, placing pressure on the aid budgets of OECD countries, closer engagement between China and other donors will become increasingly imperative. Such cooperation is a vital element of enhancing the effectiveness of aid programs, not only in terms of what can be learnt through the exchanges but also as a way of reducing duplication and increasing complementarities – which, after all, are fundamental to delivering effective aid. Engaging China in regional development dialogues and structures is one way of enhancing cooperation. For instance, China still isn’t a member of the Cairns Compact, which was agreed to in 2009 by leaders in the Pacific as a means of enhancing development cooperation and effectiveness. Signing the Cairns Compact would be valuable in terms of enhancing cooperation with China, and would also have an important symbolic effect in terms of some of the negative perceptions around China’s aid program. In

Africa, engaging China in discussions around cohesive, long term strategies for economic growth will enhance the effectiveness of all donors. Increased transparency around China’s aid program will also contribute to cooperation and reduced mistrust. It should be remembered, however, that China is still home to the world’s second largest population of people living on less than $1.25 per day, and that desire for greater aid program transparency needs to be balanced against what is domestically palatable. Notes: * Sam Byfield works as a policy adviser in the international development sector and was a delegate at the inaugural Australia China Youth Dialogue in 2010. 1.

Congressional Research Service, China’s Foreign Aid Activities in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia, 2009, p9.

‘Chinese Aid to Africa: hedging its bets and its gold’, Economist 2 July 2009.

Deborah Brautigam, ‘Africa’s Eastern Promise’, Foreign Affairs, January 2010, p2.

Deborah Brautigam, China in Africa: What Can Western Donors Learn? Norwegian Investment Fund for Developing Countries, August 2011, p10. 5. ‘The Chinese in Africa’, Economist 20 April 2011.

Christian Georges Diguimbaye Chad’s Finance and Budget Minister

6. Deborah Brautigam, ‘Africa’s Eastern Promise’, 2. 7. Mary Fifita and Fergus Hanson, China in the Pacific: the new banker in town’,. The Lowy Institute for International Policy, April 2011, 8. 8. IMF, Video of Press Briefing, African Ministers, World Bank/IMF Spring Meetings, 16 April 2011, accessed 25 November 2011- http://www.imf.org/ external/spring/2011/mmedia/

ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS? | BY DR. JEAN-PAUL GAGNON*

AN INTERVIEW WITH PROFESSOR SONNY LO**: POLITICAL REFLECTIONS IN HONG KONG

ean-Paul Gagnon: What do you see as Hong Kong's democracy future?

Professor Sonny Lo: HK's democratic future depends on two main factors: China's internal democratic changes and Hong Kong's push for democratization. At the moment, the push for internal democratization in Hong Kong has pitted the pan-democratic forces against the government of the People's Republic of China (PRC). On the other hand, Beijing as the central government is reluctant to see a Western-style democratic Hong Kong which will be vulnerable to Western influences and become a means through which foreign powers like the United States seek to democratize the mainland. As such, democratization in Hong Kong is now touching upon the bottom line of the central government in Beijing, which remains a largely paternalistic regime although it has become more politically liberalized and plu-

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ralistic than ever before. It is very likely that Hong Kong's democratic changes will proceed gradually and at a snail pace, if we use the yardstick of measurement from the viewpoint of Westernstyle democracies where there are rotations of parties in power and competitive struggle among political leaders for people's votes. Yet, Hong Kong remains the most politically pluralistic society in the PRC as many of its citizens are not only pro-democracy in terms of supporting the direct elections of both the Chief Executive and the entire Legislative Council, but also assertive in making their demands known and criticisms heard. Hong Kong also enjoys a relatively high degree of civil liberties, the rule of law and by and large clean government under the supervision of a respectable anti-corruption agency. Hence, Hong Kong is having a large degree of horizontal accountability, although not vertical accountability in terms of competitive struggle among political

ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS? | BY DR. JEAN-PAUL GAGNON

leaders for people's votes, not to mention the possibility of rotation of party in power. However, it must be said that democratization in Hong Kong, and the corresponding resistance from Beijing, illustrate a clash of two political cultures and civilizations, the more Western civilization held by many Hong Kong people and the more Chinese civilization in the psyche of the PRC leaders. As long as the PRC is ruled by a Leninist-style Chinese Communist Party, democratic changes in Hong Kong are bound to be seen as politically dangerous, socially unstable, economically detrimental to the interests of the co-opted proBeijing business class, and territorially entailing cross-border impacts on mainland China. JPG: Is organized crime a significant obstacle to realizing these democratic goals in HK? SL: Organized crime does not constitute any obstacle to the realization of democratic goals in Hong Kong. Arguably, some elements of the organized crime even participated in the rescue operations of the student democrats in mainland China shortly after the Tiananmen incident on June 4, 1989. Hence. organized crime in Hong

Kong has been displaying multiple political orientations. On the one hand, it has remained a patriotic force rescuing mainland student democrats from a humanitarian perspective. On the other hand, it has remained an economic interest group trying to enrich its own profits by both legal and illegal means. The leaders of organized crime groups in Hong Kong are also the targets of suppression and co-optation by the PRC authorities. Politically, organized crime has not yet evolved into a political interest group keen to topple any regime in power, in both the mainland and Hong Kong, unlike the triads in the Qing dynasty as they were upholding the banner of overthrowing the Qing dynasty and restoring the Ming dynasty. The PRC government sees organized crime as harmful to its national security interests, and therefore its elements have to be controlled and suppressed. Any attempt by organized crime groups to turn into political interest groups is disallowed, albeit in practice they are economic interest groups thriving in the midst of a whole range of legitimate and illegitimate businesses. JPG: Do you think mainland China will impede these democracy developments? SL: In the long run, Mainland China will democratize but it will change in its own way at its own pace without accepting the pressures from outside. China historically has been affected by foreign pressures, especially foreign humiliation during the Qing dynasty. Therefore, democratic models, if experimented in mainland China, will be basically indigenous without the need to borrow excessively from the West, an attempt that would counter the national pride of the Chinese people. Although Taiwan's political transformations in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s have demonstrated that a Chinese society can democratize along the Western model, mainland China is likely to reject this Western-style democracy. In the first place, the PRC harbors deep suspicions of foreign powers, especially the United States which appear to contain the PRC regime and foster the so-called peaceful evolution. Moreover, the PRC version of democratization entails the strengthening of the work of the anticorruption agency, the consolida-

POLITICAL REFLECTION | SPECIAL ISSUE 2012

ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS? | BY DR. JEAN-PAUL GAGNON

tion of the audit office to check the expenditure and maladministration of government agencies, the emphasis on media scrutiny of the government in a politically loyal manner, the improvement in the oversight of the legislature on the government, and the gradual consolidation of village elections to enhance cadre and party accountability at the grassroots level. These Chinese -style characteristics will persist and it is unlikely that the Western-style democracy would suddenly emerge, even though crises, such as economic and social crises, may suddenly propel China forward along the path of a more democratic regime. JPG: Are there any paradoxes of democracy in Hong Kong that you would like to address? SL: Hong Kong's democratic experiments are unique in the world. On the one hand, it has a strong middle class where Western-educated and locally educated citizens are increasingly embracing the Western-style democracy and values. But on the other hand, the strong capitalist class whose interests have been so protected by both the colonial regime and the post-1997 government as well as Beijing is staunchly antidemocratic in the Western sense. Given the fact that Beijing has to rely on the influence and rule of the capitalists in order to maintain the capitalist lifestyle of Hong Kong and its related economic prosperity, the Hong Kong city-state remains capitalistic and highly exploitative in terms of the protection of the interests of the poor and the needy, especially the proletariat and the lumpen proletariat. The tax system, housing policies and land policies are highly biased in favour of the strong capitalist class, which however is politically inactive and spoiled to a large extent. Yet, the politically active citizenry and groups involve the pro-democratic and pro-Beijing groups. The result is that Hong Kong is a deeply political divided society where the capitalist class is politically anachronistic and anti-democratic, where the liberal segment of the middle class is highly prodemocratic and pro-Western, where the proBeijing local forces are tasked by Beijing to check the power and influence of the liberal segment of

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the middle class, and where the government is a politically conservative one allying with the capitalist class, Beijing and the proBeijing forces. Yet, as class contradictions are intensifying in Hong Kong where the productive forces are growing quickly due to the development of capitalism, sooner or later such contradictions will not only split the pro-government and pro-Beijing camp and forces, but also perhaps propel democratic changes in Hong Kong further. Class politics and contradictions are arguably most prominent in this vibrant Chinese city, which is like a political sandwich between a very Chinese central government in Beijing and an increasingly pro-Western and politically assertive citizenry in Hong Kong.

