Report on the 709 Crackdown by Chr Lawyers

REPORT ON THE 709 CRACKDOWN Published by China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group

Table of Contents

Part I. Background of the 709 Incident ................................................................................ 4 1.

From rights-defence lawyers to rights-defence lawyers’ network ................... 4

Enhancing connections with civil society and mobilization capacity ............... 8

PRC government oppression ................................................................................ 9

Triggering incident — The Qing’an Incident ..................................................... 11

Part II. A Summary of the 709 Incident ............................................................................. 12 1.

Rights-defence activists Wu Gan and Zhai Yanmin detained, and official

media defame lawyer Wang Yu.................................................................................. 12 2.

Surprise investigation of the Beijing Fengrui Law Firm and other rights-

defence lawyers ............................................................................................................ 13 3.

Government media extensively report on the 709 ........................................... 14

Integrated interrogations throughout China, hundreds of rights-defence

lawyers and citizens summonsed .............................................................................. 15 5.

Tianjin PSB forced to admit that it is the authority in charge of 709 cases,

and that relevant persons have been subject to residential surveillance (secret detention) in designated locations for six months .................................................... 15 6.

Strict control over family members, other lawyers and vocal supporters ..... 16

A majority arrested and a minority released ..................................................... 18

Investigation and detention period extended, and meeting rights ................. 18

Part III. Reactions from All Sectors of Society ................................................................. 20 1.

Initial reaction ........................................................................................................ 20

International Reaction .......................................................................................... 20

Domestic reaction in China ................................................................................. 22

Part IV. Illegality Analysis .................................................................................................... 26 1.

Public security authorities .................................................................................... 26

Judicial administrative authorities ...................................................................... 37

Procuratorates, courts, administrative authorities, professional associations 38

Part V. New Methods by the Authorities to Control Rights-defence Lawyers ............. 40 1.

Control authorities: From judicial and administrative authorities to public

security authorities, from local level to central level ................................................ 40 2.

Control targets: From individuals to network .................................................... 41

Control methods: From extra-legal methods to legal methods, from the

administrative level to the criminal level .................................................................... 41 4.

Control rationale: From “disturbing social order” to “endangering state

security”, from “de-politicization” to “politicization”................................................... 42 5.

Control scope: From domestic law enforcement to law enforcement outside

of China .......................................................................................................................... 42 6.

Control tools: Multiple tools used simultaneously ............................................ 43

Part VI. Impact on Lawyers and Civil society ................................................................... 45 1. Negative impact ........................................................................................................ 45 2. Positive impact .......................................................................................................... 48 Part VII. Recommendations for Future Action.................................................................. 50 1.

Affirm solidarity and mutual trust in civil society ............................................... 50

The international community must continue long-term attention and support 51

Part VIII. Statistics of the 709 Crackdown ........................................................................ 53 1.

Statistics by category (lawyers, legal assistants / others)*: ........................... 53

(1)

Officially arrested [23 persons] ....................................................................... 53

(2)

Released on bail [13 persons] ........................................................................ 54

(3)

House arrest [1 person] ................................................................................... 54

(4)

Forbidden to leave the country [39 persons] ................................................ 54

(5)

Temporarily detained, forcibly questioned / summonsed (released / safe

now) [267 persons] ....................................................................................................... 55 (6) 2.

Search and Confiscation.................................................................................. 62 Statistics by Region (location of incident) (detained, disappeared or house

arrest / forbidden to leave the country or questioned): ........................................... 62

Part I. Background of the 709 Incident 1.

From rights-defence lawyers to rights-defence lawyers’ network

In the decades following its founding in 1949, the People’s Republic of China experienced the Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries, the Anti-Rightist Campaign, the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution and other periods of social unrest during which politics prevailed over the law, and CPC power and politics overrode all else. Before the 1980s, there was effectively no law. From the 1980s onward, China gradually recovered from the Cultural Revolution. In order to maintain social order and prepare for Reform and Opening, the status of the law was gradually restored. The 1980s brought changing perceptions of the status of lawyers. In the Interim Regulation on Lawyers promulgated in 1980, lawyers were defined as “the state’s legal workers”, the same as judges and procurators during this period, and were deemed members of state institutions with political power. But in the PRC Law on Lawyers adopted in 1997, a lawyer was referred to “a practitioner who provides legal services to society”. In 2008, the new Law on Lawyers stipulated that a lawyer is “a practitioner who provides legal services to clients”. In practice, lawyers have never obtained an independent status. In a speech at the 7th National Lawyers’ Congress in October 2008, Zhou Yongkang defined lawyers as “legal workers for socialism with Chinese characteristics”. He stressed that lawyers should “endorse the CPC leadership and support the socialist system”, and “keep on full alert and strictly prevent trouble and sabotage under the name of ‘rights protection’”.1 In September 1996, the Ministry of Justice required that “any law firm with more than three CPC members must establish a CPC branch, and law firms with fewer than three CPC members should establish a CPC branch with other law firms.”2 In July 2008, the Organization Department of the CPC Central Committee and the Ministry of Justice restated the same requirements.3 Moreover, in 2012, the Ministry of Justice adopted measures requiring lawyers to take the following oath within three months of receiving their license to practice: “I pledge to faithfully fulfil my solemn duty as a legal practitioner under Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, to be loyal to the mother country and to its people, and to support the leadership of Communist Party of China

Speech by Zhou Yongkang at the 7th National Lawyers’ Congress, http://www.legalinfo.gov.cn/zt/200907/24/content_1128209.htm. 1

Decision of the Ministry of Justice on strict implementation of the Law on Lawyers to further reinforce the building of the legal community (26 September 1996). 3

Notice of the Organization Department of the CPC Central Committee and the Ministry of Justice on further reinforcement and improvement of CPC work in the legal profession, http://www.moj.gov.cn/lsgzgzzds/content/200807/15/content_899784.htm.

and the socialist system.”4 The Articles of the All China Lawyers’ Association, adopted in April 1999, start out by stipulating that the purpose of the All China Lawyers’ Association is “to uphold the leadership of Communist Party of China, and to lead members in solidarity under the great banner of Socialism with Chinese characteristics”.5 Over the past decade, various CPC leaders have advocated the concept of “rule of law”. When President Xi Jinping took office, he also stressed “running state affairs according to law, controlling political power according to law, implementing law-based administration, and promoting all of the above together”. However, the concept of “rule of law” has always been little more than a fine slogan. In actual implementation, the CPC’s power and decisions have often prevailed over law. The “rule of man” has caused many cases of injustice and unfairness, and all protests have been suppressed. Most lawyers choose to ignore this situation, and only a small number are willing to insist on justice and fairness. In spite of risks to their personal safety and wellbeing, they defend the rights of victims through administrative or judicial lawsuits. These lawyers are called “rights-defence lawyers”. Rights-defence lawyers made their mark in 2003. In this year, Sun Zhigang, a university student from Hubei, was falsely accused by the Guangzhou public security bureau of lacking identification papers, a standard residency permit and a source of income. Ruled to have violated the Administrative Measures for Custody and Repatriation of Vagrants and Beggars with No Means of Support in Cities, Sun was forcibly taken to a Custody and Repatriation station, where he was beaten to death during detention. The event caused an uproar in civil society after being exposed by the traditional press and on the Internet, and three law professors, Teng Biao, Xu Zhiyong and Yu Jiang, co-signed a letter of recommendation to the National People’s Congress (NPC) Standing Committee requesting examination of the constitutionality of the Administrative Measures for Custody and Repatriation of Vagrants and Beggars issued in 1982, asserting that it violated provisions in the PRC Constitution guaranteeing the personal freedom of citizens. This proposal was echoed by the press, legal professionals and the general public. Ultimately, the State Council responded by abolishing the Administrative Measures for Custody and Repatriation, which was subsequently replaced by the Administrative Measures for Assisting Vagrants and Beggars with No Means of Support in Cities, and dozens of individuals involved in Sun Zhigang’s case were disciplined.

Ministry of Justice: Decision to establish the lawyers’ oath system, http://baike.baidu.com/view/8206917.htm.

Articles of the All China Lawyers’ Association, adopted in April 1999 and amended in 2011.

Sun Zhigang’s case was considered a major victory in which legal professionals promoted legal reform through legal means, challenged existing policies and carved out a route to rights protection. In subsequent prominent cases, including the Sun Dawu case, Taishi Village case and Shandong family planning case, a large number of rights-defence lawyers began confronting public authorities for the first time. The public became familiar with some well-known rights-defence lawyers. At the end of 2005, Yazhou Zhoukan selected 14 rights-defence lawyers as Asian Outstanding Personalities, including Xu Zhiyong, Gao Zhisheng, Chen Guangcheng, Teng Biao, Li Heping, Guo Feixiong, Pu Zhiqiang, Fan Yafeng and Li Boguang, among others. This was another important event that marked the rapid development of rightsdefence lawyers as a group. Although these rights-defence lawyers were soon oppressed by the authorities – for example, some lawyers had their licenses revoked, and some were sentenced to imprisonment or re-education through labour – their efforts inspired an increasing number of lawyers to join the cause of rights protection. Other active rights-defence lawyers during this period included Tang Jingling, Jiang Tianyong, Li Fangping, Li Subin, Li Xiongbing, Li Jinsong, Cheng Hai, Liu Xiaoyuan, Xie Yanyi and Yang Huiwen. Meanwhile, seeing well-known rights-defence lawyers oppressed and arrested one by one, the lawyers gradually realized the limitations of their strength and their need to combine forces in order to gain mutual support and magnify their voice. While engaging in a large number of rights protection activities, they used new media on the Internet along with the traditional press, and rights-defence lawyers with shared ideas more often joined forces for mutual support, resulting in a kind of informal organization and network. Some rights-defence lawyers stood out and naturally became leaders of lawyers’ groups, and appealed for more lawyers and citizens to actively take part in the rights protection movement. Leading lawyers organized various salons, seminars and other activities, providing an opportunity for rights-defence lawyers to become acquainted and to share ideas among themselves, while also facilitating the dissemination of information on relevant cases. Several lawyers became involved simultaneously in cases such as the Cai Zhuohua case, the case regarding the education bureau at Shuangya Shan, the case in Huashui Town, Dongyang, and the Wang Bo case. In the subsequent case in Xiaohe District, Guiyang, the Wang Quanzhang case and the Jiansanjiang incident, even more lawyers became involved. In 2008, the Sanlu malemine milk powder incident broke out in China. The lawyers’ alliance used the Internet to contact and coordinate more than a hundred lawyers all over China to set up a volunteer legal team to provide legal advice and service to the victims. It was the first time that domestic rights-defence lawyers appeared in a large-scale “lawyers’ team”, and it was also an important attempt by rights-defence lawyers to build up extensive connections.

When the Jasmine Revolution took off in the Middle East and North Africa in 2011, certain individuals appealed to the Chinese public via Twitter for peaceful gatherings of the same nature. The CPC authorities took the opportunity to make widespread searches and arrests of rights-defence activists in various places, including rights-defence lawyers such as Tang Jitian, Jiang Tianyong, Tang Jingling, Liu Shihui, Teng Biao, Liu Xiaoyuan, Jin Guanghong, Li Fangping, Liu Zhengqing and Li Tiantian. The Jasmine incident nevertheless proved that rightsdefence lawyers had become the backbone for rule of law reform and the hard core of the wider rights protection movement in China. In September 2013, several lawyers founded a rightsdefence lawyers’ network using social media to unite rights-defence lawyers who shared the same ambitions and purposes. The establishment of the rights-defence lawyers’ network provided an organization where lawyers could exchange information while sharing ideas and experience. They gained knowledge from each other, and also provided significant moral support. In practice, in some especially important and sensitive cases, they organized legal teams to ensure that the rights of clients were protected. Increasing numbers of lawyers cosigned various documents such as public statements and recommendations, in hopes that through joint participation they could constitute a cohesive collective force that could more effectively put pressure on public authorities. Meanwhile, they also hoped to share the risk of oppression. Following several years of development, the rights-defence lawyers’ network currently has more than 300 members, and has expanded to include all kinds of people who take part in the rights defence movement, extending the influence of rights-defence lawyers throughout society. Up to the present, rights-defence lawyers have been involved in various types of cases such as freedom of speech, freedom of religion, political dissent, cases relating to Tibetans and Uyghurs, etc. Other sensitive issues include personal damages, land disputes, discrimination, food safety, environmental protection, etc. In addition, their work is no longer confined to the protection of clients’ rights in specific cases, but extends to taking the initiative to submit demands to public authorities in the hope of promoting legislative reform. Apart from representing cases upon request, rights-defence lawyers have started setting up their own law firms to maintain independence. Through We-media such as microblogs (weibo) and WeChat, they comment on laws and policies, hold seminars to advocate on certain issues, establish nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to enhance networking and local work, unite scholars to become involved in promoting policies and laws, and even take part in election activities as a means of diversifying their participation in the rights protection movement.

Rights-defence lawyers also play the role of monitoring the government and exposing unlawful acts by government officials. They use legal means to submit various statements and suggestions to the relevant authorities, apply for information disclosure, and even file lawsuits to impose pressure. They also launch signature campaings or submit public proposals on major individual cases and special laws and policies in order to improve legislation. We can see the involvement of rights-defence lawyers in major influential legislative incidents and cases such as the abolition of the Custody and Repatriation system in 2003, Charter 08, the Yang Jia case, cases related to the Wenchuan earthquake, cased related to unrest in Tibet in 2008, the melamine milk powder incident, the Deng Yujiao case, the case of the three Fujian netizens, the Southern Weekend incident, protecting the rights of house churches and the repeal of the Re-education through Labour system in 2013. Relying on their professional knowledge and connection with the general public, rights-defence lawyers are actively participating as the leading force in rule of law reform and rights protection. 2.

Enhancing connections with civil society and mobilization capacity

Before 2000, due to restrictions on information dissemination and limitations in transportation and communication, citizens rarely took part in the rights protection movement, and most of the few courageous rights-defence activists were held in long-term detention. After 2000, China experienced rapid economic development, which at the same time brought more convenient transportation and communication options and the popularization of the Internet. These changes were not only advantageous to establishing and developing lawyersâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; networks, but also led to changes in the entire rights protection movement. In the past, the PRC government used its official media to control the publicâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s access to information, but the popularization of the Internet broke down this information monopoly, providing citizens with channels to evade restrictions and become informed of various rights protection cases and activities. This greatly facilitated discussion of rights protection cases in civil society in a way that the government could not ignore. Netizensâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; participation gradually evolved from initial discussions on the Internet to citizen movements such as organized response to and attendance at major cases, protests, etc. Citizens are playing a significant role in influencing the development and outcome of cases. Effectively disseminating information on the Internet and gaining the support of citizens have become key factors in creating public opinion pressure against unreasonable arrests, convictions and rulings. In addition to public opinion pressure, citizens have increasingly assisted in finding evidence and reporting cases, and have become directly involved in cases.

