Politics, the public and perceptions: James Tien and his ‘will to power’ Jane McMullen, Oxford University Summer Intern 2004
“… Some of these democrats are just too … extreme. I’d rather vote for a more moderate candidate, like that Liberal guy – James Tien. You know, someone who supports democracy, but isn’t a hardliner who will antagonise Beijing.”1
A marcher’s words encapsulate the ascendancy of James Tien into popular politics. The Liberal Party chairman and textiles tycoon has transformed his political image from an ‘oppressor of the masses’, opponent of democratic change on the grounds that it is ‘bad for business’, to the ‘saviour’ of the people against Article 23, a ‘moderate’ and popular politician providing what is perceived to be a genuine alternative to the more ‘extreme’ version of politics propounded by the democrats. And his transition has arguably been effective: in the September 2004 Legislative Council (LegCo) election he secured a victory in the geographical constituency New Territories East (NTE) which would probably have been unthinkable just sixteen months before. What is the nature of this shift and what are its implications for the Liberal Party and Hong Kong? Paradoxically, the collapse of the Article 23 legislation was a catalyst for this transformation. James Tien’s role in the events of July 2003 appears to be inadvertent and opportunistic: he maintained his support for the National Security Bill until it became evident that it was unfeasible in the face of staunch public opposition. After the Liberal Party’s request for the deferral of the second reading of the bill2 his surprise resignation from the Executive Council (ExCo) on 6 July 2003 proved to be instrumental in forcing the government to shelve the controversial National Security legislation. This was a dramatic gesture, which angered Beijing but generated a large amount of popular support in Hong Kong. Prior to July 2003, James Tien’s popularity ratings were low, yet this action turned him overnight into a hero and a ‘saviour’, albeit an apparently adventitious one, and subsequent opinion polls show a surge in popularity. On the back of this popular support the chances of success in a direct geographical election seemed more realistic. In the previous term all Liberal Party legislators had held functional constituencies seats and a move towards geographically elected seats would likely boost the party’s legitimacy and representation in LegCo. 3 It would also refute the argument often expounded that James Tien, and the Liberal Party with which he is synonymous, opposed the principle of universal suffrage. Yet running for direct election involved a gamble; certainly James Tien and his colleagues would not have wanted to follow the fate of Allen Lee, Tien’s popular predecessor as Liberal Party chairman, who chanced a geographical seat in the 1998 election only to lose it to Frontier legislator Cyd Ho. In the run-up to the nomination period in summer 2004 Tien emphasised that he would only run for direct election if he was certain of winning. Winning, then, perhaps with Lee’s defeat in mind, would necessitate broadening the appeal of the party, from one primarily of business interests to one which would encompass a wide range of social, 1
Marcher for democracy, 1 July 2004 cf ‘LP reiterates its request to defer the second reading of the National Security Bill’, 06.07.03, cit. www.liberal.org.hk 3 They would be able to offer new LP candidates to fill the seats of outgoing Liberal functional representatives; FC seats are not nearly as competitive as GCs and can even be uncontested eg Commercial I FC. 2
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economic and political concerns that would appeal to the broad electorate and not just to the business élite. This was announced in October 2003: a series of “…new initiatives to widen our public representation by recruiting new members, extending our services in the districts, and promoting our economic policy that would lead to a better quality of life.”4 Much of the narrative that follows illustrates his conveying to the electorate a broader spectrum of concerns after 2003, that are those of the electorate, rather than the narrower concerns of a functional constituency. Yet this transition has not escaped criticism from those who accuse Tien of being a politique and inconsistent rather than clearly principled. The natural conclusion to this argument is the implication that James Tien and the party have set their core convictions aside to pander to the electorate in the hope of gaining votes. This has wider implications for the future of Hong Kong politics. Others respond that this is an inevitable development as political parties in Hong Kong mature. Often it is the nature of politics, they contend, that platforms change over time and policies are re-evaluated, especially in response to changing realities. To analyse the truth of these respective arguments, the nature of the shift needs to be examined. Yet a number of factors make this analysis very challenging. Firstly, there is often inadequate evidence: James Tien, as both part-time tycoon and part-time lawmaker, and as a member of a party5, does not always speak at key LegCo debates. Moreover monitoring press releases and media