NEWS BULLETIN

Csb Highlights Failures

The US Chemical Safety Board (CSB) has released its final report into the explosion and fire at the Husky Superior Refinery in Wisconsin in 2018, which injured 36 workers and caused some $550m in damages. The explosion happened when the refinery was shutting down its fluid catalytic cracking (FCC) unit ahead of a maintenance turnaround; two vessels in the unit exploded, puncturing a storage tank and spilling some 17,000 bbl hot asphalt that caused several fires.

In addition to smoke from the fires at the refinery, more than 2,500 residents of the nearby city of Superior evacuated and a shelter-in-place order was issued in Duluth, based on the potential risk of a release of highly toxic hydrofluoric acid (HF), which was stored and used at the refinery. Although no HF release occurred, the risk of an HF release was present because the HF storage tank was closer to the point of the explosion than the asphalt storage tank and could have been punctured by the debris from the explosion.

As a result of its investigation, CSB has issued 16 safety recommendations, including a call for the US Environmental Protection Agency to develop a programme that prioritises the inspection of FCC units in refineries with hydrofluoric acid alkylation units, with particular regard to verifying FCC safeguards to prevent explosions during transient operations.

CSB has also released its final report into the toxic gas release and chemical fire at the Bio-Lab facility in Westlake, Louisiana in August 2020 during damage caused by Hurricane Laura. Rainwater from the storm came into contact with a large amount of trichloroisocyanuric acid (TCCA) stored at the site, initiating a chemical reaction and decomposition, the heat from which caused a fire. Part of nearby I-10 was closed for 28 hours and a shelter-in-place was ordered for the surrounding community.

“The CSB has investigated several incidents related to hurricanes and other extreme weather events,” noted CSB chair Steve Owens. “With powerful storms and other extreme weather occurring more frequently, companies and regulators must take action to prevent weather-related releases of hazardous chemicals that can cause substantial damage to facilities and threaten surrounding communities.” www.csb.gov

CSB found that Bio-Lab had not learned the importance of preparing for extreme weather, and had failed to implement updated industry guidance issued following the 2017 incident at the Arkema plant in Crosby, Texas. CSB also notes that TCCA is not covered by OSHA’s Process Safety Management standard nor by EPA’s Accidental Release Prevention requirements and it has reiterated its recommendation to the two agencies to extend their rules to achieve a more comprehensive control of reactive hazards.

Clean Sweep Recognises Sqas

The European Chemical Industry Council’s (Cefic) Safety and Quality Assessment for Sustainability scheme (SQAS) has been recognised by the board of the Operation Clean Sweep (OCS) certification programme as an alternative method for assessing the performance of logistics providers. As a result, SQAS-assessed companies will no longer need to obtain additional OCS certification to ensure that they operations have all the safeguards in place to prevent unintentional loss of plastics pellets.

The OCS certification scheme was industry’s response to a 2019 call from the European Commission to step up actions to combat pellet loss. OCS now audits polymer producers and converters and the OCS board, which consists of representatives from a wide range of stakeholders, has agreed to recognise SQAS as an alternative for those involved in polymer logistics.

www.sqas.org www.opcleansweep.org

Bunkering Of Gaseous Fuels

The International Association of Ports and Harbours (IAPH) has updated its bunkering checklists for fuels such as LNG, liquefied biogas (LBG) and liquid hydrogen. The harmonised bunker checklists are designed for known bunkering scenarios – including ship-to-ship and truck-to-ship – and reflect the extra requirements on ports and terminals for alternative marine fuels bunker operations.

The intention is that the bunkering checklists can support a high level of quality and responsibility in such operations. Implementing harmonised bunker checklists in ports will also be of great benefit to the vessels (and their crew) bunkering in other ports because it will reduce the potential confusion caused by having to comply with different rules and regulations in different ports, IAPH says.

The new checklists can be downloaded free of charge AT https://sustainableworldports.org/ clean-marine-fuels/lng-bunkering/bunkerchecklists/#downloads.

Rail Reminder From Phmsa

The US Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) has issued two safety advisories in the wake of the recent derailment accident in East Palestine, Ohio. Neither notice adds to regulation but, rather, both remind dutyholders of their responsibilities under existing requirements.

Firstly, PHMSA urges all those involved in the transport of hazardous materials by rail to take further actions to ensure that emergency responders are adequately equipped to respond to incidents and warns that, if investigations reveal that improvements in the emergency response planning process are necessary, it may take additional action in the future.

The second advisory urges hazmat tank car owners and offerors to review existing fleets to check for tank cars that are equipped with aluminium protective housing covers on manway assemblies, as these can melt when exposed to extreme heat, as they were in the Ohio derailment incident. They should consider replacing aluminium equipment with carbon steel housings, as is the current industry practice. Again, PHMSA and the Federal Railway Administration (FRA) may take addition action if they deem it necessary.

Ntsb Looks Into Ns

The US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), which is already investigating the 3 February derailment in East Palestine, Ohio, has opened a wider special investigation into Norfolk Southern Railway’s safety practices and culture. The East Palestine derailment, while it did not cause any fatalities, raised public awareness and concerns about the safety of the transport of hazardous materials by rail through populated areas.

NTSB notes that it has, since December 2021, had reason to launch investigation teams to five significant accidents involving Norfolk Southern, which led to three deaths, and NTSB will also review another two derailments in Ohio in October 2022 and March 2023.

“The continued safe operations of Norfolk Southern is vital to the United States,” NTSB stresses, saying it is “concerned that several organisational factors may be involved in the accidents, including safety culture”.

NTSB is continuing its investigation into the East Palestine derailment, which will report in due course; it is also examining the specific issue of the use of aluminium protective covers, a number of which failed during the fire that followed the derailment and which has already been the subject of a safety alert from PHMSA (see above). www.ntsb.gov with an amendment made to the 2015 text of RID/ADR that had been overlooked. In addition, three additional UN entries – UN 3405, 3406 and 3408 – had been identified with classification code OT1 and packing groups II and III that needed to be reflected in the tank code tables.

The Working Group on Tanks proposed –and the Joint Meeting agreed to insert a new line against LGBV under 5.1 for OT1, PG III. Against L4Bn, the current line under 5.1 for O1 is restricted to packing group II (PG I is deleted); the line for OT1, PG I is also deleted and a new line for OT1, PG II is added. Also against L4BN, the current assignment under Class 3 to F1, PG III with a boiling point below 35°C is also deleted. Against L1.5BN, the current Class 3, F1 line is deleted.