Rivals to Olympus: America and Geopolitics in the Age of "Asymmetric" War by christofer smith

RIVALS TO OLYMPUS: AMERICA AND GEOPOLITICS IN THE AGE OF “ASYMMETRIC” WAR

by Christofer J. Smith

A thesis submitted to Johns Hopkins University in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Global Security Studies Baltimore, Maryland December 2013

Abstract Scholars’ inability to forecast which forms of military conflict will influence global security matters beyond the near term remains an obstacle to the United States’ geostrategic readiness. Many predicted peace between nation-states would characterize the post-Cold War world, but traditional wars in the era of nuclear weapons, economic interdependence, and powerful non-state actors have continued to occur. That even major, nuclear-armed states have participated in recent wars suggests many Realists and Liberalists failed to recognize an important aspect of the current security environment and its influence on geopolitics. This research therefore attempts to determine which facets of the current security environment allow for the outbreak of conventional warfare—especially those involving major, nuclear-armed powers—in an age otherwise said to represent the “asymmetric generation” of conflict. The research uses quantitative methods to compare the outbreak of various forms of warfare both prior to and since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which demonstrates the nature of warfare in the post-Cold War era is not statistically distinct from earlier periods. Contrary to recent theories, which posit non-state violence would replace traditional modes of warfare, the research proposes transnational terrorism actually has made possible the perennial occurrence of conventional, interstate war. Initial findings suggests terrorism is a necessary—but not sufficient—causal variable sustaining nations’ willingness to resort to traditional war. The research also tests these nations’ economic health as a second, interceding variable, but fails to arrive at a statistically viable model. Nevertheless, it remains reasonably certain terrorism since the conclusion of the Cold War has helped shape the geopolitical paradigm, which thus far has maintained the threat of traditional, interstate war. Yet, in addition to the persistent threat of conventional warfare, scholars may have overlooked a second form of state-centric conflict that threatens to degrade the United States’ geostrategic interests. Whereas the world’s most powerful states indeed are finding fewer reasons to engage in kinetic hostilities with each other, less powerful, “rogue” countries may represent the most credible threat to American global hegemony. For instance, the research suggests Iran—which has demonstrated its ability to strike at Western interests worldwide and thereby enforce its geopolitical will—could represent a significant

obstacle to American global hegemony, and the first to attempt the status of â&#x20AC;&#x153;asymmetric superpower.â&#x20AC;?

Reviewed by Mark Stout, PhD and Jennifer Bachner, PhD iii

Table of Contents List of Tables ................................................................................................................................. vii Chapter 1 | Introduction ................................................................................................................. 1 The Interstate Circus: Setting a Path for the Analysis of Military Affairs ............. 1 Military Analysis in the Post-Cold War Era: The Theoretical Context .................. 3 The Scope of this Research: Military Conflict and the Future of American National Security .................................................................................................... 4 Existing Theory: A New Generation of Warfare .................................................... 6 Asymmetric Warfare and the US Response............................................................ 8 Geostrategic Wildcard: The Limits of an Asymmetric Approach .......................... 9 Defining the Environment: What Makes the Geopolitical Security Paradigm? ... 10 The Systems-Level Approach: A New Starting Point .......................................... 11 Chapter 2 | Terrorism, the United States, and Interstate Conflict in the Post-Cold War World ..................................................................................................................................... 13 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 13 Literature Review ......................................................................................................... 15 Liberalism ............................................................................................................. 15 Realism ................................................................................................................. 17 The Expansion of 4th Generation War Theory: Filling the Need for a New Paradigm ............................................................................................................... 18 The influence of â&#x20AC;&#x153;New Terrorismâ&#x20AC;? ....................................................................... 20 An unsolved paradox ............................................................................................ 22 Hypothesis and Research Design .................................................................................. 24 Results ........................................................................................................................... 26 The Descriptive Case of Kosovo .......................................................................... 29 India and Pakistan: A Hard Test for Deterrence ................................................... 31 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 35 Chapter 3 | Terrorism, Economics, and the Casus Belli in Post-Cold War Geopolitics .............. 38 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 38

Does Terrorism Alone Cause War? The Search for a Reliable Model ................. 39 Literature Review ......................................................................................................... 40 An Elusive Paradigm: Realists’ Search for Rational Explanations for War ......... 40 Strategic Uncertainty: Preserving the Realist Tradition ....................................... 42 Theoretic Models Fail to Isolate Specific Indicators of War ................................ 43 Fighting for Territory: The Key Observable in the Recourse to War? ................. 43 Terrorism: Further Complicating Rationalist Explanations of War ..................... 44 Hypothesis and Research Design .................................................................................. 45 Results ........................................................................................................................... 46 Economy Uber Alles: The United States’ Exceptional Response to September 11 ............................................................................................................................... 47 The US in Yemen: How Target States Can Influence the Victim’s Response ..... 51 India: A Case for Territoriality ............................................................................. 53 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 54 Chapter 4 | Iran: the Asymmetric Superpower............................................................................... 56 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 56 Literature Review ......................................................................................................... 58 The Foundations of Hegemonic War .................................................................... 58 Into the Nuclear Age ............................................................................................. 59 Globalism and the Contemporary Alternatives..................................................... 60 Searching for a True Hegemonic Rival ................................................................ 63 Hypothesis and Research Design .................................................................................. 63 Results ........................................................................................................................... 65 Irreconcilable Adversaries: Iran and the United States......................................... 67 Western Envy: Iran’s Military Capabilities .......................................................... 69 Towards Isolation: Iranian Relationship with the World ...................................... 72 Iran: The Unexpected Superpower ....................................................................... 74 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 78 Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 80 Implications for International Relations Theory ................................................... 82 Recommendations ................................................................................................. 87

Prospects for Further Research ............................................................................. 92 Bibliography ................................................................................................................................... 94 Appendix A - List of Traditional, Interstate Wars and Generations of Warfare .............................. 97 Appendix B - Sample of Panel Data ............................................................................................ 101 Appendix C - State Natural Resource Value Scores ...................................................................... 104 Appendix D - Attributes of Interstate War Systems ................................................................... 111 Curriculum Vita ........................................................................................................................... 120

List of Tables Table 1-1. The Basis of 4the Generation War (4GW) Theory. Thomas X. Hammesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s framework represents the mainstream interpretation of 4GW theory. According to Hammes and other founders of the concept, asymmetric warfare characterizes the nature of 4GW. Included in the construct for asymmetric warfare are those violent confrontations between state- and non-state actors as depicted above, derived from The Sling and The Stone, T.X. Hammes. ................................................................................. 8 Table 2-1. Radical 4th Generation War (4GW) Construct. The theories of Martin Van Crevald represent the most radical form of 4GW theory. Combining 4GW theory with more traditional Realist and Liberalist views of the post-Cold War security environment, Van Crevald argues 4GW eventually will consist of largely non-state wars, military confrontations between non-state actors........................................................ 20 Table 2-2. The Traditional Distribution of Combat. The chart depicts the distribution of the cumulative number of years various geopolitical entities participated in the recognized forms of warfare prior to the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union. The statistics demonstrate asymmetric forms of warfare (depicted as subdued) traditionally are the most prevalent type of militarized conflict. Derived from data available through the Correlates of War Project. .......................................................................................... 22 Table 2-3. The Distribution of Combat in the Post-Cold War Era. The chart depicts the distribution of the number of years various geopolitical entities participated in the recognized forms of warfare since the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union, which the research considers the beginning of the post-Cold War era. Contrary to predictions that interstate warfare would prove obsolete, states have engaged in a notable portion of the recognized forms of warfare in the post-Cold War environment. Derived from data available through the Correlates of War Project. ....................................................... 23 Table 2-4. Comparing the rate of interstate war prior to and since the conclusion of the Cold War. Analysis demonstrates the pace of interstate war has not significantly changed at the end of the Cold War. Derived from the Correlates of War Project ........... 23 Table 2-5. The Effects of Military Capabilities on Interstate War, 1816-1989 . The top row represents the independent variables used in the analysis. CINC referrers to the

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value of a country’s absolute military capabilities, Resource Value refers to the country’s comparative natural resource wealth, and Contiguity refers to the number of borders a country shares with other states. The values within the chart represent the coefficient, or the particular variables’ effects on the probability of Interstate war. Derived from The Correlates of War Project. ................................................................................................ 27 Table 2-6. The Effects of Military Capabilities on Interstate War, 1990-2007. This table repeats the statistical analysis used in table 2-4, but using data from only the post-Cold War era. Derived from The Correlates of War Project. ..................................................... 28 Table 2-7. The Effects of Terrorism on Interstate War, 1990-2007. The top row represents the independent variables used in the analysis. Casualties referrers the value of a country’s absolute military capabilities, Resource Value refers to the country’s comparative natural resource wealth, and Contiguity refers to the number of borders a country shares with other states. The values within the chart represent the coefficient, or the particular variables’ effects on the probability of Interstate war. Derived from The Correlates of War Project and RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents ..... 28 Table 3-1. The Effects of Terrorism and Countries’ Economic Status on Interstate War, 1991-2007: The top row represents the independent variables used in the analysis. Fatalities referrers to the number of fatalities countries suffered due to terrorist attacks, Pos. GDP represents a binary variable in which 1 = states’ GDP keeps pace with inflation. The values within the chart represent the variables’ coefficient, their statistical effect on the probability of Interstate war. Derived from The Correlates of War Project and RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents ............................................................ 46 Table 4-1. Comparison of Initiator and Non-Initiator sides in interstate war systems. Quantitative analysis demonstrates initiators of traditional, interstate wars generally have possessed greater military capabilities (CINC) than their opponents, at the 5% significance level. Statistics derived from The Correlates of War Project. .......................... 65 Table 4-2. CINC disparities of interstate war systems involving superpowers, before and after the Cold War. Quantitative analysis demonstrates the disparity in military capabilities (CINC) between opponents in interstate wars involving super power nations has increased since the conclusion of the Cold War, at the 5% significance level. Statistics derived from The Correlates of War Project. ...................................................... 66

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Table 5-1. Annual rate of militarized international disputes between the US and revisionist states. The data suggests the US since the conclusion of World War II has faced a constant threat of conflict from revisionist states, derived from the Correlates of War Project................................................................................................................... 91

Chapter 1 | Introduction

The Interstate Circus: Setting a Path for the Analysis of Military Affairs In mid-February 2013, The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization—an international “watchdog” commission established to monitor the globe for atomic weapons activity—detected a probable nuclear test explosion within the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea).1 With uncharacteristic speed and resolve, the United Nations (UN) struck back with support from even North Korea’s closest remaining allies, imposing upon the country additional anti-nuclear sanctions. Yet, these measures did little to defuse an increasingly provocative North Korea, whose newly ascended, untested Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un then declared the United States (US) his nuclear target.2 Into the drama of a US-North Korea nuclear standoff—which at its heights included US bombers conducting “show-of force” flights along the Korean peninsula and Kim Jongun photographed alongside charts labeled “US Mainland Strike Plan”—enter Dennis Rodman.3 Without approval of the US government, the National Basketball Association hall of fame member and pop culture firebrand in late February 2013 traveled to North Korea for a cultural visit, which included accompanying Kim Jong-un to an exhibition basketball game.4 Following his return, Rodman donned a dollar-bill festooned sports jacket and purple

Annika Thunborg, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization Spokesperson and Chief, Public Information, “On The CTBTO’s Detection in North Korea,” (February 12, 2013), available at: http://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/press-releases/2013/on-the-ctbtos-detection-in-north-korea/ Accessed: April 22, 2013 2 David E. Saner, and Choe Sang-Hun, “North Korea Issues Blunt New Threat to United States,” The New York Times, January 24th, 2013 3 Julian Ryall, “North Korea Plan to Attack US Mainland Revealed in Photographs”, UK Telegraph, March 29th, 2013 4 Daniel Halper, ”Dennis Rodman Diplomacy: North Korea Gets All Belligerent”, The Weekly Standard, March 29th 2013 1

scarf to deliver via a nationally broadcasted interview the Supreme Leader’s personal intimation: “I don’t want to do war.”5 To date, tensions on the Korean peninsula remain high, but the North has yet to fulfill its threat of a preventative military strike against the US, leading some analysts to question the sincerity of Kim Jong-un’s belligerent rhetoric.6 As RAND analyst Bruce W. Bennett describes, “the North Korean leadership culture requires the appearance of empowerment, and what besides missiles and nuclear weapons does the…regime have that suggests they are empowered?”7 To Bennett and other analysts, Kim Jong-un’s nuclear rhetoric indicates an effort to solidify domestic order, not a credible threat to the country’s overseas adversaries. In fact—if the case of North Korea is any indication—the potential for violence between states increasingly is assuming the role of international theatre, rather than credible military threat. Yet, the episode explains why scholars at the cutting edge of military analysis are becoming less concerned with conflicts between states, and are turning instead to those involving non-state actors. Despite occasions of volatile rhetoric and well-documented grievances, regimes interested in their own prosperity now seem unlikely to engage in largescale, traditional military conflict with each other. Therefore, if rival nations are increasingly less likely to provoke America into actually engaging in conventional warfare, what types of conflict should the US most expect to face in the future? For a school of analysts that since the end of the Cold War have played an increasingly influential role, the answer is asymmetric war, militarized conflict fought between state- and non-state entities.8 However, especially as the US prepares for its role in the post-Afghanistan and Iraq world, reevaluating the types of conflicts likely to arise from the current security landscape may prove critical to maintaining the country’s military readiness. It’s uncertain whether

Kari Rea, “Dennis Rodman: Kim Jon Un Wants President Obama to Call Him,” ABC News, March 3rd, 2013 On November 1st, 2013, White House Press Secretary Jay Carney described North Korea, Iran, and al-Qa’ida as the direct threats which keep US President Obama awake at night. Avalable http://www.cspanvideo.org/program/316006-1 7 Bennett, Bruce W., North Korea's Third Nuclear Test: A Sign of Weakness, Not Strength, RAND, (February 15th, 2013) 8 The research defines asymmetric war as those conflicts that 1. Meet The Correlates of War Project’s classification of war, which requires sustained combat involving organized armed forces and results in a minimum of 1,000 battle-related fatalities. And 2. Meets The Correlates of War Project’s classification of intra-state wars or extra-state wars. These wars include those fought between territorial entities that The Correlates of War Project recognizes as a member of the international system and entities not recognized as a member of the international system. See, Sarkees, Meredith Reid and Frank Wayman (2010). Resort to War: 1816 - 2007. CQ Press. 5 6

state- or non-state actors will present the next major obstacle to America’s security interests in a post-2014 world. Therefore, the goal of this research is to challenge the idea that asymmetric wars—rather than traditional, interstate ones—are now dominating the current security environment. In general, this research address the question: Which types of military conflicts will the US face in the current security environment, and to what extent could an evolution in the nature of warfare threaten American military preponderance?

Military Analysis in the Post-Cold War Era: The Theoretical Context Since the waning years of the Cold War, non-traditional forms of warfare have assumed an increasingly prominent role in the analysis of international relations and military strategy.9 That non-state groups—including terrorist organizations, cyber entities, and insurgents—have influenced US global interests continues to substantiate novel approaches to the study of geopolitics.10 Also given the likelihood nuclear weapons and increased economic interdependence would limit the outbreak of more conventional, interstate wars, many of these approaches have taken for granted the notion that conflict since the end of the Cold War would become qualitatively more “asymmetric” than in previous eras.11 In fact, of the many theories and models that since 1991 have attempted to describe the post-Cold War security environment, the most forward leaning cite non-state actors’ recent success as evidence of a fundamental change in the nature of geopolitics itself.12 Nonstate groups’ use of innovative tactical methods and strategies—which have eroded the relative military advantages of their nation-state rivals—challenges several key assumptions underlying more traditional international relations theories. Therefore, to the most radical thinkers in the field of international relations, the success of non-state actors portends no

For a theory regarding a decline in the effectiveness of conventional modes of warfare as well as a rise in nontraditional forms, see Smith, Rupert. The Utility of Force: The art of war in the modern world (2006), and. 10 For the leading view on non-state actors’ relevancy in the post-Cold War security landscape, see Arquilla, John, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini. Networks, netwar, and information-age terrorism. Naval Postgraduate School Monterey California, Graduate School of Operational and Information Sciences, 1999. 11 The existing literature lacks a clear, consistent definition regarding the nature of so-called “asymmetric” warfare. See footnote 8 for the criteria this research uses to define asymmetric war, page 8 for a construct of the more mainstream framework for asymmetric war as the basis of 4 th generation war theory, and page 19 for a framework including more forward leaning theories on exclusively non-state conflicts. 12 For theory regarding the shift from state- to non-state sponsored violence, see Van Creveld, Martin. Transformation of war. Simon and Schuster, 2009 9

less than the decline of the nation-state as the single, most influential entity in the arena of geopolitics.13 However, nations do continue to shape the current geopolitical landscape, particularly through the outbreak of traditional, interstate wars. Since 1991, nine interstate wars have occurred, including five involving nuclear-armed countries.14 Even US Secretary of State John Kerry has not excluded the possibility America will participate in further interstate wars. In a testimony before the US Senate, Kerry sought congressional approval for missile strikes against Syrian military targets, which he argued would prove an appropriate response to the regime’s use of chemical weapons against civilians. To justify US involvement, Kerry speculated the erosion of chemical weapons conventions would encourage other “rogue” nations to rely on such arsenals as a contingency for combating US troops on the battlegrounds of future conflicts.15 Whereas many have expected conventional warfare to subside in favor of non-traditional conflict, conventional, interstate war in fact proves a stubborn fixture of the global security environment.

The Scope of this Research: Military Conflict and the Future of American National Security Determining which factors underlie the persistent outbreak of traditional, interstate war—especially those involving nuclear-armed powers—may therefore yield insight into the types of military conflicts the US should expect to encounter in the current security environment. Firstly, dissecting the circumstances leading to the outbreak of recent military conflicts may enable the research to correlate certain independent variables with the occurrence of such wars. Comparing these independent variables with the security climate surrounding American national interests could then enable analyst to better forecast the types of military confrontations US grand strategy is likely to encounter. Should this comparison indicate the US is unlikely to face the potential for engaging in traditional, interstate wars, then non-state actors probably will remain the country’s most significant military threat. In this case, however, the research must also consider a more qualitative ibid According to the Correlates of War project’s list of interstate wars. See, Sarkees, Meredith Reid and Frank Wayman (2010). Resort to War: 1816 - 2007. CQ Press. 15John Kerry, Statements to US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 3 September 2013, available at http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/314830-1, accessed 3 October 2013 13 14

analysis of the methods by which nation-states contend at the lowest levels in the spectrum of combat, and whether these practices represent a viable threat to US geostrategic interests. Therefore, the research begins with a quantitative analysis designed to test the correlation between transnational terrorism—as a casual, independent variable—and the outbreak of traditional, interstate war in the post-Cold War era. Generally, the most forward leaning proponents of asymmetric war have expected terrorism and other non-state forms of violence to replace interstate wars as the primary mode of conflict during the post-Cold War era. However, the research hypothesizes that transnational terrorist attacks actually have reinvigorated the occurrence of interstate wars, particularly those involving major, nucleararmed powers. While the results of the statistical analysis fail to correlate terrorist attacks with the outbreak of interstate wars, an examination of several notable case studies provides strong evidence that terrorism is a necessary independent variable in a nuclear-armed states’ decision to resort to war. The research therefore concludes terrorism is a necessary, but not sufficient causal variable leading to the outbreak of interstate wars in the post-Cold War environment. The research then examines whether the economic stability of nation-states acts as a second, interceding variable in their decision to launch traditional, interstate wars in response to transnational terrorist attacks. Specifically, this research model uses a categorical variable developed to describe whether the relevant country’s gross domestic product (GDP) is in a state of expansion, stagnation, or decline at the time of the terrorist attack. The research then tests this figure and terrorist attacks as interactive terms in the equation leading to major interstate wars, failing again to arrive at a statistically significant correlation. Further analysis of case studies indicates terrorism indeed is a necessary condition for the outbreak of interstate wars in the current security environment, and economic factors can in fact exacerbate this relationship. However, states are possibly becoming more resilient to spectacular terrorist attacks, spoiling the results of the linear regression analyses and suggesting terrorism over time will prompt fewer conventional wars. The research then examines the extent at which rival nations can effectively challenge US national interests while remaining below the level of even limited conventional conflict. The previous research suggests interstate war over time may in fact become much less likely to occur. However, before accepting non-state actors as the US’s most credible military threat, the research must consider whether states are using non-traditional methods 5

to upset the current distribution of power, thereby nullifying America’s conventional military preponderance. The research actually finds considerable evidence Iran in fact has attempted a low-intensity strategy to accomplish no less than a reversal of American dominance in the Middle East. In fact, Iranian-American relations in recent years mirror the classic notion of a hegemonic rivalry. However, due to the former’s significant incongruity in military, economic, and political strength, Iran may in fact represent the first to advance a strategy that may increase in utility as the world continues further into the post-Cold War era: the practice of “asymmetric superpower.” Finally, the research concludes with a summary of its key findings, which suggest a new framework for navigating the US through the current security environment. That terrorism has proven a necessary condition for the outbreak of interstate wars in the current security environment suggests the US could in fact face fewer chances for engaging in traditional combat. Especially as America and its allies increasingly adopt less heavy-handed options for responding to terrorism, the security environment could leave nations with fewer viable reasons to resort to war. Managing conflicts with non-state actors and low-intensity confrontations with nation-state rivals therefore could prove the most important aspect of US military strategy. Towards these ends, both Realist and Liberalist international theories could play a critical role. This chapter therefore proceeds with an overview of international relations theories important to the overarching purpose of this research: to determine which types of conflict and geopolitical actors the US is most likely to contend with in the current security environment. In particular, the remainder of this chapter will focus on recent scholars’ framework for the concept of asymmetric warfare in the post-Cold War era as well the systems-level approach to the study of international relations. Each of these theories establishes the foundation for examining the nature and outbreak of conflict in the current security environment, and therefore guide specific research questions examined in the proceeding chapters.

Existing Theory: A New Generation of Warfare At the heart of new theoretic models of conflict in the post-Cold War era is the concept of 4th Generation Warfare (4GW), which William S. Lind and several active duty US military officers developed in 1989 as a framework for conceptualizing the impact of 6

technological advances on the history of battlefield tactics and military strategy.16 These analysts note that the technology of smoothbore muskets directly shaped the types of military formations used during “mass manpower” engagements of the 18th and 19th centuries, just as “mass firepower” dictated the use of trench warfare during World War I, and coordinated, precision artillery finally allowed for the development of “maneuver warfare” during World War II.17 4GW theory subsequently observes that, “while military development is generally a continuous evolutionary process, the modern era has witnessed three watersheds in which…generational change has been marked by greater dispersion on the battlefield.”18 These 4GW theorists envisioned that America’s adversaries would continue to develop new forms of warfare, which they would use to negate the unprecedented conventional capabilities of the former’s military forces. As early as 1989, 4GW theorists predicted the next generation of warfare “seems likely to be…largely undefined; the distinction between war and peace will be blurred to the vanishing point. It will be nonlinear, possibly to the point of having no definable battlefields or fronts…[so that] the distinction between civilian and military may disappear.”19 However, it was not until when Thomas X. Hammes’s 2004 book The Sling and the Stone that the concept of 4GW began to adhere to a more recognizable form: insurgency. Although history records insurgencies and guerilla campaigns since as early 2nd century B.C., Hammes posits such conflicts have assumed a unique, increasingly instrumental role in the post-Cold War security environment.20 To Hammes, that no country has never defeated the US in a conventional military campaign, yet America since the end of World War II has suffered three clear defeats against insurgent movements, suggests the

See appendix A for a list of the interstate wars recognized in The Correlates of War Project segregated into Lind’s four generations of warfare. 17 Lind, William S., Nightengale, Keith Colonel (USA), Schmitt, John F. Captain (USMC), Sutton, Joseph W. Colonel (USA), and Wilsonm Gary I. Lieutenant Colonel (USMCR). "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation." 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid. 20For information regarding the Maccabean Revolt—when Jewish rebels successfully wrested control of Jerusalem from the Seleucid Empire—see Szabo, Ernest A., Major (USA), Operational Issues of Insurgency/Counter Insurgency: The Maccabean Revolt, School of Advanced Military Studies, a Monograph for the United States Army Command and General Staff College, (1997) 16

growing relevancy of this form of war.21 As Hammes describes, 4GW is “an evolved form… [which] unlike previous generations of warfare, does not attempt to win by defeating the enemy’s military forces. Instead…it directly attacks the minds of the enemy decision

Asymmetric Warfare

makers to destroy the enemy’s

Insurgency

political will.”22 As such, Hammes also accepts terrorism into his framework for 4GW.23 However,

Terrorism

for these mainstream advocates of 4GW,

the

emphases remains

Intra-State War

Extra-State War

(Movement to replace existing regime)

(Movement to remove occupying force)

squarely on the various forms of insurgency, which in countless conflicts

have

given

the

disadvantaged a powerful tool. As Hammes proclaims, “as the only Goliath left in the world, we

Table 1-1. The Basis of 4the Generation War (4GW) Theory. Thomas X. Hammes’s framework represents the mainstream interpretation of 4GW theory. According to Hammes and other founders of the concept, asymmetric warfare characterizes the nature of 4GW. Included in the construct for asymmetric warfare are those violent confrontations between state- and non-state actors as depicted above, derived from The Sling and The Stone, T.X. Hammes.

should be worried that the world’s Davids have found a sling and stone that work.”24

Asymmetric Warfare and the US Response The American defense establishment has relied heavily on the concept of 4GW theory, which in recent years has guided a significant portion of US Department of Defence (DoD) strategic planning. At the heart of this theory—and subsequently important aspects of DoD capabilities acquisitions, force alignment, and training—is the departure from the traditional Realist assumption that “the means for protecting, preserving, and promoting one’s interests is power.”25 Therefore, while the US retains an unmatchable preponderance of the international community’s conventional military and economic power, it perceives Hammes, 3. Hammes cites the US withdrawal from Vietnam (1975), Lebanon (1983), and Somalia (1994) as the three major conflicts America lost to insurgencies since the end of World War II. 22 Hammes, Thomas X. The sling and the stone: on war in the 21st century. Zenith Press, 2006, p. 2. 23 Hammes, pp 130-152 24 Hammes, 5. 25 Robert Dorff, “Some Basic Concepts and Approaches in the Stufy of International relations,” in US Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy (2004) 21

itself as vulnerable primarily to a number of malign, 4GW-like groups, whose aspirations include rescinding American influence in strategically important areas of the world. Subsequently, the US in recent years has been focusing increasingly on its need to combat sub-national enemies. In 2002, then US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld opined that the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 had demonstrated the need to “defend [the] nation against the unknown, the uncertain, the unseen, and the unexpected.”26 In an essay for Foreign Affairs, Rumsfeld described cutting in half the DoD’s capacity for invading, occupying, and toppling the regimes of traditional aggressor nations. 27 Instead, Rumsfeld saw fit to “begin shifting the balance in our arsenal between manned and unmanned capabilities, between short- and long-range systems, between stealthy and nonstealthy systems, [and] between shooters and sensors.”28 Rumsfeld almost certainly was referring to the increase in the types of technological military capabilities—including armed unmanned aerial vehicles, surveillance platforms, and strike forces—that have become the hallmark of the US’s global war on terrorism. According to more recent research by journalist Linda Robinson, the US has subsequently increased spending on special operations forces—which she describes as central to “one of the Pentagon’s most crucial tasks of identifying and neutralizing terrorists and insurgents”—from $2.3 billion in 2001 to $10.5 billion in 2012.29

Geostrategic Wildcard: The Limits of an Asymmetric Approach The anecdote of Kim Jon-un’s strategic flamboyance demonstrates that competition amongst major state powers—sometimes predicated upon dwindling industrial resources, ideological differences, and key leaders’ idiosyncrasies—continues to color the security landscape. In fact, the contemporary US-North Korean relationship underscores an increasingly complex geopolitical security landscape, which continues to challenge states to defend their interests against a spectrum of traditional and non-traditional adversaries. Subsequently, the US faces challenging decisions in the alignment of forces, allocation of resources, and crafting of strategies in pursuit of its diverse overseas interests. Rumsfeld, Donald H. "Transforming the military." Foreign Afairs. 81 (2002): 3 Ibid 28 Rumsfeld, p. 5 29 Linda Robinson, “The Future of Special Operations: Beyond Kill and Capture,” Foreign Affairs, (November/December 2012), pp 1-2 26 27

Therefore, accurately defining the nature of the current security landscape as well as identifying the most viable emerging threats remains a critical task facing even the most powerful nations in the post-Cold War era. Such nations seldom possess the resources and political will to defend sufficiently against an ever-broadening spectrum of perceived threats and geopolitical concerns. Determining those hostile actors most likely to require kinetic military action—as well as the types of militarized conflicts likely to occur—therefore can posture the US to best expend its available defense capital.