interviews is an interminable task. Significantly, there is a lack of post-2003 debate material in key areas and this, in turn, makes analysis very difficult, especially in conjunction with insufficient coverage in the Englishlanguage media. Secondly, Tien’s LegCo speeches are often fairly cryptic and open to interpretation especially when relying on a translation which may inevitably lose some of the careful nuances of the original Cantonese. It is an aspect of his style as a politician that there are occasionally contradictory passages and vague statements; these have largely been ignored. Thirdly, as Tien himself remarked, “actions speak louder than words”6; yet such is the nature of Hong Kong’s present constitution that in terms of policy, there are few actions here to analyse. We must be content with merely the words and all the associated spin and ambiguity. Yet in doing so the temptation is to analyse the thoughts behind the words, a study which is prone to being ahistorical, wholly open to interpretation and perhaps irrelevant. Despite these setbacks, a tentative analysis can be made from an assessment of James Tien’s LegCo speeches and key press releases. An exhaustive summary might look at four key areas of concern: politics and the development of democracy, the economy, social and welfare concerns and finally business and investment. This would be an impossibly time-consuming task. Therefore what follows is a narrative solely of his position on democratic change, with mutually exclusive positions highlighted. It will examine his viewpoints on constitutional development, and the possible changes in his attitude towards universal suffrage and reform. Naturally this is not the whole picture. It omits the controversy over a public consultation, his relations with Beijing and the HKSAR Government and his attitude towards the Chief Executive, and his views over the relationship between the economy and political change. Indeed much of the criticism of ‘Tien Siu’ stems from his policies in the other, wide-ranging areas listed above. However it is hoped that what follows does indicate and discuss the provenance and justification of some of the criticism levelled at James Tien.
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LP, cit. www.liberal.org.hk Membership of a party is conducive to substantial delegation. JT would often leave LegCo debate of a key policy area to another party member which means he does not always comment personally on key areas. Nevertheless, given that he is chairman of the party, one must assume that anything considered ‘LP policy’ has JT’s prior consent. 6 JT, ‘Reviewing our city’, 03.06.03, in SCMP 5
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Constitutional development has always been a central concern in Hong Kong politics and was a primary determinant of voting behaviour in the 2004 LegCo election. This is an area where the ground itself is changing; a politician’s criteria, strategies and timeframes for change in 2004 are quite different to those of 1998 as new possibilities and constraints naturally come into being. Attitudes towards constitutional development also govern a politician’s relationship with the Central Authorities in Beijing; the scope for this has also changed significantly between 1998 and 2004, especially with the recent rapprochement between the Central Government and the Democratic Party in the summer 2004. The patterns are therefore complex and analysis must be based on general trends and will inevitably involve a large amount of conjecture. However, a number of factors lead to the conclusion that James Tien’s position over democracy and constitutional development has changed considerably in the last few years. Tien’s initial position is a conundrum. Prior to June 2003, the Liberal Party platform (with which Tien as chairman is inextricably linked) contained a pledge for the election of the chief executive by universal suffrage in 2007. Moreover, Tien himself promised in 2000 that he would work towards the entire Legislative Council to be directly elected in 2008. However, these seem fairly unrealistic pledges given many of Tien’s unenthusiastic comments in LegCo debates which repudiate the importance and likelihood of universal suffrage in the near future. This is encapsulated in a speech of July 2001 when he went as far as to say, “The Liberal Party certainly agrees with Mr [Martin] Lee that Hong Kong is bound to introduce [universal suffrage] sooner or later. But I simply do not agree that universal suffrage is indispensable to Hong Kong if it wishes to become a cosmopolitan city.”7 These speeches as a whole are the mark of a politician on the defensive and a reactionary; they appear to be more a series of vague, spontaneous and short-term responses than an indication of a clear-cut long-term strategy. The first outward acknowledgement that this outward acceptance of universal suffrage in 2007 did not sit well with the party’s pro-Beijing stance came in late June 2003. The Liberal Party announced that the party platform had been amended for a slower pace of democratic reform. They removed from the platform a pledge to support universal suffrage in 2007 held ever since the party’s inception in 1993. It was substituted by a clause which proposed that