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Sociology as a Practice in Humanity: Noam Chomsky, Howard Zinn, and Social Responsibility 1 Philip Luck Crit Sociol 2007; 33; 937 DOI: 10.1163/156916307X230386 The online version of this article can be found at: http://crs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/33/5-6/937

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Critical Sociology 33 (2007) 937–955

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Sociology as a Practice in Humanity: Noam Chomsky, Howard Zinn, and Social Responsibility1 Philip Luck Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Radford University, Radford, Virginia, 24142, USA E-mail: pluck@radford.edu

Abstract This paper presents sociology as a practice in humanity, whose members have a social responsibility to engage in work contributing to social progress and reform. In lieu of viewing sociology as praxis, sociologists frequently adhere to the hegemony of a conventional pedagogy, an “objective” scientific orientation, and an institutional view of scholarship that confines further positive impact on students and communities. The ramifications are myriad, including a divisive milieu within the discipline. Identified and explored is a missing link: a discipline-oriented model synthesizing intellectualism, teaching, and activism. An intervening model external to sociology, accentuating dissent, is presented from case studies of linguist and social critic Noam Chomsky and historian Howard Zinn, reflecting the potential and importance of sociology to contribute meaningfully in our society. Wedding theory and praxis, the case studies reexamine current sociological ideology and punctuate social responsibility among practitioners through institutional transformation. Keywords Noam Chomsky, Howard Zinn, humanity, social responsibility, praxis

This paper would not have been initiated or completed without personal communication with Noam Chomsky and Howard Zinn, both of whom oﬀered insight and motivation. I extend gratitude to Johnny Smith, who contributed to an earlier, related paper. Additional thanks to Ralph Brown, Kirk Elifson, Charles Gallagher, and Wendy Simonds for reviewing earlier versions of this paper and providing constructive feedback. © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2007

DOI: 10.1163/156916307X230386

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Introduction “It is the responsibility of intellectuals to speak the truth and to expose lies.” – Noam Chomsky

We are steeped in an exciting era, the early years of a new millennium. But the most casual survey of historical records reflects the degree that the “new world order” mimics the old in unsettling ways. For sociologists, the new era offers pause to reflect critically on the discipline, searching for its values, purpose, and potential. Amid the ubiquity of political rhetoric, the educational system we value has become the locus of social discourse, both within and outside the academy. Politicians make career-advancing pledges of educational support and reform, and states utilize lotteries, largely funded by the poor, to finance and cultivate educational progress. Attention to standardized tests has reached a pinnacle that, alongside additional classroom computers, Internet access, and smaller classrooms, is offered as a cure-all for failing students, dilapidated schools, underappreciated teachers, and the lingering shadow of race and class-based disparities. Despite the sound-bites and meager if not counter developments, the political discourse provides sociologists an opportunity to turn these grave matters inward; a reflective inquiry of our discipline’s needs for progress. Focusing on the philosophical and pedagogical evolution of sociology maps a seasoned question: What is the responsibility of sociologists? That is, does our discipline have a responsibility to higher education, to our students and to the public, and if so, are we honoring that social contract? While this is not a new question, an American Sociological Association president suggested over a quarter-century ago that “it is one that is eternally fresh and controversial . . . [and] can either trouble [sociologists] or open up new vistas for intellectual exploration, self awareness and historical perspective” (Lee 1976: 925). The Current State of Sociology In 1981, then ASA President Whyte proposed rethinking and reorienting sociology through new procedures, a new policy, and a new role (Whyte 1982). This remains a timely proposal, as we are living in a special time in

