untitled by Civic Exchange

A Case Study in Autonomy: Hong Kong's Response to the 2004 Tsunami

David Gottesman August 2005

Civic Exchange Summer Intern

Yale University Yale-China Summer Intern

Acknowledgements I would like to thank Civic Exchange for hosting me as a summer intern. Christine Loh offered me superb guidance in the researching and writing of this report. Yanyan Yip facilitated my research by referring me to relevant information and contacts. I am grateful to the Yale-China Association for sponsoring my internship at Civic Exchange. Mark Sheldon provided me with his insights into regional politics and Betty Ho oversaw the logistics of my stay in Hong Kong.

Introduction When Hong Kong became a part of China on July 1, 1997, a political experiment began. Normally, decolonization means that the former colony becomes a sovereign state. Hong Kong, however, became a Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China operating as a second system within “one country” under the “one country, two systems” principle. Hong Kong enjoys a high degree of autonomy except in the areas of defense and diplomatic affairs. Nevertheless, Hong Kong is able to conduct “relevant external affairs” in many areas. In order to understand how Hong Kong sees its ability to conduct external affairs, its response to the 2004 tsunami provides a useful example for reflection. In this report, Hong Kong’s response to the tsunami is compared with Singapore’s. Singapore is chosen as a contrast to Hong Kong because although they are both wealthy cities, Singapore is a sovereign state and Hong Kong is not. This allows conclusions to be drawn about the Hong Kong Government’s ambitions, capacities and abilities to engage externally.

I. Scope of Hong Kong's autonomy A. Hong Kong’s autonomy in conducting “external affairs” Hong Kong’s post-1997 constitution, the Basic Law, provides “a high degree of autonomy” to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR). 1 However, the Central People’s Government (CPG) is responsible for defense and foreign affairs.2 In order to understand the scope of Hong Kong’s autonomy, it is necessary to define where the boundary between the HKSAR’s power and the CPG’s power lies. The Basic Law establishes this fine line as the difference between foreign affairs and “relevant external affairs”; the SAR is allowed to engage in the latter, but not in the former. Liu Yiu-chu distinguishes between “high” foreign policy (“recognition of foreign states, of war and peace or of belligerency and neutrality, claims relating to territorial sovereignty, military or defense alliances, and membership in organizations whose primary purpose is the maintenance of international peace and security”) and “low” foreign policy (“agreements on international credits, monetary reforms, and of transnational industrial and scientific projects”). 3 As such, Beijing conducts diplomacy while Hong Kong has control over its “economic, trade, financial and monetary, shipping, communications, touristic, cultural and sporting” affairs.4 When acting internationally in these spheres, the HKSAR must use the name “Hong Kong, China,” indicating that the territory is still a part of the PRC. In order to facilitate trade and economic cooperation with foreign countries, Hong Kong operates missions abroad that are independent of China’s embassies and consulates. Many countries maintain a consulate in Hong Kong in addition to the embassy in Beijing.

B. Hong Kong’s membership in international organizations The HKSAR can have membership in international organizations which do not restrict membership to states. For example, Hong Kong is a member of the Asian Development Bank (1969), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation – APEC (1991), the International Olympic Committee – IOC (1951), and the World Trade Organization – WTO (1995). Hong Kong entered into these bodies while under British rule, when Hong Kong had a similar degree of autonomy from Britain, the right of which was maintained as part of the arrangements for the transfer of power from Britain to China.5 In the mid to late 20th century, manufacturing took off and Hong Kong emerged as an important economic player in the world despite its size. As such, trade, particularly exports, became important for Hong Kong. Securing agreements favorable to free access proved crucial for the colony’s growth and prosperity. By 1969, Hong Kong had the unofficial power to establish commercial agreements with its trading partners. By 1973, the territory could also enter external multilateral negotiations.6 Before 1986, Hong Kong took part in the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as part of the British delegation with a voice independent of Britain. After 1986, the colony held full, independent membership in GATT. All of these accomplishments must be considered against the backdrop of the era – a time when colonialism was becoming passé. With many colonies gaining statehood, it was not out of the ordinary for Hong Kong to gain some power over its economic affairs. Article 152 of the Basic Law provides that the CPG “shall, where necessary, facilitate the continued participation of the HKSAR in an appropriate capacity in those international organizations in which Hong Kong is a participant…but of which the People's Republic of China is not a member.” 1

