untitled by Civic Exchange

Political Party Development in Hong Kong: Beyond the “China dimension”?

Marlene Grundström Civic Exchange Intern, April 2006

Table of Contents

1. Introduction…………………………………………………..………..

2. Historical background………………………………………..……….

3. Conceptual framework: Issue, Identity, Image…………….………..

4. Three case studies & a point of reference…………………………....

5. Hong Kong party system development……………………………….

5.1 The China/democracy dimension…………………………......

5.2 The economic dimension………………………………………

5.3 Sociological dimensions…………………………………….....

5.4 Post-materialist dimensions…………………………………..

5.5 Conclusion……………………………………………………..

Hong Kong party development…………………………………………...

6.1 DAB………………………………………………………….....

6.2 Citizens Party…………………………………………….…….

6.3 Article 45 Concern Group/Civic Party……………….……....

6.4 Conclusion………………………………………………………

List of references……………………………………………………………

Introduction

In the past two decades of democratization in Hong Kong, political parties have gone from being non-existent to acquiring the recognition of both the public and the state as key actors in the political field. However, as Hong Kong is not yet a full-blown democracy, there are a set of constraints on the role political parties can play.1 Nevertheless, Hong Kong's future as a democracy partly resides in the ability of parties to gain the confidence of the citizens and the state. As constitutional reform evolves, however snail-paced, there simply is no alternative to a functioning political party system in Hong Kong. The way in which parties develop thus seems to matter for Hong Kong’s democratic future, despite current institutional constraints. Understanding which factors determine party emergence and consolidation, by comparing the specific Hong Kong context with other democracies, appears essential for enhancing the future role of parties on the political scene. Due to China's influential role on the Hong Kong party scene, particularly in its formation, Beijing has been viewed as the main determinant of party development. As Kuan and Lau argue: “Political parties have found themselves 'capture' of history and the past policies of both Britain and China” 2 and “the 'foundation moment' has therefore seriously constrained the ability of the parties to adjust to the new political environment”.3 According to Kuan and Lau's hypothesis, the relation to China constitutes the main line of competition in the Hong Kong party system. As a consequence, the number of issues and actors it can embrace is limited due to this structural constraint, in a sense being “frozen”4 in its original form. However, this study is intended to show that although the macro-level “China factor” has determined the main cleavage structuring the Hong Kong party system; the parties, issues and lines of competition are far from frozen and that Kuan and Lau's dismal view of the role of parties is not necessarily true. Instead, other micro-level factors as outlined further below also appear to be important in shaping the development of Hong Kong's political parties.

2. Historical background Explaining the emergence of a party system The first Hong Kong political party, in a formal sense, was founded in 1990 as the United Democrats of Hong Kong (UDHK). The UDHK was a result of a growing opposition within civil society against authoritarian rule during the 1980s, culminating in party formation less than a year after the Tiananmen Square massacre, an event with a huge impact on public 1

Most significantly, due to the relationship between the executive and the legislature, parties do not have a chance to govern despite popular majority support. 2 Kuan and Lau (2000) in Sing (2003), p. 240 3 ibid. p. 256 4 This terminology is used by Peter Mair to describe a state of stability in fundamental party system cleavages. Mair (1997) p.4 However, as the author of this report shall argue further on, Kuan and Lau are applying the theoretical concept of “freezing” not only to the Hong Kong party system, but to its parties and lines of competition as well.

