When the cultural historian, Rey Chow, was asked by Civic Exchange

hk political cartoons

one country, two systems & government legitimization: who has the last laugh?

Anson Lau Princeton University written for Civic Exchange August 2004 special thanks to Christine Loh Esther Lam Yan-yan Yip Mr. & Mrs. “Malone” Ma Lung Mr. & Mrs. Gavin Coates Zunzi

“Malone” Ma Lung. “Hello CE Tung!” Series.

hk political cartoons one country, two systems & government legitimization: who has the last laugh?

introduction: one country, two systems – no laughing matter?

From the collection of political cartoonist, Gavin Coates, featuring the cartoon of 4th June, 2004. Caption reads, “The Hong Kong candle is the only one in China that is able to commemorate the 1989 Tiananmen massacre.” (www.earthycartoons.com)

When the cultural historian, Rey Chow, was asked how to understand the Chinese people in the wake of the Tiananmen Square Incident, she replied, “[A]t the moment of shock, Chinese people…become simply Chinese.”2 This concept of “simply Chinese” presents a fascinating 2

Chris Berry. “A nation T(w/o)o: Chinese Cinema(s) and Nationhood(s),” 24. 1

social dilemma. On the one hand, it denotes how the Tiananmen Square Incident inspired a unification of the Chinese people into a singular, universal whole.3 Yet on the other, “simply Chinese” also signifies the Chinese people reduced to being simply, merely, and only “Chinese:” stripped of other political, economic, and social attributes and left instead, with a nebulous Chinese identity. In either case, the shocking 1989 incident motivated one million Hong Kong residents to gather in protest of Beijing’s actions and voice concern for their city’s impending Handover in 1997. Six years after the handover in July 2003, Hong Kong witnessed yet another political crisis of a smaller variety – but of no less significance to Hong Kong’s fraught relationship with the Mainland. In the public furor over Article 23, half a million Hong Kong citizens marched from Victoria Park to Central to protest what many perceived was a veiled attempt by Beijing to erode Hong Kong autonomy. In this incident – as in the crisis over a decade ago – Hong Kong would face the nagging issue of social identity while the Beijing-appointed Chief Executive, C.H. Tung, persisted in his signature mantra, “We are all Chinese.”4 What is “Chinese” in many ways molds the uneasy relationship between Hong Kong and the Mainland in One Country, Two Systems. How a Chinese nation copes with the complex demands of a Chinese Hong Kong and Chinese Mainland many a times results in keen confrontations. As the Hong Kong analyst, Christine Loh, writes on the Article 23 controversy, lying at “the core of the current political impasse between Hong Kong and Beijing…[are] two fundamentally different views of how political life should be organized.”5 To the amateur and seasoned observer alike, one could reasonably wonder how these two unlikely bedfellows can continue to sleep in the same bed. Yet to only understand the oppositional dynamics between the city and the Mainland as only polar nemeses is to risk distorting and resisting a bed that must – and will – be made. As the architect of this system, Deng Xiaopeng, stressed, One Country is the basis for Two Systems. Yet even without this official declaration, the reality of the situation is that Hong Kong has – and will – continue to rely on Mainland China for its fundamental needs – politically, economically, and otherwise. In exploring how this Chinese nation can address the uneasy dynamics generated by a Chinese Mainland and Chinese Hong Kong, we will delve specifically into the world of Hong Kong political cartoons. Without running too deeply into the abstract interplay between words and image, we will explore how political cartoons – and cartoons, in general – present an uncanny juncture between the ability of the word and the efficacy of the image to communicate messages about society. From that springboard, we will analyze further the role that political cartoons play as part of Hong Kong society – with special regard to the city’s highly developed and free media. As the scholar, Richard Cullen, aptly points out, the Hong Kong media plays a unique role in the political landscape, for it functions as an outlet for free public discourse amid a limited democratic society.6 Ultimately, exploration of local political cartoons reveals a more nuanced reality where the uneasy dynamic between Hong Kong and the Mainland should not be viewed through only the lens of polarized conflict. This oppositional relationship is more than static; it is a reactive, interactive, dynamic process whereby raucous political cartoons may serve as an outlet for civil 3

ibid. Edward Vickers and Flora Kan. “The Reeducation of Hong Kong: Identity, Politics, and Education in Postcolonial Hong Kong,” 403. 5 Christine Loh, “Boomtown II: Faceoff,” Boomtown : Re-enter the Dragon, 31. 6 Richard Cullen, “The Media and Society in Hong Kong”, page 104-116. 4

discourse while simultaneously legitimizing the authority of the Hong Kong and Beijing governments.