Basic Law, Article 12. Basic Law, Article 13. 3 Roda Mushkat, The Basic Law and Hong Kong’s Future: Foreign, External and Defence Affairs, Butterworths, Hong Kong, 1988. 4 Basic Law, Article 151. 5 Sino-British Joint Declaration. 6 Norman Miners, The Government and Politics of Hong Kong, Oxford University Press, Hong Kong, 1998. 2

To understand the CPG’s motive for including this clause in Article 152, it may be helpful to compare the dates of Hong Kong’s entry into some international bodies with that of China’s. Hong Kong entered the Asian Development Bank in 1969, while the PRC entered in 1986. The territory became an Associate Member of the International Maritime Organization in 1967, six years before China joined. Hong Kong’s Olympic Committee was recognized in 1951, China’s only in 1979. The then-colony ascended to the World Trade Organization in 1995, compared with 2001 for China.7 While Hong Kong could never join bodies like the United Nations because membership is only for states, China was aware of the territory’s importance – and high standing – in the international arena. It was to China’s advantage for Hong Kong to retain this role, particularly as the mainland economy grew, since Hong Kong served and still serves as the country’s economic gateway to the rest of the world in many respects. There are international initiatives in which the HKSAR is involved but China is not or not to the same extent. For example, the Financial Stability Forum consists of 25 members who share information to promote the stability of the international financial system. The Hong Kong Monetary Authority participates alongside the financial ministries and national banks of the G7 countries.8 Another example is the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre, a non-profit body funded by the HKSAR Government and the business community, which arbitrates commercial disputes. It is appropriate for this organization to operate in Hong Kong because of the city’s understanding of economics and trade and its British-influenced legal system, which is considerably more advanced than the one in China.9

II. Singapore A. Historical background Singapore became independent from Britain in 1965 and is today a fully sovereign nation. It was confronted with the challenges of managing full-fledged statehood, including ensuring stability and establishing itself diplomatically. The British were to withdraw their military forces in 1971, leaving the Singaporeans only a few years to raise a military. The Singapore Armed Forces Training Institute was founded in 1966; soon after came the conscription of all young men. The country’s air and naval forces were established in 1969.10 In developing its military, Singapore sought the advice of Israel. This was among the infant nation’s first acts of diplomacy and international reliance – the lesson learned from this partnership would be implemented down the road when Singapore would be able to assist other countries. 11 Since its inception, the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) have modernized and are reputed to be the strongest in Southeast Asia.12 The SAF has a history of international disaster relief. In 1970, the SAF sent a medical team to East Pakistan in response to a cyclone. During the Gulf War (1990-91), the SAF’s Medical Corps aided both refugees and the Allied Forces.13 A recent example underscores the important role of the SAF in Asia as well as its impressive response time. On September 21, 1999, an earthquake devastated Taiwan. Within two days the SAF sent supplies and a team of doctors. The name for this humanitarian effort, Operation Flying Eagle, was used again for the SAF’s 2004/2005 tsunami relief mission (discussed in Section IIIB).14

In fact, Hong Kong will host the 2005 Ministerial Conference, which is the highest authority in the WTO. See http://www.fsforum.org/home/home.html 9 See http://www.hkiac.org/main.html 10 See www.sg: Nation’s History – Coming of Age. 11 See http://www.moe.gov.sg/ne/sgstory/firstintake.htm: National Education. 12 See http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/pointer/back/journals/2004/Vol30_1/4.htm 13 See http://www.mindef.gov.sg/joint/hqmc/main.html 14 See http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/about_us/history/maturing_saf/v08n09_history.html 8