...Hong Kong is a deeply political divided society where the capitalist class is politically anachronistic and anti-democratic, where the liberal segment of the middle class is highly pro-democratic and pro-Western, where the pro -Beijing local forces are tasked by Beijing to check the power and influence of the liberal segment of the middle class, and where the government is a politically conservative one allying with the capitalist class, Beijing and the pro-Beijing forces. Notes: * Dr. Jean-Paul Gagnon is a social and political theorist with a Ph.D. in political science. He completed his doctorate at the Queensland University of Technology under the aegis of Australiaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s prestigious Endeavour Award. ** Professor Sonny Lo is the Associate Dean (Research & Postgraduate Studies) of Faculty of Arts and Sciences and Head and Professor at the Department of Social Sciences at the Hong Kong Institute of Education. Before joining HKIEd, he had worked at the University of Waterloo in Canada, The University of Hong Kong, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Murdoch University, Lingnan College (now Lingnan University), and the University of East Asia (Macau).

CESRAN Papers

CESRAN Papers | No: 6 | November 2011 FREE CORSICA! A Study of Contemporary Chinese Nationalism By James Pearson CESRAN Papers | No: 5 | July 2011 COMPETITIVE REGULATION: Stepping Outside the Public /Private Policy Debate By Dr. Jean-Paul Gagnon CESRAN Papers | No: 4 | May 2011 Turkey: The Elephant in the Room of Europe By Hüseyin Selçuk Dönmez CESRAN Papers | No: 3 | April 2011 "Whither Neoliberalism? Latin American Politics in the Twenty-first Century" By Jewellord (Jojo) Nem Singh CESRAN Papers | No: 2 | March 2011 "Civil-Military Relations in Marcos' Philippines" By Richard Lim CESRAN Papers | No: 1 | March 2011 "The Paradox of Turkish Civil Military Relations" By Richard Lim

ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS? | BY MATTHEW KENNEDY*

THE CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONSHIP: CURRENT STATUS AND POTENTIAL DIRECTIONS

ntroduction

Taiwan is a primary flashpoint in East Asia. Its explosiveness results from China’s ongoing insistence – and Taiwan’s refusal – that Taipei fall under Beijing’s auspices. It’s a periodic dispute which has lasted for over 60 years. China has not openly attempted to force Taiwan to reunify, yet there have been several times when it has initiated borderline provocations. Both sides are starting to reconcile their differences albeit slowly and with little progress. The key to resolving the dispute will probably occur within one-to-two generations, plus via a currently unthoughtof solution. The article is divided into several sections. First, it will briefly analyze the issue; Second, the piece will examine the current state of affairs between Taiwan and China. And finally, the article will explore the difficulties of finding an answer to the reunification controversy.

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Analysis The Taiwan-China Relationship is one of the most paradoxical affiliations in Pacific Rim affairs. Both countries have strong economic, yet strained political ties as a result of the reunification issue. The controversy could disappear overnight, if Beijing recognized Taipei’s status as an independent country; acknowledging Taiwan’s stature would require China to abandon a primary foreign policy objective. Chinese policymakers and independent analysts have suggested a solution is for Taiwan to adopt Hong Kong and/or Macao type model. The proposition’s difficulty is both entities and Taiwan share dissimilar backgrounds. Taipei would lose its de facto political and economic independence, if it agreed to similar conditions. The other solution is for China to force Taiwan to accept Beijing’s jurisdiction. The scenario will probably not occur considering the United States is obligated by American to law to militarily intervene if China attacks Taiwan (an issue for another article). Resolving the contro-

ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS? | BY MATTHEW KENNEDY

versy probably won’t occur within the current generation’s timeframe, since leaders on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are from or are distantly linked from the era when the dispute started. The most likely scenario is the reunification issue will remain unresolved for years to come – and that a discounted and/or unconsidered solution will present itself when a new generation of leaders occupies Beijing and Taiwan’s political reins. Background: Historical roots, China’s Perspective, and Taiwan’s Viewpoint The Taiwan conflicts’ origins are historical and political in nature. Its roots are traceable to the 1940s, while the current difficulties are linked to differences between how Beijing and Taipei interpret a settlement of the reunification problem. The dispute started in 1949. Throughout the 1930s forces loyal to the Chinese Communist Par-

ty and General Chaing Kai-Shek clashed in a civil war. Both sides set aside their differences and coordinated their efforts between 1937 and 1945 against the Japanese when Tokyo invaded and occupied a significant part of the country. Their dispute reemerged after Japan’s defeat. The civil war lasted for another four years until 1949 when Chaing Kai-Shek fled to Taiwan after his forces were defeated by the CCP. A key objective of the Chinese authorities has been the reunification of Taiwan under Beijing’s auspices since. China’s policy towards Taiwan is defined in the Chinese Constitution’s Preamble and the 2005 Anti-Secessionist Law. The Constitution’s Preamble states, “Taiwan is part of the sacred territory of the People's Republic of China. It is the inviolable duty of all Chinese people, including our compatriots in Taiwan, to accomplish the great task of reunifying the motherland..”1 Beijing’s 2005 Anti-Secessionist Law further explains China’s policies towards Taiwan. Article 2 notes that there is only “One China” and Taiwan is a part of it. Article 5 contends Beijing will seek reunification with Taipei under peaceful means. Article 6 details issues China will collaborate with Taiwan over to encourage peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits. These subjects range from economic activities, such as trade, to combating crime and encouraging cultural exchanges between both entities. Article 7 examines the steps Chinese authorities are willing to initiate with Taiwan on the reunification matter. These include ending hostilities, establishing procedures for the development of cross strait relations plus a peaceful reunification, ascertaining the political status of Taiwan’s authorities within the Chinese government hierarchy, determining Taipei’s international status within Beijing’s strategic apparatus, and related issues relevant to Taiwan’s status within China. And finally Article 8 endows Chinese authorities with the latitude of utilizing military force against

Ma Ying-jeou

POLITICAL REFLECTION | SPECIAL ISSUE 2012

ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS? | BY MATTHEW KENNEDY

Taiwan, if Taipei’s officially declares independence from Beijing.2 Taiwan’s policy towards China was spelled out in a June 2008 interview President Ma Ying-jeou furnished to the New York Times. Ma called for an enhancement of economic ties between the PRC and Taiwan to include a broader access to China’s markets for Taiwan’s businessmen, plus direct air flights between Taiwan and China among many proposals. He said Taiwan is willing to negotiate its political status with China but only when Beijing removed its short-and-medium range missiles targeting Taipei.3 He officially opposes reunification4, yet the Taiwan leader is willing to consider indirect discussions on the matter. Ma noted during the 2009 Presidential Campaign that he accepts the non-documented 1992 understanding between Beijing and Taipei leaders of the “One China” concept. What neither side resolved is what officially does the “One-China” idea mean? Neither side has revisited the issue since the 1992 meeting.5 The Reunification Issue: Complexities, the Hong Kong-Macao Solution, and Realities The Chinese-Taiwan relationship is divided into economic and reunification related affairs. The direction Beijing and Taipei have made on the issues is paradoxical in nature. Both sides have made notable progress in the financial realm; the political issue remains deadlocked, especially regarding the reunification subject. Beijing-Taipei relations were almost non-existent from 1949 to the early 21st century. A thaw in the rapport started in 2004, when Taiwan elected a president, Chen Shui-bian, who was receptive to closer relations, unlike his predecessors. The changed attitude led to a meeting between China's President Hu Jin Tao and the chairman of Taiwan's leading political party in April 2005. Both sides increased their interactions, consequently, and signed several economic agreements shortly thereafter. Their efforts were complimented by additional accords signed

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since 2008. The agreements allowed for direct flights, maritime and mail links, and an augmentation of trade and investment opportunities between China and Taiwan.6 Both countries signed a significant accord called the Economic Co-operation Framework Agreement (ECFA) in June 2010. It seeks to reduce tariff barriers and obstacles to commercial interactions. The ECFA additionally provides favorable tariffs for over 500 types of Taiwanese exports to China, while Chinese companies will receive preferential tax breaks on approximately 260 products.7 The relationship’s most difficult issue relates to reunification. Various solutions have been pro-

