Abstract: by Civic Exchange

Moving Forward with Political Reform: A Window of Opportunity for Hong Kong and China Trisha Kingsbury, Boston University Civic Exchange Internship Program 2004 Abstract: The goal of this paper is to illustrate why the current setting provides both the stimulus and opportunity for change in the political landscape of China, with Hong Kong providing the grounds for experimentation. It seeks to identify what work must be done by the key players in this undertaking. The key players include the newly elected legislators, the pro-democracy camp, the new leadership in Beijing, and the Hong Kong community and media. Finally, it acknowledges the challenges that will face this optimistic goal. Introduction The current situation presents a window of opportunity for the people of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) to capitalize on the warming relations with the Chinese leadership in Beijing, 1 and perhaps illustrate the benefits that political reform could provide for both the HKSAR and the Mainland. What are the components of the current situation that have given rise to this opportunity? China is feeling more secure with its international image than it has in recent history. The Chinese Olympic team was highly successful at Athens in 2004 and has much to look forward to when in 2008 they will be competing on their own turf in Beijing. The growth of the economy continues and China was invited to participate in talks with the Group of Seven. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has just celebrated its 55th anniversary, and has successfully overseen the first peaceful and orderly transition of power in its history. Jiang Zemin officially relinquished his last position of power as chairman for the Central Military Commission to Hu Jintao,2 who appears willing to take some bold initiatives in order to improve the CCP’s ability to govern China as a ruling party. Furthermore, the HKSAR held the most democratically advanced Legislative Council (LegCo) elections thus far in September 2004, producing a valuable plurality of voices and personalities in the legislature. The elections have brought to the legislature a group of lawmakers that is not dominated by one political camp, either pro-democracy or pro-Beijing. Instead, this body consists of many independents and moderates that could usher in the winds of change for Hong Kong politics. The cards have aligned in such a way that the next few years could witness very interesting changes in the political landscape of China, with Hong Kong continuing to act as an important testing ground. 1

The Chinese leadership is the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and is referred to as the “central government” and “Beijing” as well in this paper. 2 Jiang consolidated his own position of power as the core of the Third Generation of Leaders after Deng Xiaoping died in 1997. Hu Jintao is now referred to as the core of the Fourth Generation of Leaders and he holds the positions of general secretary of the CCP, president of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and chairman of the Central Military Commission.

This paper will illustrate the evolution of the political structure in both Hong Kong and China, and identify the similarities and differences in cultural attitudes, societal demands and historical context between the two which influence their interactions today. By understanding the steps that have led to the present situation, it is possible to recognize the most productive steps for the future which will enable a stable and rational progression towards greater democratization. The most important way forward for political reform involves open dialogue and rational decision-making on the part of all actors involved, including the leadership in Beijing, the newly elected legislators in Hong Kong, as well as the government and the people in Hong Kong. Where the rule of law is still protected, the media still operates freely and critically and mass mobilization has proven both possible and effective on numerous occasions, 3 every person in Hong Kong can play a role in developing the future political system. Perhaps soon we will see this kind of participation taking place in China as well, as more and more Mainland visitors experience a different way of life in Hong Kong. Hong Kong has an opportunity today to show China the benefits of this way of life and encourage political reform. Hong Kong’s Political History On September 12th 2004 the third Legislative Council elections took place in the HKSAR since its establishment in 1997. Half the legislature, or 30 members, was returned by direct elections, voter turnout was high and the newly elected body of lawmakers vary tremendously in political affiliations, personality, and agenda. It was an important step for Hong Kong as this year’s election was the last one which has been prearranged in the Basic Law and now stands as the most democratically advanced. However, now the issue at hand is what to do in the 2008 elections. Beijing has ruled out full universal suffrage, but clearly political reform should take place before that time in order to provide the most useful, representative, and appropriate electoral structure for that election. Before positing any recommendations, it is necessary to review Hong Kong’s own political history, as a colonial entity under the British crown and a separate but influential city within China. Furthermore, understanding the operation of the HKSAR in the last seven years will make it more obvious as to why Hong Kong’s current political situation could contribute valuably to the evolution of political reform in China. British Colonial Rule: Inducing Political Apathy? During British colonial rule, three important factors acted as constraints on any democratic advances in Hong Kong, even in the second half of the twentieth century when the British were beginning to actively promote decolonization in most of the rest of its empire.4 First, the Chinese empire to the north from which the British extracted this prosperous trading port was never discreet in its opposition to the British presence or any advances made towards more representative and democratic

Since July 1st 2003 when half a million people turned out to protest against the government’s attempt to pass strict national security legislation, Hong Kong has gained a reputation for its ability to mobilize the masses in order to express public discontent. Similar rallies were also held on January 1st and July 1st 2004. 4 Christine Loh, Government and Business Alliance: Hong Kong’s Functional Constituencies, (Civic Exchange, August 2004), 10-11.