Defining the Environment: What Makes the Geopolitical Security Paradigm? While 4GW theorists—and the US defense planners following their lead—adhere to alluring observations regarding the nature of combat throughout history and into the 21st century, they stop short of fully describing the paradigm leading to the outbreak of warfare in the current security environment. Acknowledging non-state groups as viable rivals indeed has bolstered the US’s military readiness in the post-Cold War era. However, the security environment includes structural elements more complex than the individual actors present in the system. As Jack Levy claims, “a theory of war is technically incomplete without a theory of bargaining or strategic interaction that explains how states respond to each other’s actions and how they act in anticipation of each other’s responses.” 30 Similarly, Martin van Creveld examines the history of global security with respect to three separate aspects of warfare; “who fights, why they fight, and how they fight.”31 Using these terms to describe conflict in the current security environment therefore is critical to any relevant study. While each of these three factors remain important, changes in the tactical nature of combat itself—or in Van Creveld’s terms, “how they fight”—remains far less meaningful to the study of the global security environment. Throughout the history of modern warfare, tacticians and strategists have emphasized the need for innovation on the battlefield. In fact, history credits 19th century French army officer Antoine-Henri Jomini with recognizing the need to identify and target an enemy’s “decisive points,” which he described as supporting infrastructure that, if attacked, could “dislocate and ruin” the enemy.32 Tactical-level Levy, Jack S. "Theories of interstate and intrastate war: A levels-of-analysis approach." Turbulent peace (2001): p. 4 31 Van Creveld 32 Paret, Peter, Gordon A. Craig, and Felix Gilbert, eds. Makers of modern strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age. Princeton University Press, 1986, p. 154 30

commanders throughout Western history have subsequently endeavored to target their enemy’s weaknesses while avoiding their strengths, and to seize advantageous terrain while engaging in confrontations they perceived as an opportunity for gaining a decisive advantage. Indeed, tactics have proven naturally “asymmetric.” Thus, “asymmetric” tactics are simply tactics, regardless of their level of ingenuity. Therefore, whereas scholars have proven incapable of keeping pace with the increasingly fluid, non-linear nature of combat itself, this research focuses on the overall geopolitical environment, which surrounds—but does not necessarily include—the battlefield. In addition to forecasting the types of geopolitical actors most likely to threaten American national interests, this research endeavors to describe their behavior with respect to Van Creveld’s third, and most important criteria: why they fight. This research therefore uses the term geopolitical security paradigm to describe 1. The global environment of state- and nonstate actors and 2. How these actors’ goals, decision-making processes, and subsequent actions interact to shape the outbreak of militarized combat.

The Systems-Level Approach: A New Starting Point In 2001, Levy assumed the task of examining the impetus for contemporary warfare, developing a framework which marries well with the mainstream views of 4GW theory. In Theories of Interstate and Intrastate War, Levy noted interstate wars have become increasingly intense, but much less frequent. Levy also notes the distinctions between geopolitical conflict, civil strife, and transnational terrorism has become increasingly opaque.33 Building upon previous theories regarding the outbreak of wars, Levy observed political factors at the domestic level were increasingly vital to the outbreak of even traditional, interstate war. Levy argues the defining characteristic of the post-Cold War security environment is the interaction of entities across the domestic, state leadership, and international system levels to shape the conduct of geopolitics. While Liberalist scholars have long advanced such a framework, Levy applies it primarily to the post-Cold War security environment. Levy also tends ascribe these actors’ conduct to more traditional, rational motivations, rather than purely Liberalist ideals.34 Conversely, Realist theories continue to focus on the interactions of states at the level of the international system, giving little weight to the effects of social, 33 34

Levy, p.3 ibid

cultural, and other domestic factors.35 As Levy describes, “these theories all posit that key actors are sovereign states that act rationally to advance their security, power, and wealth in an anarchic system.”36 However, as 4GW theorists have eloquently noted, non-state actors have become important geopolitical actors in the post-Cold War environment. Levy’s framework might suggest this occurs since nations in the post-Cold War, information age can no longer limit the effects of their political, economic, and cultural developments to the domestic level. In short, Levy’s framework suggests even seemingly local variables may exhibit extraordinary, global consequences in the current geopolitical security paradigm. Therefore, this research examine how independent casual variables shape, as Levy describes, the “security, power, and wealth” of actors operating at every level of the geopolitical security paradigm. This research therefore attempts to proceed from where Levy’s framework ends, at the search for specific variables responsible for shaping the geopolitical security paradigm. Levy does not specify which independent casual variables shape the occurrence of war in the post-Cold War era. Rather, he simply claims that “if we want a general theory than can provide maximum explanatory power across different temporal and special contexts and provide predictions, then theories based on international or domestic structures are likely to be particularly useful,” leaving opportunities for further investigation.37 This research therefore begins with an attempt to identify which independent variables most shape the current geopolitical security environment, focusing primarily on those that interact to prompt the outbreak of traditional, interstate war.

Levy, p.6 Lvy, p. 7 37 Levy, p.19 35 36

Chapter 2 | Terrorism, the United States, and Interstate Conflict in the Post-Cold War World

Introduction

To many Americans, the thought of engaging in a prolonged, conventional theatre war approaches on humor. Responding to criticism regarding cuts in the number of US Navy vessels, President Barack Obama during a pre-election debate in late 2012 chided, “We also have fewer horses and bayonets…We have these things called aircraft carriers, and planes land on them. We have these ships that go underwater, nuclear submarines.”38 Obama proceeded to educate critics that the character of warfare had changed, and with it the US military. In the contemporary world, according to President Obama, America’s smaller and increasingly technological forces are sufficient for meeting the country’s defense needs.39 While advanced military technologies may provide the US a valuable edge in traditional battle, the President’s strategy remains at odds with his flippant rhetoric on the nature of modern conflict. Even following efforts to adapt US forces towards insurgency and other non-traditional threats, data from the International Institute for Strategic Studies indicates America fields the third largest active duty military in the world, with respect to personnel strength.40 The US also claims the ability to defeat two separate aggressor states simultaneously, all the while maintaining the option for a counteroffensive to occupy an enemy’s capital and replace its regime.41

“Obama On Size Of Navy: We Also Have Fewer Horses And Bayonets”, Huffington Post, 10 October 2013, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/22/obama-horses-bayonets_n_2003948.html 39 ibid 40 “Military Statistics, Armed Forces Personnel,” Nationmaster.com, accessed 10 October 2013, Available at http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/mil_arm_for_per-military-armed-forces-personnel 41 Rumsfeld, Donald H. "Transforming the military." Foreign Afairs. 81 (2002): 3 38

For certain, that the US has retained a preponderant share of the world’s conventional military capacity has served the nation well. Since 1991, the US has employed its ground occupation forces for three separate campaigns, each time demonstrating an ever efficient military apparatus. In fact, its military prowess almost certainly has weighed heavily on the calculus of potential rivals, including would-be “rogue” states.42 For example, its readiness and willingness to employ military force against despots around the globe has earned for America a reputation for becoming “the indispensable nation.”43 Yet, this scenario of US preponderance and perennial intervention presents a subtle paradox for the study of military affairs. In a security environment wherein the US has demonstrated itself both an unmatchable adversary and a willing protector of the status quo, why is it that crises potentially calling for the involvement of American forces in traditional, interstate war continue to emerge? Has US grand strategy failed to capitalize on its forces’ achievements, or has an evolving geopolitical security landscape ultimately rendered America’s military advantage and recent victories irrelevant? Answering these questions remains central to America’s ability to properly structure its military, especially in a time of fiscal uncertainty. Should research indicate traditional security concerns—for instance, disruptions in the balance of power, border disputes, or resource competition—continue to dictate the outbreak of traditional wars, then the US will find good reason to maintain its existing military force. Conversely, if this paradigm has fundamentally changed, then the US could safely assume the types of risks traditionally associated with further reducing its military force. This research therefore examines the nature of what many have described as an evolving security environment, focusing primarily on the specific types of entities likely to engage in warfare and their motivations to do so. However, this research primarily examines the paradox regarding the persistence of interstate war in the post-Cold War era, which to some extent undercuts mainstream international relations theory. This research proceeds with 1. A literature review of the most prominent Realist and Liberalist models formulated at the conclusion of the Cold War 2. A hypothesis describing why these models have failed to predict the persistence of interstate war 3. A research design which attempts to correlate and

Based on nations’ score in the Combined Index of National Capabilities matrix, Sarkees, Meredith Reid and Frank Wayman (2010). Resort to War: 1816 - 2007. CQ Press 43 Available at http://www.fas.org/news/iraq/1998/02/19/98021907_tpo.html 42

the outbreak of interstate wars in the current environment with a specific independent variable 4. The results of the quantitative analysis and a review of case studies, and 5. A conclusion regarding the hypothesis’ validity and opportunities for further research.

Literature Review

The end of the Cold War presented a number of significant challenges to the field of international relations theory, as well as opportunities for its most innovative thinkers to forge novel expectations for the emerging security environment. Although research based on both the Realist and Liberalist approaches failed to predict the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Russia’s anticlimactic transition into the post-Cold War era, proponents of both positions extrapolated from existing models to forecast their implications for the new security environment. Ironically, practitioners from both schools envisioned an increasingly stable, peaceful post-Cold War world, despite relying each on separate sets of variables to construct two radically unique theoretical models. History demonstrates these approaches— although praiseworthy for their innovation—failed to completely capture the environmental factors, technologies, and geopolitical entities that would prove the most influential in shaping post-Cold-War conflicts. However, these attempts remain central to the current academic dialogue regarding the geopolitical security paradigm in the age of “asymmetric” war.

Liberalism As Soviet Russia in the late 1980s increasingly adopted more market-based economic and political reforms, Liberalist international relations scholars anticipated a post-Cold War environment anchored in the stability of globalized democracy and worldwide economic interdependence. Following Soviet President Mikhail Gorbechev’s 1987 announcement of perestroika, Francis Fukuyama in his cutting-edge essay “The End of History” speculated, “the passing of Marxism-Leninism first from China and then from the Soviet Union (meant) its death as a living ideology of world historical significance.”

Francis Fukuyama, Have We Reached the End of History, (RAND 1989) p. 23

Subsequently, Fukuyama

revived 18th century German philosopher Immanuel Kant’s theory of “the democratic peace”—which Jack Levy describes as “(the closest) we have to an empirical law in international relations"—to forge his outlook for the post-Cold War era.45 Kant’s theory famously postulates that democratic states do not wage war against each other, owing largely to their electorates’ cultural belief “that democracies should not fight each other” as well as preferences for more cordial means of settling disputes.46 Fukuyama’s vision for the postCold War era—which represents the most exuberant in the spectrum of Liberalist research at the time—therefore included the “common Marketization of international relations, and the diminution of the likelihood of large-scale conflict between states.”47 However, the idea of an “End of History” proved highly controversial in its time, and Fukuyama himself has since dismissed the theory as overreaching. Nevertheless, Liberalist scholars continue to believe the rise of democrat norms, as well as cultural and economic interdependence is shaping an increasingly stable security environment. Yet, even the most optimistic concede the world has yet to reach a level of Liberalism necessary to fully replace Realist power dynamics as the drivers of geopolitics. In Liberal Internationalism 3.0: America and the Dilemmas of Liberal World Order, G. John Ikenberry describes the evolution of international Liberalism, identifying three distinct iterations which have all fallen short in their effort to achieve a global Democratic Peace. Although Ikerman attributes the first iteration of Liberal geopolitical order to the postWorld War I efforts to US president Woodrow Wilson, its characteristics derive significantly from earlier aspects of Westphalian sovereignty. In fact, Ikerman himself claims “Liberal Internationalism 1.0” remained limited to cooperative international arrangements governing open trade and some collective security systems. The majority of geopolitical activity within “Liberal Internationalism 1.0” remained fettered to the international “rules and norms…enforced through moral suasion and global public opinion.”48 In short, Liberalism at the dawn of the 20th century influenced little in the machinations of international relations. However, at the conclusion of World War II, the international system better resembled Ikerman’s idea of a viable Liberal Internationalism. Ikerman argues that during the iteration of “Liberal Internationalism 2.0,” states began to cede aspects of their legal 45Jack

Levy, “Domestic Politics and War,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring, 1988) p. 662 Bruce Russet, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton University Press:1993) p. 4 47 Fukuyama, 23 48 Ikerman, 74 46

independence in order to the benefits of international cooperation. As Ikerman describes, “The United States took on special functional-operational roles…The American dollar became an international currency and…engine of global economic growth…and the forward-deployed military forces in Europe and East Asia gave the United States a direct and ongoing superordinate role.”49 Participants in the Liberal International order therefore expanded upon their individual capacity through strategic arrangements, which incorporated America’s economic and military strengths. In return, the nations subordinated themselves to the Liberal, supranational institutions. Where Liberal International 2.0 achieved its most significant advancements, however, was in the intricacies of these new, more elaborate systems of intergovernmental institutions. These Ikerman describes not simply as adding new international laws, but “mechanisms and processes in which states would bargain, communicate, and adjust…all within agreed-upon normative and institutional parameters.”50

Realism As Liberalist research hailed political institutions as the source of an expected postCold War stability, Realists began examining primarily the war-making capabilities those entities had come to possess. John Mearsheimer speculated that the potential for conflict in the post-Cold War era would “depend on how [nuclear] proliferation is managed. Mismanaged proliferation could produce disaster; well-managed proliferation could produce an order nearly as stable as that of the Long Peace.”51 Mearsheimer’s declaration remains faithful to the Realist proposition that the anarchical, “self help” international order ultimately forces nations into a constant state of competition. However, the statement also demonstrates recognition that the introduction of nuclear weapons into the landscape of militarized conflict had fundamentally negated some of the assumptions and principles underlying more traditional Realist thought. That most scenarios for the execution of a nuclear war conclude with the near absolute destruction of all parties involved forced Realist scholars to create new models with which to analyze the nature of conflict in the post-Cold War environment. Realists

Ikerman, 77 Ikerman, 78 51 John Mearsheimer, “Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War,” Atlantic Monthly Online (August 1991) , Accessed: December 8, 2010 49 50

examining the post-Cold War era could no-longer rely on the concept of international relations as a constant-sum game, which Robert Jervis describes as a competition wherein “whatever one side [gains], its adversary lost.”52 Rather, as Keneth Waltz describes, “in a nuclear world, no [actor] can escalate to a level of force anywhere near the top without risking its own destruction.”53 Realists therefore expect states in the post-Cold War environment to exhibit unprecedented restraint regarding the use of violence. To Realists, the introduction of nuclear weapons and the post-Cold War security landscape implied that “total war would be worse than maintaining the status quo, worse than suffering a limited loss of influence and, if a modicum of rationality and common sense prevails on both sides, worse than being conquered by the other”.54

The Expansion of 4th Generation War Theory: Filling the Need for a New Paradigm In 1991 Martin van Creveld elaborated upon Realists’ concept of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) and Liberalists’ Democratic peace to forge the most radical version of 4GW theory. Whereas mainstream 4GW theorists claim the nature of warfare in the “asymmetric age” reflects merely a progression of battlefield technologies and military art, Van Creveld describes its emergence as a symptom of a much more fundamental change. Van Creveld argues that the traditional, Clausewitzian explanation of war as the execution of national policy—which represents probably the foundation of most modern military and geopolitical strategic thought—is approaching obsolescence as nations progress further into the post-Cold War era. While Van Creveld’s model upholds warfare as essentially a political endeavor, he describes states not as the logical standard unit of the geopolitical environment, but as “artificial creations; corporate bodies that possess an independent legal existence separate from the people to whom they belong.”55 Van Creveld attributes states’ rise as the fundamental element of international relations—and therefore as the custodians of warfare—to the nature of the economic revolution in pre-Westphalia Europe. As pre-Westphalian feudal economics bolstered primarily the financial wealth of local principalities, European elites financed professional Robert Jervis, “The Nuclear Revolution and the Common Defense,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol 101, No. 5 (1986) p. 690 53 Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed (New York: W. W. Norton, 2002) p. 37 54 Jervis, 690 55Martin Van Creveld, The Transformation of War, (New York: 1991) p. 60 52

armies with which other societal, ethnic, and religious elements could not contend. In the process, pre-cursors of the Western nation-states codified the use of violence such that “populations that did not know the state and its sharply drawn divisions…were automatically declared to be bandits,” thus securing for themselves the ultimate seat of geopolitical authority.56 As Van Creveld describes, by the early 19th century, “that organized violence should only be called “war” if it were waged by the state, for the state, and against the state was a postulate that Clausewitz took almost for granted.”57 Van Creveld therefore does not describe the concept of 4GW in terms of a linear progression towards a fundamentally new geopolitical security paradigm, but as a return to a more natural, pre-Westphalian environment. Owing to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, Van Crevald argues “the state…may be on its way to oblivion, both because its ability to fight organizations similar to itself are in doubt, and because there is not much point in being loyal to an organization that does not, cannot and will not fight.”58 Where this occurs, global relations will revert to the pre-Westphalian order. According to Van Creveld, 4GW “will not be waged by armies but by groups whom we today call terrorists, guerrillas, bandits and robbers…constructed on charismatic lines rather than institutional ones and motivated by…fanatical, ideologically-based loyalties.”59 The research therefore adds Van Crevald’s theory to its construct of 4GW. Whereas Hammes’s and other mainstream constructs of 4GW remain limited to asymmetric forms of war, Van Crevald expects wars involving exclusively non-state actors will become an increasingly prominent feature of the current security environment. His theory also is unique, in that it calls for the complete cessation of traditional, interstate war in favor of conflicts somehow involving non-state actors. Conversely, more mainstream 4GW theorists stop well short of dismissing the relevancy of more conventional modes of warfare. It would therefore prove possible to distinguish Van Crevald’s theory as a separate, 5GW framework. However, for simplicity and because each construct fundamentally stress the importance of non-state actors, the research relies on the following as a framework when referring to the concept of 4GW.

Van Creveld, 50 Van Crevald, 45 58 Van Crevald, 211 59 Van Crevald, 216. 56 57

Table 2-1. Radical 4th Generation War (4GW) Construct. The theories of Martin Van Crevald represent the most radical form of 4GW theory. Combining 4GW theory with more traditional Realist and Liberalist views of the post-Cold War security environment, Van Crevald argues 4GW eventually will consist of largely nonstate wars, military confrontations between non-state actors.

The influence of “New Terrorism” To most observers, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks introduced the world to a new type of war, one involving novel geopolitical entities whose goals and methods were nothing short of maximalist.60 At the time, the ability of the US and its subsequent coalition of major nation-state powers seemed woefully unprepared to address the issue of transnational terrorism, despite several decades of significant confrontations between the West and radical Islamism. For example, US President Ronald Reagan’s policy of “non-

Max Abrahms has applied correspondence inference theory to patterns in terrorism to claim, based on the results of attacks, targeted populations will always infer terrorist who attack specifically civilians seek maximalist objectives. 60

concession”—crafted to preempt terrorists’ ability to coerce national policy—in the aftermath of September 11 appeared an untenable strategy for deterring such attacks. 61 Conversely, the botched attempt to intervene during the Iranian hostage crisis demonstrated that even the world’s most sophisticated military could not guarantee success against an asymmetric threat.62 September 11 therefore challenged states to craft a viable strategy for the new “War on Terror,” as the attacks redefined the nature of the terrorist threat itself. Since the attacks of September 11th, 2001, experts increasingly have classified certain terrorist organizations as “new” and qualitatively different from similar groups of the preCold War era. Contemporary researchers describe “New Terrorism” as more violent, better trained, better financed, and more religiously motivated, observing that less frequent terrorist attacks coincided with an almost exponential rise in the quantity of victims killed or injured.63 According to Russell D. Howard, New Terrorists are no longer “sub-state” entities, but altogether non-state actors with interests in mainly transnational attacks.64 Proponents of New Terrorism generally estimate that “power is migrating to non-state actors…who are able to organize into sprawling multi-organizational networks, especially allchannel networks, in which every node is connected to every other node,” as noted terrorism scholar John Arquilla describes.65 The persistence of al-Qa’ida-associated and inspired attacks since the since the death of the group’s senior leader Usama bin Laden demonstrates that New Terrorism—operating via common, overarching motivations and strategies rather than centralized command and control—exhibits an extreme degree of resiliency.66 Radical 4GW theorists therefore perceive the concept of New Terrorism as a mechanism by which post-Cold War geopolitics potentially could fulfill Van Creveld’s prediction for a non-state-centered security environment. Indeed, the narrative of al-Qa’ida’s enduring confrontation with the West remains consistent with Van Creveld’s belief that “the

61Ronald

Reagan, Radio Address to the Nation on Terrorism, May 31, 1986, Available via The American Presidency Projects, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=37376 62 Mark Bowden, “The Desert One Debacke,” The Atlantic, May 1st, 2006, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/05/the-desert-one-debacle/304803/ 63 Russel Howard, “Understanding Al Qaeda’s Application of the New Terrorism,” In Terrorism and Counterterrorism (2003) p. 2 64 Howard, 2 65 John Arquila, “Networks, Netwar and Information-Age Terrorism,” in Terrorism and Counterterrorism (2003) p. 45. 66 Bruce Hoffman, Mary Habeck, Aaron Y. Zelin, and Matthew Levitt, “Is al-Qaeda Central Still Relevant,” The Washington Institute, September 10, 2012, available at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policyanalysis/view/is-al-qaeda-central-still-relevant

clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future,â&#x20AC;? with traditional nation-state politics playing an increasingly trivial role.67

An unsolved paradox Despite the compelling arguments of Realists, Liberalists, and 4GW theorists alike, available data remains inconsistent with the positions that 1. Interstate wars are increasingly less likely to occur in the current security environment 2. Major, nuclear-armed powers are less likely to engage in militarized, interstate conflict and 3. Wars fought between exclusively non-state actors will characterize the geopolitical security environment. Data from the Correlates of War Project demonstrates the persistence of interstate wars far into the post-Cold War era, including those involving major nuclear powers.68 Additionally, these statistics demonstrate forms of 4GW conflict are not unique to the modern age, but traditionally have proven the most prevalent mode of combat. The following charts compare the cumulative number of years (entity-years) that each state and non-state actor spent engaged in the various types of warfare during both the pre- and post-Cold War eras.

1816-1989 states at war with other states 419, 11% 1509, 39% 680, 17%

2792, 72% 1283, 33%

non-state entities at war with other non-state entities states at war with non-state entities non-state entities at war with states

Table 2-2. The Traditional Distribution of Combat. The chart depicts the distribution of the cumulative number of years various geopolitical entities participated in the recognized forms of warfare prior to the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union. The statistics demonstrate asymmetric forms of warfare (depicted as subdued) traditionally are the most prevalent type of militarized conflict. Derived from data available through the Correlates of War Project.

67 68

Samuel Huntington, â&#x20AC;&#x153;The clash of Civilizationsâ&#x20AC;? Foreign Affairs, Accessed: December 8, 2010 Sarkees, Meredith Reid and Frank Wayman (2010). Resort to War: 1816 - 2007. CQ Press

Table 2-3. The Distribution of Combat in the Post-Cold War Era. The chart depicts the distribution of the number of years various geopolitical entities participated in the recognized forms of warfare since the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union, which the research considers the beginning of the post-Cold War era. Contrary to predictions that interstate warfare would prove obsolete, states have engaged in a notable portion of the recognized forms of warfare in the postCold War environment. Derived from data available through the Correlates of War Project.

The same data reconstructed to measure the yearly pace of various types of war also contradicts claims regarding the waning prevalence of traditional, interstate war. Radical 4GW theorists would expect the average number of entities engaged in interstate war each year during the post-Cold War era ( x1: Frequency of Interstate War post 1989) to be at least one standard deviation less than that of the pre-Cold War era (x2: Frequency of Interstate wars pre1989). However, a basic comparison of these values indicates the pace in the

Mean value x1: States at war with other 3.91 states, by year (1816-1989)

(0.38)

x2: States at war with other 2.83 states, by year (1990-2007)

(0.96)

Difference of the means

1.08

t = 0.87

(1.22)

Table 2-4. Comparing the rate of interstate war prior to and since the conclusion of the Cold War. Analysis demonstrates the pace of interstate war has not significantly changed at the end of the Cold War. Derived from the Correlates of War Project

outbreak of traditional, interstate wars remain statistically consistent throughout the pre- and post-Cold War eras. In essence, radical 4GW theorists remain unable to reject a null

hypothesis, which significantly undercuts the theory’s underlying premise: that traditional, interstate war is becoming less viable and subsequently less likely to occur.69 Radical 4GW theory—which builds upon more mainstream Realist, Liberalist, and asymmetric war models—cannot describe the current nature of armed conflict. This research therefore attempts to build on existing literature to produce a better approach to present day geopolitical conflict, focusing on those geopolitical variables which influence countries to engage in traditional, interstate war. Primarily, this research attempts to address 4GW’s incongruity with the Correlates of War data, which demonstrates that the nation-state remains the central participant in geopolitical conflict.

Hypothesis and Research Design

Whereas the most forward-leaning 4GW theorists describe terrorism and other forms of non-state violence as the antithesis of state-centric geopolitics, this research hypothesizes terrorism actually has revived the occurrence of traditional inter-state war in the post-Cold War world, particularly those involving major, nuclear-armed powers. Traditional Realist and Liberalist international relations theories generally agree that interstate war should become less likely to occur in the post-Cold War era. The persistence of such conflicts therefore suggests at least one new geopolitical variable is intervening to reshape the post-Cold War security landscape into one still conducive to traditional, interstate warfare. This research hypothesizes transnational, Islamist terrorism is one such variable. The research therefore offers two distinct theoretic models in an effort to describe the shift in major state powers’ calculus for engaging in war prior to and since the conclusion of the Cold War. In order to mark this shift, the research begins with a more traditional model in which states’ absolute military capacity shapes their willingness to engage in interstate warfare, proposing that such a model is sufficient to describe the recourse to war in the pre-

Radical 4GW theorists and more mainstream Liberalist and Realist scholars would expect interstate war to prove less frequent in the post-Cold War era than in previous periods. They therefore would expect a significant difference between the mean pace of interstate war during the two periods, making their null hypothesis: Ho:  X (Frequency of Interstate wars pre-1989 )-  X (Frequency of Interstate War post 1989) = 0 69

Cold War era. In addition to measuring the influence of states’ military capacity (CINC) on their willingness to engage in war (Interstate War), the research controls for other geopolitical factors which may have unequally drawn certain nations into traditional militarized conflict. The model therefore controls for natural resources (Resources) and proximity to potential rivals (Contiguity), variables which likely generate most forms of interstate friction. The research then tests whether this model or one based on attributes of terrorist attacks— including Casualties (Casualties), total attacks (Attacks), or lethality (Casualties/Attacks)—as the independent variable proves most viable for describing the outbreak of interstate war in the post-Cold War era. M1: Military Capabilities  Willingness to Engage in Interstate War70 M2: Attributes of Terrorist Attacks  Willingness to Engage in Interstate War71 This research subsequently draws from data available through the Correlates of War project—which provides an authoritative record of all militarized conflict since 1816 as well as comparative values for states’ combined index of national capabilities (CINC)—to quantify the occurrence of interstate war and measure its relationship with other geopolitical variables. In order to test whether nations’ military capabilities during the pre- and post-Cold War eras determined their willingness to engage in interstate warfare (M1), this research uses panel data in which each observations represents a single year in the existence of 241 separate state entities.72 Each observation includes a value for the respective state’s CINC, border contiguities, and participation in ongoing wars, which the Correlates of War project measured and compiled for these individual years. However, in order to prescribe a value for the nations’ resource worth, this research compiles its own basic index, which derives from weighted measures of countries’ renewable water, arable land, proved hydrocarbon reserves, as well as select precious and industrial metals. 73 While the available data does not allow for the measure of states’ derived resource value with year-to-year fidelity, the research calibrates P (Interstate War) = βo + β1 CINC + β2 Resources + β3 Contiguity + u P (Interstate War) = βo + β1 (Casualties) + u, or P (Interstate War) = βo + β1 (Attacks) + u, or P (Interstate War) = βo + β1 (Casualties/Attacks) + u 72 The panel data includes the 241 individual state entities that the Correlates of War project recognizes as having existed in the international system between 1816 and 2007 73 For more information regarding the natural resources index used in this data, see appendix C 70 71

the weighted values of the individual resource categories in order to adjust for their relative importance pre- and post-industrial revolution.74 Finally, the panel data includes a dummy variable in order to discriminate observations during the pre- and post-Cold War eras, which enable the research to test whether the model does not also describe on the outbreak of interstate since the dissolution of the Soviet Union.75 Finally, in order to test the hypothesis that attributes of terrorism in the post-Cold War era shape major, nuclear-armed states’ willingness to engage in conventional war (M2), the research adds statistics from the RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents to the panel data. The observations included for this panel data simply add variables for the number of terrorist attacks (Attacks), casualties (Casualties), and the ratio of terrorist attacks to casualties (Lethality) the respective state suffered during the given period, as well as a dummy variable to delineate major, nuclear-armed powers. Whereas the models centered on national military capabilities—whether pre- or post-Cold War—incorporate observations for all existing countries, the goal of this research ultimately is to measure the influence of terrorism solely on major, nuclear-armed states in the post-Cold War era, given the existing literature’s prediction that that such nations increasingly would prove the most unlikely to resort to traditional militarized conflict. The proposed post-Cold War model therefore only includes panel data relevant to major, nuclear-armed states, conceding that the calculus for other states probably has remained consistent. Additionally, in order to avoid conflating attributes of terrorist attacks that precede countries’ decisions to engage in interstate war with those that follow, the research distributes this panel data into monthly observations to more accurately define the potential temporal relationship between the two variables.