Beijing-Taipei relations were almost nonexistent from 1949 to the early 21st century. A thaw in the rapport started in 2004, when Taiwan elected a president, Chen Shui -bian, who was receptive to closer relations, unlike his predecessors.

posed to address the matter. One suggested idea is to place Taiwan under a similar administrative arrangement as Hong Kong and Macao. It’s an issue many Taipei policymakers oppose, since they contend it may cause Taiwan to lose its independence.8 The situation requires exploring several questions: under what type of jurisdiction is Hong Kong under? Is it similar to Macao? And could Taiwan accept an administration arrangement akin to Hong Kong and Macao’s status? One approach to understanding the commonalities/disparities between Beijing’s governorship over Hong Kong and Macao is an examination of the agreements China signed with the United Kingdom and Portugal over both areas. The prime documents between Beijing and London/

ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS? | BY MATTHEW KENNEDY

Lisbon are called “The Joint Declaration of the Government of the 1) the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong; and 2) People's Republic of China and The Government of the Republic of Portugal on the question of Macao.” Hong Kong and Macao share similar administrative arrangements. Both areas are described as a “Special Administrative Region……in accordance with the provisions of Article 31 of the Constitution of the PRC”9 A second commonality is Hong Kong and Macao are managed by the PRC’s Central People's Government (CPG). The “Special Administrative Region” designation allows Hong Kong and Macao’s Executive, Legislative, and Judicial authorities to create and implement their own laws and regulations; the designation prohibits both entities from formulating their own defense and foreign policies – a responsibility given to the CPG.10 Another similarity relates to the appointment of governing officials. Both Declarations give the authority for assigning Hong Kong and Macao’s chief executive to the CPG, which will make its determination based on each entity’s local electoral results. Both entities’ principle officials will be nominated by the executive officer for appointment by the CPG. 11 Hong Kong and Macao are allowed to establish economic relations with their original London and Lisbon overseers, plus any other nations of interest. 12 The last major issue relates to the right of Hong Kong/Macao’s citizens. Individuals from both areas will retain their original political, economic, and

HONG KONG

commercial privileges under the Joint Declarations; both documents mandate Hong Kong and Macao authorities with guaranteeing these rights.13 Utilizing Hong Kong and Macao’s administrative arrangements with Beijing as a model for Chinese -Taiwan reunification is unrealistic. There are similarities between Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Taipei; the differences outweigh the commonalities. Hong Kong and Macao were originally established as Colonies by the British and Portuguese, whereas Taiwan’s polity was formed by the late General Chang Kai-Shek and the KMT party. Taiwan occupies a larger geographical area, and consists of different jurisdictional areas. The island’s government is divided into various “county’s”, which are similar to Japan’s Prefectures or the American States with their own local and municipal governments, unlike Hong Kong and Macao. Taiwan has a viable military, including an army, navy, air force, and Marine Corps. It also belongs to several international organizations including the World Trade Organization. The one commonality Taiwan shares with Hong Kong and Macao is a well-developed and modern economy.14 Taiwan is a country in all but diplomatic circles, unlike the former British and Portuguese colonies. How Beijing and Taipei might resolve the reunification issue is unknown. There are several possibilities for addressing the matter. The author failed to discover reportage of the first two scenarios in media and/or academic circles; while the

ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS? | BY MATTHEW KENNEDY

final model was suggested by Dr. Cal Clark from Auburn University. 

First, China’s acceptance of Taiwan’s status under the condition that Taipei officially designates itself as “The Republic of Taiwan”, not the “Republic of China”.



Second, Beijing’s unofficial acknowledgement of Taipei’s independence with the agreement that Taiwan does not report China’s policy reversal in media circles.



A final possibility is for reunification to occur via an EU type model as suggested by Dr. Cal Clark.15

The last option is the most unlikely. It would entail Beijing allowing Taipei to possess an equal vote in all political, economic, military, and foreign affairs decisions. It’s probably the least viable scenario considering the CCP might argue Taiwan only represents of a fraction of China’s citizenry (even those living outside the Mainland would not equal the PRC’s population numbers). Nothing can be discounted, especially an idea an implausible as the above. Any resolution of the dispute must entail a settlement whereby both sides maintain a perceptual credibility in the constituents’ view – any agreement jeopardizing this tenet could have political consequences for the party seen making concessions. This component of any accord may be the hardest to achieve since both sides’ positions are clear and seemingly inflexible. Resolving the matter will probably occur via a currently unthoughtof solution plus a new generation. Beijing and Taiwan’s present leadership are directly or indirectly tied to policies neither are apparently unwilling to deviate from. The other aspect is probably a historical linkage to the leaders and events resulting from the Chinese Civil War. There is a strong possibility the leaders on both sides of the Taiwan Strait have family members who were involved in

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the conflict – fathers, uncles, cousins, or related kin. The connection may be creating a situation where pragmatism is non-existent. The reunification issue may be settled once a new generation takes the reins in Beijing and Taipei; a generation several decades removed from the events of 1949 plus who are willing to consider a new approach and/or visit old, previously discounted solutions. Conclusion The Taiwan controversy is one of the simplest, yet most complex issues to resolve. Its simplicity is that the problem could be resolved within a short -period, yet there might be strategic ramifications for the party seen as making concessions (under the current political climate at least). Taiwan is an

Any agreement between Beijing and Taipei over the reunification issue will probably not occur in the foreseeable future. independent country for all intents and purposes. It has a well-defined political system, a modern economy, and military. What Taipei lacks is a diplomatic acknowledgement necessary for Taiwan to function as a standard international player; it’s a problem Beijing is stymieing because of the “One China” issue. Any agreement between Beijing and Taipei over the reunification issue will probably not occur in the foreseeable future. This will only change if Chinese or Taiwanese policymakers develop a political determination that may adversely impact their professional livelihood. The question is how high priority is the issue among Beijing/Taipei’s leadership? And is it a significant enough concern to make the potential sacrifices necessary to resolve the decades-old issue? The existing evidence is that the subject is a secondary matter, plus neither side is willing to make the concessions needed to end the dispute. The stalemate over the reunification issue will most likely remain for the foreseeable future consequently.

COMMENTARY | BY JAMES PEARSON

Notes:

Phobia, Five Years On.” Foreign Policy Insti-

* Matthew Kennedy is a guest editorialist at Vail

tute. 16 August 2002 http://www.fpri.org/

Daily.

enotes/20020816.delisle.hongkongphobia. html Accessed 7 December 2011, 126pm

Constitution of the People's Republic of

China.

Preamble.

People's Republic of China and The Gov-

Accessed 24 November 2011, 1110am MST

ernment of the Republic of Portugal on the

Anti-Secession Law adopted by NPC.

question of Macao. Article 2, Section 1.

Articles 2, 5,6,7, and 8. http://www.china-

http://bo.io.gov.mo/bo/i/88/23/dc/en/

un.ch/eng/zt/twwt/t187208.htm, Accessed

Accessed 23 November 2011, 1211pm MST

6 December 2011, 1043pm MST

Joint Declaration of the Government of the

“Taiwan’s

Leader

Outlines

His

Policy

United Kingdom of Great Britain and

Keith Bradsher and

Northern Ireland and the Government of

Edward Wong. The New York Times. 19

the People's Republic of China on the

June

Question of Hong Kong. Article 3. Section

2008.

http://

www.nytimes.com/2008/06/19/world/

1, http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~pchksar/JD/jd

asia/19taiwan.html, Accessed 7 December

-full2.htm, Accessed: 23 November 2011,

2011, 11:26am MST

1220MST

“No unification talks with China if elected:

10.

Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou’s campaign vember

2011,

http://

news_content.php?id=1760089, Accessed

Article 2. Section 3 12.