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the world. As McKibben (1998) points out, we live in an age that is both extraordinary and dangerous, a time when the planet’s limits are tested. At the same time, precisely because of current crises of war, terrorism, and global warming, sociologists may glean from current events to revalue sociology as praxis – the agency for human action in the social world. Sociologists are presented an occasion to reflect on the purpose of our discipline, perhaps uniquely, in such a rapidly changing, tumultuous period; a period in which sociology has “lost vital contact with [its] most important values, with [its] reason for being” (Lemert 1995: xiv). This task is fortunate, for the potential of sociologists to make their mark on society has never been greater. Yet while sociological research provides the foundation upon which we build knowledge of global injustice, subsequently shared with classroom students, many practitioners practice their craft through traditional notions of objectivity and neutrality, and a hands-off approach. Others, recognizing our place in an unneutral world that carries us along with it, seek to actively change the direction through their sociological work. Generally speaking, as a discipline within an institution, neither of which is immune to the sociological gaze, sociology has followed and proffered the former and discouraged the latter. The discord among practitioners, however, suggests that the institutional model is outdated, or at least requires a restructuring that accepts, if not encourages, “creative dissent” (Lee 1976). Outside the academic presentation of institutional underpinnings, there is little agreement among sociologists regarding mission and responsibility, including the uses of scholarship. Zinn (1997) writes that the world is “topsy-turvy”, where things are all wrong and power resides in the wrong hands. From a conflict or perhaps applied position, our discipline too is topsy-turvy, with priorities that trivialize widespread human misery and injustice. While sociologists strive for the “objectivity” pronounced by our discipline, people starve. While academicians engage the nexus of tenure and promotion, our economic system perpetuates competition for scarce, limited resources, particularly among those lacking the capital to compete. As our nation spends billions of dollars through a ballooning military budget to prepare for known and unknown enemies, simultaneously funding multinationals through the military-industrial complex, we lecture from the comfort and safety of our classrooms. While students are tested on their comprehension from textbooks that all-too-frequently locate sociological knowledge in conventional

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frameworks of understanding, we maintain the status quo, not so much by our actions but by failing to act. The intellectuals who talk about and are seemingly most concerned with social problems often neglect opportunities to greater impact students and communities, missing the fuller, liberating potential of sociology. While not dissimilar to other academic disciplines, our discipline’s “neutrality” highlights the gap between what we believe, what we teach, and what we exercise. Chomsky (1987a) posits that “the scientist has no unique right to ignore the likely consequences of what he does” (201). If we concur, we also must acknowledge that our collective inaction has ramifications that affect the future of our discipline, the potential of our students, and the state of our society. That is, whether or not we agree that “there really is no substitute for participation” (Lefebvre 1947/1991: 217), consequences exist that cannot be ignored. The hegemonic orientation of an objective social science is not a postmodern problem only, but one ensuing from decades of institutional socialization. Still, a postmodern, “society of individuals” (Elias 1991) offers additional resistance to academic involvement in developing bonds and ties of community and overcoming systems of inequality. Ashley and Orenstein (1996) point out that there has been “a victory of style over substance.” Ritzer (1993), exhuming Weber’s iron cage of rationality, underscores this point, demonstrating the growing “McDonalization” of our society, a developing emphasis on quantity over quality. Higher education shows symptoms of this trend in the ever-important maintenance of status and image, reflecting and reinforcing commercial culture. Meanwhile, the established standard by which we define “academic” – theoretical, without practical application – is bolstered. Though the restrictive framework of the institution allows few departures, the resistance within the ranks of scholars cannot be overlooked. hooks (1994), for example, calls for a revolutionary pedagogy of freedom through teachers who fulfill a mission of resistance. Recalling her childhood educational experience, hooks writes: That shift from beloved, all-black schools to white schools . . . taught me the difference between education as the practice of freedom and education that merely strives to reinforce domination. The rare white teacher who dared to resist . . . sustained the belief that learning at its most powerful could indeed liberate. (4)