traditions in hk cartooning: visualizing nationality, identity, & society Hong Kong political cartoons find their roots embedded in both Western and Oriental traditions. Indeed, the term “cartoon” derives from the Italian cartone, or card.7 Referring to the material that Italian tapestry makers and fresco painters used to draw their preliminary designs, “cartoon” eventually came to denote any preliminary sketch for an artwork.8 It would not be until the 1840s that the modern usage of “cartoon” would come into being. Following the destructive fires that left the Houses of Parliament in ruin, the new Palace of Westminster was erected – featuring patriotic murals to be selected from public competition. One of the contestants was Punch magazine, which entered a series of five satirical visuals, the prototypes for the consequent modern forms of political cartoons.9 The ensuing use of political cartoons and comics in news magazines, moreover, would also reflect a greater move towards populism in the media – as these visual messages could more easily be understood and widely consumed by the common classes.10 In addition to this Western heritage, Hong Kong political cartoons are also profoundly informed by Oriental tradition, whereby the synthesis of image and word historically played a significant role in social commentary. The earliest Chinese characters evolved from pictographs used for oracle bone reading. The written word – long the domain of a select few literati scholars – would become a tool for political, moral, and social commentary. Indeed, a favorite past time of the literati, calligraphy, also reflected the synthesis of word and image as keen social consciousness. Scroll paintings usually featured pithy commentary or poetry expressing the societal significance of the painted image. This traditional Chinese synthesis of word, image, and social commentary would undergo a critical transformation during the 20th century, when the power of the word departed from the hands of erudite literati – forcing the use of the word to yield to more populist demands in order to maintain its efficacy in communicating social reality. Indeed, Rey Chow offers a useful insight into this evolution of the literal and visual communication in her analysis of a famous passage found in Lu Xun’s seminal work, A Call to Arms. Reflecting back to his medical studies in Japan, Lu Xun distinctly remembers watching a propaganda film in biology class, where a Chinese spy is executed by the Japanese before a crowd of numb Chinese onlookers: Before the term was over I had left for Tokyo, because after this film I felt that medical science was not so important after all. The people of a weak and backward country, however strong and healthy they may be, can only serve to be made materials or onlookers of such meaningless public exposures; and it doesn’t really matter how many of them die of illness. The most important thing, therefore, is to change their spirit, and since at that time I felt that literature was the best means to this end, I determined to promote a literary movement…11

Robert C. Harvey, “Comedy at the Juncture of Word and Imagine: The Emergence of the Modern Gag Magazine Reveals the Vital Blend,” 77. 8 ibid. 9 ibid. 10 N.C. Christopher Couch, “The Yellow Kid and the Comic Page,” 65. 11 Rey Chow, Primitive Passions: Visuality, Sexuality, Ethnography, and Contemporary Chinese Cinema, 4. 3

Chow adopts a fresh approach in interpreting this well-known moment in the eminent writer’s life. Whereas the standard interpretation ends with Lu Xun’s literal explanation that it was the faces of these mindless spectators that inspired his social crusade, Chow goes one step further in suggesting that it was the film, itself, that inspired Lu Xun’s moral reaction: a keen reaction to the potency of the image (in this case, aptly embodied by film) to compete with the written word, the traditional medium for conveying social commentary in Chinese society. 12 Chow argues that Lu Xun’s passage exposes a raw nerve: whether consciously or subconsciously, Lu Xun is shocked by the very power of this new breed of image to communicate reality and thereby dedicates himself to reinventing the quality of the Chinese verbal text.13 Consequently, we see in Lu Xun and consequent Chinese writers’ works a move towards more compelling, more populist, and more visual literal narratives.14 This unprecedented popularization of literal communication would spur in China socially critical, vernacular texts as well as socially conscious comic strips and political cartoons. During the Japanese invasion, many cartoons served the social cause by stirring public resistance against the Japanese army and avid Chinese nationalism. In the wake of World War II, the Nationalist-Communist civil war, and the consequent Communist victory on the mainland, many of these Chinese political cartoonists fled to overseas communities – one popular destination being Hong Kong. The distinct brand of Hong Kong political cartoons we know today, moreover, would undergo further evolutions with the introduction of American cartoons, Japanese manga, and foreign cartoonists to the British colony. Thus, we see in the political cartoons of modern day Hong Kong a unique tradition informed by social consciousness, cultural transformation, and societal hybridization. In many ways, this dynamic heritage aptly sets the stage for us to better appreciate political cartoons as fitting media for communicating the volatile reality of today’s Hong Kong. With traditional society fraying amid increased Hong Kong-Mainland traffic, political discontent, and economic crisis, the Hong Kong landscape is a difficult one to comprehend – much less accurately depict. Yet what we see in the following analyses of political cartoons is that despite this confusion over the territory’s current status and uncertainty over what the territory will become, political cartoons are still able to provide explicit images, messages, and meanings. As chaotic, confused, and sordid Hong Kong politics may get, the classic icon of the puffy-eyed, large-headed, overwhelmed C.H. Tung continues to strike a chord of tacit understanding in many a Hong Kong local’s mind.