B. Singapore’s participation in international organizations Like Hong Kong, Singapore is a member of APEC, WTO and the IOC. Both the HKSAR and Singapore have experienced rapid economic growth in the last few decades, earning them spots in another prestigious circle – the “Four Dragons” of Asia.15 As a sovereign state, Singapore can join any international organization open to the countries of the world. Soon after declaring its independence, Singapore joined the United Nations. From 2001 to 2002, it served on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), indicating that it takes an active role in diplomacy. While serving in this capacity, the country’s representatives advocated the interests of small states.16 Singapore was a founding member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967. The alliance allows its 10 small member countries to exert a collective influence greater than they could exercise independently. It also fosters cooperation amongst the neighboring countries of Southeast Asia; one of the most notable examples of this is the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI), launched by Singapore in 2000. IAI employs the experience and resources of some of ASEAN’s more developed countries to build up the less developed ones. Singapore has reached out through “Singapore Scholarships, ASEAN Students Exchange Programme, Education ‘Train-The-Trainers’ Programme, IT ‘Train-The Trainers’ Programme, and the establishment of training centers in Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam.”17 IAI is one of the ways in which the Singapore Cooperation Programme (SCP) operates. SCP is an umbrella organization that provides technical assistance and human resource development to the world’s developing countries. Government officials from these 159 nations visit Singapore to observe and learn about the island’s infrastructure as well as to participate in training programs in the fields of English language, aviation management, sustainable development, tourism promotion, etc.18

III. Tsunami 2004 A. The natural disaster On December 26, 2004, an earthquake occurred at the fault line between the India Plate and the Burma Plate at the bottom of the Indian Ocean, off the western coast of Indonesia. The magnitude of this disturbance is now estimated at 9.2 on the Richter scale – one of the most severe in recent history. The result was a tsunami, which radiated from the earthquake site and sent a wall of water crashing against the adjacent coasts. Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India and Thailand were the worst hit. The powerful waves flooded homes and hotels, sweeping away unsuspecting victims. The death toll is placed at over 250,000, with thousands more injured or still missing. Houses, buildings and markets were strewn to pieces, and resources and infrastructure destroyed. Immediately after the tsunami struck, the survivors needed food, shelter and medical care. Thousands of children and babies had become orphans, and needed care. The dead had to be identified and buried. Given the large number of deceased and injured and the lack of sanitation, preventing the spread of disease was of importance.

Along with South Korea and Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore successfully industrialized in the second half of the 20th century. Though physically small, these four economic powers play a major role in today’s international economy and have been referred to as the “Four Dragons.” 16 See http://www.mfa.gov.sg/internet/ - Foreign Policy. 17 See http://www.mfa.gov.sg/internet/ - Foreign Policy – ASEAN. 18 See http://www.scp.gov.sg/indexI.html

After emergency relief efforts, long-term attention would need to be paid to rebuilding the afflicted communities. Many of the men had supported themselves as fishermen, but their boats and equipment were destroyed. Other people’s businesses were demolished and the proprietors lacked the funds to resurrect what they had before. To prevent the displaced from having to live in refugee tents for an extended period of time, homes would have to be rebuilt – and in such a way to hold up better to future natural disasters.

B. Responses Many countries pledged aid in cash and in kind to the governments of the tsunami-ravaged countries and to relief organizations. Private citizens contributed to NGO charities. Fundraising efforts went unexpectedly well, with many relief organizations exceeding their goals by significant amounts.