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Freire (1996) calls for classroom and pedagogical reform, positing a methodology that liberates students from a “culture of silence.” Lefebvre (1947/1991) promotes transcendence of our “inferior” scientific thinking to “the level of the Possible.” He writes that “the contrast between the possible and the real, which is historical and social in character, is thus shifted [within] the most gifted individuals; it becomes the more-or-less conscious conflict between theory and practice, dream and reality” (247). Lefebvre insists that nothing is possible without demand for the impossible, a sentiment others share, often from where emerges dissidence and commitment to social responsibility. Despite the influence and range of such visionaries, academicians continue to participate in and thus perpetuate a form of institutional consent and validation, often from fear of sanctions, maintaining the conventional wisdom that scholarship and activism are distinct and often diametrically opposed pursuits. To participate would reveal color in a body of work that prefers neutral shades. But to remain passive is to deny human agency or, as Freire (1996) posits, the fact that people are beings of praxis. Passivity also undermines a rich history of social movements that evidence the transformation of the world through social engagement. If we are to affirm our beliefs, we cannot deny the transformative element of sociology. Znaniecki (1940) reminds us that “all new developments in the history of knowledge have been due to those scientists who did more in their social roles than their circles wanted and expected them to do” (164). Philosopher Bertrand Russell portrays education not as analogous to filling empty vessels with water, but as providing the best conditions for flowers to reach their natural potential for growth. Rather than adopt this renaissance model, academicians often disengage from the interconnectedness of teacher, student, and material, favoring rote memorization and conventional means of teaching that, as Marx might suggest, turn students into passive, docile tools of production. Though enjoying a more progressive reputation, sociologists also replicate these latter methods of teaching and learning. And despite the notable presence of a critical sociology, there is not a precedent for synthesizing intellectualism, pedagogy, and activism for professional practitioners, nor is there a robust discussion of how the void truncates laudable goals. Our discipline lacks a model clarifying these connections. For a better grasp of the potential of sociology and to break out of our mold of distance and objectivity, an external intervention is useful.

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Activist Traditions First, however, it is crucial to acknowledge sociologists and other intellectuals, past and present, who commit to and uphold a proactive orientation, promote social change through the context of their academic positions, and embrace pedagogy that is student-oriented and relevant to the social world. W. E. B. DuBois, R. S. Lynd, C. Wright Mills, Patricia Hill Collins, and Barbara Ehrenreich come quickly to mind as intellectuals who openly engage this debate and practice their crafts through public discourse. Lemert (1995) writes that while sociology has lost moral concerns, some practitioners are raising questions to rework “the moral basis of sociology itself ” (xv). Likewise, there are numerous ASA presidential addresses spanning decades that attend to or encourage dissent and political engagement. These aside, there exists significant literature that suggests that academia, including sociology, has perpetuated a “proper” criteria for teaching and research that manifests “a remarkable detachment from the urgent realities of the world” (Parenti 1995: 190). Burawoy (1998), for example, writes of the parallels between sociology and industry, and emphasizes an alternative model shaped by a critical analysis of the discipline. Vaughan et al (1993) detail the demise of American sociology from the discipline’s myopic attempt to emulate the natural sciences, and then present a more humane, human-rights orientation for the discipline. Other works predict the future of sociology resting on the “contextual determinants of social action” (Hallinan 1998) or in developing a sociology of the underdog (Becker 1967). Similarly, there are calls for a reflexive, responsive, and responsible sociology built upon a foundation of social change (Bourdieu 1992; Wallerstein 1999; Gouldner 1968; Gans 1989; Whyte 1991). While Huber (1995), for one, frets that our discipline attracts critical attention from administrators because of our “radical criticism”, and that the ASA has overstepped its bounds, others find the need for further discipline-oriented “soul-searching” (Feagin 1999) through critical, if not controversial, endeavors. The above literature acknowledges variation in academic convictions. But also revealed are continuities more striking than the variations: models of radical criticism are not established norms, thus many sociologists do not embrace a consciousness of professional responsibility that includes activism. Further demonstrated is a general lack of awareness of our profes-

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sional positions as products of the relatively constant nexus of interests and power that define institutions. Regrettably, the hegemonic orientation does not champion Marx’s position in his Theses on Feuerbach that we must transcend mere interpretations of the world and begin to change it. Jacoby (2001) writes of the decline in the number of public intellectuals, ones that “started off as independent intellectuals writing for small magazines and ended up as professors . . . “[while] the next generation started off as professors, wrote differently and thought differently” (26). One result is that contemporary sociology discourages activist intellectuals, preferring participative methods only within the context of qualitative data collection. Even within this realm, less conventional practices, such as feminist methods, are hotly debated. And when the anomalous, institutional advocacy stance appears, it is quickly tempered and sanctioned by practitioners who keep alive the belief that values are anathema to intellectualism and professional sociology. As Parenti (1995) argues, social activism is discouraged while detachment is treated as scholarly: Supposedly, such detachment helps [academics] to retain their objectivity. In fact, much of the best scholarship comes from ideologically committed scholars . . . It is they who have revealed the unexamined sexist and racist presumptions of conventional scholarship in the sciences and social sciences. (190)

