THE THREAT POSED BY FIXATED INDIVIDUALS

By Phillip Grindell The Threat Posed by Fixated Individuals

Just a few days after the funeral of Prince Philip, a fixated person, who had flown to the UK from Spain, arrived at the Royal residence using the name Irene Windsor (the surname of the British Royal family).

The woman, who claimed she was engaged to Prince Andrew managed to persuade the security officers at the Royal Lodge to pay for her taxi fare. She then spent 20 minutes wandering around the Royal gardens before entering the home of Prince Andrew, Duke of York, where she was finally detained, and subsequently sectioned under the Mental Health Act.

According to published research, people who pursue the rich and famous pose a greater risk of death or serious injury to their targets than do terrorist groups or criminals. (James,

2010)

Research has also identified that physical protection measures alone have not proved to be a sufficient defense against the fixated. (Mullen et al., 2009)

Despite this fact, there is a distinct lack of understanding and training within the security industry of the threats posed by the fixated both towards the person subject to the protection and those within the security detail.

This article will seek to raise awareness of this threat.

It is helpful to define what is meant by a fixated person. We all experience periods of being fixated in life, whether it is when we are in a new relationship, a new position at work or an issue that is stressing us out. That is not what is meant by fixation.

Fixation is an increased pathological preoccupation with either a person or an ideology or cause. When that fixation then consumes your every waking moment and becomes obsessive, it becomes pathological and is often linked to stalking behaviour. From a security perspective this can be difficult to identify, however an unnatural volume of interest may be an indicator. The impact of mismanaging a fixated threat may include: • Violence/Death to the person being There is a distinct lack of understanding and training within the security industry of the threats posed by the fixated both towards the person subject to the protection and those within the security detail.

protected or those tasked with doing the protection. • Psychological distress to anyone involved. • Embarrassment to the person being protected or to the individual or organisation responsible for the protection. • Disruption to an event or life in general. • Adverse media attention to all involved. • Reputational harm to the person being protected or those tasked with doing the protection. • Dissipation of resources of the security team.

An important consideration is not to confuse those afflicted by mental health illness with lack of intelligence or capability. One of the risks attached to such fixation is the need for close proximity by the fixated person. When this desire for close proximity is frustrated, it can metamorphise into strong emotions of anger and can then emotionally hijack the lives of those involved. This desire for close proximity is key and is why proper debriefs following events are so important.

Failure to conduct an inclusive debrief will leave the close protection professional unaware that a fixated person has now been seen at multiple events together with the evidence of escalation in behaviour.

On June 5, 1968, Sirhan carried out the planned assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy. Sirhan hid in the pantry at the Ambassador Hotel in Los Angeles, California and waited until Kennedy walked past. He then

shot Kennedy multiple times. In the 5 months leading up to the date, Sirhan made at least four approaches— perhaps failed attempts or efforts to see how close he could get to Kennedy in a public venue, none of which were reported. This desire for close proximity encourages fixated people to conduct extensive, obsessive research of the person they are targeting. They will seek to find out where they live, what events they are going to attend, who their family and friends are and how they are protected. Any security review of a protected person must include an audit of their private information publicly available. This should highlight areas of vulnerability and enable opportunities to either reduce this exposure or improve the security arrangements.

One consideration, which is often missed, is what information is publicly available about those tasked with doing the protection. This is an area of significant vulnerability that must be mitigated. If you, as a security professional are leaking private information about yourself and family, you or your family can then become the target of the fixated individual. This can then create an opportunity for intimidation or ‘tiger kidnap’ which might encourage an insider threat scenario. Any reputable security organisation must ensure they take steps to mitigate this threat.

In the age of social media and communicated threats, we often hear in the news of prominent people being subjected to death threats and how their security has been increased to protect against such threats. This is usually a mistake. One of the anomalies of threat intelligence is that in almost every case of a prominent person being threatened, be they political, celebrity, UHNW or sporting, those making threats have rarely posed a threat. In simple terms research has repeatedly demonstrated that those individuals who have been attacked were not threatened by their attacker. By increasing security in response to threats made on social media, the security professional unnecessarily dissipates their resources, wastes the clients’ money, increases the anxiety of those subjected to protection. This can demonstrate that the security professional fails to understand the science behind such threats, and further suggests that they are less likely to identify a genuine threat. A striking finding of multiple attacks in different countries, was that most attacks were preceded by obvious and often flamboyant warnings in the form of threatening or bizarre communications and behaviours. There are 8 key behavioural

indicators that have been identified together with several linguistic clues. The challenge is recognising them, mindful that it is rare to see all of them, nor it is necessary for a threat to be genuine.

An example of this is the attack on President Reagan. When John Hinckley Jr. attacked Reagan, he did so to impress Jodie Foster, the US actress he had been fixated on for 5 years. Whilst sat in his hotel room in the hours leading up to the failed assassination, he wrote to Jodie Foster “Dear Jodie…there is a definite possibility that I will be killed in my attempt to get Reagan”.

The fixated are sometimes referred to as stalkers, but not all fixated individuals are stalkers. Stalking is regularly mentioned in the media, but few understand that there are a number of different types of stalkers, each posing a different threat to different people. Assuming that one size fits all is a significant mistake and well-intentioned actions can escalate the risk. All too often, a stalker has gone on to kill in the hours or days after being served an injunction or released from custody.

In summary, the close and residential protection industry is faced with an increasingly challenging climate, in which activists and fixated individuals pose a significant threat.

The interpretation and analysis of information to support those on the front line requires specialists and additional training to add value and increase awareness of these threats.

As witnessed at in the incident mentioned at the start of this article, failing to understand and prevent incursions will invariably call for a security review. These failings and the reputational harm that is associated, will mean security professionals will undermine their professionalism and likely lose business. However, in the incident referred to, they got lucky. It could very easily have resulted in serious injury or death of the security professionals and Prince Andrew, and with the media storm that would have followed, it would be career ending!

Philip Grindell MSc is the founder of Defuse, a global intelligence and threat management consultancy that combines the very best in protective intelligence with behavioural science to eliminate anxiety, fear and uncertainty caused by communicated abuse, threats and intimidation targeted from fixated individuals at high profile people, private family offices, professional athletes and organisations who want to feel safer. Defuse’s team of internationally acclaimed experts have been trusted to look after and advise some of the world’s most recognised politicians and individuals.