Ibid. Joint Declaration, Hong Kong. Article

“Times Topics: Ma Ying-jeou” The New

3. Section 9. Ibid. Joint Declaration, Ma-

York Times.

cao. Article 2. Section 6

11 December 2011, http:// 13.

Ibid. Joint Declaration, Hong Kong. Article

timestopics/people/m/ma_yingjeou/

3. Section 5 Ibid. Joint Declaration, Macao.

index.html, Accessed 11 December 2011,

Article 2. Section 4

514PST

Ibid. Joint Declaration, Hong Kong. Article 3. Section 4 Ibid. Joint Declaration, Macao.

topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/

cao. Article 2. Section 2 11.

www.taiwannews.com.tw/etn/ 11 December 2011, 814PST

Ibid. Joint Declaration, Hong Kong. Article 3. Sections 2-3 Ibid. Joint Declaration, Ma-

manager”. Taiwan News Network. 11 No-

Joint declaration of the Government of the

www.usconstitution.net/china.html#

Toward China.”

http://

MST

14.

United States Central Intelligence Agency.

“China and Taiwan sign agreements to

The World Factbook. East and Southeast

open finance sectors.” Robin Kwong. Fi-

Asia: Taiwan. 10 November 2011. https://

nancial Times (London). 27 April 2009. P.4.

www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-

Accessed via Lexus Nexus Academic Au

world- factbook/geos/tw.html, Accessed 4

gust 2011

December 2011, 946pm MST

“Longtime

rivals

China,

Taiwan

sign

15.

Cal Clark (2003): Does European Integra-

trade pact.” Keith B. Richburg. The Wash-

tion Provide a Model for Moderating Cross-

ington Post.

Strait Relations?, Asian Affairs: An American

30 June 2010.

P.A08. Ac-

cessed via Lexus Nexus Academic August

Review,

2011

www.tandfonline.com/doi/

Jacques deLisle. “’Bless and Keep the SAR

df/10.1080/00927670309601506, Accessed

… Far Away from Us’: Taiwan’s Hong Kong

14 December 2011, 753pm PST

29:4,

195-215

http://

POLITICAL REFLECTION | SPECIAL ISSUE 2012

ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS? | BY SUNNY LAM*

THE IMPACT OF RENMINBI (RMB) APPRECIATION ON THE HONG KONG PROPERTY MARKET

n this article, I will point out and discuss the effect of the reform of exchange rate institution on the real estate market, and the discussion suggests that the appreciation of RMB leads to the rise of real estate price, but as well as the possible economic bubble in Hong Kong. The influx of capital flows and the real estate price volatility in Hong Kong real estate market shows that the expectation of the appreciation of RMB is one of the elements that inspires investment speculating in the real estate market causing the possible imbalance of demand and supply and various social problems.

pressure will rise. The positive outlook for asset prices and expectations of further appreciation of the RMB might attract substantial capital flows into Hong Kong.

RMB appreciation stimulates mainland investors to enter the Hong Kong real estate market

The domestic policy tightening in mainland China as well as the appreciation of the RMB causes the China investors to diversify their investment portfolio, Hong Kong is expected to be one of the first spots for it. Chinese investors in search of alternative real estate options, to reduce the overheating of domestic market risk exposures. China on the overseas property market influence eclipsed. China real estate investors are mostly limited to investment in the domestic market, forcing the Government to take vigorous measures to suppress excessive rise in prices of China's domestic policy tightening in real estate, and the appreciation of the RMB will, analysts expect more Chinese people to those high returns and low limit of the overseas market investments such as Hong Kong.

An appreciating RMB will impact the Hong Kong economy and hence the real estate market in direct and indirect ways. Indirectly, it spurs capital inflows into Hong Kong in order to lower the local interest rates, creates an accommodative monetary environment and yields substantial wealth effects from a surging stock market. As a result, such wealth effects are expected to spill over into the property market. Lower interest rates will also provide incentives for increased borrowing and boost asset prices. Under the current currency system, an increase in liquidity would suppress Hong Kong-dollar interest rates. If money supply exceeds the desired money demand, inflationary

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Hong Kong â&#x20AC;&#x201C; an alternative exit for Chinese hot money In the long run, it is believed that the reform of RMB exchange rate system and its revaluation will not have any significant adverse effects on China, but is rather one of the steps towards Chinaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s strategic goal of gradual appreciation and loosening of capital control for RMB.

ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS? | BY SUNNY LAM

Investment Strategy Consideration  The levels of total return due to the RMB appreciation offered by real estate markets in Hong Kong are likely to be attractive to many Chinese investors. In particular, in an environment when investment in low risk assets in Hong Kong offers very attractive returns, the income return from real estate is likely to be an appealing characteristic for many investors. The key to success is in the speed, scale and timing of the investment. In conclusion, the RMB appreciation presents a crossborder investor with a range of opportunities. It also offers scope for risk diversification within the real estate markets. How might investors respond? Five trends may be significant:  Increasing investment demands: Firstly increasing allocations to real estate both from traditional institutional investors (pension funds, insurance companies and endowments) but also from sovereign wealth funds and new institutional investors.  Favorable risk adjusted return: Secondly many investors show an elevated degree of China heat effect. After all, if the outlook for returns is strong in Hong Kong many mainland investors still keen to find out the risk adjusted return for their investment?  More valueadded investment opportunities: Whilst many risk adverse investors may likely continue to focus purely on prime properties in Hong Kong; I suspect that increasingly some risk accepting investors may start to commit to investments in secondary properties with a value add strategy to reposition the property into a core



property as markets continues to grow. Attractive capital flow environment: Listed real estate tends to anticipate the performance of direct or unlisted real estate. With healthy balance sheets, many listed companies have access to capital to redeploy into the wealthy real estate markets. Many investors might find this a more liquid way to participate in the boosting market environment. Focus on the core segment: Depending on the risk level the investor is willing to take, investors are suggested to invest in the core segment as part of the overseas portfolio. Hong Kong being a well developed city in the region, the core segment is relative stable in term of price growth and rental income.

So the next question is where are those opportunities? There is not a simple answer to this question, but many would answer using the real estate specific mantra: location, location, location. It will depend on the market, asset type and strategy to adopt. Up to now most investors have taken a 'flight to quality' and have focused on prime markets and assets. Even though this is an understandable choice when the economic is still on the bright side with historic low lending cost and the synchronized move towards prime assets in top markets has caused a 'bidding war' for many opportunities. In some markets the final price has been primarily determined by too much capital chasing the same property, rather than by the outlook for the fundamentals. Chinese investors convince of the robust prospects of Hong Kong are likely to find this a tempting time to rotate into the more cyclical real estate sectors. Some of the sectors such as hotel and retails are particularly in the strong position due to favorable policies driven by the central government. The current revaluation situation will not be enough to solve the problem of excess capital inflows. On the contrary, it will however further accelerate capital inflows in anticipation of further revaluation, intensifying the harmful stimulus to the economy. On the other hand, the gov-

ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS? | BY SUNNY LAM

ernment will set up various measures in order to control the overheat market. The overheat market would disadvantage the interior and could even pose a threat to the city’s long term competitiveness. What makes Hong Kong different is that it is an attractive destination for foreign direct investment (FDI). Hong Kong is one the largest recipient of FDI per area in the region, due to its growing dynamic economy and stable political environment . On the other hand, rising incomes and economic growth have also created enormous inflation pressure for the city. As Mainland China is a major investment source of investment income for Hong Kong, external factor income flows will benefit from the currency revaluation effect. It is particularly helpful for long term investors for purchasing properties for rental income purposes. The market value of investment holdings will also benefit from the currency revaluation, and this could have a positive impact on Hong Kong’s aggregate demand, and thus inflation as discussed above, through the wealth effect. The author would like to conclude the following positive impacts on the Hong Kong market: 1. To promote its internal economic growth. The prosperity of fictitious capital, to increase investor wealth, stimulate consumption and growth, changes in short-term marginal propensity to consume and hence increase its internal spending power especially the luxury sectors, the multiplier effect of expanding economic growth 2. To accelerate the concentration of wealth and capital accumulation, the process of promoting social capital. Fictitious capital has changed the way of capital accumulation, capital concentration more quickly, fast, and promote the socialization of capital, for efficient basis for large-scale socialized production. Property price distortions and market rebalancing As discussed above, one of the key factors driving the market imbalances has been cheap money,