governance in Hong Kong.5 It seemed unlikely at the time that the British Crown would not have the power in the future to resist a demand for the reinstatement of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty. However, the Convention of 1898 which only leased the remainder of Kowloon and the New Territories to the British for 99 years paved the way for the Chinese to reacquire both the nation’s dignity and a thriving city on a southern peninsula of the Mainland. 6 The timing of Deng Xiaoping’s economic reform initiatives in the late 1970s and British recognition of the approaching 1997 deadline set into effect a complex debate over what Hong Kong’s political system would look like at the time of the handover. At that time Hong Kong played only a secondary role in deciding its future as the British tried to negotiate a more democratized system. The second factor that limited a strong democratic drive in the British colony was the ability of the colonial government to absorb Hong Kong’s big business elites into the governmental structure as “unofficial members” of the Executive Council (ExCo) and LegCo. The appointment of local Chinese businessmen helped to enhance the colonial administration’s legitimacy, give the native population a sense of inclusion and representation in the governance of the territory, and placate potential adversaries among the more powerful members of the Chinese elite. The only failure of the system was that the local population in fact still had no voice within the government, and where social reforms were needed, their supposed ‘representatives’ were often against them. Therefore, the British administration ended up playing referee between ordinary Hong Kong people and the elite unofficial members in ExCo and LegCo. In order to explain the societal imbalance, the colonial administration created the myth of the “apolitical” people of Hong Kong. Rather than admitting that the appointed elites did not represent public interest, the British chose to portray the locals as uninterested in politics.7 Despite the fabrication, the British were able to convince both the outside world and even most of Hong Kong’s residents that this was in fact an accurate depiction of Hong Kong life until very recently. The third constraining factor on democratic aspirations in Hong Kong explains how this image was sustained: while democratic revolutions were making waves around the rest of the world, Hong Kong was enjoying high standards of living, fast socio-economic development, broad civil liberties, and a government which provided benign leadership and practiced the rule of law. Furthermore, while the government practiced a hands-off approach to the economy and allowed big businesses to get very rich on their own, a more hands-on approach in building up physical infrastructure and making everyday life for the entire community more comfortable allowed for a general acceptance of British rule in the territory. The lack of democracy was hardly a concern when there was money to be made and high standards of living to be enjoyed.8 Furthermore, Hong Kong society

Ming Sing, Hong Kong’s Tortuous Democratization: A Comparative Analysis (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), 31-42. 6 Mark Roberti, The Fall of Hong Kong: China’s Triumph and Britain’s Betrayal (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1994), Preface: ix-xv. 7 Loh, Government and Business Alliance, 12-13. See tax reform example. 8 Ibid., 16.

was free from some of the more drastic ethnic cleavages that existed in many other former colonies and areas of the world where democracy has taken root more firmly.9 Taken all together, the above reasons largely explain why much of the thrust for Hong Kong’s democratic transition in late twentieth century did not stem from its colonial subjects, already content with their prosperous and free lives in a stable society. Instead it was the colonial administration which began to realize the importance of safeguarding the colony’s way of life once it was inevitably handed back to its communist motherland.10 The Chinese Leadership’s Involvement: Keeping Democracy at Bay The CCP made the deliberate and important choice in the late 1970s that China’s modernization program involved economic liberalization and not political reform. The CCP viewed its monopoly over power as the most important way to maintain stability on the Mainland, though it recognized that opening up its markets and breaking down the planned economy were also imperative. Therefore, as the CCP began negotiating with the British over Hong Kong’s return, it was of no mind to acquire a fully democratized city operating within its tightly controlled state.11 In addition, the Chinese leadership was constantly paranoid that the British authorities were hoping to undermine the Party and orchestrate its downfall by using Hong Kong as a base of subversion. Therefore, the CCP set out to mobilize public opinion in Hong Kong against rapid democratization by co-opting important organizations, leaders, and elite in the community. The Chinese leadership has in fact proven adept at forging a strong and unlikely alliance with the most powerful and richest Hong Kong capitalist elite. Like the British appointments of unofficial members to ExCo and LegCo, the CCP has reached out to the same social strata with appointments to various bodies that interact with the Chinese government.12 Indeed, having always enjoyed privileged access to the governing structure of Hong Kong, the capitalist elite were in no rush to change the status quo and instill democratic values on the local population. The opening up of the Chinese economy increased elite cooperation with the Chinese government because it ensured greater access and influence within the vast Chinese markets.13 By keeping this powerful group divided from the rest of Hong Kong society, the Chinese leadership was able to keep a lid on any radical advances or threatening calls for democracy from the colony that was soon to back be in its possession. The CCP faced a massive stumbling block, however, when protests broke out and international confidence in the PRC nose-dived following the crackdown of the 9

The successful transition to democracy in Taiwan might be viewed as a model for Hong Kong because both are Chinese territories and enjoyed similar economic growth. However, the Kuomingtang in Taiwan were persuaded to democratize in part due to ethnic tensions between the Mainland elite in the ruling party and the indigenous Taiwanese who suffered under political domination. It was an important element that is missing in Hong Kong society. Ming Sing, 209-211. 10 Ibid., 191-223. 11 Ibid, 204. 12 Some examples include the Basic Law Drafting and Consultative Committees, the Preliminary Working Committee, the Preparatory and Selection Committees and the Provisional Legislature which was established immediately after handover to replace a more democratic and representative legislature created out of the drastic reforms initiated by Hong Kong’s last governor Christopher Patten. 13 Loh, Government and Business Alliance, 18.

student demonstrations in Tiananmen Square in the summer of 1989. The reaction from Hong Kong testifies to the theory that “brutal acts under authoritarian rule reinforce people’s determination to democratize in order to safeguard their human rights.” 14 For Hong Kong, the majority has often chosen not to support direct confrontation with Beijing, and instead placed high priority on stability and prosperity. This rationale undermined the desire for an elected government. However, the Tiananmen incident rallied a far greater proportion of the population behind the prodemocracy figures within Hong Kong society who insisted that democratization should take priority even if it triggers conflict with the Chinese leadership. It also inspired the departing colonial authorities to step up the level of democratic reform in the territory, whereas the capitalist elite were coaxed back to the Chinese side in the 1990s as the economy on the Mainland began to grow with increasing rapidity. However, the wedge was driven in deeply between Beijing and the Hong Kong democrats, who garnered greater support from the people of Hong Kong that wished to see faster democratization in order to safeguard their human rights. Members of the pro-democracy camp in Hong Kong were openly critical of the CCP and its actions in 1989. They have continued to the present to oppose the Chinese leadership on certain policies and actively promote democratic reforms in Hong Kong. The democrats are threatening to the CCP because it is often their opposition to Beijing which awards them strong public backing. By definition, opposition is not allowed on the Mainland where one-party rule remains in place, yet it is exactly this system of governance that the democrats distrust, particularly when it leads to events like the crackdown at Tiananmen Square. In order to break down the barriers of this mutual distrust, communication, understanding and cooperation is paramount. Unfortunately, the current Chief Executive of Hong Kong has yet to be able to promote productive dialogue thus far, further obstructing political reforms in Hong Kong. Tung Chee-hwa and the One County, Two Systems Model: The Hong Kong political system that grew out of all these anomalies and complexities has been in operation for seven years under the leadership of Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa. Under the system, the People’s Republic of China exercises complete sovereignty over Hong Kong, ensuring that there is only ‘one county.’ Yet Hong Kong is supposedly allowed a high degree of autonomy to maintain its capitalist system and way of life, with Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong, thereby establishing ‘two systems.’ The problem is that Tung was “selected” in 1997 by a Selection Committee made up of members appointed by the Central People’s Government who enjoyed close relations with Beijing and mostly came from the wealthy business class in Hong Kong. Tung himself is a former shipping tycoon who has always had close ties to Beijing. He is plagued by suspicions of cronyism and favoring private interests and has virtually lost all credibility among the people of Hong Kong. Tung is supposed to represent the HKSAR, but he is held accountable to the Central People’s Government as well.15 Instead of successfully acting as a buffer between the people of Hong Kong, including those who promote democratic reform, and the 14