Results

The statistics indicate nation states prior to the conclusion of the Cold War did base their calculus for engaging in warfare largely on their absolute military capacity. Whether countries were responding to aggression from revisionist adversaries or seeking some change

74 75

Sarkees, Meredith Reid and Frank Wayman (2010). Resort to War: 1816 - 2007. CQ Press For a sample of the panel data used in this analysis, see appendix B

the

geopolitical

Intercept CINC

themselves,

0.05

0.92*

states’ total military

(0.00)

(0.10)

capacity

proves

0.02

0.70*

0.08*

reliable

(0.00)

(0.10)

(0.01)

their

0.01

0.68*

0.08*

0.00

use

(0.01)

(0.10)

(0.01)

(0.00)

order

generally

indicator

willingness

warfare as a policy means prior to the formal dissolution of the

Soviet

Union.

Similarly, a country’s resource

wealth

Resource Value

Contiguity

Table 2-5. The Effects of Military Capabilities on Interstate War, 1816-1989 . The top row represents the independent variables used in the analysis. CINC referrers to the value of a country’s absolute military capabilities, Resource Value refers to the country’s comparative natural resource wealth, and Contiguity refers to the number of borders a country shares with other states. The values within the chart represent the coefficient, or the particular variables’ effects on the probability of Interstate war. Derived from The Correlates of War Project.

exhibits a statistically significant effect on its likeliness to engage in traditional interstate war, although the coefficient of this relationship is notably less than that of military capabilities. What proves most telling, however, is that the number of borders a state shares with its neighbors bears no statistically significant relationship to its probability for engaging in war. Altogether, the model suggests a geopolitical paradigm in which direct competition for local resources and territory alone factor far less significantly in a country’s calculus for resorting to war than does its absolute military capacity. Possibly, the model reflects the ongoing struggle during the pre-Cold War era of the world’s most powerful nations to improve their geopolitical stature vis-à-vis other major powers, which lends credence to Neorealists’ predictions regarding the balance of power. However, the same model lacks statistical significance when applied to post-Cold War data, suggesting absolute military capacity is less of a determinant of countries’ willingness to engage in traditional, interstate war in the current security landscape. Assuming the level of geopolitical rivalry in the current security environment is consistent with those of the pre-Cold War era, two scenarios could explain this change in the model’s descriptive power. Either 1. The world’s most powerful states increasingly are using methods other than warfare to pursue their strategic interests or 2. The world’s least powerful countries are no longer as reticent to engage in traditional, interstate war. Indeed, the latter scenario poses a unique set of challenges for US strategic security, and its emergence here 27

Intercept CINC

Resource Value

Contiguity

foreshadows the research’s eventual

0. 01*

0. 75*

examination of potential challenges

(0.01)

(0.27)

to American hegemony emanating

0.01*

0.56

0.02

from

(0.01)

(0.31)

(0.01)

nations. However, for the purposes

0.01

0.65

0.03

-0.00

(0.01)

(.035)

(0.01)

(0.00)

explanation for the most powerful

Table 2-6. The Effects of Military Capabilities on Interstate War, 1990-2007. This table repeats the statistical analysis used in table 2-4, but using data from only the post-Cold War era. Derived from The Correlates of War Project.

less arriving

powerful, at

“rogue” alternative

countries’ continued willingness to engage in conventional warfare, the research

here

turns

the

hypothesis that terrorism is a

necessary antecedent to interstate wars involving major, nuclear-armed powers in the postCold War environment. Finally, the data suggests the attributes of terrorist attacks used here do not correlate temporally with the outbreak of interstate war. In fact, the model produces coefficients so low as to suggest no credible way of reconciling terrorism as a casual variable necessary for the outbreak of traditional, interstate wars in the post-Cold War environment. Ultimately, the models used here suggest little more than a decrease in the descriptive power of states’ absolute military capabilities as a determinant of their participation in war. Even in this regard, the models remain limited in their ability to describe with any precision why states chose warfare as a policy means in the current security landscape. However, they do provide somewhat of a reference point for dissecting case studies relevant to the question of traditional, interstate war in the post-Cold War environment. This research therefore turns to two

Intercept

Casualties

0.01

0.00

(0.00)

Attacks

0.01

0.00

(.00)

(0.00)

Lethality

0.01

-0.01

(0.01)

(0.00)

Table 2-7. The Effects of Terrorism on Interstate War, 1990-2007. The top row represents the independent variables used in the analysis. Casualties referrers the value of a country’s absolute military capabilities, Resource Value refers to the country’s comparative natural resource wealth, and Contiguity refers to the number of borders a country shares with other states. The values within the chart represent the coefficient, or the particular variables’ effects on the probability of Interstate war. Derived from The Correlates of War Project and RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents

such studies, which prove particularly descriptive of the effects of transnational terrorism on the current geopolitical security paradigm.

The Descriptive Case of Kosovo The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s entry into the Kosovo war is a particularly descriptive case of terrorism’s ability to shape nations’ strategic calculus in the post-Cold War environment. Since the conclusion of the Cold War, nine significant interstate wars have occurred, including five that involved major nuclear powers (1991 Gulf War, 1999 Kosovo War, 1999 Kargil War, 2001 Afghan War, and 2003 Iraq War).76 The remainder of these wars (1992 War of Bosnian Independence, 1994 Azeri-Armenian War, 1995 Cenepa Valley War, 1998 Badme Border War) did not involve major, nuclear-armed powers, but generally remained post-Soviet or other post-colonial conflicts in which new political boundaries failed to match the cultural landscape. While it remains largely appropriate to describe the 1999 Kosovo war as the later, the conflict eventually drew the full participation of the Western nuclear powers vis-à-vis NATO. Therefore, identifying those aspects of the Kosovo conflict responsible for attracting Western participation therefore presents a viable opportunity for describing major, nuclear-armed states calculus for participating in post-Cold War contests. In Kosovo, the character of the combatant parties themselves—rather than the nature of the combat—prompted a great deal of US attention. In 1990, Slobodan Milosevic’s abolition of Kosovar autonomy forced ethnic Albanians in the country to accept a reduction in both political and cultural autonomy. While the whole of Albanian society remained altogether revisionist, the group’s major political party—the Democratic League of Kosovo led by Ibrahim Rugova—“embraced a policy of peaceful resistance that relied on their own social solidarity and sought international support.”77 Thusly, Albanian civil resistance in Kosovo for a time remained limited to contesting the legitimacy of Serbian-imposed institutions.78 As early as 1990, the Albanian faction had lost any reasonable hope to match Serb militias in direct, force-on-force engagements, enabling the Yugoslavian people to

Sarkees, Meredith Reid and Frank Wayman (2010). Resort to War: 1816 - 2007. CQ Press Klejda Mulaj, “Resisting an Oppresive Regime: The Case of Kosovo Liberation Army” in Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, (Routlege: 2008) p. 1006 78 ibid 76 77

escalate its level of repression. Yugoslav-sponsored ethnic cleansing campaigns targeted civilian Albanian populations and wreaked untold atrocities. Yet, despite the potential to test recently adopted NATO “peace keeping” methods, Kosovo had yet to garner any significant attention among the major Western powers. While the US up to this point had done little to indicate its potential concern for the region, the emergence of non-state violence there would prove sufficiently enticing. With ethnic Serbs outmatched, the desperate situation led the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) to form in 1993 “as a force to oppose Serbian oppression violently but also to oppose civil resistance led by Rugova and his party.”79 The non-state group quickly initiated kinetic operations with sporadic attacks against mostly Serb police forces, prompting the US State Department to formally label the group a terrorist organization. Though hardly proportionate to the previous waves of Serb-sponsored terror, the KLA’s campaign demanded Washington’s immediate response. The actions of the West demonstrate that it was much more concerned with a growing asymmetric threat to the moderate Albanian institutions than it was any statesponsored wave of atrocity. While noting the “zero tolerance” for Islamic terrorism among nations led to a dramatic decrease in terrorist-related deaths, both the 1995 and 1996 State Department “Patterns of Global Terrorism” warned of the increased threat stemming from “Ethnic terrorism.”80 In the case of the KLA, NATO feared a wave of Albanian terrorism-possibly blaming the West for its noninvolvement in the Serbian-Albanian conflict—would spread from the Balkans and into Western Europe. Writing for Foreign Affairs in 1999, Chris Hedges summarized the West’s trepidation, which prompted NATO intervention in the Balkans: …the KLA will wage a protracted guerrilla war in the Serbian province that could ignite a wider war in neighboring Macedonia and Albania, potentially even dragging in Greece and Bulgaria. The KLA is uncompromising in its quest for an independent Kosovo now and a Greater Albania later. And it has, to the consternation of Washington's would-be peacemakers, supplanted the ineffectual leadership of the moderate voice of Kosovo's ethnic Albanian majority, Ibrahim Rugova. The KLA is important out of all proportion to its size -- not merely because it will probably eventually get Kosovo to secede from Serbia, but 79 80

Mulaj, 1109 US Department of State, Patterns in Global Terrorism (Washington, DC: 1996)

because it now represents the aspirations of most Kosovar Albanians. To understand the current conflict in Kosovo and America's stakes in its resolution, one must understand the KLA, how it came into being, who leads it, what drives it, and why it now speaks for a majority of Kosovars. Even a truly vicious, Bosnia-like wave of atrocities by the Serbs in reprisal for NATO's attacks will only pour fuel on the separatist fire. The grim reality is that we had better get to know the KLA -- because it is not going to go away.81 Ultimately, the situation led the US and its allies to engage in kinetic operations to diffuse the KLA, which they perceived as in a state of surge. Eventually, NATO forces intervened in favor of the KLA, launching a 1,000 aircraft bombing campaign, punishing the Yugoslav government into capitulation. Following the major combat action in 1998, NATO ground forces entered to maintain a fragile peace, overseeing the establishment of nascent government institutions to replace KLA leadership. The measures forced the KLA to disband as a series of war crimes investigations implicated the organization in scores of civilian-targeted attacks. Much of the organizations leadership has either assimilated into the new Kosovar government or banded with Macedonia-based Albanian terrorist groups. According to the International Crisis Group, “The main political rivalry now is between two KLA successor parties: the larger PDK and the AAK. Now, both jostle to become LDK’s government partner.”82 If the US objective, however, was to thwart a potential Albanianbased anti-Western terrorist spree, its leaders should find evidence considered this mission a success.

India and Pakistan: A Hard Test for Deterrence While it’s easy to accept that global and regional hegemons in the post-Cold War era would remain willing to engage in warfare with less powerful nations, the case of India and Pakistan suggests even comparable, nuclear-armed nations may resort to traditional, interstate war following incidents of terrorism. In 1999—when each side technically possessed the capability to employ nuclear weapons—the two countries engaged in a limited conventional war in order to compete for territory along their border. First impressions suggest the incident could simply mark the climax of a deep-seeded rivalry, which since the Chris Hedges, “Kosovo’s Next Masters,” Foreign Affairs Vol. 78 No. 3 (1999) “Kosovo: No Good Alternatives to the Ahtisaari Plan,” Europe Report N°182 (International Crisis Group 2007) p. 27 81 82

end of British colonialism in the mid-20th has plagued the two neighbors. However, as the following case study demonstrates, terrorism factored prominently in the commencement of kinetic hostilities during the 1999 war. Understanding the history of the conflict, therefore could further reveal the role of terrorism in the current security landscape, and indicate whether its effects are such that the concept of nuclear MAD can no longer endure. For certain, the geopolitical disposition facing India and Pakistan subject the two to an abnormal threat of nuclear, interstate confrontations. Since 1947—when the British exodus from colonial India led to the division between Pakistan and India—the two States have waged three separate wars in order to seize advantage over the semi-autonomous area of Kashmir. Situated along the Pakistan-India border, the Kashmir is both a source of valuable natural resources and religious strife. Early violence culminated in the 1971, when during the first Indo-Pakistan War the two sides engaged in a total confrontation of ground, air, and naval forces. Though the Pakistan military (PAKMIL) initiated kinetic hostilities, the 13 day war ended when India’s military supremacy forced Pakistan into a nearly unconditional surrender. The resulting “peace,” called for the division of the Kashmir along a Line of Control (LOC), south of which was to remain an Indian mandate.83 Despite the secession of violence, each side continued maneuvers to attain some form of strategic advantage, exacerbating for both states the impetus to achieve nuclear weapons capabilities. By 1998, both nations had conducted public testing of “peaceful” fission devices.84 While its nascent Agni-I Short Range Ballistic Missile program lent India at least a perceived nuclear tactical advantage, the traditional balance between Indian and Pakistan ground forces limited either’s chances to develop a conventional force that could reasonably seize control of the Kashmir.85 Despite these setbacks, Pakistan leveraged what could potentially become an even greater national asset. Domestic frustration over Pakistan’s inability to exact territorial concessions from India and sporadic Western involvement in Asian affairs helped cultivate the rise of Islamic radical groups inside the country. However, for the Pakistan government, not all terrorist

S.M. Burke, “The Postwar Diplomacy of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971,” Asian Survey Vol. 13 No. 11 (1973)p. 1037 84 “Pakistan Nuclear Weapons,” The Federation of American Scientists; Accessed: December 8, 2010 85 Michael Carver, “Conventional Warfare in the Nuclear Age,” in The Makers of Modern Strategy, (Princeton University Press: 1986), p. 802 83

organizations were created equal. When confronted with the rise of al-Qa’ida salafis within their borders, Pakistan was quick to recognize Osama bin Laden as an international terrorist. Conversely, Kashmir-based terrorist organizations—which maintained primarily anti-India objectives—would receive sympathetic, if not favorable treatment from the Pakistani government. The common agenda between the Pakistan government and groups such as Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LeT) led to a more than hospitable environment, enabling the fledgling organizations to flourish. As Stephen Tankel, working for the International Center for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence, describes: LeT’s vision included establishing a pan-Islamic Caliphate, but since 9/11 its primary objective has remained the liberation of Kashmir and the destruction of India. For this reason, within Pakistani society and in the eyes of the state, Lashkar’s identity has remained separate from that of al-Qaeda and other jihadi actors, enabling the group to position itself as the ‘good jihadis’. Because of this the Pakistani state rewarded LeT with preferential treatment…86 Following the palpable rise in anti-Indian extremism, Pakistani launched the 1999 Kargil War in an effort to reclaim the Kashmir, despite the threat of nuclear retaliation. At that time, “an estimated 2,000 Kashmiri militants, reportedly trained in Pakistan, crossed the border into Kargil, on the Indian side of the LOC and seized high mountain ridges, threatening the main road between Srinagar and Leh.”87 Once cognizant of the situation, the Indian army demonstrated that the over 17 years of non-war had not degraded the country’s military readiness. Two Indian infantry division—mobilized in concert with massing air and artillery attacks—successfully waged uphill battles which inflicted punishing losses on the terrorist brigades. Under constituent and PAKMIL pressure not to abandon the Kashmir— and facing few prospects for a military victory—Pakistan’s president Musharraf subsequently sought US aid in the matter.88 Yet, even during the eventual exchange with US leaders, the Pakistani government could not escape the need to placate PAKMIL and its likely subordinate terrorist groups, who clearly were operating with heightened indifference to the civilian government in Islamabad. The following month, President Clinton and President Musharraf met in Stephen Tankel, Lashkar-e-Taiba: From 9/11 to Mumbai (London: 2009) p. 4 Farzana Shaikh, “Pakistan's Nuclear Bomb: Beyond the Non-Proliferation Regime”, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 78, No. 1(Jan., 2002), p. 37 88 Bruce Riedel, American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House, (Center for the Advanced Study of India: 2002) pp. 5 -6 86 87

Washington, DC. As Riedel describes, Musharraf , “confused and vague on many details…seemed a man possessed with fear of war.”89 Having insured that his family accompany him on his stateside voyage, “the Prime Minister told Clinton that he wanted desperately to find a solution that would allow Pakistan to withdraw with some cover. Without something to point to, Sharif warned ominously, the fundamentalists in Pakistan would move against him and this meeting would be [their] last.”90 Ultimately, the US could not justify intervening on the side of Pakistan, who without provocation had sparked the crisis. Despite even “disturbing evidence that the Pakistanis were preparing their nuclear arsenals for possible deployment,” the Clinton administration decided Pakistan-sponsored forces should withdraw from the Kashmir.91 Following intense discussions, Musharraf conceded to Washington’s demands. Pakistani forces conducted a phased withdrawal from the LOC. Finally, when Musharraf returned to Pakistan, he faced the anticipated onslaught of extremist assassination attempts, which started in 2000.92 The 1999 Kargil War therefore suggests the nuclear revolution does not extend to geopolitical conditions involving terrorism, at least in situations where states victimized in terrorist incidents perceive such attacks as state-sponsored. Attempting to use concerted terrorist campaigns to exact a major territorial concession, PACMIL’s incursion into the Kashmir met India’s full military opposition. Though brief, the conflict between the two nuclear states was an intense conventional war, which only reaffirmed the status quo. As the current unipolar international system dissolves to accommodate a more equal distribution of power, confrontation between nuclear-armed states is destined to become more likely. In these situations, terrorism could therefore spark at least short, conventional interstate wars in which only a political agreement to revert to the status quo could defuse further escalation.

Riedel, 11 Riedel, 11 91 Riedel, 8 92 “Musharraf assassination plot foiled,” CNN Online ( September 20, 2002) Accessed: December 8, 2010 89 90

Conclusion

This research suggests terrorism is generally prerequisite to major, nuclear-armed powers’ involvement in any traditional, interstate war in the current security landscape, likely because terrorist organizations remain the most viable military threat such nations face. As the existing literature predicts, the concept of MAD virtually guarantees no state will risk threatening the vital interests of its nuclear-armed adversaries, but terrorists “have learned to drop below the threshold of the utility of [such] weapon systems. They have learned not to present a target that favours the weapons we possess and the way we use them,” as Rupert Smith describes.93 Conventional mechanisms of deterrence—which remain widely credited with stabilizing the post-Cold War geopolitical order—are therefore futile counter-terrorism strategies. As America’s inability to conclude a so-called global “War on Terror” vividly illustrates, terrorism perhaps is the most viable course of action revisionist geopolitical entities still possess as a means for employing violence against nuclear-armed adversaries. Therefore, as Van Creveld’s version of 4GW theory predicts, it remains possible terrorism is playing an increasingly influential role in the current geopolitical security paradigm. As the research illustrates, prominent nation-states currently factor terrorism into their specific actions as well as policies for reacting to broader security issues, which represents a departure from the previous geopolitical security paradigm. While terrorism indeed is an ancient form of conflict, rarely before the emergence of the post-Cold War security environment have terrorist campaigns so influenced the calculus of nation-states. Therefore, whereas terrorism is widely studied for its ability to coerce governments indirectly through the targeting of civilian populations, the propensity to spark traditional, interstate wars in the current security landscape may prove “New Terrorism’s” defining characteristic. This research suggests terrorism has actually revived the relevancy of conventional, state-sponsored militaries in the post-Cold War security environment. Since neighbors and allies remain likely to respond to manifestations of terrorism with traditional, interstate warfare, maintaining a competitive force is critical to the individual countries’ ability to defend their interests.

Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force, (New York: 2007) p. 301

Therefore, the concept of 4GW—primarily Van Creveld’s argument the security environment is reverting to its natural, pre-Westphalian paradigm—may prove an untenable theory. This research indicates the product of nuclear proliferation is a regenerative cycle, in which 1. The general growth of conventional military preponderance discourages interstate war, 2. Increasingly sensational terrorist attacks replace more conventional forms of violence in order to advance interstate rivalries 3. States engage in conventional warfare in response to these attacks and 4. States once again find cause to increase the conventional military capabilities. For the foreseeable future, this cycle is likely to dictate the geopolitical security paradigm, for in it no amount of conventional military preponderance could prove sufficient for deterring either of the two forms of geopolitical struggle: traditional, interstate war or terrorism. Rather, such a cycle could continue, perhaps until the vast majority of countries achieve nuclear capable status or states find a more viable solution for dealing with terrorist outbreaks. Only following either of these two circumstance may states finally prove unable to resort to traditional, interstate warfare, making possible the geopolitical security paradigm 4GW theorists have envisioned. Yet, the model this research initially sought suffers a major deficiency in its ability to accurately describe the current security paradigm, jeopardizing the validity of the aforementioned cycle. Primarily, while the research offers compelling evidence terrorism is a necessary casual variable in the outbreak of traditional, interstate war in the current security environment, it almost certainly is not sufficient. Certainty, heinous terrorist attacks occur frequently, and in many countries across the globe. Rarely do these events themselves spark a reactive interstate war. For instance, perhaps the most critical juncture in the ongoing Indo-Pakistan conflict arrived in the form of a multi-day complex terrorist attack on the city of Mombai in November, 2008. According to George Friedman, “the operational goal of the attack clearly was to cause as many casualties as possible, particularly among Jews and well-to-do guests of five-star hotels. But attacks on various other targets…indicate that the more general purpose was to spread terror in a major Indian city.”94 In addition to causing 170 deaths—which included six American citizens—the event highlighted India’s inability to stage an effaceable counterterrorism response at both the tactical and strategic levels, as the country failed to

George Friedman, Strategic Motivations for the Mumbai Attack, (SRATOR: 2008) p. 1

quell either the attack itself or its sponsors’ subsequent presence in the region.95 Prior to the attack, the US State Department in 2007 reported that India had already suffered more than 2,300 deaths due to terrorism, suggesting Mumbai came not as an isolated event, but the climax of a persistent terrorist movement with which India has struggled to contend since the Kargil War.96 That India since the Kargil war has not responded with launching a traditional, interstate war against Pakistan—from which the preponderance of terrorism within the region emanates—remains a paradox challenging the hypothesis presented in this research. Indeed, New Dehli remains perplexingly judicious in its response to terrorism. As George Friedman argues, the Mumbai attacks should “have set the stage for another Indo-Pakistani confrontation. India [should have] pushed forces forward all along the Indo-Pakistani frontier, moved its nuclear forces to an alert level, (began) shelling and… airstrikes deep in Pakistan.”97 While tensions remain, such an unrestrained scenario has yet to unfold. While peace remains elusive, it appears even the most sensational terrorist events will no longer pull New Dehli and Islamabad into conventional wars. Therefore, there must exist one or more interceding variables that help shape the outbreak of traditional interstate wars following terrorist events in the post-Cold War security environment. Identifying these variables and arriving at a more complete model for the current paradigm of warfare could enable states to better shape the regenerative cycle of conventional military growth and terrorist campaigns, possibly enabling a more complete peace. This research therefore continues with such an examination, in an effort to more accurately describe the geopolitical security paradigm in the so-called “4th generation” of warfare.

Lisa Curtis, “After Mumbai: Time to Strengthen US-India Counterterrorism Cooperation, Backgrounder No 2217 (2008) p 1. 96 US Department of State, Country Rerports on Terrorism 2007, April 2008, p. 132 97 Friedman, 4 95

Chapter 3 | Terrorism, Economics, and the Casus Belli in PostCold War Geopolitics

Introduction

The research demonstrates wars involving major, nuclear-armed states continue to persist, undercutting many theorists’ expectations of the post-Cold War security environment. Whereas Realists expected the spread of nuclear weapons among the world’s major power-patrons would prevent conflicts from into conventional theatre wars, Liberal international relations scholars believed the increasing spread of democracy and economic interdependencies would ensure peaceful alternatives to the use of force.98 Yet, the historical record illustrates major interstate war is statistically as common in the post-Cold War era as it has been during any other notable period.99 However, while the post-Cold War security environment has failed to slow the pace at which major nuclear-armed states engage in war, it may in fact be shaping the qualitative nature of these conflicts. The research indicates terrorism since the end of the 1993 Gulf War—the first major conflict of the Post-Cold War era—has played some role in every major nation-states’ calculus for resorting to war.100 However, although existing evidence suggests terrorism is necessary for the outbreak of traditional war in the current geopolitical

For the prevailing Realist views on the implications of nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War environment, reference Robert Jervis, “The Nuclear Revolution and the Common Defense,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol 101, No. 5 (1986) p. 690 and Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed (New York: W. W. Norton, 2002) p. 37. For the most notable Liberal models of the post-Cold War era, reference Francis Fukuyama, Have We Reached the End of History, (RAND 1989) p. 23, Jack Levy, “Domestic Politics and War,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring, 1988) p. 662, and Bruce Russet, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton University Press:1993) p. 4 99 Frank Wayman, Resort to War: 1816-2007 (CQ Press.) 100 Analysis of major-states’ calculations for resorting to war is based on the Correlates of War Project’s classification of international conflicts, as compiled in Wayman’s Resort to War 1816-2007 (CQ Press.) 98

security paradigm, further efforts are necessary for determining whether terrorist events alone are sufficient for shaping the resort to warfare.

Does Terrorism Alone Cause War? The Search for a Reliable Model Consistent with Van Creveld’s concept of 4GW theory, this research posits terrorism is central to the current security environment, particularly for its tendency to instigate traditional, interstate wars.101 However, whereas 4GW theory provides a more-robust understanding for how and why terrorist attacks manifest, it ignores other vital components of the most notable, interstate conflicts of the post-Cold War era. For instance, that the US following the September 11 2001 terrorist attacks proved able to gather large coalitions for invading Afghanistan and Iraq suggests nations consider conventional interstate warfare the best method for responding to asymmetric threats. Yet, Van Creveld’s theory fails to accommodate even terrorism as a rationale for the outbreak of interstate wars in the current security environment. Further, the research indicates sensational terrorist acts alone are insufficient predictors of wars involving major, nuclear-armed states. For instance, the United States until 2001 used primarily law enforcement-based techniques to combat terrorism, despite such sensational attacks as the 1993 World Trade Center Bombing, the 1998 US embassy attacks in Kenya and Tanzania, and the USS Cole bombing in 2000.102 The coordinated attacks against Mumbai, India in 2008—possibly the most spectacular terrorist incident since September 11—also failed to illicit a conventional military response from New Delhi.103 Therefore, while terrorist attacks may prove necessary, they must be insufficient for prompting interstate wars in the post-Cold War environment. In other words, terrorist attacks probably prompt traditional, interstate wars in the current security environment only when combined with some other interceding variables.

Martin Van Creveld predicted terrorism and other forms of asymmetric violence increasingly would replace conventional warfare as the primary mode of military conflict, Van Creveld, The Transformation of War, (New York: 1991, pp. 45-50 102 Richard H Shultz and Andreas Vogt, “The Real Intelligence Failure on 9/11 and the Case for a Doctrine of Striking First,” In Terrorism and Counterterrorism, edited by Russel D Howard and Reid L. Sawyer, (Connecticut: 2002); pp 405-407 103 "Mumbai attacks probed as India-Pakistan relations strained". CNN. 1 December 2008. Available at http://web.archive.org/web/20090219205611/http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/11/30/india. attacks/index.html 101

This research attempts to identify which variables can predict the outbreak of interstate wars in the post-Cold War if combined with transnational terrorist attacks. The following analyses therefore draw heavily from traditional, “rationalist” theories of geopolitics and the causes of war, focusing largely on general security trends and concepts extrapolated existing literature.104 Therefore, this research proceeds with 1. A literature rearview intended to identify the most viable, rationalist casus belli existing in the current security environment. 2. A research design intended to test such variables as an interceding mechanism in the recourse to traditional, interstate wars following transnational terrorist attacks 3. The results of the statistical analysis as well as a review of pertinent case studies. 4. A conclusion detailed the findings and their implications for the study of international relations.

Literature Review

Academics have long sought to describe the processes by which nation-states engage in warfare, providing a wealth of understanding regarding how variables in the security environment shape states’ rivalries and decision-makin. Since wars predicated on transnational terrorist attacks ultimately remain state-centric endeavors, any viable hypothesis regarding their outbreak must first consider the prevailing theories for describing states’ recourse to war in traditional terms. Although such theories often minimize the implications of terrorism as a fundamentally distinct independent variable, these traditional views set the baseline principles for describing nation-states’ decision-making processes. Traditional theories therefore constitute the preponderance of this review.

An Elusive Paradigm: Realists’ Search for Rational Explanations for War The bulk of the empirical research for describing states’ recourse to war relies almost exclusively on the Neorealist framework for international relations. In general, these models seek to employ structural and cost-benefit rationales for explaining what otherwise remain the illusive—and seldom-predictable—aspects of nations’ grand strategy. However, these The use of the term “rationalist” here includes what some notable scholars refer to as “positivist” explanations, in which the recourse to war follows a discernible train of cause-and-effect, but may not comport with varying subject views of the concept of rationality. 104

models all rely on the host of key assumptions underpinning the Realist tradition, including considering the modern nation-state in terms of a single, monolithic entity, which uses costto-benefit analyses as a decision-making processes for pursuing actions in pursuit of its own self-interests.

