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SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST
BEHIND THE NEWS GOVERNANCE Donald Tsang is vesting more authority in key figures under his new initiatives. Christine Loh suggests the move does little to move away from a democratic deficit
Power policy C
hief Executive Donald Tsang Yam-kuen told us in his policy address on Wednesday that his “foremost job is to fully grasp Hong Kong’s political landscape”. What this means is that he will focus on politics to get public support for the government. To allow him to focus his full attention on political matters, he’s giving more important responsibilities to the chief secretary and the financial secretary. They will now have the key tasks of co-ordinating policymaking and ensuring policies “are properly staged, public resources are efficiently used, and duplication, inaction and ineffective action are avoided”. In other words, the chief secretary and financial secretary are now tasked with delivering the Tsang administration’s pledges. Mr Tsang’s move reverses efforts by his predecessor, Tung Chee-hwa, to downgrade the role of the chief secretary into something rather fuzzy. Mr Tsang will more “clearly define” the two top secretaries’ portfolios. Most significantly, for day-to-day operations, all ministers will report to the chief secretary and financial secretary, and Mr Tsang said he would work closely with them. The chief secretary and financial secretary will use the longstanding Policy Committee, comprising the secretary for justice and all ministers, “as the main platform for policy co-ordination and initial clearance”. This committee, chaired by the chief secretary, fell into disuse during Mr Tung’s time, but will again consider all policy proposals before they are submitted to the Executive Council for deliberation.
Mr Tsang wants to expand his own office too. The director of the Chief Executive’s Office, a political appointee, will liaise with external bodies including the Legislative Council and the greatly expanded advisory Commission on Strategic Development. More interestingly, an additional post of permanent secretary will take care of internal management, including co-ordination with Exco and the respective offices of the chief secretary and financial secretary. This civil service position will in many ways be more powerful than that of the director. This may mean the person Mr Tsang wants is a civil servant who does not want to become a political appointee. Mr Tsang is turning back the clock to a great extent to the colonial “executive-led” system, although he is polite to say Mr Tung’s ministerial system is “a necessary reform in the path of constitutional development”. He wants us to see the reversal as a step towards “further consolidation and improvement” of the governing structure when in fact it is being dismantled. With these moves in place, Mr Tsang believes the “most pressing need” now is to give the ministers greater support “to undertake growing political work related to the formulation and implementation of policies, actively reach out to various social sectors and seek wider and more solid public support for the government”. His idea is to make room for “a small number of positions dedicated to political affairs” whose main duty will be to support the chief executive and the ministers in their political work. These positions are presumably deputy min-
THE REAL ECO CHALLENGE Donald Tsang admits creating a better environment poses a “big challenge for the government”. Then why not consider whether there’s a more sustainable alternative than creating a huge government complex on Tamar that will consume a vast amount of materials and generate a lot of construction waste? Why create more than nine million sq ft of new floor space on the Central harbourfront when the
One of the West Kowloon redevelopment designs
government has admitted it will add substantial traffic? Why not reconsider the West Kowloon Cultural District too and drop the giant
canopy? Why not use sustainability criteria to assess what developments can be done at the frontier border area? Christine Loh
Christine Loh says the success of the latest changes hinges on efforts to translate political accountability into personal responsibilities for Exco. Photo: May Tse
isterial posts, which he had suggested once before but the civil service objected. Mr Tsang believes people with political ambition might be willing to become deputies, including civil servants who aspire to become politicians. How does Exco fit into Mr Tsang’s revamp? He will increase the number of unofficial (non-ministerial) members, and the portfolio ministers will be bumped off except for the chief secretary, financial secretary and secretary for justice. Mr Tsang says this will allow more time and opportunities for the unofficial Exco members “to express their views and put forward proposals”. He promises the unofficials will “have more opportunities to participate at an earlier stage of policymaking, and will be able to focus on individual policy areas through division of labour”. He will, however, also require them to “explain and promote policies” in public. The success of these latest changes depends on the calibre of Exco members and, more importantly, on an effort by the government to translate political accountability into specific personal responsibilities for Exco to have the legitimacy it needs within a system that cannot have elections to create the government. The restructured Exco will also likely undermine still further the credibility of the ministers. If they are not full Exco members, how do they differ from the old arrangement under which civil servants were appointed as policy secretaries, performing the duties of ministers without the title? The ministerial system will forfeit its original justification. It will also become more difficult to cultivate “political talent” for political roles as these