support for democracy in Hong Kong. However, activism in favor of democracy was not new. In fact, during the 1960s, organizations such as the Reform Club and the Civic Association were passionate advocates of democratic reform.5 The success of the pro-democracy groups/parties in the 1991 Legco elections led to a further polarization of the camps,6 as Beijing and the pro-China groups realized the serious challenge they would have to face in order to maintain control over Hong Kong. Consequently, China made a u-turn on its stance towards political parties and began to regard them as a tool to maintain in power, rather than as a threat to its future role in the SAR. Beijing thus supported the formation of the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong in 1992, a party which functioned as its puppet on the Hong Kong political scene. With the birth of the DAB, a party system had been formed. But why did not political parties emerge earlier in Hong Kong, despite evident ideational support for democratic reform? This can largely be explained by the actions of local political and social actors7, combined with the historically derived bias against partisanship in Hong Kong.8 Modernization theories have appeared unable to explain the lack of democratization in Hong Kong, given the high level of economic prosperity since the 1960s. External and institutional constraints only partly explain why political parties emerged in the early 1990s. An explanation based upon external power relations would not predict the emergence of political parties only a few years before the transfer from the hands of a consolidated democracy to one of the world's most authoritarian dictatorships. Beijing's concessions and uturn on its stance towards political parties in Hong Kong was not an independent factor, but rather a result of the actions of local Hong Kong groups, as well as the British government. Similarly, I will argue that the subsequent development of individual parties is not primarily a result of macro-level power relations or structurally determined social and economic conditions, but rather a result of conscious processes of politization and bargaining by individuals, political groups and parties.9 Such a perspective on the development of political parties in Hong Kong assigns greater explanatory power to ideas and micro-level events and decisions, as opposed to macro-level pre-determined structures.

3. Conceptual framework 3.1 The role of political parties The most recent research on political parties has indicated a “crisis” of party. Along with increasing voter mobility, decreasing party identification, and increased number of alternative channels of representation, political parties no longer seem to be able to perform their 5

Leung (1999) p. 68 Sing (2004) p. 94 7 ibid. p. 113 8 According to Professor Michael Degolyer, maintaining a prominent role for the HK civil service and resisting the development of political parties has been convenient for both the British colonial government and Mainland Chinese authorities. Consequently, any form of party organization was seen as a threat to their basis of power. The British, Chinese, and now Hong Kong governments have all benefited form keeping alive a myth of Hong Kong people being “politically apathetic”. However, as transition grew near, increasing activism and a high level of political knowledge among the general public showed that this was not true. Based on conversation with Professor Michael Degolyer, Hong Kong Baptist University, March 27 2006 9 Holmberg (2002) p. 141 6

representative role.10 However, one of the strongest pieces of evidence for the irreplacability of political parties appears to be empirical: in modern democracies, no viable alternative has evolved.11 In addition, the notion of party “decline” or “crisis” is not necessarily true. Although parties today play less of a mobilizing role, they still perform the crucial functions of recruitment, issue structuring, interest aggregation and social integration and forming government.12 The Hong Kong context is unique as parties do not form government, given the constitutional arrangements dividing the executive and the legislature. Despite this significant constraint, this paper will be based upon the view that political parties have a role to play in Hong Kong, based on the above mentioned crucial functions of political parties. In fact, there is reason to believe that the constitutional constraints particular to Hong Kong may strengthen the role of parties in one respect. Their monitoring role, as “watchdogs” of the government, may become greater in the eyes of the people, particularly during times of anti-government sentiment.13 Consequently, the effects of Hong Kong's constitutional design are not one-sidedly detrimental to the development of political parties. 3.2 Party system development The freezing of party systems has been regarded as an inevitable phenomenon in Western democracies.14 By the term freezing, it is implied that the fundamental cleavage or political divide structuring the party system will persist.15 Western party systems in general, and the Swedish party system in particular, are characterized by a high degree of cleavage stability. Since the 1960s, the Swedish party system has been regarded as frozen, since the left-right economic divide survived through a decade of immense societal transformation. Distinguished from the cleavage are however the constantly changing lines of competition along which individual parties compete – i.e. the issues influencing how voters cast their votes. Kuan and Lau argue that the Hong Kong party system has frozen, both in terms of cleavage and in terms of lines of competition. They argue that the “China factor” and the related issue of democratization has frozen the development of individual parties and suggest that these so called “political issues”16 are “far more important than non-political issues” and that “parties place top priority on distinguishing themselves from their competitors on political issues”.17 According to Leung, the “China Cleavage” was rather a “China Syndrome”, decreasing in importance after the crucial transition in 1997, as Hong Kong political parties develop and mature.18 Based upon the idea of political learning among the public, there is a potential for a 10