105

In addition, these and other Realist predictive models often rely on the

assumption that the material difference between adversarial states’ military capabilities represents the decisive factor for success in war.106 While Neorealist assumptions remain intuitive, logical, and appealing, their model struggles to explain why self-interested, rational states will resort to highly-destructive war when less-costly options to compromise exist.107 None can dispute the inevitable material and political costs associated with the recourse to war, and even noted Realist scholars Adam Meirowitz and Anne Sartori “think of international disputes as concerning the division of a pie that shrinks in the event of a war.”108 Yet, devout Realists have developed quantitative models for reconciling the theories’ key assumptions with the seemingly irrational nature of nation-states’ recourse into war. Neorealists’ ability to dissect and describe the outbreak of interstate wars culminates with Bueno de Mesquita’s expected utility model. Using a complex and multifaceted quantitative model, de Mesquita demonstrates in probabilistic terms that “war (or lesser conflicts) can be initiated even when losses are expected, so long as those losses are not as large as the liability associated with continuing to live with the existing and the anticipated status quo”109 In de Mesquita’s terms, such calculations actually can lend to the decision for war a “positive utility,” and other Realists note that the circumstances leading to 65 of 76 wars since 1815 meet the quantitative conditions for the term. However, the increasingly catastrophic risks now associated with conventional warfare continue to challenge Neorealists to reconcile this model with the persistence of interstate wars.

Jack S. Levy, “The Causes of War: A Review of Theories and Evidence,” in Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War, vol I, Edited by Phillip E. Tetlock, Jo L. Husbands, Robert Jervis, Paul C. Stern, and Charles Tilly. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989. p. 244 106 ibid 107 James D. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” in International Organization, vol 49. No. 3 (Summer 1995) pp. 379 108 Adam Meirowitz and Anne E. Sartori, Strategic Uncertainty as a Cause of War, as presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Washington, DC, September 2005; pp. 1-2 109 Bueno De Mesquita, “The War Trap Revisited: A Revised Expected Utility Model,” The American Political Science Review , Vol. 79, No. 1 (Mar., 1985), p. 163 105

Strategic Uncertainty: Preserving the Realist Tradition Neorealists counter the irrationality associated with engaging in traditional, interstate war with the contention that the “strategic uncertainty” inherent in the security environment influences otherwise logical actors to risk war when more beneficial options exist. As noted in previous Realist literature, the cost of conventional combat usually reduces the potential gains of wars to below that of a pre-war compromise, suggesting risk-averse states with perfect situational awareness should compromise.

110

To describe this in conceptual terms,

James Fearon devised a mathematical-based thought experiment wherein states fighting for $100 could negotiate for a pre-war settlement to split the sum evenly, each gaining 50 dollars. If waging a war in hopes of winning the entire $100 cost each state $20, and each side stood a 50% chance of winning the contest, the decision for war would represent a net value of positive $30 (0.5- 100 + 0.5 0 - 20), making compromise the rational decision.111 However, Neorealists note that states maintain incentives to “privatize” information, concealing from each-other their strategic intentions and capabilities in the hopes of preserving some decisive advantage. As Meirowitz and Sartori contend, nations’ concealment of advancements in their military capabilities creates an “asymmetry of information,” which leads adversaries to favor using worst-case assessments to fill gaps in their knowledge of the environment. The two cite the DoD estimates for global military spending—which explicitly caveat the degree of uncertainty underpinning its analysis—as evidence states lack a complete understanding of the security environment.112 Without perfect information regarding adversaries’ intentions, resolve, and absolute military capabilities, nation-states cannot possibly hope to arrive at a viable cost-benefit analysis for dictating the recourse into war. While strategic uncertainty may suggest the very concept of rationality is a superficial construct—with no real practical utility for describing the geopolitics of any era—Realists contend it explains how self-interested, rational nation-states can use deliberate calculations to arrive at the recourse to war, which otherwise may seem illogical.

Meirowitz and Sartori, p. 1 Fearon, pp. 387-388 112 Ibid, pp. 2-4 110 111

Theoretic Models Fail to Isolate Specific Indicators of War While the Neorealist worldview is capable of explaining why nation-states resort to war in the theoretical sense, the bulk of their literature fails to identify the specific conditions necessary to precipitate such conflicts. In fact, Neorealist work in general better describes why wars do not occur. Further, Erik Gartzke takes the logic of strategic uncertainty to its maximum theoretic potential, claiming war is the result of variables which neither the postmortem researcher nor real-time participants are able to observe. In Gartzke’s model, war and its underlying causes therefore remain beyond theorists’ analytic ability to either predictive or describe.113 Yet, there exists limited research into the key observable variables that often precede the recourse to war, offering potential opportunities for further describing terrorism’s role in prompting interstate violence.

Fighting for Territory: The Key Observable in the Recourse to War? A limited literature does attempt to extend Neorealist theoretical models for explaining the recourse to war into more practical terms, primarily that of territorial disputes. Neorealists’ predict states will chose war as a method for settling “indivisible” issues, which they describe as contests for which neither side can willingly accept compromise. 114 However, most geopolitical issues remain complex, with sufficient facets to enable compromise via smaller, non-decisive concessions. However, Neorealists contend territorial disputes remain uniquely indivisible and therefore a reliable predictor of the recourse to war. These theories note the presence of land- or sea-based disputes in almost all geopolitical rivalries that culminate in war, as well as their general absence from lesser confrontations 115 A territory-based model, however, must offer little to the analysis of wars predicated as a response to transnational terrorism. Major nation-states responsible for initiating war in response to transnational terrorism usually claim no direct territorial equities in the states they subsequently engage with conventional military force. Additionally, terrorist groups responsible for facilitating transnational attacks may intend to remove their target nations’

Erik Gartzke, “War is the Error Term,” in International Organization (1999), 53 : pp 567-569h Fearon, p. 382 115 John A. Vasquez, “Distinguishing Rivals that Go to War from Those That Do Not,” in International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 40 N0. 4 (December 1996): pp. 531-532 113 114

military forces from certain areas, but history demonstrates their aspirations of controlling and governing their own territories remain wildly unrealistic.116

Terrorism: Further Complicating Rationalist Explanations of War Existing theories largely agree that wars predicated as a response to transnational terrorism generally lack an immediately rationalist explanation. Theories have therefore stopped short of attempting to identify rationalist variables for explaining the outbreak of such wars. Rather, these scholars note the cost of government reactions typically outweigh the damages terrorists are capable of inflicting, based on comparisons of the quantity of lives and property lost in transnational terrorist attacks with that of subsequent wars.117 Evidence of these phenomena include the airline restrictions following the September 11 terrorist attacks, which influenced more Americans to rely on automobiles for long-distance domestic travel and subsequently facilitated more than 1,000 additional US automobile-related fatalities in the next year.

118

If nation-states indeed fall victim to the propensity for

overreacting to spectacular terrorist attacks, then almost by definition the resort to war under these circumstances cannot derive from a rational decision-making calculus. In the rationalist literature regarding nation-state responses to terrorism, however, there exist two notable theories that reconcile states’ strategic logic and the disproportionate nature of action and reaction in counterterrorism campaigns. In Why Terrorism Does not Work, Max Abrahms adapts “correspondence inference theory”—a psychological phenomenon in which observers correlate the outcomes of an event with the sponsors’ unstated, but underlying intent—to explain why victims of terrorist attacks interpret the attackers’ goals as maximalist. For example, noisy children who observe their mother close the door in an adjacent room intuitively infer the mother desires a more-quiet atmosphere. Accordingly, victims of spectacularly lethal terrorist attacks infer the attackers seek simply the existential death and destruction of the target society.119 In addition, other observers of wars predicated in response to terrorist attacks note governments’ use of terrorism a “political ploy” to

Abrahms, “Why Terrorism Does not Work,” in International Security, Vol. 31 No. 2 (Autumn, 2006) John Mueller, Reactions and Overreactions to Terrorism, As presented at the 25th Aniversary Conflict Studies Conference, Center for Conflict Studies, University of New Brunswick (October 2005) pp. 3-4 118 ibid 119 Abrahms, pp. 56-60 116 117

pursue unrelated, previously-established political agendas.120 The most famous example remains the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, which many contend the Bush administration launched in order to gaining freer access to Middle Eastern oil.

Hypothesis and Research Design

This research hypothesizes that, in the current security environment, major, nucleararmed states states will resort to conventional warfare following sensational terrorist attacks only in times of perceived economic frailty. While the existing literature largely ignores economics as a geopolitical motivation for nation-states to initiate war, the concept is consistent with the rationalist tradition, which generally focuses on rival nations’ desires to gain or preserve resources. Since it remains virtually inconceivable that a nation-state could stand to gain significant, zero-sum concessions directly from a terrorist organization, this hypothesis assumes countries tailor their use of interstate war in order to defend against losing some resource as a consequence of terrorist attacks. For instance, Max Abrhams describes the desire to protect citizens from the perceived existential threat of terrorism as one such internal dynamic shaping states’ response to terrorist attacks. Such variables seem more likely to shape states’ reactions to terrorism than the potential for more direct concessions, such as land, mineral, or energy resources. However, if states perceive terrorist attacks as capable of disrupting commerce, it’s plausible these countries would engage in responsive interstate wars in order to preserve their economic prosperity. In order to test the hypothesis, this research therefore relies on panel data, which in each observation encompasses 1. A single nation-state 2. A month-year time series 3. A binary value representing the relevant country’s decision to launch interstate war or not (War) 4 The number of fatalities the country suffered from terrorist attacks during the time period (Fatalities) and 5. A binary value representing weather the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) kept pace with inflation or had fallen in capacity relative to the previous year (Pos. GDP).121 The following model illustrates the hypothesis, in which i terrorist attacks and

Mueller, p. 3 Statistics for War derived from Sarkees, Meredith Reid and Frank Wayman (2010). Resort to War: 1816 2007. CQ; Statistics for Fatalities derived from RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents, RAND 120 121

target countries’ economic outlook interact to predict the outbreak of traditional, interstate wars in the post-Cold War security environment. Terrorism + Economic Fragility  Interstate War122

Results

Intercept

Fatalities

Pos. GDP

Fatalities & Pos. GDP

0.03

0.00

-0.01

0.00

(0.01)

(1.00)

(0.01)

(0.00)

Table 3-1. The Effects of Terrorism and Countries’ Economic Status on Interstate War, 1991-2007: The top row represents the independent variables used in the analysis. Fatalities referrers to the number of fatalities countries suffered due to terrorist attacks, Pos. GDP represents a binary variable in which 1 = states’ GDP keeps pace with inflation. The values within the chart represent the variables’ coefficient, their statistical effect on the probability of Interstate war. Derived from The Correlates of War Project and RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents

This datamodel itself suggests the interaction between fatalities from terrorist attacks and victim countries’ economic health does not correlate with their decision to engage in traditional warfare. In fact, in scenarios where states’ GDP either fail to keep pace with inflation or make significant gains (Frail GDP = 0), the number of fatalities those states suffer from terrorist attacks seems to decrease their probability for engaging in war, although at an insignificant rate. In practice, that states would prove less likely to engage in warfare as it suffers more terrorist attacks proves highly counter-intuitive, suggesting severe inconsistency in the dataset itself. Conversely, in scenarios where states’ GDP keep pace with or make slight gains on inflation, fatalities from terrorist attacks exert no impact on the outbreak of traditional, interstate wars. It’s likely several incongruities exist within the dataset which complicate its use in the analysis of traditional, interstate wars as a response to terrorism. For example, states may

Corporation, last modified November 05, 2013, available at http://www.rand.org/nsrd/projects/terrorismincidents.html; Statistics for Pos. GDP derived from “World Economic Outlook Databases,” International Monetary Fund, accessed November 12, 2013, available at http://www.imf.org/external/ns/cs.aspx?id=28 122 P (Interstate War, Posst-Cold War) = β + β Fatalities + β Pos. GDP + β Fatalities * Pos. GDP + u o 1 2 3

embark on any number of procedural measures prior to launching a traditional, interstate war in response to a terrorist attack. Countries incorporated into the Liberal international order may first seek UN approval and assemble allied coalitions, whereas other states may simply mount a quicker, unilateral response. States also may require uneven periods of prewar mobilization, depending on the varying size, capabilities, and force structures of the their conventional militaries. Therefore, lag times separating the independent and dependent variables in this test may vary on a case-by-case basis, making a generalized approach impossible. Therefore, in order to dissect the causal mechanism which may dictate states’ response to terrorism in the post-Cold War security environment, this research traces the contemporary counterterrorism policies of the US and India. Each of these countries have suffered repeated sensational terrorist attacks, only on occasion opting to engage in traditional, interstate war. In examining the nature of their inconsistent responsive measures, this research identifies the strengths and limitations of the proposed theoretical model.

Economy Uber Alles: The United States’ Exceptional Response to September 11 Many cite the September 11 attacks as the watershed moment in the emergence of a new, more dangerous form of terrorism, which they believe prompted the US to bring counterterrorism to the fore of its national security strategy. At the heart of the concept of New Terrorism are scholars’ observations that the tempo of terrorist attacks worldwide up-to and including the September 11 were steadily decreasing, while the numbers of deaths sustained in such attacks had sharply risen.123 The nearly 3000 lives lost in the September 11 attacks all but confirmed that the transnational terrorist threat had become increasingly lethal.124 Consistent with Max Abrahms’ use of Correspondence Inference Theory, then President George W. Bush’s rhetoric following the event included the belief that September 11 revealed “a world where freedom itself (was) under attack.”125 Bush further constructed the

Russel Howard, “Understanding Al Qaeda’s Application of the New Terrorism,” In Terrorism and Counterterrorism (2003) p. 2 124“Official 9/11 Death Toll Rises by One,” CBS Online News, September 10, 2010, available at; http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-201_162-4250100.html 125 President Bugsh addressed his intentions for responding to the September 11 2001 terrorist attacks in a speech to a joint session of congress on September 20, 2001. The text is available through the Washington Post online, “President Bush Addresses the Nation,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/bushaddress_092001.html/ 123

justification for his eventual counterterrorism response with the administration’s assessment that new terrorists strove to kill Americans simply out of spite for the individual liberties.126 Yet, New Terrorism in practice long predates September 11, suggesting the potential lethality of terrorist attacks in-and-of itself fails to account for the sudden US retaliation. In fact, the US government in 2000 held a National Commission on terrorism, which prompted R. James Woolsey’s often cited belief that “today’s terrorists do not want a seat at the table, they want to destroy the table and everyone sitting at it.”127 In addition, US defense scholars as early as 1992 were forming theories regarding the emergence of Netwar, a revolution in military affairs in which non-state actors’ use of interconnected attack and facilitation nodes, innovative tactics, and various information technologies threatened the relative superiority of conventional military forces.128 Accompanying these theories were a spate of lethal terrorist attacks from the early 1990s and up-to September 11, including against New York City’s World Trade Center (WTC), two US Embassies in Africa, and the then Yemen-based USS Cole.129 These almost certainly would have demonstrated to the US government that alQa’ida—already recognized as the world’s most prominent and menacing practitioner of transnational terrorism—had been employing the concepts of New terrorism and Netwar to real world, lethal effect. In fact, while the September attacks remain the most lethal transnational terrorist operation in history, they are not completely without precedent. Rather, in terms of the strategic context, the US would have considered the 1993 WTC Center bombing similarly spectacular, deserving of a meaningful counterterrorism response. The attack—which resulted in 6 civilian deaths and over 1000 injuries—demonstrated al-Qa’ida’s operational reach into the US homeland and its ability to exploit the vulnerabilities inherent to civilian targets.130 Immediately following the attack, then New York State Governor Mario Cuomo

Ibid National Commission on Terrorism, Countering the Changing Threat, p. 2 128 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “The Advent of Netwar (Revisited),” in Networks and Netwar: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy, RAND Corporation, (Washington, DC 2001)pp. 1-4 129 Shultz and Vogt, Ibid 130 J. Gilmore Childers, Esq. and Henry J. DePippo, Esq., statements to the Senate Judiciary Committee, "Foreign Terrorists in America: Five Years After the World Trade Center,” February 24, 1998, available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1998_hr/s980224c.htm 126 127

noted "we all have that feeling of being violated. No foreign people or force has ever done this to us. Until now we were invulnerable.”131 Cuomo’s statements capture the country’s immediate emotional response, which post-attack law enforcement investigations and intelligence examinations would further substantiate. These inquires eventually revealed the operatives’ detailed and long-term attack preparations, which included advanced training in operational tradecraft and homemade explosives production in Pakistan-based camps.132 The operatives’ use of a then unique recipe for mixing urea-nitrate-based homemade explosives and aluminum powder further demonstrates the high degree of operational acumen these al-Qa’ida training efforts by 1993 had achieved. At the time, the urea-nitrate and aluminum mixture represented an innovative method for creating thermobaric explosives—charges capable of increased blast pressures and designed specifically for attacking enclosed spaces–from commercially available materials.133 Indeed, the 1993 WTC bombing represented a concrete example of al-Qa’ida’s intent and capability to destroy US-based targets, variables thought to account for the US’s uniquely forceful response to September 11. In addition, the US also would have understood that the 1993 WTC attack represented the manifestation of a truly enduring threat, rather than a single isolated anomaly. In legal testimonies, the perpetrators of the bombing cited the attack as their response to specific US foreign policies, claiming similar al-Qa’ida-sponsored attacks would persist until America halted its aid to Israel.134 Certainly, al-Qa’ida’s political agenda at the time was no secret. Usama bin Laden’s eventual fatwas in 1996 articulated the group’s objection to the US presence in the Middle East and support for regimes they branded as corrupt and un-Islamic.135 Any serious analyst would have forecasted the al-Qa’ida transnational attack threat to persist for as long as the US continued its Middle East policies. Yet, the US did not fundamentally alter its defense strategy following the 1993 bombing. In 1993 and 1994, then Secretary of Defense Dick Chaney’s strategies included no reference counterterrorism operations, but continued to favor building forces to deter BBC News Story at http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/february/26/newsid_2516000/2516469.stm 132 Childers and DePippo, Ibid 133 Childers and DePippo, Ibid 134 Childers and DePippo, Ibid 135 Bin Laden's Fatwa, 1996, available at PBS News Online at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_1996.html 131

hostile nations.136 The omission of any counterterrorism policy in the defense strategies of the time demonstrates the US’s continued adherence to Cold War power politics. It wasn’t until September 11 that the US put-forth a concerted effort to combat transnational terrorism. In the aftermath of the attack, the Bush administration created the Department of Homeland security, an entirely new cabinet-level bureaucracy for coordinating America’s efforts for defending against specifically terrorism.137 The same effort expanded the US intelligence community’s authorities for collecting information to support counterterrorism operations as well as for increasing cooperation between agencies formerly segregated along either foreign or domestic functions.138 In addition, the US response to the September 11 attacks included invading and toppling two separate sovereign regimes, operations the country hadn’t been willing to attempt since World War II.139 The extreme scope of damage to private commercial property—as well its expected implications for the US economy— remains September 11’s most fundamental distinction from that of the 1993 WTC bombing. As detailed in a 2002 Congressional Research Service study, analysts initially perceived the September 11 Attacks would “push a weak economy over the edge into an outright contraction.”140 According to the report: The attacks on the twin towers threatened the heart of the US financial system. Their destruction devastated the leading dealer in US Treasury securities, the loss of whose staff accounted for almost one quarter of those killed in New York City. The debris from the collapsing towers and the general chaos in the area brought about the closing of the New York Stock Exchange, the major stock exchange in the United States, as well as closing brokerage houses and banks in the Wall Street area. The grounding of all air planes severely hampered the clearing of checks and the distribution of paper currency, creating great uncertainty for financial institutions.141 In addition, the study notes a short-term decline in foreign entities’ net purchase of US assets following the attacks.142 However, while business in New York and insurance sectors did suffer profound setbacks, the Congressional Research Services has since concluded the attacks caused few lasting economic setbacks. Rather, the more recent analysis suggests the A national Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, Office of the President of the United States, February 1995 137 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, USPATRIOT Act 138 Ibid 139 Wayman, Ibid 140 Congressional Research Service, The Economic Effects of 9/11: A Retrospective Assessment, September 2002, p. 2 141 Ibid, p. 4 142 Ibid, p. 3 136

economy had actually entered a recession in March 2001, six months prior to the attack.143 It is therefore likely Bush Administration officials attributed the September 11 attacks with negative economic trends that owed actually to a naturally ailing market.

The US in Yemen: How Target States Can Influence the Victim’s Response The US by 2009 faced the emergence of a new al-Qai’da node capable of facilitating sensational transnational attacks. On December 25, 2009 now-infamous al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) operative Omar Faruq Abdulmutallib successfully infiltrated a powerful, artfully concealed improvised explosive device aboard a US-bound airliner.144 While Abdulmutallib failed to properly detonate the device and ultimately succumbed to the restraint of other passengers, the operation successfully demonstrated to the US that AQAP had emerged as a viable transnational terrorist group with an operational acumen capable of defeating even the most robust security measures. The operation quickly prompted lawmakers and President Obama to begin considering full-body-scanners, an emerging and highly controversial technology capable of visually penetrating layers of clothing to identify potential explosives concealed on airline passangers.145 Then, AQAP in October 2010 facilitated another transnational attack against a US-bound aircraft, this time successfully infiltrating a parcel-bomb aboard a mail airline.146 Again using highly innovative concealment techniques, AQAP reaffirmed its continued ability to defeat US technological security measures, with only an intelligence tip-off thwarting the otherwise impressive operation.147 Certainly by early 2010, the US government was acutely aware of the economic implications a successful AQAP airline attack would incur, and its continually failing security apparatus offered little assurances it would intercept future attempts. In December of 2009, US Senator Joseph Lieberman in a personal interview relayed a colleague’s opinion that “Iraq was yesterday’s war. Afghanistan is today’s war. If we do not act preemptively, Yemen will be tomorrow’s war.”148

Ibid, p. 8 Josh Meyer, Obama Calls Jet Incident a Serious Reminder, The Lost Angeles Times, December 29, 2009 145 Ibid. 146 Mark Mazzetti, US Sees Complexity of Bombs as Link to Al Qaeda, The New York Times, October 30, 2010 147 Ibid. 148 Transcript: Sen. Liberman, Rep. Hoekstra on FNS, December 27, 2009, available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,581260,00.html 143 144

Yet, rather than launch an expeditionary conventional war to route AQAP from its then-expanding safehaven in southern Yemen, the US opted for using less decisive means. According to Washington Post staff writer Dana Priest, then CIA Director George Tenet following the September 11 attacks “coaxed (then Yemeni President) Ali Abdllah Saleh into a partnership that would give the CIA and US military units the means to attack terrorist training camps and al-Qaeda targets” in Yemen.149 This agreement allegedly has enabled the US to facilitate counterterrorism strikes targeting Yemen-based AQAP senior leaders, including the group’s now-deceased former external operations planner Anwar al-Awlaqi.150 While the US probably amplified its kinetic operations in Yemen in response to these AQAP transnational attack attempts, the strategy writ-large prove inconsistent with the country’s decision to invade Afghanistan and Iraq. However, that the US has decided against invading Yemen in response to AQAP does not indicate less impetus on the part of Washington in combating terrorism than did its campaign in 2001 to defeat core al-Qa’ida in Afghanistan. Former US ambassador to the Republic of Yemen William A. Rugh describes the Obama administration’s prioritization of operations targeting AQAP in late 2009 as a drastic reversal of the US government’s previous disregard for Yemeni issues.151 Rather, the US strategy in Yemen probably reflects a changing dynamic in states’ efforts to deal with the threat of transnational terrorism. Yemen’s actions as the next potential battleground in America’s War on Terror may have proved decisive. Whereas the Taliban regime in Afghanistan clung to its cultural obligation against betraying its al-Qa’ida guests, Saleh waged a successful political evasion. According to Rugh, Saleh artfully promised to increase his country’s campaign against AQAP elements in southern Yemen, while simultaneously extending overtures to China, Europe, and Gulf states for their continued economic assistance.152 Immediately following Saleh’s removal, the Yemeni military’s ability in early 2012 to swiftly force AQAP from several of its key safehavens—where the group until then had expanded without significant resistance—demonstrates his predecessor’s extreme lack of sincerity for combating YemenDana Priest, US Military Teams, Intelligence Deeply Involved in Aiding Yemen on Strikes, The Washington Post, January 27, 2010 150 Kimberly Dozier, Drones: Obama administration’s weapon of choice in the war on al-Qaida, Associated Press, September 30, 2011 151 William A. Rugh, “Yemen and the United States: Conflicting Priorities,” in The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Vol. 34:2 Summer 2010, p. 111-113 152 Rugh, p. 114-116 149

based transnational terrorists.153 Only with the ascension of current Yemeni President Abd Rabbuh Mansur al-Hadi have Yemeni forces advanced concerted, faithful effort for defeating the threat of transnational terrorists emanating from within their borders.

India: A Case for Territoriality India and Pakistan in the post-Cold War era have demonstrated a willingness to resort to traditional war in their ongoing dispute over the state of Jammu and Kashmir, a border territory vital to the region’s water supplies. In 1999, “an estimated 2,000 Kashmiri militants, reportedly trained in Pakistan, crossed the border into Kargil on the Indian side of the [established line of control] and seized high mountain ridges, threatening the [strategic] main road between Srinagar and Leh.”154 The Indian armed forces responded promptly to the assualt, mobilizing ground forces in concert with massing air and artillery attacks. Two Indian Infantry Divisions effectively executed a series of uphill battles which, inflicting punishing losses on the terrorist brigades, threatened to overrun the Pakistani encrouchment. Under constituent and military pressure not to abandon the Kashmir and facing increased military futility, Pakistan’s president Musharraf quickly sought US diplomatic intervention, which eventual would arbitrate a return to the previously-accepted line of control.155 However, in response to probably the most spectacular terrorist attack in history save September 11, India more recently has decided against using conventional military options. Between November 26th and 29th of 2008, the Pakistani terrorist group Lashkar-e Tayyiba executed a surprise, complex small arms assault against multiple civilian targets in the Indian city of Mumbai, ruthlessly massacring 164 people.156 The attack—which shocked the entire world and actually followed a string of at least 9 less notable terrorist attacks against Indian targets—may have prompted the India military to dispatch fighter jets to

Bill Roggio, “Yemeni Army drives AQAP from 2 key strongholds in southern Yemen,” The Long War Journal, available at http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/06/yemeni_army_drives_a.php#ixzz24D7it2nL 154 Farzana Shaikh, “Pakistan's Nuclear Bomb: Beyond the Non-Proliferation Regime”, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 78, No. 1(Jan., 2002), p. 37 155 Bruce Riedel, American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House, (Center for the Advanced Study of India: 2002) pp. 5 -6 156 Press Information Bureau of the Government of India, HM announces measures to enhance security, available at http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=45446 153

patrol the country’s border with Pakistan, according to Pakistani press reports.157 However, no major military confrontations ensued. Rather, the government of India built its counterterrorism capabilities, expanded information-sharing programs, and improved coordination with the US.158 A number of independent variables could explain India’s inconsistent response to the 1999 militant incursion and the 2008 Mumbai attacks in rationalist terms, including territory. In this ongoing regional dispute, militants have demonstrated their intent and capability to contest terrain, which in the case of the Kargil war may have prompted the swift military response. Conversely, the Mumbai attacks proved exponentially more sensational and destructive than any previous border incursion, but failed to an Indian counteroffensive. However, there remains significant evidence economics have also played a role in the India-Pakistan rivalry. While the Indian economy at the time of the Mumbai attacks was by no accounts booming, it in fact was solidifying gains in certain sectors. In 2008, “western India, which had witnessed substantial growth in the initial flush of economic liberalization, [showed] no signs of slowing down, with the country boasting a 7.9% growth rate with the quarter ending in June of that year.”159 Overall, the Indian economy was struggling to cope with spikes in global energy prices and the residual effects of the US financial crisis, but the countries 26% growth in GDP between 2008 and 2010 suggests India at the time of the Mumbai attacks was devoting the majority of its efforts to enhancing its economy.160

Conclusion

In conclusion, sensational terrorist attacks combined with degrading economic conditions may not be sufficient for prompting nations to launch traditional, interstate wars. According to the analysis of case studies, this process explains the outbreak of war in a few

Lisa Curtis, “After Mumbai: Time to Strenthen US-India Counterterrorism Cooperation,” in Backgrounder, December 9, 2008 p. 4 158 Ibid, p. 5 159 Sumit Ganguly, “Domestic Turmoil and External Hopes,” in Asian Survey Vol XLIX No. I, January 2009. p. 40 160 Ibid. 157

historical circumstances. However, the datamodel fails to correlate these independent variables with the outbreak of interstate war. Therefore terrorist attacks and the economic health of states are not viable interaction terms capable of fully describing the outbreak of war in the current security environment. While these independent variables are not sufficient, they may, however, tend to lead to interstate wars under certain conditions. The case studies also suggest states tend to drastically exaggerate the economic implications of terrorist attacks, which in fact exhibit few lasting effects. But, having gleaned valuable experience and operational knowledge from the US responses to the September 11 2001, major nuclear-armed states possibly have been preparing themselves to better place sensational terrorist attacks within a more-appropriate strategic context. This may be preventing other nuclear-armed states from over-exaggerating the potential economic implications of terrorist campaigns, thereby reducing the potential for “correspondence inference theory” to influence societies into interpreting terrorist groups as an existential threat. If accurate, this would account for the proposed theoretical model’s decreasing ability to correlate the interaction between terrorist attacks and states’ economic health with the outbreak of traditional, interstate wars. Further, a reduction in the propensity for nation states to exaggerate, or otherwise “overact,” to terrorist attacks suggests interstate warfare may in fact become increasingly scarce in the current security environment. The research initially suggested terrorism is a necessary independent variable leading to the outbreak of traditional, interstate wars in the current security environment. If states are tempering their response to terrorism, the security environment should therefore include no viable reason for states to engage in conventional war. If so, non-state groups indeed could prove the most credible threat to US national security in the current security environment. However, in order to conclusively exclude rival nation from the types of threats the US must concern itself with, the research turns to the possibility states could use methods other than war to disrupt American geostrategic interests.