Indeed, the antagonism toward the American Sociological Association for publishing Barbara F. Reskin’s book, The Realities of Affirmative Action in Employment (1998), reveals these trends. In a signed, published letter, 38 sociologists, many of whom are nationally recognized scholars, castigate the ASA’s publication of a book that examines “empirically what scientific research can tell us about the effects of affirmative action” (Footnotes March 1999: 9). The signatories, which include only one woman (also the spouse of a fellow signatory), write that “it is inappropriate for the American Sociological Association to take an advocacy role on affirmative action . . . [though] the majority of the active ASA membership is probably supportive of the pro side.” Further demonstrative of the anti-advocacy orientation is Reskin’s own disclaimer that she has “no personal mission to promote” (9) affirmative action. Are we so removed from sociological knowledge and implications about race and social mobility that we must defend an undeniable empirical

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examination of the topic by suggesting personal distance? To apply scientific methods and draw conclusions from data suggest an obligation to acknowledge results, even if they counter the researchers’ beliefs. To not serve an advocacy role is to prevent or avoid dissemination of data. And to deny or not support scientific findings hypocritically undermines the value of near universal application and acceptance of research methods. Promoting racial equality, then, grounded in the depth and breadth of sociological research, is part and parcel of the counter-hegemonic mission to fulfill through professional publications and classroom interactions. Advocating affirmative action is an exercise in social responsibility without apology and a validation of our own field of research. It is fair to say that sociology, particularly within the ASA, sees its share of controversy: the aforementioned debate over affirmative action; the undemocratic selection of an editor of American Sociological Review (ASR); voiced concerns over the lack of intellectual diversity within sociology journals; and a lack of minority representation governing text publication. These controversies, of many, demonstrate contention, but also possibilities for emerging discourse on the responsibility of sociologists and for the future of the discipline. So where do we turn for a richer, more robust understanding of our responsibilities? How do we find our place in the academy of postmodern society? What model do we use to propel sociology further into the 21st Century? One method is to look within the discipline at practitioners addressing such questions. As illustrated previously, there are sociologists who offer unconventional or revolutionary perspectives and approaches. There is also a larger context of intellectual work and progressive movements over the past century. Analyzing key moments in the separation of theory and practice, or the development of more radical caucuses in sociology, including the emergence of Critical Sociology (formerly the Insurgent Sociologist) and the Society for the Study of Social Problems, also offer insight into new directions of thought. Another method, employed here, is to step outside the margins of the discipline itself to extrapolate from non-sociologists who raise similar questions, who value the dance of intellectualism, teaching and activism. The value of the latter is the broader context, which avoids the trap of viewing these issues in too narrow a focus. As we use our sociological imagination to peer beyond our immediate surroundings and gain insight, stepping

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away from the local is conducive to a broader consideration of professional responsibility and the product and potential of our scholarship.

Case Studies in Praxis Noam Chomsky During the 1960s, still early in his academic career, Noam Chomsky reached a critical juncture: continue with his linguistics work while enjoying his tenure as professor, or enter the emerging political discourse on Vietnam and social progress. It was to be an important decision, for the ramifications would persist throughout his academic career, possibly damaging his reputation as a respected intellectual. Chomsky knew what happened to public figures who voiced dissent, including possible prison sentences, yet he entered the fray, “visibly exercising the social responsibility he [has] as an intellectual . . . [to] bring the truth about matters of human significance to an audience that can do something about them” (Albert 1998: 3). Chomsky’s consciousness of the cost of dissent to academicians, from alienation to dismissal, conveys his early commitment to social responsibility. Chomsky occasionally shares a personal experience that continues to influence his beliefs and actions. As a child, he observed a bully abuse an overweight child, and though the injustice was apparent to all present, no one in the crowd aided the victim. Most observers went so far as to reinforce the behavior by cheering for the bully. Chomsky stood back, afraid to intervene. Afterward, ashamed of his lack of intervention on behalf of the victim, he resolved to always support the underdog – the oppressed. His writings, teachings, and political activities reflect this resolve, drawn from the lingering memory of this early encounter, to expose and counter those who wield power for their own benefit, often at the expense of the defenseless. Chomsky wrote a series of essays entitled “The Responsibility of Intellectuals”, published in the New York Review of Books in the late 1960s, unveiling the tenuous relation between academia and politics, challenging the way in which intellectuals previously viewed their commitment to politics. Within one early essay, he stated what he considers a truism: “It is the responsibility of intellectuals to speak the truth and to expose lies”