Ming Sing, 219. Article 43 of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China.

Chinese leadership, the Tung Administration has demonstrated its inability to govern effectively: “The long litany of blunders (from housing to national security to public health to post-SARS events management) has only reinforced in the public’s mind that the system itself needs a major revamp.”16 The effect of this has been that the people of Hong Kong have begun taking more interest in politics and how to enhance the governing capabilities of their government. The issue came to a head on the 1st of July 2003 when half a million people took to the streets in Hong Kong to protest against the government’s plans to enact controversial national security legislation under Article 23 of the Basic Law. This massive outpouring of public sentiment shocked both the government in Hong Kong as well as Beijing. The July 1st protest marked an important change in Hong Kong/Mainland relations. Beijing had been willing to back the Tung Administration in order to maintain a positive image of ‘one country, two systems,’ but more recent events have begun to illuminate how much control Beijing actually possesses over Hong Kong affairs. In the spring of 2004 the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (SCNCP) issued a preemptive interpretation of the Basic Law which proclaimed that the 2007 election for the Chief Executive and the 2008 LegCo elections would not be returned through universal suffrage, and that the ratio between the members of the legislature returned by direct elections and functional constituencies would remain 50:50. 17 The interpretation shed light on the diminishing trust in the Tung Administration and also undermined the main feature of pro-democracy camp’s platform before the campaigning began for the 2004 LegCo elections. Having declared that they backed full universal suffrage in the next round of elections, suddenly the democrats were left with little room to maneuver. They faced the potential challenge that the public would be persuaded that the introduction of universal suffrage in 2007/08 would be impossible in the face of Beijing opposition. The Tung Administration has been reduced to a lame duck, and the divide within Hong Kong society has caused political tensions, with the democracy camp and public opinion rallying behind more rapid constitutional reform, and the pro-Beijing and capitalist elite supporting the SCNPC decision. On July 1st 2004 huge numbers of demonstrators again poured onto the street to express their discontent with the political situation in Hong Kong. The Tung Administration’s debilitation coupled with these mass demonstrations have brought into play a new dynamic between Beijing and Hong Kong in which the Central People’s Government has begun to interact directly with the people of Hong Kong, and vice versa.18 By looking closely at the recent LegCo elections, the build up, the outcome, and the initiatives that have been taken since, it would appear that the political winds are changing in Hong Kong, and perhaps for the better. The Political Face of Hong Kong Today: The 2004 Legislative Council Elections The spirit of the elections could be felt all over the city, with posters plastered on the walls in the subway and on the medians of roads, campaigners handing out leaflets in various public areas, rallies and demonstrations where candidates could lay out their 16

Christine Loh. “Boomtown II: Faceoff,” in Boomtown: Re-enter the Dragon, Provided at Boomtown Conference. July 2004, 32. 17 Loh, Government and Business Alliance, 2. 18 Loh, “Boomtown II,” 32.

platforms and constant media coverage of the twists and turns in public opinion and campaigning techniques. In and amongst the excitement, many other developments were taking place in China. The Chinese Government hosted a grandiose military parade and allowed Buddha’s finger, a famous relic, to be exhibited in Hong Kong. The Closer Economic Partnership Association (CEPA) was created to move the Hong Kong and Mainland economies closer together. Regulations on tourism, in particular, have been further relaxed, allowing increased mobility across the border. Furthermore, the Summer Olympics in Athens delivered a strong dose of nationalism on both the Mainland and the Hong Kong side as athletes proved shining stars in the games. In early September, with the buzz of the election hanging in the air, the Olympic heroes were invited to tour Hong Kong and provided various exhibitions, generating patriotic feelings among all Chinese. The timing of these developments suggests that Beijing was pursuing a kind of charm offensive in Hong Kong. By generating warmer feelings towards the Mainland, Beijing aimed to ensure that Hong Kong voters would not issue the pro-government and pro-Beijing parties another battering as they did in the November 2003 District Council elections.19 However, the months leading up to the 2004 LegCo elections also witnessed evidence of a smear campaign, which many speculated might have been orchestrated or aided by Beijing as well. Rumors of intimidation began circulating, particularly when three popular radio hosts resigned from their posts in May after admitting they were feeling political pressure to tone down the content of their programs.20 A number of scandals involving the candidates from the Democratic Party also surfaced. One prominent example was the case of Alex Ho who was standing for election in Kowloon East. While visiting Guangdong Province on the Mainland on a business trip he was detained by authorities for allegedly having relations with a prostitute. Just three days before the September 12 elections the Guangdong authorities released half-naked photos of the candidate, supposedly in order to “prove” that he had in fact solicited the services of a prostitute. It is difficult to say what effect the charm offensive and the smear campaign actually had on the elections, and even more difficult to decipher Beijing’s intentions in pursuing both. However, the people of Hong Kong maintained their active pursuit of more advanced involvement in the governing of their territory by coming out in large numbers to vote. Voter turnout increased to nearly 56% of the electorate, even despite issues with inefficient voting stations and faulty ballot containers. Even more importantly, the results were largely satisfactory to everyone. In exact terms, the prodemocracy camp won 25 seats and the pro-government camp, which includes the DAB and the Liberal Party and many independents, won 35 seats. The DAB has become the largest party in LegCo with 12 seats, the Liberal Party in second place with 10 seats, and the Democratic Party taking third with 9 seats. 21 Despite the Democratic Party’s plunge from the position of the largest party in LegCo, and the

The Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong (DAB), recognized as the political party enjoying the closest connections to the Hong Kong Government and Beijing, won far fewer seats than their rivals in the Democratic Party in the November elections. Many believe the voting pattern illustrated continuing public discontent with the Tung Administration, the economy, and the slow, if not non-existent, pace of democratic reform. 20 Loh, “Boomtown II,” 33. 21 Wang Xiangwei, “Beijing breaths a huge sigh of relief,” South China Morning Post, 14/9/04.

pro-democracy camp’s failure to secure a majority of the seats as they had hoped, they still managed to garner 62% of the popular vote.22 The response to the election from Beijing was supportive,23 indicating perhaps that the CCP was pleased with the success of the DAB in winning the highest number of seats.24 The democrats had hoped to win a majority in the legislature, but many feared that this would increase tensions between the Chinese leadership and Hong Kong, and impede constructive dialogue on moving forward with political reform.25 Therefore, the actual outcome was seen as creating conditions for stabilizing relations between Beijing and Hong Kong as well as continuing the discussions on moving political reform forward. However, there are many new and diverse faces that have been chosen by the people of Hong Kong to represent them in the legislature. The rise of independents such as the outspoken activist “Longhair” Leung Kwok-hung and former radio host Albert Cheng have brought to LegCo new perspectives and different techniques for debating and interacting with the Hong Kong Government and Beijing. Also, Ronny Tong, Alan Leong, Margaret Ng, and Audrey Eu, the elected members of the Article 45 Concern Group, provide a moderate democratic stance that is based in legal scrutiny of government actions and rational approaches to democratic reforms.26 It is important to note that this election shows an interesting shift in attitude among a key group of China’s typical supporters. Hong Kong’s big business sector and the Liberal Party which typically aligns with this group seem to be portraying a more accommodating position in relation to democratic advances. Liberal Party chairmen James Tien chose to stand election in the New Territories East geographical constituency, exhibiting that his party recognizes the importance of securing the vote of the Hong Kong people rather than just resting on the party’s enduring ability to maintain representation through the functional constituencies. Furthermore, the business sector seems to finally be acknowledging the demand for political and constitutional reform and shows signs of aligning with public interest in Hong Kong rather than with its allies in Beijing. While this sector has always taken a conservative stance, recently the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce has urged the government to issue a timetable towards full democracy before 2007. For a key player in the business sector to endorse positive steps towards democratic reforms marks a momentous shift in Hong Kong politics. Many observers have welcomed the

Michael DeGolyer, “For the record: The democracy alliance increased its seats and proportion of the vote,” The Standard, 16/9/04. 23 Xinhua noted that both the number of voters and the voter turnout set a record high, and that the elction marked a milestone in Hong Kong’s constitutional development, being the most democratic election in Hong Kong’s history. “60 Member HK Legislative Council Elected,” Xinhua, 13/9/04. 24 In an opinion article in South China Morning Post entitled “Untidy, unfair, and undemocratic,” outspoken democrat Emily Lau argues that the pro-democracy camp’s real opponent in the elections was the Communist Party, who provided unlimited resources in order to ensure the DAB performed well in the polls. 25 Loh, “Boomtown II,” 37. 26 In an interview with The Standard, Eu explains in greater detail that the group’s moderate image comes from the members’ legal training which has taught them to be restrained and to back up claims with evidence, particularly when taking sides. According to her the group does not differ from the other democrats, in terms of the ultimate aim of achieving universal suffrage in 2007 and 2008, though so far they enjoy more favorable relations with Beijing than member of the Democratic Party. 11/10/04.

new attitude since the September elections, while recognizing the reality of the challenges that still need to be addressed in order to move forward: It is heartening to see the emergence of a consensus on the need for a clear timetable on the implementation of full democracy…But unless and until a timetable is issued, people’s energy will continue to be wasted on debating the dates, instead of on the proper task of building up the institutions that form the backbone of a functioning democracy.27 The elections have come and gone, and they have left in their wake a revitalized political society in Hong Kong. With a plurality of voices in the legislature and an emerging common goal among different sectors, now is the time to push forward democratic reforms. For the HKSAR to do so, however, requires significant participation and acceptance from Beijing. Therefore, it is important to understand China’s political history, Chinese traditional thinking, and the attitude of the CCP today. China’s Political History The movements towards political reform in Hong Kong offer an important stimulus for China, where the CCP has been successfully resisting the process of democratization in order to maintain power and control over the Mainland. The situation today presents a more favorable setting for democratization in light of China’s strengthened sense of security, drawn from its broadened national unity, nuclear power status, membership in the UN Security Council, improving relations with the outside world, the democratization of other East Asian countries which can serve as a model and most importantly its solid economic development. Furthermore, change can be inspired by discomfort as well, so “a healthy tension between Beijing and local forces stands democracy in good stead.”28 With Hong Kong leading the way as a strong local force, there is an opportunity to advance the efforts towards democratization in China. However, before diving into the prospects of this opportunity, it is necessary to understand China’s political history and the most important developments of the twentieth century in order to appreciate the mammoth undertaking that is political reform. Furthermore, it is useful to keep in mind that when democracy truly takes root in China, it will not blindly copy Western-style democracy. This is a point that is often reiterated by the newly consolidated fourth generation of leadership headed by Hu Jintao: “Mr Hu made clear his bottom line in a speech on September 15th: ‘History has proved that in China copying the model of western political systems is a dead-end road.’”29 For China, democracy needs to be homegrown. The Path Leading to Communist Rule in China China is not only one of the oldest civilizations in the world, but also the country responsible for establishing Asia’s first democratic republic. The 1911 Revolution 27