From the collection of the political cartoonist, Larry Feign. (www.lilywong.net/books/)

ibid., 9 ibid., 10 14 ibid., 11 13

From the collection of the political cartoonist, “Malone” Ma Lung. Left to right. Slide 1: “Seeing you work so hard just makes me wish you could take some of that Moon Lady’s medicine.” Slide 2: “A medicine for eternal life? No thanks. The longer one lives, the more…” Slide 3: “What I meant was, if you took the medicine, you would fly up to the moon and not be able to return. Then everyone would be fine!”15

hk political cartoons: visualizing a space for mainland-hk interaction In understanding the predicament of today’s Hong Kong, we must first understand it as embedded in a series of relationships to sovereign powers. Hong Kong has by and large been relegated to the status of accepting – and within that space, reacting to – the large questions looming about its head. Indeed, as the legal scholar, Michael Davis, offers, the Hong KongMainland relationship can best be visualized by a triangle.16 During the colonial period and the impending handover, the three corners were the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Great Britain, and Hong Kong while after the Handover, the British corner was replaced with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) government under C.H. Tung. In both cases, the voice of the Hong Kong people was severely limited to Hong Kong reacting more to Mainland China than interacting with the motherland.

“Malone” Ma Lung. “Hello CE Tung!,” Volume 2, 89. Michael Davis Lecture. “Hong Kong Autonomy: Gradual and Orderly Erosion of One Country, Two Systems.” Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University. 26 April 2004.

From the collection of political cartoonist, Zunzi, commenting on the government’s lack of responsiveness to public concern during the Article 23 controversy, which eventually inspired the July 1st Rally. (http://www.civilhrfront.org/gallery/g allery_zz_e.htm)

§ From top to bottom, clockwise: Former Secretary of Security, Regina Ip, crying after she uses a mallet entitled, “National Security,” to smash a dissenter for the reason that “He laughed at my daughter.” A young girl (HK) cries as a Communist granny binds her feet with clothe labeled Article 23. A dissenter is smashed against a wall with a boxing glove representing the government that says, “Thank you for your opinions.”

Yet the intended role of the Tung Administration as the effective arbiter between the Hong Kong people and the Mainland government has not materialized. Public anger, frustration, and resentment over the Tung Administration’s numerous policies, blunders (not to mention SARS, the least), and inability to quickly react to public opinion has resulted in massive public rallies both in 2003 and 2004. As Christine Loh explains, with Beijing’s loss of faith in the Tung Administration to govern Hong Kong, “both Beijing and Hong Kong people have entered uncharted territory of facing each other.”17

Christine Loh, “Boomtown II: Faceoff,” Boomtown : Re-enter the Dragon, 33. 6

From the collection of political cartoonist, “Malone” Ma Lung, entitled, “Rely on the Mother Country.” Slide 1: “Among the myriad of things I’ve said, one statement stands out…” Slide 2: “ That is, rely on the mother country!” Slide 3: “In other words, don’t count on me!” (“Malone” Ma Lung. “Hello CE Tung!” Volume 1, 7.)