any alterations should be “in a gradual and orderly progress after giving due consideration to the interests of the different sectors in society and should be made in light of the actual situation in Hong Kong.”8 Tien argued that these changes were made to comply with requirements of the Basic Law and better reflected the political reality. He stated that the party still supported “the spirit of universal suffrage” but admitted that it was back-tracking over the pace of democratic reform. A closer realignment with the Basic Law gave the party a clearer policy line, and a line which avoided censure given that it was legally enforced. Yet the stance was still characteristically vague and open to interpretation. Moreover, the move laid the party exposed to criticism. None were more severe than from the founding chairman of the party Allen Lee, who contested that the party had 7
JT, Legislative Council Motion Debate on The Cosmopolitan City, 12.07.01, cit. http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr00-01/english/counmtg/hansard/010712fe.pdf pp.119-122 8 LP platform: “…As regards the section on constitutional development, the pledge to support a directly elected Chief Executive in 2007 and a fully elected LegCo in 2008 had been substituted by the line that any changes in constitutional development should be implemented in a gradual and orderly progress after giving due consideration to the interests of the different sectors in society and should be made in the light of the actual situation in Hong Kong. The latest platform was made to better comply with spirit of the Basic Law. LP Chairman James Tien said the original manifesto, drawn up in 1993 at the inception of the LP, should be updated on the constitutional development. The changes were only to better reflect the requirements of the Basic Law and the development of political parties in a new perspective.” ‘LP updates party platform’, 27.06.03, in www.liberal.org.hk, cit. various newspapers; cf. Ambrose Leung, ‘Liberals drop pledge over pace of reform’, 27.06.03, in SCMP
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been “manipulated by the government” and reduced to a “voting machine”. This shift can be seen as a cynical attempt bid to curry favour with Beijing at the expense of potential voters in Hong Kong, as Lee was swift to point out in his riposte on 27 June 2003. It is also significant that Tien was prepared to admit himself that he was backtracking; a move with potentially dire political consequences in Hong Kong if not outweighed by the advantages of allying himself closer with Beijing. The move and the subsequent admission left Tien in a politically weak position. Tien’s next move had the opposite effect. He had spend months supporting with only minor reservations the government’s proposed Article 23 legislation, arguing that in the course of Hong Kong’s political development it was now “the right time for the HKSAR Government to do what is legally required of it, namely to enact laws …to protect the fundamental interests of the state and protect national security.”9 Then, following the mass protest of July 1 2003, Tien’s surprise resignation from ExCo on 6 July 2003 was instrumental in the demise of the legislation. While he reaffirmed his support for the legislation, he argued that “more time is still needed for the community to fully understand the Bill.”10 This was a gesture which openly challenged the interests of Beijing. In terms of constitutional development it represents a shift away from Beijing’s desired course towards a much more popular one. Perhaps it can be viewed as a bid to redeem himself with the electorate in view of his perceived weakness after the platform admission. If so, it certainly had the intended effect: his action won a good deal of popular support. It was a dramatic shift and a dramatic gesture. He was hailed as a hero for forcing the government to shelve the legislation. Yet his action also drew its fair share of critics. Many saw his volte-face as a politique move, inconsistent, opportunistic and insincere. They found his overnight change of heart over the legislation unconvincing. In his defence, Tien’s gesture was generous and may have been without alternative. But it is difficult to view it as a sincere change of heart. It was an awakening to a changed political reality in the aftermath of the mass protest on July 1 2003, a reality in which Tien’s previous position was untenable and politically damaging. The final analysis must point to a serious inconsistency, which allowed a complete about turn in Tien’s policy. It does not strike me as a particularly astute or calculated move either, rather a politique move in keeping with his short-sighted political goals or even a gamble at reverse gear to engineer himself out of a scrape. Whatever his motives were, the outcome enabled Tien to successfully re-emerge as a political star. He capitalised on his sudden popularity with a new manifesto and eventually, with two successful campaigns in geographical constituencies fourteen months later. Tien’s post-Article 23 stance on democratic development has not undergone any radical shifts. He reiterated in February 2004 that constitutional development “must comply with the provisions in the Basic Law” and that “all