The rise of citizen power through rapidly increasing Internet dissemination quickly made civil society an important element in the rights protection movement. Through handling more and more rights protection cases and contacts with the grass roots, rights-defence lawyers discovered the importance of cooperating with ordinary citizens. At this point, the Internet became a bridge between rights-defence lawyers and civil society. Rights-defence lawyers used the Internet to publish developments in cases they represented, as well as legal documents, comments, etc. The information, widely disseminated among netizens, put rights protection cases under the public spotlight. The press and public opinion have become powerful monitors, greatly increasing the cost of violations of the law by public authorities. Meanwhile, the emergence of the Internet has significantly reinforced the mobilization capacity of rights-defence lawyers. Together with members of the public, they are able to extensively disseminate information on various cases, integrating random and individual actions into organized small-scale collective action. There has also been increasing participation in signature campaigns concerning rights protection cases. For instance, the mutual support of a lawyers’ network successfully catalysed the 2014 case involving religious rights in Jiangsanjiang, Heilongjiang Province, into a rights protection case that gained vocal support throughout China. Even the All China Lawyers’ Association indicated that it would support the lawyers. Finally, all the lawyers arrested in connection with the case were released, reinforcing lawyers’ confidence in the importance of collective action. Lawyers even attempted to use social media to establish rights-defence legal funds to support voluntary efforts by individual rights-defence lawyers. Although these attempts ultimately failed due to authorities’ suppressive action, the mobilization capacity of rights-defence lawyers and their strong ties with civil society put the PRC government on the alert. The permanently enhanced networking and organizational power between rights-defence lawyers and citizens developed into a force with the capacity for extensive influence in society, not only on individual cases but also on local governments, further undermining the authority and reputation of the PRC government. The mobilization capacity of the civil rights protection forces became the most significant threat to the existing authorities. 3.

PRC government oppression

When the Sun Zhigang incident was first exposed in 2003, for various reasons, the PRC government did not take a hostile position against individual rights-defence lawyers who tried to promote the rule of law based on existing law, but considered their participation helpful in pushing forward legal reform. However, the government soon found that the efforts of rights-

defence lawyers regarding society, policies and legislation either directly resisted the will of the CPC and the government or indirectly pointed out their deficiencies. The participation of rightsdefence lawyers exposed a large number of criminal and corrupt acts by the government and delivered a blow to the government’s prestige while enhancing civil society’s recognition of rights-defence lawyers. Most objectionable to the PRC government was rights-defence lawyers’ organizational ability and dissemination of ideas to the wider community. The government consequently began to oppress rights-defence lawyers, attempting to impose pressure through intermediaries such as law firms and lawyers’ associations, etc. The government directly prohibited lawyers from representing sensitive cases, refused to issue certain documents, used the annual inspection process to threaten lawyers against representing sensitive cases or disseminating relevant information, dispatched personnel from the State Security Bureau to harass lawyers and their family members, targeted well-known rights-defence lawyers with arrest, detention or revocation of their licenses, and even charged lawyers with non-existent crimes as a warning to others. The government-run People’s Daily in 2012 defamed rightsdefence lawyers as counter-revolutionary anti-China forces that the United States was using to subvert China’s political power. Regarding them as the primary group of people to be subjected to harsh precautions and oppression demonstrated the government’s fear of rights-defence lawyers. After Xi Jinping took office in 2013, large-scale oppression was imposed on civil society, and rights-defence lawyers such as Xu Zhiyong, Ding Jiaxi, Tang Jingling, Chang Boyang, Ji Laisong, Pu Zhiqiang, Xia Lin and Qu Zhenhong were arrested or sentenced. In spite of increasing oppression, most rights-defence lawyers persevered with their beliefs and their work. Neither threats nor inducements could prevent rights-defence lawyers from taking action; on the contrary, protesting voices increased, and more people joined the ranks. The Qing’an Incident in May 2015, raising simultaneous vocal support from a large number of rights-defence lawyers throughout China, finally led the PRC government to impose a wholesale clampdown on rights-defence lawyers. Before the 709 Incident, Wu Gan and Zhai Yanmin, the main rights-defence activists in the Qing’an Incident, had already been subjected to criminal detention. Wu Gan was even charged with the serious crime of “incitement to subvert state power”. In the 709 Incident, the first batch of rights-defence lawyers and activists detained, including Xie Yanyi and Xie Yang, had all taken part in the Qing’an Incident. On July 12, the official People’s Daily published an article entitled “Exposing the Inside Story of the ‘Rights Defence’ Incident”, which accused rightsdefence lawyers, petitioners and online activists of manufacturing public interest in the Qing’an

incident in an organized manner, and of disturbing public order by hyping a lawful police shooting as an instance of killing petitioners. The Qing’an Incident was therefore the trigger for the 709 Incident. 4.

Triggering incident — The Qing’an Incident

On 2 May 2015, the petitioner Xu Chunhe was intercepted in the waiting room of a train station in Qing’an, Heilongjiang Province, and in an altercation with the police, he was shot to death by policeman Li Lebin. After the incident occurred, many petitioners and rights-defence activists protested outside the Qing’an train station and disseminated information and photos through weibo, raising widespread concern throughout China. On 7 May, 22 lawyers, including Liu Weiguo and Xie Yanyi, submitted a letter of complaint to the CPC’s Supreme Procuratorate and Ministry of Public Security publicly denouncing Li Lebin’s act as intentional homicide. On 14 May, the government-run CCTV broadcasted the investigation results along with edited monitoring video footage, insisting that Li Lebin had properly performed his duties in accordance with rules and regulations, but this met with strong public criticism. Less than one month after the incident occurred, more than 20 citizens were detained when they tried to carry out protests in Qing’an, and even rights-defence lawyers who provided legal aid were subjected to various forms of abuse and torture. Rights-defence lawyers published a joint letter co-signed by an unprecedented 660 lawyers entitled “Solemn Statement on the Large-scale and Serious Violation of Lawyers’ Rights and Interests by the Police of Qing’an, Heilongjiang Province”. Under public attention and protest throughout China, all of the detained lawyers were ultimately released. Following this incident, several local government officials and police officers involved in the case were suspended from duty or dismissed, and a series of local corruption cases came to light thereafter. The Qing’an Incident highlighted the influence of civil forces led by rights-defence lawyers and also marked a change in the PRC government’s attitude towards rights-defence lawyers and rights-defence activists from precaution to determined oppression, resulting in the “709 Incident”.

Part II. A Summary of the 709 Incident The 709 Incident, also known as the 709 mass arrests, refers to the incident on 9 July 2015 in which hundreds of rights-defence lawyers, legal assistants, law firm personnel, rights-defence activists and relatives of lawyers and activists were detained by public security authorities and subjected to arrest, summons, interrogation, exit restrictions, forced disappearance or shortterm restriction of personal freedom. As of 31 May 2016, the number of affected persons had reached 319 and extended to 25 provinces in China.

The 709 Incident can be roughly divided in eight parts as follows.

Rights-defence activists Wu Gan and Zhai Yanmin detained, and official media

defame lawyer Wang Yu (May to June 2015) Although Wang Yu and Bao Longjun were first detained on 9 July 2015, large-scale interrogation of lawyers and citizens throughout China began on 10 July 2015, and Wu Gan, Zhai Yanmin and other rights-defence activists closely related to the 709 Incident were detained before 9 July 2015. When Wu Gan protested in front of the Jiangxi Supreme People’s Court on 20 May 2015 regarding the court depriving lawyers of access to case files in the “Leping unjust case”, he was held in administrative detention for 10 days by the Donghu sub-branch of the Nanchang PSB in Jiangxi Province. He was taken into criminal detention again on 27 May 2015 by the Fujian police on allegations of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” and “incitement to subvert state power”. Wu Gan was the first person of those related to the 709 Incident to be subjected to criminal compulsory measures. On 11 June 2015, the official Xinhuanet.com and People.com.cn published an anonymous article entitled “Female Lawyer Sentenced for Deafening Someone by Beating, Refuses to Implement Ruling while Continuing to Practice Everywhere”. A large number of official media, especially microblogs of public security, procuratorial and judicial organs, reproduced this article and related comments. This article stated that the lawyer Wang Yu, “under the cover of being a lawyer, advocates so-called fairness and justice”, that she is “a lawyer who talks a lot about humanity and ethics, parades sympathy towards the disadvantaged and preaches fairness and justice”, and that she “always speaks out on rule of law, human rights and justice, but actually rambles around under the slogan of ‘rights protection’”. On 15 June 2015, Zhai Yanmin, Liu Xing, Li Yanjun, Zhang Wanhe, Yao Jianqing and other rights-defence activists were taken into criminal detention by the Weifang municipal PSB for holding a banner in front of the Shandong Weifang Intermediate Court to protest the “Xu

Yonghe case” alleging the crime of “gathering people to disturb public order”. Xu was among the second batch of people subjected to criminal compulsory measures in relation to the 709 Incident.

Surprise investigation of the Beijing Fengrui Law Firm and other rights-defence

lawyers (July 9 to 13, 2015) According to information obtained by lawyer Cheng Hai on 22 April 2016 from police officer Li Bin of the Tianjin PSB, the Ministry of Public Security designated the Tianjin municipal PSB to take charge of cases related to the 709 Incident on 7 July 2015. The bureau filed the case on 8 July 2015. In the early hours of 9 July 2015, Wang Yu, a well-known human rights lawyer in Beijing, her husband Bao Longjun (also a lawyer) and her 16-year-old son Bao Mengmeng disappeared one after another. Wang Yu sent out her last message at 4:17 AM on 9 July 2015, and it was received by a friend two hours later. This message stated, “Someone outside the door is trying to break in by picking the lock”. No one was able to contact Wang Yu after this message. A security guard at the residential building where Wang Yu lived revealed that at 4 AM, 20 to 30 policemen surrounded the building on the pretext of searching for drug users, and detained some individuals. Before that, Wang Yu sent out a message at 3 AM stating that the power supply and Internet in her home had been cut off, and that she could heard someone trying to force open her door. Furthermore, she was unable to contact her husband and son from 1 AM onward. Wang Yu had seen her husband and son off at Beijing International Airport on the evening of 8 July, but a friend who enquired at the airport the next day was informed that Wang Yu’s husband and son had never left China. From 7:30 AM to 1 PM on 10 July 2015, seven members of the Beijing Fengrui Law Firm were detained one by one by the police or could not be contacted. They included Zhou Shifeng (lawyer, law firm head), Zhou Shifeng (assistant), Li Shuyun (lawyer), Wang Quanzhang (lawyer), Huang Liqun (lawyer), Xie Yuandong (intern lawyer), Wang Fang (financial head), and Liu Sixin (lawyer, administrative assistant). The law firm office was ransacked that same day. This law firm had represented a number of well-known human rights cases, and was also where Wang Yu once practiced. From 2:00 PM to midnight on 10 July 2015, well-known human rights lawyers including Li Heping (Beijing) and his assistant, Zhao Wei (Beijing), and Sui Muqing (Guangdong), as well as rights-defence activists including Hu Shigen (Beijing), Liu Yongping (Beijing), Gou Hongguo (Beijing) and Lin Bin (Fujian), were detained by police or reported missing. According to Li Heping’s family, among the 20 persons who detained Li Heping, two were from the Tianjin PSB.

On 11, 12 and 13 July 2015, human rights lawyers Xie Yang (Hunan), Xie Yanyi (Beijing) and Chen Taihe (Guangxi) were subjected to criminal compulsory measures by the police. Afterwards, Gao Yue, assistant to lawyer Li Heping, was also detained, and the Beijing offices of lawyers Li Heping and Li Jinxing were searched.

Government media extensively report on the 709 Incident (11 to 20 July 2015)

While rights-defence lawyers and activists were being detained, official media began extensively reporting the 709-related arrests. At 23:43 on 11 July 2015, People’s Daily published an article entitled “Ministry of Public Security Exposes the Inside Story of ‘Rights Defence’ Incident”, which claimed that following a detailed investigation by public security authorities in Beijing, Tianjin, Heilongjiang, Shandong, Fujian and elsewhere under the command of the Ministry of Public Security, the suspected involvement of Zhai Yanmin, Wu Gan and others in serious crimes had a new development: Based on further statements by suspects and further evidence, the Ministry of Public Security had ordered public security organs in Beijing and elsewhere to take simultaneous action to destroy a gang suspected of serious crimes, using the Beijing Fengrui law firm as platform to organize, plan and hype of more than 40 sensitive cases since July 2012 in order to seriously disturb social order. A criminal gang had emerged that connected “rights protection” lawyers, lobbyists and petitioners into a tight organization with a large number of members and detailed division of labour. The inside story was that this gang used “rights protection”, “justice” and “public interest” as a cover for engaging in actions that seriously disrupted social order in order to achieve dishonest objectives. At 5:10 AM on 12 July 2015, People’s Daily published a commentary on the article entitled “Lawyers’ Battlefield Should Be in Court”, which stated that there were “manipulators” behind a series of hotspot sensitive incidents. The inside stories behind these “rights protection” incidents were surprising and outrageous: The participants made false statements, confused public opinion, misled the public, “polluted” the Internet and seriously disrupted social order in order to achieve their own ends. In addition, they made use of netizens’ sympathy, profaned the people’s sense of justice, and deserved to be attacked and condemned. On 18 July 2015, Xinhuanet.com published another article entitled “Follow-up on Beijing Fengrui Law Firm Case”, which stated that “nine lawyers, including Zhou Shifeng, Wang Yu, Li Heping, Xie Yanyi, Sui Muqing, Huang Liqun, Xie Yuandong, Xie Yang, and Liu Jianjun, as well as Liu Sixin, Wu Gan, and Zhai Yanmin, were sanctioned by criminal compulsory measures according to law… In recent days, several criminal suspects engaged in in-depth self-

examination and felt that their acts seriously obstructed implementation of the law, and worse yet, seriously harmed social fairness and justice.”

Integrated interrogations throughout China, hundreds of rights-defence lawyers

and citizens summonsed (11 to 20 July 2015) Starting in the early hours of 11 July 2015, state security and public security bureau personnel in provinces throughout China began interrogating, summonsing or detaining rights-defence lawyers and citizens. As of 20 July 2015, within just 10 days, the number of affected persons reached at least 236 in 24 provinces, among which were lawyers, legal assistants or law firm personnel. The majority of the interrogations took place at midnight or in the early hours of the morning. Most PSB or state security personnel did not produce formal summonses prior to interrogation, nor did they take notes in accordance with legal requirements during the interrogations. Among the 24 provinces and cities, Beijing, Guangdong, Jiangsu, Shandong, Hunan, Guangxi and Shanghai were the most seriously affected. The main purpose of the interrogation and summonses was to warn rights-defence lawyers and citizens not to publicly express support on the Internet for Zhou Shifeng, Wang Yu and others, and some were even required to provide written guarantees of their compliance.

