Is There an Erosion of Freedom of Speech in Hong by Civic Exchange

Is There an Erosion of Freedom of Speech in Hong Kong? David Lau Summer Intern 2004 Civic Exchange Introduction I know that the stereotypes of the Hong Kong Chinese businessman who is apolitical and focuses on nothing other than making money no longer apply. I have always seen freedom of speech as a value that set Hong Kong apart from the mainland. With the resignations of the three radio hosts, I too became worried that there was an erosion occurring and talked with several journalists to understand better why this was the case. I was surprised that there was a wide consensus amongst the five journalists that I interviewed – Chris Yeung, Frank Ching, Ching Cheong, Michael Vatikiotis, and Lin Neumann - that the erosion had been occurring for quite some time, albeit undetected. As I researched more, I was shocked by the subtle changes that the Hong Kong media was undergoing since the Handover and became convinced that that freedom of expression in Hong Kong was indeed being eroded. Freedom of expression in my opinion is undoubtedly the most important value of Hong Kong. Because the erosion is virtually imperceptible to the average Hong Konger, it is up to the journalists who are at the frontline of this erosion to relay their fears to the Hong Kong people and educate them constantly. At the same time it is important for the Hong Kong people to demonstrate and proclaim their wishes to the government to reinforce the idea that the Hong Kong people are mature enough to express their opinion responsibly and factually. The Hong Kong media must also show that they are mature and responsible in reporting the news, but the central government is taking away those opportunities to display maturity by preemptively clamping down on what it feels are politically sensitive issues. Some analysts have argued that Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa has been the greatest ‘democrat’ that Hong Kong has ever had because he has caused so many more people to be interested and involved in political issues. I don’t necessarily agree with this, but I do think that the most important thing that has happened for the Hong Kong people is that a new identity has emerged – one that values political freedom as much as

economic freedom. This identity is the new identity that my generation is growing up with and taking in as their own. Background Over the last twelve months, Hong Kong has experienced significant changes to its political landscape. On July 1st, 2003, more than 500,000 people marched in the streets to protest against the Hong Kong Government’s attempt to pass national security laws as stated in Article 23 of the Basic Law, Hong Kong’s mini-constitution. It was feared that this anti-subversion bill would have severely curtailed the civil liberties of people in Hong Kong. Facing overwhelming opposition from the public, and losing the support of the Liberal Party, the government abruptly decided to withdraw the bill from consideration in the Legislative Council. The bill was indefinitely shelved in September 2003 pending further consultation. This was perceived as a more relaxed attitude and mature approach by the central government towards the political development of Hong Kong. However, the landslide victory for the Democratic Party and other pro-democracy candidates over the pro-Beijing parties such as the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong (DABHK) at the local District Council elections in November 2003 caused the Central Authorities to worry about the pace of political development in Hong Kong. Political analysts forecast that the landslide victory for the Democrat Party could be repeated at the Legislative Council elections in September 2004. In February 2004, a campaign was launched by the Central Authorities to promote ‘patriotism’ in Hong Kong. The Xinhua News Agency, a mainland government body, stated that: “Hong Kong should be governed by Hong Kong people, with patriots forming the main body of this ruling elite.”1 This campaign thus became a platform for attacks against members of the pro-democracy camp such as Martin Lee and Szeto Wah. This controversial debate on patriotism politicized and polarized the views from all sections of the Hong Kong community. Even when the patriotism debate faded out, more turmoil was to come. In late April, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (SCNPC), which has the right to interpret provisions in the Basic Law, ruled that there would be no universal 1

Hong Kong Journalists Association. Beijing Turns the Screws: Freedom of Expression under Attack,