decisions on constitutional development must be premised on the maintenance of our economic prosperity and social stability.” This is characteristically vague and is open to distortion, but does not appear to reflect a departure from the previous line of June 2003. Interestingly, Tien offered some clarification when he added, “I want to reiterate here once again. In putting forward the principle of gradual and orderly progress, we, contrary to the criticism levelled by some, are not seeking to delay or temporize. The Liberal Party does not oppose universal suffrage. The point is that constitutional review is a major issue. We think that there must be careful consideration and that it is not advisable to make a hasty decision.” Tien continued to argue that the business sector (which he represented as legislator for the Commercial
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JT, ‘The Right Time and the Right Law’, 21.12.02, SCMP LP press release, ‘LP reiterates its request to defer the second reading of the National Security Bill’, 06.07.03, cit. www.liberal.org.hk
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I FC) had voiced to him certain reservations about reaching universal suffrage “in one step”.11 He expressed a similar opinion in his reaction to the NPCSC Interpretation of the BL in March 2004, when he stated that “undoubtedly, there is a strong voice among the people of Hong Kong demanding universal suffrage for electing the chief executive in 2007 and the entire legislature in 2008. However, there is also a substantial proportion of the population which has reservations.” He highlighted the need to “maintain prosperity and social stability” and for changes to be “rational, practicable and in accordance with the Basic Law” and above all, cautious. Moreover he repeated his argument that he believed that many people had “reservations about introducing universal suffrage in 2007 and 2008 in one step.”12 In the run-up to the election (broadly March/April to September), Tien submitted some concrete and detailed proposals about constitutional reform. These policies include a timeframe for universal suffrage 13 and the expansion of the size and representativeness of the Election Committee and LegCo.14 The general thrust of his arguments seems to be that universal suffrage as a long-term goal is not disadvantageous but that it is not possible in 2007: “The conditions are not ripe for direct polls in 2007… Giving a timetable may be a good idea. Like doing business, it is important to have a business plan so we can work towards the target.” He also maintained that he did not support the abolition of all functional constituency seats by 2012. “Many of us are worried about the total abolition of those seats in one go.”15 These policies are consistent with his general line since 2003 but do appear to have a different tone and approach; they are more definite and tangible than previously, perhaps a natural development ahead of an election. It is also interesting that in his statements he emphasised his role as the representative of the business community as a whole much more than previously. That his stance is seen to be a representation of his constituents is certainly legitimising for him. Emphasising his ability to represent the interests of his constituents would also certainly be a boost as he prepared to stand for direct election. In a similar speech he stated, “It's a misunderstanding that the business sector is against direct elections. We support gradual and orderly change. If people like me win in direct elections, the business community will feel less worried. … We hope that our success ... will help pull society to the middle.”16 This is an indication of the new role which Tien has set out for the party: at this state he began to publicise the remoulding the party in to a “middle-of-the-road force”17. He emphasised the middle ground role he envisaged for his party during the new LegCo term: 11
JT: “… Many from the small and medium enterprises, middle class, professionals, and industrial and business sectors are not in favour of scrapping all the functional constituencies in 2008, which indicates that those in the industrial and business sectors and members of the middle class do have some reservations about conducting universal suffrage with the aim of reaching the goal in one step.” JT, LegCo Debate on Motion of Thanks, 06.02.04, Hansard, cit. www.legco.gov.hk/ 12 JT, ‘Time to build a broad consensus’, 28.04.04, in SCMP 13 JT: “We can have it by 2012 at the earliest or 2017 at the latest, but of course according to the practical situation. This will provide enough time to develop political talent.” cit. Matthew Lee, ‘Democrat slams travesty’, 12.05.04, in The Standard 14 “Liberal Party chairman James Tien Pei-chun proposed expanding the committee from 800 to between 1,200 and 1,600 members. He added that the committee's electoral base should be widened to make it more representative. Mr Tien said his party would propose electing the chief executive by universal suffrage in 2012 or 2017. “I think the people of Hong Kong will be disappointed if we are not given a timetable. We can't keep asking the people to wait aimlessly,” he said. Mr Tien said his party also wanted to increase the number of functional constituency and geographical constituency seats to be contested in the 2008 Legislative Council election from 60 to 70. The seats would be split evenly between the two constituencies.” Gary Cheung and Chloe Lai, ‘Parties call for larger Election Committee’, 12.05.04, SCMP 15 JT; cit. Chris Yeung, ‘Searching for poll position’, 11.06.04, SCMP 16 JT; in Chris Yeung, ‘Searching for poll position’, 11.06.04, SCMP 17 JT; in Chris Yeung, ‘Searching for poll position’, 11.06.04, SCMP