1. Hong Kong’s response Monetary donations The per capita contribution of Hong Kong residents was the highest in the world. As of January 11, 2005, the average Hong Konger had contributed over HK$100.19 While it is true that the SAR is among the wealthiest regions in the world (The Economist’s “World in Figures” places Hong Kong at number 17 on the wealth league)20, there must have been some other factors behind this enthusiastic response. Perhaps first and foremost, Hong Kong is near the tsunami-affected areas, so the disaster struck close to home. Many Hong Kong residents have vacationed in the affected areas, particularly Phuket, Thailand. Most foreign domestic workers in Hong Kong hail from Southeast Asian countries, including Thailand and Indonesia. Therefore, Hong Kong people have a sense of familiarity with and strong connection to the tsunami-ridden countries. Most of the money raised in Hong Kong went to the following five NGOs: Red Cross, World Vision, Oxfam, UNICEF and Salvation Army. These organizations appealed directly to the public for donations and were also the principal beneficiaries of the government’s fundraising. The HKSAR government organized a charity concert on January 1, 2005, which raised HK$33 million.21 Seventy percent of these funds went to the aforementioned NGOs, while the remainder was allocated for compensation for families of Hong Kong residents lost in the tsunami. The Home Affairs Bureau of the HKSAR Government manages this fund. 22 It awarded HK$200,000 to each of the 28 successful applicants.23 While the Hong Kong people responded heartily to the calls for aide, their government is criticized as having offered little from its coffers towards disaster relief. The Disaster Relief Fund (DRF), established in 1993, provides a financial response to natural disasters which result in humanitarian crises overseas. Each year the fund receives HK$50 million from the government (this amount can be increased, depending on the need that year) and considers applications for aide from relief agencies and foreign governments. The DRF approved HK$30 million for tsunami relief on December 31, 2004, HK$22.5 million of which had been appropriated to foreign governments and relief organizations by February 28, 2005.24 Almost immediately after the 12/31 announcement, Legislative Council (LegCo) members deemed this amount insufficient and called upon the

19 20 21 22 23 24

Frank Ching, “Keep the tsunami funds flowing,” January 11, 2005 South China Morning Post: EDT16. C.K. Lau. “Help the poor to help themselves,” January 6, 2005 South China Morning Post: EDT15. Press Release, Hong Kong SAR Government. “$33 million raised for tsunami relief,” January 1, 2005. See http://www.hab.gov.hk. Phone interview with Brendan Au, Home Affairs Bureau. August 4, 2005. See http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200502/28/02280237.htm.

government to contribute at least another HK$100 million, which never materialized.25 Government action abroad The day after the tsunami, Donald Tsang, then Chief Secretary for Administration, announced that “we have about 1,000-odd Hong Kong tourists now in Phuket.” To help these residents, many of whom had lost their travel documents, return home, four immigration officers were deployed to Phuket. They searched hospitals for Hong Kong residents in need of assistance.26 By December 29, another five officers arrived in Phuket, and four were sent to Colombo, Sri Lanka for the same purpose. 27 The following day, a team of 120 civil servants departed for Phuket, including representatives from the Immigration Department, Police, Civil Aid Service, Auxiliary Medical Service and Department of Health. Calls placed by family and friends to the Immigration Department indicated that 1,052 Hong Kong residents might be stranded in the disaster areas; by the evening of the 30th, 265 of these individuals were located.28 On December 31, the number possibly stranded increased to 1,340 people, with 497 located. The HKSAR Government set up help desks at Bangkok and Phuket airports and at the Thai government’s Phuket coordination center, in addition to providing three hotlines. 29 As the weeks passed, the number of missing Hong Kong residents declined, and the government teams’ numbers decreased correspondingly. Through the DRF’s mechanism which provides direct aide from the HKSAR Government to affected countries, two shipments were made. The first, on New Year’s Day, transported equipment needed for sanitation, like plastic bags, boots and body bags, to Thailand. The second, on January 7, comprised bottled water, tents, blankets and flashlights, and went to Indonesia. These materials, 76 tons in the Indonesian shipment, were transported free by Cathay Pacific Airways and Hong Kong Air Cargo Terminals Limited.30

2. Singapore’s response Monetary donations The Singaporean people offered a strong response to the appeals for donations from the government and from relief NGOs, contributing a total of S$80 million (HK$377.6 million). Corporations provided millions of Singapore dollars’ worth of cash and supplies. Within two days of the tsunami, the Singaporean government pledged S$2 million (HK$9.4 million) towards humanitarian relief.31 This amount was surpassed very soon, primarily through the relief and recovery work of the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF). By the second week of relief operations, S$20 million (HK$94 million) had been spent by the government. On January 7, Singapore pledged S$16.5 million (HK$77.5 million) to the UN fund for reconstruction in the devastated areas.32 The SAF’s recovery operations continued well into February. On February 19, it was estimated that in total, Singapore contributed S$150 million (HK$705 million) of which S$70 million (HK$329 million) came from the government.33