Diamond (2001) p. 338 ibid. 12 ibid. p. 7 13 Cheng (1999) p. 38 14 Mair (1997) p.4 15 Consequently, it is also necessary to distinguish between party and party system change. The latter may remain “frozen” , even though individual parties change or even are replaced. 16 Political issues are in the context of Hong Kong often defined as issues related to democratization and constitutional reform, although this is appears to be an extremely narrow and somewhat misleading definition of the term. 17 Kuan & Lau (2000) in Sing (2003) p. 257 18 Leung in Scott (1998) p. 85 11

widened competitive arena which includes more lines of competition among parties. Increasingly, voters are paying more attention to other issues and parties are emerging – partly in response to and partly spearheading – new ideational trends within Hong Kong's ideological space. The number of dimensions in a party system depends on several different factors. Traditionally, sociological explanatory models have been most frequently employed. 19 Although collective, social identities still are seen as important, researchers of party system development have found it more and more useful to look at other, less structurally determined factors, and particularly, the processes of politization among local political actors. These factors will be important in studying the potential of new dimensions emerging within the Hong Kong party system. 3.3 Party development Factors shaping party development Distinguished from the development of the party system is the development of individual parties. Both ideational and organizational factors are important in shaping the conditions for party development. The conditions for party development are of course related to the ideological space available in the party system. The party's relation to the China/democracy dimension could be determinative of its chances of succeeding, particularly if the “freezing” hypothesis appears to be true. However, the party's relation to the economic dimension, as well as other potentially relevant dimensions, will be studied as well, in order to find out how other ideational factors are for party development in Hong Kong. In addition to the ideational conditions for party development, three more practical factors will be considered for each case study. Close ties with civil society may be one way for parties to secure support from crucial voter groups.20 Issues related to the party's organization can potentially determine its chances of achieving long-term support and consolidation, as well as its chances of mobilizing during elections. Party organization is becoming increasingly important factor as they must adapt to new conditions along with the “crisis” of party and competition from alternative modes of interest representation.21

Lazarsfeld (1944); reference in Holmberg (2002) p. 142 Civil society; Sing, Ming (2003): “Governing Elites, External Events and Pro-democratic Opposition in Hong Kong (1986-2002)”, Government and Opposition, Volume 38 Issue 4, October 2003 21 Diamond (2001) p. 335 20

Table 1.1 Factors shaping party development in Hong Kong22 Ideational factors

Relation to China/democracy dimension Relation to economic dimension Relation to other potential dimensions

Organizational factors

Civil society relations Party organization

Three key components of party appeal How parties relate to the above factors appears to be crucial to shaping their issues, identity and image, three key components of party success. 23 These three concepts will be used throughout the study of party development, as a prism for understanding how parties appeal to voters. Issues are defined as “bounded sets of problems that can be isolated” 24 and should be separated from broader ideas of what is beneficial to a specific group or class. Voters who issue vote are generally flexible, and must take active part in public debate in order to identify which party best handles their specific issue. Voting upon partisan identity 25 is in many ways the opposite of issue voting and is emphasized by sociological theories of party development. Voters choose the same party election after election, disregarding how politicians handle individual issues. Image is the direct link between the voter and the party. It is the way through which parties communicate their ideas and the way in which voters perceive parties in their particular political context, which depends on leadership and party strategies.