This keen juncture in the Hong Kong-Mainland relationship offers a critical testing ground for the viability of One Country, Two Systems. Through the July 1st rally and Tiananmen Incident Vigil, Hong Kong people have voiced their concerns stridently in reaction to political tactics by the Mainland. In turn, the Mainland has reacted vehemently with swift moves to delay universal suffrage in Hong Kong. What is clear is that both sides are concerned, proactive, and – most importantly – in need of moving beyond the stage of reaction and into the plane of interaction. A possible avenue for this interaction lies in the role political cartoons, as part of the Hong Kong media, can play as an indirect arbiter between the Mainland and Hong Kong. As Richard Cullen aptly points out in his The Media and Society in Hong Kong, the highly developed and highly varied (at times, sundry) Hong Kong media can function as the “surrogate congress” to a well-informed society that is otherwise deprived of full democratic involvement in their government.18 Indeed, as the “most free and diverse in East Asia,” the Hong Kong media has served in several instances to alter government policies – such as the controversies that encircled the Principle Officials Accountability System (POAS) and Article 23 national security law.19 More importantly, by virtue of being a non-democratically elected government, the HKSAR (and to a certain extent, the Mainland government) are placed in the paradox of all non-democratic regimes. Namely, as Cullen writes: Under the current political structure, the Government is particularly powerful. But it lacks any democratic legitimacy – and it knows it. All non-democratic governments are aware of a basic irony related to their existence: the lack of any need to seek democratic re-endorsement saves them from the tedium of electoral politics; but their lack of a popular mandate means they must keep an especially keen eye on public opinion.20 Hong Kong political cartoons can act as specific sources of public opinion from concerned Hong Kong citizens. If the recent numbers posted by the rallies for the July 1st and Tiananmen Vigil are accounted for, the HKSAR and concerned Mainland officials are indeed facing a significant, dedicated lot of concerned Hong Kong residents. What government authorities could do then is use political cartoons, as part of a freer media, to gauge and 18

Richard Cullen, “The Media and Society in Hong Kong,” 115. ibid. 20 ibid., 110. 19

“manage”21 public opinion – especially in the absence of democratic legitimacy. The Hong Kong people, in turn, can not only cull social concerns from political cartoons but also voice their own misgivings in a less confrontational manner to the authorities. Albeit political cartoons are the product of an individual artist’s observations, they are also perspectives gathered from the local media, newspapers, and popular opinion. In this unique interaction between the political observer, the political subject, and the political cartoonist, something as simple as Hong Kong people staging a sit in at the local government office could well become the next day’s fodder for an editorial cartoon. If not to rouse political movement, serious political cartoons that pique the authorities’ attention – at the very least – offer Hong Kong people a less drastic, more viable route for expressing discontent with the government. What may at first seem contradictory to government interests in allowing searing political commentary, can in fact be used by the government to not only manage public opinion but also allow the public to bring forth their grievances in much more constructive ways. As opposed to the large public demonstrations that are often followed by notorious brain drains of the city’s well-educated and well-heeled, Hong Kong residents may not see the need for such drastic measures if there was a modicum of faith in the city’s integrity – a key indicator being its state of political liberties. By allowing concerned residents to express discontent through political cartoons, then, one hurdle may be cleared in the difficult relationship between the Hong Kong people and the HKSAR and Mainland governments by demonstrating that the authorities are willing to listen – perhaps respond – to the people’s frustrations. From the collection of political cartoonist, Gavin Coates, featuring the cartoon on 30th May, 2004. Caption reads, “Tung Chee Hwa is pleased to hear another brain drain out of Hong Kong is on the cards. There`s far too much thinking going on... not to mention remembering... the 1989 Tiananmen massacre.” (www.earthycartoons. com)

Related to this issue of increased political involvement through the media is the fact that Hong Kong residents may also voice their own conservative leanings in the form of market censorship. If they don’t like what they see, they simply won’t buy it. The ominous specter of government censorship and self-censorship among the Hong Kong media seems a perennial favorite of the press, yet what perhaps should also be seriously considered is the force of market censorship in Hong Kong society. As even the politician, Audrey Eu, writes on the political mentality of Hong Kong people: The irony is that anyone who is familiar with Hong Kong affairs will tell you that even 21

ibid. 8

if there is universal suffrage tomorrow, Hong Kong is unlikely to produce a chief executive opposed to Beijing. Political reality is such that a candidate who does not have the blessing of Beijing is unlikely to run. Further, Hong Kong people are pragmatic. They know which side their bread is buttered and are unlikely to pick a candidate whom Beijing is known not to approve.22 The quote above should not be taken as a confirmation of the “apolitical” nature of Hong Kong people (we will clarify this issue later), but rather illustrates how pragmatic many Hong Kong residents can be. By allowing for searing political cartoons in the media, the authorities could communicate symbolically to the masses that the authorities do not view the Hong Kong residents as merely stooges of extreme rightists or running dogs of extreme leftists. That the authorities understand the reality that Hong Kong is not made up of only two polarized camps. There is a middle ground. There is room for compromise. And, most importantly, there is room for interaction. By engaging less in government censorship (which ultimately creates greater animosity towards the authorities) and instead, allowing more political freedoms, the authorities could express their opinions in other forms and allow the opportunity for less dogma ridden rhetoric to be expressed. Indeed, perhaps this approach of less government censorship and the attendant polarized environment could carve out more room for market censorship – a much more powerful, popular force – to repress “inappropriate” material for the authorities.

