Rethinking Stadium Typology by Chris Grosser

Rethinking Stadium Typology Social Responsibility in Stadium Design

Chris Grosser

Contents Social Responsibility in Stadium Design (2-3)

Background Information (4-31)

Only FIFA wins the World Cup (6-9) The Place of Soccer and the Stadium in Brazil (10-17) Brazil - Social Dynamics (18-25) Brazil - Protests (26-29)

Case Studies (32-67)

Athens 2004 (34-41) London 2012 (42-51) South Africa 2010 (52-55) VTB Arena Park, Moscow (56-61) Regeneration of a Formal Landfill (62-65)

Thesis Proposal - Rethinking Stadium Typology (68-71)

Appendix (72-91)

A - More Stadiums (74-81) B - Image Citations (82-87) C - Bibliography (88-91)

Social Responsibility in Stadium Design The stadium is a major component of social interaction in cultures all around the world, in both developed and developing nations. It is currently a place where people are able to come together to celebrate sport, see a show, congregate for self-expression, or some other similar social event. This means that the use is limited to a few hours a day and a few times a week. In developing nations with more scarce resources, hosting mega-events and building large stadiums is straining and compounds the dilemma further. There has to be a major shift in the way that stadiums are viewed, designed, and financed, allowing them to become more flexible. Is there potential for a new stadium typology that guarantees public use, keeping the stadium from being an economic bust and guaranteeing a social gain? Is it possible to create a stadium that can become its own micro community? Can a stadium become more of a public amenity to the city, instead of helping a very few to profit and only being used sparsely for a limited number of things? How can a developing nation host a world mega-event as well as provide meaningful, impactful projects long beyond the event duration? This document investigates stadium development and megaevent hosting in an attempt to better understand the economic and social ramifications, as well as beginning to rethink stadium typology.

Background â&#x20AC;&#x153;Rio de Janeiro is a mosaic of contradictions. Stunning and repulsive, accessible and forbidding, rich and poor, mountains and sea, refined and vulgar, obvious and hidden, exotic and common, tranquil and violent, lively and deadly - the list goes on.â&#x20AC;?1

Only FIFA wins the World Cup (6-9) The Place of Soccer and the Stadium in Brazil (10-17) Brazil - Social Dynamics (18-25) Brazil - Protests (26-29)

2.1 - Rio de Janeiro

2.1.1 - Announcement of Brazil Hosting the 2014 World Cup

Only FIFA Wins the World Cup “What wins you the bid is the promise to lay on lavish games to the greater glory of FIFA and the IOC, largely at the public expense.”2

Hosting a mega-event is a massive undertaking, involving years of planning and billions of dollars with no guarantee of any tangible profit. The international governing bodies for these competitions and events are the ones who really profit, not the host country. The commercial income that FIFA received from the 2010 World Cup in South Africa is estimated to be about 2.2 billion euro for TV rights, sponsorship, and merchandising, with only 800 million being spent on organizing the tournament and 700 million on local development projects.3 This then leaves a “non-profit” organization with a profit of 700 million euro, which they either retain for their own projects or disperse among other national football associations as a bargaining chip. The taxpayers were told that the projected costs for hosting the World Cup was 200 million euro, but the actual figure ended up around 3 billion, if not more. It is more common for the project to be over budget as opposed to actually being accurate. The organizers and FIFA had reassured the South African people that there will be an economic stimulus estimated at 4.8 billion euro, generating in excess of 300,000 additional foreign tourists.4 These types of claims, which are nothing more than empty promises that sound good to the people of the host nation, can be found at the beginning of any major hosting

event. In the case of the World Cup, this claim rests on two foundations: “first, that the building of stadiums and related infrastructure will boost the construction industry, with knock-on effects into the wider economy; second, that there will be a large influx of foreign visitors.”5 It is most certainly true that building things will boost the construction industry, but is building stadiums for a two week event the best use of resources for a developing nation? This is the real question. And the second point is that the tourism changes are negligible. There is a large influx of people to attend whatever the event may be, but it has been proven numerous times that other tourists actually avoid these host countries during the events so that they don’t have to deal with the large crowds, inflated prices, and circus type atmosphere that is the event. Germany as the host of the 2006 World Cup is a great example of this. In June of 2006, their hotel bookings as a nation increased by 1.4 million compared to the previous June, which sounds like a substantial influx of tourists until you look at the rest of the year, realizing that stays were significantly down in May and August and only slightly higher as a whole for the year.6 Another example is when Greece hosted the Olympics in 2004. There were 14 million visitors in 2003, and only 13 million in 2004.7 7

Only FIFA Wins the World Cup 8

2.1.2 - Sao Paulo Stadium Construction

When South Africa won the bid to host the 2010 World Cup visitor numbers were estimated as high as 600,000 during the time of the event, but in the spring before the event the number dropped to 375,000 and even that seemed like a high estimate.8 This was also evident during the ticket sales periods, and the World Cup itself, with games being played to half full stadiums in the early rounds.9 The situations are intriguing as they can be said to be comprised of inflated numbers, empty promises, and misleasing claims, all to persuade cities or countries to host these events. FIFA and the IOC have created a system where they want the biggest and the best, not wanting to give away their events cheaply, and the bids have to reflect that. If the politicians and the people bidding on the event are realistic, there is no hope of winning the ability to host the event. These events actually do have the potential to be self-funding, but then they may not be as lavish and the international organizations may not be able to exercise the same powers they do now.10 Another problematic part of all of this is that the international organizations such as FIFA and the IOC don’t have to pay taxes on the money they make.11 In a developing nation, resources are being used that may be arguably better valued somewhere else, so everything they can make back would help. The tax exemptions for Brazil in 2014 have been estimated at $250 million, but that could potentially double when it is all said and done.12 The IOC will have the same tax exemptions as well, so there is a lot of money not being filtered back into the system for the host countries.

FIFA Requirements for World Cup Stadiums FIFA has released the 60 page document that lays out the regulations for Brazil when hosting the 2014 World Cup. This document talks about the responsibilities of the host nation, from preparation all the way to fruition, including sections on responsibilities, eligibility, discipline, ticketing, venues, commercial rights, and much more. Under the Organizing Associations Responsibilities section, FIFA directly states that “the Organizing Association shall discharge FIFA from all responsibility and relinquish any claim against FIFA and the members of its delegation for any damages” and “the Organizing Association shall ensure that any decision taken by the FIFA Organizing Committee relating to its duties and responsibilities is enforced immediately.”13 This basically means that FIFA can mandate any change at any time, not have to pay for it, and not be held accountable. As far as the stadium design and choice goes, the FIFA recommendations can be summarized into eleven main categories: 2.1.3 - Cape Town Stadium Construction

1. Decisions before construction • Capacity: minimum 30,000 seats for international games, 50,000 seats for Confederations Cup Final, and 60,000 seats for a World Cup Final • Location: close proximity to parking, public transit, hotels, commercial centers, airport 2. Direction of the Field • Ideal North to South (can adapt to regional factors) 3. Security/Safety • Sectors like staircases, doors, and corridors are clearly marked and free from obstacles • Control room with panoramic view, surveillance cameras (both in and out) • First aid room 4. Car Parking • Supporters – 60,000 seat stadiums offer 10,000 parking spaces for cars, 500 for buses (ideally adjacent, but can be within 1.5 km) • VIP – private, inside stadium • Delegations – 2 reserved spots for buses, 8 for cars. Inside stadium, separate from public • Media – exclusive entrance • TV Compound – between 3,000-5,000 sm, adjacent to stadium, extra security, independent energy generation • Satellite Transmission Vehicles – adjacent to TV Compound • Emergency and Security Vehicles – adjacent to or inside stadium, allowing for rapid flow • Heliport – encouraged 5. The Playing Area • 105m long, 68m wide • Natural or synthetic grass (synthetic must pass tests) • Absence of barriers between stands and field, but presence of security, raising stands above field, or construction of moat may be required 6. Dressing Rooms and Access Routes • Players and officials have own entry • Home and away dressing rooms have 150 sm of equal comfort (recommend 4 units) • Offices of managers adjacent to dressing rooms (24 sm min) • Access tunnel at least 4m wide (6 is ideal) • Warm up rooms (100 sm, close to dressing rooms) 7. Comfort of the Spectators • Cover is required for places where there is a lot of sun, or a cold or wet climate • Seats shall be 47 cm wide, seat-backs 30 cm high (minimums) • 85 cm between backrests for ease of circulation

• •

VIP are centrally located and separated from general public Everyone shall have a “perfect” view of the field (no obstructions or blind spots) • All sectors have ramps for wheelchair use, adaptive bathrooms and support services 8. Hospitality • Correspond to the VIP sections • FIFA takes over this section during World Cup, commercializing the boxes and suites to individual groups, companies, sponsors, partners, and TV networks • Room for common use as well as boxes that can hold 10-20 people • Hospitality Villages required 9. Media • Press cabins – central location within stadium • Radio and TV cabins – central location, preferably undercover but not a closed location (at least 50 cabins, each holding at least 3 people) • TV studios – at least 3 TV studios (25 sm), easily accessible to players and managers (big international matches require 4 more, with a panoramic view of the field) • Media center – capacity based off press • Group press room – minimum 100 sm, 100 seats • Mixed area – between players changing room and exit (used for post-game interviews) • Flash interview positions – in between lockers and pitch 10. Energy and Lighting • Alternative energy generators for backup • Lighting shall provide quality TV transmission as well as avoiding being an inconvenience to players and spectators, and those who live in neighborhood 11. Green Goal (Sustainability) • Attempt to reduce co2 emissions at events • Focuses on four main points: water waste energy and transport14 These are a lot of factors to implement in the design of a stadium whose primary use is a two week long window. Similar types of systems/regulations exist for the Olympics as well. Since these types of benchmarks for stadiums are required and the public is footing the bill, can the stadium be rethought into something that is a much more supportive type space, a space that plays a major role for the community and general public all the time outside of sporting hours?

2.2.1 - Brazilian Fans

The Place of Soccer and the Stadium in Brazil “Soccer stadiums and informal soccer spaces dominate the sporting landscape of Rio de Janeiro. Soccer is everywhere: parks, favelas, clubs, streets, beaches. Every bar and restaurant shows soccer on television almost every day. Soccer is an unavoidable element of Brazilian life.”15

Since soccer is a vital part in the daily lives of Brazilians, the stadium becomes a central place in society. “The stadium is the apex of the soccer world and is where Brazilians ritually gather to celebrate, bemoan, and perform.”16 The stadium becomes the stage for not only sport but large scale interaction and demonstration as well. Stadiums in Latin America are often named after political leaders or prominent men that are associated with the club who owns the stadium, although most are better known by their nicknames (for example, the Estadio Journalista Mario Filho is known around the world as Maracana). Because of “the increased socioeconomic and spatial polarization of Brazilian society positioned stadiums and teams as vehicles for public expressions of discontent.”17 These public places have become the stage for protests, riots, and violence as people voice their disdain for the current situation. They have been the thing that fans use as a means of personal identification and memory. Stadiums have become a badge of urban distinction all across the world, and the stadiums in Rio de Janeiro are no different, with the pride of the people being Maracana Stadium. The stadium and club hold an important place in Brazilian culture and society. Each of the professional teams in Rio de Janeiro has a sporting club to go with it. Depending on the club, this can include other sports teams, sporting venues, large public support spaces, and much more. Ever since Brasilia became the capital city in 1960, Rio “suddenly lost political, economic, and

cultural influence. These losses, combined with an acceleration of rural to urban migration, overurbanizaion, and political instability, created a crisis of urban governance that is far from being resolved.”18 These social effects can be clearly seen with a great number of people living in the favelas and escalated public violence, but they can also be found in the sporting culture of Rio as well. Currently, the location of the club has everything to do with its ability to survive. If the club is well known and located in a better part of town they will often have larger, nicer, and more secure stadiums. They have the ability to offer other sporting amenities to club members such as swimming pools, tennis courts, shooting ranges, volleyball facilities, etc., and become a larger sports complex. These clubs boast their history, wealth, and tradition, can afford more talented players for their teams, and can gain fans from all over, not just the surrounding geographic location. If a club is located in a poorer area, the numbers of members has often become very low, they cannot afford to bring in and keep talented players, and they have facilities such as barely there grass fields, makeshift bleachers for fans, and often no lights. These smaller, less successful clubs do not have large numbers of members or economic stability, meaning that they invest less in their infrastructure and facilities, eliminate their services, cut payroll, don’t travel to tournaments, and ultimately lose the ability to be competitive with the larger clubs. All of these reasons help determine the success/failure of the club. 11

The Place of Soccer and the Stadium 12

2.2.3 - Stadium Places Diagram

In recent years there has been a shift in the scale of soccer in Brazil from that of the local to the national and international level, which has left “stadiums that once occupied a central position in a network of soccer spaces in the city marginalized.”19 Now that people are able to watch high quality games from all across the country and the world, people no longer need the stadium experience to catch a game. The accessibility of global soccer has had an impact on the overall quality of the Brazilian game at the local level: “as the explosion of cable television and global media accelerated the global reach of soccer in the 1990s (with the 1994 World Cup in the United States as an important moment), television revenues increased and wealth further concentrated in the hands of bigger 2.2.2 - Stages of Stadium Development Historically

2.2.4 - Stadium Scale Diagram

clubs in wealthy European leagues.â&#x20AC;?20 This has caused many nations, including Brazil, to outsource their best players and talent to foreign leagues because the money present is too great. This watering down of the league further hurts the smaller club teams; the larger clubs can still afford some good players, but the smaller clubs cannot compete. Since the average wage of a professional soccer player playing in Brazil is US$400 a month, and clubs are notorious for being several months late with paying salaries (using prompt payment as incentive for good performance), there is no real way for the local game to compete with the global scale.21 Because of this, the city of Rio is becoming littered with once popular stadiums that are now barely able to be maintained.

2.2.5 - Stadium Extensibility Diagram

Security Security is a major issue in the stadium. Many Brazilians in recent years prefer to watch games from their homes or at bars rather than run the risk of stadium violence. Forty-nine percent of stadium-goers say they do not bring their children to the stadium because of violence and forty-three percent say that their attendance at matches has diminished in recent years due to violence in and around the stadium.22 Fan violence is far too common. Not only is there violence between fans of opposing teams, there is also violence geared toward fellow supporters and the police in the stadium. The design of stadiums in Rio used to have specific sections called gerals, or standing sections. These sections allowed fans to not be confined to a single seat, and the tickets for 13

The Place of Soccer and the Stadium

World Cup Stadium in Rio - Maracana

“Maracana is the world’s most important (soccer) shrine, considered by many the spiritual home of world soccer.”25 For the many people who consider Brazil and Rio as the soccer capital of the world, the Estadio Journalista Mario Filho, more commonly known as Maracana, is the apex of the sport. It was at one point in time the largest soccer stadium in the world and has hosted the largest recorded stadium crowds, some as large as 200,000 for a game. The stadium is known for the passion, the history, the place: it is the biggest soccer stage in the most successful soccer nation. Maracana is owned by the Rio de Janeiro state government and maintained by SUDERJ. Since it is publicly owned, loved, and constantly worked on, it is a “heavily subsidized public works project, public space, private fiefdom, global icon, and cultural patrimony.”26 The stadium, which is a part of a larger sports complex, will be the host of seven World Cup matches in 2014, including the World Cup Final.