Ambrose Leung and Klaudia Lee, “$30m in help is not enough, say lawmakers,” December 31, 2004 South China Morning Post: EDT2. 26 See http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200412/27/1227181.htm and http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200412/27/1227159.htm. 27 See http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200412/29/1229124.htm. 28 See http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200412/30/1230019.htm. 29 See http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200412/31/1231333.htm. 30 See http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200501/07/0107231.htm. 31 Karamjit Kaur and Chang Ai-Lien, “S'pore sending more aid to affected areas,” December 30, 2004 Straits Times: Prime News. 32 Chua Mui Hoong. “S'pore ups aid, adds another $16,” January 7, 2005 Straits Times: Prime News. 33 Peh Shing Huei. “S'pore's tsunami aid close to $150m,” February 19, 2005 Straits Times: Singapore.

Government action abroad A SAF plane loaded with tents, blankets, food and medical supplies was sent to Indonesia on 12/28 – the first such shipment to arrive there after the disaster.34 The following day, a SAF medical team, two Chinook helicopters, and a Disaster Assistance and Rescue Team (DART) of 23 members were dispatched to Medan, Indonesia; another DART and a humanitarian aid package were sent to Thailand; and an aid package was forwarded to Sri Lanka.35 On December 30, another two Chinooks left for Medan to engage in search and rescue operations, personnel transport and medical evacuations; four helicopters were sent to Phuket, Thailand for the same purposes. New Year’s Eve was not a blissful soirée, but rather a time to act: a landing ship tank with 350 men, heavy-duty equipment and vehicles and humanitarian supplies set sail for Sumatra, Indonesia that night. Another significant step was taken on December 31: after a US call for a “core group” of nations, including Japan and Australia, to lead relief efforts and an Italian call for the G8 to do the same, Singapore pushed for an urgent ASEAN summit.36 This meeting took place one week later in Jakarta; Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong was one of three keynote speakers to address the conference, which was open to 23 countries.37 By January 3, the vessel from New Year’s Eve had arrived in the disaster zone, delivering the first batch of supplies to the previously inaccessible area. Throughout the rest of January, ships and helicopters were sent every few days to the affected areas with supplies and personnel provided by the Singaporean government and by the public and corporate sectors. It was during this time that the international response grew strong, with supplies flooding the region. The airports in the disaster-stricken countries struggled to handle all the shipments, but were simply beyond their capacity. To relieve this congestion and facilitate the efficient delivery of supplies, Singapore offered the use of its air and naval bases, equipment and facilities to the UN on January 3.38 The next day, relief materials started arriving in Singapore, where they were held until the intended countries could receive them.39 By January 8, Singapore’s initiative had facilitated 55 aircraft sorties.40 A thorough understanding of the needs of the disaster areas at the highest level of government, enhanced by a willingness to listen, characterized Singapore’s response. On January 4, Prime Minister Lee visited Banda Aceh and Meulaboh, Indonesia. When he encountered SAF servicemen working there, he asked, “What additional resources do you need?”41 Three days later he met with Indonesian Vice President Jusuf Kalla and asked how Singapore could best help. When Kalla suggested that Singapore focus its efforts on Meulaboh, Lee immediately agreed. The SAF allocated 700 of its 900-strong relief team to the area.42 A major breakthrough for relief operations in Banda Aceh came about on January 9, when Singapore sent a mobile air traffic control tower to the Banda Aceh airport. This enhanced the airport’s capacity to handle planes carrying relief supplies to the area.43