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“Unlike the Democrats and the [DAB], we will not oppose government policies for the sake of opposition.” This is a position that naturally lends itself to mediating between the different ends of the political spectrum. To this end, Tien has in recent months shown a commitment to act as a mediator between the Democratic Party and the HKSAR Government and with the Central Government. He has pledged to play a role in facilitating reconciliation between the two sides. In late June he wrote, “Suspicion and mistrust built up by the events of recent decades will not dissolve overnight. But if the baggage of history is laid aside, discussions can begin without preconditions. … The Liberal Party will be happy to step in if there is anything we can do to help. For that purpose, I will table a motion on July 7 urging the government to assist communications between Beijing and the democrats, for the sake of the city's long-term prosperity and stability. The motion also seeks help in obtaining home re-entry permits for long-barred democrats, so they can cross the border to see for themselves the economic, social and political development that has taken place in the mainland.”18 Tien also sent a delegation to Beijing on 29 June to lobby state officials over the issues of home return permits for the democrats; he later urged the Chief Executive Tung Chee-Hwa to reform ExCo after the legislative elections, arguing that the appointment of leaders of all the key parties, including the democrats, would smooth governance and enhance communication with the pro-democracy alliance. Dismissing claims that the presence of democrats in ExCo would undermine its operation, he stated, “I don't see why three parties could not come to terms. I think the democrats need not always play the role of opposition.”19 This role as a mediator has significant consequences. It allows him to highlight the perceived radicalism of the Democratic Party and to capitalise accordingly: his re-emergence in the centre enabled him to win over fringe voters. The very fact that he IS a mediator allows him to claim he is in the middle ground. Yet in communicating with the democratic camp in this way he is also departing from his previous hostility towards them. It is clear from his early speeches in LegCo that Tien’s attitude towards the democrats was openly antagonistic. Evidently this appears to have changed a great deal. This new position does not represent a contradiction to previous policy but it does symbolise a new phase. Perhaps it is more a question of different nuances and fine-tuning than a policy shift. Tien appears at this stage far more involved politically, not merely with the grassroots but with other political parties; his statements seem clearer and more specific and his actions more reasonable and main-stream. It seems unlikely that Tien would have acted thus even sixteen months ago, especially in playing such a direct mediating role. His statements are addressed to the electorate and seem to represent a radical departure from earlier ones. This is the position in which James Tien successfully fought the election for the NTE constituency on 12 September 2004.
It is clear from this narrative that James Tien’s public position over constitutional reform has undergone a series of changes. Initially the change was an outward alteration to the platform over the timeframe for constitutional reform. Coupled with the volte-face over Article 23 and the recent change in tone, this has earned him condemnation as hypocritical, insincere and inconsistent. The criticism has ranged from the mild and constructive to the explosive and outspoken. Illustrative of the latter is an attack from fellow NTE candidates activist Leung “Long-hair” Kwok-hung and Frontier legislator Emily Lau at an election forum on 17 August 2004. Leung accused the Liberal Party of “always ma[king] turnarounds whenever they can 18 19
JT, 29.06.04, ‘In search of a common destiny’, SCMP JT, 27.06.04; in Jimmy Cheung, ‘Call to put democrats in Cabinet’, 28.06.04, SCMP