2004 Annual Report. Hong Kong: Article 19 and Hong Kong Journalists Association, 2004, pg. 6.

suffrage for the selection of the Chief Executive in 2007 as well as the election of the Legislative Council in 2008. The South China Morning Post editorialized that “as winter turned to spring, [the Hong Kong people] found themselves hurtling downwards…this was the lowest point.” 2 The frustration and hurt felt by Hong Kong people was propelled to new heights with the dramatic resignations of three prominent and controversial radio talk-show hosts in May. Albert Cheng was the most critical of the Hong Kong and Central Authorities among the three, hosted the morning phone-in program “Teacup in a Storm” on Commercial Radio. When he resigned, he cited the suffocating political climate in Hong Kong. Raymond Wong Yuk-man, another popular talk-show host who was also known for his criticism of the Hong Kong and Central Authorities, resigned ten days later. Both he and Cheng had received various threats months before their departure. Cheng’s replacement, Allen Lee, a former legislator and a National People’s Congress deputy who held moderate views on the Hong Kong and Central Authorities, quit two weeks into his job. He commented that he wanted to ‘get out of the kitchen’ before the temperature became too hot. He also said that he had received a phone call from a former mainland official who made suggestive remarks about his wife and daughter and wanted to talk about his hosting of “Teacup in a Storm”. The caller later revealed himself as Cheng Shousan, a former deputy director of the Hong Kong branch of the China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who said that he merely wanted to make contact with Lee to exchange views on Hong Kong. In the wake of the three resignations, the Hong Kong Government issued several public statements regarding freedom of expression: “We do not see any tightening in the freedom of expression and of the press. The Government will continue to uphold the fundamental rights of Hong Kong people…”3 Some academics and professionals decided to fight back, publishing an advertisement in Apple Daily in late May, expressing concerns over threats to freedom of expression. The statement read:”[The radio hosts’] presence in popular phone-in 2

Buddle, Cliff. “Twelve Months on a Roller Coaster to Maturity.” South China Morning Post 4 July

2004: EDT11 3

Hong Kong Journalists Association. Beijing Turns the Screws: Freedom of Expression under Attack,

2004 Annual Report. Hong Kong: Article 19 and Hong Kong Journalists Association, 2004, pg. 11.

programs is one of the most important indicators of freedom of speech in Hong Kong. Today, there is growing alarm at the threat to the freedom of speech and we need to be vigilant against the signs of its erosion.”4 A second advertisement was published in June, calling for the defense of Hong Kong’s core values – liberty, democracy, human rights, rule of law, fairness, social justice, peace and compassion, integrity and transparency, plurality, respect for individuals and upholding professionalism.5 Anson Chan, former Chief Secretary of Hong Kong, remarked in Time Magazine on June 14, 2004 that the manner in which “the central government has handled [the political reform in Hong Kong] coupled, with its political rhetoric and posturing reminiscent of the Cultural Revolution, have left most Hong Kong people puzzled, hurt and frustrated.” 6 These remarks drew scathing attacks from Beijing officials and their supporters in Hong Kong. In a further indication of Beijing’s involvement in the resignations of the three radio hosts, Spike Magazine, an informative and occasionally satirical magazine that also has the English translation rights to Apple Daily, reported on July 9th that there was evidence of the involvement of the central government in influencing Cheng’s and Wong’s decisions to step down: “a prominent businessman with major entertainment industry interests and triad links was responsible for the threats delivered to Albert Cheng and Raymond Wong Yuk-man…he told the hosts that he was passing on a message from a senior official in China’s State Security Bureau…this official was extremely unhappy about what the hosts were doing in their radio shows.”7 Spike also reported that even though the suspicion of triad involvement had been reported to authorities, no police investigation had taken place. Several other newspapers, including the South China Morning Post, later confirmed this story. These incidents indicate that there is a gradual and almost imperceptible erosion of freedom of expression in Hong Kong. Ching Cheong, East Asia Correspondent for the Straits Times, likened the erosion of freedom of expression in Hong Kong to the well-known analogy of the frog in boiling water. “There is a theory of the frog in boiling water. The frog can get used to water becoming hotter and hotter, until the final stage and then he dies. Core values do not collapse overnight – it becomes

Ibid, pg. 8

Ibid, pg. 9

Chan, Anson. “Trust Us.” Time Magazine 14 June 2004: 47.

“Revealed: How the Radio Hosts were Intimidated.” Spike Magazine 9-15 July 2004: 6-7.

eroded bit by bit until everybody realizes that everything is not right.”8 The resignations of the three popular radio hosts in the span of a few weeks was the ‘tip of the iceberg’ that caused people to start questioning their freedom of expression. This paper examines several factors that have caused this erosion of freedom of expression. It describes a ‘journalistic paradigm shift’ and the increased political involvement of the central government in Hong Kong affairs. It also shows how the growing concern over freedom of expression by the Hong Kong media and the role that the media has played in Hong Kong has drawn public attention to this erosion of freedom. Finally, it discusses how this perceived erosion of freedom of expression has formed a new identity amongst the Hong Kong people. A Journalistic Paradigm Shift In 1991, Joseph Chan of the Chinese University of Hong Kong described a journalistic paradigm in Hong Kong.9 He defined the term as “gestalt worldviews that inform the media as to what social facts to report (and what not to report) and how to interpret them.” 10 He classified Hong Kong newspapers into four categories: “ultra-rightist”, papers controlled by the Kuomintang Party (KMT), “rightist”, papers traditionally tilted towards the KMT and commercially owned, “centrist”, papers that were market-directed and with no party affiliation, and “ultra-leftist”, papers controlled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).11 Chan’s study showed that it was clear that the journalistic pattern was shifting towards a more pro-central government point of view. Chan described two power centers – the Xinhua News Agency, and the British colonial government. Xinhua’s emergence as a second power center had a significant impact on the press in Hong Kong: “Mainstream rightist papers’ historical allegiance to KMT is reduced and their historical antagonism towards China is softened…it is widely observed that these papers [Ming Pao, Sing Pao, Sing Tao, and the now-defunct Wah Kiu] have exercised considerable self-censorship in criticizing China partly out of fear of punishment, partly due to the success of Xinhua’s cooptation, and partly triggered by realism that