Chapter 4 | Iran: the Asymmetric Superpower

Introduction

Especially as the US and other Coalition forces prepare for a near-complete withdrawal from Afghanistan, and the concept of a “Global War on Terror” begins to subside, it appears traditional, interstate wars in fact could become less frequent in the current security landscape. The research suggests major, nuclear-armed states in the current geopolitical security paradigm have only resorted to conventional warfare as a means for combating terrorist organizations in their safehaven areas. However, that the US and other great power countries increasingly are adopting more measured counterterrorism response options suggests the resort to war could become increasingly exceptional. Therefore, it’s possible non-state actors increasingly could present the most credible military threat to the US and its allies. With fewer reasons for countries to engage in traditional, interstate war, it’s likely terrorist and other non-state actors will prove the most willing to engage in direct, violent confrontations with American forces. Certainly, the US will face geopolitical grievances from a host of nations. However, the research suggests these countries will prove increasingly less willing to engage in exchanges of kinetic, military force. Yet, before the US embraces a grand strategy for confronting exclusively non-state actors, it must first consider if nations have resorted to non-conventional methods that present an equally significant military challenge. For instance, when DoD leaders in late August began planning strikes against unspecified Syrian chemical weapons infrastructure, Middle East expert Matthew Levitt warned such actions could provoke a retaliatory threat from either Syria or Lebanese Hezbollah, whom he described as “inclined to do the

asymmetric thing.”161 In fact, analysts since September 11 have not only described non-state actors in terms of an “asymmetric” threat, but rogue nations as well. As Levitt’s commentary on the Syria crisis demonstrates, the concept of asymmetric conflict remains ill-defined and subsequently problematic. For the purpose of this research, the term asymmetric is reserved for conflicts between state- and non-state actors. However, nations certainly have demonstrated an increasing propensity for employing non-conventional military strategies, which warrant further attention. This research therefore will explore whether a less powerful, “rogue” nation could use non-conventional methods as a strategy to compete with the US for hegemony over key geographical regions, despite the latter’s overwhelming military preponderance. Since maintaining an overwhelming military force remains the cornerstone of US global hegemony, successfully negating the utility of conventional power would in fact threaten America’s status as the world’s sole remaining superpower. Further, that the world so relies on US global hegemony as a guarantor of the status quo suggests degrading America’s superpower status would in fact fundamentally alter the nature of the security environment itself, possibly enabling less powerful, aspiring hegemons to establish new systems within their spheres of influence. This research therefore proceeds with 1. A literature review of traditional Realist and Liberalist theories regarding the nature of classic hegemonic rivalries, which traditionally have proven the mechanism for interstate rivalries to bring about significant changes to the security environment 2. A hypothesis that the phenomenon of globalization is allowing lesser nations to employ non-conventional military strategies in order to challenge US hegemony 3. Quantitative analysis of the balance of military capabilities in traditional, interstate wars of the pre- and post-Cold War eras and a case study analysis of the US-Iranian rivalry, and finally 4. A conclusion summarizing the findings and the subsequent implications for the US foreign policy and the field of international relations.

Warren Strobel and David Alexander, “Analysis: Strike on Syria Could Trigger Retaliatory Attacks, Cyberwar,” Reuters, August 29, 2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/29/us-usa-syriaconsequences-analysis-idUSBRE97S06220130829 161

Literature Review

The Foundations of Hegemonic War Realists and other international relations scholars traditionally attribute dramatic changes in the geopolitical order to wars of hegemony, which they describe as the inevitable consequence of ever-shifting power dynamics in the international system. Citing the academic contributions of ancient Greek historian Thucydides—whose chronicling of the Peloponnesian War remains one of the greatest breakthroughs in the field of international relations—Robert Gilpin asserts that the uneven growth of power between states is a permanent fixture of the geopolitical order.162 According to Gilpin and like-minded analysts, Hegemonic wars arise as entities within the international order gain the strength and capabilities necessary to contend with the leading power—or hegemon—of the period. As this occurs, states coalesce into a global, bipolar rivalry that ends only with a decisive military victory and the establishment of a new geopolitical hierarchy.163 Not all wars are hegemonic in nature, but most agree that a truly hegemonic episode has occurred every approximately one hundred years. Gilpen claims the Thirty Years War (1619-1648), the One Hundred Years War (1792-1815), and World War I (1914-1918) as the hegemonic watersheds of the modern age.164 Each of these wars included festering bipolar power dynamics, climactic wars spanning the international systems of the day, and the eventual establishment of radically new power hierarchies. Since at least the early 18 th century, hegemonic wars have marked the evolution of the geopolitical security paradigm. That previous hegemonic wars appear so cyclical in nature has provided Neorealists perspective into what they describe as the balance of power, in which members of the interstate system grow and form alliances as required to match the military capabilities of the existing hegemon. Previous hegemonic wars each produced new, stable geopolitical orders, which relied on a state or small group of states to govern the resulting post-war period, at least for as long as dissatisfied states lack the capability necessary to challenge new

Robert Gilpin,, “The Theory of Hegemonic War,” The Journal of Interdisciplinary History,” Vol. 18 No 4, (Spring 1988), pp. 591-592 163 Ibid 593-595 164 Ibid 609 162

hegemons. Yet, history suggests the degeneration into a new hegemonic struggle is all but inevitable.165 Keneth Waltz attributes this near paradox—in which ostensibly stable hegemonic orders foster the resurgence of degenerative world wars—to the structural nature of geopolitics itself. To Waltz and other Neorealists, states are unable to acquiesce to a system of imbalanced power, and therefore will continually strive to forge alliances or build their own independent capabilities in order to match the strength of the existing hegemon. As Waltz describes, “Unbalanced power, whoever wields it, is a potential danger to others. The powerful state may…think of itself as acting for the sake of peace, justice, and wellbeing in the world…which may conflict with the preferences and interests of others.166

Into the Nuclear Age That analysts cannot convincingly identify a major hegemonic episode looming over the current security landscape challenges both Neorealist theories of natural power balancing and the concept of hegemonic wars itself. If hegemonic wars occur once every approximately one hundred years, with World War I (1914-1918) being the most recent example, the current security landscape by Realist accounts is due for a significant upheaval. However, the balance of power following World War I—which replaced Europe’s domination of international relations first with a system that included Europe and the US, then US-Soviet Union bipolarity, and ultimately US unipolarity—has over time concentrated power within the hands of the incumbent hegemon, rather than prompt balancing through viable distributed alliances.167

Writing in 1990, Charles Krauthammer identified that

“American preeminence [in the post-Cold War era] is based on the fact that it is the only country with the military, diplomatic, political, and economic assets to be a decisive player…in whatever part of the world it chooses to involve itself.”168 Later in 1999, William C. Wohlforth revisited the question of America’s post-Cold War preponderance. Having compared the data describing international power dynamics—including countries’

William C. Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” International Security, Vol. 24 No. 1 (Summer 1999), p. 26 166 Keneth Waltz, “Evaluating Theories,” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 9 No. 4 (Dec. 1997) pp. 915916 167 Wohlforth, 607-608 168 Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs Vol. 70 No. 1 (1990/1991), p. 24 165

population, gross domestic product, and military expenditures—Wohlforth concluded that “never in the modern international history has the leading state been so dominant.”169 Even scholars critical of the Waltzian concept of power balancing—who nevertheless believe in the current waning of US primacy—cannot refute the country’s hegemonic status for as long as into the foreseeable future. In 2006, Christopher Layne claimed “The United States enjoys no privileged exemption from the fate of past hegemons,” but conceded that no great powers or power-alliances could emerge to plausibly challenge US primacy until as long as 2030.170 Ultimately, that US hegemony remains at least reasonable within the 2013 security landscape challenges Neorealists to explain the durable and exceptional hegemonic order of the post-Cold War era. Probably the most obvious potential explanation for the apparent stability of the current hegemonic order is the US and its potential adversaries’ possession of nuclear weaponry. However, while most analyst agree the dawn of the nuclear age brought with it the most dramatic and widespread implications in perhaps the history of warfare, the introduction of nuclear weapons into the security landscape fails to account for the current stability. As Gilpin describes, although “Nuclear weapons have indeed profoundly transformed the destructiveness and consequences of a great war…in the contemporary anarchy of international relations, distrust, uncertainty, and insecurity have caused states to arm themselves and to prepare for war as never before.” 171 To Gilpin and other Realists, that some states now poses the means to obliterate each other in war does not alter fundamentally the nature of geopolitics, which continues to prove itself a “self-help,” competitive, and un-governed system.172 Neorealists therefore cannot rely on the existence of nuclear weapons in order to explain the stability of the current geopolitical order.

Globalism and the Contemporary Alternatives Analysts with both Realist and Liberalist perspectives continue to struggle with adapting more traditional frameworks to the current geopolitical environment. Whereas

169 170

Wohlforth 13 Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion Revisited,” International Security Vol. 31 No. 2, (Fall 2006), pp. 35-

39 171 172

Gilpin, 611 Keneth Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” International Security Vol. 25 No. 1 (Summer 2000), p.

traditional Realist and Neorealist scholars continue to anchor theories along typical notions of international power dynamics, contemporary thinkers have been searching for new ways in which the global security environment may be evolving. Whether Realist or Liberalist in nature, these theories generally cite factors of modern globalization—which Martin Albrow describes as “those processes by which the peoples of the world are incorporated into a single society”— as responsible for the unique stability of the post-Cold War international order.173 However, their work leaves opportunities for further exploring whether the US truly faces the prospects for a hegemonic power rivalry in the current security environment. For Liberalists, political, cultural, and economic entanglements represent the most attractive alternative to using conventional force as a means to influence other nations. Yet, as the Cold War ended—and with it many of the incentives for nations to participate in the US-led Liberal Internationalism—the geopolitical order entered a crossroads in terms of its commitment to Liberalism ideals. As Ikerman explains “America [during the Cold War] needed allies and its allies needed America. This provided the basis for bargains.” 174 For the international order to transition into a truly viable Liberal Internationalism, Ikerman therefore envisions the US ceding much of its authority in order to facilitate a flatter geopolitical hierarchy. As Ikerman describes, “The “private” governance that the United States provided through NATO and its dominance of multilateral institutions would give way to more “public” rules and institutions of governance.”175 Yet, that the US maintains its preeminent role in the most critical global issues—including conflicts in Syria, Egypt, and Arab-Israeli relations—demonstrate its continued commitment to preponderance, which calls into questions prospects for a truly Liberal Internationalism. Other analysts therefore explore whether power balancing in the face of US hegemony has assumed non-kinetic forms, which nevertheless remain capable of fulfilling Neorealists’ expectations for a balance of power. Noting the relative aggression with which the US in 2003 pursued an allied invasion of Iraq and a unilateral ballistic missile defense capability, Robert Pape in 2005 predicted other world powers—including France, Germany Russia, and Japan—increasingly would engage in “actions that do not directly challenge US

Albrow, Martin and Elizabeth King, Globalization, Knowledge, and Society, (London:1990) P. 8 Ikerman 79 175 Ikerman, 81 173 174

military preponderance but that use nonmilitary tools to delay, frustrate, and undermine aggressive unilateral US military policies.”176 Pape terms the phenomenon “soft balancing.” Perhaps the most recognizable example of soft balancing remains the international community’s reaction to US plans for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. In 2002, then US Vice President Dick Chaney called for a “preventive” war to oust then Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, asserting the need to interrupt the latter’s development of nuclear weapons. That the international community had long accepted norms against the practice of preventive wars gave many second-tier world powers—including US allies—cause for disrupting what would become Operation Iraqi Freedom.177 In the United Nations, France used its veto powers to force the Bush administration into accepting a renewed Iraqi weapons inspections program. Reports from UN chief inspector Hans Blix that the program would eventually resolve the crisis prevented the US from gaining a Security Council resolution supporting the war.178 In addition, even as the US continued with operational plans, Turkey and Saudi Arabia denied US requests for using their territories—which Pape describes as “strategically important to a low-cost, high-confidence strategy for defeating Iraq”—as staging areas and overflight zones to facilitate the eventual invasion.179 Traditionally, China serves as the quintessential example of a modern nation-state whose non-conventional grand strategy could present significant challenges to US military preponderance. In a 2004 analysis for the Strategic Studies Institute, David Lai compares the differences between Western and Chinese military thought to that of the Western game of chess and the Chinese game of go. As Lai describes, “the philosophy behind chess is to win decisively…by decimating whatever opposing forces are standing in the way. The philosophy behind go therefore is to compete for relative gain.180 Further, in Unrestricted Warfare: China’s Master Plan to Destroy America, Canadian Air Force Major Darrell Synnott reviews the translated theses of two Chinese military officers who closely studied the implications of the 1991 US-led invasion of Iraq. Having concluded US military power over the long-term will remain beyond the conventional capabilities of China’s armed forces, these Chinese officers Robert Pape, “Soft Balancing against the United States,” International Security, Vol. 30 No. 1 (Summer 2005), pp. 7-9 177 Pape, 25 178 Pape, 39 179 ibid 180 David Lai, Learning from the Stones: A Go Approach to Mastering China’s Strategic Concept, Shi, May 2004, The Strategic Studies Institute, p. 28 176

actually promote non-military methods—including flooding the American economy with counterfeit goods, supplying its citizens with addictive drugs, and seizing scare industrial resources—as the most viable methods for eroding US hegemony.181

Searching for a True Hegemonic Rival Contemporary views ultimately fail to describe whether the US faces the potential for a viable hegemonic rivalry in the current geopolitical environment, or if the country finally has broken the cycle of hegemonic episodes. Even the most optimistic Liberalists concede a viable Liberal Internationalism remains in only its nascent stages, and therefore lacks the efficacy to preempt emerging hegemonic rivalries. Conversely, while the most recent Realist scholarship has identified nation-state activities within the current security environment capable of limiting US power, so-called “soft balancing” fails to provide countries a viable method for challenging US vital interests offensively. However, Realist views do suggest the nature of conflict in the current security environment is encouraging states to use primarily non-kinetic methods for resisting or otherwise influencing the US. This suggests states opposed to US interests therefore will fail to amass sufficient conventional power to effectively balance American forces in a truly hegemonic conflict. This research therefore will attempt to reconcile views of the current security environment and globalism with the traditional notion of hegemonic war.

Hypothesis and Research Design

Whereas traditional views would expect the US is increasingly less likely to face a viable hegemonic challenge, this research posits globalism in the current security environment is allowing the world’s least powerful nations to compete with America over vital interests. Traditionally, states probably have resorted to violence and coercion only under circumstances wherein their own military capabilities at least matched that of potential rivals. However, the research believes globalism is allowing so-called “rogue” nations

Major Darrell Synnott, Review of “Unrestricted Warfare: China’s Master Plan to Destroy America,” in The Canadian Air Force Journal, Spring 2008, p. 59 181

increasingly to use low-intensity violence as a means for protecting national interests from a militarily superior US. In an extreme case, such states could use non-traditional methods to deter the US from pursuing its goals in certain geographic regions, thus negating the latter’s hegemony. Since only superpowers have traditionally demonstrated the ability to deter other superpowers, such a strategy could constitute a new type of superpower, which this research hypothetically terms an “asymmetric superpower.”182 This research uses data from The Correlates of War Project to measure the relative military capabilities of adversaries throughout the history of international war. This research expects states responsible for initiating scenarios of military conflict possess a greater Combined Index of National Capabilities (CINC) than do their adversaries (Test 1).183 The research therefore relies on panel data, wherein each observation represents either the initiating (Initiator) or responding (Non-Initiator) side in the interstate wars included in the Correlates of War project. Each observation includes data regarding its particular side’s CINC—which include a cumulative score for coalitions, or sides possessing more than a single contributing nation—and year of the war’s commencement. This construct allows for basic comparison between the average CINC scores of opposing sides in interstate wars (test 1). The research then proceeds to test whether the relationship between initiator states and their CINC relative to their adversaries (CINC Disparity) has changed with the advent of the post-Cold War era (test 2).184 Test 1: CINC (Initiator side) > CINC (Non-Initiator Side)185 Test 2: CINC Disparity (1991-2007) > CINC Disparity (1816-1990)186

Lyman Miller defines a superpower as “a country that has the capacity to project dominating power and influence anywhere in the world, and sometimes, in more than one region of the globe at a time.” Lyman Miller, “China an Emerging SUperopower?” Stanford Journal of International Relations, available at http://www.stanford.edu/group/sjir/6.1.03_miller.html 183 The Combined Index of National Capabilities is a measure of the absolute conventional military power of nation states 184 For a list of the interstate war systems and details regarding the disparity in capabilities between the opposing forces, see appendix D 185 HA:  X Initiator CINC -  X Non-Initiator CINC ≠ 0 Ho:  X Initiator CINC -  X Non-Initiator CINC = 0 186 HA:  X CINC Disparity 1991-2007-  X CINC Disparity 1816-1990 ≠ 0 Ho:  X CINC Disparity 1991-2007-  X CINC Disparity 1816-1990 = 0 182

The research then examines Iran’s use of non-conventional military methods in its rivalry with the US, testing whether the former qualifies as a viable “asymmetric superpower”. Building upon Pape’s logic that “soft balancing” can “delay or frustrate” a vastly superior rival, this research uses viable deterrence and some form of multi-regional power projection as the defining characteristic of a viable asymmetric superpower. Lyman Miller provides the best definition of a traditional superpower, which he describes as, “a country that has the capacity to project dominating power and influence anywhere in the world, and sometimes, in more than one region of the globe at a time.”187 Miller explains that superpowers traditionally wield power via four major axes: Military, economic, political, and cultural.188 Since the concept of an asymmetric superpower infers a country that achieves the effects of traditional superpower from a position of relative weakness, this research considers any use of at least one of these four major axes to suffice. Therefore, the case study will examine 1. Whether Iran has used one of the major axes of power to deter the US from achieving its policy goals and 2. Whether Iran has proven capable of operating through in more than one theatre.

Results

The quantitative

results

research

the

indicate

Mean Initiator CINC

828.0849 (122.6456)

initiator states generally do possess

Non-Initiator CINC

501.0584 (83.94009)

a slightly greater military capacity

Difference

than those of their opponents

means

(table

t = 2.2004

4-1),

but

only

confidence level of 5%. The test does demonstrate that possessing a military advantage has traditionally

187 188

189

the 327.0265 (148.6199)

Table 4-1. Comparison of Initiator and Non-Initiator sides in interstate war systems. Quantitative analysis demonstrates initiators of traditional, interstate wars generally have possessed greater military capabilities (CINC) than their opponents, at the 5% significance level. Statistics derived from The Correlates of War Project.189

Miller, p. 1 ibid

Ho:  X Initiator CINC -  X Non-Initiator CINC = 0 65

dictated states’ willingness to initiate interstate wars. However, that non-initiator states generally have possessed a level of military capacity approaching that of the initiators suggests military force is central to their willingness to resort to warfare as well. In situations wherein these states lacked approximate power parity with their would-be adversaries, they probably capitulated to initiator states’ policy demands, rather than willfully enter into war. Conversely, if non-initiator states perceived themselves capable of competing equally, or at least attiring initiating states into defeat, they acquiesced to the outbreak of a traditional war. Further, indicates

the

weaker

second

test

nation-states

Mean x1: CINC Disparity 1991- 2162.294

increasingly have decided to risk

2007

traditional,

x2: CINC Disparity 1816- 1264.985

interstate

wars

with

superpower rivals. According to the analysis, the disparity of conventional military capacity between opponents in interstate wars involving superpowers has risen since the conclusion of the Cold War, at the 5% significance level (table 4-2). In this respect, even traditional, interstate war in the current

(218.2716)

1990

(210.4499)

Difference of the means

897.3088

t = 2.0924

(428.8336

Table 4-2. CINC disparities of interstate war systems involving superpowers, before and after the Cold War.190 Quantitative analysis demonstrates the disparity in military capabilities (CINC) between opponents in interstate wars involving super power nations has increased since the conclusion of the Cold War, at the 5% significance level. Statistics derived from The Correlates of War Project.

security environment has somehow become more “asymmetric” than in previous eras. The statistics themselves point to a change in the relevancy of conventional strength for determining the outcomes of military conflict and interstate rivalries. These tests prove valuable, as they broadly suggest a trend which accounts for the increasing use of so-called “soft power” and non-conventional methods against American military preponderance. Generally, revisionist states seeking concessions from a potential opponent prove willing to initiate conventional combat only if they perceive their military capabilities as greater than that of the other side’s. In the post-Cold War, this aspect of the geopolitical security paradigm remains intact, as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate militarily superior nations prove most likely to initiate traditional, interstate war. However, in the post-Cold War era, some aspect of the security environment increasingly is

190

Ho:  X CINC Disparity 1991-2007-  X CINC Disparity 1816-1990 = 0

influencing lesser, non-initiating states to enter into conventional combat with superpower states, rather than capitulate to their policy demands. While the decision to engage rather than concede may ultimately prove futile for these lesser states, it hints at some aspect of the security environment that signals to these nations either 1. A net benefit in engaging in traditional, interstate war with a militarily superior superpower, despite the likelihood for a crushing defeat, or 2. Opportunities for somehow negating the initiating sides’ conventional military advantage, which could actually facilitate the lesser states’ victory. However, without further examining the qualitative nature of these rivalries, it remains impossible to attribute this trend to a specific facet of the current security environment. Ultimately, the statistics fall short of describing the current geopolitical security paradigm, especially with respect to lesser states’ means for confronting superpower nations. The statistics do not capture instances wherein lesser states may have deterred superpowers from perusing a specific policy goal, which this research uses as a threshold requirement for the term asymmetric superpower. Conversely, the statistics fail to capture instances wherein superpowers’ overwhelming military force preemptively coerced lesser states into adopting the formers’ will. Therefore, in order to test the concept of an asymmetric superpower, this research examines Iran’s ongoing efforts to protect its national interests against the growing military might of the US, which in fact may constitute the most kinetic example of a state’s efforts to use non-conventional methods to disrupt American military preponderance.

Irreconcilable Adversaries: Iran and the United States James Brill in 1999 claimed that, “viewed from the perspective of hegemon theory, Iran assumes a special importance to the United States. Its independent nature, born of the 1979 Revolution and the trying years of the Iran-Iraq war, clashes with America’s existence as a global hegemon.”191 Brill’s claim reflects a growing realization the US increasingly would face security challenges wherein its national interests intersect with those of a defiant Iran. Since 1979, the Islamic Republic has maintained its revisionist tenor vis-à-vis the US, as many in the international community today note Iran for its designation as a state sponsor of terrorism, its alleged facilitation of an assassination plot on American soil as well as the 2011

191

James A. Brill, “Iran and the United States: A Clash of Hegemonies,” Middle East Report (Fall 1999) p. 46

raid against the U.K. embassy in Tehran, and for possibly pursuing a nuclear weapons capability in defiance of UN resolutions.192 Iran since the 1979 Islamic revolution has maintained a strategy that increasingly has brought the country into confrontations with the US, and inevitably could usurp the latter’s unipolar moment. Whereas Western nations’ competition with both Tsarist and Soviet Russia for access to oil supplies subordinated Iran in the first half of the 19 th century to “the arena of great power politics,” the 1979 revolution initiated in Iran religious and nationalist motivations to achieve hegemony in the Middle East.193 This strategy culminated in 1982, with Iran’s decision to meet Iraq’s incursion into Khurramshahr with a counter-invasion designed to overthrow Iraq’s secular Ba’ath regime.194 While the campaign—Iran’s first endeavor at regional hegemony—ultimately failed, the experience cemented within the country a belief that it should protect the Middle East from American interference. Following eight years of bloody attrition in its war with Iraq, Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander Gen. Rezai proclaimed defiantly that “Americans should be assured…so long as they are in the Pesian Gulf they are at war with us.”195 Nor has the end of the Cold War or the September 11 terrorist attacks altered Iran’s stance towards the US and the West. While Iran’s continued independence from the Soviet Union certainly ranked prime among US foreign policy objectives in the 1980’s and 1990’s, never has the Islamic Republic sacrificed its anti-secular ideals for the pursuit of a major power patron.196 In its nearly decade-long war with Iraq beginning in 1980, the Islamic Republic battled a relatively modern air-land military that possessed capabilities almost alien to the hapless rank-and-file members of Iran’s IRGC and Basiji forces, a result primarily of Soviet sponsorship of the Iraqi regime.197 Yet, rather than seek assistance from the US, the Islamic Republic suffered the eight years of civilian and military losses that characterized the Iran-Iraq war, the most devastating conventional conflict since World War II.

Matthew Levitt, “A History of Violence,” Foreign Policy, October 12, 2011, available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/12/a_history_of_violence 193 Efram Karsh, “The Origins of the Iran-Iraq War,” Middle East Journal Vol. 44 No. 2 (Spring 1990) pp. 259, 265 194 Ray Takeyh, “The Iran-Iraq War: A Reassessment,” Middle East Journal Vol. 64 No. 3 (Summer 2010) pp. 366-367 195 “The Key to the War is Resistance”, Tehran Times, October 15, 1987. 196 Claudia Wright, “Implications of the Iraq-Iran War,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 59, No. 2 (Winter, 1980), pp. 275303 197 Bulloch, John & Morris, Harvey The Gulf War, Methuen: London, 1989 page 185. 192

Rather, subsequent to Iran’s intrepid stance during the 1980’s, the US and the Islamic republic have engaged in a reciprocating political discourse of belligerence and blame attribution that reached its pitch in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks. Despite the US’s firm understanding of al-Qa’ida’s facilitation of the attack, US policymakers leveraged September 11 to rally domestic and international opposition to the Islamic Republic. As Kaveh Afrasiabi describes, “Iran’s new insecurity is fueled by the [then] Bush administration’s anti-Iran policy under the rubric of the axis of evil.”198 Given the adversarial tenor of US-Iranian relations, the latter’s hard-line opposition to US strategic goals, and the US’s emergence as a military power beyond any comparison, Realists and other proponents of hegemonic rivalry should expect the two countries inevitably to engage in an at least a limited, but decisive military confrontation. However, such an episode has yet to occur.