Tianjin PSB forced to admit that it is the authority in charge of 709 cases, and that

relevant persons have been subject to residential surveillance (secret detention) in designated locations for six months (July 2015 to January 2016) The family members of Xie Yang, Chen Taihe, Sui Muqing, Gou Hongguo, Gao Yue and other detained and arrested persons received Notices of Residential Surveillance in a Designated Location in July 2015, but the families of other affected individuals did not receive oral or written notice of criminal compulsory measures. Li Heping’s family members reported his disappearance to the police sub-station of his place of residence several times, but in vain. Without written notice, defence lawyers could not become involved in the cases or provide legal counsel to the defendants. On 15 July 2015, Wang Yu’s defence lawyers, Li Weida and Feng Yanqiang, went to the legal affairs division, criminal police division, narcotics division and other authorities at the Tianjin Hexi sub-branch to enquire into the whereabouts of Wang Yu and other lawyers, and were informed that there was no case relating to Wang Yu. It was not until 28 July 2015 that the Tianjin PSB was forced to admit that it was the authority in charge of the 709 cases. On that day, Liu Sixin’s defence lawyer, Wang Lei, and Zhao Wei’s

defence lawyer, Ren Quanniu, went to the Hexi sub-branch of the Tianjin Municipal Public Security Bureau to inquire into the whereabouts of their clients. After repeated inquiries, one of the bureau personnel, Zhao Xu, finally admitted for the first time that Liu Sixin and Zhao Wei were being detained at the Hexi District Detention Centre in connection with the 709 mass arrests, and that their case was being handled by a special investigation team. This was the first time that defence lawyers involved in the 709 case arrests were able confront Zhao Xu, a person in charge of the case, and put an end to the forced disappearance. Subsequently, defence lawyers for the 709 cases were gradually informed by Zhao Xu of the Hexi sub-branch that their respective clients were under residential surveillance at designated locations under allegations of various crimes, including “incitement to subvert state power”, “picking quarrels and provoking trouble”, “embezzlement”, “disturbing court order”, etc. Although the month-long forcible disappearances had ended, the authorities in charge still refused to provide information on the specific locations of residential surveillance, and also denied requests by defence lawyers to meet with their clients.

Strict control over family members, other lawyers and vocal supporters (July 2015

to 31 May 2016) After lawyers involved in the case were subjected to criminal compulsory measures, their family members also suffered different levels of control, including interrogation, summonses, warning, monitoring, exit restrictions and even criminal detention. Bao Mengmeng, lawyer Wang Yu’s 16-year-old son, was detained on 9 July 2015. Although he was released after several days under house arrest, police summonsed him four times in the same month and warned him not to hire lawyers for his parents, solicit external support or contact rights-defence lawyers. Police also confiscated his passport and household registration booklet, which prevented him from going to Australia to study. In order to prevent him from contacting the press or the outside world, police closely monitored Bao Mengmeng and kept him under house arrest in a relative’s home. On 1 February 2015, Bao’s grandmother revealed to defence lawyers that police had arranged for her grandson to live in an aunt’s home while State Security personnel lived in the rooms opposite. Any visitor had to first register and obtain prior approval from an upper level. A special police car took Bao to and from school every day, accompanied by the police and his aunt. On 6 October 2015, with the help of rights-defence activists Tang Zhishun and Xing Qingxian, Bao Mengmeng attempted to go to Australia through Burma, but people wearing Burmese police uniforms took all three of them away from Room 8348 in the Huadu Hotel in Mongla City, on the border between Yunnan and Burma. Bao

Mengmeng was repatriated to Inner Mongolia, while Tang Zhishun and Xing Qingxian were subject to forced disappearance for 225 days. Lawyer Li Heping’s brother, Li Chunfu, who is also a lawyer, was detained by Tianjin police for publicly supporting Li Heping on 1 August 2015. It was subsequently established that he was being held under residential surveillance in a designated location, and his residence was searched. Li Heping’s wife was taken away by Tianjin and Beijing police officers who broke into her home on 6 August 2015 after she repeatedly published articles regarding Li Heping. Accused of the crime of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble,” she was interrogated at the police sub-station for five hours. Li Heping’s 15-year-old son and 5-year-old daughter had their passport applications rejected and were banned from leaving China in August 2015. Wang Quanzhang’s father was told to make a video recording to convince his son to “admit his crime”. On 27 April 2016, the public security bureau raided the home of Wang Quanzhang’s brother-in-law and demanded that he “persuade” Wang Quanzhang. On the following day, the PSB video-taped Wang Quanzhang’s father, telling him to “persuade Wang Quanzhang to admit his error” and to “use family love to convince Wang Quanzhang to admit committing a crime”. While lawyer Xie Yang’s wife was passing through customs from Shenzhen to Hong Kong on 4 April 2016, she was informed by customs officers that they had been notified by public security authorities that her exit might jeopardize state security, as a result of which she would not be permitted to exit. Customs officers refused to tell her which specific public security authority had issued this order, or the starting and ending date of her exit restriction. Zhao Wei’s parents were warned not to seek help from the public. At 10:40 AM on 7 March 2016, three State Security Bureau plain-clothes officers, two men and one women, went to the home of Zhao Wei’s mother and told her not to contact lawyers or take part in signature campaigns, as doing so would jeopardize Zhao Wei. They told Zhao Wei’s mother to contact them in case of emergency, and that they would provide help. The state security personnel left after an hour at Zhao Wei mother’s home. Public Security Bureau officers also advised the wife of lawyer Sui Muqing not to accept press interviews and to remain silent and low-key. Meanwhile, human rights lawyers and citizens who protested on behalf of arrested lawyers were also oppressed. In July 2015, lawyer Yu Wensheng was interrogated after protesting on behalf of detained lawyers, while his wife was also interrogated. Eight citizens who made and distributed clothes in support of Wang Yu were interrogated, repatriated to their place of residence or criminally detained. As of 25 May 2016, at least 39 rights-defence lawyers and

citizens were restricted from exiting China, including 13 defence lawyers involved in 709 Incident cases.

A majority arrested and a minority released (January to March 2016)

On 8 and 9 January 2016, upon expiration of the 6 months of residential surveillance, 16 individuals were formally arrested, including 10 lawyers, two legal assistants and four others. The authority in charge of the case was changed from the Hexi sub-branch to the Tianjin Municipal PSB. The crimes under which the arrests were approved were “subversion of state power”, “incitement to subvert state power”, “abetting the destruction of evidence” and “picking quarrels and provoking trouble”. In February 2016, lawyers Wang Qiushi and four Christian pastors, Huang Yizi, Zhang Zhi, Cheng Congping and Yang Xiaojie (in the same case with lawyer Zhang Kai), had their compulsory measures changed from “residential surveillance in a designated location” to “release on bail pending trial.” In March 2016, the Guangxi PSB withdrew charges against Chen Tai, a law professor in Guangxi, and Chen emigrated to the United States. In addition, Zhang Kai, a Beijing lawyer who represented several churches in Wenzhou, Zhejiang Province, was released on 23 March and repatriated to Inner Mongolia. In April 2016, Fengrui Law Firm intern lawyer Li Shuyun and Li Heping’s assistant Gao Yue were released on bail pending trial.

Investigation and detention period extended, and meeting rights repeatedly denied

(January to June 2016) Since the seven-month investigation and detention time period in for the Wu Gan case was due to expire on 3 February 2016, the Tianjin police decided on 20 January 2016 that the investigation and detention time period should be re-calculated based on the “discovery of new criminal facts”. Likewise, the authorities in charge decided to extend the investigation and detention time periods of one month and two months for 16 persons whose arrests were authorized on 8 and 9 January 2016, but family members were not given any written notice, and requests to meet with defence lawyers were all denied on the basis that such meetings would “obstruct the investigation” or “possibly divulge state secrets”. As of 31 May 2016, at least 319 lawyers, law firm personnel, human rights defenders and family members had been subject to interrogation, summons, exit restriction, house arrest, residential

surveillance, arrest or disappearance. As the first anniversary of â&#x20AC;&#x153;709 Incidentâ&#x20AC;? approached, the number of people affected by the ongoing oppression continued to grow.

Part III. Reactions from All Sectors of Society 1.

Initial reaction

A joint statement by 101 Chinese human rights lawyers denouncing the disappearance of Wang Yu and her family members, published on 9 July 2015, was the first response to the 709 Incident. However, by the next day, mass arrests extended throughout China; within just one week, 190 lawyers and citizens were detained, summonsed, interrogated or warned. Consequently, similar public action totally disappeared for nearly a month afterwards. 2.

International Reaction

UN and foreign governments Compared with China’s domestic reaction, the international community was more willing to speak out at this time. On the same day that the “China Change” website reported the 709 Incident, Hong Kong’s Chinese Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group issued a statement expressing concern over the disappearance of Wang Yu and her family members and urging the PRC government to launch an investigation and adopt all measures to ensure the personal safety of Wang Yu and her husband and son. In July 2015, the governments of seven Western countries (United States, Germany, European Union, Canada, United Kingdom, France and Australia) and the UN publicly denounced the PRC government’s arrest of rights-defence lawyers and citizens. Meanwhile, international civil society groups also published more than 20 public statements. Compared with other countries and the UN, the governments of the United States (including its House of Representatives and Senate) and Germany used the toughest wording in their statements, such as “strongly condemn” and “increasingly blatant disregard for fundamental human rights”, while the UN and other Western countries used wordings such as “serious attention” and “desist in arresting”. Legal profession Although no governments of other Asian states or regions except Taiwan publicly expressed a position regarding the 709 mass arrests, legal professional groups in the region expressed their views, including the Hong Kong Law Society and Bar Association, the Taiwan Bar Associations and Japan’s bar associations. In addition, lawyers’ associations in the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand also published public statements in support of detained lawyers and citizens. As of the end of July 2015, a total of 13 legal professional associations published statements on the 709 mass arrests, including some that had never previously taken a position on China’s human rights issues, such as the Japan Federation of Bar Associations, the Law

Society of England and Wales, the Hong Kong Legal Election Committee and 13 former presidents of the Hong Kong Bar Association. As might be expected, statements and public letters published by legal professional groups mainly focused on fundamental rights and legal procedures. Many groups also urged the PRC government to implement UN recommendations and to adhere to the United Nations “Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers”, published in 1990, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Apart from legal professional groups, the Hong Kong Foreign Correspondents’ Club, comprised of foreign journalists, also published a statement expressing serious concern over the 709 mass arrests. Their statement focused on freedom of speech and publication, stating that “Freedom of speech and of the press can

only be guaranteed when there is the clear and unfettered rule of law ” and that the arrests sent “a very chilling message to both journalists and lawyers working in China”. International institutions International non-government organizations and overseas Chinese quickly engaged in advocacy regarding the sudden 709 mass arrests. In July alone there were 10 such actions, among them a White House petition, overseas Chinese protests, a protest by the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China, a signature campaign launched by Amnesty International and a civil society signature campaign launched by the Taiwan Association for Human Rights. Humanitarian China, headquartered in California, set up a Chinese Human Rights Lawyers Fund to assist rights-defence lawyers and their family members. By the end of July 2015, 23 statements had been released by civil society groups all over the world, such as the Netherlands (Lawyers for Lawyers and 24 other international organizations), Hong Kong, Taiwan, the United States, Ireland and Japan. Compared with public statements by foreign governments and professional groups, civil society groups used less rigid and conservative wording. Apart from typical phrases such as “serious concern” and “immediate release”, they also described the 709 Incident as “black Friday”, “maniacal”, “a huge blow to China’s law professionals”, “revenge against human rights lawyers”, “serious persecution” and “terror”. The demands of civil society groups can be summarized in the following five points: 1.

release detained and arrested individuals;

stop persecution in the name of “state security”;

stop harassing and persecuting family members;

publish locations and reasons of detention;

ensure the safety of the detained and prevent torture.

Professional associations in the international community also expressed support for the detained lawyers, including the New Zealand Law Society, the Law Council of Australia and the International Bar Association, etc. Meanwhile, Hong Kong civil society groups carried out nine advocacy actions, while Thailand and Taiwan also held activities demanding the release of the lawyers. In addition to launching signature and letter-writing campaigns, there were also photo campaigns, talks on the street and at universities, a 709 Incident video, street demonstrations and Internet campaigns. In August 2015, Hong Kong civil society groups launched a global signature campaign involving more than 50 civil society groups all over the world. Meanwhile, overseas groups and overseas Chinese gathered to read open letters outside of the Chinese Embassy in Washington, D.C. When Xi Jinping attended the UN Women’s Summit, the US launched a campaign appealing for the release of 20 female political prisoners, including lawyer Wang Yu. Half a year after the “709 Incident”, 113 global civil society groups released a joint statement calling on the international community to focus continuous attention on the “709 mass arrests” and urging the PRC government to respect proper procedures, observe its commitment to rule of law and grant immediate release to the 38 illegally detained rights-defence lawyers and citizens. In addition, well-known human rights lawyers in Europe, North America and Australia appealed to Chinese President Xi Jinping to stop the unprecedented repression of hundreds of human rights lawyers, their relatives and other involved individuals. The Beijing Fengrui Law Firm was awarded the 2015 Annual Human Rights Award by the Association of European Lawyers. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights expressed public concern over China’s oppression of rights-defence lawyers and citizens. During a meeting of the UN Human Rights Council on 10 March 2016, 12 countries, including the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greenland, Ireland, Japan, Norway, the Netherlands and Sweden, published a joint statement condemning China’s deteriorating human rights record and expressing particular concern regarding the arrest of rights-defence lawyers. 3.