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which, together with weak regulation of high-risk investment, led to the potential bubbles in Hong Kong. Many investment funds from developed countries including US and Europe currently make the advantage of extremely low interestrate policy. It brings capital flows into Asia particularly Hong Kong in anticipation of higher investment return compared to that in their own countries. It therefore further boosts the property price. The appreciation of RMB together with rising Chinese household income and larger official reserves mean that there will be rising demand for diversification by Chinese investors into crossborder assets. Hong Kong is always one of the top destinations for such cross-border capital flow. To facilitate these future cross-border capital flows, it would be helpful for China to maintain a stable

The appreciation of RMB together with rising Chinese household income and larger official reserves mean that there will be rising demand for diversification by Chinese investors into cross-border assets. exchange rate and large foreign exchange reserves, both of which are critically important in reducing the Chinese and foreign investors’ uncertainty that would result from a volatile exchange rate. Implication on the Hong Kong society as a whole The current strong influx of Chinese hot money causing the real estate market in Hong Kong as one of the fastest growing investment tools for the mainland Chinese. However, it has also become an important area of investment, growing its virtual nature, which led to many social problems such as excessive inflation, distortion of the housing market, loss of the city’s competitiveness, etc. Virtual capital itself is not value, but the virtual capital to generate profits through circular motion to get some form of “residual value”, it can

ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS? | BY SUNNY LAM

not be directly used as real factors of production or production activities, but only the ownership certificate, the “reality paper copy of the capital”, reflects the debt payment. A lot of money flows from the real economy and financial markets and real estate market, causing economic false prosperity as we have seen before in 1997 and 2008. If the flow of funds into the virtual economy too much, it will cause a lack of real economic sector funding, the development of fatigue, there crowding out productive investment. The fast capital accumulation in the virtual reality of capital accumulation in the case of interest-bearing money capital does not reflect the reality of not only the accumulation of money capital, and self-aggrandizement, which led to bubble economy. Increasing the composition of the bubble economy, people’s pursuit of profit led to the virtual non-normal influx of a lot of money the virtual capital markets, people are keen on playing the stock / property market, futures and other “money game” activities. The biggest challenge for the Hong Kong policymakers now is how to deal with the property bubbles being formed by the hugh purchasing power caused by the appreciation of RMB and cheap money from China. As asset prices and the consumer price index rise, it is important for China to raise its interest rate. It is therefore necessary for China to improve its capital control mechanisms, to allow orderly cross-border capital flows for more efficient investments.

China in the near future and the rate of appreciation is likely to be at a stable and controlled pace. One important implication for Hong Kong is that it will be difficult to pursue a weak-dollar policy as Hong Kong dollar pegs with US Dollar.

For short term measurement, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority and China Central Bank can cooperate effectively in maintaining the stability of the exchange rate and orderly cross-border flows of capital. A stable RMB-dollar exchange rate seems to fit both parties interest. However, Hong Kong is a free trade port and there is hardly any existing tight regulation on controlling cross-border capital flow. Any additional regulations may damage the reputation of Hong Kong being one of the freest trading places in the world especially China is the biggest trading partner for Hong Kong.

The strong cross-border capital flow may cause a sharp change in the Hong Kong property landscape as such influx of money is intensifying demand for office, retail, and apartment spaces. In the world’s most expensive high-rise cities, such as Hong Kong, the free market axiom that real estate should be developed for its “highest and best use” has never been truer.

Notes: The author would like to share the following viewpoints:

Given the complex institutional and structural limitations in China, the nominal RMB appreciation will become a key policy for

* Sunny Lam is a freelance journalist specialising in city development, urban planning and property market. He is active in various kinds of publications. He has over 10 years experience in conducting research in regional real estate markets.

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CULTURAL ANALYSIS | BY ANTONY OU*

BITTER LOVE: A SILENCED MOVIE

CHINA

Movie of an Unrequited Patriot

History… a series of genuine history! I didn’t let anyone rape her, and that is why I am now impoverished… This is a book that will not be published until after hundreds of years. By that time, archaeologists will dig out my bones and discover this manuscript. The only thing that I wish for is that, after reading this manuscript, they will say, “Ah! I can’t believe that in 1976AD there was such an honest old chap! A Miracle indeed!” Enough! I will keep my mouth shut in Hell and be silent for ten thousands of years… — Bitter Love, Bai Hua

Ling Chenguang, a gifted artist without a father, endured hardships during his childhood

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AND ITS IMPLICATION

with the help of benevolent people. During his adolescence at the time of the Japanese occupation, he was forced to join the army of Kumingtang (KMT). He was saved by a young lady named Lu from a fisherman’s family who later became his wife. After joining an antigovernment movement, Ling was warranted by agents of KMT and consequently escaped to a foreign country. He eventually became a successful painter who lived as a bourgeoisie. When the New Modern China was born, he and his wife forwent the comfort of their past and went back to their motherland with patriotic aspirations. All the hopes were gradually gone when the Anti-Rightist Movement and Cultural Revolution came. As a former bourgeois and a “revisionist” who deviated from Mao’s orthodoxy, Ling’s family became political outcast. Together with their

CULTURAL ANALYSIS | BY ANTONY OU

daughter, they were confined and secluded in a tiny windowless house with no sunlight and countless spider webs. The painter was even severely beaten up during his birthday. When his daughter grew up, he ran away with her boyfriend. She left him after asking, “You are bitterly loving this country, however, does this country return your love?” After all the misfortunes, Ling exiled himself into the wilderness of snow. The hermit finally used his last footsteps to paint a huge question mark on the snow, and he finished it with his freezing body as the dot. Bitter Love: A Movie of Controversy Waves of political and social movements have suffocated millions of common people’s lives after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China since 1949. The Land Reformation, the Anti-Rightist Movement, and the Great Leap Forward (1958-1961) had all created devastating political, economic, cultural and environmental disasters. However, the Great Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), also known as “Calamity of Ten Years”, had redefined the conception of political chaos— a further advancement of Maoist orthodoxy that eventually led to almost complete collapses of political institutions, social norms and cultural artefacts, of which were replaced by lies, ignorance and greed.

Bai Hua

Bai Hua (白樺, 1930- ), a Chinese intellectual and former dedicated CCP member, became a “rightist” from 1958 to 1976. During that time, he had been deprived of his chances to write basically anything. His conviction has been removed by Deng Xiaoping in 1979 and his play manuscript Bitter Love (苦戀, originally known as Sun and Man) was firstly published by the same year. It was subsequently re-published in a Hong Kong leftist newspaper as well. The short novel was considered to be one of the pioneers of Scar Literature (傷痕文學): a new fiction genre that was fermented specifically right after the waves of Maoist political movements from the end of 1977 to 1979. It was considered as a cultural blossom of the “Second Hundred Flowers Movement”. The work had then been made into a movie, directed by Pang Ning and screen played by Bai Hua and the director himself. Before the actual movie could be possibly shown to the public, a sample of the movie has been previewed by the Secretariat of the Communist Party of China Central Committee and the Committee strongly opposed it unless the screenplay was heavily redrafted. Nonetheless, from 1981 onwards, the movie has received an overwhelming support by intellectuals, directors, movie critics and screenwriters. For the People's Liberation Army General Political Department and the Central Party School, the feelings of their members were mixed but the majority was against it. The situation exacerbated by the fact that the Newspaper of the People’s Liberation Army reminded the intellectuals that there were four types of principles that writers should be abided by them. Together with tens of other government-controlled newspaper and radio broadcasts, Bai Hua and his screenplay Bitter Love were severely criticized. Consequently, the movie was banned to show anyone in public. Yet, according to Bai Hua, the original copy of the movie was stored in good condition at Changchun Film Group Corporation. One should be noted that there was a Taiwanese version (1982) of the mov-