C.K. Lau, “Even Afghanistan has it…” South China Morning Post, 16/10/04. Shaohua Hu, Explaining Chinese Democratization (Wesport: Praeger Publishers, 2000), 154. 29 “Hu Jintao’s consolidation of power does not mean that democracy is in the cards,” The Economist, 23/9/04. 28

was orchestrated by an elite group of Chinese, but was motivated by foreign influence in two ways. Disillusionment with the Qing dynasty after the Opium wars in the 19th century left the Chinese in a worsened socioeconomic situation. There was a strong desire to rebuild the nation and catch up to the Western powers. At the same time, foreign powers also offered the Chinese new ideologies and alternative forms of governing. The Chinese elite often sought to use these new methods for practical purposes while maintaining Chinese learning as the basis. However, after the Qing Dynasty was overthrown maintaining a democratic system was fraught with difficulties. While the new republic struggled to reestablish central authority, local forces were working to undermine the democratic leadership. Soon enough it lapsed into a dictatorship once again. The following period of “warlordism” left the state in anarchy and drove the goal for national unification to the forefront of Chinese politics.30 When the Nationalists managed to establish a symbolic unification of China under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, the ideas of democracy were easily disregarded in a world setting dominated by power politics, imperialism and capitalism. Although China never became a colony, it suffered all kinds of humiliation, exploitation and losses of sovereign territory at the hands of the imperial powers. Japanese aggression posed the strongest threat to the survival of China, so Chiang sought to build a strong and modern nation-state rather than a democratic government. However, even as the Chinese were still reeling from the effects of the Sino-Japanese war, suddenly the Civil War broke out between the Nationalists and the Communists, both of whom claimed to know the correct path towards redeeming power, wealth and prestige for China. The Communist victory in 1949 led to the decision to isolate China completely from the capitalist world and try to build the country into a powerful, selfsufficient and rich socialist nation. This goal was not achieved, and Chairman Mao’s reign imposed a powerful totalitarian rule on China, leaving the country in a backward, isolated darkness until after his death.31 When Deng Xiaoping consolidated his position as the paramount leader, the most important goal in China became economic development. Mao left behind a unified poverty-stricken state that had suffered the prolonged tyranny of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). For Deng, political reform and liberal democracy were hardly appropriate solutions, and he instead focused on the growth of the economy, raising living standards, rationalizing the bureaucracy and creating and maintaining social stability. Under Deng’s reform program, one-party rule prevailed, but China enjoyed tremendous economic growth. While this growth continues today, new social strains such as severe income inequality and tremendous corruption among government and party officials threatens the legitimacy of the CCP. The dearth of democratic institutions leaves few outlets for the people of China to vent their frustration arising from these problems. Democracy has been evaded in China throughout the last century due to constraints made by the world system and the need for a unified, powerful and modern nation-state. Yet, in order to comprehend and address the problems today, it is necessary to consider the impact of Confucianism on Chinese thinking. The potential for political reform in China must be understood in the context of Chinese culture. 30 31

Shaohua Hu, 44-63. Ibid, 84-113.

The Impact of Confucian Ideals and Traditional Chinese Thinking Traditional thinking still has a strong influence in China today. China is a vast and relatively homogenous country in which Confucianism has been at the core of society for a very long time. Confucianism emphasizes a number of important principles which are often at odds with Western democratic ideals. Confucian thinking tends to reflect a need for strong government, but it stipulates that the government has a responsibility to the people to exert benign leadership. Confucianism plays down the negative side of human nature and expects that rule by man is effective and useful because morality will guide his leadership. Furthermore, harmony, consensus and conformity are the ideals towards which society strives. Hierarchy is assumed natural due to the differing endowments of human beings. Therefore, authority is very much respected in traditional Chinese thinking, and the Western notion of a small government which is plagued by opposition voices in society seems out of place in a Confucian setting. Similarly, individual rights are less important in relation to familial ties, where filial piety is an utmost virtue in Confucian society.32 Today these attitudes remain in place, where “the state remains absolute and unchallengeable. At the apex of power is the Politburo, where important decisions are made.”33 China’s linear political history and the Confucian mindset together illustrate why society has not demanded liberal democracy thus far. Times have changed, however, and the new leadership of the CCP is beginning to shift its methods of governance. China’s New Leadership: Hu Jintao and the Fourth Generation Take Charge A breakthrough in contemporary Chinese politics occurred in October 2004 when Jiang Zemin retired from his position as head of the Central Military Commission, fully handing over power to Hu Jintao and marking the first peaceful transition of power in the history of the CCP. Jiang’s resignation came as a great surprise to many, particularly amid rumors of a power struggle between Hu and Jiang.34 While the speculation about tensions at the top level may have been exaggerated, it is still apparent that, “Hu’s consolidation of China's top party and military posts is expected to give him and his premier, Wen Jiabao, a freer hand to act as they wrestle with huge challenges ranging from rural poverty to fighting rampant corruption that is undermining public confidence in the communist leadership.” 35 The Fourth Generation of leaders faces very new and difficult problems that have resulted from the tremendously rapid economic growth over the last two decades. Understanding the process which brought them to power, their backgrounds, and their visions for the future of the CCP sheds light on some of the most recent initiatives taken, including a 36-page document released in September which discusses the leadership’s goals for enhancing the CCP’s ruling capability. The new leaders leading China is continuing the work towards transforming the CCP from a revolutionary party into a governing party. The rise of the technocrats in leadership positions has led to a strong body of engineers with experience in 32