2.2.6 - Stadium Feeling Diagram

these sections were the cheapest in the stadium, allowing for anyone to attend and pack as many people in as possible. Since the fans are overcrowded and able to move freely, there is a far greater chance of confrontation. The gerals are located closest to the field of play, and often have to be separated from the field by a large concrete moat and military police to further hinder confrontation with the game. Because the stadium has become somewhat of a public forum where the people are able to congregate and express themselves as well as all of the fan violence, stadium architecture has had to adapt as well, becoming more militarized and uncomfortable. The Superintendency of Sports in Rio de Janeiro (SUDERJ) is the agency that operates all publicly owned stadiums in the state of Rio de Janeiro: this includes the Maracana Complex, Caio Martins in Niteroi, and the multiple stadiums constructed for the 2007 Pan American Games.23 Land that the SUDERJ stadium complexes occupy are exempt from taxation by the municipality of Rio, and they also have special provisions for criminal acts that are carried out in the stadium space.24 This helps to keep the stadium violence in check.

The complex that Maracana is a part of includes many other large sporting amenities. There is a 30,000 seat indoor arena, Olympic swimming facilities, and a 5000 capacity outdoor track and field facility, among other things. The complex averages 76 athletic competitions a year, and is also used for military training, public university examinations, school outings, and tourist visits.27 Even with other things going on in the complex, there is still a steady presence of the community lacking inside. As stated earlier, security in stadiums is a big problem, and Maracana is no different. During the renovations to the stadium, the geral was removed and every person attending an event is required to have a seat (this is also a FIFA requirement). Since the stadium is on SUDERJ land and there are special stadium provision laws, criminals can literally be dealt with in house. “In order to facilitate the detention and prosecution of unruly fans in the Maracana, SUDERJ built a judge’s chambers and jail within its walls. Thus fans can be arrested, arraigned, tried, and imprisoned under local, state, and national laws without leaving the stadium.”28 The renovations to bring the stadium to FIFA standards wrapped up just before the Confederations Cup in 2013, and the stadium was the site for both soccer and protest.

2.2.7 - Central Rio de Janeiro Diagram

2.2.8 - Maracana Complex Diagram

The Place of Soccer and the Stadium

World Cup Stadium in Manaus - Arena Amazonia

2.2.9 - Maracana Before Most Recent Renovations

Manaus is one of the host cities for the World Cup, a city in the middle of the rainforest. The production of Arena Amazonia has been plagued with issues, causing it to go millions over budget and be months behind schedule. The construction coordinator for the site said that â&#x20AC;&#x153;the Brazilian press compares us to a lot of other stadium constructions, but there is no comparison. There is nothing like this.â&#x20AC;?29 There is no other stadium being developed for the World Cup on a site like this in this type of time frame, but beyond that there has never been a FIFA stadium built in a rainforest. Some of these issues include figuring how to get the massive cranes and large stainless steel members to the site, a site that is surrounded by 2.1 million square miles of rainforest and poor, non-truck-accessible infrastructure.30 Almost all of the materials have had to be shipped from Portugal, taking 20 days to cross the Atlantic, and then even longer to navigate the Amazon and surrounding rivers to reach Manaus.31 Once the materials get there, they then have to be put together before the rainy season floods the entire construction site, a season that lasts from the end of November through March and often generates over 45 inches of rain.32 Because of the amount of time it took for materials to arrive as well as the incoming rainy season, a concrete prefabrication facility had to be built on-site to streamline the process. In some cases, multiple days have to be spent on soldering each joint because the intense humidity can cause the steel to fail.33 Even things such as the seat paint have created problems. What was meant to be a gradient of yellows, the seat paint has been melting off in the equatorial heat, leaving the seats an off-white.34 Crews of over 1400 people have been working day and night trying to make up some of the lost time, but between the design changes, weather, cost increases, and other miscellaneous delays, finishing on time seems like a stretch. The original stadium estimate for cost and completion was around $230 million and by July, but now it looks to be over $50 million over-budget and wonâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t be finished until December.35 FIFA has said that the four games the stadium will host for the World Cup will be moved if these newest deadlines cannot be met. Beyond the logistical issues of deciding to build one of the stadiums in the middle of the rainforest, this stadium like many of the others has raised questions about its post-event life. There was never a plan put in place for what the stadium could become post World Cup, and there no upper division teams in the region who could

2.2.10 - Maracana Stadium Renovation

successfully fill up the stadium. A recent Nacional game (one of the fourth division teams from the area) drew barely more than 1000 fans, a way smaller crowd than the 42,000 capacity of the new stadium that is required by FIFA.36 A recent proposal has suggested that the stadium could be converted into a prison, so there is no clear vision as to what this stadium can become.37 This poor planning and the severe juxtaposition of the rich and poor in the area have led many high profile people to speak out against the stadium spending (not just for Manaus but the whole country). Romario, a former Brazilian national team star and now a member of congress has been one of the biggest antagonists of the stadium developments, saying “the stadiums in Manaus, Cuiaba, and Natal – they are absurd. There will be a couple games there and then what, who will go? It is an absolute waste of time and money.”38 The counterpoint to this argument is that the Northern part of Brazil is the poorest, least developed part of the nation, so hosting the World Cup has given Brazil the opportunity to begin to develop a better infrastructure in the area and provide the people with some public amenities. There are currently around two million residents in Manaus, and the area is often used by tourists coming to and from the rainforest, so there is real potential for the area begin to develop.39 There is a growing economy in the area that includes electronics, chemical and oil companies, a ‘Free Economic Zone’ which can become an incentive to draw other outside industry into the area, and a landscape that is unique to this area of the world only. The World Cup provides the opportunity for the area to be exposed on the global stage. There is a growing number of youth and an untapped passion for football in the area. Filling the stadium after the World Cup is a big dream, but one that some people believe can be achieved. There is serious potential for the area as an urban development, but this over-budget stadium puts the question front and center as to how should public funding be spent.

2.2.11 - Arena Amazonia Construction

2.2.12 - Arena Amazonia Construction

2.3.1 - Juxtaposition of Rich and Poor

Brazil - Social Dynamics “Our people have a lot of reasons to be proud. We have today, a stable and growing economy. Within the past eight years, we elevated forty million Brazilians to the middle class. We are a country that promotes social inclusion, and that has in its ethnic, cultural, and religious diversity one of its biggest treasures. Because of that, today Brazil is admired for much more than its soccer, its music, and its popular parties. I invite people from all over the world to get to know Brazil better, and the Brazilian people. You will find a country that is very well prepared to host the World Cup with all the necessary infrastructure, with an efficient system of transportation, with advanced technology for communication, and with a lot of safety. We are doing our part for the World Cup of 2014 to be the best of all time. You can be sure that this new Brazil will be ready to enchant the world in 2014.”40

This was said by the Brazilian president, Dilma Rousseff, during one of her many public addresses since Brazil was chosen as the hosts of the World Cup. From this statement, it seems as if Brazil is well off, and ready to host the World Cup (and the Olympics as well). But is this really the case?

Favela Life “A map of Rio de Janeiro can be drawn showing its favelas, and this map will resemble a sea filled with islands large and small, a city with many smaller cities and overlapping sovereignties. This map could render the favelas not as a blind spot in the psychological and epistemic charting of the city but as places of spatial and urban consequence.”41

In all of the major metropolises of Brazil, you can find the formal city clearly defined, but next to it in a much more organic and informal community development are the favelas. The 2000 census defined a favela as a “subnormal agglomerate,” and to be one there had to be “more than 51 houses in an area and the majority of houses lack land title or official land documentation.”42 This is basically saying that the favelas are the slums and squatter settlements of Brazil, and the numbers of favelas are staggering. In Rio alone (according to the 2000 census) there were 811 different favelas, a number that has most likely risen since then.43 They are often found on the fringes of the city, in the harsher environments. But who is actually able to define what a favela is? Favelas are defined “as much culturally and aesthetically as they are legally or statistically.”44 They have become iconic in their own right, especially the favelas in Rio de Janeiro. Since Rio is so unique as far as topography goes, the favelas are even more noticeable: the main urban center is built on the low lying land by the beaches, but the favelas are built up into the massive hills that frame the city, put on display for all to see. 19

Brazil - Social Dynamics 20

Representation is a major issue for the people of the favelas. More often than not, they are treated as if they just don’t exist. The representation of the favelas on maps of Rio are often incomplete or misleading, sometimes just not including the settlements all together. Maps that do include the favelas “are produced based on government aerial photographs, not information gathered on the ground,” and if one visits the city planning department, they would find that “these documents are filed separately from the city’s official plans, which do not show the buildings and streets of the city’s favelas.”45 It is almost as if the city as a whole has tried to ignore their existence, not providing these areas with any sort of public infrastructure, support, or amenities. If you would look at these maps, it would be immediately apparent where the areas of favelas are: the main city would appear continuous and connected and the favelas would be the points of isolation, not only from the main city but from the other favelas as well. These maps would also show you that very few generalizations can be made as far as the scale of the favela, with some ranging from hundreds to hundreds of thousands of inhabitants.46 But once you get down on the ground and into them, you will more fully understand that no real generalizations can be made at all: they all have their own unique cultures, economies, residents, etc. This type of mindset for the city, one of negligence and oblivion toward the poorest and most isolated of citizens, is hindering for the development of the city as a whole.

2.3.2 - Favela Plan

2.3.3 - Favelas Built into the Harsh Landscape

According to a 1999 study, the unemployment rate for the people of the favelas is 18.6% (compared to 12.6% for Rio as a whole), 62% had not completed primary school (compared to 38% for Rio as a whole), and the average monthly wage is US$200.47 The people who live in Rio’s favelas are obviously at a disadvantage, not having any type of connection to infrastructure or any way of social or economic mobility. Because of the lack of integration to the rest of Rio de Janeiro, the favelas have to become their own informal communities. They have their own economies and jobs, an economy that is a completely separate entity from the rest of the city. A large majority of the “1.3 million favela residents make their living in large part through an enclosed, informal economy, which neither contributes nor benefits from the rest of Rio or Brazil’s economy.”48 Even with all of the issues that the favelas hold, they are growing at a much faster rate than the rest of the city. A study in 2001 showed that more than 20% of the population of Rio de Janeiro was living in the favelas, up from just 7% thirty years earlier, and a population that is increasing at 7.5% annually (compared to 2.7% for the rest of the city as a whole).49 There have been a few relocation attempts for the people put on by the government, but they have been so unsuccessful that

people often leave them abandoned and move back to the slums. One of the most well-known attempts was the ‘City of God’ (Cidade de Deus), a public housing project that was featured in a popular film. This film, which plot-wise is loosely based on real events, does a great job of accurately portraying the slum conditions, focusing on the culture of the favelas, the gang and drug violence, and becomes a very insightful tool for understanding favela mindset and lifestyle. An impactful quote from this film that accurately describes the situation of these people stuck in the favelas is “if you run, the beast will get you, but if you stay, the beast will eat you.”50 These communities are becoming a major issue that has been overlooked for too long. Safety is one of the major issues in Brazilian culture at the moment, mainly stemming from the gang violence and drug trafficking in the favelas. In Rio alone, there are over 6000 people killed each year, and in some favelas the number is as high as 100 per every 1000 inhabitants.51 Almost as unbelievable as this number is the number of people killed by police operations. About 1/6 of the annual violent deaths in Rio are caused by police officers.52 This is a staggeringly high numbers of homicides that lead people to question the choice of Rio as a host city for both the World Cup and the Olympics. Because of these safety concerns, Brazil has spent a good amount of money on new security measures for “pacifying” the favelas. The following in a summary of the pacification process from the article Financing, Ethics, and the Brazilian Olympics:

2.3.4 - Favela Cable Car

“The process of pacification is complicated and violent. From various interviews, here is a collected summary of the process. A favela is targeted and scheduled for pacification on a day unknown to the public. BOPE (Batalhao de Operacoes Policiais Especiais, a Special Forces group) invades the favela, usually in the very early morning around 5 a.m. This force has already mapped and targeted houses they are going to raid. Generally the most powerful drug traffickers live toward the top of the hill of the favela, and the BOPE begins there. In the early morning invasion the BOPE opens fire and usually kills a select group they believe are the most powerful traffickers of the area. The next few days are violent, full of gunfire and hundreds of police occupy and control the surrounding area. Citizens avoid leaving their homes, so they are not victim to stray bullets. The BOPE works day and night to arrest and clear the community of traffickers. Once they believe most are jailed, dead or have fled, then the UPP (Unidade de Policia Pacificadora) takes over to pacify the favela. The UPP works to maintain peace in the community to keep the pacified favela free of trafficking. The UPP works on a more personal level with the community to gain trust and enact social change. This type of police task force use favela citizens as UPP police. This method of policing is significantly different from a traditional force. The end goal is for favela citizens to enjoy community security without traffickers controlling the neighborhood.”53 2.3.5 - Density v. Income Deprivation

Brazil - Social Dynamics 22

2.3.6 - Favela Pacification

2.3.7 - Favela Pacification

2.3.8 - Favela Pacification

There have been a good number of favelas that have been pacified, but there are still a majority of them that need pacification before the World Cup and Olympics. Many of the people of Brazil are concerned about the actual intent of these programs and worry that the funding for them will stop after the World Cup and Olympics have passed. They can be interpreted as a means for cleaning up the image of the city of Rio and providing safety for the people attending the spectacle that is the mega-events instead of providing a more secure place to live for the people of the city. If the funding for these endeavors would stop, then the opportunity for the gangs and traffickers to come back and rule the favelas would be all too present.