4. Three case studies & a point of reference 4.1 Three case studies From below, the DAB, the Citizens Party and the Article 45 Concern Group will be chosen as case studies. The choice of case studies is based upon the following criteria: representing

In Hong Kong, there are also obvious institutional constraints to the development of parties in Hong Kong. However, due to the limited scope of this report, ideational and organizational factors of party development will be the primary focus, although the institutional limitations of course cannot be ignored. For a deeper analysis of Hong Kong's institutional constraints on party development, see, among others, Richard Cullen's report for Civic Exchange: “Regulating parties in Hong Kong”.22 23 Sartori (1976) p. 328 24 ibid. 25 Sartori (1976) p. 328

different stages of success, 26 formed in different periods in HK democratization, representing different defining ideas.28

and

Table 1.2 Hong Kong main political parties since 1991 and their defining ideas PARTY

FOUNDATION

CAMP

UDHK/DP DAB Liberal Party

1990/1994 1992 1993

Pro-democracy Pro-Beijing Pro-Beijing

ADPL

Pro-democracy

The Frontier

1996

Pro-democracy

Citizens Party Article 45 Concern Group/Civic Party

1997 2003/2006

Pro-democracy Pro-democracy

MAIN/DEFINING IDEAS Democratization Pro-Beijing Free market, business interests Social justice, workers' interests Pace of democratization, Social justice Environment, education Democratization, rule of law

The stage of party development is important since explaining its variance is the main purpose of this study. The party case studies are chosen include one emerged, consolidated and increasing in public support (DAB), one emerged, consolidated and decreasing in public support (DP), one emerged but not consolidated (Citizens Party) and one just emerged (Civic Party). 27 Since political party change is the focal point of this study, time is an important factor in choosing the three cases. They are chosen to cover as broad a period of time as possible, formed in the vicinity of four separate Legco election years in Hong Kong political history: 1991, 1992, 1997 and 2003. 28 Since one of the purposes of this report is to show that there is room for more lines of competition than the China/democracy dimension admits, the party case studies are chosen to represent different issues in Hong Kong politics. The choice of the DAB forms a critical case since it was part of the original cleavage in the Hong Kong party system and thus would be most prone to adhere to the original China/democracy dimension. The choice of the Citizens Party is interesting since its defining issue represents a dimension which previously has not been a line of competition in Hong Kong. The Civic Party implies a revival of the original China/democracy dimension; however, a closer study may reveal if it is in fact competing on other lines.

Table 1.3: Legco election results 1991-2004: legislators obtained by each party, elected through direct elections/functional constituencies/electoral committee29

Pro-democracy camp

Pro-Beijing camp

UDHK/DP

1991 12/2/0

1995 14/5

1998 9/4

2000 9/3

2004 7/2

1/0 1/0 0/0

Meeting Point ADPL The Frontier Citizens Party

3/0 1

3/1

3/0/1 1/0

1 2 0/0

CTU Article 45 Concern Group/Civic Party

0/1 -

2/0 -

1/0 3/1

Independents & Others Total

0/0 16/4/0

3/2 21/10

1/1 15/5

2/2 17/5

5/4 18/7

DAB CRC/Liberal Party/

0/8/12

4/2 1/9

7/2 1/9

7/3 0/8

8/4 2/8

Hong Kong Progressive Alliance FTU Independents & Others30 Total

2/9/5 2/17/17

1/0 0/1 2/8 9/20

3/2 0/1 4/11 15/25

3/1 0/1 3/12 13/25

1/0 1/11 12/23

4.2 Swedish comparison Despite the particularities of the Hong Kong party system, it is nonetheless relevant to place it within a wider context in order to identify which features are specific to Hong Kong, and which can be seen as part of international trends. The international comparison is especially relevant if the China factor appears to be less important than assumed. The Swedish party system will therefore be used as a point of reference throughout the report. The Swedish party system is recognized as typical of many Western European party systems. Its left-right cleavage based upon a socio-economic divide is viewed as one of the most stable in the world31 and has long been seen as largely uni-dimensional. Thus, it appears to be a critical test to the â&#x20AC;&#x153;freezingâ&#x20AC;? hypothesis: if changes are taking place, and new dimensions are being added to the extremely stable Swedish party system, they could be expected to take place elsewhere as well. 4.3 Material The report will be based upon a wide range of sources. With an actor-oriented, rather than structural approach, the words and deeds of politicians and particular local political events play an important role.