“outsiders” will in practice be little more than late entrants to the senior ranks of the civil service if deprived of Exco membership. Presumably, political appointments will be based on patronage, like in the old colonial days. Nevertheless, it will be helpful for the chief executive to pledge to the new Exco that he will ensure members can function better in their constitutional role under the Basic Law. Article 56 requires the chief executive to consult Exco before making “important” policy decisions and in introducing legislation. Article 56 also makes it clear that it is a very serious matter for the chief executive to act against “a majority opinion” of Exco
subjects, senior officials would assess whether Exco members themselves would consider that they ought to have been consulted on an issue before the government made its decision. It can be argued that the whole thrust of Article 56 is to insert into Exco a group of independent “outsiders” the right to have their views considered seriously before the government undertakes any significant activity. This reading of the Basic Law makes sense if seen within the context that what is needed in our political system is to have some restraining measures within the powerful executive-led structure. Thus, Exco reform must be judged on whether it will enable the indepen-
Mr Tsang is turning back the clock to the colonial system. He wants us to see the reversal as a step towards “further consolidation and improvement” when in fact it is being dismantled and requires him to put the specific reasons on record. Yet, no mechanisms are incorporated into the Basic Law by which the chief executive can be compelled to account for his failure to heed the advice of Exco. Furthermore, the chief executive is left to define what is considered “important policy”. In the colonial era, there was a similar lack of clarity about what ought to be put to Exco. In the 1990s, senior officials adopted two informal and entirely pragmatic criteria: first, if Exco had been consulted previously on an issue, members would be informed of any significant change in the government’s views on the subject; secondly, on new
dent “outsiders” to play that role better. We recommend that Mr Tsang now consider adopting the following measures for that purpose. Initially, he must fulfil the promise in the policy address that “a strong government does not work behind closed doors” with a protocol spelling out the circumstances where the administration must take matters to Exco. This is necessary because the administration has bypassed Exco: the most recent example that made the headlines was the West Kowloon Cultural District project, where the administration had not bothered to report to Exco for an extended period and Exco in fact played a “limited role” in what is
one of Hong Kong’s largest development projects. Mr Tsang must also commit to giving Exco sufficient time and information to consider policy proposals. A constant gripe among councillors is that they are given papers with little time before meetings. In return, the appointees need to be willing to spend considerable time discharging their responsibilities. The second measure is to be prepared to appoint Exco members in representative capacities. For example, party members are there to represent their parties so that a wider range of views, perspectives and judgments can be brought into Exco’s deliberations. Thirdly, he should consider dropping the rules of collective responsibility and require only limited obligation to confidentiality so that Exco members can play the role as guardian of the public interest and wellbeing by voicing concerns publicly if the executive wants to push ahead with plans that are unready or inappropriate; or refuse to give priority to important matters. Another measure would be accepting where there are serious disagreements between the administration and a member that the proper action is for the member to resign and for him or her to explain publicly (perhaps in Legco) the reasons why. Finally, he must accept that the oddities and awkwardness of our political system cannot be cured by making new appointments to Exco alone and that without true representative government, we will still suffer from a democratic deficit, where those in power cannot claim the full political legitimacy to act. Christine Loh Kung-wai is chief executive of independent think-tank Civic Exchange