Domestic reaction in China

Although support and protests in the international community gradually decreased, support from lawyers and civil society in mainland China increased, including a series of statements and protests launched by lawyers, communities and family members. Actions by Chinese lawyers Groups of Chinese human rights lawyers mainly issued urgent appeals on special dates, or took action during international events to attract the attention of the public, press and

international community. For instance, they published statements during the US-China human rights dialog, when Wang Yu’s son disappeared in Burma, on the 100th day after the 709 mass arrests, on the birthdays of detainees, on International Human Rights Day and on other special dates. They were not intimidated by the Chinese authorities’ oppression of lawyers, and the joint efforts reached a level rarely seen in the past. As of 1 February 2015, they made 13 joint statements. The entities issuing joint statements were more varied than in the past, and included detained defence lawyers, lawyers subject to exit restrictions, family members and defence lawyers of the detained, lawyers in the provinces where detained lawyers lived, etc. In addition to the statement and accusations, Chinese human rights lawyers also organized a seminar in February 2015 on recent legal actions and strategies and on enhancing collaboration among lawyers and family members. Actions by Chinese civil society The first statement by a Chinese civil society group on the 709 mass arrests was issued on 2 August 2015 by more than 100 disabled persons. Later, other socially disadvantaged groups expressed their views, including family members of victims in sexual harassment cases, people submitting complaints to higher authorities, and feminists. These were groups that included clients in cases represented by detained and arrested lawyers. Meanwhile, netizens played an important role in protesting the 709 mass arrests. On 9 July 2015, they published information and developments relating to 709 Incident on the Internet, and also launched an Internet photo collection campaign. Netizens also visit the family members of detainees, celebrated the birthdays of detainees, etc. Family members who had not been arrested along with the rightsdefence lawyers also wrote an open letter to the Ministry of Public Security, which was very unusual, given that the family members of victims usually maintain a low profile. Religious groups also organized a special prayer session in September 2015 for detained and arrested Christian lawyers. As with domestic lawyers, civil society groups also made use of special dates to attract the attention of the press and international community; for example, when Xi Jinping visited the United States, human rights defenders sent a letter to President Obama asking him to put pressure on PRC government. Before National People’s Congress (NPC) and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) sessions in 2016, more than 300 Chinese lawyers and other citizens sent a letter on the 709 Incident to NPC delegates and the NPC, requesting protection of the litigant rights of detained and arrested persons, and demanded correction of the practice of official media passing judgment on the defendants before trial. Meanwhile, eight family members, 27

defence lawyers and 52 other lawyers co-signed a letter to NPC delegates requesting the establishment of a special committee to investigate the 709 mass arrests. The PRC government’s response Since the beginning of the oppression, the PRC government has maintained a consistent position that the detained and arrested lawyers are part of “a major crime gang”, and that they are “radical human rights lawyers” who “planned and organized several sensitive cases” and “seriously disturbed social order and judicial order”. Following strong reactions both in China and overseas, on 12 July 2015, the PRC government used its official media to emphasize the above points and tried to prove the legitimacy of arresting human rights lawyers. The government did not do so through laws and legal procedures but by seeking to influence public opinion through official media such as CCTV, People’s Daily and Global Times. In response to international critics, the government-controlled Global Times on 14 July 2015 published a news commentary, saying that criticism by “extremist forces” in US Congress and some “extremist forces” in Taiwan and Hong Kong on the arrest incident had caused ill feelings among the mainland public, but that external forces should not interfere in the arrests. Anticommunist forces inside and outside of China might be acting in collusion, and the arrest of rights-defence lawyers could bring more peace and order to Chinese society. The PRC government published no formal comments on the 709 mass arrests until hearings of the UN Committee Against Torture were held four months later. At the meeting, the PRC government was questioned over the 709 mass arrests. On 11 September 2015, the PRC government replied by stating the same position as before. The government stressed that the Ministry of Public Security had broken up a major crime gang using the Beijing Fengrui Law Firm as its platform, and in which rights-defence lawyers, lobbyists and petitioners colluded with each other to cause trouble and disturb social order. The government had filed for investigation and prosecution of the suspects and had adopted compulsory measures, and the cases were in the process of investigation. Lawyers, like other people, should observe the law, and the relevant Chinese authorities handled cases according to law and focused on illegal acts. The PRC government hoped that the committee would strictly perform its own duties and avoid politicizing its deliberations. In response to comments made by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights regarding the 709 Incident, the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs in February 2016 voiced strong opposition to “groundless accusations” made by the UN High Commissioner regarding China’s domestic affairs and asserted that China is a state under the rule of law, with equality for everyone before

the law, and that whoever violates the law will be sanctioned according to the law. The PRC government hoped the High Commissioner would assess the development of human rights in China in a fair and objective manner and respect Chinaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s judicial sovereignty. In response to the joint statement published by 12 countries at the 31st session of the UN Human Rights Council, the spokesman for the PRCâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Ministry of Foreign Affairs told journalists at a routine press briefing on 11 March 2016 that the PRC government advised these states to reflect well on their own problems and correct their own numerous human rights issues, and to stop politicizing human rights issues and using them to interfere in the domestic affairs and judicial sovereignty of other countries.

Part IV. Illegality Analysis Not only public security, judicial and administrative authorities, but also procuratorates and courts engaged in a large number of illegal acts in the 709 Incident, specifically as follows: 1.

Public security authorities

1. Tianjin municipal public security authorities had no territorial jurisdiction Based on legal documents and information received by lawyers, the cases of Wang Yu and 10 other individuals were handled by the Hexi sub-branch of the Tianjin Municipal PSB. Tianjin was neither where the said individual committed the alleged crime, nor their place of residence. The inference from relevant legal provisions is that the Hexi sub-branch obtained “designated jurisdiction” from public security authorities at a higher level. However, “designated jurisdiction” in this case has the following issues: First, Article 26 of the PRC Criminal Procedure Law provides that designated jurisdiction falls within the competence of the people’s courts and of public security authorities. Therefore, the authorization provisions under Article 19 of the Procedural Provisions on Handling Criminal Cases by Public Security Authorities regarding designated jurisdiction of public security organs lack legal basis in its upper law. Second, Article 19 of Procedural Provisions on Handling Criminal Cases by Public Security Authorities is highly arbitrary – the law does not include provisions on what are considered “special circumstances” and under what circumstances the designated procedure to change jurisdiction may be launched, nor is there any legal or judicial interpretation on how to determine the authority that takes over the case after a change of jurisdiction. In judicial practice, authorities with similar case experience that could meet needs at a higher level are more likely to be designated as the competent authority. Third, there is no system for concerned persons to raise objections, and lawyers cannot get involved. 2. Joint cooperation by a project team to handle the case violated the principle of checks and balances Based on information received by lawyers, the 709 cases were handled by a specific project team comprised of unidentified individuals. Various indications suggest the participation of individuals from public security, court, procuratorate and judicial administrative authorities, the political and legal affairs committee and the official press. Court, procuratorate and judiciary administrative authorities as well as the political and legal affairs committee involved in cases under the jurisdiction of public security authorities without

authorization provisions under any law violates the principle of checks and balances among public security, court and procuratorial organs. This joint case-handling resulted in a wilful expansion of the investigation power of public security authorities without effective supervision or restriction, which could very easily result in cases of injustice. In fact, this shows how the CPC takes the place of law and uses its political will to override laws. 3. Abuse of crimes of “endangering state security” Regarding lawyers and rights-defence activists once or currently in detention or disappeared, 25 persons were charged with crimes of endangering state security, including “incitement to subvert state power” and “stealing, secretly gathering, purchasing or illegally providing state secrets or intelligence to an organization, institution or personnel outside the country”. Based on information revealed by Xinhuanet.com on 18 July 2015, the accused are said to have “organized, planned and hyped more than 40 cases and incidents that seriously disturbed normal judicial activities and seriously disturbed public order”. Regardless of whether or not the official press reports are objective or fair, regarding the charge itself, lawyers and rights-defence activists did not fabricate false information or disseminate speech detrimental to state power, so it cannot be concluded that there was any relationship between the actions of lawyers and rights-defence activists and the crime of incitement to subvert state power and to overthrow the socialist system. The actions of these rights-defence lawyers caused no harm to society and therefore do not constitute a crime. Their actions promote the rule of law and defend human rights and deserve acknowledgement and admiration. Abuse of the crime of endangering state security to accuse these lawyers only serves the interests of the CPC. 4. Abuse of residential surveillance in a designated location Twenty-five lawyers and rights-defence activists, including Wang Yu, were subjected to residential surveillance in a designated location, which was inconsistent with applicable conditions, bringing the authorities in charge of the case in violation of Articles 72 and 73 of the PRC Criminal Procedure Law. First, the cases of Wang Yu and the others do not fall within the scope of residential surveillance measures. Article 72 of the PRC Criminal Procedure Law provides five applicable situations for residential surveillance. The authorities in charge of the case imposed residential surveillance on Wang Yu and others on the grounds that, “based on the special circumstances of the cases or the needs for handling the cases, it was more appropriate to adopt residential surveillance measures”. However, the law does not provide for what are “special circumstances”, what are

“the needs for handle cases” or what is “more appropriate”. In this case, the authorities in charge of the case did not make any explanation as to why the cases of Wang Yu and the others complied with the said circumstances. Second, even the applicable situation in accordance with residential surveillance measures does not comply with Article 73 of the PRC Criminal Procedure Law on implementing residential surveillance in a designated location: (1) Wang Yu and the others have permanent residences in China, so residential surveillance should be carried out at their places of residence. (2) Even applying the second type of situation for alleged crimes of endangering state security, the authorities in charge of the case did not provide any explanation as to why implementing the surveillance at the place of residence could possibly obstruct the investigation. Furthermore, the decision for residential surveillance in a designated location was made by the Hexi subbranch rather than the higher-level Tianjin Municipal PSB. (3) In certain cases, such as that of Xie Yuandong, where the concerned persons had fixed residences and were suspected of nothing more than the crime of picking quarrels and provoking trouble, the authorities in charge still decided to implement residential surveillance at a designated location. (4) The system of residential surveillance at a designated location was added when the PRC Criminal Procedure Law was amended in 2012 for the purpose of reducing detentions and arrests. However, in this case, the authorities in charge of the case were freed from the supervision of the detention centre, and residential surveillance became secret detention in disguise. The litigation rights of the concerned persons were violated more seriously than in detention or arrest. Based on past practice, it is more than possible that this “residential surveillance at a designated location” involved torture and inhumane treatment. 5. Lawyers deprived of their right to know the facts of the case The defence layers of the lawyers and rights-defence activists once or currently in detention or disappeared were never informed of their clients’ circumstances by the authorities in charge of the cases. Defence lawyers were not informed of the alleged crime or the verified facts relating to it, the compulsory measures imposed, the extension of investigation and detention periods or other circumstances. The authorities in charge of the cases refused this information mainly on two grounds: that “lawyers are not persons in charge of the cases, and do not understand the circumstances”, and that the “cases involve state security”. Public security authorities have the obligation to inform defence lawyers of the relevant circumstances of cases. In this respect, Article 36 of the PRC Criminal Procedure Law and Articles 40 and 47 of the Procedural Provisions on Handling Criminal Cases by Public Security

Authorities do not authorize exceptions, which means that the authorities in charge of the cases were acting illegally. 6. The authorities refused to notify family members in a timely manner regarding the imposition of compulsory measures and the place of detention Articles 73 and 83 of PRC Criminal Procedure Law give family members the right to information, including the type, time, place of detention or surveillance and whether the compulsory measures are changed. Under normal circumstances, this right to information should be fulfilled within 24 hours. The Hexi sub-branch of Tianjin Municipal Public Security Bureau did not fulfil its obligations in this respect. Among the lawyers and rights-defence activists who were once or currently in detention or disappeared, (1) 25 persons were placed under residential surveillance at a designated location, but the families of only 14 of them received notices from the authorities in charge of the case, and none of the family members received notice within 24 hours of the implementation of residential surveillance at a designated location. None of the notices informed family members of the place of detention or surveillance of the defendants. Consequently, the defendants were deprived of their right of correspondence or to meet with their lawyers. (2) Five of the individuals taken away by police were subjected to criminal detention measures, but the families of only two of them received a notice of criminal detention from the authorities in charge of the cases, and in neither case did they receive this within 24 hours of the defendants being placed in criminal detention. (3) After four individuals were taken away by the police, the authorities in charge of the case changed the compulsory measure from criminal detention to residential surveillance at a designated location, but family members were not notified of the change by the authorities in charge of the case. (4) Authorities in charge of the case changed the detention place of one individual, Wu Gan, but family members were only informed that Wu’s place of detention was no longer the Yongtai Detention Centre, and family members and lawyers were not told his new place of detention. 7. Defendants deprived of their right to meet with defence lawyers The Hexi sub-branch of the Tianjin municipal PSB abused Article 37 of the PRC Criminal Procedure Law by interpreting the clause “meeting with a lawyer needs to be approved” as meaning “generally forbidden to meet lawyers” so as to deprive the accused of their right to meet with their lawyers.

As of 31 May 2016, only five of the lawyers and rights-defence activists once or currently in detention or disappeared were given permission to meet with a defence lawyer. The authorities in charge of the case withheld approval on the grounds that the defendants were accused of crimes of endangering state security, and a meeting would obstruct the investigation or possibly divulge state secrets. First, the possibility of “obstructing the investigation” is not a legitimate reason to refuse a defendant his right to meet with his lawyer. (1) Based on Article 49 of the Procedural Provisions on Handling Criminal Cases by Public Security Authorities, there are four conditions under which approval to meet with a lawyer can be withheld on these grounds, but the authorities in charge of these cases did not provide any explanation or interpretation as to whether the cases fell under any of the four conditions. (2) From 9 July 2015 up to the present, defence lawyers have made repeated applications to meet their clients, but all have been refused. While the condition of “obstruction investigation” may have initially applied, it has not been applicable for the past five months. Second, the possibility of divulging state secrets no longer constitutes a reason to refuse the accused their right to meet with a lawyer. Even if this case involves “state secrets”, they would not be “divulged” by meeting a lawyer. As with investigating personnel, lawyers are also participants in the criminal lawsuit and have to know the relevant circumstances in order to perform their duties, and relevant provisions of the PRC Law on Protecting the State Secrets, PRC Criminal Procedure Law and Law on Lawyers impose confidentiality on lawyers. If defence lawyers violate the relevant legal provisions, they should bear legal liability, but this cannot be a reason for the investigating authorities withholding approval for the accused to meet with a lawyer. In addition, the Wenzhou Municipal PSB publicly refused the meeting request of lawyers Zhang Lei and Li Boguang, ignoring Article 8.1 of the Provisions on Protecting the Rights of Practice of Lawyers in Accordance with the Law, promulgated in September 2015 by the Supreme People's Court, Supreme People's Procuratorate, Ministry of Public Security and Ministry of State Security, which stipulates, “Where a criminal suspect or defendant in detention files to terminate a client-attorney relationship, the case-handling authority shall require him to give or sign a written document and shall forward, within three days, such document to his appointed lawyer or law firm. The defence lawyer may request to meet the criminal suspect or defendant in person to confirm the termination of the client-attorney relationship, and upon such request, the detention centre shall arrange a meeting”. The two lawyers were unable to confirm whether the note was written by the detainees themselves or whether the terminations were their true

intention. They also could not judge whether the detainees’ actions were the result of them being tortured, forced, deceived, seduced or subjected to other illegal treatment. 8. Defendants deprived of their right to correspond with defence lawyers and family members Only two of the lawyers and rights-defence activists once or currently in detention or disappeared were given permission to correspond with lawyers or family members. The authorities in charge of the cases ignored or returned numerous correspondence requests from defence lawyers, alleging that “as the facts of the case are related to state secrets, correspondence is prohibited”. In addition, according to a reply Xie Yang’s wife received from Xie Yang on 2 January 2015, Xie Yang had not received a letter from his defence lawyer up until then. It can therefore be concluded that all letters written by defence lawyers to Xie Yang were examined by the authorities in charge of the case and were not approved. Article 37 of PRC Criminal Procedure Law confers upon defence lawyers the right to meet and correspond with defendants. The authorities in charge of the case and of the place of detention have the obligation to protect these rights as long as defence lawyers and defendants exercise them. Although investigative authorities are allowed to approve meetings in when cases involving crimes that endanger state security are under investigation, the law does not grant investigative authorities the power to approve correspondence. 9. Illegal summons, confinement, threats, intimidation and assault of children of rights-defence lawyers On the evening of 9 July 2015, the Tianjin PSB abducted Bao Zhuoxuan (aka Bao Mengmeng), Wang Yu’s 16-year-old son, from Beijing International Airport and took him to a hotel in Tianjin, where they threatened, intimidated and assaulted him while restricting his personal freedom for 44 hours. The PSB of Inner Mongolia interrogated Bao

Zhuoxuanfour times in July 2015.