Ching Cheong. Personal. 20 July 2004.

Chan, Joseph and C.C. Lee. Mass Media and Political Transition: The Hong Kong Press

in China’s Orbit. New York: Guilford Press, 1991. 10

Chan, Joseph and C.C. Lee. Mass Media and Political Transition: The Hong Kong Press

in China’s Orbit. New York: Guilford Press, 1991, pg. i. 11

Ibid., pg. ii

necessitates to reality in order not to ‘rock the boat’.”12 Also, Chan’s study showed that there was a 17% increase amongst the centrist newspapers such as Ming Pao and Sing Pao citing Xinhua as the chief newsmaker, and a 14% increase amongst the ultra-leftist newspapers such as Ta Kung Pao and Wen Wei Pao.13 This clearly shows that even by 1991, six years before the handover, the erosion of freedom of expression was starting, and Xinhua was becoming the dominant power center in the Hong Kong media. The complete pattern shift was confirmed by a study done by students at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, who surveyed the content of news articles and editorials in 14 of Hong Kong’s daily newspapers from January 28th to March 8th, 2004 – the height of the patriotism debate. Their results showed that while all newspapers gave full support to the ‘one country, two systems’ principle, there were different views on the relationship between the central and Hong Kong government. With the exception of the Apple Daily, which gave wholehearted support to the Democratic Party, the other newspapers were either neutral or supportive of the pro-Beijing camp. The study found that 42.6% of all editorials were in support of the pro-Beijing camp, 27.8% were neutral, and 29.6% were supportive of the pro-democratic camp.14 This shows a reduction in the diversity of the newspapers and an erosion of freedom of expression because newspapers have become more afraid of antagonizing the central government and thus are choosing to take a more pro-Beijing stance in comparison to thirteen years ago when Joseph Chan conducted his study. Political Involvement of Beijing The increased political involvement of the central government in Hong Kong affairs has also resulted in the media becoming more ‘pro-Beijing’. For example, two groups of newspapers have formed since the handover in place of the old ‘left-center-right’ categorization: “newspapers can be classified as ‘pro-China’ or ‘pro-Hong Kong’.” 15 Through direct and indirect pressure, the central government officials influence what is said and done in Hong Kong affairs. 12

Ibid., pg. 21

Ibid., pg. 30

Hong Kong Journalists Association. Beijing Turns the Screws: Freedom of Expression under Attack,

2004 Annual Report. Hong Kong: Article 19 and Hong Kong Journalists Association, 2004, pg. 16 15

Chan, Joseph Man and Clement Y.K. So (2003). The Surrogate Democracy Function of the Media:

Citizens’ and Journalists’ Evaluations of Media Performance. In S.K. Lau and S.L Wong, et al. Indicators of Social Development: Hong Kong 2001. Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, the Chinese University of Hong Kong, pg. 255.