Favela Rocinha Rocinha is one of the largest and most well-known favelas in Rio. It is located in between upscale neighborhoods, gated communities, and beaches, and perfectly portrays the juxtaposition of the hyper-rich and the hyper-poor in such close proximity. The population of Rocinha has been estimated anywhere from 60,000 to 150,000 residents, all packed together in an incredibly dense settlement on one of Rio’s many hills. It also may be the clearest example of a favela acting as a city within the larger city of Rio de Janeiro. There are fourteen distinct, differing “neighborhoods” in Rocinha, all differing dramatically in “density, width of streets, the quality and scale of housing, availability of infrastructural services, and general quality of life.”54 There is a social structure in place in Rocinha, similar to that of the urban Rio, where the more well off people are able to live closer to the main roads, have the off chance to be near some public amenity or infrastructure, and live lower down the hill in more accessible houses. The less well-off live farther away up the steep inclines of the hills, in lower material quality houses, and with no ease of access to the amenities of the surrounding city. Rocinha is unique because it has better access to jobs and more prosperous parts of the larger city of Rio than most of the other favelas.55 They also have become somewhat of a tourist destination, providing one of the most attractive views of Rio as well as a glimpse into the favela life. Because of its location, Rocinha’s real estate market is relatively strong compared to many of the other favelas but is nowhere near that of urban Rio. The favela has also been able to provide a commercial zone of its own with over 2000 establishments and such amenities as gyms, banks, a McDonalds, pet stores, and much more, but not comparable to any of the urban shopping centers.56 Although Rocinha is relatively developed and advanced for favela standards, the settlement is still rather isolated from the rest of urban Rio and acts as its own entity. It struggles with many of the same issues that the other favelas experience, such as “poverty, stigmatization, and drug wars.”57

2.3.9 - Favela Rocinha

2.3.10 - Favela Rocinha

Brazil - Social Dynamics

2.3.11 - Social Housing

2.3.12 - Social Housing

2.3.13 - Evictions

2.3.14 - Workers and Jobs

2.4.1 - Hundreds of thousands of protesters took to the streets during the Confederations Cup in 2013

Brazil - Protests “If this is the beginning of a revolution, it is a revolt of rising expectations.”58

The protests currently taking place in Brazil have been well documented since the summer of 2013. The scale of these protests is massive; they are the largest protests in the last twenty years in Brazil and are taking place in over 100 cities across the country. With more than one million people turning out in the first few weeks and the fact that they coincided with the Confederations Cup, they were given international attention. During the Confederations Cup, while matches were being played, people were protesting in the streets outside the stadiums. There was a police barricade (per FIFA regulations) set up to keep protesters out of the two kilometer “exclusion zone,” the zone that FIFA basically runs for the duration of the events.59 Police officers opened up nonlethal fire on the protesters to keep them back, trying to enforce the FIFA rules against the people “circulating in these areas.”60 As of two weeks of protests, four people had been killed, countless injured, and hundreds of thousands of dollars in damage had been done. The protests originally started when a small group of university students from Sao Paulo were protesting the increase in bus fares.61 These small and ineffective protests went on for about a week, but images of police brutality toward these students surfaced and the entire situation exploded.62 After that, people began to protest by the thousands, and the cause grew to much more than just the increase in bus fares. When asked what they were protesting for,

many in the crowds have replied “a better Brazil,” and the rallying cry has been “less corruption, more health, education, transport, and security.”63 The people who are protesting are those who have not benefited from the economic boom in the country, those who cannot afford to buy security, those who live day by day while others flourish: they are the middle class and the poor, the inconvenienced and the isolated. The lower middle class has expanded greatly in the past few years, jumping from 21% of the population in 2005 to more than 54% within only a few years.64 These are the people “at the mercy of a deteriorating public order,” those stuck in a violent society with a murder rate on par with drug-plagued Mexico, a deteriorating education system, and a corrupt government.65 These people are a majority of the country, and the real voice of the nation. But what might be the most shocking thing about all of it is that the Brazilians, potentially the most football-crazed nation in the world, were even protesting the World Cup. There is an abundance of public money being spent on new stadiums for both the World Cup and the Olympics, spending that the people see is unnecessary when what they think they really need are new schools, new hospitals, new infrastructure, and so on. Countless protester signs have been calling for FIFA approved (fill in the blank with social good) as a mockery of the high expense of a FIFA approved stadium.

2.4.2 - Protesters

Brazil - Protests

2.4.3 - Riot Police

2.4.4 - Protesters

Not only are they protesting spending on the World Cup, they were protesting some of the rules and regulations implemented by the international governing bodies. To make room for more VIP type seating and private boxes that are required by FIFA, some of the stadiums had to reduce their capacity during the renovations, in some instances by as much as 50%.66 Not only are less people able to go to games now, but ticket prices have increased dramatically as well. When Brazil last hosted the World Cup in 1950, Maracana was able to hold 200,000 people for the final; for the current World Cup, the capacity has dropped to only 74,000 in the very same stadium. Other ridiculous rules that FIFA has enacted are that fans cannot play drums or bring large flags, staples to attending a game in Brazilian culture, and only FIFA approved vending is allowed on site which effectively kills the income of many Brazilians in those areas. Some of the corruption previously mentioned even found its way into the Brazilian Football Confederation. The previous head, Ricardo Teixiera, and other major officials, the people who “won” the World Cup for Brazil, have all resigned under corruption allegations, and Teixiera is currently living “the tranquil life in a $7.4 million house in Miami.”67 There has also been a massive online presence for the protests. People have been using social media as a way to inform the rest of the world as to how the situation really is. A young filmmaker from Brazil has made two youtube videos, “No, I am not going to the World Cup” and “Yes, you can still go to the World Cup,” as a means of informing the rest of the world about the injustices occurring in Brazil. She states that hundreds of thousands of people are being evicted from their homes to build new sports facilities, millions are going hungry, many die waiting for medical treatment, corruption is still prevalent in the government, FIFA and the IOC as well as the wealthy are the ones making all the money the World Cup will bring, and a lot of the dirt is being pushed under the rug to show Brazil in a good light for the world.68 She says that “we do not need stadiums, we need education. We do not need Brazil to look better for the world, we need our people to have food and health. We do not need more parties, we need people with jobs and a sustainable way of living,” an opinion that is felt by all of the protesters and a majority of Brazilians.69 It is videos like this, as well as the millions of protesters who have taken to the streets, that have put the necessary pressure on Brazil to begin to investigate more change.

2.4.6 - “We Don’t Need the World Cup”

2.4.7 - “FIFA Go Home!”

2.4.8 - “We Need Money for Hospitals and Education”

2.4.9 - “Don’t Come to the World Cup”

2.4.10 - “Brazil Woke Up!”

2.4.11 - Protester outside of Maracana Stadium

Confederations Cup Protests

2.4.5 - “Leave FIFA”

2.4.12 - “Public Transport Cannot be Deprived!”

Background - Endnotes

Background Notes

1. Christopher Thomas Gaffney, Temples of the earthbound gods: stadiums in the cultural landscapes of Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires, Austin: University of Texas Press, 2008, 78. 2. Stefan Szymanski, “Only Fifa wins the World Cup,” New Statesman 139, no. 5008 (July 5, 2010): 28, Academic Search Elite, EBSCOhost (accessed September 11, 2013). 3. Ibid., 27. 4. Ibid., 27. 5. Ibid., 27. 6. Ibid., 28. 7. Ibid., 28. 8. Ibid., 28. 9. Ibid., 28. 10. Ibid., 28. 11. John Sinnott, “A fair World Cup deal for Brazil?” CNN, July 24, 2013, http://edition.cnn.com/2013/06/24/sport/football/ brazil-protests-fifa-tax/index.html. 12. Ibid. 13. FIFA, “Regulations: 2014 FIFA World Cup Brazil,” http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/tournament/competition/01/47/38/17/regulationsfwcbrazil2014_en.pdf. 14. Portal 2014, http://www.portal2014.org.br/ noticias/2350/KNOW+THE+FIFA+REQUIREMENTS+FOR+WORLD+CUP+STADIUMS.html. 15. Gaffney, Temples of the earthbound gods, 82. 16. Ibid., 82. 17. Ibid., 88. 18. Ibid., 87. 19. Ibid., 89. 20. Ibid., 87. 21. Ibid., 88. 22. Ibid., 115. 23. Ibid., 110. 24. Ibid., 110. 25. Ibid., 106. 26. Ibid., 108. 27. Ibid., 108. 28. Ibid., 111. 29. Sam Borden, “Not Just the Heat,” New York Times, September 25, 2013, sec. B. 30. Ibid. 31. Ibid.

32. Ibid. 33. Ibid. 34. Ibid. 35. Ibid. 36. Ibid. 37. Ibid. 38. Ibid. 39. Ibid. 40. Carla Dauden, No, I’m not going to the World Cup, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZApBgNQgKPU. 41. Daniela Fabricius, “Resisting Representation: The Informal Geographies of Rio de Janeiro,” Harvard Design Magazine 28, (April 2008): 6. 42. Erin Eleanor Sheridan, “Financing, Ethics, and the Brazilian Olympics,” Seven Pillars Institute for Global Finance and Ethics, http://sevenpillarsinstitute.org/case-studies/financing-ethics-and-the-brazilian-olympics. 43. Ibid. 44. Fabricius, “Resisting Representation,” 6. 45. Ibid., 6. 46. Ibid., 6. 47. Victoria Baena, “Favelas in the Spotlight,” Harvard International Review 33, no. 1 (Spring 2011): 35, Academic Search Elite, EBSCOhost (accessed September 11, 2013). 48. Ibid., 37. 49. Ibid., 35. 50. Cidade de Deus, Film, Directed by Walter Salles, Sao Paulo, Brazil: 02 Filmes: 2003. 51. Baena, “Favelas in the Spotlight,” 34-35. 52. Ibid., 35. 53. Sheridan, “Financing, Ethics, and the Brazilian Olympics” 54. Fabricius, “Resisting Representation,” 10. 55. Ibid., 10. 56. Ibid., 10. 57. Ibid., 10. 58. Isabel Hilton, “Football, Riches, and Protest,” New Statesman 142, no. 5164 (2013): 27, Academic Search Elite, EBSCOhost (accessed September 11, 2013). 59. Marina Amaral and Natalia Viana, “Brazil vs. the World Cup,” Nation, 297, no. 3/4 (July 2013): 8, Academic Search Elite, EBSCOhost (accessed September 11, 2013). 60. Ibid., 8. 61. Hilton, “Football, Riches, and Protest,” 22. 62. Ibid., 25.

63. Christopher Garman and Clifford Young, “Brazil’s protests are not just about the economy,” Reuters, http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/06/21/brazils-protests-are-not-just-about-the-economy/. 64. Garman and Young, “Brazil’s protests are not just about the economy” 65. Hilton, “Football, Riches, and Protest,” 25. 66. Amaral and Viana, “Brazil vs. the World Cup,” 8. 67. Ibid., 8. 68. Dauden, No, I’m not going to the World Cup 69. Ibid.

Case Studies â&#x20AC;&#x153;The Olympics are expensive and colossal by the nature of the concept and, consequently, functionally and visually demanding beyond most other urban design projects. The games are a short-lived presence that ignites an instant monumentality, and the overwhelming scale is bound to leave a vast range of facilities in constant need of maintenance. And even if the necessary resources are available, there will always be a longing after the great event that enabled these structures.â&#x20AC;?1

3.1 - Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park

Athens 2004 London 2012 South Africa 2010 VTB Arena Park, Moscow Regeneration of a Former Landfill

(34-41) (42-51) (52-55) (56-61) (62-65)

3.1.1 - 2004 Olympic Opening Ceremony

Athens 2004

Olympic Stadium - Santiago Calatrava

“In 2004 the Olympics will return to the place where they were born, where they were revived, and where they will be renewed. The ATHENS 2004 Olympic Games are more than an opportunity to participate in the greatest celebration of humanity. They are an opportunity to be a part of a story as old as history itself. And when it comes to making history, there is really no place like home.”2

Athens is often considered the poster child for failure in hosting the Olympics after their selection as the location for the summer games in 2004. Currently, 21 out of the total 22 venues that had to be produced to host the Olympics are abandoned, leading one to seriously rethink their choice to host the two week event.3 Beyond the poor stadium planning, many point to hosting the Olympics as one of the main reasons for their current economic struggles. The country was (and still is) in serious debt, almost having to renounce the euro after the economic crisis of 2008. Beyond the initial stadium costs, Greece has spent upwards of 500 million euro for the annual ‘maintenance’ for the empty stadiums.4 As one can see, something was seriously missed in the planning of the Greek Olympics, but what?

The Bid Athens developed very rapidly in the 1960s and 1970s because of an industrial boom, creating a mass migration of Greeks to the area. The city sprawled, and there was a good deal of illegal and unplanned urban fringe settling that took place. The city was in major need of infrastructure revitalization. Through bidding to host the Olympics, the country saw the opportunity to produce “a new face for Greece, outward looking and ready to take on the

challenges of globalization,” an opportunity that would allow them to compete in the world market for jobs and investment as well as solve the urban issues.5 The list of urban issues was great, including “atmospheric pollution, traffic congestion, noise, lack of parking, shortage of open space and new sports facilities, outmoded media facilities, and deficiencies in the public transport network.”6 Greece originally lost their bid to host the centennial Olympics in 1996, but decided to bid again for the 2004 games and won. The original estimated budget was $1.607 billion, which they hoped to recoup from TV rights, sponsorships, and donations. There was an additional $7.35 billion budget that was to be used for the infrastructure developments, such as the roads, airport construction, and landscaping. The bid claimed that 75% of the competition venues and 92% of the training facilities were existing facilities in the city already. After they were awarded the Olympics, a new team was put in charge of the planning the games; sporting venue locations changed (meaning more new stadiums, and some locations were pushed toward the outskirts, less ideal locations), and the timetable was quickly set back. Many of the 75% of existing venues needed serious renovation and new transport strategies had to be created to get to the new venues. This is why there was so much international worry as to if the projects required to host would even be completed by the Opening Ceremony; the Olympic Committee even threatening to move the games in the early 2000s.7 35

From the start, Greece was going to have a difficult time breaking even on the Olympics. As a general rule, the larger and more populated the host nation is, the easier it is to foot the bill. This is because there is often a larger national economy and likely more people paying taxes, etc. A smaller nation hosting just means more strain on the economy. When Greece was elected to host, they were the smallest nation to do so since Finland in 1952.8 Greece was also the unfortunate victim to being the first host nation after 9/11, so the actual security costs ended up quadrupling the initial estimates.9 The proposal for Athens’ city transformation was composed of three main parts: • •

Case Study - Athens 2004

•

The permanent structures such as sports facilities, transport infrastructure, city renovation, and arts infrastructure were designed to be the physical legacy for the city. The temporary facilities such as additional sporting facilities, visitor accommodation, and traffic movement would have specific design interventions to shape the look of the city in order to provide the festive Olympic atmosphere. The population was encouraged to volunteer and change behaviors such as littering and smoking to provide a better cultural and national image.10

One of the perks of hosting the Olympics, as previously stated many times, is the ability to quickly overhaul, update, and add to the urban setting and the infrastructure of the host city. Athens had very ambitious urban renewal goals, which included large parts of the city as well as the surrounding Attica region. Their efforts reaches as far as the cities of Thessaloniki, Patrai, Volos, and Herakleion.11 The scope of their undertaking is often seen as immense compared to many other host nations, and this partly has to do with their status as an up-and-coming nation. Along with the infrastructure overhaul, Greece was looking to “re-brand itself as a European city of commerce and tourism,” an important location for the development of new economic activity in the eastern Mediterranean.12 Athens tourism had dropped from 40% of arrivals in 1980 to 16% in the mid 1990’s, so the opportunity of re-branding and being broadcast to the world in such an immense way was one they couldn’t pass up. This could have been their opportunity to catapult onto the world stage, but with the poor post-event planning and the economic melt-down, the international image of Greece has suffered greatly. 3.1.2 - Environmental Assessment

The Stadiums Through hosting the Olympic Games, Greece wanted to reclaim the world attention, creating a new image of what they could represent in the twentyfirst century as well as portraying their history in a new, modern, and iconic way. Because of this, Santiago Calatrava was selected to be the head architect for the design of the Athens Olympic Sports Complex (AOSC) because of his iconic, sculptural style of design. The AOSC was an existing sports complex to the north of ‘metro’ Athens, a facility that was built about twenty years prior when Greece hosted the European Athletic Championships. Although it was mainly a renovation project, the scope was massive, it was incredibly costly, and Calatrava put his personal stamp on the design in a monumental way. The transformation was larger than anyone could have imagined. He reimagined the layout of the entire park, saying “the plan is classical, the elevations are Byzantine, and the spirit is Mediterranean.”13 There are references to the classic Greek theater, the Agora in the social, public spaces of the complex, the Stoa in the four entrances, as well as ‘the Agora pathway,’ an arching pedestrian pathway of monumental scale covered by 99 steel arches.14 His references to the Byzantine are through arches, columns, vaults that can be found all throughout the park and the stadiums. The Mediterranean feel comes from the color pallet chosen, using mainly whites with some blues and ochre, colors often found in the Mediterranean vernacular.15

3.1.3 - Agora Pathway

The stadiums located in the AOSC were garnished with Calatrava’s trademark design features, such as “spectacular hovering roofs held together by sophisticated cable systems, massive but slender-looking supporting columns, and predominantly white surfaces with a slick finish.”16 As soon as they were built, there was an ‘instant monumentality’ about them. William Curtis uses ‘instant monumentality’ as a way to “explain the characteristics and rhetorical effects of architecture of an overwhelming scale,” which perfectly describes the intent of Olympic facilities and their attempts to bolster an image and heighten the dramatic effect.17 The main Olympic Stadium in Athens was a 72,000 seat stadium for football and other athletics, a stadium that after the renovations captured the signature look that Greece was looking to portray to the world. Calatrava designed a two-leaf laminated glass and polycarbonate roof that was held up by two massive steel arches.18 Next to this stadium, the Velodrome that hosted the cycling events, has a similar feel and arching roof system, only much smaller. The other venues were scattered all around the city and region, many located on the outskirts or in poorer areas of town.