Police intimidated Bao Zhuoxuan to prevent him from hiring lawyers for his parents or appealing for outside help. On 6 October 2015, Inner Mongolian police forcibly took Bao Zhuoxuan from Mongla, Burma, and put him under house arrest in the home of his guardian in Inner Mongolia. As of today, Bao Zhuoxuan remains under 24-hour monitoring by the Inner Mongolia police, and his personal freedom is largely restricted. The Tianjin and Inner Mongolia PSBs imposed unlawful confinement, threat, intimidation, assault , and restriction of personal freedom on Wang Yu’s 16-year-old son, Bao Zhuoxuan, in violation of the Minors Protection Law, PRC Criminal Procedure Law, PRC Law on Penalties for the Violation of Public Security Administration and other legal provisions, specifically as

follows: (1) Bao Zhuoxuan did not violate the administration of security or commit any crime. The Inner Mongolia and Tianjin PSB’s were not authorized to summons or interrogate Bao Zhuoxuan. (2) The Inner Mongolia PSB did not produce a written summons before summoning Bao Zhuoxuan, and has no legal documentation for the round-the-clock monitoring of his whereabouts. The Tianjin PSB likewise unlawfully abducted Bao and restricted his personal freedom without producing any effective approval. (3) The Inner Mongolia PSB summoned Bao Zhuoxuan without notifying his legal representative to be present, in violation of Article 270 of the PRC Criminal Procedure Law. (4) The Inner Mongolia and Tianjin PSBs threatened, intimidated and even assaulted Bao Zhuoxuan, in violation of Article 50 of the Minors Protection Law. 10. Trial by news media On 11 July 2015, People’s Daily published a report entitled “Ministry of Public Security Exposes the Inside Story of the ‘Rights Protection’ Incident.” The report alleged, “The Ministry of Public Security deployed and commanded the public security authorities of Beijing and other localities to take collective action to destroy a major crime gang, which since July 2012 has used the Beijing Fengrui Law Firm as a platform to organize, plan and hype more than 40 sensitive cases and incidents, committing the crime of seriously disturbing public social order.” On 8 July 2015, Xinhuanet.com published a report entitled “Tracking the Case of the Beijing Fengrui Law Firm”, which provided a detailed description of more than 40 cases. Meanwhile, CCTV broadcasted videos in which Zhou Shifeng and others admitted their crimes. As Wang Yu and other individuals were charged with crimes of endangering state security, the authorities in charge of the cases refused to allow them to meet or correspond with their lawyers, and imposed residential surveillance at a designated location on the grounds that the defendants were suspected of crimes that endangered state security, and that they might divulge state secrets when meeting or corresponding with lawyers. It can be concluded that the information relating to the said cases falls under “state secrets” as stipulated under Article 9 of the State Secrets Law. According to Articles 3, 5 and 6 of the States Secret Law, state authorities involved with state secrets are obliged to maintain confidentiality and shall not disclose information relating to state secrets to the public, or they will be held legally accountable. This means that the Hexi subbranch of the Tianjin Municipal PSB unlawfully provided information on a criminal case investigation to the official news media for extensive reports, and that official media such as People’s Daily and Xinhuanet.com violated the relevant provisions of the State Secrets Law by

reporting that Wang Yu and others had committed crimes. Official media reports that Wang Yu and others committed crimes, and broadcasts of videos in which Zhou Shifeng and others admitted committing crimes, were serious violations of Article 12 of the PRC Criminal Procedure Law, which stipulates, “No one shall be guilty of an offence without a judgment passed by the people's courts in accordance with the law” (the universal “presumption of innocence principle”), and of Article 50, which states that “no one shall be forced to testify against himself”. 11. Forced disappearance Almost every lawyer who lost his or her freedom in the 709 Incident lost contact with the outside world for an extended period and was deprived of the right of correspondence. Their lawyers and family members could not meet with them. All of this falls under the enforced disappearance prohibited by international human rights treaties. Although the PRC government has refused to ratify the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from

Enforced Disappearance, it has violated the relevant provisions of other international human rights conventions that it has ratified, and has also obviously violated the PRC Constitution, Criminal Litigation Law and other relevant provisions. Article 37 of the PRC Constitution stipulates: “Freedom of the person of citizens of the People’s Republic of China is inviolable. No citizen may be arrested except with the approval or by decision of a people’s procuratorate or by decision of a people’s court, and arrests must be made by a public security organ. Unlawful detention or deprivation or restriction of citizens’ freedom of the person by other means is prohibited, and unlawful search of the person of citizens is prohibited.”

There has been no news of Tang Zhishun and Xing Qingxian since they were taken away by people wearing Burmese police uniforms in Mongla City on the border between Yunnan and Burma on 6 October 2015. The authorities refuse to admit that they have been deprived of their liberty and conceal their whereabouts, which prevents the two rights-defence activists from obtaining effective legal protection. 12. Illegal interference in applications by lawyers to transfer to another law firm Since Zhou Shifeng, head of the Beijing Fengrui Law Firm, and others were arrested on 10 July 2015, lawyers at the firm have been suspended from practicing. As financial personnel were also detained on the day that Zhou Shifeng was arrested, the police also searched and seized financial books and the firm’s official chop. Without the official chop, the firm cannot represent

new cases or issue invoices for service fees or official letters to lawyers in charge of cases. Up to now, more than 50 lawyers at the law firm have applied for transfer, but have been informed by the Beijing Judicial Bureau that a transfer requires approval from the case-handling team. According to Article 20 of Administrative Measures for the Practice of Law by Lawyers, lawyersâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; application to change law firms falls within the scope of duties of judicial and administrative authorities, and the investigative authority in criminal cases has no power to intervene. 13. Forced recording of video confessions The public security bureau of Guilin, Guangxi Province, forced Chen Taihe to record a video in which he admitted to committing crimes. This violates Article 50 of the PRC Criminal Procedure Law, which states that â&#x20AC;&#x153;no one shall be forced to testify against himselfâ&#x20AC;?. 14. Interrogations throughout China to intimidate lawyers From 9 July 2015 until the present, hundreds of public security personnel have forcibly interrogated, illegally summonsed and unlawfully restricted the personal freedom of 255 lawyers or rights-defence activists in 24 provinces throughout China. The main content of the interrogations has been to threaten and warn people not to join in supporting Wang Yu and Zhou Shifeng or to publish articles or disseminated messages. The interrogations are usually carried out at midnight and in the early hours in the morning, and public security personnel do not show their identification or produce written summonses or other relevant legal documents. According to the relevant provisions of the PRC Regulations on Administrative Penalties for Public Security, police officers are only allowed to interrogate and question citizens suspected of committing a crime after producing warrants and law enforcement documents (such as a summons or notice of enquiry). If a suspect is caught in the act of committing a crime, police can question him or her after showing a warrant card. Otherwise the police have no right to forcibly interrogate citizens. The public security bureaus of various localities throughout China went beyond their legal authorization, interfered with the free speech of lawyers and citizens, and even restricted the personal freedom of individuals under forced interrogation. 15. Midnight law enforcement and deceptive law enforcement According to official media reports and public information, under the deployment and command of the Ministry of Public Security, the public security bureaus of multiple localities, including Beijing, Tianjin, Heilongjiang, Shandong and Fujian, imposed criminal compulsory measures on dozens of individuals, including Wang Yu and Zhou Shifeng, beginning in the early hours of 9 July 2015. Most of the law enforcement measures were carried out around midnight or in the

hours immediately following. Meanwhile, hundreds of police officers from public security bureaus in 24 provinces throughout China carried out forced interrogation, illegal summons, and illegal temporary restriction of personal freedom upon 255 lawyers or rights-defence activists, also largely around midnight or the early hours of the morning. In addition, police also use deceptive law enforcement measures to detain Sui Muqing, Li Chunfu and others by drawing them to designated places on various pretexts such as, “Your car was hit, please come down to handle the case”, or “Your neighbour downstairs has reported a water leak and the property management office is notifying you to come back home and check your kitchen”. The principles of administrative legality and reasonableness constitute the principles of administrative rule of law. The principle of legality mainly deals with issues of legal and illegal administration, while the rationality principle applies to the issue of proper administration. Under non-emergency situations where there is time to choose, when public security authorities deliberately choose midnight or the early hours to carry out law enforcement actions and use deception to detain suspects, this violates the principle of administrative rationality. The real purpose is to create an atmosphere of terror and put immense psychological pressure on the persons being arrested or interrogated, as well as to intimidate their family members, colleagues, etc. 16. Prohibiting family members, defence lawyers and the children of lawyers from leaving China As of 31 May 2016, 28 lawyers (among whom 13 were defence lawyers in the 709 Incident), six family members and children of lawyers and five rights-defence activists were subjected to exit restrictions on the grounds that they could “possibly jeopardize state security and interests”, and the deciding authority has always been the Beijing Municipal PSB, which has refused to issue any legal documents. Based on Article 12 of the PRC Law on the Administration of Exit and Entry, only a “relevant competent department of the State Council” can decide that a citizen shall not leave the country. The actions of the Beijing Municipal PSB go beyond its scope of delegation. In addition, decision-making authorities have refused to explain why the said persons’ exit could possibly jeopardize state security and interests. Moreover, based on Article 38 of the PRC Administrative Licensing Law, decisions as to whether to allow or disallow exit should be put in writing. It is clearly illegal for the Beijing municipal PSB to refuse to issue a written decision. 17. Illegal case registration, and punishing supporters by criminal means

On 28 August 2015, the public security bureau of Zengcheng, Guangzhou Province, held rightsdefence activists Liu Yajie, Huang Yongxiang, Wei Xiaobing and Huang Tao in criminal detention for mailing and wearing T-shirts printed with face of PRC rights-defence lawyer Wang Yu, alleging that they had committed the crime of provoking trouble. In addition, Wang Fang, Yin Xu’an and others in Hubei were held in administrative detention for protesting on behalf of lawyer Wang Yu, and upon expiration of administrative detention were subjected to criminal detention and approved for arrest. Based on Article 107 of the PRC Criminal Law and Article 175 of the Procedural Provisions on Handling Criminal Cases by Public Security Authorities, public security authorities can only file a case for investigation when “criminal facts are discovered and criminal liability should be taken”. Based on the principle of “no punishment for acts that are not prohibited by law”, the act of “mailing and wearing T-shirts printed with face of PRC rights-defence lawyer Wang Yu” does not constitute a “crime of picking quarrels and provoking trouble” as stipulated in the PRC Criminal Law, and the Guangzhou and Hubei public security bureaus unlawfully filed these case purely for the purpose of punishing the protesters with criminal detention. 18. Mass dismissal of defence lawyers On 9 January 2016, after persons involved in the 709 Incident cases were formally arrested, a total of 19 defence lawyers were “dismissed” by the Tianjin PSB, which claimed that the defendants had engaged new defence lawyers and signed engagement letters. In accordance with Article 8 of the Provisions on Protecting the Rights of Practice of Lawyers in Accordance with the Law, published in September 2015 by Supreme People's Court, Supreme People's Procuratorate, Ministry of Public Security, and Ministry of State Security, defence lawyers requested to confirm the disengagements face-to-face with the concerned persons, but the Tianjin PSB refused all their requests. 19. Refusal to disclose relevant government information Since Wang Yu and others were secretly detained and outsiders, including defence lawyers, could not find out their specific situations, many defence lawyers made use of the Regulations on the Disclosure of Government Information to apply to public security authorities at all levels (including the Ministry of Public Security, Tianjin Municipal PSB and the Hexi sub-branch of the Tianjin Municipal PSB) to disclose official information. For instance, they asked “whether Wang Yu was affected by the massive explosion in Tianjin”, “the location, conditions, and food and clothing situation of Bao Longjun’s residential surveillance”, “the jurisdiction decision made by the Ministry of Public Security designating the Tianjin public security bureau as the competent

authority”, “the type of criminal compulsory measures imposed on Tang Zhishun, along with the time and location”, etc. However, up to now, defence lawyers have not obtained a single piece of information from public security authorities at any level, and only received the replies that either “the information does not exist” or “the applied information to be disclosed is not deemed official information”, or received no reply at all. 20. Non-acceptance or rejection of administrative review applications by defence lawyers Given that the authorities in charge of the case, the Hexi sub-branch of the Tianjin Municipal PSB, refused to inform defence lawyers of circumstances relating to their cases and deprived defendants and defence lawyers of their litigation rights, many defence lawyers and family members (including Wen Donghai, Lü Zhoubin, Gou Hongguo, Ji Zhongjiu and Li Heping’s wife) made use of the PRC Administrative Review Law to apply to the next higher level, the Tianjin Municipal PSB, for administrative review. However, the Tianjin Municipal PSB replied that the “application is not within the scope of administrative review, and has not been accepted”. Meanwhile, defence lawyers also made use of the PRC Administrative Review Law and the Regulations on the Disclosure of Government Information to apply to the higher-level public security authorities for administrative review regarding the refusal to disclose relevant government information. Although the application was accepted, the review was ultimately rejected on the grounds that “the information applied for disclosure is not within the scope of government information”. 21. Refusal to implement the procuratorate’s recommendation In the Zhang Kai case, the Wenzhou Municipal PSB in Zhejiang Province, having already received a recommendation from the Wenzhou Municipal People’s Procuratorate requiring the correction of illegal acts, continued to carry out these illegal acts and refused to notify defence lawyers of any facts regarding the Zhang Kai case. 2.

Judicial administrative authorities

1. Interference with defence lawyers’ representation in individual cases, and forcing lawyers out After accepting engagement by family members, defence lawyers suffered illegal interference and harassment, including: (1) being forcibly summoned by local police and required to terminate the engagement, as with Wang Yu’s defence lawyer, Li Weida; (2) being harassed in their homes by local police, as with Xie Yang’s defence lawyer, Jiang Yuanmin; (3) law firms being told to disengage defence lawyers, as with Wang Yu’s defence lawyer, Feng Yanqiang;

(4) being forcibly taken away by local police and prohibited from representation, as with Li Heping’s defence lawyer, Liu Shuqing; (5) being interrogated by the local judicial bureau and being warned not to disclose the circumstances of the case to outsiders, as with Xie Yang’s defence lawyer, Zhang Zhongshi. Local public security and judicial authorities violated the relevant provisions of the Law on Lawyers by interfering in lawyers’ defence work and violating their independence and defence rights. 2. Defamatory warning and education The Beijing municipal judicial bureau in July 2015 compiled and distributed a book entitled Warning and Education: Compilation of News Reports and Relevant Comments regarding the Beijing Fengrui Law Firm Suspected of Committing Major Crimes, and required Beijing law firms to pick up and study the book. This practice violated Article 12 of the PRC Criminal Procedure Law, which stipulates that “no one shall be guilty of an offence without judgment passed by the people's court in accordance with law”. 3.