For example, Frank Ching, a Hong Kong-based political commentator, described in an editorial written on June 3rd, 2004, “No doubt, all [Cheng Shousan] meant to do was persuade Mr. Lee either not to continue with the radio phone-in program, Teacup in a Storm, or change his style. This is part of the mainland’s culture of high-pressure persuasion…this is commonly known as sixiang gongzuo, or ideological work, that is, an attempt to reform a person’s ideology.”16 This style of ‘high-pressure persuasion’ has manifested itself in many ways in Hong Kong, and not just with the resignations of the three radio hosts. Prior to the resignations, excrement was smeared on the door of pro-democratic legislator Emily Lau’s office, and another pro-democratic legislator, Frederick Fung, received an anonymous threat in the mail. The letter writer cited remarks made by a Hong Kong member of the SCNPC, Tsang Hin-chi. Tsang had earlier criticized Fung and other democrats such as Martin Lee and Szeto Wah. Such critical and inflammatory remarks made by members of the pro-Beijing camp will allow certain members of the public to justify violent acts against members of the pro-democracy camp and inevitably will deter people from expressing certain opinions. Enough of these remarks made over time, especially when the political situation is so tense, will erode the freedom of expression in Hong Kong. Another example of political interference in Hong Kong affairs that resulted in an erosion of freedom of expression has to do with the resignations of Albert Cheng and Wong Yuk-man. The involvement of a mainland official and the triads in the decision by Cheng and Wong to resign indicates an attempt by mainland officials to clamp down on freedom of expression in Hong Kong. Even though the comments made by Cheng and Wong in the past may have been highly controversial, the Hong Kong government should allow opinions to be broadcast so that there is wide political debate. Once again, this incident shows how political interference has led to a form of self-censorship. Indeed, the publisher of Spike Magazine, Stephen Vines, described how few newspapers decided to follow up on the story of the involvement of the businessman and triads for fear of being criticized. Vines described the Hong Kong media as being at a crossroads. “The Hong Kong media is torn between a desire to attract readers and the need to protect the source of the bulk of their revenue which comes from advertising…without exception these powerful advertisers are also strong supporters of the Chinese Government and like to be seen demonstrating their enthusiasm…”17 This is a frustrating compromise that journalists sometimes have to make. 16

Ching, Frank. “The Art of Persuasion, Beijing Style.” South China Morning Post 3 June 2004: EDT12.

Vines, Stephen. “The Bad Guys are Winning.” Spike Magazine 16-22 July 2004: 19.

When Albert Cheng announced that Commercial Radio had terminated his contract prematurely, he received no other offers from other radio stations, despite the fact that he was one of Hong Kong’s most popular commentators and would make a great deal of money for the company he signed with. If this truly were a society with a completely free media, Cheng should have been flooded with offers from every other media organization in Hong Kong, because of the significant publicity and profit he would bring to the station. This clearly indicates the nervousness of the media bosses in Hong Kong. If the Central Authorities becomes too involved in Hong Kong affairs, not only will this betray the ‘one country, two systems’ principle, but it will tarnish the privately-owned newspapers in Hong Kong as what is published is dictated more by what the advertisers want in order to maintain a good economic relationship with China and not what the public wants to hear. The Media as an Indicator The media’s voicing of concerns about the erosion of freedom of expression is a major reason why there is an increased perception of the erosion of freedom of expression in Hong Kong as a whole. The media plays a unique role in Hong Kong because Hong Kong doesn’t enjoy full democracy, the media becomes a ‘representative political institution’ in representing the public’s opinions, initiating public debate and becoming a forum for people to express their opinions. In Hong Kong, the media serves as an indicator of freedom of expression for the Hong Kong people. Thus, when the media raises concerns about the loss of freedom of expression, the public is likely to echo these concerns. In a study done by Joseph Chan and Clement So in 2002, 83% of people surveyed said that it was important for the media to “be the mouthpiece of the people”, and 78% also said it was important for the media to “improve communication between officials and citizens”.18 Chris Yeung wrote in an editorial shortly after Allen Lee resigned from his radio show, “[Hong Kong people] may have faced up to the cold reality of life in a so-called bird cage democracy since [Beijing ruled out direct polls in 2007/2008], but this series of radio talk-show departures will only serve to deepen people’s feelings of 18

Chan, Joseph Man and Clement Y.K. So (2003). The Surrogate Democracy Function of

the Media: Citizens’ and Journalists’ Evaluations of Media Performance. In S.K. Lau and S.L Wong, et al. Indicators of Social Development: Hong Kong 2001, pg. 262. Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, the Chinese University of Hong Kong.

helplessness in having a say on Hong Kong affairs.”19 Even though the radio shows had a certain degree of subjectivity, they were still a forum for public debate and criticism of political and social issues. While some may suggest that it will be better for the relationship between the Hong Kong and central government and the Hong Kong people to have calm and rational debate, it may actually lead to an even deeper polarization of society because people have grown accustomed to listening to the radio hosts being extremely critical and may feel that there is one less channel for them to air their grievances. The radio is also a much more powerful medium than the newspaper. As Lin Neumann, the editor for the Standard, puts it, “You got every taxi driver and minibus driver listening to Teacup in a Storm so a guy like Albert Cheng is a local celebrity. Radio is a very powerful medium – the radio guy is a part of your life, more so than the newspaper. When he says he’s been tossed off the air for political reasons, people are going to get freaked out.”20 An integral part of the radio shows is the involvement of the public who phone in and voice their opinions. When that channel is taken away or is perceived as being eroded, then obviously there will be an adverse reaction to it. This was especially true when Commercial Radio, the station that all three radio hosts worked for, announced that it would change its style from emotional appeal to that of rationality shortly after the resignations. Many people believed that by changing its confrontational style the traditionally anti-government station was narrowing the scope for broad political debate. The Formation of an Identity Through Frustration The Hong Kong Journalists Association put forth the recommendation in its 2004 Annual Report that the Hong Kong Government “strongly encourage the Central Government in Beijing to state unequivocally and publicly that it does not, and will not, tolerate actions by anyone on the mainland…that impinge on or threaten freedom of expression in the Hong Kong SAR, as guaranteed in the Basic Law.”21 However, the Hong Kong people are becoming increasingly frustrated with the Hong Kong government’s ability to present their opinion and views to the central government. A survey conducted by Civic Exchange and the Hong Kong Transition Project released 19