Shaohua Hu, 23-25. Loh, “Boomtown II,” 30. 34 John J Tkacik Jr, “China’s Peaceful Rise at stake in power struggle,” Asia Times, 8/9/2004. 35 “Hu Becomes China's New Military Leader” The Associated Press, Retrieved from http://abcnews.go.com/wire/World/ap20040920_55.html on 20/9/2004. 33

managing factories, research institutes, cities, and provinces. Some of the highest leaders in the Party such as Hu Jintao and Zeng Qinghong36 also portray a variety of political skills as well, including leadership in policy debates, consensus building, and articulation of new visions. Alongside these leaders are the policy experts and administrators, particularly Premier Wen Jiabao, who are instrumental in carrying out reforms while maintaining control in the economic and political realms.37 This group of leaders has the advantage of having risen through a more institutionalized system of succession in which they have been well groomed for leadership at a younger age. There is a need amongst this group to share power and build consensus since Hu’s does not enjoy a power base similar to his predecessors, Mao, Deng and, to a lesser extent, Jiang. Yet he and his peers are stepping up as leaders that are more removed from ties to the Tiananmen disaster and less influenced by the intrusiveness of past Party Elders.38 While the new leaders cannot be described as “liberal”, there is a sense that as a team they are pragmatic and flexible enough to consider more radical measures for reform if the need arises. At the same time, they still adhere to the notion that Chinese society needs strong guidance, and that free wheeling democracy is inappropriate in such a complex, vast and turbulent society. The overall goal remains to “soften authoritarian rule, make it more responsive, and use the media and some political institutions, such as elections and courts, as tools to discipline the lower bureaucracy.”39 At the Fourth Plenum of the 16th Communist Party Central Committee Hu Jintao ascended to the position of top leadership, and the party simultaneously issued an uncharacteristically self-critical document vowing to improve the party’s governing capabilities. The paper admits that the Party’s monopoly over power is not guaranteed, and instead must be safeguarded by weeding out rampant corruption and ensuring that respectable leaders are put into place in order to maintain stability and prosperity in China. The document maintains the ring of typical CCP statements, stressing that: The Party must adhere to Marxism and Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory and the important thought of "Three Represents" as its guiding ideology, while keeping on exploring the new horizon for the development of Marxist theories in its new practice.40 Yet the developments towards inner-party democracy, which began to emerge more visibly in the Third Plenum in October 2003, could have important implications for political reform in China. The practice seeks to make the system of electing cadres and officials more competitive by having multi-candidate elections rather than relying 36

Hu Jintao is President of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), General Secretary of the CCP, and Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) and Zeng Qinghong is Vice President of the PRC and is head of Hong Kong and Macau affairs. 37 Along with Premier Wen, other prominent technocrats include: Wu Bangguo (Chairman, Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference), Luo Gan (Secretary Central Disciplinary Inspection Commission), and Li Changchun (Executive Deputy Premier). 38 Andrew J. Nathan and Bruce Gilley, China’s New Rulers: The Secret Files (New York: New York Review of Books, 2002), 232-233. 39 Ibid, 235. 40 “CPC issues document on ruling capacity” Xinhua, 27/9/04

on appointments by top officials. It also has the effect of institution building within the party by subjecting individual party secretaries to set procedures and norms.41 While these developments are limited in terms of reaching out to the population at large, many nevertheless argue that, “If democracy takes root in the CCP’s massive membership of nearly 70 million, it would pave the way for the rest of Chinese society to follow.”42 Furthermore, the NPCSC has recently passed new laws which normalize, standardize and improve elections in a number of ways. The practice of preliminary elections has been reintroduced, which narrows the field of candidates before a final voting for a region’s delegates, and allows candidates to brief voters and take questions in a manner of campaigning. The introduction of direct contact between the voters and the candidates will allow for increased competition, but seeks to limit this practice to ensure that wealthier candidates do not have an unfair advantage over their adversaries by using their personal fortunes to boost their campaigns. The new law also defines vote-buying and punishments, but stops short of attending to calls for the use of secret ballots and voting rights for the country’s entire population, including the 100 million transient residents. The rationale for restricting the scope of new election practices is that, “Developed areas are more able to experiment and advance the practice of democracy.”43 The statement could have important implications for Hong Kong since it is arguably the most developed and prosperous Chinese city, and therefore advanced democratic experimentation is possible in this region. If Hong Kong can illustrate that its model of democracy safeguards stability and prosperity, the CCP might continue to expand electoral and democratic institutions on the Mainland as well. The new leadership in Beijing has been illustrating a more open mind towards political reform, which offers new opportunities for Hong Kong, both in the HKSAR’s own advances towards political reform, and also in its ability to help democracy take root on the Mainland. The 36-page document refers to the governance of Hong Kong as a ‘brand-new subject under new circumstances,’ and suggests that the CCP is beginning to recognize the need to listen to the spectrum of diverse voices within all sectors of Hong Kong society in order to ensure effective governance in the HKSAR.44 Keeping in mind China’s political history and the steps which have brought the new leaders to power, we turn now to why Hong Kong and China have come upon a window of opportunity, where the setting is ideal for political reform to rest at the forefront of Chinese politics. How to Work Together: Hong Kong and China Experimenting Together The willingness of the new leadership in Beijing to find a new approach to dealing with Hong Kong, where the push for political reform is more powerful and focused, marks an important step forward. The 2004 National Day celebration gave the people of Hong Kong reason to cheer when a group of moderate democrats were invited to 41

Joseph Fewsmith, “The Third Plenary Session of the 16th Party Congress,” China Leadership Monitor No. 9 (Fall 2003). 42 Chua Chin Hon, “Communist Party’s Hold on Power ‘not ironclad’” The Straits Times, 28/9/04. 43 Irene Wang, “Law change seen making polls fairer,” South China Morning Post, 29/10/04. The statement quotes an unnamed professor from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. 44 “CPC issues document on ruling capacity,” Xinhua, 27/9/04.