Western Envy: Iran’s Military Capabilities Iran’s security disposition certainly includes material incentives to avoid engaging in direct military confrontation with the US. While geography has shielded the country from foreign invasion, Iran has wasted this potential strategic advantage, cultivating one of the most poorly-equipped conventional militaries in the second world. Accord to US Defense Intelligence Agency estimates, Iran’s air-, sea-, and land-based forces continue to rely on legacy US armaments that date back to the latter’s patronage of the pre-1979 Pahlavi regime.199 With few opportunities to procure advanced weapons systems from foreign producers, Iran’s strategic arms remain limited to primarily short-range ballistic missiles. The maximum range of the country’s few viable medium-range missiles remains limited to 1,800 kilometers, approximately half the distance necessary to target Paris from Tehran.200 In addition, Iran’s latest innovation, an unmanned aerial vehicle that Tehran hailed as the country’s “ambassador of death,” remains technologically inferior to any of its Western counterpart systems. Further, the system probably is fraught with design flaws that lead to

Kaveh Afrasiabi, ”Iran’s Foreign Policy After September 11,” The Brown Journal of World Affairs, Winter/Spring 2003, Vol IX No. II 199 Lieutenant General Ronald L. Burgess, United States Army, in a statement before the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services, April 2010, available at http://www.dia.mil 200 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, Strategic Weapon System, Iran, December 06, 2011 198

the accidental crashing of three systems into the containment dome of an Iranian nuclear reactor in August.201 Iran’s navy remains the country’s most strategically viable conventional military asset, but consists mostly of Cold War era vessels and probably lacks the training and organizational effectiveness necessary to contend with those of the major Western powers. The Navy’s three Russian Kilo class submarines—commissioned in 1992—remain Iran’s only viable subsurface attack craft. The country’s surface fleet includes only four frigates and 26 fast attack vessels commissioned between 1953 and 2010.202 While the Iranian Navy conducts persistent counter-piracy patrols throughout the Indian Ocean, its inability to rescue an Iranian merchant vessel the Islamic Republic in August claimed had become the victim of a Somali pirate group hijacking demonstrates the force’s inability to plan and facilitate complex operations in fluid, warlike situations.203 While the pursuit of nuclear weapons offers Iran an opportunity to level its conventional capabilities with that of the major Western powers, the Islamic Republic has yet to develop the capability, despite potentially ongoing clandestine efforts. In April 2010, the US Director of Central Intelligence submitted to Congress an assessment of Iran’s nuclear program to amend the US intelligence community’s 2007 claim that Iran in the fall of 2003 halted its “nuclear weaponization work and covert…uranium-enrichment-related” programs.204 According to the 2010 document, the community believed Iran had continued to both expand its uranium enrichment infrastructure and improve a heavy water research reactor despite restrictions the United Nations Security Council imposed on these programs since late 2006.205 According to nuclear weapons experts, these activities—not critical to a viable civilian nuclear program—remain the most difficult aspect of nuclear weapons construction, with the fuels they produce easily convertible into weapons-grade fissile

“Iran’s Ambassadors of Death,” The Washington Times, August 24, 2010, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/aug/24/irans-ambassadors-of-death/ 202 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, Navy, Iran, December 07, 2011 203 “Iranian ship rescued from pirate attack,” Tehran Times, August 15, 2011, available at http://www.tehrantimes.com/politics/1642-iranian-ship-rescued-from-pirate-attack204 National Intelligence Council, “Iran: nuclear Intentions and Capabilities,” November 2007, available at http://www.dni.gov 205 Deputy Director of National Intelligence, “Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions” April 2010, available at http://www.dni.gov 201

materials.206 In addition, the International Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) in November 2012 released a report claiming Iran had conducted technical research in the development of explosive bridgewire as well as reengineering of specifically the payload chamber of its Shahab III medium-range ballistic missile’s re-entry vehicle.207 Whereas Iran’s impetus for modifying already existing ballistic missiles remains uncertain, explosive bridgewire—a detonating component that simply enables the precision-timed initiation of multiple explosives charges—is critical the functioning of thermonuclear devices but remains superfluous to even the most advanced conventional explosives.208 These data points prompted the IAEC’s “increasing concern about the possible existence in Iran of undisclosed nuclear related activities involving military related organizations, including activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile.”209 In any direct, defensive military confrontation with a major Western power, the Islamic Republic almost certainly would face a swift and crushing defeat. In its nearly decade-long campaign against Iraq, Iran’s lack of material resources forced its military planners to resort to almost medieval measures. As Ray Takeyh describes of the Islamic Republic’s tactical methods during the 1980s, “ Iran dismissed conventional war planning for a strategy that relied on religion and valor…In practice, this involved…poor coordination between the different branches of the armed forces and human wave assaults that were basically large-scale suicide missions.”210 This strategy facilitated a nearly decade-long war of attrition that resulted in a cease-fire agreement that neither the Iraqi or Iranian leadership were enthusiastic to accept. While Iraq during the 1980s possessed a relatively modern compliment of weapons and other physical military resources , the discrepancy in capabilities that lead to Iran’s use of a large-scale “suicide strategy has only grown in the decades since the Iran-Iraq war. Whereas economic sanctions have all but halted Iran’s ability to field and

Michael Anton, “The CIA’s Curious Report on Iran’s Nuclear Program,” The Weekly Standard, April 1, 2010, available at http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/cias-curious-report-irans-nuclear-program 207 International Atomic Energy Agency, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, November 8 2011, available at http://www.google.com/url?q=http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/world/2011/IAEA-Nov-2011ReportIran.pdf&sa=U&ei=xdu8Toa_EsiF2AWfsfG0BQ&ved=0CBUQFjAA&sig2=LPnY5udRum1of5_8AmVN2w &usg=AFQjCNEZkVUcOmoBfoMFbQVoFumzBhSVdg 208 Cooper, Paul W. (1996). "Exploding Bridgewire Detonators," Explosives Engineering. Wiley-VCH. pp. 353– 367 209 International Atomic Energy Agency, Ibid. 210 Takeyh, 369. 206

procure advanced weapons systems, the US and its allies since the September 11 attacks have invested unprecedented sums in defense manning and readiness. As a result, the Western powers now possess the most lethal and precise weapons ever conceived, many tailored directly towards employment against small, mobile non-conventional groups.

Towards Isolation: Iranian Relationship with the World Whereas Iran remains in need of a viable security collective, the Islamic Republic has largely pursued a strategy of autonomy. Especially with the US continuing to conduct military operations from bases in the vicinity of the Iran-Afghanistan border, the regime almost certainly perceives itself in a position of relative military weakness, one necessitating a strong alliance. However, despite lacking the material power necessary to defend against a US strike unilaterally, the clerical regime’s anti-secular rhetoric continues to reserve for the Iranian state an isolated position within the international community.211 Until recently, the Islamic Republic’s responses to what it considered Westernimposed restrictions on its nuclear program risked the country’s diplomatic access to the West. On November 27th, members of Iran’s Basiji forces—a volunteer paramilitary militia subordinate to country’s supreme leader—raided the British embassy in Tehran, destroying property, burning documents, and briefly holding six British staff members in an incident reminiscent of the 1979 Iranian hostage crisis.212 While Iranian security forces eventually disrupted the attack and secured the release of the British diplomats, many of Iran’s Western allies have condemned the incident. Along with the United Kingdom, Germany, France and the Netherlands promptly recalled their ambassadors from Tehran.213 While Russia since the end of the Cold War has remained Iran’s most explicit ally, it too is finding fewer reasons to sponsor the Islamic Republic’s agenda. Despite UN sanctions, Russia has provided Iran with limited advanced conventional weapons, a Nuclear power plant now operating in the southern Iranian city of Bushehr, and more than 100 tons Robert F. Worth, “Iran Escalates Anti-US Rhetoric Over Nuclear Report,” New York Times, November 9, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/10/world/middleeast/iran-seeks-to-frame-un-nuclearreport-as-american-bullying.html 212 Barbara Slavin, “Iran's Growing Isolation a Dubious Win for the West,” Inter Press Service News Agency, November 30, 2011available at http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=106041 213 “Italy summons Iran envoy over UK embassy attack, demands security guarantees for diplomats,” Associated Press, December 1, 2011, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/italy-summons-iranenvoy-over-uk-embassy-attack-demands-security-guarantees-fordiplomats/2011/12/01/gIQA0EZOGO_story.html 211

of low-enriched uranium fuel rods.214 And yet, beginning in June 2010, Russia has supported UN sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program. Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in mid July 2010 publicly expressed concerns Iran “was moving into a position that may allow Tehran to acquire nuclear weapons.”215 Iran in September of that year, decided to bring the issue to the International Court of Justice in the form of a law suit intended to compel Russia to finalize the weapons transfer.216 According to Jane’s analyst Gala Riani, “this [was] bad news for Iran…it lost, to some degree, one of its closest allies in that Russia is now complying a lot more with the Western stance.”217 Whether states were distancing themselves from Iran in order to contain what they perceived as a growing threat or to avoid standing in opposition to the US, Iran under former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad made little effort to mitigate the country’s isolation. For instance, when Iranian forces on December 4th recovered a malfunctioning US RQ-170 stealth unmanned aerial reconnaissance vehicle, the Islamic Republic claimed its electronic warfare unit “hijacked” the craft.218 Given that Iran almost certainly does not possess the capabilities to so disrupt US unmanned aerial vehicles, the US’s claims the craft malfunctioned are highly plausible.219 In this rare occasion where Iran potentially could have offered tangible evidence of US encroachment into the country’s national sovereignty, the Islamic Republic instead chose to claim the incident as an attack they facilitated. Ultimately, the Iranian regime squandered an opportunity to cultivate sympathy among an international community that increasingly was becoming unavailable to assist the country in its economic and security crises. However, with the election of current Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, the country may be in the nascent stages of abandoning its strategy of complete isolation. The country In late September 2013—following negotiations with the US and five other great power nations—forged a plan of action to bring Iran’s cycle of uranium fuel production closer to the parameters Western states have defined for a more transparent, benign nuclear power Pavel Feigenhauer, “The ‘Unraveling Relationship’ Between Russia and Iran,” BBC News Europe Ibid. 216Al Pessin, “Iran-Russia Arms Dispute Damages Relations,” Voice of America, September 8, 2011 http://www.voanews.com/english/news/middle-east/Iran-Russia-Arms-Dispute-Damages-Relations129464433.html 217 Ibid. 218 “Iran shows film of captured US drone,” BBC News Middle East, December 8, 2011 available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-16098562 219 ibid 214 215

program.220 In return, Iran receives some reprieve from the economic sanctions that previously were crushing the country’s domestic prosperity. The agreement in and of itself is unprecedented, but many analysts agree it does not necessarily signal a departure from Iran’s hegemonic rivalry with the US. Rather, many analyst believe Rouhani—and more importantly the clerical Iranian regime—simply have forged a new path toward the same ultimate objective: their hegemonic victory over the US. These scholars believe the current regime is embracing the nuclear plan of action in order to recover from the economic setbacks they sustained as a result of their commitment to building a nuclear weapons capability. As Suzanne Maloney describes, “thanks to the deal, regime moderates have started to rebalance a government that seemed on the verge of toppling…Despite facing the most severe sanctions in history, increasing global isolation, and domestic unrest, Iran’s revolutionary theocracy has once again navigated its way off of history’s exit ramp.”221 Meanwhile, others claim Iran already has achieved a nuclear “dash” capability, which affords the country the option to build a functional atomic weapon within two months following the supreme leader’s order to do so.222 Therefore, Iran essentially has yet to cede its prospects for achieving a nuclear weapons capability. In fact, the negotiations could signal Iran has actually met the goals it first set out to achieve with its nuclear weapons program. Having met the milestone of a nuclear dash capability, Iran could now be pursuing a more economically viable strategy, but one that nonetheless brings the country into direct confrontation with the US. As Akbar Ganji claims, the negotiations suggest “Khamenei does not want Iran to be at open conflict with the West, nor does he want it to be a supplicant to the United States. He is signaling that rapprochement is possible, but not at the price of abandoning Iran's resistance to Western hegemony.”223

Iran: The Unexpected Superpower Despite its absolute disadvantage in military capabilities, Iran’s ability to emerge as a regional hegemon today is ripe amongst what has become a radically unique global security Text of the Iranian Nuclear Plan of Action is available via CNN, at http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/24/world/meast/iran-deal-text/ 221 Suzanne Maloney, “Saved by the Deal,” Foreign Policy (November 27, 2013) p. 1 222 Jeffery Goldberg, “Six Reasons to Worry About the Iranian Nuclear Deal” (December 3, 2013) Bloomberg L.P. 223 Akbar Ganji, “Frenemies For Ever: The Real Meaning of Iran’s “Heroic Flexibility,” Foreign Affairs (September 24, 2013), p. 1 220

landscape. The US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 and subsequent installation of a federated, largely Shia Iraqi government to replace Sadaam Hussein has removed from the single regional actor noted for its ability to project power against Iran’s interests in the Middle East.224 Exploiting the material resources, defendable topography, swelling population, and other natural features that afford Iran a marked advantage in the region, the Islamic Republic since 2003 has pursued what former International Assistance Security Force (ISAF) commander Gen. Stanly McChrystal described in a 2009 assessment as “an ambiguous” strategy.225 As this research will demonstrate, Gen. McChrystal’s statements refer to Iran’s practice of supporting US initiatives wherein they directly improve the country’s security landscape while clandestinely subverting those that do not. In Iraq, the Islamic used a non-conventional strategy to inflict losses on US forces while simultaneously supporting a political system inside Iraq favorable to Iranian national interests. According to the US Military Academy’s counterterrorism center (CTC), analysis of recovered Ba’ath party intelligence documents reveal that Iran estimated democratic elections in Iraq would emplace a pro-Iranian, Shia government. Iran therefore sought to avoid direct confrontation with US forces following the March, 2003 invasion.226 With the establishment of the Maliki government, however, Iran began leveraging the IRGC’s extensive clandestine network to provide multiple Shia militant groups operating in Iraq with direct military support.227 For example, insurgents on Januray 20, 2007 used US military uniforms and American-produced vehicles to abduct and kill 5 US soldiers.228 Following the attack, some Iraqis speculated IRGC’s involvement in retaliation for the capture of five of its members in Irbil, Iraq earlier that month.229 In mid 2012, an Iraqi court ordered the release

Joseph Felter and Brian Fishman, Iranian Strategy in Iraq: Politics and Other Means, (Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point: October 2008) p. 6 225 Karsh, pp. 257-261 Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, COMISAF Initial Assessment, 30 August 2009, redacted and available at http://www.washingtonpost.com 226 Felter, p. 26 227 Ibid, pp. 21-25 228 “Iran involvement suspected in Karbala compound attack,” CNN World News. January 30, 2007, available at http://articles.cnn.com/2007-01-30/world/iraq.main_1_sophisticated-attack-iranian-revolutionary-guardcorps-iranian-agents?_s=PM:WORLD 229 Ibid. 224

of suspected Lebanese Hezb’allah operative Ali Musa Daqduq, who US forced detained on accusations of facilitating the 2007 operation.230 Despite President Bush’s promise that "if Iran escalates its military actions in Iraq to the detriment of our troops and or innocent Iraqi people, we will respond firmly,” the Islamic Republic has remained persistent in its support to Iraq-based shia terrorists.231 Among weapons caches discovered in Iraq between January and May, 2008, Multinational Forces-Iraq count eighty-five stockpiles that contained Iranian-produced mortars, artillery rockets, antipersonnel mines, explosively-formed penetrators, and other advanced conventional weapons of post 2003 vintage.232 CTC analysis of intelligence documents reveals the IRGC also provides Iraq-based Shia groups with the military training necessary to employ these weapons effectively.233 While the US government has yet to disclose specific evidence of the IRGC’s operational control over Shia militant groups in Iraq, Defense Intelligence Agency commander Gen. Ronald Burgess in April, 2010 informed congress that “the (IRGC) engages in paramilitary operations to support…insurgent attacks on Coalition and Iraqi security forces. Generally, it directs and supports groups actually executing the attacks, thereby maintaining plausible deniability within the international community.”234 While Iraq remains the most vivid example of Iran’s ability to influence US foreign operations, the Islamic Republic’s lethal aid to Shia militant groups is expanding in direct correlation to US military interests worldwide. In Afghanistan, the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) on January 9th captured a senior Taliban leader it claimed—based on indications of significant financial transactions—"is definitely associated with Qods Force."235 ISAF troops in 2011 also interdicted a shipment of 28 Iranian-produced 122mm artillery rockets in western Afghanistan, the latest in a string of weapons transfers Iran has facilitated only intermittently since 2006.236 While the Department of Defense has yet to release the specific tangible evidence it uses to assess Iranian involvement in the Afghan 230Jack

Healy and Charlie Savage, “Iraqi Court Acts to Free Suspect in Deadly Raid on G.GI’s,” New York Times, 7 May 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/08/world/middleeast/in-case-that-hasvexed-americans-defendant-in-iraq-could-go-free.html?_r=0# 231 “Iran involvement suspected in Karbala compound attack” 232 Ibid, p. 77 233 Ibid, p 8 234 Lieutenant General Ronald L. Burgess, United States Army, in a statement before the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services, April 2010, available at http://www.dia.mil 235 Bill Roggio, “ISAF captures Qods Force-linked Taliban leader in Afghan west,” The Long War Journal, January 10, 2011, available at http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/01/isaf_captures_qods_f.php 236 “NATO forces seize rockets from Iran in Afghanistan,” The Associated Press, 9 March, 2011

insurgency, The Long War Journal analyst Bill Roggio believes the Iranian Republic’s Ansar Corps is responsible for providing the Taliban with training, financial, and material resources in an strategy modeled on the IRGC’s operations in post 2003 Iraq.237 Iran has also attempted to expand its power in the Middle East. In Yemen—where the US in recent years has increased its direct military assistance to disrupt al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula—Iran has demonstrated nascent efforts to exert its own influence.238 Commenting on Saudi Arabian Intelligence claims that Iran had dispatched IRGC facilitators to meet with Shia anti-government groups in Yemen, US secretary of State Hillary Clinton in March stated Iran was “very much involved in the opposition movements.”239 Former US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates separately indicated his belief the Islamic Republic would attempt to capitalize on regional instability subsequent to the “Arab Spring” movement.240 Yet, despite attributing a notable share of its military losses in Iraq and Afghanistan to the IRGC’s sponsorship of Shia militancy, the US has yet to match Iran’s actions with a proportional direct military response. Having undisputedly superior air- and ground-based forces and the advantage of a nuclear arsenal, the US continues instead to pursue primarily an economic strategy of sanctions in its political discourse with Iran. 241 Former President Bush’s approval for US Forces to conduct Kinetic operations targeting IRGC members inside Iraq remains Washington’s most aggressive action against its counterparts in Tehran.242 While many beleive fiscal concerns during the years of the Global War on Terror prevented the US from pursuing a military confrontation with Iran, never before has a country possessed such a favorable disposition to mount a significant campaign against Iranian territory. As Iran’s recovery of a US unmanned aerial reconnaissance vehicle demonstrates, America’s Iraq- and Afghanistan-based contingency operating bases provided

Roggio, Ibid. The US government has disclosed its military assistance to the Republic of Yemeni Government. Background Note: Yemen, US Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, available at http://www.state.gov 239 “Iran contacting Arab opposition movements: Clinton,” AFP, March 2, 2011 240 “Remarks by Secretary Gates During Troop Visit at US Division Center Camp Liberty, Baghdad, Iraq,” US Department of Defense, April 7, 2011, available at http://defense.gov 241 Lieutenant General Ronald L. Burgess, United States Army, in a statement before the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services, March 2011, available at http://www.dia.mil 242 “Catch and Release v. Capture or Kill,” WakeupAmerica, January 26, 2007, available at http://wwwwakeupamericans-spree.blogspot.com/2007/01/catch-and-release-vs-capture-or-kill.html 237 238

the ability to quickly and efficiently deploy military platforms against Iran-based targets.243 These bases also offered regional logistics and staging centers that would prove vital to any ground-based incursion into Iran, but America’s withdrawal from the region signals its ultimate balk at the concept of a direct military confrontation with Iran. Iran’s support to Shia terrorist groups remains the most compelling explanation for the US’s hesitancy to engage in direct military confrontation. Fearing reprisal attacks from Iranian-sponsored terrorists, the US is likely to exhaust every peaceable, albeit impotent, alternative to a military confrontation with. Iran’s ability to defy this US with relatively little risk of direct military confrontation indicates its innovation of a novel deterrent strategy that in practice may be as effective as the concept of nuclear “mutually assured destruction.” As the case study demonstrates, Iran has projected military power in several theatres to strike unilaterally at US interests, eliciting little in response. The research therefore considers Iran a viable example of an asymmetric superpower, which increasingly could prove its relevancy to the current security environment.

Conclusion

Whereas many believed non-state actors would prove the most credible threat to US national interests in the current security environment, this research posits states could effectively challenge American hegemony in key geographic areas. Non-state actors’ ability to wage insurgency and terrorist campaigns is a phenomenon as old as interstate war.244 However, Iranian-US relations since 1979 demonstrate a state’s use non-conventional methods to degrade US hegemony could represent a shift in the nature of the geopolitical security paradigm, and a defining characteristic of the post-Cold War era. Whereas Realist theories previously would expect either the current Iranian Republic to seek participation in a security collective capable of hedging against the US or the latter’s complete domination of Iranian interests, Iran continues to defy the US geopolitical agenda unilaterally. Lacking the conventional military capabilities necessary to contend with the US directly, Iran since 1979 has reinvented itself to become the world’s first asymmetric superpower. 243 244

“Iran shows film of captured US drone,” Sarkees, Meredith Reid and Frank Wayman (2010). Resort to War: 1816 - 2007. CQ Press.

As the first archetype of an asymmetric superpower, Iran has developed a novel deterrent strategy that theoretically could prove viable for second- and third-world nations seeking to deter Western influence. However, itâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s likely Iran will prove the only geopolitical actor capable of employing this technique. Iranâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s ability to influence and sponsor Shia groups throughout the Middle East is exceedingly unique. To replicate this model, nations with notable diaspora communities must first create for itself an equally effective narrative to rally these populations towards a credible and justifiable goal. Further, the research hypothesized the phenomenon of globalization somehow factors into the strategy of an asymmetric superpower, but the case studies fail to illuminate its role. Further research could focus on better identifying the functional elements underlying the strategy of an asymmetric superpower are universal. Determining its underlying causes and limitations could enable analysts to forecast whether the US increasingly will face this type of hegemonic rivalry in the current security environment.

Conclusion

The research suggests the US—despite possessing nuclear weapons and an unprecedented preponderance of conventional power—continues to face viable military challenges, including the potential to engage in traditional interstate war. Primarily, the US since the conclusion of the Cold War has chosen to engage in traditional, interstate war as either a preemptive or reactionary method to combat transnational terrorist groups. In fact, the research provides strong evidence that terrorism factors prominently in all nuclear-armed states’ willingness to engage in interstate war in the post-Cold War era. Generally, these countries have demonstrated their reliance on conventional war as a means to seize and secure territories in which transnational terrorist groups—owing to either the inability or unwillingness of host-nation government to engage in counterterrorism—have developed viable power bases. Therefore, as long as major nation-state powers continue to adhere to this calculus and model for addressing terrorist threats, transnational terrorism is likely to reinvigorate the outbreak of conventional interstate wars, which otherwise may prove increasingly uncommon in the post-Cold War era. However, while terrorism seems inextricably tied to nuclear-armed states’ willingness to resort to war in the post-Cold War era, terrorist attacks alone are not a sufficient causal variable, which suggests opportunities for further reducing the occurrence of major interstate wars. Probably the most promising supplementary variable capable of assisting terrorism to instigate the outbreak of war remains the measure of target nations’ economic health. However, the quantitative methods used in this research fail to arrive at a statistically significant model in which incidents of terrorism and a target nation’s economy interact to cause an outbreak of interstate war. A truly reliable model describing the relationship between terrorism and interstate war in the current security environment therefore remains elusive. However, it remains reasonably certain that the recourse to war following a terrorist attack is an internal national decision—rather than an automatic, innate response—that target countries make based largely on some domestic condition. Changing these nations’ 80

internal calculus regarding terrorism therefore could reduce the outbreak of interstate wars in the post-Cold War era. Yet, terrorism and other forms of non-state sponsored violence remain unlikely to replace traditional warfare in ways that fundamentally alter the geopolitical security paradigm, despite some 4GW theorists’ predictions for an environment based exclusively on non-state entities. While asymmetric forms of warfare indeed are more prevalent than traditional ones in the post-Cold War era, the research indicates this relationship is consistent with historical norms. In fact, intrastate and extrastate wars have always proven the most common form of militarized conflict, and that the post-Cold War security environment has failed to upset this paradigm beyond a single standard deviation suggests state- and non-state entities actually retain their traditional roles within the geopolitical order. Some nation-states have reverted to the use of terrorist proxies as a method for seizing territory or gaining policy concessions from similarly powerful geopolitical rivals, but the research indicates these countries increasingly will learn such actions risk instigating the types of conventional warfare they seek to avoid. More important, however, is that the age of 4th generation, “asymmetric war” has not fundamentally altered the nature of geopolitics itself. That countries have sought alternative methods for striking at their nation-state rivals is proof conflict—almost certainly predicated on traditional forms of national strategic interest—continues to underscore the nature of international relations in the post-Cold War era. For example, the research details Pakistan’s sponsorship of the terrorist group Lashkar-e Tayyiba as part of the country’s offensive bid to seize Indian-controlled territory coveted for its strategic water resources. The research also details Iran’s hostilities towards the US, which almost certainly derive from conflicting hegemonic ambitions, and therefore remain consistent with Realist and Neorealist descriptions of the anarchical international environment. However, the research indicates the current geopolitical security environment includes aspects of Liberalist as well as Realist international relations theories alike. The case of Iran and other so-called “rogue” states suggest only those countries at the periphery of the world’s liberal international organizations—such as the UN and “G-20” economic summit—are likely to resort to kinetic, offensive means for pursuing their strategic interests. That disproportionately powerful nation-states committed to the liberal geopolitical order have not engaged in non-conventional military confrontations with each other indicates the 81

viability of the supranational institutions they participate in, as well as the interdependence they promote. Conversely, that second- and third-world nations with no equities in the liberal geopolitical order have not mounted offensive conventional military strikes against potential super-power rivals almost certainly reflects the efficacy of traditional principles of deterrence. The research therefore concludes so-called “rogue states” present the most credible and immediate threat to the US and its allies in the current geopolitical environment. For instance, the research provides evidence Iran has proven a viable contender for US hegemony in the Middle East. Using an innovative approach to the sponsorship of terrorist proxy groups—which far exceeds mainstream interpretations of “soft power”—Iran has inflicted casualties upon the US and its allies while successfully deterred the former from achieving in total its policy objectives in the Middle East. While Iran ostensibly has gained little in terms of tangible geopolitical benefits, its ability to successfully deter the world’s sole remaining superpower suggests it too has achieved a type of superpower status, one which other nations of the developing world may be capable of replicating. Clearly defining the nature of “rogue” states, accurately identifying levers for influencing them, and effectively incorporating these countries into the mainstream of

the world liberal international

organizations therefore remains a challenge necessary for the US and its allies to further reduce the potential for militarized geopolitical conflict in the current security landscape.