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benefit from it”, while Lau commented of Tien that “in politics, consistency, integrity, honesty, openness is important. People should differentiate us [the pro-democracy alliance] from people who keep twisting and turning. We don’t know which way they are going to turn next time.”20 Naturally it is important to remember that criticism of their opponent was in the interest of these two candidates as they competed with Tien in a tough election. However when compared with the staunch and unwavering policies of these two democrats it is hard not to see the grounding in their accusations of the Liberal Party chief. In contrast to these democrats, Tien seems outwardly to waver considerably in his positions over democratic reform. Moreover, his defensiveness and vagueness do not do him any favours, especially in comparison with Lau’s directness and lucidity and Leung’s clear sense of purpose. So how crucially does he waver? To bring this discussion to a definite and specific conclusion is in fact very difficult. The evidence provided by the preceding narrative can be read in one of several ways. However my sense of it is that the alterations in stance are indeed inconsistent. The change of position outlined in the policy platform in June 2003 constitutes reneging on a previous commitment: the policies of the latter platform are incompatible with those of the former. Similarly, the U-turn over the Article 23 legislation symbolises a complete and sudden break with Tien’s earlier policies. This too is an inconsistent action. Lastly, the general reorientation of the party towards a more involved, mediating role is along lines that are inconsistent with previous behaviour, although it does not constitute a complete turnaround in stance. Therefore, a measure of the criticism of Leung and Lau is vindicated. However there are some aspects of his policies which have stayed the same. It is possible to identify a continual mistrust of universal suffrage which, although tempered in recent months with more moderate language, is a running theme throughout his years as a legislator. He reiterates time and time again the need to preserve economic stability at all costs, claiming even recently that there could be economic repercussions if democracy comes too fast for Hong Kong. He also warns repeatedly even in 2004 that “universal suffrage should not be mistaken as the panacea for all the political problems we have faced”21, drawing recently on the argument that many democratic countries such as Indonesia face immense economic hardship22. Perhaps in spite of his apparent outward changes, Tien has not changed his personal view on democracy. He appears underneath to be a reactionary, content with the status quo; afterall the status quo rewards him significantly as a member of the political and economic elite. Perhaps he inadvertently acknowledged the reason for this when he said that “… any party with vested interests will look at reforms from a negative angle.”23 Naturally, a party with ‘vested interests’ has the most to lose from reform. Therefore, a shift towards the grassroots is necessary, if the Liberal Party is to continue to enjoy its political pre-eminence. Tien’s recent shift appears to be a guise of moderation in a cynical attempt to win votes. It is therefore more that the gloss, rather than the substance, has changed. This is because in seeking to meet the demands of a much larger and more disparate electorate he has had to refashion the party image. Therefore it is possible to read in his character an underlying ability to identify political advantage and to react accordingly. His actions show the mark of a politique. In the light of this analysis it is impossible to view his actions and policies as sincere.
20
Leung Kwok-hung and Emily Lau, 17.08.04; in Cannix Yau, ‘Tien comes under fire’, 18.08.04, The Standard 21 JT, ‘Time to build a broad consensus’, 28.04.04, in SCMP 22 cf Cannix Yau, ‘Tien comes under fire’, 18.08.04, in The Standard 23 JT, Legislative Council Motion Debate on Civil Service Reform, 09.06.99 cit. www.liberal.org.hk/
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The implications of Tien’s election success are wide-reaching for politics in Hong Kong. The first are for the short-term. If James Tien is called upon to act as a mediating force between the prodemocracy alliance and the government this may have benefits for the governance of Hong Kong. If his proposal to put members of the democratic camp into ExCo is accepted by the government, this result cannot fail to have positive effects on the relationship between the executive and the legislature. However, as a politician guided by the people, there is technically no limit to him changing his stance again should his present position become unpopular. There is no check against possible inconsistencies in the future other than him not wishing to lose face with the electorate. This may have some implications on political stability in Hong Kong. The second, less immediate, implication is for the future of political parties. By shifting towards a broader set of popular concerns Tien acknowledges that the future of political success in Hong Kong, as it moves towards a more democratic system, lies with aligning the parties with the people. This indicates how political parties are maturing: many are moving away from being mere interest groups with a narrow range of concerns, and are developing a broader base of social, economic and political stances and competing for the votes of the people. While this is generally conducive to assuming political power, it is presently inconceivable in Hong Kong’s current constitutional structure. It is likely that as political parties of various persuasions develop, they will want to call for changes in the constitution that allow for an actual share of government. Moreover, Tien’s tacit acknowledgment raises questions about the future of the functional constituencies. While