Procuratorates, courts, administrative authorities, professional associations

1. Procuratorates refusing to perform their supervisory duties Defence lawyers of 36 lawyers and rights-defence activists still in detention or disappeared have filed complaints with the local procuratorates regarding the fact that investigative authorities have violated the litigation rights of defendants and the lawyers, but procuratorates at all levels throughout China (including the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, the Hunan Provincial Procuratorate, the Changsha Procuratorate in Hunan Province, the Zhejiang Provincial Procuratorate, the Tianjin Municipal Procuratorate, the Hexi District Procuratorate in Tianjin , etc.) have for the most part refused to reply, delayed reply or ignored the facts, in violation of relevant provisions under the PRC Criminal Procedure Law and the Rules on Criminal Procedures of the People's Procuratorates. For instance, in its reply letter to lawyer Zhang Zhongshi, the Changsha Procuratorate in Hunan Province alleged, “The issues you revealed are not true, and the sub-branch of the Changsha Public Security Bureau did not violate legal provisions”. In Zhang Kai’s case, the Zhejiang Provincial Procuratorate replied that “upon investigation, Zhang Kai has terminated lawyer Zhang Lei’s engagement, and therefore we will not deal with the letter (accusations)”. The Tianjin Municipal Procuratorate even ordered defence lawyers “not to publish microblogs on the Internet”; the Dazhi Procuratorate in Hubei Province refused to undertake supervision, alleging that it was “unable to force the Dazhi Public Security Bureau to correct illegal acts”;

and the Hinggan League Procuratorate in Inner Mongolia alleged that “illegal acts of public security bureaus are not under our jurisdiction” and refused to accept complaint documents. 2. Lawyers’ associations refused to perform their duty to protect the lawful rights and interests of lawyers From 10 January 2015 onward, the wives of Li Heping and Wang Quanzhang went to the Beijing Lawyers’ Association on 12 working days, requesting that the lawyers’ association perform its duty by protecting family members’ right to information and the right to meet with lawyers. Delaying action on the grounds that “documents have been submitted and are awaiting reply”, the Beijing Lawyers’ Association refused to effectively perform its legal duty to defend lawyers’ lawful rights and interests, in violation of Article 46.1 of the Law on Lawyers. 3. Courts refused to file case or rejected lawsuits Defence lawyers and family members filed lawsuits in court regarding illegal acts such as defamatory reports in the press, public security authorities refusing to disclose relevant government information or accept administrative review, the authorities in charge of cases depriving defence lawyers and defendants of their litigation rights, etc. However, they received replies that their cases did not “fall within the scope of cases subject to administrative action, and cannot be filed”, or that “there is no relationship of interest between the plaintiff and the defendant, and the case cannot be filed”. 4. Government authorities refused to disclose relevant government information To obtain information regarding the persons concerned, defence lawyers made use of the Regulation on the Disclosure of Government Information to apply to government authorities to disclose information. For example, lawyer Wang Qiushi applied to the Tianjin municipal financial bureau to disclose “financial information relating to residential surveillance designated by the Tianjin Municipal Public Security Bureau”, but received the reply that “no such information existed”.

Part V. New Methods by the Authorities to Control Rights-defence Lawyers Whether in terms of the control authority, targets, means and reasons, or in terms of the scope and tools of control, the “709” Incident has revealed many new methods used to control rightsdefence lawyers, and these new methods are likely to be widely used in the future. 1.

Control authorities: From judicial and administrative authorities to public security

authorities, from local level to central level It is noteworthy that most of the personnel implementing the nation-wide interrogation of lawyers were from public security and state security bureaus, while the judicial and administrative authorities and lawyers’ associations that normally oversee the legal profession played a minimal role. In addition, as criminal compulsory measures were imposed instead of administrative punishment, public security organs, as the investigative organs, became the main authority controlling this group of lawyers. An example is the All-China Lawyers’ Work Conference held on 20 August 2015. This was the first meeting jointly convened by the Ministry of Public Security, Supreme People’s Court, Supreme People’s Procuratorate and the Ministry of Justice, which indicates the enhanced role of public security authorities in controlling lawyers. This is also in line with the gradually expanding power of the public security forces, which is turning China into a “police State”. Another change is the increasing centralization of power. More than a hundred lawyers in 24 provinces throughout China were subjected to forced interrogation within 48 hours. The Tianjin PSB crossed a province border to arrest Zhou Shifeng, Wang Yu and other individuals in Beijing. The mass interrogation and arrests indicated that deployment was arranged at the central level, as the Ministry of Public Security also acknowledged in official media reports. Compared with the past, when lawyers were largely controlled by the authorities in the location of their practice and there was little collaboration between central and local authorities, this has greatly enhanced the efficiency and intensity of current controls. Regarding division of labour among local authorities, there has also been a shift from location of practice to location of residence. Before the 709 Incident, lawyer were controlled by the judicial and administrative authorities or public security and state security organs in the provinces, cities and districts where practices were located. In this nation-wide interrogation operation, however, many of the law enforcement personnel were public security or state security personnel from the lawyers’ place of residence. For example, Beijing lawyer Zhang Lei was interrogated by state security personnel from Hunan Province, and Beijing lawyer Li Fangping was interrogated by state security personnel from Jiangxi Province.

Control targets: From individuals to network

Before the 709 Incident, only the most active rights-defence lawyers and those handling large numbers of sensitive cases such as those involving the Falun Gong spiritual movement were criminally charged. The 709 Incident, however, involved an unprecedented range and number of individuals subjected to serious criminal charges. Apart from rights-defence lawyers, legal assistants, law firm administrative personnel and rights-defence activists have also been treated as crime accomplices. Meanwhile, many authorities included lawyers’ family members in their dragnet. The authorities asserted that lawyers such as Zhou Shifeng, Wang Yu and Li Heping colluded with Internet activists such as Liu Sixin and Wu Gan and petitioners such as Zhai Yanmin to form a gang involved in committing major crimes. Aware of the strong mobilization capacity and organizational ability of rights-defence lawyers in civil society, the authorities have shifted from controlling individual lawyers to a collective suppression of lawyers, legal assistants, law firm personnel, Internet activists and rights-defence activists. 3.

Control methods: From extra-legal methods to legal methods, from the

administrative level to the criminal level Unlike the secret detentions and forced disappearances carried out without legal procedures during the Jasmine Revolution in 2011, lawyers persecuted in the 709 Incident have been subjected to criminal compulsory measures by the authorities. Although most of the affected individuals have effectively been held in secret detention, the authorities seemed to have no intention of imposing forced disappearances on a large number of rights-defence activists for a few weeks or months and then releasing them as they did in 2011. Consequently, on the surface there appears to be a greater element of judicial procedure involved than during the Jasmine repression in 2011, but in fact the authorities have been even more ruthless in their attempts to eliminate rights-defence lawyers as a community. In addition, the specific crimes for which lawyers in the 709 Incident have been charged mainly involve conflicts between the lawyers and the courts. Before the 709 Incident, the authorities normally handled so-called “illegal acts” in lawyers’ performance of their defence duties through suspension of licenses (Cheng Hai), judicial detention (Wang Quanzhang), deregistration of license (Teng Biao, Jiang Tianyong) or revocation of license (Tang Jitian, Liu Wei). More recently, however, many authorities have adopted criminal compulsory measures ranging from administrative punishment to criminal punishment. This is evidenced by the significant increase in individual criminal cases in 2015: A total of 19 criminal charges were filed against rightsdefence lawyers and legal assistants in the 709 Incident in 2015, compared with 13 such

charges in 2014 and only seven from 2002 to 2013. This also illustrates the repressive strategy taken toward rights-defence lawyers as a group since President Xi took office. 4.

Control rationale: From “disturbing social order” to “endangering state security”,

from “de-politicization” to “politicization” Before the 709 Incident, lawyers were mainly charged with routine crimes of disturbing social order such as “picking quarrels and provoking trouble”, “gathering a crowd to disturb order in a public place” and “engaging in illegal operations”. But in the 709 Incident, the main charges were “incitement to subvert state power”, “stealing, secretly gathering, purchasing or illegally providing state secrets or intelligence to an organization, institution or personnel outside the country” and “divulging state secrets”. In addition, a total of 27 rights-defence lawyers, rightsdefence activists and their family members were prohibited from leaving China on the grounds of “possibly endangering state security”. The control rationale of “endangering state security” was more frequently used because it facilitated control by government forces; once accused of endangering state security, suspects and their lawyers are unable to protect their litigation rights during the investigation phase, nor can they exercise their rights to family notification within 24 hours, access to legal counsel or external correspondence. The highly politicized charges and serious potential punishments also maximize the element of intimidation so as to intentionally isolate rights-defence lawyers. 5.

Control scope: From domestic law enforcement to law enforcement outside of China

On 6 October 2015, lawyer Wang Yu’s son, Bao Zhuoxuan, and two other rights-defence activists were detained by police in Mongla City, Burma, and transported to Inner Mongolia. Bao Zhuoxuan said Chinese police also took part in this law enforcement operation. It is unusual for the Chinese authorities to request the cooperation of Burmese authorities and transport individuals from Burma back to China. Starting in 2015, however, a number of cases of “law enforcement outside China” came to light, including the case of Li Xin and the cases of Hong Kong booksellers Gui Minhai and Li Bo. As the Chinese government’s influence increases in the international community, the scope of its control will continue to expand, and this could become common practice in the future.

Control tools: Multiple tools used simultaneously

First, secret detention was implemented in the name of “residential surveillance in a designated location”. In the 709 Incident, at least 28 rights-defence lawyers or rights-defence activists were subjected to the compulsory measure of residential surveillance at a designated location. This measure was added by amendment in 2013 to the PRC Criminal Procedure Law, the standards of which can be applied at will, and this effective secret detention can be imposed for up to half a year. “Residential surveillance at a designated location” is in effect pre-trial detention outside of a legal place of detention. In addition, as it is not bound by the rules of a detention centre, the conditions of residential surveillance in a designated location are in practice often more severe than formal arrest, and make torture harder to prove. Second, “trial by media” manipulated public opinion. In cases still in the investigation phase, CCTV repeatedly broadcasted videos of the defendants confessing to their crimes, and People’s Daily, the Xinhua News Agency and other official media also widely disseminated videos and passed public judgment on the cases. Although the method of trial by media was also used before the 709 Incident, it never targeted rights-defence lawyers. This action is intended to damage the image of rights-defence lawyers and manipulate public opinion. Third, the authorities implicated related parties in order to increase suffering and spread terror. Those accused of crimes in the 709 Incident included family members and underage children of lawyers, lawyers’ defence lawyers, colleagues or fellow professionals, and individuals who protested on their behalf. These people were subjected to summonses, exit restrictions, illegal confinement, harassment, restrictions on changing law firms, criminal arrest, forced disengagement of defence lawyers, etc. Fourth, the authorities blocked communications between related parties. From 9 to 11 July 2015, “Telegram”, a popular communication tool used by lawyers and civil society groups, was blocked by the Chinese authorities. It can now only be accessed in China through a foreign server, greatly affecting contact between the related parties. This blocking method was not used before the 709 Incident. Fifth, authorities used “warning and education” to prevent other lawyers from following suit. In June 2015, the Ministry of Justice distributed the Opinion on Rule of Law Education among Lawyers Throughout China, stating that “there are still some issues in lawyers’ team-building that cannot be neglected, especially when a minority of lawyers frequently violates ethics and professional discipline, and this must be carefully corrected and solved.” In July 2015, the Beijing Municipal Judicial Bureau compiled and distributed a book entitled Warning and

Education: Compilation of News Reports and Relevant Comments regarding the Beijing Fengrui Law Firm Suspected of Committing Major Crimes, and required Beijing law firms to pick up and study the book. In August 2015, the All-China Lawyers’ Association convened a seminar on rule of law education. This kind of “ideological education” was used in the Li Zhuang case, but never to such an extent. The campaign aims at unifying thought, spreading terror and preventing other lawyers from teaming up with rights-defence lawyers. Sixth, authorities used “disengagement of lawyers” to reduce the influence of the case. A total of 15 defence lawyers were disengaged by the authorities in 709 Incident cases. All were human rights lawyers with flexible and diversified case-handling methods who are adept at using various legal remedies as well as using social media and the traditional press to expose illegal acts. They are also highly resistant to pressure. The authorities cited defendants’ oral disengagement of the said lawyers and then engaged official lawyers who would naturally reinforce the influence and control of the authorities in charge of the case. Although this method was used before the 709 Incident, it was used on an even larger scale after the incident. Seventh, authorities used “cooperation among related parties” to block access to legal remedies. Over the course of almost a year, defence lawyers for 709 Incident cases made numerous attempts to use legal means to remedy the litigation rights of defendants, including the right to meet with defence counsel, the right of correspondence and the right to notify family members, but all of these attempts failed without exception. Public security authorities, procuratorates, courts and government authorities at all levels throughout China seemed to be in full cooperation with each other in refusing to perform their supervisory duties, resulting in the litigation rights of defendants being repeatedly violated.