Implications for International Relations Theory Since the conclusion of the Cold War, the concept of 4GW has provided international relations scholars an alternative to Realists’ traditional descriptions of the security environment. Scholars traditionally have considered nation states—which in the unregulated struggle to accrue economic fortune, military power, and material wealth use violence as a means for implementing policy—the single proponent for geopolitical conflict. In the post-Cold War era, however, both Realist and Liberalist scholars have decided a number of independent variables would transform the character of the international environment from that of a “self help” model into one of economic and military interdependence, preempting the outbreak of traditional, interstate wars. Therefore, 4GW theorists claimed subnational groups would therefore assume an increasingly prominent role, perpetuating conflict in a new, “asymmetric” age of warfare. 82

Yet, the research indicates traditional Realist principles of “self help” struggle, hegemony, and a state-centric geopolitical order in fact persist within corners of the current security environment. States continue to contend over conflicting national interests and—in extreme cases predicated in response to transnational terrorist attacks—they do not shy from the potential for engaging in traditional, interstate war. Subsequently, nation-states have found cause to continue building their military capabilities to ever unprecedented levels. However, the research also indicates liberal, supranational institutions are successfully transforming the environment in which participant states interact. As the research shows, volatile, “rogue” nations tend to prove those states that chose not to participate in liberal supranational institutions. Conversely, those states that do participate, tend not to engage in warfare against eachother. Absent the persistence of transnational terrorism as well as a significant contingent of major nation-states that continue to operate outside the world’s liberal supranational institutions, it’s possible the current geopolitical security paradigm is progressing towards a Liberalist model. However, until the international system arrives at a comprehensive solution to terrorism as well as these so-called “rogue” states, neither Realist nor Liberalist international relations theories alone will prove sufficient for explaining the current geopolitical security paradigm. Rather, subject to potential adversaries’ level of participation in existing liberal supranational institutions, the research suggests analyst of current international relations must pick either a Realist or Liberalist framework for describing, traditional, interstate conflicts. In short, it seems the geopolitical security paradigm is headed towards the hybridization of international relations theories. In general, views founded in the concept of 4th generation or “asymmetric” war present the best starting point for a new, hybrid theory of international relations, but the research suggests these too remain incomplete. Generally, 4GW theorists have focused on the emergence of subnational entities as major geopolitical actors, but the research demonstrates traditional nation-states can also constitute a type of “asymmetric” rival to other, more powerful countries. In fact, the research suggests a more viable concept of 4th Generation, “asymmetric” war should derive less from the disparity of rivals’ military capabilities—which alone refutes Realist traditional views on military confrontations—than it should a specific strategy which either of these types of actors can chose to employ. The research therefore argues for a more nuanced approach to studying conflicts in the current 83

security environment, which, in addition to intrastate and extrastate forms of asymmetric warfare, includes interstate asymmetric war as well. While interstate, intrastate, and extrastate asymmetric war differ in the levels of disparity existing between rival military forces, these forms of conflict all rely on a shared method of strategic targeting, which may all derive from the current geopolitical security paradigm. Although combat—here defined as the application of military force—remains central to each of these forms of war, opponents in asymmetric war do not seek to influence the enemy’s military centers of power, but its civilian centers instead. Thomas X. Hammes himself

explains,

“as the

first

practitioner

define

insurgency,

Mao

[Tse-

Tung]…understood that war is fundamentally a political undertaking. [Mao eventually wrote] the problem of political mobilization of the army and the people is indeed of the utmost importance…political mobilization is the fundamental condition for winning the war.”245 Bard E. O’neill’s analysis of insurgencies since the 20th century further demonstrates the importance of political mobilization in an effective asymmetric movement. According to O’neill, asymmetric groups are most successful when they diagnose correctly the social, economic, and political inequities facing indigenous populations and offer a cogent solution or otherwise acceptable alternative.246 In asymmetric wars, opponents therefore use combat as a method for signaling political ideas to the enemy’s civilian base, which largely remains a crucial components to nations’ willingness and ability to project power. Iran’s strategy for confronting the US suggests this concept of asymmetric war may also apply to states as well. As the research outlines, Iran sponsored gruesome proxy attacks against US forces in Iraq, contributing to the a perception among the American populace’s that Operation Enduring Freedom was a needless and unjustified commitment of the country’s military resources. Ultimately, US forces withdrew from Iraq without ever establishing security within the country, its single most articulated strategic objective. Therefore, the strategy of targeting civilian power bases with the intent of indirectly degrading an enemy’s military capacity differentiates this concept of asymmetric war from traditional modes of conflict. This description of asymmetric warfare is not entirely novel, but 4GW theorists generally do not extend these principles to conflicts between nation-

245 246

Thomas X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone, (Minneapolis, MN: 2006) p. 51 Bard E. O’Neill, Insurgency & Terrorism, (Washington, DC: 2005) pp. 99-102

states a well. Theorists probably believe extending the concept of asymmetric war to the nation states defies traditional Realist ideals of the security environment. However, the concept of influencing an enemy’s military capacity indirectly via its civilian support centers is not necessarily at odds with more traditional, Realist interpretations of military conflict. 18th century Prussian general—and author of On War, the seminal work of military doctrine based in the Realist tradition—General Carl Philipp von Clausewitz famously described the political-military will of a nation as deriving from the “trinity” of its people, its government, and its armed forces.247 As Clausewitz further describes, and indeed Realist scholars have fully accepted, “the combat is the single activity in war; in the combat the destruction of the enemy opposed to us is the means to the end.”248 However, in as far as he accepted the enemy’s capitulation as the practical end game in war, would Clausewitz have objected to a theory of kinetic military conflict focused on the civilian—rather than the military—leg of his national trinity? In practice, Realists can accept asymmetric war as operating within the same theoretic framework that more traditional models use to describe the geopolitical security paradigm. In How Democracies Lose Small Wars, asymmetric war scholar Gil Merom describes the original expansion of nationalism as a compromise between heads of state and the expanding bourgeoisies they governed. According to Merom, “expansion of the state—as long as it included meritocracy—opened to the middle-class an expanding job market, provided it with an opportunity to promote its social and economic interests, and increased its relative power” as national rulers solidified and strengthened their positions within the international order.249 Realists therefore might accept that nation-states originally organized themselves into “Clausewitzean triangles” at the behest of autocratic rulers—but with the approval of the greater society—to better prepare for competition as a nation within the anarchical international order. The research therefore suggests a framework for defining conflict in terms of the interaction of these national, Clausewitzean trinities. Such a framework would describe interstate—whether traditional or asymmetric—as that occurring between some combination of different Clausewitzean triangles. Whether enemies in these conflicts chose a

Ibid, pp24-25 Ibid, p. 32 249 Gil Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars, (New York: 2003) p. 50 247 248

strategy of obliterating their opponent’s military forces or influencing its populace determines the traditional or asymmetric character of the conflict. Further, Merom’s research describes interstate and extrastate wars as conflicts occurring within—but involving all aspects—of the national trinity. Focusing on insurgencies that combat the occupation of an outside national force, Merom claims asymmetric campaigns create and exploit a “normative gap” which oftentimes manifests itself between a government—which commands its military—and the society upon which both depend. As Merom describes, “In the West…cultural and political changes culminated in the formation of a normative difference between the state and educated segments of society. The latter increasingly questioned the power and purpose of the state…in particular the ways states conquered, subjugated, and pacified foreign societies.”250 Merom’s model explains therefore the potential for an asymmetric adversary—whether a state- or non-state entity—to drive a wedge between segments of its opponent’s Clausewitzean trinity. As Realists would suggest, these normative differences will oftentimes focus on the allocation of national resources, foreign policies, or some factors that otherwise effect the nation’s ability to compete internationally. However, these differences could also encompass shared socialcultural ideas, which figure prominently as a driver in Liberalist views of the emerging “liberal internationalism.” Therefore, it is accurate as describing asymmetric groups—their existence and success—as a product international order Realists describe. Therefore, this research argues international relations scholars need not search for a single, all-encompassing theoretical model to describe the current geopolitical security paradigm. Rather, the defining feature of the post-Cold War era is a security environment that encompasses Realist and Liberalist international relations theories equally and simultaneously. As light in the physical world is both wave and particle, 4 th Generation, asymmetric war embodies the technical characteristics that have come to signify both Realists’ and Liberalists’ geopolitical imperatives.251

Ibid, pp. 63-64 I attribute this analogy to Professor William Belding, JHU AAP, who provided it in comments on my original research into 4th Generation War Theory 250 251

Recommendations 1. The US should limit its response to high-profile terrorist attacks and encourage other nations to do the same, as the research suggests transnational terrorism is perhaps the last remaining concern over which major powers prove willing to resort to traditional warfare. Reshaping its capacity for responding to high profile terrorist operations will require that the US cultivate among its population a better understanding of transnational terrorism, which could diminish the seemingly “irrational fear” such attacks produce, place these instances within the proper strategic context, and overcome the political imperative for swift, kinetic retaliation. In 2011, only 17 private US citizens died in terrorist attacks worldwide, according to US National Counterterrorism Center Statistics.252 In comparison, the US Department of State indicates 26 citizens the same year died of other non-natural causes in Jamaica.253 Therefore, in so far as the US remains willing to combat transnational terrorism emanating from ungoverned spaces overseas, it remains equally logical that the country would engage in traditional warfare against the sovereign nation of Jamaica over the latter’s wanton inability to curb homicides, drowning, maritime accidents, and other vicious killers of American citizens. In fact, analysts since 2001 have mused over similar statistics illustrating America’s well-documented irrational fear of terrorism. For example, in a June 2012 article for the Atlantic, Micah Zenko noted US citizens were as likely to die in terrorist attacks as they were in household furniture accidents. 254 As have so many other authors, Zenko therefore claimed Americans’ “irrational fear of terrorism is both unwarranted and a poor basis for public policy decisions.”255 Yet, while the handling of its most recent high-profile terrorist attack indicate America has made some efforts to craft a new approach for dealing with terrorist attacks, the country continues to tolerate political factors which dictate its proclivity for an over-aggressive US National Counterterrorism Center, 2011 Report on Terrorism, available at https://www.fas.org/irp/threat/nctc2011.pdf 253 Death of US Citizens Abroad by Non-Natural Causes, US Department of State, database available at http://travel.state.gov/law/family_issues/death/death_600.html 254 Micah Zenko, “Americans Are as Likely to be Killed by their Own Furniture as by Terrorism,” The Atlantic, 6 June 2012, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/06/americans-are-as-likelyto-be-killed-by-their-own-furniture-as-by-terrorism/258156/ 255 ibid 252

response. Immediately following the terrorist bombing against the Boston Marathon on 15 April 2013—while other heads of states were just beginning to offer condolences—president Obama vowed “we will get to the bottom of this. Any responsible individual, any responsible groups will feel the full weight of justice.”256 Subsequent FBI investigations therefore focused primarily on illuminating any affiliations the suspected bombers held with active terrorist organizations. Responding to American “speculation” the suspects received training from the terrorist group Imarat Kavkaz, the group claimed “the Caucasian Mujahideen are not fighting against the United States of America. We are at war with Russia… [and] prohibit strikes on civilian targets.”257 Still, Republican leaders meanwhile accused the president of “leading from behind,” warning his unspecified “reluctance” would encourage further terrorist attacks.258 Externally, fostering ongoing, enduring counterterrorism relationships with countries from where transnational terrorist attacks are likely to launch could cultivate response options which simultaneously match the geopolitical security environment and satiate the realities of the American political landscape. Such efforts could provide the US opportunities to act bilaterally through host nations in order to perform kinetic strikes against specific terrorist leaders and facilitators, decrease the likelihood of successful high-profile attacks, and fulfill political calls for action. For example, press reports claim the US throughout 2012 conducted 42 airstrikes in Yemen targeting al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula, while the country also has been providing active support to regime military forces responsible from routing terrorists from safehavens and training camps within its borders. 259 This proactive cooperation and ongoing offensive campaign has enabled the US to pursue relatively modest counterterrorism response measures, even as the Yemen-based al-Qa’ida group has launched numerous transnational operations attempts targeting US interests.260

Bonnie Malkin, “Boston Marathon Explosions: World Leaders React,” Reuters, 16 April 2013, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/9996671/Boston-Marathon-explosionsworld-leaders-react.html 257Statement attributed to the Imarat Kavkaz, posted via the group’s online media outlet, 21 April 2013, available at http://www.kavkazcenter.com/eng/content/2013/04/21/17679.shtml 258 Bob Cesca, “Republicans: The Boston Marathon Bombing Was the President’s Fault! Impeach!” The Huffington Post, 25 April 2013 259 Bill Roggio and Bob Barry, “Charting the data for US air strikes in Yemen, 2002 – 2013,” The Long War Journal, available at http://www.longwarjournal.org/multimedia/Yemen/code/Yemen-strike.php 260 James Madison, “Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP),” Council on Foreign Relations, available at http://www.cfr.org/yemen/al-qaeda-arabian-peninsula-aqap/p9369 256

2. The US should limit its involvement overseas and emphasize perceptions of the growing world multipolarity in order to debase terrorist and other non-state actors’ political appeals against the country’s global hegemony. Rising national powers—such as China and India—offer the US an opportunity to increase the pool of countries perceived as responsible for global economic imbalance and disparities in national resource consumption, two key grievances that non-state actors have cited in their justifications for targeting US citizens. In 2007, Daniel W. Drezner noted China’s trillion-dollar hard currency reserves, technological development, and recognition as a nuclear power in order to recommend the country assume a more influential role in the geopolitical order. In a framework which he described as a “New New World Order,” Drezner applauded former US President George W. Bush’s efforts to bolster China and India’s representation and authority within existing international institutions—including the International Monetary Fund and World Health Organization—and thereby incentive these nations to adopt US-prescribed geopolitical ideals.

261

Further, in an analysis of China’s

emerging relationship with the European Union’s civil space programs, Joan JohhnsonFreese argues that the country’s drivers for increased space-centered development— primarily domestic economic expansion and the subsequent need to maximize scare resources—virtually guarantee Chinese geopolitical interests will remain aligned with US strategic imperatives, including for stable, affordable energy supplies and economic fairness. 262

Therefore, the US need not fear the emergence of additional superpowers, but can

leverage their existence in order to undercut terrorist narratives attributing global inequity solely to American hegemony. Additionally, shifting from its strategy of preponderance could also save the US valuable defense resources. Whereas America has allowed third-party nations to exploit the economic benefits of its overseas security operations, a US withdrawal from global hegemony probably would force emerging powers to contribute actively to the stability of key regions within their spheres of influence. For example, in 2010, the US military identified vast deposits of mineral resources located in Afghanistan, which included potential copper and lithium mines

Drezner, Daniel W. "New New World Order, The." Foreign Affairs. 86 (2007): 34. Johnson-Freese, Joan, and Andrew S. Erickson. "The emerging China–EU space partnership: a geotechnological balancer." Space policy 22, no. 1 (2006): 12-22. 261 262

that pentagon officials speculated would “become the backbone of the Afghan economy.”263 Despite heavy US investments in the security and infrastructure development of Afghanistan, China that year won a politically contentious bid for the country’s Anyak copper mine, which could produce as much as 250,000 tons of copper annually.264 Whereas the US-led invasion of Afghanistan has cost the country billions in subsequent defense spending—with virtually no tangible return on investment—the military campaign has gained for China a viable source of much-needed industrial resources. Looking to the potential conflict regions of the future, France since at least 2010 has been unilaterally providing military assistance in Mali, where the country wishes to expand its North Africabased Uranium and Oil extraction.265 These cases suggest that fostering other nations’ willingness to provide security in key, potentially unstable resource areas could allow the US to spend less on conventional military operations without assuming additional risks.

3. While the US need not fear current or emerging national powers operating earnestly within the world’s liberal international institutions, the country should not drastically reduce its conventional military forces until it arrives at a viable solution for confronting so-called “rogue” states. In fact, until these countries become earnest members of the liberal geopolitical order themselves, the US should acknowledge any casualty-producing attacks originating from “rogue” states and enact meaningful, military reprisals, regardless of the scale of such incidents. The research indicates conventional military capacity remains an important deterrent against revisionist states that operate generally from outside the liberal geopolitical order. Nations such as Iran, Syria, and North Korea—whose heads of state regularly act without deference to the UN—have proven the only countries since the conclusion of the Cold War willing to engage in hostile confrontations with the US. If available, these nations have threatened to employ weapons of mass destruction against the American and its forces

James Risen, “US Identifies Vast Mineral Riches in Afghanistan,” The New York Times, 13 June 2010 ibid 265 “The Interests Behind France’s Intervention in Mali,” DW, 16 January 2013, Available at http://www.franceonu.org/france-at-the-united-nations/thematic-files/peace-and-security/un-peacekeepingoperations/article/peacekeeping-operations#Presence-of-French-troops-in 263 264

abroad, but probably their most effective tool for inflicting tangible damage upon US interests worldwide remains innovative, 4GW-like warfare. That second world nations operating within the framework and norms of the liberal geopolitical order have not also resorted to such methods for gaining US policy concessions suggests the major supernational institutions are succeeding in their efforts to forge an increasingly peaceful security environment. So-called “rogue” nations therefore remain the last geopolitical contenders for whom the US must maintain conventional military preponderance. However, military preponderance alone is unlikely to secure American interests against the threat of so-called “rogue” states, as the US’s inability to coordinate an effective policy for dealing with these countries probably is emboldening their military leaders. Data from the Correlates of War

Project

indicates

the

since

US Militerized International Disputes with Revisionist States (1834-2001)

US the

conclusion

9 8

World War II has

faced an elevated

from

less

powerful, revisionist

states.

has more recently escalated to the use lethal

Total

However, that Iran

force

against the US and

2 1 0

1834 1850 1858 1870 1887 1896 1915 1921 1940 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000

threat

Table 0-1. Annual rate of militarized international disputes between the US and revisionist states. The data suggests the US since the conclusion of World War II has faced a constant threat of conflict from revisionist states, derived from the Correlates of War Project.

its allies’ interests suggests revisionist states are considering exploiting the perceived climate of American complacency in order to pursue more aggressive strategies. While effectively incorporating these countries into the liberal geopolitical order should remain the US’s ultimate goal, America in the meantime probably should consider matching “rogue” states’ aggression with carefully calculated, military action.

Prospects for Further Research The research suggests incorporating rogue states into supranational institutions probably is the best option for defusing hostile, interstate confrontations in the current security landscape, yet we lack a solid understanding regarding why such countries would willingly adopt a more moderate liberal defense strategy. As Thomas H. Henriksen describes, “in the modern context, rogue states show contempt for international norms by repressing their own populations, promoting international terrorism, seeking weapons of mass destruction and standing outside the global community.”266 In his analysis of rogue states since the end of the Cold War, Henriksen concludes these nations follow a generally cyclical pattern of geopolitical posturing. Almost predictably, rogue states have alternated between periods of empowerment—during which they rely on increasingly erratic, aggressive geopolitical gestures in order undercut US global hegemony—and subsequent strategic withdrawals into the security umbrella of a major power patron sympathetic to the “antihegemonic” cause.267 Thus far, analysis and the historical record portends rogue states will remain a perennial facet of the geopolitical security environment. Understanding the drivers and underlying motivations shaping this cycle, and identifying points at which outside states can interject in order to promote rogue stats’ transition into the liberal geopolitical order, therefore remains a critical task in the field of international relations. For example, Libya under the leadership of its former President Colonel Mu’ammar Qadhafi in 2003 abandoned its nuclear weapons program, concluding years of negotiations with the US and Britain. Military and economic pressures certainly drove the Libyan regime towards rapprochement with the US on nuclear issues, but according to John B. Alterman, “the fundamental diplomatic challenge faced by both the US and Libyan sides was how to build trust.”268 Somehow, the US and Libya were able to forge a recursive discourse that brought the latter closer to earnest participation in the liberal geopolitical order. Incorporating rogue countries into the liberal geopolitical order therefore is not beyond the realm of possibility, but the US should take care to determine the motivations

Henriksen, Thomas H. "The rise and decline of rogue states." Journal of International Affairs-Columbia University 54, no. 2 (2001): 349-374. 267 ibid 268 Alterman, Jon B. "Libya and the US: The Unique Libyan Case." Middle East Quarterly (2006). 266

underling such developments in order to translate small, incremental gains into lasting results. As was once the case with a defiant Libya, Iran has recently entered into negotiations with the US and its allies on its own nuclear ambitions. While the prospects of these negotiations remain uncertain, the impetus on the Iranian side almost certainly derives from its need to mitigate crippling economic sanctions.269 While the anecdotal evidence therefore suggests economic incentives prove sufficient to bring rogue states to the bargaining table with their hegemonic rivals, their motivations for transforming into earnest members of the liberal geopolitical order remain fair less certain. In fact, it remains possible that even US-led diplomatic successes on the Iranian nuclear issue well remain subsidiary to continued Iranian aggression on other fronts. However, the Libyan experience suggests deliberate work on behalf of the US and its allies could result in a new, meaningful peace between Iran and its Western adversaries. Ultimately, Iran’s stature as one of the world’s most active rogue states—which perhaps constitutes one of the last remaining proponents of interstate conflict—suggests such efforts could prove a seminal achievement of the 21st century geopolitical history.

Michael R. Gordon, “In New Nuclear Talks, Technological Gainst by Iran Pose Challenges to the West,” The New York Times, 15 October 2013 269

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Howard, Russel. (2003). “Understanding Al Qaeda’s Application of the New Terrorism,” In Terrorism and Counterterrorism Jervis, Robert. (1986). “The Nuclear Revolution and the Common Defense,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol 101, No. 5 Katzman, K. (2005, August). Al Qaeda: Profile and threat assessment. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS WASHINGTON DC CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE. Krauthammer, C. (1990). The unipolar moment. Foreign affairs, 70(1) Layne, C. (2006). The unipolar illusion revisited: The coming end of the United States' unipolar moment. International security, 31(2) Levy, J. S. (1988). “Domestic politics and war.” The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 18(4) Levy, Jack S. (2001). "Theories of interstate and intrastate war: A levels-of-analysis approach." Turbulent peace: Lind, William S., Nightengale, Keith, Schmitt, John F. Sutton, Joseph W., and Wilson, Gary I. (1989). “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation.” Marine Corps Gazette Makinen, G. (2011). Economic effects of 9/11: A retrospective assessment. DIANE Publishing. Meirowitz, A., & Sartori, A. E. (2008). “Strategic uncertainty as a cause of war.” Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 3(4) Pape, R. A. (2005). Soft balancing against the United States. International Security, 30(1) Mueller, J., & Center, M. (2005). Reactions and overreactions to terrorism. Ohio State University. Mulaj, K. (2008). Resisting an Oppressive Regime: The Case of Kosovo Liberation Army. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 31(12) Paret, P., Craig, G. A., & Gilbert, F. (Eds.). (1986). Makers of modern strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age. Princeton University Press. Riedel, Bruce. (2002) American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House, Center for the Advanced Study of India Robinson, Linda. (2012). “The Future of Special Operations: Beyond Kill and Capture,” Foreign Affairs Russett, B. (1994). Grasping the democratic peace: Principles for a post-Cold War world. Princeton University Press.

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Appendix A - List

Traditional,

Interstate

Wars

Generations of Warfare

1st Generation

1 Franco‐Spanish War of 1823 4 First Russo‐Turkish War of 1828‐1829 7 Mexican‐American War of 1846‐1847 10 Austro‐Sardinian War of 1848‐1849 13 First Schleswig‐Holstein War of 1848‐1849 16 War of the Roman Republic of 1849 19 La Plata War of 1851‐1852 22 Crimean War of 1853‐1856 25 Anglo‐Persian War of 1856‐1857 28 War of Italian Unification of 1859 31 First Spanish‐Moroccan War of 1859‐1860 34 Italian‐Roman War of 1860

2nd Generation

37 Neapolitan War of 1860‐1861 40 Franco‐Mexican War of 1862‐1867 43 Ecuadorian‐Columbian War of 1863 46 Second Schleswig‐Holstein War of 1864 49 Lopez War of 1864‐1870 52 Naval War of 1865‐1866 55 Seven Weeks War of 1866

and

58 Franco‐Prussian War of 1870‐1871 60 First Central American War of 1876 61 Second Russo‐Turkish War of 1877‐1878 64 War of the Pacific of 1879‐1883 65 Conquest of Egypt of 1882 67 Sino‐French War of 1884‐1885 70 Second Central American War of 1885 73 First Sino‐Japanese War of 1894‐1895 76 Greco‐Turkish War of 1897 79 Spanish‐American War of 1898 82 Boxer Rebellion of 1900 83 Sino‐Russian War of 1900 85 Russo‐Japanese War of 1904‐1905 88 Third Central American War of 1906 91 Fourth Central American War of 1907 94 Second Spanish‐Moroccan War of 1909‐1910 97 Italian‐Turkish War of 1911‐1912 100 First Balkan War of 1912‐1913 103 Second Balkan War of 1913 106 World War I of 1914‐1918

3rd Generation

107 Estonian War of Liberation of 1918‐1920 108 Latvian War of Liberation of 1918‐1920 109 Russo‐Polish War of 1919‐1920 112 Hungarian Adversaries of 1919 115 Second Greco‐Turkish War of 1919‐1922 116 Franco‐Turkish War of 1919‐1921 117 Lithuanian‐Polish War of 1920 118 Manchurian War of 1929

121 Second Sino‐Japanese War of 1931‐1933 124 Chaco War of 1932‐1935 125 Saudi‐Yemeni War of 1934 127 Conquest of Ethiopia of 1935‐1936 130 Third Sino‐Japanese War of 1937‐1941 133 Changkufeng War of 1938 136 Nomonhan War of 1939 139 World War II of 1939‐1945 142 Russo‐Finnish War of 1939‐1940 145 Franco‐Thai War of 1940‐1941 147 First Kashmir War of 1948‐1949 148 Arab‐Israeli War of 1948‐1949 151 Korean War of 1950‐1953 153 Off‐shore Islands War of 1954 155 Sinai War of 1956 156 Soviet Invasion of Hungary of 1956 158 Ifni War of 1957‐1959 159 Taiwan Straits War of 1958 160 War in Assam of 1962 163 Vietnam War Phase 2 of 1965‐1975 166 Second Kashmir War of 1965 169 Six Day War of 1967 170 Second Laotian War Phase 2, 1968‐1973 172 War of Attrition of 1969‐1970 175 Football War of 1969 176 War of the Communist Coalition of 1970‐1971 178 War for Bangladesh of 1971 181 Yom Kippur War of 1973

184 Turco‐Cypriot War of 1974 186 War Over Angola of 1975‐1976 187 Second Ogaden War of phase 2, 1977‐1979 189 Vietnamese‐Cambodian Border War of 1975‐1979 190 Ugandan‐Tanzanian War of 1978‐1979 193 Sino‐Vietnamese Punitive War of 1979 199 Iran‐Iraq War of 1980‐1988 202 Falklands War of 1982 205 War over Lebanon of 1982 207 War over the Aouzou Strip of 1986‐1987 208 Sino‐Vietnamese Border War of 1987

4th Generation

211 Gulf War of 1990‐1991 215 War of Bosnian Independence of 1992 216 Azeri‐Armenian War of 1993‐1994 217 Cenepa Valley War of 1995 219 Badme Border War of 1998‐2000 221 War for Kosovo of 1999 223 Kargil War of 1999 225 Invasion of Afghanistan of 2001 227 Invasion of Iraq of 2003

100

Appendix B - Sample of Panel Data

The below is a sample of the panel data used in the researchâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s regression analyses. The sample includes observations pertaining to the US between August, 2001 and May, 2003. However, the complete dataset includes observations for all members of the international system from 1816 until 2007. An explanation of the variables follows the chart. entity

year

mon

4GEN

res

contig

nuclear

USA

2001

USA

2001

USA

2001

USA

2001

USA

2001

USA

2002

USA

2002

USA

fatal

attacks

enter_war

at_war

0.1420117

2982

0.1420117

0.1434598

2002

0.1434598

USA

2002

0.1434598

USA

2002

0.1434598

USA

2002

0.1434598

USA

2002

0.1434598

USA

2002

0.1434598

USA

2002

0.1434598

USA

2002

0.1434598

USA

2002

0.1434598

USA

2002

0.1434598

USA

2003

0.1420938

USA

2003

0.1420938

USA

2003

0.1420938

USA

2003

0.1420938

USA

2003

0.1420938

101

CINC

Variables: 4GEN: A binary variable wherein the value 1 represents that the observation occurs in the time period associated with 4th Generation warfare. Derived from The Coreelates of War Project. nuclear: A binary variable wherein the value 1 represents the state entity is recognized as a nuclear-armed power during the period of the observation. res: A continuous variable representing the state entityâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s associated natural resource value. Derived from multiple sources. For more information, see appendix C. contiq: A continuous variable quantifying the number of borders the state entity shares with other countries during the period of the observation. Derived from The Correlates of War Project. CINC: A continuous variable quantifying the state entityâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s score in the Composite Index of National Capability, which measures the countriesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; absolute military capacity. Derived from The Correlates of War Project. enter_war: A binary variable wherein the value 1 represents that the state entity entered into a traditional, interstate war during the period of the observation. Derived from The Correlates of War Project at_war: A binary variable wherein the value 1 represents that the state entity was involved in traditional, interstate war during the period of the observation. Derived from The Correlates of War Project fatal: A continuous variable quantifying the number of terrorism-related fatalities the state entity suffered during the period of the observation. Derived from RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents. 102

attacks: A continuous variable quantifying the number of terrorism attacks the state entity suffered during the period of the observation. Derived from RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents.

103

Appendix C - State Natural Resource Scores † state entity does not exist in the Correlates of War database during the specified time range * data not available

Country

Score1 (Pre1914)

Score2 (1914pres.)

Renewable Water3 (km3/yr)

Arable Land4 (km2)

Proved Crude Oil5 (106 barrels)

Proved Coal6 (106 tons)

Gold7 (kg) 29800 0.0

Iron Ore7 (103 tons) 51600 .0

United States of America

3069.0

1628240. 8

22017.0

237292.0

91600. 0

Canada

3300.0

454675.5

4839.0

6584.0

14886 0.0 0.0

30969 .0 0.0

16300. 0 0.0

Bahamas

†

80.1

0.0

Cuba

38.1

36508.9

0.0

264.0

0.0

1000. 0 0.0

Haiti

14.0

10500.4

0.0

Dominican Republic

21.0

8021.1

0.0

61.0

Jamaica

†

9.4

1202.1

0.0

328.0

0.0

Trinidad and Tobago

†

3.8

251.4

0.0

839.0

Barbados

†

Grenada

†

0.1

160.0

0.0

20.1

0.0

Antigua and Barbuda

†

0.1

80.1

0.0

St. Kitts and Nevis Mexico

†

0.0

40.0

0.0

457.2

250769.6

48472.0

1211.0

Belize

†

18.6

707.1

0.0

21324 .0 0.0

9941. 0 0.0

14051. 0 0.0

Guatemala

111.3

15002.4

0.0

15.0

0.0

Honduras

95.9

10182.0

0.0

El Salvador

25.2

6775.4

0.0

4500. 0 4984. 0 0.0

0.0

Nicaragua

196.7

19013.7

0.0

Costa Rica

†

112.4

0.0

3750. 0 0.0

0.0

Panama

148.0

5501.2

0.0

Colombia

2132.0

17752.0

2798.0

6745.0

688.0

663.0

Venezuela

1233.2

27343.6

72667.0

480.0

†

241.0

4133.9

0.0

18000 .0 0.0

4160.0

Guyana

1500. 0 20799 .0 9465. 0 13581 .0 300.0

Suriname

†

122.0

624.0

0.0

Ecuador

432.0

11921.3

3453.0

0.0

104

2750. 0

Steel7 (103 tons)

0.0

67.0

Country

Score1 (Pre1914)

Score2 (1914pres.)