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(1966/1987: 60). Critiquing the distortion of information that emerges from major institutions, including higher education, Chomsky documents the “growing lack of concern for truth” (63). Later essays, speciﬁcally “Objectivity and Liberal Scholarship” (1968), “Equality” (1976), and “The Manufacture of Consent” (1984), continue this tradition, exposing the hypocrisy of political pundits, intellectuals, and so-called experts. Detailing the connection between politics and freedom and elaborating on Marx’s “realm of freedom”, Chomsky writes that “freedom is illusion and mockery when conditions for the exercise of free choice do not exist” (185). Chomsky is clear in his call for raised consciousness in the hope for a better society, including the social role of academics. For example, without the guise of objectivity, he details the characteristics of a socialist society, one with “bonds of solidarity, sympathy, and concern for others” (192): Socialists are committed to the belief that we are not condemned to live in a society based on greed, envy, and hate. I know of no way to prove that they are right, but there are also no grounds for the common belief that they must be wrong.

For sociologists, Chomsky’s engaged scholarship and expressed convictions in the face of institutional and public sanctions raise troubling questions regarding our roles, particularly in exposing and fighting social problems. If we internalize our sociological leanings, if we are committed to the value of sociological knowledge, and if we truly value the agency of people, how can we perceive our craft as other than as praxis? Likewise, a mere consciousness of responsibility lends itself to rethinking sociological scholarship in multiple ways. Consider the subject of race and intelligence. In 1976, Chomsky was uncovering racist assumptions underlining research on this subject. “It is difficult to see how the study of race and IQ, for example, can be justified on any scientific grounds . . . In a racist society, inquiry into race and IQ can be expected to reinforce prejudice” (200). Chomsky comprehends the impact of race in society, and believes that intellectuals have a responsibility to reverse this social problem. Why, then, have sociologists long researched this topic? Chomsky stresses the underpinnings of sociology: that there is a pervasive process of indoctrination that socializes people into acceptable patterns of thought and behavior. Higher education is one of

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the means for suppressing certain views and certain questions. Chomsky (1987a) writes: The professional guild structure in the social sciences . . . has often served as a marvelous device for protecting them from insight and understanding, for ﬁltering out people who raise unacceptable questions, for limiting research – not by force, but by all sorts of more subtle means – to questions that are not threatening. (30)

Furthermore, social scientists are “very unlikely to study . . . the way power is actually exercised in their own society, or their own relationship to that power” (30). Here he deviates from conventional wisdom on the proper role of an intellectual, suggesting that intellectuals do view their work as pro-active, but that the establishment itself is counter-inducive to this view. As “ideological managers” and as the “literate part of the population . . . subjected to the mass of propaganda . . . intellectuals are the most indoctrinated” (Chomsky 1987b: 53). Sociologists, then, are products of this “ivory-tower mentality” (Barsky 1997: 168), obscuring our convictions and the power our discipline wields over our understanding of roles and responsibilities. Through personal communication with this author, Chomsky wrote further of these issues, expressing interest despite being “wary of the topic of responsibility of intellectuals . . . [because] the answers are pretty simple.” Chomsky posits that “the most important aspect of being an academic is to try to do something important and to do it honestly.” Similarly, he suggests that in the classroom we must be up front and honest about our ideological commitments, instead of concealing them “in the manner standard in the professions.” His honesty and willingness to engage his craft unconventionally provides respite in order to consider our roles and obligations as sociologists. Howard Zinn Like Chomsky, historian Howard Zinn postulates the potential uses of scholarship. From humble beginnings in the depression years, as the son of poor immigrant parents living in New York, Zinn, not unlike Chomsky, uses his early experiences as grounding for his convictions. Zinn tells of an event as a boy when he attended a demonstration in Times Square with a