POLITICAL REFLECTION | SPECIAL ISSUE 2012

CULTURAL ANALYSIS | BY ANTONY OU

ie, known as “Portrait of a Fanatic” in English, can now be bought easily. Thanks to the Internet, one can also freely download and synchronously looped somewhere on the web with no English subtitles. The Silenced Question Mark As Maureen Duffy says, “The pain of love is the pain of being alive. It is a perpetual wound.” Ling, the painter, loved his country deeply, yet in return, the country never attempted to heal the hopeless and hapless man. He was the modern version of Qu Yuan (340BC-278BC) who kept on demanding answers from Heaven after having been expelling by his beloved country of Chu. We should not enquire for whom the question is asked; the question is asked for countless persecuted Chinese intellectuals. Through the painter’s life, Bai Hua asked profound questions about the Maoist era, which are still extremely crucial and somehow relevant to today’s China. One of the most important questions is: What is left in Chinese nationalism if the people of China were remorselessly ill-treated by the Communist Party? According to statistics, the farce of the Great Leap Forward has resulted in catastrophic deaths of over 40 million people, mostly due to hunger. The movement aimed at boosting up the steel production of the entire country, ambitiously claiming that the production would surpass that of the British and American Empires. However, when most of the citizens were brainwashed and the system was socially re-engineered by setting up People’s Communes, who were going to grow crops to feed the whole population? Exacerbated by years of serious and comprehensive droughts, Mao’s political ideal became one of the massive human exterminations in the 20 th century. During the Cultural Revolution, innocent lives were labelled as, very often without any substantial and sound evidence, “counterrevolutionaries”, “revisionists” and “capitalists”. They had to go through the political processes of

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“criticism” and “self-criticism”— mockery parties held by winners of the power struggles, aiming at condemning ones’ political stances, reestablishing their “correct” political belief system (i.e. Maoist orthodoxy), and eventually depriving the will and dignity of the political, social and cultural elites. During the processes, they were often severely beaten up without any justifications. In order to preserve ones’ personal safety, the “dominate strategies” for them were either to cheat, or betray, even the closest ones. Committing suicide became the only way out for some of the victims, and for some of the others, they were sent to Re-education Through Labour (RTL) in various remote places like the North-east provinces.

According to statistics, the farce of the Great Leap Forward has resulted in catastrophic deaths of over 40 million people, mostly due to hunger. The movement aimed at boosting up the steel production of the entire country, ambitiously claiming that the production would surpass that of the British and American Empires.

Ling the painter, like every other Chinese by that time, was living and suffering in a nation of poverty, chaos and a nation lack of credibility. Bai Hua attempts to test the limits of every Chinese patriot: Why do patriots still love a wounded country if they can no longer count their very own scars? Why did some of them stay in China if exit was a viable option (there was huge number of illegal emigration during the Cultural Revolution though)? If Chinese nationalism (or nationalism in general) is a lie, what could be an ultimate “resting place” for the Chinese souls?

CULTURAL ANALYSIS | BY ANTONY OU

Implications China in the 21st century is no longer a Communist nation. As Deng Xiaoping, famously asserted, “Only (economic) development makes hard sense”. In post-Mao China, economic development was the only concern of China. As a result, China is now the second largest economy and is the world’s fastest growing economy. It has been sustaining an average growth rate of 9.4% for the past 30 years. As a drawback, the economic gap between the rich and the poor of China (Gini coefficient in 2010: 0.47) is huge and widening. As Deng also said, the nation should “let some people grow rich first”, but we never know when and how such an ideal can be realised. The uncontrollable accumulation of wealth is concentrated in a handful of party members as well as some local capitalists. In addition, the Party firmly believes that by ensuring a high economic growth rate leaders can maintain their legitimacy. Nonetheless, the systematic and structural corruption is so incurable that as a result, the Party is losing the “hearts and minds” of the people. Economic progress has led to social and irreversible environmental degradation throughout

the country. Injustice in local provinces and villages are widespread that has led victims to point of no return. Without an independent judiciary system, an extrajudicial political action formally called “Letter and Complaints” or Xinfang in Chinese, becomes a widespread phenomenon. Over five million petitions have been received each year and the victims have been packed in Beijing to lodge complaints against their local authorities and to protect their basic human rights. Unfortunately, most of the petitioners has failed to redeem their justice and many of them have been severely threatened and beaten. Worse still, the environmental problems are devastating. For instances, more than 30% of water in China is not drinkable and more than 500 million people are affected. Moreover, countless health problems caused by pollutions are common namely, respiratory problems, cardiovascular damage, heavy metal poisoning, and cancer. Together with the recent tragedy of the highspeed railway system due to unacceptable governance, ethnic minority conflicts and terrorism, the daily violence of Chengguan (The City Urban Administrative and Law Enforcement Bureau) against the street-sellers, the

Chengguan Officers

POLITICAL REFLECTION | SPECIAL ISSUE 2012

CULTURAL ANALYSIS | BY ANTONY OU

persecution of public intellectuals and other countless social problems piece together a mosaic picture of Modern China in the 21st century. In an earlier article named “Hong Kong Democracy: A Pessimistic Review” of Political Reflection (PR), I contend that, The concept of a “harmonious society” has become an over-arching theme campaigning over the years in China. The Chinese central government advocates that it is necessary to construct a “harmonious society” while enjoying the economic prosperity. The term has been repeatedly criticized as a strategy that underplays the democratic reform of China. China is never a “harmonious” place due to its undemocratic and injustice environment. The “haves” are the exploiters and the “have-nots” are severely oppressed. As I said, “the only reason for a government to promote harmony is because the society it governs lacks harmony.” (Political Reflection Issue No.2, Vol.1) In 2010, there was a successful Chinese Spaghetti Western style movie written, directed and starred by Jiang Wen, Let the Bullets Fly. Towards the end of the movie, the protagonist “Pocky” and his subordinates were about to overthrow a local authority (Chow Yun-Fat). They at first shot many holes onto the gate of a mansion. Later, one of his subordinates shot an exclamation mark on the gate while Pocky shot a question mark. Pocky finally said, “Release all of your bullets through that question mark dot!” The symbolic messages here are clear: The gate refers to the barrier between the people and the government. The hundreds of fire holes are the grievances of the people. The question mark can possibly mean two things. It can mean thousands of inquiries imposed by the director towards the regime. It can also be understood together with the exclamation mark — the compound symbol actually looks like hammer and sickle ( ) — meaning that the Communist Party of China. By shooting all the remaining bul-

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lets through the question mark, people can be then “re-liberated” again. Like Jiang Wen, the people have been tired of waiting for meaningless slogans, official apologies and empty promises. As we can see, all the tragedies and reactions of the Chinese citizens are dangerously alarming to the seemingly unshakable regime. Are huge storms about to come? I do not have a clear answer. However, as Zhong Zukang, a Chinese author who now lives in Norway proclaim, “I don’t want to be Chinese again!” I am sure from time to time, unacquainted patriots of China will eventually wake up and strive for a better change. If patriotism and nationalism are

China is never a “harmonious” place due to its undemocratic and injustice environment. The “haves” are the exploiters and the “have-nots” are severely oppressed. As I said, “the only reason for a government to promote harmony is because the society it governs lacks harmony.” mythical constructions, a liberal democratic “irresponsible compound” might be a more realistic utopia. Note: * Antony Ou is a PhD Researcher of University of Sheffield, the China Review editor of Political Reflection Magazine, and the China Representative of CESRAN. His monograph, Just War and the Confucian Classics: A Gongyangzhuan Analysis, has been published and is available at amazon.com. E-mail: ouantony@gmail.com Twitter: https://twitter.com/ouantony Douban: http://www.douban.com/people/ ouantony/

About the CESRAN | Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis The CENTRE FOR STRATEGIC RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS (CESRAN) is a private, non-political, nonprofit, internet-based organization of scholars who are interested in world politics, and enthusiastic about contributing to the field of international relations as not only academics, but also practitioners. The underlying motive behind the foundation of the CESRAN is a need to bridge the gap between the students of international relations and practitioners of international politics. In this regard, the main ideal is gathering people, who come from different backgrounds and have different perspectives, around the CESRAN in order to yield fresh and illuminating insights as to how the international relations is carried out in a globalizing world. To this end, the CESRAN aims at establishing and maintaining close contact with and between politicians, bureaucrats, business people, and academics that would lead to the development of better policies. We invite anyone who shares these interests to become a member and participate in our activities.