the government, political cartoons & freer media: why the authorities have something to smile about…

Hong Kong people may realize which side their bread is buttered (or perhaps, more fitting, from which side their milk teas comes from)…But equally important, how can Mainland China willingly come to terms with her new prodigal son? (Zunzi Work. www.hongkongunmasked.com)

Understandably, when reading the arguments above, one might be tempted to dismiss them as idyllic circumstances that are often lost in our own real world. Hong Kong would like to reform the current system yet the bigger question is, can the Mainland government handle these reforms? After all, a very real fear of the Party cadres is that a too free-wheeling Hong Kong may benefit its residents but ultimately destabilize Party rule on the overall Mainland. Nonetheless, if we are to consider the Mainland government’s recent track record with liberalization, we see that restricted forms of societal freedoms – even democratization – have in fact led to advantageous outcomes for the Communist Party. We will briefly cover a few examples whereby contained varieties of liberalization actually help to maintain the momentum for Mainland reform while ultimately serving to legitimize the rule of the Party. 22

Audrey Eu. “Who’s a Patriot?” Personal Website. http://www.audreyeu.org/frame_article.htm. 30 July 2004. 9

In the initial stages of economic reform, a specially created and more liberalized – but also well contained – Shenzhen Special Economic Zone provided Deng Xiaopeng the opportunity to experiment with market reforms and fine tune them. Eventually, the very success of this initially isolated example would serve as the drive and template for economic reform elsewhere in China. It would be the very success of this economic liberalization that would renew the Party’s legitimacy among the people – and as some China observers suggest, deflect strident discontent away from the Party’s rampant corruption and Tiananmen Square Incident. In a likewise fashion, when we approach the role of the Internet in PRC society, we find that instead of the Internet being the undeniable force of democracy, economic reform, and social liberalization – that was all too often touted by American luminaries, such as US Presidents Reagan, Bush, and Clinton, the Internet has only left a very limited impact on the overall structure of PRC society. 23 Yet where the Internet failed to herald American-style capitalism and freedom to the doors of the National People’s Congress, it has served as an effective catalyst in liberalizing the Chinese media. When faced with the potential of the Western worldwide web’s array of professional services, critical reporting, and risqué topics, private and public Mainland online firms have responded with their own glossy – albeit watered-down – versions to maintain Chinese consumer interest. Looking at popular Chinese websites, one can now find previously taboo subjects such as premarital sex, drugs, and homosexuality scattered among the topics. Likewise, when faced with the more critical journalism of Western sites, even local Chinese newspapers and T.V. channels are reporting more than the customary state visits and moving towards greater investigative reporting (granted, usually reporting safely on the ills of the neighboring province – and not theirs).24 Beyond exploring how limited liberalization has aided in serving the Beijing regime’s purposes, we see that even democracy in its proscribed ranks has helped legitimize the Party. When faced with rampant corruption that threatened to cripple the reform agenda and stir up social unrest, the Mainland government decided to institute democratic elections of local leaders. Instead of the standard dispersal of already strained Central government resources to deal with the daunting task of corruption, the state in fact marshaled democratic elections – in effect, the Chinese people, themselves – to supervise and contain the corruption that otherwise would have weakened the Party’s credibility and power base. What we see in these three examples are encouraging precedents for supporting the idea of a freer media in Hong Kong. Similar to Shenzhen, Hong Kong can serve to be an isolated, contained case to see how a free media in China can be fine tuned to fit within a more conservative Mainland society. This experiment would be a much less drastic and volatile process than completely stripping Hong Kong of its de facto freedoms already enjoyed under the British and highly regarded around the world. Akin to the Internet case, a contained – but free – Hong Kong media would not necessarily destabilize the HKSAR government and Communist Party’s credibility. On the contrary, the authorities could use a free media to act as a means of “preemptive liberalization.” 25 The anger, frustration, and resentment that blew up in the Tung 23