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group of young Communists a few years older than he. Though peaceful and nonthreatening, with a thousand or so people keeping to the sidewalks, marching and holding banners and chanting slogans of peace and justice, hundreds of policemen soon arrived and assaulted the protestors with their clubs. Zinn (1997) writes: I was astonished, bewildered. This was America, a country where whatever its faults, people could speak, write, assemble, demonstrate without fear. It was in the Constitution, the Bill of Rights. We were a democracy. (154)

Zinn was knocked unconscious from a blow to his head, and later woke up with the realization that “the state and its police were not neutral referees in a society of contending interests” (154). He elaborates further: From that moment on, I was no longer a liberal . . . I was a radical, believing that something fundamental was wrong in this country – not just the horrible treatment of black people, but something rotten at the root. The situation required not just a new president or new laws, but an uprooting of the old order, the introduction of a new kind of society – cooperative, peaceful, egalitarian.

After being drafted into the Air Force during World War II, and later working in a shipyard, Zinn began his academic training in history at age 32, eventually landing his first teaching job at Spelman College, then a female all-black finishing school in Atlanta, Georgia. There, Zinn drew on his experiences from life in inner-city New York and as a bombardier in the war, as well as from his love for classical literature, in shaping his view that race and class oppression are intertwined. In 1956, Zinn was appointed chair of the history and social sciences department, quickly realizing the potential of his position and the inevitable impact on disenfranchised black students in the deep South. Despite an “unwritten, unspoken agreement between the white power structure of Atlanta and the administrations of the black college” (19), Zinn spoke against race prejudice, having his students write about their experiences in the deeply segregated South. As with Chomsky, Zinn was infuriated with bullying of all types, including “the bullying by white racists of black children going to school” (1990: 271). From this, alongside the impact of his students’ stories and struggles, Zinn reflects:

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The events of my life, growing up poor, working in a shipyard, being in a war, had nurtured an indignation against the bullies of the world, those who used wealth or military might or social status to keep others down. And now I was in the midst of a situation where human beings, by accident of birth, because of their skin color, were being treated as inferior beings. I knew that it was wrong for me, a white teacher, to lead the way. But I was open to anything my students wanted to do, refusing to accept the idea that a teacher should conﬁne his teaching to the classroom when so much was at stake outside it. (1994: 21)

Support of student protests, presence at student picket lines, and visits to students jailed for acts of civil disobedience made Zinn a student favorite. But it also led to the violation of his tenure agreement: dismissal from Spelman for insubordination. Despite the negative consequences for rejecting American ideology, what Zinn calls a “dominant pattern of ideas . . . pushed forward by the most powerful mechanisms of our culture” (1990: 3), his convictions held sway at Boston University, his next academic post. There, despite the promise of tenure after one year, three years passed before a departmental tenure review began. Several professors opposed, stating that Zinn’s actions against the war in Vietnam “were embarrassing to the university” (1994: 184). But for Zinn, ideas are not subjects just for intellectual debate – they are matters of life and death, transcending institutional notions of objectivity. He writes: From the start, my teaching was infused with my own history. I would try to be fair to other points of view, but I wanted more than “objectivity”; I wanted students to leave my classes not just better informed, but more prepared to relinquish the safety of silence, more prepared to speak up, to act against injustice wherever they saw it. (1994: 183)

For Zinn, teaching is more than a classroom exercise of the mind: it is a manner of living consistently with and acting on convictions, sharing those with others, and supporting alternative views of the world as is and as it should be. Zinn posits that his students who “left their classes to sit-in, to be arrested, in protest against racial segregation, [learned] more in a few weeks of participation in social struggle than they could learn in a year of going to class” (1997: 496). Taking part in the struggles of our times is appropriate for students and scholars alike.