Renewable Water3 (km3/yr)

Arable Land4 (km2)

Proved Crude Oil5 (106 barrels)

Proved Coal6 6 (10 tons)

Gold7 (kg)

Peru

1913.0

37120.0

0.0

8233.0

609078.2

6681.0

4559.0

Bolivia

622.5

36832.2

0.0

Paraguay

336.0

38140.8

0.0

15701 3.0 37886 .0 11256 .0 0.0

Brazil

Chile

922.0

12640.0

0.0

Argentina

814.0

309246.0

2588.0

0.0

Uruguay

139.0

18727.1

0.0

United Kingdom Ireland

175.3

60482.5

4988.0

46.8

10884.6

Netherlands

89.7

Belgium

20.0

Luxembourg

†

France

Switzerland Spain

Iron Ore7 (103 tons) 0.0

Steel7 (103 tons)

21200 0.0 0.0

29604. 0 0.0

0.0

80.0

7269. 0 0.0

1280.0

10.0

231.0

38688 .0 32486 .0 2079. 0 0.0

0.0

11718. 0 0.0

10523.8

0.0

6000.0

8387.6

0.0

1.6

619.0

0.0

11000. 0 2700.0

186.3

194419.3

0.0

53.5

4080.0

0.0

2600. 0 0.0

111.1

125198.8

0.0

528.0

0.0

Portugal

73.6

11250.8

0.0

3600. 0 0.0

10.0

Germany

188.0

119921.8

0.0

40698.0

0.0

Poland

63.1

125330.4

0.0

5706.0

296.0

0.0

45015. 0 8367.0

Austria

84.0

13683.4

0.0

50.0

581.0

6208.0

Hungary

116.4

45808.2

0.0

1662.0

0.0

2141.0

Czech Republic Slovakia

16.0

31827.0

0.0

1101.0

0.0

6512.0

50.1

13801.8

0.0

2000. 0 77.0

175.0

4275.0

Italy

175.0

68828.8

0.0

600.0

0.0

Malta

†

0.1

80.0

0.0

25930. 0 0.0

Albania

†

41.7

6110.2

0.0

97.0

Macedonia

†

6.4

4211.7

0.0

500.0

1.0

260.0

Croatia

†

105.5

8673.8

0.0

34.0

Bosnia and Herzegovina

†

37.5

9945.0

0.0

70.0

0.0

Slovenia

†

32.1

1752.2

0.0

481.0

Greece

72.0

25522.2

0.0

3018.0

0.0

1835.0

Cyprus

†

0.3

868.6

0.0

a b

Value transposed into Austria-Hungary data observations Value transposed into Czechoslovakia data observations

105

0.0

20524. 0 1100.0 16358. 0 800.0

Country

Score1 (Pre1914)

Score2 (1914pres.)

Renewable Water3 (km3/yr)

Arable Land4 (km2)

Proved Crude Oil5 (106 barrels)

Proved Coal6 6 (10 tons)

Gold7 (kg)

Bulgaria

107.2

31373.8

0.0

2365.0

†

11.7

18155.3

0.0

2612. 0 0.0

Moldova Romania

25.7.

87882.9

0.0

291.0

Russia

4498.0

54086.0

157007.0

Estonia

†

12.3

1211888. 4 5977.0

0.0

Latvia

†

337.3

11689.8

Lithuania

†

24.5

Ukraine

†

Belarus

†

Armenia

Iron Ore7 (103 tons) 105.0

1860.0

0.0

Steel7 (103 tons)

77.0

5491.0

0.0

3000. 0 15800 0.0 0.0

49000 .0 0.0

59777. 0 0.0

0.0

20555.8

0.0

139.5

324998.5

395.0

33873.0

0.0

58.0

55369.9

198.0

0.0

32300 .0 0.0

34538. 0 0.0

†

7.8

4556.8

3911.0

0.0

4363.0

Georgia

†

63.3

4447.4

0.0

5.0

Azerbaijan

†

34.7

18754.7

1178.0

0.0

3200. 0 2000. 0 0.0

0.0

Finland

†

110.0

22488.6

0.0

4004.0

Sweden

183.4

26261.8

0.0

389.4

8247.7

11280.0

0.0

13000 .0 350.0

5754.0

Norway

4666. 0 4800. 0 0.0

Denmark

16.3

24312.4

862.0

0.0

392.0

Iceland

†

170.0

100.3

0.0

Cape Verde

†

0.3

600.5

0.0

GuineaBissau Equatorial Guinea Gambia

†

31.0

3008.8

0.0

†

26.0

1318.4

0.0

200.0

0.0

†

8.0

4000.0

0.0

Mali

†

100.0

63449.9

0.0

Senegal

†

39.4

38506.0

0.0

Benin

†

25.8

24447.0

0.0

36344 .0 4381. 0 20.0

0.0

Mauritania

†

11.4

4122.8

0.0

†

33.7

149470.6

0.0

11500 .0 0.0

5.0

Niger Cote D'Ivoire Guinea

†

81.0

27984.0

0.0

†

226.0

28503.5

0.0

Burkina Faso

†

17.5

59097.6

0.0

Liberia

†

232.0

4045.4

0.0

8300. 0 1900. 0 5310. 0 15217 .0 24104 .0 800.0

0.0

Sierra Leone

†

160.0

10814.6

0.0

270.0

0.0

Ghana

†

53.2

43915.2

0.0

76332 .0

0.0

106

694.0

0.0

Country

Score1 (Pre1914)

Score2 (1914pres.)

Renewable Water3 (km3/yr)

Arable Land4 (km2)

Proved Crude Oil5 (106 barrels)

Proved Coal6 6 (10 tons)

Gold7 (kg)

Iron Ore7 (103 tons) 0.0

Steel7 (103 tons)

Togo

†

14.7

21973.6

0.0

†

285.5

59561.5

0.0

Nigeria

†

286.2

339717.2

20828.0

0.0

13000 .0 1800. 0 600.0

Cameroon

0.0

50.0

410.0

Gabon

†

164.0

3349.7

2800.0

0.0

Central African Republic Chad

†

144.4

19312.4

0.0

300.0

0.0

60.0

0.0

†

43.0

42812.8

0.0

100.0

0.0

Congo

†

832.0

5122.5

Congo, Democratic Republic Uganda

†

1283.0

68011.5

0.0

150.0

0.0

3500. 0

0.0

120.0

†

66.0

65937.3

0.0

150.0

194.0

Kenya

†

30.7

54068.3

0.0

91.0

100095.4

0.0

†

3.6

8988.0

0.0

2000. 0 39448 .0 750.0

Tanzania

†

Burundi

0.0

Rwanda

†

9.5

13001.1

0.0

20.0

0.0

Somalia

†

14.2

10037.4

0.0

Djibouti

†

0.3

23.2

0.0

Ethiopia

†

110.0

139000.0

0.0

110.0

Eritrea

†

6.3

6868.0

0.0

5936. 0 35.0

0.0

Angola

†

184.0

39894.4

3695.0

0.0

Mozambique

†

217.1

50328.3

0.0

80.0

0.0

Zambia

†

105.2

33452.6

0.0

40.0

Zimbabwe

†

20.0

41779.8

0.0

504.0

3400. 0 0.0

0.0

Malawi

†

17.3

36015.0

0.0

South Africa

†

50.0

143307.5

0.0

30155.0

†

17.7

8232.9

0.0

58709 .0 0.0

8480.0

Namibia Lesotho

†

5.2

3339.6

0.0

18870 1.0 2683. 0 0.0

0.0

Botswana

†

14.7

2266.9

0.0

Swaziland

†

4.5

1754.4

0.0

1800. 0 0.0

0.0

Madagascar

†

337.0

29658.5

0.0

70.0

0.0

Comoros

†

1.2

799.8

0.0

Mauritius

†

2.8

870.9

0.0

Morocco

29.0

80334.0

0.0

650.0

44.7

455.0

Algeria

†

11.6

73833.9

10800.0

0.0

723.0

688.0

Tunisia

4.6

27032.6

0.0

1469. 0 0.0

107

0.0

Country

Score1 (Pre1914)

Score2 (1914pres.)

Libya

†

Sudan

†

Iran

Turkey

Iraq

Renewable Water3 (km3/yr)

Arable Land4 (km2)

Proved Crude Oil5 (106 barrels)

Proved Coal6 6 (10 tons)

Iron Ore7 (103 tons) 0.0

Steel7 (103 tons)

0.6

17595.4

29500.0

0.0

64.5

201960.0

300.0

0.0

26317 .0 341.0

0.0

137.5

172626.3

92600.0

0.0

17000 .0 0.0

0.0 0.0

12000. 0 29030. 0 0.0

213.6

213187.5

0.0

2345.0

†

75.6

45169.3

112000.0

0.0

Egypt

58.3

28868.1

3000.0

0.0

256.0

6700.0

0.0

4607. 0 0.0

Syria

†

16.8

46274.8

2450.0

Lebanon

†

4.5

1452.7

0.0

63.0

0.0

Jordan

†

0.9

2041.9

0.0

150.0

Israel

†

1.8

3029.6

0.0

430.0

Saudi Arabia

†

2.4

32245.4

261444.0

0.0

5000.0

2.1

11615.3

0.0

4476. 0 0.0

Yemen

†

0.0

Kuwait

†

0.0

106.9

96500.0

0.0

500.0

Bahrain

†

0.1

9.9

0.0

Qatar

†

0.1

115.9

3700.0

0.0

1975.0

United Arab Emirates

†

0.2

668.8

97800.0

0.0

1180.0

Oman

†

1.4

928.5

5238.0

0.0

82.0

0.0

84.0

Afghanistan

†

65.0

77615.4

0.0

Turkmenista n Tajikistan

†

60.9

18327.3

546.0

0.0

†

99.7

7417.9

0.0

Kyrgyzstan

†

46.5

12850.6

0.0

Uzbekistan

†

72.2

42965.4

594.0

0.0

450.0

Kazakhstan

†

109.6

234873.9

5417.0

33603.0

2738.8

16422.0

114499.0

Mongolia

†

34.8

1100642. 6 9321.4

0.0

Taiwan

†

67.0

0.0

8700. 0 10700 00.0 3203. 0 0.0

4868.0

China

5000. 0 18000 .0 80000 .0 22402 .0 34500 0.0 6037. 0 0.0

Japan

430.0

43011.0

0.0

351.0

India

†

1907.8

5364.0

60598.0

Bhutan

†

95.0

1578763. 9 767.8

8544. 0 0.0

0.0

Pakistan

†

233.8

204283.2

0.0

Bangladesh

†

1210.6

75628.8

0.0

Myanmar

†

1045.6

110444.9

Sri Lanka

†

50.0

11977.6

108

Gold7 (kg)

0.0

825.0

637230 .0 64.2 0.0

0.0

23000 0.0 0.0

109599 .0 68300. 0 0.0

2073.0

0.0

290.0

1100.0

0.0

Country

Score1 (Pre1914)

Score2 (1914pres.)

Maldives

†

Nepal

†

Thailand

Cambodia

†

Laos

Renewable Water3 (km3/yr)

Arable Land4 (km2)

Proved Crude Oil5 (106 barrels)

Proved Coal6 6 (10 tons)

Gold7 (kg)

Steel7 (103 tons)

0.0

Iron Ore7 (103 tons) 0.0

0.0

39.9

0.0

210.2

23939.5

0.0

409.9

152756.1

0.0

1241.0

4125. 0 0.0

969.9

4145.0

476.1

39010.9

0.0

†

333.6

13617.2

0.0

1060. 0 3465. 9 0.0

4314.0

0.0

5061. 0 3500. 0 3766. 0 0.0

Vietnam

†

891.2

62944.2

890.0

0.0

Malaysia

†

580.0

18070.3

3852.0

0.0

Singapore

†

0.6

0.0

Brunei

†

8.5

31.6

1090.0

0.0

Philippines

†

479.0

53968.8

0.0

800.0

2838.0

235504.1

4980.0

5530.0

0.0

336.1

468620.3

0.0

76399.0

801.0

2717.2

0.0

†

397.0

4739.6

0.0

572.0

43300 0.0 4594. 0 0.0

7140.0

†

Solomon Islands Fiji

†

44.7

167.9

0.0

40847 .0 10631 6.0 26100 0.0 62900 .0 13469 .0 0.0

Indonesia

†

Australia

†

Papua New Guinea New Zealand

0.0

†

28.6

1607.8

0.0

Korea DPR

†

77.1

0.0

603.0

Korea Rep

†

69.7

0.0

Arithmetic Mean

.22456 1

.24210 5

322.6

80480.6

5841.3

4753.3

0.0

5693.0 620.0

0.0 853.0

1856. 0 2000. 0 235.0

0.0

5300. 0 513.0

1300.0

14194. 4

12911. 1

58912. 0 8123.6

The country scores included in this column attempt to quantify the varying strategic value of nations’ natural resources prior to 1914. These estimates derive from statistics regarding countries’ renewable natural water reserves, arable land, and strategic mineral reserves, and represent the sum of the the following criteria: 1. Countries possessing quantities of arable land greater than the respective worldwide arithmetic mean receive three points 2. Countries possessing quantities of renewable water reserves receive two points 3. Countries possessing proved coal reserves receive a single point 4. Countries yielding greater than 500 kg of mined gold 3 receive three points 5. Countries yielding greater than 100 x 10 tons iron ore receive one point. This weighted scoring criterion attempts to preference the strategic value of arable land, precious metals, and industrial th materials of the 19 century. 2 The country scores included in this column attempt to quantify the varying strategic value of nations’ natural resources since 1914. These estimates derive from statistics regarding countries’ renewable natural water reserves, arable land, hydrocarbon, and strategic mineral reserves, and represent the sum of the following criteria: 1. Countries possessing quantities of renewable water and arable land greater than the respective worldwide arithmetic means receive one point for each of these categories 2. Countries possessing proved coal reserves receive two points 3. Countries possessing proved crude petroleum reserves receive three points 4. Countries

109

producing greater than 500 kg of mined gold receive a single point 5. Countries producing greater than 500 x 10 tons of either iron ore or crude steel receive two points in a single strategic metal category. This weighted scoring criterion attempts to preference the strategic importance of energy resources and manufacturing resources in the post industrial age. 3 “Total Renewable Freshwater Supply by Country,” Pacific Institute, last accessed March 31, 2013, http://www.worldwater.org/data.html 4 Arable land estimates derive from the most recent surveys available. Therefore, these arable land values do not account for changes to country borders throughout the time range presented in this chart, or in other time-series data used for the remainder of this research; Values derived from “Arable land (% of land area)” data, The World Bank, last accessed March 31, 2013, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/AG.LND.ARBL.ZS and “Land area (sq/ km) data, The World Bank, last accessed march 31 2013, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/AG.LND.TOTL.K2/countries 5 Proved crude oil reserve values represent 1997 statistic, which provide the most robust worldwide coverage. Country resource scores pre-1914 do not include these proved crude oil statistics, in order to control somewhat for the change in this resource’s relative strategic importance following the industrial revolution; OPEC, last accessed March 31, 2013, http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/ 6 Proved coal reserve values represent 2010 statistics. Country resource scores pre-1914 do not include these proved coal reserves statistics, in order to control somewhat for the change in this resource’s relative strategic importance following the industrial revolution; Europe’s Energy Portal, last accessed 31 March 2013, http://www.energy.eu/#non-renewable 7 Mineral mining values represent the most recent surveys available, and do not account for fluctuations throughout the time range presented in this chart, or in other time-series data used for the remainder of this research; “International Minerals Statistics and Information”, United States Geological Survey, last accessed March, 31 2013, http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/country/

110

Appendix D - Attributes of Interstate War Systems Decisive Interstate Wars, 1812 — 2007 CINC: Combined Index of National Capabilities x 10,000 †initiator side

War

Victor Side

CINC

Deaths victor

Defeat Side

CINC defeat

Deaths defeat

victor

∆CINC

∆Deaths

victor - defeat

FrancoSpanish War First RussoTurkish MexicanAmerican AustroSardinian

†France (1467.643)

1467.643

400

Spain (301.795)

301.795

600

1165.848

-200

†Russia (1525.648)

1525.648

50000

Ottoman Empire (568.53)

568.53

80000

957.118

-30000

†United States of

827.573

13283

Mexico (179.395)

179.395

6000

648.178

7283

760.322

3927

†Italy (183.909)

225.532

3600

534.79

327

First SchleswigHolstein Roman Republic

†Prussia (485.381)

485.381

2500

Modena (7.266) Tuscany (34.357) Denmark (57.543)

57.543

3500

427.838

-1000

†France (1321.712)

2435.32

1200

Papal States (65.551)

65.551

1400

2369.769

-200

74.407 5183.633

500 164200

Argentina (26.585) Russia (1354.154)

26.585 1354.154

800 100000

47.822 3829.479

-300 64200

2956.996

500

Iran (57.949)

57.949

1500

2899.047

-1000

La Plata Crimean

AngloPersian

America (827.573) Austria (760.322)

Austria (897.646) Two Sicilies (215.962) †Brazil (74.407) †Turkey (471.254) United Kingdom (3360.89) France (1253.639) Italy (97.85) †United Kingdom (2956.996)

111

War

Victor Side

CINC

Deaths victor

Defeat Side

CINC defeat

Deaths defeat

victor

Italian Unification First SpanishMoroccan ItalianRoman Neapolitan EcuadorianColombian Second SchleswigHolstein Lopez Naval War Seven Weeks

FrancoPrussian

∆CINC

∆Deaths

victor - defeat

France (1387.151) Sardinia/Piedmont (147.915) †Spain (267.245)

1535.066

10000

†Austria (822.447)

822.447

12500

712.619

-2500

267.245

4000

Morocco (27.043)

27.043

6000

240.202

-2000

†Sardinia/Piedmont

286.275

300

Papal States (45.924)

45.924

700

240.351

-400

286.275

600

Two Sicilies (156.053)

156.053

400

130.222

200

8.254

300

Ecuador (2.535)

2.535

700

5.719

-400

964.519

1548

Denmark (30.963)

30.963

2933

933.556

-1385

Brazil (55.131) Argentina (27.37) Peru (23.584) Chile (16.179) †Germany (658.419) Mecklenburg Schwerin (4.714) Italy (500.07)

82.501

110000

†Paraguay (11.916)

11.916

200000

70.585

-90000

39.763

700

†Spain (211.298)

211.298

300

-171.535

400

1163.203

14100

783.648

30000

379.555

-15900

Bavaria (44.664) Germany (1060.46) Baden (20.298) Wuerttemburg (17.541)

1142.963

52313

Hanover (32.339) Bavaria (68.818) Baden (12.75) Saxony (57.244) Wuerttemburg (16.377) Hesse Electoral (11.797) Hesse Grand Ducal (11.775) Austria (572.548) †France (1273.982)

1273.982

152000

-131.019

-99687

(286.275) †Sardinia/Piedmont (286.275) †Colombia (8.254) †Germany (567.315)

Austria (397.204)

112

War

Victor Side

CINC

Deaths victor

Defeat Side

CINC defeat

Deaths defeat

victor

First Central American Second RussoTurkish War of the Pacific Conquest of Egypt Sino-French Second Central American First SinoJapanese GrecoTurkish SpanishAmerican Boxer Rebellion

Sino-Russian RussoJapanese Third Central American

∆CINC

∆Deaths

victor - defeat

†Guatemala (2.735)

2.735

2000

El Salvador (2.963)

2.963

2000

-0.228

†Russia1 (318.926)

1318.926

120000

Turkey (335.974)

335.974

165000

982.952

-45000

†Chile (17.914)

17.914

3276

20.379

10592

-2.465

-7316

†United Kingdom

2116.762

Peru (13.777) Bolivia (6.602) Egypt (40.787)

40.787

10000

2075.975

-9921

1045.231 2.674

2100 200

China (1621.223) †Guatemala (2.855)

1621.223 2.855

10000 800

-575.992 -0.181

-7900 -600

†Japan (282.584)

282.584

5000

China (1540.882)

1540.882

10000

-1258.3

-5000

Turkey (242.576)

242.576

1400

†Greece (21.064)

21.064

600

221.512

800

†United States of

1970.619

2910

Spain (170.124)

170.124

775

1800.495

2135

5783.657

1003

China (1199.774)

1199.774

2000

4583.883

-997

1092.385 545.433

242 80378

China (1199.774) Russia (1132.343)

1199.774 1132.343

3758 71453

-107.389 -586.91

-3516 8925

5.179

400

Honduras (1.436) El Salvador (2.93)

4.366

600

0.813

-200

(2116.762) †France (1045.231) El Salvador (2.674)

America (1970.619) †United States of America (1879.988) United Kingdom (1775.276) France (747.144) Russia (1092.385) Japan (288.864) †Russia (1092.385) †Japan (545.433) †Guatemala (5.179)

113

War

Victor Side

CINC

Deaths victor

Defeat Side

CINC defeat

Deaths defeat

victor

Fourth Central American Second SpanishMoroccan ItalianTurkish First Balkan Second Balkan World War I

Estonian Liberation Latvian Liberation

∆CINC

∆Deaths

victor - defeat

†Nicaragua (2.25)

2.25

400

Honduras (1.626) El Salvador (3.068)

4.694

600

-2.444

-200

†Spain (145.18)

145.18

2000

Morocco (12.264)

12.264

8000

132.916

-6000

†Italy (332.649)

332.649

6000

Turkey (180.282)

180.282

14000

152.367

-8000

†Yugoslavia (18.971)

68.374

52000

Turkey (158.286)

158.286

30000

-89.912

22000

320.371

42500

†Bulgaria (157.34)

157.34

18000

163.031

24500

6550.602

5191831

†Austria-Hungary

2398.608

3386200

4151.994

1805631

16.24

3750

†Russia (374.051)

374.051

8000

-357.811

-4250

1742.694

4496

†Russia (374.051)

1142.557

8750

600.137

-4254

Greece (19.067) Bulgaria (30.336) Yugoslavia (17.764) Greece (73.417) Romania (53.402) Turkey (175.788) United States of America (2440.332) United Kingdom (1379.118) Belgium (117.331) France (747.499) Portugal (26.713) Italy (339.822) Yugoslavia (18.857) Greece (18.325) Romania (38.494) Russia (1108.134) Japan (315.977) Estonia (6.528) Finland (9.712) Germany (1724.369) Estonia (8.14) Latvia (10.185)

(682.371) Germany(1582.045) Bulgaria (12.697) Turkey (121.495)

Germany (768.506) 114

War

Victor Side

CINC

Deaths victor

Defeat Side

CINC defeat

Deaths defeat

victor

Russo-Polish Hungarian Adversaries Second GrecoTurkish LithuanianPolish Manchurian Second SinoJapanese Chaco SaudiYemeni Conquest of Ethiopia Third SinoJapanese Changkufen g Nomonhan World War II

∆CINC

∆Deaths

victor - defeat

Poland (188.027) †Romania (72.196) Czechoslovakia (106.042) Turkey (58.226)

188.027 178.238

40000 5000

†Russia (631.666)

Hungary (37.849)

631.666 37.849

60000 6000

-443.639 140.389

-20000 -1000

58.226

20000

†Greece (27.839)

27.839

30000

30.387

-10000

†Poland (271.653)

271.653

500

Lithuania (14.884)

14.884

500

256.769

†USSR (1337.485) †Japan (411.423)

1337.485 411.423

200 10000

China (1266.302) China (1254.375)

1266.302 1254.375

3000 50000

71.183 -842.952

-2800 -40000

Paraguay (3.539) †Saudi Arabia (5.336)

3.539 5.336

36000 100

†Bolivia (7.155)

56661 2000

-3.616 -3.598

-20661 -1900

†Italy (511.954)

511.954

4000

Yemen Arab Republic (8.934) Ethiopia (42.804)

7.155 8.934 42.804

16000

469.15

-12000

†Japan (534.113)

534.113

250000

China (1172.409)

1172.409

750000

-638.296

-500000

USSR (1643.592)

1643.592

1200

†Japan (590.805)

590.805

526

1052.787

674

USSR (1381.359) Mongolia (1.358) United States of America (2444.945) Canada (90.911) Brazil (110.36) United Kingdom (996.836) Netherlands (50.486) Belgium (75.867) France (395.961)

1382.717

8000

†Japan (590.574)

590.574

20000

792.143

-12000

7148.598

10720907

†Germany (1779.559)

3630.464

5917000

3518.134

4803907

France (758.349) Hungary (48.101) Italy (295.233) Bulgaria (16.613) Romania (53.087) Finland (13.211) Japan (666.311) 115

War

Victor Side

CINC

Deaths victor

Defeat Side

CINC defeat

Deaths defeat

victor

RussoFinnish Franco-Thai Arab-Israeli

Off-shore Islands Sinai War

Soviet Invasion of Hungary IfniWar

Poland (183.111) Italy (219.315) Yugoslavia (43.765) Greece (25.271) Bulgaria (34.025) Romania (81.784) USSR (1243.385) Norway (12.623) Ethiopia (28.083) South Africa (43.412) China (986.568) Mongolia (4.061) Australia (67.231) New Zealand (6.537) †USSR (1381.359)

∆CINC

∆Deaths

victor - defeat

1381.359

126875

Finland (17.939)

17.939

24923

1363.42

101952

Israel (14.135)

33.143 14.135

700 3000

758.349 80.855

700 5000

-725.206 -66.72

0 -2000

†China (943.573)

943.573

1003

France (758.349) †Jordan (2.19) Iraq (12.97) Egypt (53.934) Syria (8.55) Lebanon (3.211) Taiwan (64.802)

64.802

1367

878.771

-364

†Israel (11.856)

829.717

221

Egypt (52.115)

52.115

3000

777.602

-2779

1701.965

1500

Hungary (50.237)

50.237

926

1651.728

574

444.777

122

†Morocco (16.381)

16.381

1000

428.396

-878

†Thailand (33.143)

United Kingdom (492.237) France (325.624) †USSR (1701.965) France (337.533) Spain (107.244)

116

War

Victor Side

CINC

Deaths victor

Defeat Side

CINC defeat

Deaths defeat

victor

Assam Vietnam War, Phase 2

†China (1036.09)

Vietnam (39.885)

1036.09 39.885

500 700000

Second Kashmir Six Day War

†Pakistan (111.278)

111.278

3800

†Israel (15.568)

15.568

1000

Second Laotian, Phase 2

†Vietnam (50.155)

50.155

2250

Football War Bangladesh Yom Kippur War

†El Salvador (3.715)

India (530.791) Israel (32.709)

3.715 530.791 32.709

700 3241 2838

TurcoCypriot UgandianTanzanian SinoVietnamese Punitive

†Turkey (86.276)

86.276

Tanzania (14.774) †China1 (185.344)

∆CINC

∆Deaths

victor - defeat

India (491.182) †United States of America (2015.391) South Korea (90.671) Thailand (34.73) Cambodia (11.054) South Vietnam (65.254) Philippines (33.8) Australia (72.816) India (520.336)

491.182 2323.716

1353 321442

544.908 -2283.83

-853 378558

520.336

3261

-409.058

539

86.197

18600

-70.629

-17600

2084.209

11625

-2034.05

-9375

2.66 85.843 178.928

1200 7982 11601

1.055 444.948 -146.219

-500 -4741 -8763

1000

Egypt (64.842) Syria (13.999) Jordan (7.356) United States of America (2039.257) Thailand (38.654) Laos (6.298) Honduras (2.66) †Pakistan (85.843) †Egypt (86.542) †Syria (18.086) Iraq (28.933) Jordan (8.688) Saudi Arabia (36.679) Cyprus (1.459)

1.459

500

84.817

500

14.774

1000

†Uganda (7.246)

28.862

2000

-14.088

-1000

1185.344

13000

88.96

8000

1096.384

5000

Libya (21.616) Vietnam (88.96)

117

War

Victor Side

CINC

Deaths victor

Defeat Side

CINC defeat

Deaths defeat

victor

Falkland Islands War over the Aouzou Strip Gulf War

AzeriArmenian War for Kosovo

∆CINC

∆Deaths

victor - defeat

United Kingdom (234.384) †Chad (3.801)

234.384

255

†Argentina (67.969)

67.969

746

166.415

-491

3.801

1000

Libya (16.49)

16.49

7000

-12.689

-6000

United States of America (1355.988) Canada (123.652) United Kingdom (264.498) France (234.724) Italy (212.774) Morocco (34.608) Egypt (82.864) Syria (47.177) Saudi Arabia (126.078) Kuwait (32.927) Qatar (6.015) United Arab Emirates (21.577) Oman (6.421) †Armenia (4.88)

2549.303

1466

†Iraq (125.427)

125.427

40000

2423.876

-38534

4.88

5500

Azerbaijan (10.78)

10.78

8500

-5.9

-3000

†United States of

2618.793

Yugoslavia (19.634)

19.634

5000

2599.159

-4998

America (1428.883) †United Kingdom (225.393) †Netherlands (65.765) †France (228.116) †Germany (299.012) †Italy (204.668) †Turkey (166.956)

118

War

Victor Side

CINC

Deaths victor

Defeat Side

CINC defeat

Deaths defeat

victor

Kargil War Arithmetic Mean

India (667.366)

667.366 952.0351

474 232723.2468

†Pakistan (131.035)

131.035 448.102052

698 152755.4805

∆CINC

∆Deaths

victor - defeat

536.331 503.9331

-224 79967.766

Sarkees, Meredith Reid and Frank Wayman (2010). Resort to War: 1816 - 2007. CQ Press. National Material Capabilities: Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey. (1972). "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965." in Bruce Russett (ed) Peace, War, and Numbers, Beverly Hills: Sage, 19-48

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Curriculum Vitae Christofer Smith was born in New York on July 17th, 1982. After receiving a bachelor of arts in history from Concordia College in 2004, Mr. Smith enlisted in the United States Army. Upon completion of the US Army Special Forces Qualification Course and Ranger Course, Mr. Smith served two combat deployments in Afghanistan, where he helped train, assist, and advise host-nation security forces in counterinsurgency operations. Mr. Smith currently is a civilian employee of the US Department of Defense, where he focuses on terrorism and other forms of asymmetric warfare. Disclaimer: The statements of fact, opinion, and analysis expressed in this thesis are of the author alone, and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its components. This thesis is the product of the authorâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s academic work as a student of Johns Hopkins University.

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