3.1.4 - Velodrome

The Real Legacy of the Athens Olympics Stadium Abandonment

Case Study - Athens 2004

Not even five years after hosting the Olympics, there were tons of images of abandoned stadiums and news stories describing the situation. A British journalist, after visiting Athens in 2009, is quoted as saying “a diving pool with four inches of stagnant water, brand new stadia mothballed and derelict, an Olympic complex all but abandoned and strewn with litter and graffiti – this is the legacy of the Athens Olympics in 2004.”19 What was initially seen as a great success as a hosted event quickly turned to the opposite. Huge amounts of money were spent on the venues and the AOSC, but almost all of them turned to wastelands, derelict architecture, and emptiness. The problem with these venues becoming ‘monuments’ or ‘icons,’ a way for people to gain a sense of place and significance from the games, was that they were all located far from actual tourist destinations and main tourist areas. When the games were over, there was nothing planned to happen in these facilities, and most were so far out of the way anyway that no one had any reason to be near them.

Criticism can be directed toward Calatrava’s style of architecture for the AOSC as well. The massive scale of the complex as a whole has left a space that post-Olympic events cannot ever fill, as reproducing the size of the events for the games is not achievable. Even when there is a sold out event at the stadium, the 70,000 people cannot cover the plazas the way that the fans and tourists did for the two weeks of the Olympics. The scale is too large, leaving a hollow, vacant monumentality for the park. The stadium designs do speak to Greek culture and history, but they are more about the personal style of Calatrava than anything else. The colors and materials used for Calatrava’s style require high maintenance, something they are not receiving, so “what used to be a spectrum of crisp white surfaces was in fact reduced to a garish mixture of green, brown, and grey shortly after the Olympics.”20 Instead of looking to the success of Barcelona and focusing on only a few key locations for venues, Greece employed the ‘scattered model’ in an attempt to “promote multi-nucleus urban regeneration and development.”21 The plan was to spread the benefits that would come from the Olympic investment around to include poorer neighborhoods and those lacking leisure facilities as well, but there was no strategic plan for what would happen after the Olympics. Because of this, Athens has abandoned and unkempt sports venues

scattered all across the city. When studying the spatial impacts of sports facilities, people “often use the term ‘topocide’ to describe places that for various reasons have been robbed of their place identity.”22 Since there is no longer an Olympic context in which to view these venues, they are no more than generic sports facilities with no program to ensure their use. So in other, more direct terms, they are a waste. There are only a few bright spots in the mass of failures for Greece as a host city. The infrastructure updates are seen as a relative success. The city of Athens was able to double the size of their underground rail network, as well as create a brand new rail and bus network.23 Many new motorways were implemented and many others were redeveloped, allowing for a smoother and greater traffic flow throughout the city. They also were able to build a completely new airport, completed in 2001, that services the entire Attica region and has annually ranked as one of Europe’s 30 busiest airports.24 Many of the city’s tourist destinations were revamped, and the atmospheric pollution that was a major issue in the late 1990’s has dramatically declined. These slight victories are at least some small consolation.

olympic village

main complex

3.1.5 - Olympic Venue Locations

3.1.6 - Olympic Venues in relation to municipal Athens/Tourist Destinations

to thessaloniki

to patras rafina

piraeus

3.1.7 - Olympic Venues in relation to Public Transportation

3.1.8 - Olympic Venues in relation to Population Density

Case Study - Athens 2004 40

3.1.9 - Athens Olympic Sports Complex

3.1.10 - Olympic Beach Volleyball Arena in 2012

3.1.11 - Olympic Swimming Facilities in 2012

3.1.12 - Olympic Swimming Facilities in 2012

3.1.13 - Athens Olympic Sports Complex in 2012

3.1.14 - Athens Olympic Sports Complex in 2012

3.1.15 - Olympic Training Pool in 2012

3.1.16 - Athens Olympic Sports Complex in 2012

3.1.17 - Olympic Field Hockey Venue in 2012

3.1.18 - Olympic Fountain in 2012

3.2.1 - Olympic Stadium Aerial

London 2012

Olympic Stadium - Populous

“From the moment London won the bid in July 2005 to host this summer’s Olympic Games, the organizers’ chief goal was to use the massive athletic and media event as a catalyst for economic and social change in East London – a gritty and long-overlooked section of the city. For planners, the Olympics was an opportunity to remake a zone full of contaminated industrial sites, transforming it with amenities such as a parkland, affordable housing, and improved public transport. As part of this strategy, the London Organizing Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic Games (LOCOG) mandated that the only permanent sports facilities that would be built were those for which there was a demonstrated long-term need. These would be designed so that they could easily shift from Olympics mode to community use. Other competition venues would be adaptable, or temporary in nature, with elements that are quickly demounted and the land freed for other uses.”25

Olympic Stadium_Populous The main Olympic Stadium, designed by Populous Architects, is a permanent feature of the Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park. The design of the stadium was driven by the “London 2012 Sustainability Plan” put forth by the Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA), “challenging architects to deliver facilities that would embody the spirit of the Games, create a lasting social, economic, and environmental legacy for the United Kingdom, and inspire change in the way that future events worldwide would be planned and built – all without compromising design.”26 The stadium was intended from the start to downsize after the event from the 80,000 seats of Olympic capacity to around 25,000 for a much more manageable post-event life. A dismantling on this scale had never been designed or successfully done before, and Populous was able to come up with a solution that was both cost-effective and sustainable. The lower bowl, consisting of the 25,000 permanent seats, was sunk into the ground, allowing the earth and reinforced concrete to become the structure for the permanent stadium instead of steel.27 The upper bowl then became a totally independent structure, 112 steel rakers, supporting the 55,000 temporary seats. These rakers were specified to be “standard, off-the-shelf wide-flange structural steel sections, which workers could bolt together easily and, after

the Games, dismantle and return to the market just as easily.”28 This allowed for optimal efficiency in construction, as well as helped keep cost and energy use during construction down. The roof, a PVC fabric canopy which was a late addition to the design, also has its own freestanding structure that would allow it to easily be dismantled. The canopy is supported by “3-inch-diameter steel cables drawn tight between an outer steel compression truss and an inner steel tension ring” to create the rigid structure, with the outer compression truss transferring the entire weight down to the concrete footings through the diagonal steel columns.29 The steel for the roof system was even acquired sustainably, using excess piping from a Russian Oil Pipeline that was able to be cut and welded on site. The two independent structural systems for the upper bowl and roof were differentiated visually as well: the pipe structure for the roof was painted white and the rakers and bowl supports were painted black. The concessions were pulled out from under the seating bowls and into temporary pods on the main pedestrian concourse, further allowing for the lightness of the stadium since there were reduced requirements for mechanical ventilation and fire suppression equipment.30 43

Because of the different design decisions and strategies described above, the stadium was able to be built using only 11,000 tons of structural steel, compared to 42,000 used on the Bird’s Nest.31 Populous was able to “embrace the temporary” to produce a successful stadium that provided the “immediate needs of the large Games stadium and a long term, small scale venue.”32 Their exploration has led to a new thinking or typology in stadium design that explores the idea of the stadium and architecture as a more sustainable and “temporary” practice.

Post-Olympics - What Is Actually Happening With the Stadium

Case Study - London 2012

Instead of the stadium fulfilling its “sustainable” post-event life and downsizing to a capacity of 25,000 seats like it was originally designed and intended to do, the London Legacy Development Corporation (LLDC) had decided to keep both the upper and lower bowls and look for bidders to operate the building as a multipurpose venue.33 The stadium has already been committed to the 2017 World Athletic Championships, an event that would require more seats than the reduced capacity of around 25,000 as originally intended. After hearing all of the bids and proposals, the LLDC decided to let the professional football club of West Ham United to use the stadium as their home facility. The fact that a majority of the stadium was designed to be dismantled and be reused has been forgotten. The team, which will move for the 2016-2017 season, has signed a 99-year lease that makes them the sole tenant of the Olympic Stadium, and the government is doing 25 million pounds worth of the football club’s proposed redevelopments to the stadium and site. The stadium that was going to be a public amenity in the Olympic Park after its Olympic life now has a use that is dictated by the football club, whose Vice Chairman said that the stadium was going to be transformed into a world class football stadium and that anything West Ham would always have top priority as far as events.34 The not even two-year-old stadium is now undergoing major renovations to prepare for its new football use. The stadium is being converted so that it has two distinct modes: athletics mode and football mode. Athletics mode is basically the stadium as it was for the Olympics, with the running track clearly visible from all four sides of the stadium. Football mode, on the other hand, is where the multi-million pound investment is evident. The lower bowl was modified to allow for the seats to move closer to the pitch. This automated system used drive motors to move the lower bowl seats closer, giving fans a “better view” of the game, but also allowing for

3.2.2 - Stadium Structure Diagram

the addition of bridge seats between the upper and lower levels to create a “kop” style seating section (a large continuous stand, often where the hardcore fans attend).35 When in football mode, the lower stands cover up the running track. Other additions to the stadium include multiple turnstile entrances around the stadium and concessions inside the stadium perimeter. Instead of the free flowing circulation of the Olympic stadium where people attending an event were scanned onto the premises and could move both in and out of the stadium, the new modifications keep people inside of the defined stadium and out of the park during events. More restrooms were added in the stadium as well and on the exterior they are building a new club shop and ticket office as well as a “community pitch,” a soccer field in the park that will help “expand the scale of all community projects.”36 The stadium was purposely scaled and designed with the idea of being temporary and lightness as driving factors, so now extra money is being spent to perfect the stadium for football mode and make it a permanent installation.

3.2.3 - Lightness of Stadium Structure

3.2.4 - “Athletics Mode”

3.2.5 - “Football Mode”

Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park - The Legacy of the Games

Case Study - London 2012

“At the end of the games, we have to rapidly unpack the site and turn it into a real piece of the city.”37

London took the opportunity of hosting the Olympics to not only provide the global athletics event, but to regenerate a large part of the city as well. The mantra for London’s Olympics as a whole was “legacy,” so thought was not only put into planning for the games but large scale strategic planning for post-event use as well. The site of the Olympic Park, located in East London, straddles four of the city’s poorest boroughs in the Lea River Valley, “far removed from the royal palaces and leafy residential squares of West London.”38 East London has historically been the city’s port, housing docks, shipbuilding, other service and industry, and the working class neighborhoods that supported them.39 This side of London has not developed as consistently as the west, and had become somewhat disjointed in terms of transport and infrastructure. The Olympics were seen as a way of kick starting development in this postindustrial area, providing new infrastructure and public amenities to the part of town that could most benefit. It is impossible to really look at the Olympic park as it was for the Games in 2012 without keeping the overall development in mind. This development was going to be the largest urban park and green space development project in the last century, so all of the plans will not come to fruition until 2030. The goal for the legacy was to create a new destination place in East London, a place that provided people the opportunity to live, work, and play all in the same new development.

Live

East Wick Chobham Manor Sweetwater Marshgate Wharf Pudding Mill 3.2.6 - New Neighborhood Locations

Space in and around the park was specially set aside for the development of five new neighborhoods: Chobham Manor, East Wick, Sweetwater, Marshgate Wharf, and Pudding Mill. In these neighborhoods, 70% of the available housing is family housing, which will allow younger families and children to further regenerate and re-energize East London and the park development.40 There will be 8000 new homes and living units built in these neighborhoods, which will be supported by a network of new schools, nurseries, health centers, and community spaces.41 These units are aiming to mix income levels together, with 35% being affordable housing and some being higher end as well. The first of the housing will

open by 2015, and it will all be completed by 2030. Beyond the new support development for the neighborhoods, Statford already is the home to the largest urban shopping center in Europe. The amenities provided in close proximity of the neighborhoods allow for the entire area to transform into a mixed-use development.

Work The East End of London has already been a â&#x20AC;&#x153;hotbed of investment and growth,â&#x20AC;? so the park development will only further encourage businesses to develop and thrive in the area.42 The north-west edge of the park will transform to become a new commercial district, providing upwards of 8000 new jobs.43 The ease of access and connectivity of the site and area to the rest of the city, as well as the increased public traffic to the area to visit the park (9.3 million visitors are expected per year, beyond the local use) will provide an environment that allows new business to flourish. There will also be an abundance of work inside of the park itself to support the countless venues, bars, retail, grounds management, and other park needs.