Cat and mouse game played door to door in Afghanistan Responsible for hunting Taleban fighers and reassuring villagers, US soldiers take Scott Baldauf on patrol It has not been an auspicious start to the morning. The heavy weapons squad has just been dropped into the wrong field of mung beans. “Man, one of these days we’ll be dropped in the right place,” Private Mike Patraw said, voicing everyone’s thoughts. Being out of position means not only a longer walk, but possibly not being able to provide covering fire for units searching a village in the valley below. By the time they reach the village of Kunlalan, Afghan National Army (ANA) soldiers and other members of the US 82nd Airborne are already going house to house looking for signs of Taleban weapons or support. Any Taleban who might have been in the village would have hidden their Kalashnikovs at the first sound of the Chinook helicopters. The 40-odd men of the 82nd Airborne – on a five-day mission with ANA troops in the mountains of
northern Zabul province – know the chances of an armed encounter with the Taleban are not great. But from a military standpoint, it has been foot patrols and air assaults like this that have produced a year of the most serious fighting with insurgents since the fall of the Taleban government in 2001. The key, US commanders say, is sending a message to the Taleban that their havens are no longer safe, and to Afghan villagers that they can begin to trust the Afghan army will be there to protect them. “Most of the people say they haven’t seen anything, never saw any Taleban,” said Sergeant Joseph Parker of Cleveland, Ohio, as men of 2nd Battalion, Charlie Company, search the mud-walled room of an Afghan home. Sergeant Parker nods his head towards the residents of this home, some women and children, huddling in a corner of the yard. “As far
as going and getting to the Taleban through local intelligence, it’s not going to happen. The only way to do it is to sneak up on them.” Private Jacob Rutledge, a quiet, lanky kid from Washington DC, searches through some baskets near one of the women, who is holding an infant in her arms. A chicken darts out of the basket, as if clucking its final prayer. The baby starts to cry. “I’m sorry,” Private Rutledge said gently. Outside the compound, a crowd of old men and children are gathering around the US soldiers. One shepherd pleads with the soldiers to arrest another shepherd who has just passed through town with his flock. “He’s a thug,” the shepherd said in Pashto. Another villager, an elderly man, approaches an army medic to ask for medicine for a child. The local people may not be ready to inform on the local Taleban, but they grasp that the US Army is a possible source of help. “This is what I love,” said Specialist “Doc” Kris Tyte, a medic from Charlotte, North Carolina. “You get to sit down with kids and an interpreter and just talk. And you know, kids are pretty much
kids everywhere. They don’t say, I want to be a Taleban. They say, I want to be a policeman, or even president. Even after all these years of war, they want to be productive members of society.” So far, this day has brought what Lieutenant Ben Wisnioski, of Rocky Hill, Connecticut, calls “the usual lies” from the villagers: No, we haven’t seen the Taleban. If we have seen the Taleban, they pass the village at night. If they came during the day, we haven’t seen them before, and we didn’t see their faces very clearly. No, we didn’t see what direction they came from or what direction they left in. But these men know they have to stay alert, nonetheless. Hiking between villages, they keep their heads “on a swivel”, scanning for signs of movement. They also make sure they are always within 10 paces of a boulder to provide cover, in case of an ambush, which has long been the Afghan’s preferred method of warfare. Just a month ago, a few days before the national election, some Taleban fighters opened fire on a patrol near the town of Shahjoy. “We air assaulted into a village, and one
An Afghan soldier, on joint patrol with the US 82nd Airborne, searches a village house for signs of the Taleban. Photo: The Christian Science Monitor
guy with an AK-47 opened fire on an Apache helicopter,” said Private Jeremy Wier, of Douglasville, Georgia. “The Apache pretty much handled him.” In the next village, said Private Wier, two other men carrying weapons ran out of the village when he and his team arrived. Helicopters handled those fighters too. “We heard them talking on their
radio,” said Private Wier. “Our interpreter told us they were doing a roll call. There were three confirmed dead and one missing. There were 20 of them down in that village originally, but most fled to the mountains.” When the Taleban did fight, they were usually bad shots, Private Wier said. A few weeks ago, the Ta-
leban fired two rocket-propelled grenades at some of the squad from just 46 metres away – and missed. Private Wier pauses. “Basically, it’s either zero or 100 [Taleban] here. So far today, it looks like nothing.” Private Shane Hahn of Rush City, Minnesota, smiles: “That’s not necessarily a bad thing.” Still, the past two days have brought some results. In one village, men tell Charlie Company’s translator, Ahmed, that they have recently slaughtered two goats for Taleban to eat. In another village, ANA soldiers discover about 100 rounds of ammo, mortars, and rocket-propelled grenades. Clearly, the Taleban come to this area often. Yet it’s a game of cat and mouse. Every time the Americans enter a new valley, the Taleban radio the fighters to clear out: the Americans are coming. At dusk, the men pause on a road and sip from their water pouches, while a few hundred sheep and donkeys belonging to the “thug” shepherd walk past. “Baaa-aaa,” said some of the sheep. “Baaa-aaa,” responded a chorus of exhausted soldiers. The Christian Science Monitor