The total number of legislators in the Legco is 60. The proportions of legislators elected through direct elections/functional constituencies/election committee has however changed throughout the years, as follows: 1991: 18/21/0, 1995: 20/30/10, 1998: 20/30/10, 2000: 24/30/6, 2004: 30/30/0. In 1991, 18 members were appointed and 3 were ex officio members. Sources: Sing (2004); http://www.legco.gov.hk/english/index.htm; 30 Entailing legislators from both camps, although formally they are independent. 31 Holmberg (2002) p. 141

Much information will be gathered from Hong Kong local newspapers; primarily South China Morning Post and The Standard. Since Hong Kong citizens read more newspapers than anywhere else in the world, what is written in the media appears to matter quite a good deal for how political parties are perceived by the public.32 Also, since party membership and activities generally are quite low, it seems that most political education takes place through the media. In addition, I have performed six interviews with representatives of political parties and nongovernmental organizations, and had e-mail exchanges and informal discussions with several party representatives and academics in Hong Kong. For a full list of these, please see attached the list of references. The interviews have been valuable not least for identifying key internal, organizational factors, which are not publicly displayed in the media. Party manifestos and election platforms are also studied to find out how parties themselves wished to raise issues and build a public image. In addition, in order to understand further how Hong Kong citizens perceive the parties, surveys issued principally by Civic Exchange and the Hong Kong Transition Project have been consulted throughout the writing of this report. Finally, a broad range of secondary sources have been consulted in order to relate this report to previous research and an international context.

5. Hong Kong party system development 5.1 The China/democracy dimension In Hong Kong, the “China cleavage” was the main cleavage around which the first parties formed in the early 1990s. The main agenda of the UDHK was the democratization of Hong Kong, causing a direct conflict of interest with Beijing. The formation of the DAB in 1992 was a response by groups with close ties to Beijing, striving to preserve stable relations with the Mainland.33 The subsequent development of two camps, one labeled the “pro-democracy camp”, and one labeled the “pro-Beijing camp” suggests that the “China” dimension was not sufficient to capture all the issues at stake. The original “China cleavage” quickly absorbed a second cleavage along the same lines: the divide on democracy.34 Along with the massacre on Tiananmen Square in 1989 and the following wave of popular protests in Hong Kong, Beijing and democracy became antonyms in peoples' ears, setting the stage for the subsequent integration of the two parallel cleavages in the Hong Kong party system. The question at stake, however, is how important the divide on China/democracy has been in shaping the Hong Kong party system since the early 1990s. In the early stages of party system development in Hong Kong, the China dimension appeared to dominate people's perceptions of political alternatives.35 According to an electoral survey in 1995, many people perceived ADPL to be closer to DAB and the LP than to the DP on democratization issues. 36 32

According to Professor Michael Degolyer at Hong Kong Baptist University, there are 7-800 newspapers per 1000 Hong Kong citizens, while the average figure in developed countries is around 2-300. 33 The main objectives of the DAB were to “support the ressumption by the Chinese government of the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong”, to establish a “harmonious relationship of co-operation” between Hong Kong and China. Reference in Leung (1999) p. 256 34 Kuan & Lau (2000) in Sing (2003) p. 251 35 One of the most important factors in determining voters' attitudes towards partisan politics is the existence of clear alternatives – in other words, people must know what they are choosing between; Holmberg (2002) 36 Leung (1998) in Scott (1998) p. 102