Play Even with the developments in housing and business, the Olympic Park is still intended to be a main destination, a park that serves the entire city. The key element of the park will still be sport even after the post-Olympic transformation is complete. Five of the venues are being kept and will allow for varying degrees of community use, as well as the implementation of some new recreational fields and facilities. The VeloPark will still be used as a cycling facility, but new facilities will be added allowing the community to rent bikes and bring their own for repair and encourage the active lifestyle that is embedded in the park. The Aquatics Center will have community swim sessions, and the Tennis and Hockey Center will continue hosting those community sports as well as five-a-side football.44 Beyond the sports venues themselves, there is an abundance of reclaimed waterways and open space still in the park. Childrenâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s playgrounds, gardens, climbing walls, bicycle trails, and much more can be found all throughout the park. There will be specific spaces that can host other large events such as concerts, festivals, temporary attractions, and art installations, all in the unique mixed-use development atmosphere.45

Not all Good News from London Initial news from London regarding the economic benefits of hosting the games are not looking too positive. A study done by Oxford University that will come out later this year is claiming that London was hit especially hard by the curse of the Olympics: cost overruns and under-delivery on promises 3.2.7 - Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park Plan - 2030

Case Study - London 2012

of economic transformation.46 More than $14 billion was spent on hosting the Olympics and the surrounding developments (the original number was $4 billion), and there has been no noticeable economic boosts for the surrounding businesses or the development to date, and unemployment is still an issue. Economists and Labor MPs have been quoted saying “the Government and the Mayor of London have failed to build an Olympic legacy to match the brilliant games” and “even just looking at the period of the Games, if you include the businesses that have been negatively affected and the people that leave the country to avoid the Games, there doesn’t seem to be any benefit.”47 Many businesses reported negligible or negative impact both during and after the Games. Many of those businesses and restaurants in the surrounding areas of the Olympic Park have actually folded, and the new office blocks and residential developments stand virtually empty.48

3.2.8 - Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park Location

3.2.9 - Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park Access

What London did right was to focus on not allowing the stadiums to become white elephants after the Games were over; each stadium had a specific post-Olympic plan or transformation attached to it before its conception. 257,000 out of the 745,000 seats at the 34 venues that were used were taken down after the Games were over, making London the most “temporary” host yet. But some people really question the legacy that this leaves as well, citing no legacy or an “empty legacy.” A lot of money is still spent on the temporary structures, but at least there are not lingering maintenance costs and empty stadiums. The main Olympic stadium has ended up bypassing the downsizing plan in favor of letting West Ham United use it as their home grounds, and the potential costs of the stadium conversion could end up being near $300 million. An economist made the comparison of hosting the Olympics to a wedding reception, saying “it’s a great party, but you’re not going to get back what you spend.”49

Olympic Park/Stadium Programming Analysis Proximity The location of a stadium is vital in the success of both the stadium and the surrounding area. The proximity to public transportation and other amenities is vital to guarantee use (if it could be used for more than organized sport). The main Olympic Stadium in London is no different. The location of the stadium is in Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park, on a diamond shaped natural island framed by existing waterways. The area is under rapid development, both from the Olympic legacy plan and outside investment. It seems as if the location of the Olympic stadium will guarantee constant use. The park development as described above as well as the new neighborhoods and businesses will mean that people will always be inhabiting the area. There is ease of access from all sides to get to the stadium, and a large plaza all around the stadium for easy circulation. As it was originally designed, the stadium was entered by people attending events by scanning in across the bridges, allowing people to inhabit the entire plaza surrounding the stadium and still technically be at the event. The proximity to the metro and other public transit lines is imperative, allowing for people from all over the city to have access to the stadium and the park without really going out of their way to get there. There will be nine different rail lines that serve the park and stadium as well as a Crossrail stop at Stratford Regional Station by 2017. Once all these lines are in place, 30% of Londonâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s stations will be accessible with a direct connection from the site.50 The site is also 20 minutes from the airport and a 30 minute drive to the M25, so it is very well connected to the rest of the city.

Program The program of the stadium itself is pretty straightforward. Populous streamlined the stadium, keeping only what was necessary and required. The main stadium support spaces were buried and the concessions and other vending were all moved to the exterior, allowing for the structure of the stadium to become incredibly light and airy. The only public support to be found inside the actual defined stadium are the restrooms, whose numbers were as minimal as possible and determined by the capacity. This lightness of the stadium was important because 3.2.10 - Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park Cycle Routes - 2030

in the original program, the stadium was to be disassembled from 80,000 to 25,000 seats and the lighter structure would be easily disassembled. The idea of pushing the concessions and other public amenities to the exterior of the stadium is an interesting idea with potential for other future applications. In this instance, it seems to have further activated the stadium and surrounding space, both during an event and outside of organized stadium use. If you could have people attending events in the stadium scan in and out, then other people in the community could inhabit the surrounding plazas and indirectly be a part of events as well.

Case Study - London 2012

Circulation

The circulation for the stadium is rather typical as far as stadium design goes. Once off the entry plaza and inside the defined stadium space, people are able to circulate around the entire stadium on the concourse under the upper level of seats, as well as move vertically with the stairs found throughout the concourse to get to seats. There is a clear divide between concourse level and stadium support levels. The stadium support levels have their own network of circulation not accessible to the public or by people attending an event. This network is vital in linking the field of play to the locker rooms and other service spaces, allowing for workers and security to bypass crowds, housing mechanical equipment and structure, storage, and much more. 3.2.11 - Stadium Entry/Circulation Diagram

Multi-Use Capability The stadium seems to be able to host other large scale events such as concerts and conventions, but it can never really become an extension of Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park. This means that use will always be as limited as the events that are held there. If the stadium began to take on a different formal quality or shape, something to allow people to literally circulate through the space while the stadium is not in use, or had some other type of program worked into it such as restaurants or retail, people could then inhabit it just as easily as the rest of the park all the time. The stadiumâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s location means that people will always be around, but right now in hours outside of events the stadium becomes nothing more than wasted space. As it sits at the moment, the stadium is a large amount of space that can only be used in a very limited manner and for a short amount of time. Uses are large events that benefit the people directly invested in the stadium and event can benefit the public when they happen, but is there a way to allow for the stadium to benefit the public all the time? 3.2.12 - Stadium Circulation Diagram

3.2.13 - Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park Circulation

3.2.14 - Potential Circulation

3.3.1 - Site Perspective

South Africa 2010 Moses Mabhida Stadium, Durban

“Although in most cases their architecture, at least during the planning stage, was regarded as costly, these buildings have come to represent unique and groundbreaking solutions to the search of new types of construction. The architecture gives way to a feeling of regional pride, inspiration, and identification. In every case, the design helps the building succeed in becoming a landmark and part of the memorable character of the cities, which in turn succeed in ‘getting their name on the world map.’”51

When South Africa was chosen to host the World Cup in 2010, they became the first African nation to host the cup and can be considered the first developing nation to host the event as well (in the context of recent times when the undertaking required serious resources). Even though South Africa is a relatively developed nation, they had to invest heavily in multiple areas other than stadium development as well. This is a big deal because the 3 billion euro (about) that South Africa has spent on the World Cup is 25% of their annual education budget: scarce resources are “being diverted from activities that have much greater value.”52 South Africa had planned to use 10 stadiums in 9 host cities for the duration of the World Cup, all having the minimum capacity of 40,000 seats that FIFA required.53 Five of these stadiums were renovated to meet the FIFA regulations, and the other five were newly built or replacing old stadiums. The original estimated expenditure on stadiums was about $280 million, but an in process total was around $1.6 billion.54 This may not seem like too much compared to other host nations (some recent hosts - Germany in 2006 spent $1.8 billion, in 2002 South Korea spent $2 billion and Japan spent $4 billion55), but factors such as the exchange rate differences need to be taken into consideration, the cost of materials and labor, the use of resources that could be used in more important ways, the plans for post-event use, the ability for the economy to

withstand the expenditures, and much more. Politics played a major role in the choice to build new stadiums and their locations across the country as well. The stadiums are distributed between the major metropolises and the coastal areas, which all make sense. But when stadium placement on the micro (city) level is examined, the locations begin to lead to some questions. For example, with Green Point, the stadium development in Cape Town, you can begin to see the political and social factors at work. The original plan was to upgrade an existing stadium for an estimated 150 million euro, a redevelopment that could have helped regenerate a poor area of town, triggering public-sector spending and providing a long-term facility for the football loving fans in the area.56 It is appropriate to also note, that the poorer Cape Flats area is majority blacks, whereas the stadium ended up being built in a more affluent part of town with mostly whites, many of which prefer rugby and cricket to football anyway. Because the new stadium would provide better TV shots and a better experience for tourists and visitors, FIFA and the South African government decided to move forward with that plan. There would have been some guaranteed use after the World Cup with the redevelopment plan, but instead, they decided to spend 400 million euro for a new stadium in a location where football wasn’t even appreciated just for a month-long experience.57

Case Study - South Africa 2010

Durban Analysis

3.3.2 - Site Plan

3.3.3 - Section Perspective

Durban is one of the largest cities in South Africa and is the second most important manufacturing city in the nation behind Johannesburg. The city also had one of the new stadiums built for the World Cup, Moses Mabhida Stadium, a 70,000 seat stadium that was the host to the one of the semifinal games.58 One of the goals with the stadium development was to produce a worthwhile and sustainable structure that could have a lasting impact after the Cup, but it remains to be seen if this was successful. The stadium was intended to be the seed for the development of the surrounding area, providing culture, commercial, and leisure activity as well as sport. To accomplish this, the city planners decided that the stadium should “express a statement that would stand for the city and the nation, showing respect for the local history and regional character,” and should “influence the motives of planners and their clients, affecting their decisions and shaping the patterns of development.”59 The thought is that then the stadium could potentially shape investor’s perceptions or even promote additional investment from other owners, government, etc. The stadium project became a part of a larger urban complex development, which included a plaza framed by the stadium, a smaller arena, and additional buildings which offered shopping, education, and leisure.60 It is hard to measure the impact of iconic architecture, but if nothing else, it can often generate civic pride or give an image that people equate to a city, often “putting the city on the map.” Perceptions of the stadium development according to the residents of Durban is mostly positive. In a survey given to the residents of the surrounding Durban area, 62% of people expected positive effects from the stadium development, 52% expressed interest in using the stadium, 74% expected positive business effects from the development, 64% expected their standard of living to increase, 66% expected the stadium to help provide a positive image as a tourist destination, and 88% thought the cost of living would increase.61 The people obviously had, and still have, high expectations for the development.

3.3.4 - Stadium Plan

3.3.5 - Perspective

3.3.6 - Interior Perspective

3.3.7 - Exterior Perspective

3.4.1 - Concept Sketch

VTB Arena Park

(designed by) Erick van Egeraat “After the announcement of our winning design the jury presented their ambition for the site, acknowledging that this was the only design that achieved all objectives whilst respecting the park and the monumental value. This challenging site embodies a great tradition which we must honor. It also holds all potential conflicts a city can offer. To resolve this, we proposed a design that embraces the history and context of the Dynamo stadium and the Petrovsky Park and creates a contemporary icon of the 21st century of which the people of Moscow can be proud. A project that will provide diversity to the area and reinforce its identity. Since its start in 1930 the FIFA World Cup will be held for the first time on Russian Federation soil. This opportunity can be regarded as a great venue for the growth of the nation and will further strengthen the confidence of the Russian people.”62

The VTB Arena Park is one of the largest redevelopment projects ever undertaken in Russia. An international design competition was held for the redevelopment of a stadium in metropolitan Moscow, and the winning design was that of Erick van Egeraat, a Dutch architect. His competition proposal began to dissect the stadium typology, working extra components into the design in a way that he thought could lead to a self-sustaining facility. Located in Petrovsky Park, the project looks to adopt and enhance the tradition of the park by combining sports, park, culture, and entertainment.63 The project centers around the redevelopment of the Dynamo Stadium, a soccer team in Moscow. The original stadium was inaugurated in 1928, and is perceived as an icon for the park. Because of this, Egeraat proposed that the main perimeter wall from the old stadium was to be preserved and the new stadium should be set inside of it, having a roof that majestically floats over the top. The project is now under design by MANICA Architecture, and the local partner is Speech Architects.64 Ground was broken in February of 2012, and the estimated completion date is in early 2017. The project is estimated at $1.5 billion, but the scope is much more than just a stadium redevelopment.65

The Program - ”all-under-one-roof” “Contemporary, multi-functional, urban regenerator, will play a key role in transforming its wider surroundings”66 The most unique thing about the VTB Arena Park is the diversity involved in the program. The larger stadium holds 33,000 fans regularly, but is expandable up to 45,000 seats. This is in part because of the requirements for hosting World Cup games, but also planning for future growth if necessary. These seats include 6,750 club level seats and 98 suite boxes, and there is a restaurant located in one of the stage ends of the stadium. The configurations allow for the stadium to host FIFA football, NFL American football, Rugby League, and Rugby Union all at the appropriate regulation sizes, as well as different concert configurations.67 The smaller indoor arena is able to hold 12,000 fans regularly, but is expandable up to 15,000 seats. There are 1,632 club seats in this arena with 82 suite boxes as well. Like the larger stadium, the arena provides the ability to have regulation size courts, and is able to host a range of events 57

EUROPAN 6 Competition Proposal

Case Study - Redevelopment of a Former Landfill 58

such as IIHL, NHL, and NBA games, Gymnastics events, concerts, and other various sporting events.68 This type of versatility can be found not only in the stadium and arena, but throughout the rest of the park as well.

3.4.2 - Site

3.4.3 - Public Green Zone

The stadium is located on a very centralized site, something that lends itself to guaranteeing the constant flow of people and use of the facilities and park. The site is in the vicinity of the city’s main infrastructure connections, and directly under the site is a major metro line stop. Along with the metro stop, there is an abundance of parking (structured parking for 1600 cars for retail/stadium/ arena development and 750 cars for the training facility).69 This allows for the project site to be a “transferium:” a place where the combination of retail, parking, and the metro come together to make a transportation hub.70 The above ground site then is maximized with green park space. The built interventions are limited to the new stadium (which is confined to the space previously occupied by the old one) and the training facility, which has an occupiable green roof. The training facility is both a public and private structure and offers a wide range of program, such as an indoor football practice facility, an indoor hockey training rink, indoor basketball training courts, an indoor gymnastics floor, indoor fencing and boxing training, places dedicated to spectator viewing, public amenities, and offices, medical, therapy, and storage areas to support all sport and training facilities.71 The idea for burying/confining program allows for the iconic park to remain a green retreat within the Moscow metropolis.72 Part of the development, city block “arena park” will be an urban development on neighboring blocks to further support the site and bring the “all-under-one-roof” concept to fruition. This city block part of the project is 13 buildings that host a range of functions such as offices, hotels, apartments, and conference centers. The lower levels in the buildings will be dedicated to street-level retail and entertainment.73 The versatility of the stadium is well documented, but the main thing that begins to set this stadium apart is the attempt at creating a financially self-sustaining model. The stadium is meant to host cultural events regularly in between sporting events, and the stadium complex has multiple levels of retail as well, located under the main stadium and arena. This allows for there to be a constant use for the stadium site and flow of people to and from. There will be between 50,000-60,000 square meters of leasable retail space. People who have already signed on to lease the space are luxury fashion retail, and other forms of entertainment including bars, restaurants, and clubs.74 The retail is all located directly over the metro line, something

3.4.4 - Multifunctional

that will increase/encourage site access for users from all over the city. Because of all these factors, the stadium becomes a destination place for an abundance of reasons. Even when there are not sporting events, hypothetically there will be constant use from all types of people. The “all-under-one-roof” concept is something that has never really been tried in a stadium before. In his competition proposal, Egeraat says that “the mix of sports, culture, and retail facilities creates profitable and vibrant activities 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year.”75 It will be interesting to see if this is the case.