Yeung, Chris. “Silent Airwaves Deepen the Despair.” South China Morning Post 20 May 2004:

EDT3. 20

Lin Neumann. Personal. 23 July 2004.

Hong Kong Journalists Association. Beijing Turns the Screws: Freedom of Expression under Attack,

2004 Annual Report. Hong Kong: Article 19 and Hong Kong Journalists Association, 2004, pg. 4.

on August 4th, 2004 showed that many more people were dissatisfied with the performance of the Chief Executive in July 2004 than in August 2000.22 It is important for the Central Authorities and Hong Kong Government to understand that the Hong Kong people have their very own unique identity. Lin Neumann remarks, “I think the problem with the central government is that they want us to draw a line and say that on this side is economic freedom and that’s good, and on the other side is political freedom, and that’s limited, without harming the economic side of the equation. What the Hong Kong people are saying is that the two are linked.”23 With the growing dissatisfaction with the Hong Kong Government, the Hong Kong people are increasingly recognizing the need to assert their own views and fight for what they cherish the most. A new identity is forming – as Christine Loh describes, “a blend of multiple identities – a mixture of Chinese and western; Cantonese and other Chinese regional identities; individualistic and communal; Buddhist and Christian; capitalist and class conscious; and free versus constrained.”24 They want to feel that the government supports them, but “by continuing to tell a society clearly capable of managing universal suffrage that it is not mature enough, the government and its allies have driven ordinary people to develop their own ‘self help’ initiatives to challenge the status quo…the administration needs to recognize that continuing to deny the people what they want will only feed the movement.” 25 When the Hong Kong people perceive that their freedom of expression is being slowly eroded, they realize that a way for them to express their opinions is being taken away and they will react adversely to this. Conclusion The erosion of freedom of expression has occurred for several reasons. A journalistic pattern shift has occurred amongst most mainstream Hong Kong newspapers to become more pro-Beijing. The Xinhua News Agency has emerged as the leading newsmaker in Hong Kong and the new power center in the Hong Kong media. Along with the emergence of Xinhua, the Central Authorities, according to Frank Ching, believes it has “been too lax and [it feels the need] to tighten control over Hong Kong because ‘Hong Kong people running Hong Kong’ has not been to be 22

“Surveys on All Geographical Constituencies: Civic Exchange’s Analysis on Polling

Results.” Civic Exchange and Hong Kong Transition Project. Accessed 30 August 2004. <http://www.civic-exchange.org/publications/2004/CE0908E.doc> 23

Lin Neumann. Personal. 23 July 2004.

Loh, Christine. “Hong Kong’s Search for Identity.” South China Morning Post 24 June 2004: A15.

Loh, Christine. “Do-It-Yourself Reformers.” South China Morning Post 19 July 2004: A11.

successful. The Central Authorities has not gotten involved and Hong Kong people have botched things up.”26 Of course, Mr. Ching disagreed with this view. This increased involvement has caused the ‘one country, two systems’ principle to be blurred in recent years, and thus the freedom of expression enjoyed by the Hong Kong people has eroded. The recent concerns raised by the media over freedom of expression have caused the Hong Kong people, who use the media as an indicator, to echo the concerns. Because Hong Kong is not a full democracy, the media serves as a ‘representative political institution’ in promoting public debate and a channel for the public to voice their opinion. When this channel is taken away, the people will have no alternative but to react adversely and fight for their rights. This has led to the formation of a new identity of the Hong Kong people – one that values political freedom as much as economic freedom.

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Frank Ching. Personal. 16 July 2004.

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Yeung, Chris. “Silent Airwaves Deepen the Despair.” South China Morning Post 20 May 2004: EDT3. Yeung, Chris. “A Wild Card in Hong Kong Politics?” South China Morning Post 12 July 2004: EDT10.