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In his essays “The Uses of Scholarship” and “How Free is Higher Education”, Zinn recognizes the potential of higher education, calling it a “knowledge industry” that “can be used, as it was traditionally, to maintain the status quo, or to change it” (501). But “knowledge is also dissipated on pretentious conceptualizing in the social sciences,” stimulating academic discussions that go “nowhere into the real world” (502). Zinn calls for “acting out the beliefs that always moved us as humans but rarely as scholars” (508). If we act on these deep-seated convictions: We will be taking seriously for the ﬁrst time the words of the great poets and philosophers whom we love to quote but not to emulate. We will be doing this, not in the interest of the rich and powerful, or in behalf of our own careers, but for those who have never had a chance to read poetry or study philosophy, who so far have had to strive alone just to stay warm in the winter, to stay alive through the calls for war. (508)

His is a model worth emulating.

Case Study Summary Two intellectuals’ case studies are presented as models for our discipline’s examination of responsibility. They are presented not because of their race or gender, but because of this author’s connection to them, to their work, and to their validation of my deepest feelings about social responsibility and uses of scholarship. As stated earlier, Chomsky and Zinn are not the only existing models; there have always been those willing to risk their own jobs, reputations, and sometimes their lives, to fight against social injustice, regardless of their own race or gender. And it matters little that they were not all sociologists, for each illustrates social responsibility and a model exploring the topic. Recalling the intelligence and convictions of many historical figures, and their impact on a world-in-flux, is a study in humanity and morality. Eugene Debs, for example, the famous leader of the Socialist Party, went to prison in 1894 for organizing a railroad strike. Upton Sinclair’s muckraking resulted in social reform, improving standards within the meat industry. His classic book, The Jungle, was the impetus for increased awareness of the insufferable conditions meat-packers endured, compelling a

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reluctant public to side with humanity over inhumanity. John Steinbeck depicted the day-to-day struggle of so many Americans who were not only subjected to drought, poverty, and exploitation by wealthy land owners, but to the clubs of police when they fought for life’s basic necessities. The Grapes of Wrath demonstrates brilliantly the cruelty of a system that allows the bounty of this country to be given to those who already have more than their share of power, wealth, and leisure, all at the terrible burden of those working hardest to sustain themselves and their families. There are many other inspirations, including Mother Jones, who actively participated in union organizing into her eighties, risking jail sentences to speak words of encouragement to working class men. Rosa Luxemberg, W.E.B. DuBois, and Emma Goldman were all sensitive to issues of poverty and injustice, envisioning a truly democratic society without war, without hunger, without discrimination. Through their writings, teachings, and activism, each displayed social responsibility as the essence of humanity and critical consciousness Likewise, Martin Luther King Jr. thundered against the war in Vietnam, despite warnings from his advisors, despite illegal wire-tappings of the FBI, despite growing hostility toward him. From these activist figures is demonstrated the potential for individuals to generate social change. But also depicted is an understanding of social responsibility, for academicians and laypersons, that refuses to be stifled by institutional norms and prevailing narratives of inaction. As such, the examples provide a guide for reinventing sociology. While most readers will be familiar with Chomsky and Zinn’s work, as well as with the historical figures, rarely do these names surface within sociological texts and modes of discourse. These individuals are well known within academe. Yet despite their recognition, they are situated within the margins of our discipline and seldom emerge as models of dissent. Outside of the academy, many now-involved in grassroots movements may not be familiar with Chomsky and Zinn. These individuals, as well as future participants, would benefit from familiarizing themselves with Chomsky and Zinn. It is our responsibility, then, as intellectuals and as sociologists, to introduce these models for our students. The case studies are not conclusive – they do not offer a single answer. However, by positing a social responsibility, they liberate sociology from institutional restraints and transform our craft into a practice of humanity. And, if nothing else, Parenti (1995) is correct in claiming that “a dissenting

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ideology can free us from long established blind spots and awaken us to things overlooked by the established orthodoxy” (191).