Shanthi Kalathil & Taylor Boas. Open Networks, Close Regimes: The Impact of the Internet on Authoritarian Regimes. Chapter 2. http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue8_1/kalathil/kalathil_chapter2.html 24 ibid. 25 Shanthi Kalathil & Taylor Boas. Open Networks, Close Regimes: The Impact of the Internet on Authoritarian Regimes. Chapter 2. http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue8_1/kalathil/kalathil_chapter2.html 10

Administration’s face might have been diverted to less anti-government demonstrations through giving – at least – the façade of societal freedoms – most aptly demonstrated by freedom of the press. As the political cartoonist, Zunzi, points out, cartoons – whether political or otherwise – are a critical part of the personal expression of Hong Kong locals.26 One sees a high degree of cartoons canvassing public service announcements, commercial advertisements, and the personally designed posters, t-shirts, and political banners hoisted during the Tiananmen Incident Vigil and July 1st rally. In short, cartoons play a definite role in personal and public expression. Greater freedoms allotted to political cartoons, as part of a freer Hong Kong media, can provide the HKSAR and Mainland governments an opportunity to allow the Hong Kong people to let off steam before a more serious political crisis occurs. On a related note, a more liberal Hong Kong media could also dispel some of the acrimony between Hong Kong and Beijing – perhaps making the Hong Kong media, already a major cultural influence on the Mainland, a competitive (but also potentially more authority friendly) force in the media liberalization of the motherland. Lastly, like the use of democratic elections to shore up Party legitimacy, the authorities could employ a freer Hong Kong media to “manage” public opinion – and ultimately, open another source for reliable information about the dynamics of Hong Kong society. The Beijing government’s previous reliance on the Tung Administration – and what many suspect, an unholy alliance with a coterie of HK tycoons – to relay reliable understanding about the situation in Hong Kong has clearly proved ineffective in avoiding political crises and confrontations of the sorts witnessed at the recent Tiananmen Incident Vigil and July 1st rally. Why depend on only the limited ears of an unpopular administration and select tycoons when one can hear the voices of the Hong Kong people, themselves, through a freer Hong Kong media? Ultimately, we must tackle the question what impact searing political cartoons, as part of a freer media, will have for the Hong Kong populace, itself. For those committed to the political life of the city, biting political cartoons can continue to voice their opinions. Admittedly, one could argue that Hong Kong has only a limited audience for political aficionados; yet one must also recognize that this limited lot is dedicated indeed. And, as evidenced by the recent numbers for the Tiananmen Incident Vigil and July 1st rally, their numbers are more than a one time deal; they are significant numbers of people committed to the cause of political activism.

South China Morning Post. Editorial Section. 14 June 2004. 26

Zunzi. Personal interview. 15 July, 2004. Foreign Correspondents Club, Hong Kong. 11

For those individuals put off by biting political cartoons and the supposed media circus surrounding much of Hong Kong’s socio-political circles, we can at least realize that these individuals are taking politics seriously. In their retreat from political life, there is a demand for certain standards of political rapport – and, at the very least, consideration of political variables. Indeed, a common response from supposedly “apolitical” individuals was that they found it all too sordid, polarizing, and non-effective. Another popular concern for self-proclaimed apolitical individuals for not joining the July 1st rally was a fear of being manipulated by political parties. In this light, an apolitical group’s apparent rejection of politics reflects a society contemplating seriously political issues and in turn, a politically conscious society. As for the final group of truly “apolitical” folks, we find that even their own disinterest in politics does not stop the occasional wry remark about the wild state of affairs in Hong Kong politics. Furthermore, we often find that formerly political individuals and the second variety of “apolitical” persons can often fall into this group of truly politically disengaged. Likewise, formerly politically disinterested individuals can also move into the two other former groups. In truth, even political cartoonists are often apt to point out in their works the futility of politics at times. Whatever the case, we must recognize that this last variety of “apolitical” folks – perhaps the most prolific – is rarely someone who is completely unaware of the political matters surrounding them. Apolitical people are disinterested. But that should not qualify them as “apolitical,” for many of them are aware of some politics. Moreover, simply because they are apolitical now should not bar them from ever being political. Thus, whatever breed of Hong Konger, all these groups are at least aware of some political issues – and are able to speak in political terms on their (a)political stance. Being political and apolitical are not mutually exclusive traits. Rather, they are complementary qualities that are existent in many people. Whether one supports, opposes, or is just plain indifferent to politics, biting political cartoons can serve to voice, feed, and – at the very least, provide a good natured laugh – in the uneasy relations between Hong Kong and the Mainland.

conclusion: who has the last laugh? We began this paper with a political cartoon that, at face value, strikes as yet another inflammatory jab at the Mainland. One is apt to wonder, in attempting to shape the trajectory of One Country, Two Systems, how could such a searing piece serve any purpose but to further polarize an already critical condition? The answer lies in the picture.