Part VI. Impact on Lawyers and Civil society The 709 Incident had a huge effect on rights-defence lawyers as a group, constituting the most large-scale and ruthless oppression since rights defence movement began in 2003 and causing tremendous loss. The oppression continues, and it will take time to return to the conditions before the 709 Incident. Although facing unprecedented repression, rights-defence lawyers continue to resolutely fight on and bravely carry out rescue operations. A batch of new rightsdefence lawyers has emerged and been trained, and the rights protection movement has not been totally destroyed. At the beginning of the incident, the ability of rights-defence lawyers to respond and take action was clearly undermined and was only able to gradually recover only a month after the event. On the other hand, lawyers and civil society groups engaged in a series of rescue actions towards the arrested persons, which strengthened the solidarity between lawyers and the relevant groups, enhanced recognition of the concept of rights protection, gained compassion and support from civil society and members of the general public, and also attracted unprecedented attention from the international community. 1. Negative impact (1) Development of rights-defence lawyer groups 1. Loss of key members The authorities imposed the most wide-ranging criminal measures in history upon many rightsdefence lawyers, reflecting a trend toward restricting the activities of rights-defence lawyers through criminal procedures and accusations. Once convicted of crimes, lawyers could have their practice qualifications permanently revoked and no longer be able to conduct defence work in human rights cases. Meanwhile, the incident was politically motivated to thoroughly suppress rights-defence lawyers, and public security bureau and judicial institutions, all acting under orders from the central government, could not handle the cases of those detained with independence and fairness. As a result, lawyers engaged by family members met repeated obstacles when they tried to become involved through legal means, and could not make any progress. Harassment of family members by state security and public security personnel also put immense pressure on the families of detained lawyers. Experienced rights-defence lawyers who were detained suffered various restrictions and threats to their personal freedom, right to practice and peace of mind, as well as to their families. 2. Short-term diminished activism within groups

The mass detention and interrogation operation delivered a blow to the community of human rights lawyers. In order to avoid further implication, some lawyers reduced their presence at protests and their contact with other human rights lawyers and groups soon after the event occurred. This undermined the collective ability of rights-defence lawyers to respond as a group in the early stage of the 709 Incident. 3. Obstruction of the development of a new force Some young lawyers who had just become involved in human rights issues pulled back due to fear or inability to confront hardship, temporarily narrowing the circle of rights-defence lawyers. Rights-defence lawyers are under unprecedented pressure, making the majority of other lawyers keep their distance even more than in the past, and making it even more difficult to find and contact new people to add to the ranks. This has further undermined the development space and energy of rights-defence lawyers as a group. (2) Support groups and communication 1. Families of rights-defence lawyers Some family members of detained lawyers, when forcibly interrogated, warned, threated and intimidated by public security personnel, refused contact with lawyers and groups offering assistance, preventing the provision of legal aid to detained lawyers and making it even more difficult to know the situation of the lawyers and their families and to provide help. 2. Other lawyers’ groups In order not to be labelled “rights-defence lawyers” or be regarded as supporting rights-defence lawyers, lawyers handling non-sensitive public interest cases deliberately kept a distance from rights-defence lawyers and declined to comment on or protest the 709 Incident. This further isolated rights-defence lawyers in their adversity. 3. Domestic civil society Rights-defence lawyers have been having increasing interactions with other citizens’ groups recently. During the investigation and trial stages of human rights cases, relevant groups will sometimes protest, even drawing the participation of uninvolved lawyers in order to put pressure on the authorities or court in charge of the case to handle it fairly. Some citizens provide assistance to defence lawyers to facilitate defence work. In the 709 Incident, the authorities labelled lawyers and citizens involved in the case as a “criminal gang”, which could

affect the methods lawyers and citizens use in the future to influence cases in and outside of court, and discourage some lawyers from contacting other citizens’ groups. 4. Domestic public Dissemination of information is tightly restricted in China, and for the most part the general public receives almost all of its information from official and closely monitored news media. Government media passed judgement on detained lawyers and rights-defence lawyers as a group before trial, and made groundless accusations and defamed rights-defence lawyers in a way that made it harder for rights-defence lawyers to gain understanding and support from the public. 5. Obstacles in communicating with the international community Many lawyers were subjected to exit restrictions, thereby greatly limiting the contact between rights-defence lawyers and foreign countries to Internet platforms or other indirect methods and preventing direct and in-depth communication and exchange. The PRC State Security Law, adopted and implemented in July 2015, and the PRC Law on Administration of NonGovernmental Organizations, adopted in April 2016, indicate the PRC government’s concern over increasingly active exchanges between domestic civil society and organizations outside China, and its desire to increase its supervision of these relationships. This would further restrict rights-defence lawyers’ contact with the outside world, preventing the international community from understanding domestic circumstances in a timely manner and providing necessary support. 6. Difficulties in dissemination The 709 Incident made words and phrases such as “human rights”, “rights protection”, and even “public interest” highly sensitive in China, and it became even more difficult to disseminate information on relevant incidents among civil society groups and the public. When handling human rights cases, lawyers often use various media to expose the unfairness of the social and judicial systems, but the increasing difficulty of dissemination largely diminishes this effect. (3) Rule of law environment 1. Legitimization of monitoring In the past, the authorities seriously oppressed human rights lawyers through administrative detention, obstruction or illegal abduction. Compared with administrative detention, criminal measures allow a longer detention period. Under the newly amended Criminal Law that took

effect in January 2015, Article 309 added more punishment clauses regarding acts of disturbing the courts, but the provision is vague and general and has raised concern that it might be abused to suppress defence work and remarks in court by rights-defence lawyers. Oppression through criminalization will further increase the risk of human rights lawyers’ work. Criminal investigation and judicial procedures have become monitoring tools maliciously abused to subvert the principles of independence and fairness. This was especially evident in the unreasonable shift from criminal measures to “residential surveillance at a designated location” and in using the crime of “endangering state security” to investigate most of the 709 cases. In the process, the procuratorates not only failed to perform their supervisory duties, but even colluded with public security authorities to conduct joint investigations. 2. Greater difficulty for lawyers to represent relevant cases The public security bureaus have long been denounced for obstructing rights-defence lawyers in representating human rights cases, but in the 709 Incident, the authorities openly oppressed rights-defence lawyers, allowing public security organs even more freedom to do what they wanted. Some lawyers have been treated with even greater spite and scorn when representing human rights cases, and others became increasingly reluctant to take active defence strategies in sensitive cases, for fear of also becoming targets of oppression. 2. Positive impact (1) Rights-defence lawyers 1. Enhanced team solidarity and resolve Through serious oppression, lawyers who have been able to withstand pressure and risk and remain in the rights defence community have become more united and courageous. They have involved themselves in the cases of the detained lawyers through various legal means to facilitate mutual support between cases and lawyers, and have remained resolute in their pursuit of legal justice. Some lawyers who had drawn back were inspired and gradually rejoined the team. 2. New key members rapidly fostered The detention of seasoned rights-defence lawyers has spurred some relatively junior lawyers to take part in human rights cases, seek more opportunities to practice, accumulate more experience in a short time and fill the power vacuum. (2) Support groups

1. More support and involvement from lawyersâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; family members Family members of many detained lawyers, observing the arbitrary acts of the public authorities, realized that if they gave up without a fight or heeded the warnings of public security personnel, their detained love ones would not receive fair and reasonable treatment, and as a result, they have begun cooperating with engaged lawyers in a series of rights protection and rescue actions. In addition to lawyers inside China, they have also increased contact with international organizations and media in order to maintain international attention on the cases of their family members in hope of a breakthrough that might result in their loved ones being released more quickly. The process has resulted in their better understanding of and greater support for the rights defence work in which their detained family members have been engaged. 2. Close attention of international society The extensive reporting in the overseas press, and the concern and protest actions by overseas lawyersâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; groups, international human rights organizations and civil society groups have been unprecedented and have continued even after the event reached its climax. In spite of limited channels, information has been actively disseminated, allowing the international community to better understand issues relating to Chinese lawyers and the Chinese judicial authorities.

Part VII. Recommendations for Future Action 1.

Affirm solidarity and mutual trust in civil society

Since ancient times, there has been a strong cynicism in China under which the government has discouraged people from filing complaints with authorities. There was even the practice of “accepting 80 blows before seeing an official”. Meanwhile, numerous corrupt officials committing fraud and corruption bred a traditional distrust of legal workers among the general public. The proverb went, “Avoid the government office in life, and Hell in death”. Once the CPC founded the PRC, legislation became a tool for those in power, and lawyers were defined as state legal workers in service to the CPC. This increased the mistrust of civil society towards lawyers and other legal workers. This conception gradually changed along with the developments of the era. In the 1980s, China embarked on Reform and Opening and vigorously trained lawyers, amending the law to formally define them as professionals providing services to clients, in line with international practice. This had the effect of awakening rights awareness among some lawyers and indirectly improved the image of rights-defence lawyers. Comprising only a small portion of lawyers as a group, these rights-defence lawyers fought for rule of law, constitutional rights and citizens’ fundamental liberties, sometimes even sacrificing their own liberty to win greater respect in society. They have become the spiritual pillars and key force for the rights defence movement. Compared with the past, when only a minority dared to protest, increasing numbers of people are joining the cause. Thanks to the first generation of rights-defence lawyers and other rightsdefence activists understanding in the importance of mutual tolerance and respect, as well as the acceptance of different forms of participation, many kinds of people have become willing to join in. Different fighting methods have been developed, and more new ideas have been created through debate, which has also clarified ideas and enhanced solidarity. It is very important to continue to push forward this movement and evaluate risks. We need to give careful strategic consideration to the effect of each action and the effect on individuals and on the sustainability of the entire movement. However, different people may reach different conclusions based on consideration of their own safety. The current rights protection movement is no longer limited to intellectuals, but lawyers, non-government organizations and other citizens promote the rights protection movement in different ways, including those who stick to the rules through the court system, those who organized the public to publicize laws in society, those who disseminate advocacy information through the Internet and those who “radically” and bravely fight against dictatorship. Each type participates in the overall movement within the scope they can accept, but can still remain connected and united with each other.

In the 709 Incident we saw official oppression imposed upon various participants, including journalists, churches, lawyers, NGOs, feminists, scholars, ethnic minorities and labour activists. Civil society groups staged a series of protests to support each other. We hope this solidarity will continue, and that the movement’s participants can maintain mutual trust and rational communication in the future, so that the movement becomes more diversified and doesn’t lose direction. 2.

The international community must continue long-term attention and support

The 709 Incident can be considered a PRC rights protection movement that received international attention, especially as a milestone for lawyers’ groups. It was the first time that state governments and professional groups all over the world, including the EU, the governments of the United States, Canada and Australia and law societies in England and Wales, Australia, Taipei and Hong Kong, as well as international law societies, issued an unprecedented number of statements criticizing the PRC government and reiterating the importance of protecting the universal values of freedom and rule of law. This public opinion pressure has been effective in certain cases, such as those of China’s feminist five, lawyer Pu Zhiqiang and journalist Gao Yu. The PRC government, while unwilling to recognize universal values and often obliterating international human rights standards by using words such as “national situation”, “China model”, etc., still has to acknowledge the importance of maintaining its international image. In fact, China has also signed at least 25 human rights conventions and is theoretically bound by international laws. For instance, China recently dispatched a huge team to attend hearings of the UN Committee against Torture, showing the importance the PRC government attached to the hearings. Although PRC officials presented high-sounding pretexts to cover the truth at the meeting, they still made a poor impression when UN officials closely questioned them on the facts. The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs subsequently issued a statement stressing China’s efforts on relevant work. This shows that international public opinion can impose some amount of pressure. We recommend and hope that the international community, including international organizations, Western governments, news press, international human rights organizations, universities and other research institutions, lawyers’ professional groups in various countries, etc., will take the following action: A.

Maintain their close attention and support for oppressed PRC rights-defence lawyers and

the rights protection movement.

Provide emergency aid in some individual cases, including those involving torture and

forced disappearance. C.

Pay serious attention to and denounce the PRC government’s new trend of cross-border

kidnapping; relevant states should adopt clear and effective means to fulfil their responsibility to protect their own citizens. D.

Continue to support China’s human rights lawyers and rights protection movement through

training, exchanges, monetary support, human rights awards, etc. E.

Stop supporting official lawyers’ associations. China’s official lawyers’ associations are

completely manipulated by the government and have always played the role of accomplice rather than representing lawyers’ rights in China. F.

Invite non-official representatives from China to attend relevant international meetings and

activities, giving them an opportunity to reveal actual circumstances and share information and experience. G.

Adopt effective means of identifying human rights violators, and consider taking sanction

measures such as bans on entry to Western territories and freezing of assets. H.

End appeasement policies, and stop separating trade from human rights.

Assist in contacting various forces to jointly supervise the evolution of the implementation

of international conventions in China, and oppose China’s downplaying and lowering of international standards on unreasonable grounds. J.

Maintain close contact with other lawyers, human rights defenders and NGOs who may be

suffering oppression and retaliation. K.

Pay close attention to upcoming trials relating to 709 cases, and make statements, reports

and protests on relevant matters, etc. L.

Before the human rights situation fundamentally improves in China, stop granting China

the right to host major athletic, cultural and political events including the Olympics and Asian Games. Decisions that have already been made should be re-evaluated in light of China’s deteriorating human rights. M. Given that the official news media are one of the forces engaged in defaming rightsdefence lawyers through trial by media, the international community should re-evaluate collaborative projects with official media.

Part VIII. Statistics of the 709 Crackdown As of 18:00 on 27 May 2016, at least 319 lawyers, law firm staff, human right activists and family members have been questioned, summoned, forbidden to leave the country, held under house arrest or residential surveillance, criminally detained, arrested or missing.

1. Statistics by category (lawyers, legal assistants / others)*: Officially arrested: 24 persons (11/ 13) Released on bail: 13 persons (8 / 5) House arrest: 1 person (0 / 1) Forbidden to leave the country: 39 persons (28 / 11) Temporarily detained, forcibly questioned/ summoned (released/ safe now): 267 persons (127 / 140) * 23 individuals are listed under two categories; 1 individual is listed under three categories (1) Officially arrested [23 persons]

11 Lawyers / Legal assistants / Law firm

13 Others (non-lawyers):

staff 1. Hu Shigen (Beijing) 1. Wang Yu (Beijing)

2. Liu Yongping (Beijing)

2. Bao Longjun (Beijing)

3. Gou Hongguo (Tianjin)

3. Wang Quanzhang (Beijing)

4. Lin Bin (Fujian)

4. Liu Sixin (Beijing)

5. Wang Fang (Hubei)

5. Zhou Shifeng (Beijing)

6. Yin Xuâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;an (Hubei)

6. Xie Yang (Hunan)

7. Zhai Yanmin (Beijing)

7. Zhao Wei (Beijing)

8. Zhang Wanhe (Shanghai)

8. Xie Yanyi (Beijing)

9. Liu Xing (Beijing)

9. Wu Gen (Beijing)

10. Li Yanjun (Guangxi)

10. Li Heping (Beijing)

11. Yao Jianqing (Shaanxi)

11. Li Chunfu (Beijing)

12. Tang Zhishun (Myanmar) 13. Xing Qingxian (Myanmar)

(2) Released on bail [13 persons] 8 Lawyers / Legal assistants / Law firm staff:

1. Sui Muqing (Guangdong) 2. Huang Liqun (Beijing) 3. Xie Yuandong (Beijing) 4. Wang Fang (Hubei) 5. Wang Qiushi (Beijing) 6. Zhang Kai (Beijing) 7. Li Shuyun (Beijing) 8. Gao Yue (Beijing) 5 Others (Wenzhou Christian cases): 9. Huang Yizi (Zhejiang) 10. Zhang Zhi (Zhejiang) 11. Cheng Congping (Zhejiang) 12. Yan Xiaojie (Zhejiang) 13. Zhang Chongzhu (Zhejiang) (3) House arrest [1 person] 1 Other (non-lawyer):

Bao Mengmeng (Beijing)