New Directions for Sociology As sociologists, part of our responsibility to the discipline, as well as to society, is to recognize the wealth of ideas from which we may benefit, including those opposing our own or voiced by persons without institutional accreditation, members of the ASA, or holders of the holy Ph.D. This is a crucial step in creating inclusive discourse through which horizons are broadened, allowing a critical consciousness to be maintained and encouraged. If we are to practice freedom of thought and uncover the latent potential of our positions, then dissent must be viewed positively. Part of the latent potential will surface through a more robust discourse on the topic of responsibility to the discipline and to humanity; one that also welcomes input from the undervalued voices of students, part-time instructors, and non tenure-track professors. Another step includes forming bonds with other disciplines and modes of thought to renew our base of knowledge and maintain a healthy perspective of ourselves from an external view. Bonds should also be forged with activists who have much to offer through direct worldly experience. While we have busily created a comfortable niche for sociology in the social sciences, we have missed valuable opportunities to form unions with other academic disciplines, government agencies, and community oriented organizations. “Turf guarding” assists in defining our discipline, but the defining boundaries isolate sociologists, preventing crucial bonds needed for social theory to ripen into praxis. In broadening our discourse, through acceptance of dissenting views, to working closely with other disciplines, we must be mindful that true dialogue, as Freire (1970/1996) writes, cannot exist without critical thinking: . . . thinking which discerns an indivisible solidarity between the world and the people and admits of no dichotomy between them; thinking which perceives reality as process, as transformation, rather than as a static entity; thinking which does not separate itself from action, but constantly immerses itself in temporality without fear of the risks involved. (73)

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To think critically about our work is to keep open possibilities. In our writings, for example, particularly in professional journals, we find heavyladen, academic prose, largely inaccessible to laypersons. A critical review of our writing and of the journals themselves creates possibilities for change – in this case, an approach to professional work that maintains a grounding in humanity and keeps people external to the discipline involved, valuing their interpretations and input. Otherwise, we risk practicing alienating rhetoric and undermining sociology’s potential. As Lemert (1995) optimistically affirms, sociology is special; its potential is real and promising, particularly for those willing to use their sociological imagination. That is, sociologists must break the conventional mold provided and push the boundaries that define sociology. Acknowledging the hindrance of institutionalized thinking promotes a changed angle of vision – a rethinking of our connection and commitment to the social world. Whether adopting primary sources and non-mainstream texts for introductory classes, redefining the cannon of social theory, involving students in community service projects, writing clearly and accessibly, or accepting the role of personal convictions and activism within scholarship, including in tenure reviews, there is room to maneuver into new ways of thought and action. Finally, there is a wonderful burden that sociologists face, an awesome responsibility, one that places us in the nexus of activism and intellectualism; a burden and responsibility that allow and offer a chance to leave a healing mark on a wounded society. It is this point that we must consider and remember: Through teaching is the means to a better society. But the point is lost when humanity and responsibility are considered in terms of objectivity and neutrality, and when the interconnectedness between heightened consciousness and social intervention has been overshadowed by the social detachment of academia and by the business model of the ever-developing corporate university. We should embrace the ideals of those mentioned – from Sinclair to Chomsky, Mother Jones to Zinn – as well as those unnamed, including many sociologists whose activism paves the way for other practitioners, while remembering why many of us are sociologists: to make a difference, to teach with passion and compassion, to do research that is beneficial to our society, and to challenge conventional thought. We are obligated to do as much, and no less. Again, Chomsky:

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We must never forget that what we do is tainted and distorted, inevitably, by the awe of expertise that is induced by social institutions as one device for enforcing passivity and obedience. What we do as scientists, as scholars, as advocates, has consequences, just as our refusal to speak or act has deﬁnite consequences. We cannot escape this condition in a society based on concentration of power and privilege. There is a heavy responsibility that the scientist or scholar would not have to bear in a decent society, in which individuals would not relegate to authorities decisions over their lives or their beliefs. We may and should recommend the simple virtues: honesty and truthfulness, responsibility and concern. But to live by these precepts is often no simple matter. (1987a: 202)

This is an argument for hope and change. While no panacea is oﬀered, part of the remedy is through valuing the sociological imagination by engaging in work that transcends the current ideology of academia. Zinn tells us that education can, and should, be dangerous. Perhaps sociology can be the discipline of dissent in such troubled times. After all, we study the social world in which we are involved, as Bourdieu (1988) stresses. Through a discipline-oriented model embracing humanity and incorporating activism into the foundation of our mission, the potential and social promise of sociology can be recognized. Let us take Zinn’s advice and ﬁnally emulate those radical thinkers whom we love to quote.

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