Email: info@cesran.org

Members of the Executive Board of the CESRAN: Özgür TÜFEKÇİ, Chairman (King’s College London, UK) Alper Tolga BULUT, Vice-Chairman (University of Houston, USA) Kadri Kaan RENDA, Vice-Chairman (King’s College London, UK) Aksel ERSOY, Member (University of Birmingham, UK) Ali Onur ÖZÇELİK, Member (University of Sheffield, UK) Hüsrev TABAK, Member (University of Manchester, UK) Abdullah UZUN, Member (Karadeniz Technical University, Turkey)

Members of the Council of the CESRAN: Prof. Mark BASSIN (Södertörn University, Sweden) Prof. Bülent GÖKAY (Keele University, UK) Dr. Ayla Göl (Aberystwyth University, UK) Prof. Bayram GÜNGÖR (Karadeniz Technical University, Turkey) Prof. Alp ÖZERDEM (Coventry University, UK) Mr Bill PARK (King’s College London, UK) Prof. İbrahim SİRKECİ (Regent’s College, UK) Prof. Birol YEŞİLADA (Portland State University, USA)

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CULTURAL ANALYSIS | BY MASSIMO CARRANTE*

KANG YOUWEI’S (1858-1927) STUDY AND VISION OF THE CHINESE CALLIGRAPHIC ART

oday, the pertinence of Kang Youwei relevant figure and the historical role he played in China during the turbulent years between the 19th and 20th century, is no further object of discussion. Kang Youwei, who came from a family in which some of his members served the country as government officials, has often been at the centre of academic debates for his political activities and for the philosophical content of his writings. Amongst Kang Youwei’s characteristic traits, there was a vast and heterogeneous cultural formation, derived by his widespread interest towards different fields of human knowledge, learned from the disciplines and the writings of the western world and from the more traditional kind of culture tied to his native homeland. In China, as it is well-known, the cultural level of a person was also judged on the basis of the depth of his calligraphic education, thus, his inherent knowledge for this type of visual art, that over the centuries had developed a strong bond with the scholar-

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officials.1 Throughout his life, Kang Youwei, has dedicated time and energy to the art of calligraphy, acquiring a ample theoretical and practical knowledge, later merged in his compendium published in 1891, entitled Guang yi zhou shuang ji 廣藝舟雙楫. Even in its complexity and through different observation levels, Guang yi zhou shuang ji, structured in twenty-seven chapters compounded in six books, presents itself like a work of criticism to calligraphy, putting in evidence Kang Youwei’s approach towards this art which many considered essentially theoretical. Nevertheless, he produced an enormous amount of calligraphic works; created a personal and characteristic style, and entered, by rights (most of all for his theoretical competence), in that circle of experts and art connoisseurs, who, since the middle of the Qing dynasty, tried to inject into calligraphy new vital lymph derived from the more ancient calligraphic tradition - like those of the stone tables dating

CULTURAL ANALYSIS | BY MASSIMO CARRANTE

back to the Jin (265–420) and Northern Wei dynasties (386-535) - that, in the course of history, found themselves ruled out of the process of establishing the calligraphy classical tradition already described by Ledderose. In the Guang yi zhou shuang ji, despite the fundamental conceptuality, there are some parts that the author dedicated to eminently practical aspects and are concentrated in the following four chapters: Zhi bi di er shi (執筆第二十), where Kang Youwei offers his considerations about the right method of holding the brush; Zhui fa di er shi yi (綴法第二十一), discussing on the composition method of a calligraphic work starting from the correct movement of the writing tool; Xue xu er shi er (學敘第二十二), in which the author speaks of the right sequence to follow in the calligraphy learning process; Shu xue di er shi san, (述學第二十三), where, with a prose rich of personal details,

Kang Youwei

Kang Youwei, relays his personal experience in studying the chinese calligraphic art, which began at the age of ten under the guidance of his paternal grandfather, Kang Zanxiu. His grandfather, a government official, taught calligraphy in the administrative residence of Lianzhou, in the province of Guangdong. Later on, his illustrious grandson, described his attendance at the course with this words: [At that time] I had in my mouth the sweet taste of sugar and dates2, and I amused myself playing with the brushes. My defunct grandfather would begin teaching with [making] imitate [by the students] the Yue yi lun and the calligraphy of Ouyang Xun and Zhao Mengfu. The lesson was quite strict3. On these occasions, Kang Youwei, had the role of his Grandfather’s young attendant, whom, besides schooling him in the different examination subjects for entering the bureaucratic career, was also getting him acquainted with the basics of the calligraphic art. According to what Kang Youwei describes in this chapter, for many years, his calligraphy didn’t make any substantial improvements; for his demeanour, that he defines as laidback and slow in understanding things and also for the absence of good calligraphy rubbings in the house of his grandfather, with whom Kang Youwei was living since 3 months after the premature death of his father in 1868. Guang yi zhou shuang ji dates the first important turning point in Kang Youwei’s calligraphy learning process back to 1876, when, following his failure at the provincial examinations held the same year in Guangzhou, he decides to continue his studies at Lishan, a village near the capital of Guangdong province, under the auspices of Zhu Ciqi (1807-1881), an ex government official and a renowned Confucian scholar, who dedicated himself to teaching after his retirement from the administrative functions thirty years before at the Xinglin district in Shanxi province. Zhu Ciqi, described in Guang yi zhou shuang ji as you gong bi zha (尤工筆札) - proficient in the use of brush and paper - was known also with his sobriquet

POLITICAL REFLECTION | SPECIAL ISSUE 2012

CULTURAL ANALYSIS | BY MASSIMO CARRANTE

Jiujiang, from his native place, the country town of the same name in Nanhai district, twenty-five kilometers south-west of Guangzhou. Kang Youwei remained in Lishan for around three years, where besides the study of different disciplines as confucian classics, literature, institutions and rhetoric, he devoted himself to the refining of his calligraphy technique through the imitation of renowned works as the Ouyang Xun's masterpiece Inscription on the Sweet-Water Spring at Jiucheng Palace, the Stele of the Buddhist Monk Daoyin written by Ouyang Tong (?-691), Yan Zhenqing's (709-785) Stele of the Yan Family Temple, the Stele for the Xuan Mi Pagoda written by Liu Gongquan (778-865), as well as through modelling after the style of Song calligraphers like Su Shi (1037-1101) and Mi Fu (1051-1107)4. As Kang Youwei states in his autobiography, the time spent studying with Zhu Ciqi was for him of fundamental importance. In the perspective of his calligraphic education, it was relevant, above all, in view of his acquired greater technical awareness: the author of Guang yi zhou shuang ji becomes aware of the fact that there are no shortcuts in the art learning process: The study of calligraphy has a correct sequence; it is in fact essential, to know how to hold the brush. For what concerns the writing, it is necessary to begin from the structure of the character, from the horizontal and vertical strokes, defining first the square form, and later, concentrate on its characteristics, on its movement, on its flexibility. Once the characters have been well traced out, it is possible to concentrate on the calligraphic composition with its different parts and their distribution. 5

studying this method, I suffered, seeing that by putting my wrist horizontally, I could not hold the brush in a vertical position and viceversa. Hence, during daytime, I would scrutinize Mr. Zhu’s way to hold the brush […], according to this method, by putting the wrist horizontally, the brush, takes a natural vertical position. My handwriting became more elegant and balanced but not yet strong and vigorous6. In the winter of 1878 determined to go back home earlier to dedicate himself to a more individual study and to a contemplative life, Kang Youwei, left Zhu Ciqi’s class, and retired close to the Xiqiao mountain, a place not far away from his hometown and specially suited to meditation for the beauty and peacefulness offered by the

...“empty fist and solid fingers, horizontal wrist and perpendicular brush”. Whilst studying this method, I suffered, seeing that by putting my wrist horizontally, I could not hold the brush in a vertical position and vice-versa.