(4) Forbidden to leave the country [39 persons] 28 Lawyers / Legal assistants: 1. Zhang Qingfang (Beijing) 2. Liang Xiaojun (Beijing) 3. Cai Ying (Hunan) 4. Si Weijiang (Shanghai) 5. Li Fangping (Beijing) 6. Li Guobei (Beijing) 7. Chen Jiangang (Beijing) 8. Chen Wuquan (Shenzhen) 9. Yan Xin (Beijin) 10. Ge Yongxi (Guangdong) 11. Liu Zhengqing (Guangdong) 12. Pang Kun (Guangdong) 54 / 63

13. Ge Wenxiu (Guangdong) 14. Wang Quanping (Guangdong) 15. Huang Simin (Hubei) 16. You Feizhu (Beijing) 17. Lin Qilei (Beijing) 18. Zhang Keke (Hubei) 19. Wang Xing (Beijing) 20. Li Xiongbing (Beijing) 21. Tang Tianhao (Chongqing) 22. Ren Quanniu (Henan) 23. Ran Tong (Sichuan) 24. Yuan Yulai (Zhejiang) 25. Qin Chenshou (Guangxi) 26. Wen Donghai (Hunan) 27. Ma Lianshun (Tianjin) 28. Li Zhongwei (Shandong) 11 Others (Non-lawyers) *Individual number 1 below is also listed under other categories 1. Bao Mengmeng (Beijing) 2. Su Nan (Beijing) 3. Xiang Li (Beijing) 4. Child of lawyer Yu Hejin (Beijing 5. Son of lawyer Li Heping (Beijing) 6. Daughter of lawyer Li Heping (Beijing) 7. Daughter of Liu Yajie (Guangdong) 8. Feng Zhenghu (Shanghai) 9. Son of lawyer Liu Xiaoyuan (Jiangxi) 10. Ou Biaofeng (Hunan) 11. Chen Guiqiu (Guangdong) (5) Temporarily detained, forcibly questioned / summonsed (released / safe now) [267 persons] 127 Lawyers / Legal assistants: *Individual numbers 5, 11, 43, 57, 69, 70, 83, 95, 97, 98, 99, 103, 111, 121, 124 below are also listed under another category 1. Zhang Weiyu (Shandong) 2. Zuo Peisheng (Beijing) 3. Jiang Tianyong (Beijing) 55 / 63

4. Ni Yulan (Beijing) 5. Zhang Kai (Beijing) 6. Liu Xiaoyuan (Beijing) 7. Cheng Hai (Beijing) 8. Hu Guiyun (Beijing) 9. Zhou Ze (Beijing) 10. Yu Wensheng (Beijing) 11. Liang Xiaojun (Beijing) 12. Liu Lianhe (Tianjin) 13. Ma Wei (Tianjin) 14. Li Weida (Hebei) 15. Liang Lanxin (Hebei) 16. Yao Minfu (Hebei) 17. Ji Laisong (Henan) 18. Ren Quanniu (Henan) 19. Meng Meng (Henan) 20. Ma Lianshun (Henan) 21. Chang Boyang (Henan) 22. Zhang Junjie (Henan) 23. Miao Jie (Henan) 24. Zhou Zhichao (Henan) 25. Wang Lei (Henan) 26. Liu Weiguo (Shandong) 27. Shu Xiangxin (Shandong) 28. Xu Hongwei (Shandong) 29. Fu Yonggang (Shandong) 30. Wang Yuqin (Shandong) 31. Xiong Dongmei (Shandong) 32. Liu Jinxiang (Shandong) 33. Wang Xueming (Shandong) 34. Xiong Wei (Shandong) 35. Li Jinxing (Shandong) 36. Zhang Hai (Shandong) 37. Feng Yanqiang (Shandong) 38. Xu Guijuan (Shandong) 39. Zhao Yonglin (Shandong) 40. Xu Zhong (Shandong) 41. Liu Jinbin (Shandong) 42. Liu Shuqing (Shandong) 43. Wang Qiushi (Heilongjiang) 44. Zhang Xuezhong (Shanghai) 45. Li Tiantian (Shanghai) 46. Xue Rongmin (Shanghai) 47. Qin Lei (Shanghai) 56 / 63

48. Zhong Jinhua (Shanghai) 49. Wang Weihua (Shanghai) 50. Liu Shihui (Guangdong lawyer) 51. Zheng Enchong (Shanghai) 52. Zhang Lei (Jiangsu) 53. Zhu Yingming (Jiangsu) 54. Cheng Weishan (Jiangsu) 55. Wang Cheng (Hangzhou) 56. Zhuang Daohe (Zhejiang) 57. Yuan Yulai (Zhejiang) 58. Lu Zhoubin (Zhejiang) 59. Wang Liao (Zhejiang) 60. Wu Youshui (Zhejiang) 61. Wang Wanqiong (Sichuan) 62. Yu Quan (Sichuan) 63. Fu Jianbo (Chongqing) 64. He Wei (Chongqing) 65. You Zhonghong (Chongqing) 66. Zhang Tingyuan (Chongqing) 67. Lei Dengfeng (Chongqing) 68. You Feizhu (Chongqing) 69. Tang Tianhao (Chongqing) 70. Huang Simin (Hubei) 71. Hu Linzheng (Hunan) 72. Wen Donghai (Hunan) 73. Guo Xiongwei (Hunan) 74. Chen Nanshi (Hunan) 75. Wang Haijun (Hunan) 76. Shi Fulong (Hunan) 77. Yang Jinzhu (Hunan) 78. Yang Xuan (Hunan) 79. Zhang Zhongshi (Hunan) 80. Luo Qian (Hunan) 81. Lu Fangzhi (Hunan) 82. Zhang Yujuan (Hunan) 83. Cai Ying (Hunan) 84. Long Langben (Hunan) 85. Jiang Yongji (Gansu) 86. Ceng Weichang (Yuannan) 87. Liu Wenhua (Yuannan) 88. Yang Mingkua (Yuannan) 89. Wang Zongyue (Guizhou) 90. Li Guisheng (Guizhou) 91. Zhou Lixin (Guizhou) 57 / 63

92. Chen Jianguo (Guizhou) 93. Zou Lihui (Fujian) 94. Chen Xuemei (Fujian) 95. Liu Zhengqing (Guangdong) 96. Wu Kuiming (Guangdong) 97. Ge Yongxi (Guangdong) 98. Chen Wuquan (Guangdong) 99. Ge Wenxiu (Guangdong) 100. Chen Keyun (Guangdong) 101. Chen Jinxue (Guangdong) 102. Wu Zhenqi (Guangdong) 103. Wang Quanping (Guangdong) 104. Wen Yu (Guangdong) 105. Sun Shihua (Guangdong) 106. Jiang Yuanmin (Guangdong) 107. Liu Hao (Guangdong) 108. Cui Xiaoping (Shenzhen) 109. Xu Dejun (Shenzhen) 110. Zhu Jinhui (Shenzhen) 111. Pang Kun (Shenzhen) 112. Xiao Fanghua (Shenzhen) 113. Qin Yongpei (Guangxi) 114. Yang Zaixin (Guangxi) 115. Wu Hui (Guangxi) 116. Wu Liangshu (Guangxi) 117. Huang Chaohui (Guangxi) 118. Qin Chenshou (Guangxi) 119. Pang Xinxiang (Guangxi) 120. Zhang Jiankang (Shanxi) 121. Li Fangping (Beijing) 122. Li Yuhan (Liaoning) 123. Li Junquan (Liaoning) 124. Chen Jiangang (Beijing) 125. Liu Peng (Zhejiang) 126. Fang Xuangui (Zhejiang) 127. Chen Taihe (Guangxi) 140 Others (non-lawyers) *Individual number 10, 28, 50 below are also listed under another category 1. Zhou Qing (Beijing) 2. You Yuping (Beijing) 3. Feng Bin (Beijing) 58 / 63

4. Yuan Li (Beijing) 5. Jia Qi (Beiing) 6. Li Xuehui (Beijing) 7. Li Xiaoling (Beijing) 8. Du Yanlin (Beijing) 9. Wu Wenjian (Beijing) 10. Xiang Li (Beijing) 11. Tian Weidong (Beijing) 12. Lu Shang (Beijing) 13. Li Maizi (Beijing) 14. Wang Peng (Beijing) 15. Xu Yonghai (Beijing) 16. Guo Yuhao (Beijing) 17. Murong Xuecun (Beijing) 18. Hao Shu’e (Beijing) 19. Huang Bin (Beijing) 20. Xu Yan (Beijing) 21. Wang Jinbo (Beijing) 22. Li Dongmei (Beijing) 23. Liu Di (Beijing) 24. Dong Xuan (Beijing) 25. Zhao Mo (Beijing) 26. Wang Qiaoling (Beijing) 27. Fan Lili (Beijing) 28. Bao Zhuoxuan (Beijing) 29. Zheng Jianhui (Tianjin) 30. Bao Haiying (Tianjin) 31. Tong Yanchun (Tianjin) 32. Bao Longjun’s mother (Tianjin) 33. Lan Wuyou (Henan) 34. Hou Shuai (Henan) 35. Yue San (Henan) 36. Lu Qiumei (Shandong) 37. Xu Zhihan (Shandong) 38. Li Xiangyang (Shandong) 39. Ding Yu’e (Shandong) 40. Gong Lei (Shandong) 41. Zhao Zhuyuan (Shandong) 42. Li Fawang (Shanxi) 43. Li Dawei (Gansu) 44. Wang Fulei (Shenzhen) 45. Yang Qinheng (Shanghai) 46. Wang Fazhan (Shanghai) 47. Zhou Guozhun (Shanghai) 59 / 63

48. Li Xuezheng (Shanghai) 49. Ren Naijun (Shanghai) 50. Feng Zhenghu (Shanghai) 51. Lu Zhenping (Jiangsu) 52. Shan Lihua (Jiangsu) 53. Qu Hua (Jiangsu) 54. Zhang Xiuqin (Jiangsu) 55. Ji Hongbing (Jiangsu) 56. Han Lei (Jiangsu) 57. Hu Cheng (Jiangsu) 58. Gu Xiaofeng (Jiangsu) 59. Gu Yimin (Jiangsu) 60. Xu Zhengbiao (Jiangsu) 61. Xu Juan (Jiangsu) 62. Zhao Changdong (Jiangsu) 63. Pan Lu (Jiangsu) 64. Wang Mingxian (Jiangsu) 65. Xu Wenshi (Jiangsu) 66. Yao Qin (Jiangsu) 67. Fan Yonghai (Jiangsu) 68. Wang Xiaoli (Jiangsu) 69. Ding Hongfen (Jiangsu) 70. Ge Jueping (Jiangsu) 71. Lu Guoying (Jiangsu) 72. Shen Aibin (Jiangsu) 73. Yu Huaiqian (Zhejiang) 74. Wu Gaoxing (Zhejiang) 75. Zou Wei (Zhejiang) 76. Chen Zongyao (Zhejiang) 77. Zhen Jianghua (Guangdong) 78. Xiao Yuhui (Guangdong) 79. Wang Aizhong (Guangdong) 80. Chen Ronggao (Guangdong) 81. Jia Pin (Guangdong) 82. Yuan Guozhi (Guangdong) 83. Wu Bin (Guangdong) 84. Huang Yijie (Guangdong) 85. Xu Xiangrong (Guangdong) 86. Liu Hui (Guangdong) 87. Li Weiguo (Guangdong) 88. Huang Minpeng (Guangdong) 89. Huang Zijing (Guangdong) 90. He Yanyun (Guangdong) 91. Huang Shaoyun (Hunan) 60 / 63

92. Hu XX (Hunan) 93. Su Shangwei (Guangdong) 94. Liu Sifang (Guangdong) 95. Guo Chunping (Guangdong) 96. Huang Xi (Guangdong) 97. Liu Jinlian (Guangdong) 98. Huang Yongxiang (Guangdong) 99. Wei Xiaobing (Guangdong) 100. Lai Rifu (Guangdong) 101. Huang Yuzhang (Guangxi) 102. Su Shaoliang (Guangxi) 103. Tan Aijun (Guangxi) 104. Mo Qianli (Guangxi) 105. Zhou Shichen (Guangxi) 106. Zhang Wei (Guangxi) 107. Luo Ming (Guangxi) 108. Duan Qixian (Guangxi) 109. Wang Debang (Guangxi) 110. You Jingyou (Fujian) 111. You Minglei (Fujian) 112. Dai Zhenya (Fujian) 113. Pan Xidian (Fujian) 114. You Jinxu (Fujian) 115. Lu Zuoyu (Fujian) 116. Wu Xinfa (Wuhan) 117. Wei Peng (Hubei) 118. Geng Caiwen (Hubei) 119. Ou Biaofeng (Hunan) 120. Huang Zhiping (Hunan) 121. Wei Defeng (Hunan) 122. Li Zhengran (Hunan) 123. Xiao Yong (Hunan) 124. Xu Lin (Hunan) 125. Xu Xilian (Jiangxi) 126. Huang Yanming (Guizhou) 127. Luo Yaling (Chongqing) 128. Shan Yajuan (Heilongjiang) 129. Quan Yushun (Heilongjiang) 130. Jiang Jianjun (Liaoning) 131. Yu Mingwen (Sichuan) 132. Kong Xiaoyou (Zhejiang) 133. Zhou Aiping (Zhejiang) 134. Cheng Chaohua (Zhejiang) 135. Zhou Jian (Zhejiang) 61 / 63

136. Wang Yunxian (Zhejiang) 137. Zhang Baocheng (Beijing) 138. Chi Jinchun (Harbin) 139. Yu Yunfeng (Harbin) 140. Li Wei (Beijing) (6) Search and Confiscation 1. Fengrui Law Firm 2. Lawyer Li Jinxing's office (NGO Xiyuan Action Office) 3. Lawyer Li Heping's office in Beijing 2. Statistics by Region (location of incident) (detained, disappeared or house arrest / forbidden to leave the country or questioned): Beijing 67 (18 / 49) Guangdong 59 (1 / 58) Jiangsu 24 (0 / 24) Shandong 31 (5 / 26) Hunan 25 (1 / 24) Zhejiang 24 (6 / 18) Guangxi 17 (0 / 17) Shanghai 15 (0 / 15) Henan 15 (0 / 15) Fujian 9 (1 / 8) Chongqing 8 (0 / 8) Hubei 8 (2 / 6) Tianjin 8 (1 / 7) Guizhou 5 (0 / 5) Sichuan 3 (0 / 3) Liaoning 3 (0 / 3) Heilongjiang 5 (0 / 5) Hebei 3 (0 / 3) Yunnan 3 (0 / 3) Jiangxi 4 (0 / 4) Gansu 2 (0 / 2) Inner Mongolia 1 (1 / 0) Shaanxi 1 (0 / 1) Shanxi 1 (0 / 1) Anhui 1 (0 / 1) Myanmar 2 (2 / 0)

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China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group Report on the 709 crackdown

Editing and Proofreading: Teng Biao, Stacy Mosher Type-setting: Ash

Published by China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group info@chrlawyers.hk http://www.chrlawyers.hk

All rights reserved; no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior permission of the publishers.

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