From the collection of political cartoonist, Gavin Coates. (www.earthycartoons.com)

Without going into a thousand words, let us notice that Hong Kong is still placed well within the realm of the Mainland. The vigil candle – a symbol for Hong Kong, for democracy, and perhaps everything anti-Mainland – is now safely within the fold of the motherland. In many ways, the uneasy contradiction evoked in this picture embodies the even more layered paradoxes existent in the Hong Kong-Mainland relationship. Yet at the same time, just as everyone knows that One Country, Two Systems must work, so must a Hong Kong (no matter how uneasy) be properly within the Mainland’s sovereignty. Hong Kong must deal with being part of the Mainland. The Mainland must deal with Hong Kong. Perhaps a nagging question throughout this entire discussion has been, why can’t the Mainland – just as it did with the Mainland masses after the Tiananmen Square Incident – simply buy off Hong Kong with economic treats? A response ventured by this paper would be that the HKSAR must become more responsive anyways – and that politicization of Hong Kong through a freer media may, in the end, prove advantageous to the HKSAR and Mainland authorities. What strikingly unfolded before the Tung Administration’s face during the 2003 and 2004 years was a public reaction to the government’s seeming apathy, lack of transparency, and unwillingness to interact with the Hong Kong people. This situation must change. For the issue of an unresponsive government has already become a core concern among many Hong Kong people. If the government is to pursue any successful economic recovery in Hong Kong, it must be built on a stable society. This stability can be in part achieved through the use of a freer media in Hong Kong. That is, the authorities can use the media to more appropriately handle popular opinion – whether that be to preemptively liberalize, gauge popular opinion from a wider circle beyond Beijing appointed officials and select tycoons, and/or enhance their credibility among the Hong Kong masses. Ultimately, a freer media can act as the arbiter for a 13

workable relationship between Hong Kong and the Mainland. Likewise, for Hong Kong residents, a freer media constitutes an arena to voice opinions, debate those political opinions, and in general, provide a sense of faith that they possess a voice – and a medium – to speak to and, perhaps pressure, an unresponsive government. In an environment where biting political cartoons can be freely read, the controversy to differentiate between the “political” and the “apolitical” will be needed less as individuals are not forced into the volatile debates of choosing a(n) (a)political camp. Indeed, they are allowed to naturally express their opinion. With a Hong Kong less polarized over (a)political conflicts, economic recovery can be more efficiently pursued. The HKSAR and Mainland authorities can gain further political cache among the Hong Kong populace while on the international arena Mainland China can demonstrate that it is able to handle a world-class city – a befitting distinction for a nation eager to assume the world stage. The symbolic value of a Hong Kong that enjoys political freedoms and economic finesse will serve as valuable political capital in the Mainland’s ability to inspire greater credibility among its own populace and for the PRC in the international playing field. On that note, what should be made clear in this paper is that political cartoons and freedom of the press may lead to further liberalization – but they need not necessarily spell democratization. A freer media can, in fact, act as a useful tool for non-democratically elected regimes to preemptively liberalize, gauge popular opinion, and, in general, understand the masses in the absence of democratic venues. And like with any good comic strip, we arrive at the end punch line: biting political cartoons may, in the end, provide the Hong Kong and Mainland authorities an opportunity to enhance the viability of their non-democratic rule among the populace.

South China Morning Post. Editorial Section. 10 June, 2004.

This intricate set of reactions witnessed between Hong Kong and the Mainland ultimately reveal a very distinct interaction: That of a Chinese nation coping with the complex demands of a Chinese Mainland and Chinese Hong Kong. Perhaps the most apt representation of this relationship can be seen in a recent, government sponsored exhibit, where at a Tiananmen Incident kiosk were written the words: “Blood is thicker than water.”27

Edward Vickers and Flora Kan. “The Reeducation of Hong Kong: Identity, Politics, and Education in Postcolonial Hong Kong,” 435. 14

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