Kang Youwei dedicates the entire twentieth chapter of Guang yi zhou shuang ji in describing the procedures for achieving the correct brush grip, and that starts with these words:

surrounding scenery. While there, in the first month of the following lunar year (1879), he met a scholar and compiler of the Imperial Academy arrived from Beijing, Zhang Dinghua, also known with his courtesy name Yanqiu. The encounter between the two, not easy at first, would later prove to be of great importance. This new acquaintance, led Kang Youwei to gather evidence on the cultural tendencies of those years, inducing him, to reconsider in a positive way the contribution that some ancient calligraphic traditions could give to the evolutionary process of the art. In his autobiography, Kang Youwei wrote few lines about this encounter:

Mr. Zhu Jiujiang, in his “Method to hold the brush”, says: “empty fist and solid fingers, horizontal wrist and perpendicular brush”. Whilst

Whilst I was living at the mount Xiqiao, the compiler of the Hanlin Academy, Zhang Yanqiu, whose name in life was Dinghua, came to

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CULTURAL ANALYSIS | BY MASSIMO CARRANTE

a visit at the mountain with four or five of his colleagues. […] I met him and we had a discussion, finding ourselves in disagreement, we shouted at each other, and then he left7. The reason for this argument, is explained in Guang yi zhou shuang ji in greater detail: At that time, the compiler Zhang Yanqiu, told me that all the model-books tie were only a copy of original works and that it would have been better to study the steles bei [of the Northern Dynasties]. I contradicted him, quoting the “Zhanqiu” (the felt cloth) of Jiang Baishi (1155-1221), but I only did that, because I was still immersed in an old way of thinking8. The old way of thinking that Kang Youwei refers to, was based on the, till then, supposed superiority of the southern calligraphic tradition with its “tie” model-books, in contrast with the northern one, mainly represented by the calligraphy stone tablets carved during the Six and Northern Wei dynasties; this, in short, was a calligraphic tradition of populations that Kang Youwei considered backward and primitive. His point of view was still far away from the position held by other important scholars of the middle and late Qing dynasty, who, by re-qualifying the northern calligraphic traditions and combining it with the southern ones, saw it as the way of instilling new vigour and creative spirit to calligraphy. Later on, Kang Youwei became a good friend of Zhang Dinghua who, together with his teacher Zhu Ciqi, played a pre-eminent role in Kang Youwei's technical, teorethical and critical growth, not only in the field of calligraphy:

From my teacher, Mr. Jiujiang, I have heard the principles of virtues and justice of the [ancient] sages, from my friend, Mr. Zhang Yanqiu, I have received ample explanations on the northern literary fashion9. Kang Yowei's calligraphic formation was characterized by a third important moment: the encounter with Shen Zengzhi (1850-1922), courtesy name Zipei, a scholar, calligrapher and officer of the Imperial Board of Punishments. In 1889 he supported Kang Youwei in his writing a memorial to the throne, asking for immediate reforms in order to save China from its arresting decline. The petition failed and, as Kang Youwei states in his autobiography: Shen Zengzhi advised me not to talk any more about state affairs, and [told me that] I should happily deploy my time with the study of ancient bronze and stone inscriptions.[…] I planned to write a book [on this topic] but many other scholars were doing [the same], and so, I wrote a continuation of the work by Bao Shichen (1775-1851), that later [I called] An Expansion of the Twin Oars of the Ship of the Art (Guang yi zhou shuang ji)10. After rediscovering the importance of the calligraphy of northern tradition, Kang Youwei, dedicated himself to the study and the copying of different works carved on stone tablets dating back at various ancient dynasties, like The Stone Gate Epitaph, but also The Jing Shi Yu Stone Scriptures and The Epitaph for Zheng Xi11. As a consequence to his long practice and experience, Kang Youwei, developed a powerful wrist for calligraphy and created his own style. Presenting a detailed visual analysis of Kang Youwei's particular works

CULTURAL ANALYSIS | BY MASSIMO CARRANTE

goes beyond the scope of this paper; I will provide some examples to facilitate a minimal visual contact with some peculiarities of his brushstrokes. Taking into exam, in particular, the characters written in ordinary style (kaishu 楷書) or running style (xingshu 行書), it is possible to affirm that, although he gives particular consideration to constant training and adequate technical qualification as something essential for a good calligrapher, the forms of his individual brushstrokes are rather simple, since they are lacking in virtuosity and attention to small details. If we look through his works written in the above-mentioned styles, his strokes (both round and square) show a great sense of strength, fluidity and freedom from the technical orthodoxy of the calligraphy of the Tang dynasty (618-907). Nevertheless the freedom he shows in the way of using the tip of the brush does not alter the balanced fundamentals of his writings.

And more: Calligraphy is a minor art, not particularly worthy for discussing it. [Nevertheless] even in other disciplines, if we don’t aspire with decision at an advanced level of knowledge, without learning something easy, how can it be done for the more important things13? These are the conclusive words of the twentythird chapter of Guang yi zhou shuang ji, in which, Kang Youwei, describes his vision of the art of calligraphy defining it a minor art (xiao yi), intended as an instrument for reaching a more important aim: forming the character for patience

Conclusions: the importance and the role of calligraphy in Kang Youwei’s thought In Guang yi zhou shuang ji, Kang Youwei, recognizes the pre-eminent role played by Zhu Ciqi in introducing him to the right techniques of calligraphy and in helping him to penetrate the spirit of the art. Yet, in his essay, he seems to heighten, more his abilities as a calligraphy critic and connoisseur rather than as a calligrapher in the strict sense. This was directly connected with his conception of calligraphy and to his personality, more inclined to the speculation, rather than the rigid disciplinary routine that the study of calligraphy naturally requires: My personality leads me to investigate the deeper nature of things and I have no inclination for studies that have no concrete utility. Therefore I have been extremely lazy in studying calligraphy and I only took its general idea12.

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CULTURAL ANALYSIS | BY MASSIMO CARRANTE

and perseverance, for appraising small details and for a correct overall view. All of these virtues, should have been part of the personality of that “sage” or “superior being” that he aimed to be, in order to carry out in its entirety, the high mission of which he felt empowered. Notes: * Massimo Carrante is a PhD candidate of Centre for East Asian Studies, Heidelberg University.

海書畫出版社,1981 II.

2. 3.

Ledderose, Lothar, Chinese Calligraphy: Its Aesthetic Dimension and Social Function, Orientations, p. 35-50 (October 1986). Kang Youwei talks here about a particularly happy period of his life. 廣藝舟雙楫注(清) 康有為著, 崔爾平較注, 上

III.

Jiucheng gong li quan ming 九成宮醴泉銘,

IV.

bei 玄秘塔碑 (841). Works carved in regular style (kaishu) and presently preserved in the Beilin Museum of Xi'an. 5.

廣藝舟雙楫注(清) 康有為著, 崔爾平較注, 上海書畫出版社, 2006.1, p.169.

Ibidem, p.153.

康南海自編年譜 (外二種), 樓宇烈整理, 中華書局出版, 北京 1992.9, p. 9.

廣藝舟雙楫注(清) 康有為著, 崔爾平較注, 上海書畫出版社, 2006.1, p.173.

康南海自編年譜 (外二種), 樓宇烈整理, 中華書局出版, 北京 1992.9, p. 15.

10.

康南海自編年譜 (外二種), 樓宇烈整理, 中華書局出版, 北京 1992.9, p. 16.

11.

Shi men ming 石門銘 (509), Jing shi yu 经石峪 (Northern Qi, 550-577) and Zheng wen gong bei 鄭文公碑 (511).

12.

廣藝舟雙楫注 (清) 康有為著, 崔爾平較注, 上海書畫出版社, 2006.1, p. 174.

13.

Ibidem, p. 175.

References

康有為書法藝術解析, 趙一新著, 江蘇美術出版社, 2001 書法美學思想史, 丹亭著, 河南美術出版社, 1992

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(632). Daoyin Fashi bei 道因法師碑 (663). Yan jia miao bei 顏家廟碑 (780). Xuan mi ta

康南海自編年譜 (外二種),樓宇烈整理,中華書局出版, 1992

海書畫出版社, 2006.1, p.173. 4.

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中國現代書法史, 朱仁夫著, 北京大學出版社, 1996

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Chang, León Long-yien, Four Thousand Years of Chinese Calligraphy, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1990 XII. Ch'en, Chih-mai, Chinese Calligraphers and their Art, Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1966 XIII. Hsiao, Kung-ch'üan; Israel, Jerry, A Modern China and a New World: K'ang Yu-wei, Reformer and Utopian, 1858-1927, University of Washington Press, 1975 XIV. Ledderose, Lothar, Mi Fu and the Classical Tradition of Chinese Calligraphy, Princeton University Press, 1979 XV. Ledderose, Lothar, Chinese Calligraphy: Its Aesthetic Dimension and Social Function. Orientations, (Oct. 1986), pp. 35-50 XVI. Lo, Jung-pang, K'ang Yu-wei: A Biography and a Symposium, Tucson, University of Arizona Press, 1967 XVII. McNair, Amy, Engraved Calligraphy in China: Recension and Reception, The Art Bullettin, No.1 (Mar. 1995). pp. 106-114 XVIII. Ouyang, Zhongshi [et al.], Chinese Calligraphy, translated and edited by Wang Youfen, Yale Univesrity Press, 2008

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