3.4.6 - Upper Level Program Diagram

3.4.7 - Lower Level Program Diagram

3.4.5 - Site Location

3.4.8 - Gameday Checkpoints

EUROPAN 6 Competition Proposal

Case Study - Redevelopment of a Former Landfill 60

3.4.10 - Exterior Elevation

3.4.9 - Exterior Perspective

3.4.11 - Exterior Perspective

3.4.12 - Interior Perspective

3.4.13 - Section Axon

3.4.14 - Interior Perspective

3.4.15 - Retail Perspective

3.4.16 - Retail Perspective

3.5.1 - Perspective

Redevelopment of a Former Landfill EUROPAN 6 Competition Proposal

“We understand architecture as a reversible process, that due to its slowness, requires the capacity of anticipation and the use of a strategic thought, including the time dimension as a necessary project material.”76

This project proposal was the winning design for EUROPAN 6, an International Design Competition for young architects that looked into urban strategy and concept design. The idea behind this project was to create an experimental urban development on a former municipal landfill, allowing the former brownfield site to have a new use and life. In the proposal, a new topography is created to allow for soil improvements, a process that takes several years for the soil to be re-naturalized, rehabilitated, and consolidated.77 Because of the time that this process takes, it is possible to use the temporary feature of the project and site to your advantage and implement something beneficial for the community in the short term: in this proposal that is a series of multipurpose venues and communal spaces in a park setting. The driving force for the project is that “the architectural project is a plan to manage the built object’s life, so we are interested in architecture which is projected for construction and also dismantling.”78 This proposal breaks up the temporary landscape in the park into different size enclosure rings on which different temporary structures are built depending on the use of the enclosure ring. Some of the rings are residential and house communal green spaces while others are multipurpose venue oriented for housing fairs, concerts, and sports facilities and are linked to public service buildings.79 As the soil is rejuvenated, the site becomes an active public amenity, but when the process comes to fruition the site is easily dismantled and reused.

This is a park scale application, but it would be interesting to see if it would be feasible on a large stadium complex scale. The hosting of a mega-event could then allow for the host nation to pinpoint specific locations and sites that could benefit from soil regeneration or some sort of “re-greening” type project. The sites could become renewed and revitalized, providing the temporary structures required to put on the event as well as regeneration of the land for future alternative uses. What was once an abandoned or brownfield site could become the first truly green stadium during the games (literally an extension of the land in some way), which over time then develops into a site to best suit the city’s needs. Instead of building more massive stadium structures, this option still allows for countries to host large scale events, but in a way that can better benefit the general public after the fact. The time frame of hosting the mega event seems to work well with the idea of soil improvement from the proposal since they look to only occupy the site for a short period of time, artificially building a temporary landscape on the flat land “creating a new building level on which it is possible to build temporary structures.”80 With more and more waste being produced and dumped each year, there will be an abundance of sites that are similar to the one described in this project proposal: this provides the opportunity to take those sites and reinterpret them, allowing the architecture and strategic thought to help in the reversing process. 63

EUROPAN 6 Competition Proposal

Case Study - Redevelopment of a Former Landfill

3.5.2 - Site Plan

3.5.3 - Perspective

3.5.4 - Perspective

3.5.5 - Perspective

3.5.6 - Site-Life Diagrams

3.5.7 - Site Elevations

Case Studies - Endnotes

Case Study Notes

1. Even Smith Wergeland, “When Icons Crumble – The Troubled Legacy of Olympic Design,” Journal of Design History 25, no. 3 (2012): 315, JSTOR (accessed September 11, 2013). 2. John Robert Gold and Margaret M. Gold, Olympic Cities: City Agendas, Planning, and the World’s Games, 1896-2016, 2nd Ed., (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2011), 315. 3. Wergeland, “When Icons Crumble,” 304. 4. Ibid., 304. 5. Gold and Gold, Olympic Cities, 317. 6. Ibid., 319. 7. Ibid., 322. 8. Wergeland, “When Icons Crumble,” 305. 9. Ibid., 305. 10. Gold and Gold, Olympic Cities, 322. 11. “A Lasting Legacy for London?” London Assembly, http://www.uel.ac.uk/londoneast/research/documents/lasting-legacy.pdf. 12. Ibid. 13. Wergeland, “When Icons Crumble,” 308. 14. Ibid., 308. 15. Ibid., 309. 16. Ibid., 308. 17. Ibid., 306. 18. Gold and Gold, Olympic Cities, 323. 19. Wergeland, “When Icons Crumble,” 310. 20. Ibid., 314. 21. Gold and Gold, Olympic Cities, 322. 22. Wergeland, “When Icons Cumble,” 313. 23. “A Lasting Legacy for London?” London Assembly. 24. Athens International Airport, http://www.globalairportcities.com/page.cfm/Action=Exhib/ExhibID=4. 25. Joann Gonchar, “Wave of the Future: Designers Behind the London 2012 Summer Olympics Look Well Beyond the Games’ Closing Ceremonies. Creating Venues that can Adapt to Long-Term Needs,” Architectural Record 200, no. 6 (06, 2012): 92, Avery Index (accessed October 18, 2013). 26. Aaron Seward, “An Olympic Feat: Three New Stadiums for London’s 2012 Games Combine Structural Innovation with Sustainability to Ensure a Positive Legacy Long After the Torch Moves on,” Architect (Washington, D.C.) 101, no. 1 (01, 2012): 84, Avery Index (accessed October 18, 2013). 27. Ibid., 88.

28. Ibid., 88. 29. Ibid., 88. 30. Gonchar, “Wave of the Future,” 93. 31. Ibid., 92. 32. “London 2012 Olympic Stadium, London, UK: Populous,” A + U: Architecture and Urbanism no. 8 (08, 2012): 24, Avery Index (accessed October 18, 2013). 33. Gonchar, “Wave of the Future,” 93. 34. Karren Brady, An Olympic Stadium Presentation from the Vice Chairman, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9MdhT81QRQw. 35. Ibid. 36. Ibid. 37. Gonchar, “Wave of the Future,” 92. 38. Hattie Hartman, “Going for the Green: Can London Oust the Ghosts of Olympics Past and Find Ways to Reuse its Venues?” Architectural Record 200, no. 6 (06, 2012): 82, Avery Index (accessed October 18, 2013). 39. Ibid., 82. 40. London Legacy Development Corporation, http://www. londonlegacy.co.uk/. 41. Ibid. 42. Ibid. 43. Ibid. 44. Ibid. 45. Ibid. 46. Nico Hines, “Congrats Tokyo, Now Meet the Olympics Curse,” World News, The Daily Beast, http://www.thedailybeast. com/articles/2013/09/07/the-curse-of-the-olympics.html. 47. Ibid. 48. Ibid. 49. Ibid. 50. London Legacy Development Corporation, http://www. londonlegacy.co.uk/. 51. Wolfgang Maenning and Florian Schwartoff, “Stadiums and Regional Economic Development: International Experience and the Plans of Durban, South Africa,” Journal of Architectural and Planning Research 28, no. 1 (April 2011): 7, Avery Index to Architectural Periodicals (accessed September 11, 2013). 52. Szymanski, “Only Fifa wins the World Cup,” 28. 53. Maenning and Schwartoff, “Stadiums and Regional Economic Development,” 2. 54. Ibid., 3. 55. Ibid., 3. 56. Szymanski, “Only Fifa wins the World Cup,” 27.

57. Ibid., 27. 58. Maenning and Schwartoff, “Stadiums and Regional Economic Development,” 6. 59. Ibid., 6. 60. Ibid., 6. 61. Ibid., 9. 62. Erick van Egeraat, “VTB Arena, Moscow,” Designed by Erick van Egeraat. 63. Erick van Egeraat, “Erick van Egeraat’s winning design for VTB Arena Park (Dynamo Moscow Stadium),” http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cl0_dXGwvv4. 64. “VTB Stadium & Arena,” Manica Architecture, http://sbs2011. stadiumbusinesssummit.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/vtblaunch/VTBfactsandffigures.pdf. 65. Ibid. 66. van Egeraat, “VTB Arena, Moscow.” 67. “VTB Stadium & Arena,” Manica Architecture. 68. Ibid. 69. Ibid. 70. Erick van Egeraat, “VTB Arena, Moscow,” Designed by Erick van Egeraat. http://www.erickvanegeraat.com/static/projects/vtb_arena_moscow. htm. 71. “VTB Stadium & Arena.” Manica Architecture. 72. van Egeraat, “Erick van Egeraat’s winning design.” 73. “VTB Arena Park.” http://www.vtb-arena-park.ru/. 74. “VTB Stadium & Arena.” Manica Architecture. 75. van Egeraat, “VTB Arena, Moscow.” 76. Program Diagrams, Seoul, South Korea: DAMDI Publishing Co., 140. Print. 77. Ibid., 140. 78. Ibid., 140. 79. Ibid., 140. 80. Ibid., 140.

4.1.1 - Conceptual Stadium Sketch

Thesis Proposal Rethinking Stadium Typology

“Let us inquire the contemporary event space that is a stadium, its single purpose character, the periodical emptiness, and the schism between the endorser and the community.”

The people of Brazil have been protesting the abundance of stadium development because of the country hosting the World Cup in 2014 and the Olympics in 2016, insisting that the money could be spent to provide social amenities that better help the overall population. I want to take the critique of the nation into consideration and explore the opportunity of finding the medium between stadium and social enhancement. In rethinking the stadium typology, I want to achieve a space that basically moonlights as a stadium – a space that is used mainly because of different programmatic elements, but is still successfully used as a stadium when it is necessary (once or twice a week). This will ensure that the stadium development doesn’t become a white elephant project and a symbol of a short event and money wasted, instead becoming a worthwhile long term investment. During the protests, the people of Brazil have cited such social needs as new updated schools and hospitals, better public transportation opportunities, more assistance programs to provide food and healthcare to the poor, and much more. If the opportunity of hosting a mega-event such as the World Cup or Olympics where stadium development is necessary could also be an opportunity to fulfill other social needs, then the money could be better spent for the general public and ensure long term success.

The location of the stadium is vital for its success. The proximity businesses, residential zones, transportation, and much more is what determines the success or failure of the development. The accessibility of the site will be even more imperative with the added program that I am proposing to the stadium. Since there is such great disparity between the rich and the poor in Brazil as a whole as well as Rio de Janeiro, I want to explore the opportunity of making the added program an amenity for the lower classes, the people who have been protesting and are the most in need. There are a few options of what a stadium can become that I want to begin to explore. First I want to see if the stadium can successfully become a multiuse facility. Other than the typical stadium program, I want to incorporate a transportation hub directly into the stadium or site (or have one nearby), allowing access to a wider range of the community. There will also be another program incorporated to the stadium determined by the need of the community depending on the site. Based off the community critique this would be something like a school, hospital, new rethought business district, or other social program that caters mainly to the poorer communities in the city. The other piece to the proposal is the ability for part of the stadium development to be seen as temporary. Since the enormity of the stadium is often only needed for the very short time of the event, is it possible for part of the stadium to deconstruct after the fact, leaving a more manageable and sustainable development? 69

Site - Estadio Leonidas da Silva 70

4.1.2 - Site Location

4.1.3 - Site

4.1.4 - Favela Cable Car

The Site - Estadio Leonidas da Silva The site that I have chosen in Rio de Janeiro is an existing small stadium for the football club Bonuscesso and the surrounding blocks. The current stadium has a maximum capacity of 10,000, so to accommodate for the FIFA capacities as well as the expanded program, I will be using the next block over as well (see maps). The site is located near a large group of favelas and surrounded by businesses and middle class residential zones, so it is directly accessible by a large diverse group of people. There is also a large transportation hub near the site that has both above ground rail lines and a cable car that connects to the favelas, similar to the cable car system that Urban-Think Tank designed for Caracas. There is a major highway just to the south as well, so the site can be accessible by many modes of transportation and by people and from all over the city. Programmatically I think the stadium should incorporate a school based off of the site location. There is a hospital nearby, and even though it is run-down, it is still accessible to the community. I have not found a nearby school, so that is how I decided on it being the supplementary program. A major problem with the favela populations is the lack of access to education, so a new accessible school development makes sense. The field and stadium itself could form some sort of quad space or interior courtyard, allowing constant use by the students and surrounding community. Since the stadium would still be used by the school and Bonuscesso football club after the World Cup, part of the stadium has to be temporary, able to deconstruct to cut the capacity to a more reasonable and manageable number and providing more flexibility in the stadium development. There are also a decent amount of school related programmatic needs that can also be multi-use for the stadium, such as locker rooms, restrooms, larger event spaces, and much more. Also stadium hours are more often than not opposite of school hours which allows for no real issues upfront, and initially when the stadium is dedicated to World Cup use there wonâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t be any conflicts with school since it happens over the summer.

4.1.8 - Existing Stadium

4.1.9 - Existing Stadium

4.1.5 - Existing Transit Station

4.1.6 - Railway Connection

4.1.7 - Cable Car Connection

4.1.10 - Existing Neighborhood Conditions

4.1.11 - Existing Favela Conditions

Appendix

5.1 - Old Trafford Stadium, Manchester

A - More Stadiums (74-81) B - Image Citations (82-87) C - Bibliography (88-91) 73

Dorell.Ghotmeh.Tane Architects

Appendix A - Japan National Stadium Proposal 74

5.2 - Japan National Stadium Render

5.3 - Japan National Stadium Render

5.4 - Japan National Stadium Render

5.5 - Japan National Stadium Section

5.6 - Japan National Stadium Section

5.7 - Japan National Stadium Concept Diagram

5.8 - Japan National Stadium Exploded Axon

5.9 - Japan National Stadium Concept Diagram

5.13 - Japan National Stadium Render

5.15 - Japan National Stadium Render

5.14 - Japan National Stadium Render

Rock Stadium

5.12 - Rock Stadium Section

Japan - Zaha Hadid

5.11 - Rock Stadium Render

National Stadium

5.10 - Rock Stadium Render

5.16 - Japan National Stadium Render

Ethiopia - LAVA

Appendix A - Addis Ababa National Stadium 76

5.17 - Ethiopia Sports Complex

5.18 - Ethiopia National Stadium Render

5.19 - Ethiopia National Stadium Section

5.22 - Ethiopia National Stadium Exploded Axon

5.20 - Ethiopia National Stadium

5.22 - Ethiopia National Stadium Sports Complex

5.25 - Munich Olympic Stadium

5.27 - Munich Olympic Stadium Structure

5.26 - Munich Olympic Park

5.28 - Munich Olympic Stadium Structure

Indianapolis

Stadium Lofts

5.24 - Stadium Lofts

Munich Olympic Park

5.23 - Stadium Lofts

5.29 - Munich Olympic Park

Populous

Appendix A - 2014 Incheon Asian Games Stadium 78

5.30 - Incheon Stadium Render

5.31 - Incheon Stadium Render

5.32 - Incheon Stadium Render

5.33 - Incheon Stadium Plan Development

5.34 - Incheon Stadium Plan Development

Density

5.40 - Mixed-Use Stadium Development

Concept Stadiums

5.39 - Mixed-Use Stadium Development

5.38 - Stadium as Storm Shelter

Mixed-Use

5.37 - Stadium as Storm Shelter

5.36 - Stadium in Dense Development

Storm Shelter

5.35 - Stadium in Dense Development

Park Development

Appendix A - Concept Stadiums 80

5.41 - Stadium as a Park

5.43 - Stadium as a Park

5.45 - Stadium as a Park

5.46 - Stadium as a Park

5.42 - Stadium as a Park

5.44 - Stadium as a Park

5.47 - Stadium as a Park

5.51 - Mixed-Use Stadium Complex

5.53 - Mixed-Use Stadium Complex

5.49 - Mixed-Use Stadium Complex

5.52 - Mixed-Use Stadium Complex

5.54 - Mixed-Use Stadium Complex

5.50 - Mixed-Use Stadium Complex

Mixed-Use Stadium Complexes

5.48 - Mixed-Use Stadium Complex

5.55 - Mixed-Use Stadium Complex

Background Information

Fig 2.1 - http://www.lovethesepics.com/2011/04/christ-the-redeemer-statue-1-of-7-new-wonders-of-the-world-45-inspiring-pics/