Tien is anxious to keep them at least for the present (and indeed since all bar one of his colleagues in the Liberal Party owe their present legislative seats to them), his gesture shows that in the longer term success in the geographical constituencies is far more important to the party and to the legitimacy of their representation in the legislature. The functional constituencies, therefore, do not have a permanent future in a democratic Hong Kong. Another major ramification is that it demonstrates that success in politics is often about presentation; that a politician has the potential to win an election on the basis of a public perception that could be far removed from the reality. James Tien has rebranded his image as a popular politician in such a way that it precludes certain aspects of his present and former positions that might be unpalatable to the electorate. This demonstrates the importance of personalities and image, of self-presentation and style. Tien has a strong image; in the run-up to the 2004 election he ran a media campaign to refashion himself as a grassroots politician. And judging from his electoral victory, the campaign has been convincing. Yet close perusal of his LegCo speeches in key areas over a number of years presents a picture of Tien that is quite disparate to the popular image of him. It is this which made the comment cited at the beginning so startling to me. The pre-eminence of personalities and image over substance is not a new phenomenon. It has always been the case that people will vote for the faces they recognise and the words they want to hear. However it is continually surprising to me that Tien has been able to convince a substantial proportion of the electorate of his sincerity and plausibility as a grassroots politician given the seismic shifts in his stance over the last few years and the apparent insincerity of his present position. This also highlights the implications of a potential shift from politicians motivated by true convictions towards those motivated by self-interest. Again, there have always been selfinterested politicians. However the emergence of political figures and parties who are prepared to change their stances and demands in order to court votes could mark a new phase in Hong Kong, perhaps the inevitable result of the gradual increase in directly elected seats. Tien has broadened the appeal of the party to the grassroots in order to pander to the electorate; he was perceived to act in the interest of the electorate while he courted votes for his own ends. If this does indeed
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mark a general shift in the nature of Hong Kong politics, it has major ramifications. It encourages politicians who are prepared to serve the people and grant the majority its wishes. This has its advantages as long as the politicians are reasonable and the majority principled. Indeed it could have positive effects on the democratic development of Hong Kong as long as this remains the wishes of the majority of the population. Yet the consequences could be equally damaging if the majority proved to be unscrupulous. However this general trend is kept in check by the continual emergence of politicians who act on genuine convictions even when they are not shared by the majority of the electorate.
Bibliography Legislative Council Motion Debates, 1998-2004, at Hansard online, www.legco.gov.hk Liberal Party website, www.liberal.org.hk [a number of press releases, the platform, key speeches; including LP Manifesto (2003); ‘LP reiterates its request to defer the second reading of the National Security Bill’ 06.07.03; ‘LP updates party platform’, 27.06.03] Cannix Yau, ‘Tien comes under fire’, 18.08.04, The Standard Cannix Yau, ‘Liberals to reach out beyond business’, 05.08.04, The Standard James Tien, ‘In search of a common destiny’, 29.06.04, SCMP Jimmy Cheung, ‘Call to put democrats in Cabinet’, 28.06.04, SCMP Klaudia Lee, ‘Liberal go-between heading to Beijing’,27.06.04, SCMP Teddy Ng, ‘Rivals showing sincerity, says Tien’, 21.06.04, The Standard Klaudia Lee, ‘Liberals chief gives big hint the party will contest direct polls’, 18.06.04, SCMP Chris Yeung, ‘Searching for poll position’, 11.06.04, SCMP Klaudia Lee, ‘Election strategy? The writing is on the wall’, 07.06.04, SCMP Gary Cheung and Chloe Lai, ‘Parties call for larger Election Committee’, 12.05.04, SCMP Matthew Lee, ‘Democrat slams travesty’, 12.05.04, The Standard James Tien, ‘Time to build a broad consensus’, 28.04.04, SCMP Michael Ng and Matthew Lee, ‘Yeung fury at ‘blow to freedoms’’, 27.04.04, The Standard Teddy Ng, ‘Protests won’t help, says Tien’, 05.04.04 Gary Cheung, Klaudia Lee, Carrie Chan, ‘Review is ‘major blow to self-rule’’, 27.03.04, SCMP Gary Cheung and Ambrose Leung, ‘Liberal party manipulated, says founder: Allen Lee says it has been reduced to a ‘voting machine’,’ 28.06.03, SCMP Ambrose Leung, ‘Liberals drop pledge over pace of reform’, 27.06.03, SCMP James Tien, ‘Reviewing our city’, 03.06.03, SCMP
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James Tien, ‘The Right Time and the Right Law’, 21.12.02, SCMP (abridged) James Tien, ‘Changes Mean A Better Way To Run Hong Kong’, 02.07.02, SCMP (abridged)
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