“Help for S'poreans in disaster,” December 29, 2004 Business Times Singapore. See http://www.mindef.gov.sg/navy/navynews/documents/2005/0501.pdf. 36 Chua Mui Hoong. “S'pore calls for urgent Asean talks,” December 31, 2004 Straits Times: Prime News. 37 Asad Latif. “Leaders to attend emergency summit,” January 2, 2005 Straits Times: In The News. 38 Carolyn Quek. “Big-Hearted S'poreans,” January 2, 2005 Straits Times: In The News. 39 Zuraidah Ibrahim. “PM Lee flies to disaster spots for first-hand look,” January 5, 2005 Straits Times: Prime News. 40 “Singapore proposals taken up at summit,” January 8, 2005 Straits Times: Prime News. 41 See reference 38. 42 Chua Mui Hoong, “S'pore to concentrate aid efforts on Meulaboh,” January 7, 2005 Straits Times: Prime News. 43 “S'pore sends mobile air control tower,” January 8, 2005 Straits Times: Prime News. 35

The SAF’s efforts went beyond providing the basic human needs of food, water, shelter and medical care. In Meulaboh, Indonesia, Muslims use livestock for a sacrificial ritual known as korban. To facilitate one such ceremony, the SAF endeavored to find cows or buffaloes from other regions to bring to Meulaboh.44 Singapore played a major role in gathering and coordinating international support for tsunami response. Its modus operand for calling widespread attention to urgent matters manifested itself again on January 25 in a joint declaration with Japan, proclaiming the need for an effective tsunami warning system.45 Singapore’s relief operations have been the subject of international acclaim. On January 5, the Indonesian ambassador to Singapore, Mochamad Slamet Hidayat, extended his “…utmost appreciation to the people of Singapore for their solidarity, sympathy as well as their generosity and continued support in our efforts to help the victims and rebuild the province of Aceh...”46 A January 19 UN announcement declared that Singapore’s response would be used as a case study for disaster relief efforts.47 Secretary-General Kofi Annan personally thanked Singapore, writing “Your Government responded... magnificently, and provided the critical support required to sustain the United Nations' effort on the ground, particularly in terms of logistics, civil-military liaison and coordination.”48

IV. Implications for Autonomy A. Singapore’s capacity and ability to act As of July 2005, Singapore’s population is estimated at 4,425,720; the figure for Hong Kong is 6,898,686, one third more. Singapore’s purchasing power parity of US$120.9 billion is approximately half of Hong Kong’s, at US$234.5 billion.49 The main financial efforts on Hong Kong’s behalf came from the territory’s citizenry, with the government spending much less than Singapore’s, in both absolute and relative terms. In fact, the Singaporean Government spent 15 times as much as the HKSAR government: HK$329 million vs. HK$22.5 million. With fewer people and less economic power, Singapore’s response was nonetheless significantly greater than Hong Kong’s. Singapore had goals and knew how to go about achieving them. The country’s possible motivations included humanitarian altruism, the desire for better relations with ASEAN countries (particularly Indonesia), and the ambition to prove itself as a regional power. While it is difficult to pinpoint which of these drove Singapore to act as it did, the outcome suggests that it succeeded at all three. The SAF genuinely touched people’s lives, its men having brought needed resources and hope to the devastated regions. Indonesia benefited immensely from Singapore’s efforts and wholeheartedly thanked them. Worldwide media attention turned to Singapore’s response – while among the smallest countries in the world, it emerged as a leader and garnered recognition as such. Since responding to the tsunami was deemed a national priority, Singapore gave it its all and succeeded. The decision to focus its resources on Indonesia allowed Singapore to make a significant, tangible impact in a particular area. This resulted in it receiving positive international 44

David Boey, “SAF goes on buffalo hunt for Hari Raya Haji ceremonies,” January 16, 2005 Straits Times: In The News. 45 Anthony Rowley, “Tsunami early warning system to be set up,” January 26, 2005 Business Times Singapore: World. 46 Karamjit Kaur, “Thank you, Singapore,” January 6, 2005 Straits Times: Prime News. 47 “S'pore aid a case study for UN's crisis planners,” January 19, 2005 Straits Times: Asia - South-east Asia. 48 “UN chief thanks S'pore for help in tsunami relief,” March 7, 2005 Straits Times: Singapore. 49 See http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/sn.html and http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/hk.html.

attention.