Only FIFA Wins the World Cup

Fig 2.1.1 - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2014_FIFA_World_Cup_bids Fig 2.1.2 - http://worldcup-in-brazil.com/news/world-cup-host-city-news/world-cup-stadiums-progress-report-april-2013/ Fig 2.1.3 - http://blog.galetti.co.za/2013/04/sa-construction-firms-admit-to-bid-rigging/

Appendix B - Image Sources

The Place of Soccer and the Stadium in Brazil

Fig 2.2.1 - http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/americas/brazil/130618/5-signs-brazil-not-ready-the-world-cup Fig 2.2.2 - Temples of the Earthbound Gods Fig 2.2.3 - Temples of the Earthbound Gods Fig 2.2.4 - Temples of the Earthbound Gods Fig 2.2.5 - Temples of the Earthbound Gods Fig 2.2.6 - Temples of the Earthbound Gods Fig 2.2.7 - Temples of the Earthbound Gods Fig 2.2.8 - Temples of the Earthbound Gods Fig 2.2.9 - http://www.aztux.com/travel/page/Rio_de_Janeiro Fig 2.2.10 - http://blogs.independent.co.uk/2013/04/11/zero-dark-thirteen-brazilian-football-wallows-in-the-mire-of-corruption/ Fig 2.2.11 - http://rodrigomattos.blogosfera.uol.com.br/2013/10/11/copa-2014-tem-50-mais-procura-de-estrangeiros-do-que-africa/ Fig 2.2.12 - http://www.skyscrapercity.com/showthread.php?t=787064&page=14

Brazil - Social Dynamics

Fig 2.3.1 - http://evergreeninstitute.wordpress.com/2013/02/15/video-games-poop-and-south-america/ Fig 2.3.2 - Harvard Design Magazine - â&#x20AC;&#x153;Resisting Representationâ&#x20AC;? Fig 2.3.3 - http://www.ibtimes.com/why-rios-favelas-disappeared-google-maps-1185455 Fig 2.3.4 - http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/13/rio-de-janeiro-shanty-cable-car_n_3267245.html Fig 2.3.5 - http://citygeographics.org/2013/11/04/rio-de-janeiro-a-city-in-transformation/ Fig 2.3.6 - http://catcomm.org/asphalt-frontier/ Fig 2.3.7 - http://www.npr.org/blogs/parallels/2013/08/09/210313400/unease-in-sprawling-rio-slum-ahead-of-police-pacification Fig 2.3.8 - http://en-maktoob.news.yahoo.com/lightbox/world-cup-previews-brazil-goes-after-drug-traffickers-1383242394-slideshow/ rio-pacification-photo-1381157726380.html Fig 2.3.9 - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Favela Fig 2.3.10 - http://realriodejaneiro.com/2012/07/13/favela-tour/ Fig 2.3.11 - http://catcomm.org/asphalt-frontier/ Fig 2.3.12 - http://catcomm.org/asphalt-frontier/ Fig 2.3.13 - http://catcomm.org/asphalt-frontier/ Fig 2.3.14 - http://catcomm.org/asphalt-frontier/

Brazil - Protests

Fig 2.4.1 - http://o.canada.com/news/brazil-protests-videos-michel-de-souza-rio/ Fig 2.4.2 - http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/20/brazil-protests-continue_n_3473667.html Fig 2.4.3 - http://sourcefed.com/whats-happening-in-brazil/

Fig 2.4.4 - http://www.occupy.com/article/5-demands-brazil-million-marchers-across-country-say-its-not-about-20-cents Fig 2.4.5 - http://blogs.reuters.com/photographers-blog/2013/06/26/from-confederations-cup-to-demonstrations-cup/ Fig 2.4.6 - http://web.orange.co.uk/article/sports/protests_at_confederations_cup Fig 2.4.7 - http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?228192-Friday-s-FIX-of-PIX!!-June-28th-2013 Fig 2.4.8 - http://www.theatlanticcities.com/politics/2013/06/we-dont-need-world-cup-stark-photos-brazils-enormous-protests/5942/ Fig 2.4.9 - http://www.theatlanticcities.com/politics/2013/06/we-dont-need-world-cup-stark-photos-brazils-enormous-protests/5942/ Fig 2.4.10 - http://www.thedahliapages.com/2013/06/24/brazil-protests-in-images/ Fig 2.4.11 - http://www.businessinsider.com/where-guy-fawkes-masks-come-from-2013-7 Fig 2.4.12 - http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:2013_Brazilian_protests.jpg

Case Studies

Fig 3.1 - http://ozgo.co.uk/tag/olympics/

Athens 2004, Olympic Stadium - Santiago Calatrava

Fig 3.1.1 - http://www.dolphin-hellas.gr/athens-olympic-stadium/ Fig 3.1.2 - Olympic Cities Fig 3.1.3 - http://thefabweb.com/47436/30-best-architecture-pictures-of-the-week-june-21th-to-june-28th-2012/attachment/47464/ Fig 3.1.4 - http://kevrekidis.deviantart.com/art/ATHENS-2004-Olympic-Velodrome-60218783 Fig 3.1.5 - Map developed by Chris Grosser Fig 3.1.6 - Map developed by Chris Grosser Fig 3.1.7 - Map developed by Chris Grosser Fig 3.1.8 - Map developed by Chris Grosser Fig 3.1.9 - http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/IOTD/view.php?id=4739 Fig 3.1.10 - http://www.2oceansvibe.com/2012/08/22/shocking-images-of-2004-athens-olympics-venues-abandoned-today-gallery/ Fig 3.1.11 - http://architizer.com/blog/haunting-photos-of-athens-eight-years-after-the-olympics/ Fig 3.1.12 - http://architizer.com/blog/haunting-photos-of-athens-eight-years-after-the-olympics/ Fig 3.1.13 - http://architizer.com/blog/haunting-photos-of-athens-eight-years-after-the-olympics/ Fig 3.1.14 - http://architizer.com/blog/haunting-photos-of-athens-eight-years-after-the-olympics/ Fig 3.1.15 - http://www.2oceansvibe.com/2012/08/22/shocking-images-of-2004-athens-olympics-venues-abandoned-today-gallery/ Fig 3.1.16 - http://www.2oceansvibe.com/2012/08/22/shocking-images-of-2004-athens-olympics-venues-abandoned-today-gallery/ Fig 3.1.17 - http://www.2oceansvibe.com/2012/08/22/shocking-images-of-2004-athens-olympics-venues-abandoned-today-gallery/ Fig 3.1.18 - http://www.businessinsider.com/2004-athens-olympics-venues-abandoned-today-photos-2012-8

London 2012, Olympic Stadium - Populous

Fig 3.2.1 - http://www.rsvlts.com/2012/03/24/london-2012-olympic-stadium-picture/ Fig 3.2.2 - http://www.bdonline.co.uk/steel-structure-of-the-london-2012-olympic-stadium/5016252.article Fig 3.2.3 - http://www.detail-online.com/architecture/news/london-2012-olympic-stadium-019389.html Fig 3.2.4 - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9MdhT81QRQw Fig 3.2.5 - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9MdhT81QRQw Fig 3.2.6 - http://www.londonlegacy.co.uk/ Fig 3.2.7 - http://www.bdonline.co.uk/planning-application-submitted-for-olympic-park-legacy/5025611.article Fig 3.2.8 - http://www.londonlegacy.co.uk/ Fig 3.2.9 - http://www.londonlegacy.co.uk/ Fig 3.2.10 - http://www.londonlegacy.co.uk/ 83

Fig 3.2.11 - Diagram developed by Chris Grosser Fig 3.2.12 - Diagram developed by Chris Grosser Fig 3.2.13 - Diagram developed by Chris Grosser Fig 3.2.14 - Diagram developed by Chris Grosser

South Africa 2010, Moses Mabhida Stadium, Durban

Fig 3.3.1 - http://thedesigninspiration.com/articles/2010-fifa-world-cup-moses-mabhida-stadium/ Fig 3.3.2 - http://www.dezeen.com/2010/06/04/moses-mabhida-stadium-by-gmp-architekten/ Fig 3.3.3 - http://www.dezeen.com/2010/06/04/moses-mabhida-stadium-by-gmp-architekten/ Fig 3.3.4 - http://www.dezeen.com/2010/06/04/moses-mabhida-stadium-by-gmp-architekten/ Fig 3.3.5 - http://www1.durban.gov.za/durban/government/www.mosesmabhidastadium.co.za/moses Fig 3.3.6 - http://stadiumdb.com/stadiums/rsa/moses_mabhida_stadium Fig 3.3.7 - http://www.mmstadium.com/news/turbo-charged-top-gear/

Appendix B - Image Sources

VTB Arena Park, Moscow - (designed by) Erick van Egeraat

Fig 3.4.1 - http://www.bustler.net/index.php/article/erick_van_egeraat_wins_vtb_arena_park_in_moscow Fig 3.4.2 - http://www.bustler.net/index.php/article/erick_van_egeraat_wins_vtb_arena_park_in_moscow Fig 3.4.3 - http://www.erickvanegeraat.com/#/projects/vtb_arena_moscow Fig 3.4.4 - http://www.erickvanegeraat.com/#/projects/vtb_arena_moscow Fig 3.4.5 - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cl0_dXGwvv4 Fig 3.4.6 - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cl0_dXGwvv4 Fig 3.4.7 - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cl0_dXGwvv4 Fig 3.4.8 - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cl0_dXGwvv4 Fig 3.4.9 - http://www.bustler.net/index.php/article/erick_van_egeraat_wins_vtb_arena_park_in_moscow Fig 3.4.10 - http://www.bustler.net/index.php/article/erick_van_egeraat_wins_vtb_arena_park_in_moscow Fig 3.4.11 - http://www.stadiumguide.com/vtbarena/ Fig 3.4.12 - http://www.bustler.net/index.php/article/erick_van_egeraat_wins_vtb_arena_park_in_moscow Fig 3.4.13 - http://www.stadiumguide.com/vtbarena/ Fig 3.4.14 - http://www.bustler.net/index.php/article/erick_van_egeraat_wins_vtb_arena_park_in_moscow Fig 3.4.15 - http://www.bustler.net/index.php/article/erick_van_egeraat_wins_vtb_arena_park_in_moscow Fig 3.4.16 - http://www.bustler.net/index.php/article/erick_van_egeraat_wins_vtb_arena_park_in_moscow

Redevelopment of a Former Landfill, EUROPAN 6 Competition Proposal Fig 3.5.1 - http://ecosistemaurbano.com/portfolio/regeneration-of-a-former-landfill/ Fig 3.5.2 - http://ecosistemaurbano.com/portfolio/regeneration-of-a-former-landfill/ Fig 3.5.3 - http://ecosistemaurbano.com/portfolio/regeneration-of-a-former-landfill/ Fig 3.5.4 - http://ecosistemaurbano.com/portfolio/regeneration-of-a-former-landfill/ Fig 3.5.5 - http://ecosistemaurbano.com/portfolio/regeneration-of-a-former-landfill/ Fig 3.5.6 - http://ecosistemaurbano.com/portfolio/regeneration-of-a-former-landfill/ Fig 3.5.7 - http://ecosistemaurbano.com/portfolio/regeneration-of-a-former-landfill/

Thesis Project Proposal

Fig. 4.1.1 - http://vimeo.com/user9910673 Fig. 4.1.2 - Site Location Diagram developed by Chris Grosser

Fig. 4.1.3 - Site Diagram developed by Chris Grosser Fig. 4.1.4 - http://expatbrazil.co.uk/alemao-favela/ Fig. 4.1.5 - http://www.panoramio.com/photo/82368714 Fig. 4.1.6 - http://caltrain-hsr.blogspot.com/2011/10/meanwhile-in-rio.html Fig. 4.1.7 - http://noticias.band.uol.com.br/cidades/noticia/?id=100000429835 Fig. 4.1.8 - http://www.panoramio.com/photo/90595149 Fig. 4.1.9 - http://albertigues.blogspot.com/2012/01/flamengo-bonsucesso-viejos-conocidos.html Fig. 4.1.10 - http://farm7.staticflickr.com/6113/6849387094_679fb5f90b_z.jpg Fig. 4.1.11 - http://urbangeographies.tumblr.com/post/62902777436/land-tenure-and-urban-planning-in-rio-de-janeiros