Beijing. In a speech to the delegates, Hu Jintao showed a more progressive attitude towards Hong Kong affairs, emphasizing the importance of accommodating different views in striving for unity, stability, and harmony. A rapprochement between Beijing and the Hong Kong democrats seems more likely as the Tiananmen crackdown, which led to the severing of ties between the two, recedes further and further into the past, and the new leadership continues to move forward with the goal of improving governance. In relation to Hong Kong, “The Beijing leadership appears to have faced up to the plain truth that Hong Kong is a diverse and pluralistic society with strong aspirations for democracy and better governance…and that people’s expectations must be managed through dialogue and discussion, not by heavy-handed government orders.45 The response from the Hong Kong side also appears compromising and progressive. Recently the organizers of the massive public marches that have taken place on July 1st and January 1st in the last two years have announced that they will not be holding the January 1st rally again this year. The decision shows a high level of political maturity, and perhaps suggests that, “The democrats have realized that staging another mass demonstration could be a tactical error. It might rock the boat at a time when it is – at last – sailing in the right direction. Dialogue with the central authorities is the way forward.”46 The practice of taking to the streets has proven very effective in the past, but is now perhaps becoming less necessary for vocalizing public opinion. At the time of this writing, progress is being made via public consultations on political reform which ended in mid-October 2004, and it seems that attitudes in Hong Kong are shifting and converging: “Even pro-government parties and the business sector are coming to the view that universal suffrage should be introduced in 2011 and 2012.”47 By speaking with a more unified voice, Hong Kong society has a real opportunity to communicate its desires for greater democracy in a way in which Beijing will feel comfortable with the prospects of change. Hong Kong has a great advantage over other Chinese cities because the ‘one country, two systems’ model allows for the continuance of free press and the right to demonstrate. As we have already seen, the mass mobilization projects have ushered in this new era of communication between Hong Kong and Beijing by providing a voice and an outlet for the people when the government does not appear to be acting in their interest. The existence of free media, which is often scathingly critical of both the Hong Kong Government and Beijing, also provides an important outlet for society: “The comparative lack of democratic freedoms enjoyed by Hong Kong residents in a society that enjoys a free media has created a kind of media-based, ‘surrogate congress.’”48 The value of this kind of people’s congress is that it can persuade and influence the government in the SAR, which is more aware of and sensitive to public opinion due to its lack of public mandate. Furthermore, even the government in Beijing pays attention to the opinions of the people of Hong Kong. This is reflected in Beijing’s support for the shelving of the Article 23 legislation after the public protested in the summer of 2003. For the CCP, which is more accustomed to guiding 45

Chris Yeung, “Back to the basics” South China Morning Post, 4/10/04. “Abandoning march paves way for dialogue” South China Morning Post, 16/10/04. 47 Ibid. 48 Richard Cullen, “The Media and Society in Hong Kong,” in Building Democracy: Creating Good Government for Hong Kong, ed. Christine Loh and Civic Exchange (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2003), 110. 46

public opinion rather than actually listening to the views of the people, this is an important exercise. Chinese politics tends to portray an elitist view that the party knows best, resulting in part from Confucian traditions, but this idea was contradicted when the people of Hong Kong united on July 1st 2003, and again the following year, to express public discontent with the government. It is advantageous for Beijing to listen to what is being said in Hong Kong in order to gain a full and enlightened understanding of public opinion. The practice might eventually demonstrate the advantages of loosening of media controls on the Mainland as well if the Hong Kong system can put forward a picture of political maturity, stability and prosperity. Alongside the expanding levels of communication between Beijing and Hong Kong, we are seeing an increase in cultural links between Mainland Chinese and Hong Kong Chinese, which could also have important implications for the prospects of political reform. The increasing interest in tourism, aided by the loosening of restrictions under the CEPA agreement, has not only helped the Hong Kong economy rebound, but it has given Mainland Chinese some new perspectives on the way of life that is protected under ‘one country, two systems’ in Hong Kong. For instance, tourists may witness large street protests such as the July 1st rallies, or take part in the June 4th candlelight vigils that are held every year as a memorial for those who died in the Tiananmen crackdown. They might also shop in bookstores which offer all sorts of materials banned on the Mainland, or read local newspapers which comment very critically on all sorts of issues, including political reform. Or if they were visiting during the LegCo elections in September, they could get a taste for political campaigning and the spirit of democratic elections. 49 In October 2004 many Mainlanders visiting Hong Kong witnessed its first gay and lesbian parade, as well. Exposure to a more open, tolerant and expressive society which still maintains a cultural familiarity will no doubt instill a desire for a similar life of freedom among some of these Mainland visitors. Perhaps the development of democracy might actually proceed faster in places like Guangzhou or Shanghai, where rights have long been denied and society might prove to embrace them with even greater vigor than in Hong Kong.50 At the time of this writing, the democratic camp in Hong Kong has united behind the above-mentioned call to hold a non-binding referendum on whether to introduce universal suffrage by 2007/08, which has been interpreted in Beijing as a challenge to the Central People’s Government. Debate has flared on both sides, but underneath the tensions there is an important opportunity for dialogue between the democrats and the Chinese leadership. The use of the word ‘referendum’ itself was controversial, since the term tends to be negatively associated with Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bien.51 However, there is much to be learned from this comparison. Chen failed to explain the nature of the referendum, which technically sought to assess public opinion in Taiwan towards the positioning of Chinese missiles directed at the island. The questions Chen posed to the population were phrased as follows:

Loh, “Boomtown II,” 35-36. Bruce Gilley, China’s Democratic Future: How It Will Happen and Where It Will Lead (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 200. 51 The Taiwanese president, now in his second term of office after being reelected in March 2004, clashes with Beijing over his pro-independence stance. 50