B. Hong Kong’s capacity and desire to act While the government’s press releases proudly documented the HKSAR’s response to the tsunami, newspaper reports and editorials decried its efforts to help affected Hong Kong residents as slow and inadequate. In response to LegCo members’ questioning of the government’s ability to react appropriately to disasters, the Security Bureau proposed a tiered alarm system. Such a setup would respond according to the severity of the emergency, ranging from immigration officers answering overseas HKSAR citizens’ enquiries via telephone to the use of a search, recovery and rescue team.50 In response to direct criticism of the government’s actions, the Permanent Secretary for Security Stanley Ying stated that it would “not [be] feasible” to require civil servants to engage in international disaster relief.” 51 No explanation was attached to this statement, but taken from an autonomy perspective, international disaster relief fits into Liu’s definition of “low foreign policy.” As such, Hong Kong would be within its rights to make international disaster relief part of its operating policy. It is unlikely that doing so would anger the CPG. The PRC would actually stand to benefit if Hong Kong’s capacity for relief were increased from two perspectives: firstly, the relief effort could assist China as a whole, and secondly, China would benefit from any international appreciation of Hong Kong’s humanitarian efforts abroad. Ying went on: “Hong Kong residents abroad should approach local authorities and Chinese embassies before seeking help from Hong Kong.”52 While this is the technically correct position (China has embassies overseas, not Hong Kong), such a statement may indicate Hong Kong officials did not feel the tsunami offered them an opportunity to exercise their autonomy in external affairs more creatively. If the HKSAR Government had a greater ambition to conduct the territory’s external affairs to enhance Hong Kong’s external position, more could have been done in response to the tsunami beyond the sending out of a 120-member team on December 30 for Phuket as discussed above. Most of Hong Kong’s experience in external affairs is related to trade and economics. It is only recently (e.g. – since the establishment of the DRF) that the territory has entered the stage of international disaster response but even here, its primary recipient was Mainland China. Since there appears to be no real constraints from the PRC impeding Hong Kong’s response to the tsunami, the only remaining issues behind the government’s modest response are resources and desire. In terms of economic resources, Hong Kong could have contributed more towards relief and recovery efforts. It also had the resource of its incredibly generous people, which could have been tapped to assist in a heftier governmental response. Hong Kong’s resource lineup differs most from Singapore when it comes to the military. Singapore has the most advanced armed services in Southeast Asia while Hong Kong cannot have a military as a non-sovereign entity. The HKSAR Government did, however, send small Auxiliary Medical Service and Department of Health teams to the devastated areas. Nevertheless, perhaps what really held Hong Kong back was its lack of ambition.

50 51 52

“Disaster rescue plan revealed.” The Standard June 2, 2005: World A15. “Staff shortage fear on catastrophe response plan.” The Standard June 14, 2005: Metro A15. See footnote 36.

V. Conclusion In the exercise of its autonomy, Hong Kong does not appear overly motivated to explore what it can do in terms of external affairs. When confronted directly with this topic, Secretary for Security, Ambrose Lee, commented that: “as large-scale relief efforts would also involve diplomatic matters, the SAR government should notify the Ministry of Foreign Affairs before taking action.”53 This statement is conditional, describing the actions that Hong Kong might one day take. It expresses a passive attitude and does not indicate that Hong Kong even has a desire to perhaps work alongside China in future international relief. Rather it hints that the HKSAR could do what it would like as long as it apprised China of its intents. The extent of Hong Kong’s autonomy in managing its external affairs will perhaps only be known when it tries to do something and is restricted by China. Until then the only force restricting Hong Kong’s autonomy is Hong Kong itself.

Dennis Ng. “Disaster plan to be updated after tsunami response criticized,” March 1, 2005 Standard: Metro A20.