Appendix

Fig. 5.1 - http://www.wallpaperage.com/old-trafford-stadium-sport.html Fig. 5.2 - http://www.designboom.com/architecture/dorell-ghotmeh-tane-kofun-stadium-competition-proposal/ Fig. 5.3 - http://www.designboom.com/architecture/dorell-ghotmeh-tane-kofun-stadium-competition-proposal/ Fig. 5.4 - http://www.designboom.com/architecture/dorell-ghotmeh-tane-kofun-stadium-competition-proposal/ Fig. 5.5 - http://www.designboom.com/architecture/dorell-ghotmeh-tane-kofun-stadium-competition-proposal/ Fig. 5.6 - http://www.designboom.com/architecture/dorell-ghotmeh-tane-kofun-stadium-competition-proposal/ Fig. 5.7 - http://www.designboom.com/architecture/dorell-ghotmeh-tane-kofun-stadium-competition-proposal/ Fig. 5.8 - http://www.designboom.com/architecture/dorell-ghotmeh-tane-kofun-stadium-competition-proposal/ Fig. 5.9 - http://www.designboom.com/architecture/dorell-ghotmeh-tane-kofun-stadium-competition-proposal/ Fig. 5.10 - http://www.designboom.com/architecture/mz-architects-rock-stadium/ Fig. 5.11 - http://www.designboom.com/architecture/mz-architects-rock-stadium/ Fig. 5.12 - http://www.designboom.com/architecture/mz-architects-rock-stadium/ Fig. 5.13 - http://www.dezeen.com/2013/09/10/tokyo-2020-olympics-to-centre-around-zaha-hadid-stadium/ Fig. 5.14 - http://www.designboom.com/architecture/zaha-hadid-new-national-stadium-of-japan-venue-for-tokyo-2020-olympics/ Fig. 5.15 - http://www.dezeen.com/2013/09/10/tokyo-2020-olympics-to-centre-around-zaha-hadid-stadium/ Fig. 5.16 - http://www.designboom.com/architecture/zaha-hadid-new-national-stadium-of-japan-venue-for-tokyo-2020-olympics/ Fig. 5.17 - http://www.designboom.com/architecture/lava-national-stadium-sports-village-in-addis-ababa-ethiopia/ Fig. 5.18 - http://www.designboom.com/architecture/lava-national-stadium-sports-village-in-addis-ababa-ethiopia/ Fig. 5.19 - http://www.designboom.com/architecture/lava-national-stadium-sports-village-in-addis-ababa-ethiopia/ Fig. 5.20 - http://www.designboom.com/architecture/lava-national-stadium-sports-village-in-addis-ababa-ethiopia/ Fig. 5.21 - http://www.designboom.com/architecture/lava-national-stadium-sports-village-in-addis-ababa-ethiopia/ Fig. 5.22 - http://www.designboom.com/architecture/lava-national-stadium-sports-village-in-addis-ababa-ethiopia/ Fig. 5.23 - http://www.coreredevelopment.com/ Fig. 5.24 - http://historicindianapolis.com/a-room-with-a-view-bush-stadium/ Fig. 5.25 - http://prabhasmyhero.blogspot.com/2012_01_01_archive.html Fig. 5.26 - http://www.munichphotos.com/maxvorstadt/munich-olympic-park Fig. 5.27 - http://hamlife.blogspot.com/2012/09/olympic-park-munich-and-elsewhere.html Fig. 5.28 - http://nocloudinthesky.wordpress.com/2013/01/24/philip-ball-biomaterials-and-spider-silk/ Fig. 5.29 - http://www.richardalois.com/europe/germany/munich-olympic-park Fig. 5.30 - http://www.bustler.net/index.php/article/2014_incheon_asian_games_main_stadium_design_competition_result/ Fig. 5.31 - http://www.bustler.net/index.php/article/2014_incheon_asian_games_main_stadium_design_competition_result/ Fig. 5.32 - http://www.bustler.net/index.php/article/2014_incheon_asian_games_main_stadium_design_competition_result/ Fig. 5.33 - http://www.bustler.net/index.php/article/2014_incheon_asian_games_main_stadium_design_competition_result/ 85

Appendix B - Image Sources 86

Fig. 5.34 - http://www.bustler.net/index.php/article/2014_incheon_asian_games_main_stadium_design_competition_result/ Fig. 5.35 - http://www.turkeysforlife.com/2013/08/fethiyespor-football-home-games-ptt1.html Fig. 5.36 - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Estadio_Hernando_Siles Fig. 5.37 - http://www.designboom.com/architecture/endo-shuhei-architect-institute-slowtecture-m/ Fig. 5.38 - http://www.designboom.com/architecture/endo-shuhei-architect-institute-slowtecture-m/ Fig. 5.39 - http://www.cleveland.com/business/index.ssf/2011/04/cleveland_browns_pitch_mixed-u.html Fig. 5.40 - http://www.cleveland.com/business/index.ssf/2011/04/cleveland_browns_pitch_mixed-u.html Fig. 5.41 - http://dbrds.wordpress.com/2011/03/07/east-village-stadium-masterplan-concept/ Fig. 5.42 - http://www.archello.com/en/project/park-stadium Fig. 5.43 - http://inhabitat.com/dalian-shide-stadium-a-new-approach-in-stadium-design/ Fig. 5.44 - http://inhabitat.com/dalian-shide-stadium-a-new-approach-in-stadium-design/ Fig. 5.45 - http://www.manicaarchitecture.com/projects/masterplan/11-workers-stadium Fig. 5.46 - http://inhabitat.com/rolling-green-roofed-sports-park-in-slovenia/sadar-vuga-architects-sports-park-stozice-slovenia-4-2/ Fig. 5.47 - http://www.aedas.com/Los-Angeles-NFL-Stadium Fig. 5.48 - http://www.designboom.com/architecture/duo-china-national-sports-group-jingzhou-sports-center/ Fig. 5.49 - http://www.liabocled.com/news/16.htm Fig. 5.50 - http://www.designboom.com/architecture/duo-china-national-sports-group-jingzhou-sports-center/ Fig. 5.51 - http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1811563-world-cup-2014-stunning-images-of-brazils-stadiums/page/2 Fig. 5.52 - http://www.bizjournals.com/kansascity/stories/2010/01/18/daily24.html?page=all Fig. 5.53 - http://www.archdaily.com/241366/ Fig. 5.54 - http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Daily/Issues/2011/05/26/Facilities/Baltimore-Arena.aspx Fig. 5.55 - http://www.skyscrapercity.com/showthread.php?t=263345&page=78

Bibliography “A Lasting Legacy for London?” London Assembly. http://www.uel.ac.uk/londoneast/research/documents/lasting-legacy.pdf. Amaral, Marina, and Natalia Viana. “Brazil vs. the World Cup.” Nation, 297, no. 3/4 (July 2013): 6-8. Academic Search Elite, EBSCOhost (accessed September 11, 2013). Athens International Airport. http://www.globalairportcities.com/page.cfm/Action=Exhib/ExhibID=4. Baena, Victoria. “Favelas in the Spotlight.” Harvard International Review 33, no. 1 (Spring 2011): 34-37. Academic Search Elite, EBSCOhost (accessed September 11, 2013). Billings, Stephen B., and J. Scott Holladay. 2012. “Should Cities Go For The Gold? The Long-Term Impacts of Hosting The Olympics.” Economic Inquiry 50, no. 3: 754-774. Acadamic Search Elite, EBSCOhost (accessed September 11, 2013). Borden, Sam. “Not Just the Heat.” New York Times, September 25, 2013, sec. B.

Appendix C - Bibliography

Brady, Karren. An Olympic Stadium Presentation from the Vice Chairman. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9MdhT81QRQw.

Brazilian Olympic Committee. Rio 2016. Rio 2016: Candidate City. <http://www.rio2016.com/sites/default/files/parceiros/candidature_file_ v1.pdf>. Brillembourg, Alfredo. “Urban Think-Tank.” Drury University. Hammons School of Architecture, Springfield, Missouri. 28 January 2013. Lecture. Brillembourg, Alfredo, and Marie Aquilino. Beyond Shelter: Architecture and Human Dignity. New York, NY: Metropolis Books, 2010. Burdett, Richard. The Endless City: The Urban Age Project by the London School of Economics and Deutsche Bank’s Alfred Herrhausen Society. London: Phaidon, 2007. Burdett, Richard, and Deyan Sudjic. Living in the Endless City: The Urban Age Project by the London School of Economics and Deutsche Bank’s Alfred Herrhausen Society. London: Phaidon Press Ltd, 2011. Carrion, Maria. 2013. “Brazil’s Poor Pay World Cup Penalty.” Progressive 77, no. 7:26. EBSCOhost (accessed September 11, 2013). Cidade de Deus. Film. Directed by Walter Salles. São Paulo, Brazil: O2 Filmes; 2003. Coates, Dennis and Humphreys, Brad R. “The Stadium Gambit and Local Economic Development.” Regulation Abstracts, Vol. 23, Issue 2, 2000. http://www.rebelavenger.com/sports/4.pdf. Cruz, Marcos, and Alexandre Lazarow. “Innovation in government: Brazil | McKinsey & Company.” McKinsey & Company | Home Page. <http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/public_sector/innovation_in_government_brazil>. Cruz, Teddy. “Estudio Teddy Cruz.” Drury University. Hammons School of Architecture, Springfield, Missouri. 12 November 2012. Lecture.

Dauden, Carla. No, I’m not going to the World Cup. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZApBgNQgKPU. Dauden, Carla. Yes, you can still go to the World Cup. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-8Zrxr8r-fY. Fabricius, Daniela. “Resisting Representation: The Informal Geographies of Rio de Janeiro.” Harvard Design Magazine 28, (April 2008): 4-17. FIFA. “Regulations: 2014 FIFA World Cup Brazil.” http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/tournament/competition/01/47/38/17/regulationsfwcbrazil2014_en.pdf. Gaffney, Christopher Thomas. “Hunting White Elephants / Caçando Elefantes Brancos.” Web log posts. Hunting White Elephants / Caçando Elefantes Brancos. <http://www.geostadia.com/>. Gaffney, Christopher Thomas. Temples of the earthbound gods: stadiums in the cultural landscapes of Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2008. Garman, Christopher and Clifford Young. “Brazil’s protests are not just about the economy.” Reuters. http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/06/21/brazilsprotests-are-not-just-about-the-economy/. Gold, John Robert, and Margaret M. Gold. Olympic cities: city agendas, planning and the world’s games, 1896-2016. 2nd ed. Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2011. Gonchar, Joann. “Wave of the Future: Designers Behind the London 2012 Summer Olympics Look Well Beyond the Games’ Closing Ceremonies. Creating Venues that can Adapt to Long-Term Needs.” Architectural Record 200, no. 6 (06, 2012): 92-96, 98, 100. Avery Index (accessed October 18, 2013). Hartman, Hattie. “Going for the Green: Can London Oust the Ghosts of Olympics Past and Find Ways to Reuse its Venues?” Architectural Record 200, no. 6 (06, 2012): 80-88. Avery Index (accessed October 18, 2013). Hilton, Isabel. “Football, riches and protest.” New Statesman 142, no. 5164 (2013): 22-27. Academic Search Elite, EBSCOhost (accessed September 11, 2013). Hines, Nico. “Congrats Tokyo, Now Meet the Olympics Curse.” World News. The Daily Beast. http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/09/07/the-curse-ofthe-olympics.html. “London 2012 Olympic Stadium, London, UK: Populous.” A + U: Architecture and Urbanism no. 8 (08, 2012): 22-27. Avery Index (accessed October 18, 2013). London Legacy Development Corporation. http://www.londonlegacy.co.uk/. Maennig, Wolfgang and Florian Schwarthoff. “Stadiums and Regional Economic Development: International Experience and the Plains of Durban, South Africa.” Journal of Architectural and Planning Research 28, no. 1 (04, 2011): 1-16. Avery Index to Architectural Periodicals (accessed September 11, 2013). Mayhew, Douglas, and Roberto J. Canallero. Inside the Favelas: Rio de Janeiro. New York: Glitterati Incorporated, 2012. Munoz, Francesc. “Olympic Urbanism and Olympic Villages: Planning Strategies in Olympic Host Cities, London 1908 to London 2012.” Sociological Review 54, (December 2, 2006): 175-187. SocINDEX with Full Text, EBSCOhost (accessed September 11, 2013). “New Projects: VTB Arena Park Development to Feature at the Stadium Business Summit 2012.” The Stadium Business Summit. http://www.stadiumbusinesssummit.com/new-projects-vtb-arena-park-development-to-feature-at-thestadiumbusiness-summit-2012/. 89

Perlman, Janice E. Favela: Four Decades of Living on the Edge in Rio de Janeiro. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. Portal 2014. http://www.portal2014.org.br/noticias/2350/KNOW+THE+FIFA+REQUIREMENTS+FOR+WORLD+CUP+STADIUMS.html. Program Diagrams. Seoul, South Korea: DAMDI Publishing Co., 140-147. Provoost, Michelle. The Stadium: The Architecture of Mass Sport. Rotterdam: NAi Publishers, 2000. Rich, Wilbur C.. The Economics and Politics of Sports Facilities. Westport, Conn.: Quorum Books, 2000. Santo, Charles. “The Economic Impact of Sports Stadiums: Recasting the Analysis in Context.” Journal of Urban Affairs 27, no. 2 (June 2005): 177-192. Academic Search Elite, EBSCOhost (accessed September 11, 2013).

Appendix C - Bibliography

Seward, Aaron. “An Olympic Feat: Three New Stadiums for London’s 2012 Games Combine Structural Innovation with Sustainability to Ensure a Positive Legacy Long After the Torch Moves on.” Architect (Washington, D.C.) 101, no. 1 (01, 2012): 84-94. Avery Index (accessed October 18, 2013).

Sheridan, Erin Eleanor. “Financing, Ethics, and the Brazilian Olympics.” Seven Pillars Institute for Global Finance and Ethics. http://sevenpillarsinstitute.org/case-studies/financing-ethics-and-the-brazilian-olympics. Sinclair, Cameron, and Kate Stohr. Design Like You Give A Damn: Architectural Responses To Humanitarian Crisis. London: Thames & Hudson, 2006. Sinnott, John. “A fair World Cup deal for Brazil?” CNN, July 24, 2013. http://edition.cnn.com/2013/06/24/sport/football/brazil-protests-fifa-tax/index.html. Slessor, Catherine. “World Cup development seems at odds with the inconvenient urban truth.” Architectural Review 228, (October 2010): 27. EBSCOhost (accessed September 11, 2013). Smith, Peter D. City: A Guidebook for the Urban Age. New York: Bloomsbury, 2012. Stohr, Kate, and Cameron Sinclair.Design Like You Give A Damn: Building Change From The Ground Up. New York: Abrams, 2012. Szymanski, Stefan. “Only Fifa wins the World Cup.” New Statesman 139, no. 5008 (July 5, 2010): 26-28. Academic Search Elite, EBSCOhost (accessed September 11, 2013). van Egeraat, Erick. “Erick van Egeraat’s winning design for VTB Arena Park (Dynamo Moscow Stadium).” http://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=Cl0_dXGwvv4. van Egeraat, Erick. “VTB Arena, Moscow.” Designed by Erick van Egeraat. http://www.erickvanegeraat.com/static/projects/vtb_arena_moscow.htm. “VTB Arena Park.” Manica Architecture. http://www.manicaarchitecture.com/projects/arena/6-vtb-arena-park.

“VTB Arena Park.” http://www.vtb-arena-park.ru/. “VTB Arena Park by Erick van Egeraat.” Dezeen Magazine. http://www.dezeen.com/2010/06/30/vtb-arena-park-by-erick-van-egeraat/. “VTB Stadium & Arena.” Manica Architecture. http://sbs2011.stadiumbusinesssummit.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/vtblaunch/VTBfactsandffigures.pdf. Wergeland, Even Smith. “When Icons Crumble – The Troubled Legacy of Olympic Design.” Journal of Design History 25, no. 3 (2012): 304-318. JSTOR (accessed September 11, 2013). Yapp, Robin. “Sport Goes Solar: Plans for a greener World Cup.” Renewable Energy World (March 3, 2012): 17. Science Reference Center, EBSCOhost (accessed September 11, 2013). Zimbalist, Andrew. “Brazil World Cup Olympics Finances - Brazilian Infrastructure Olympics and World Cup Impact.” Latin America Goes Global | Americas Quarterly. <http://www.americasquarterly.org/zimbalist>. Zirin, Dave. 2008. “Olympic Ruin.” Progressive, April. 12. EBSCOhost (accessed September 11, 2013)