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If China refuses to withdraw the missiles it has targeted at Taiwan and to openly renounce the use of force against us, would you agree that the government should acquire more advanced anti-missile weapons to strengthen Taiwan's self-defense capabilities? Would you agree that our government should engage in negotiations with China about the establishment of a "peace and stability" framework for crossStrait interactions in order to build consensus and for the welfare of the peoples on both sides?52

The controversy that arose centered on Beijing’s interpretation of Chen’s act as supporting a referendum on independence, which would destabilize cross-straits relations that delicately hinge on Taiwan’s acceptance of the ‘one China’ principle. Chen failed to clarify the intention of the referendum, and tensions escalated. Learning from Chen’s mistakes, the pro-democracy camp needs to make clear the goal of the proposal. Legislator Fernando Cheung suggested the action with the intention of gaining insight into public opinion regarding the introduction of universal suffrage. Beijing has interpreted this move as a threat to its authority, understanding the referendum as an exercise which would lead to a binding agreement. This is impossible because the SCNPC already ruled out universal suffrage for 2007/08, so the exercise is viewed only as provocation. Without questioning that it is Beijing that will ultimately make decisions regarding political reform, the most useful exercise is a healthy dialogue which leads to a mutually acceptable blueprint. The democrats should make it clear to Beijing that the referendum was proposed because they believe that public opinion should also be considered when mapping that blueprint. The goal is not to confront Beijing, but to emphasize that, “Hong Kong people not only have the right to voice their views; they can actually help Beijing make the right decision.”53 The issue of introducing universal suffrage in 2007/08 can still be a topic of productive discussion if the democrats are willing to patiently and carefully explain their position, and if Beijing is willing to listen and consider the viewpoints of the Hong Kong people. In the spirit of dialogue, three Hong Kong think tanks organized a conference on “Constitutional Development: 2007/08 and Beyond,” which took place on the 6th of November 2004. It was the third such seminar that Civic Exchange, the Hong Kong Policy Research Institute, and SynergyNet had jointly hosted. Having invited a wide spectrum of participants from both Hong Kong and the Mainland, the group of over 350 participants enjoyed thirteen presentations representing a variety of views towards constitutional reform from different sectors in Hong Kong.54 The seminar allowed for open debate and encouraged all participants to take part in table discussions, express their opinions on the presentations, and offer their own ideas towards constitutional development. By offering a forum for discussion and debate, the organizers were able to illustrate the benefits of allowing the public to channel 52

Laurence Eyton, “Beijing’s rants boost Taiwan referendum and Chen,” Asia Times, 23/1/04. Margaret Ng, “Beijing holds the key,” South China Morning Post, 4/11/04. 54 The 15-20 minute presentations were given by representatives for the DAB, the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce, the Democratic Party, the Hong Kong Progressive Alliance, the Frontier, the Hong Kong University Graduates Association, the Liberal Party, the Article 45 Concern Group, the Hong Kong Democratic Foundation, the Hong Kong Development Network, SynergyNet, the Hong Kong Policy Research Institute and Civic Exchange, 53

their views and voice their criticism in a mature and rational way. The participants had a brief response to the discussion from a representative of the Hong Kong Government, Secretary for Constitutional Affairs Stephen Lam. Furthermore, two Mainland professors were also invited to speak to the participants and respond to some of the suggestions made during the conference. Professor Rao Geping and Professor Wang Zhenmin expressed their intentions to pass on to Beijing the information, viewpoints and perspectives that they had encountered in taking part in the conference. One of the overall messages of the conference was that the most important way to make progress in the future is to establish trust between Hong Kong and Beijing. The only way to establish trust is to look one another in the face and explain each point of view. In his closing remarks, Paul K.W. Yip, Chairman of the Hong Kong Policy Research Institute, called upon the Chinese leadership to give concrete answers regarding what it most fears in relation to political reform. It is that fear that continues to act as an obstacle, but Hong Kong must be willing to give due consideration to Beijing’s hesitation while moving forward with constitutional development. Yip proposed that China allow the Hong Kong model to work as a pilot for political reform. The Chinese leadership can learn from both the success and the mistakes of the HKSAR in pursuing democratic development. Conclusion The current setting in both Hong Kong and China offers groundbreaking territory for the process of democratization. While there are many elements of shared cultural identities and historical similarities, Hong Kong and China’s political histories have diverged in very important ways due to the influence of British colonialism in Hong Kong. Neither region has a long history of democratic aspirations, though the Hong Kong experience was accelerated in an unusual and unique manner beginning in the 1980s under colonial rule. With new leadership in Beijing and a plurality of voices both within and outside of the Hong Kong government, the conditions are favorable for real discussion to take place on democratic development. Hong Kong has an important role to play in the process of political reform on the Mainland. The goal of the region and all actors involved should be to put Hong Kong’s best face forward and offer Beijing and the Chinese people a picture of a stable, mature political system which incorporates freedom of press, tolerance, the protection of civil liberties, democratic representation and universal suffrage. Sources: Cullen, Richard. “The Media and Society in Hong Kong.” In Building Democracy: Creating Good Government for Hong Kong, ed. Christine Loh & Civic Exchange, 104-116. Hong Kong University Press: 2003. Gilley, Bruce. China’s Democratic Future: How it will happen and where it will lead. New York: Columbia University Press, 2004. Hu, Shaohua. Explaining Chinese Democratization. Westpoint, London: Praiger Publishers, 2000. Loh, Christine. “Boomtown II: Faceoff.” Boomtown: Re-enter the Dragon. Provided at Boomtown Conference. July 2004.

Nathan, Andrew J. and Bruce Gilley. China’s New Rulers: The Secret Files. New York: New York Review Books, 2002. Roberti, Mark. The Fall of Hong Kong: China’s Triumph and Britain’s Betrayal. John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1994. Sing, Ming. Hong Kong’s Tortuous Democratization: A Comparative Analysis. London, NY: Routledge Curzon, 2004.

Acknowledgements: Many thanks to Christine Loh for providing guidance, constructive criticism and support during the writing of this paper.