In fact, the DP and ADPL held similar views on democratization, while they differed in their relation to China, ADPL emphasizing co-operation over confrontation.37 Similarly, the DP was perceived as the most social welfare-oriented among the parties, while ADPL according to a group of academic analysts had the most consistent platform on the issue.38 Thus, it appears that other issues mattered little to most Hong Kong voters at this stage of development of the party system. Parties were judged according to a uni-dimensional cleavage; their relation to Beijing determining how they were perceived by voters. However, the dominance of the China factor is perhaps not surprising, considering the pending transition to Chinese rule. Hong Kong citizens feared that their civil and political liberties would be restricted and that the city would be ruled exclusively by the Chinese Communist Party. This apprehension and focus on the China factor could be labeled as the “1997 syndrome”.39 However, even in 1997, China was not the only dimension in the party system. According to a report by the Hong Kong Transition Project, the Hong Kong party system was highly flexible and unstable in 1997, a point in time when the China factor could be assumed to be most prominent and polarizing.40 This appears to be true both for how voters relate to parties, and how parties act in relation to one another. Reportedly, voting patterns and alignments in the Legco shifted issue by issue; indicating that the “China/democracy” dimension was not sufficient to absorb other prevailing issues. However, the strongest piece of evidence for the inability of the China/democracy dimension to act as a sole determinant of the party system structure is perhaps demonstrating the existence of other dimensions. 5.2 The economic dimension The prominence of the socio-economic divide in many Western democracies makes it a relevant starting point in the search for additional dimensions in the Hong Kong party system. Furthermore, the external shock caused by the Asian financial crisis in 1997 led to an “awakening” of the Hong Kong public: Hong Kong was no longer viewed as the invulnerable and immune to economic decline.41 Citizens increasingly started to worry about their own, and Hong Kong's economic future. Reasons for marginalization no longer valid However, political parties have been accused of not incorporating the public's economic concerns into party politics.42 Reasons for this have included an overall lack of resources among the parties, attempts at avoiding internal dissension, a lack of popular policy debate due to the institutional constraints of the party system and the lack of governing opportunity

ibid. p. 103 South China Morning Post, September 11 1995 39 Leung (1998) in Scott (1998) p. 105 40 “1997 July Report -- Sticking Your Neck Out, The First Ten Years of the HKSAR: A Study in Unintended Consequences”, Hong Kong Transition Project; p. 10 41 Civic Exchange/Hong Kong Transition Project, 9 September 2004: “Countdown to decision – The final days of 2004 Legco election campaign”; Tables 32 & 33 p. 16 42 Kuan & Lau (2000) in Sing (2003) p. 255 38

of parties.43 However, several factors indicate that if ever true, this has increasingly been changing since the transition in 1997 and that this was a temporary, rather than permanent stage of Hong Kong party development. Regarding the lack of resources, this is perhaps true for smaller parties but cannot be seen as a valid reason for the marginalization of socio-economic issues within the three largest parties: the DAB, the Liberal Party and the DP. The DAB and the Liberal Party were financially backed by Beijing and the business sector, respectively. The Democratic Party has largely relied on private donations from members, equaling approximately three quarters of the party's total income in 1996. Although the party has had a clear financial disadvantage vis-à-vis the pro-Beijing parties, Martin Lee and Szeto Wah's trip to the United States in 1997 is an example of the Democratic Party's successful fundraising.44 The second reason is perhaps more significant and has been true for both the Democratic Party and the DAB, the two parties with the broadest popular support. However, both parties have appeared to become more firm on their stances on socio-economic issues, internal dissension being dissolved by the existence of alternative parties/groupings along socioeconomic divisions within each camp.45 In an attempt to improve its image as a popular party and expand the political base of the proBeijing camp in 2004, the DAB merged with the Hong Kong Progressive Alliance, a conservative party largely associated with business interests. This step provided more space for the Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions (FTA) to appeal to unionists and leftist organizations, while the DAB could become clearer on absorbing the business interests of the HKPA without having to worry too much about internal dissension causing a set-back for the entire pro-Beijing bloc.46 Similarly, the Democratic Party appears to have become more pronounced on economic issues by steering towards more of a middle-class image. Although the pro-democracy camp was considered quite homogeneous, or perhaps, less outspoken on economic issues back in 1997, it has increasingly become more fragmentized along this particular divide as well.47 Culminating in 2000, the economic dispute within the DP tore the party apart in 2000, as the “Young Turk” fraction left the DP for the socio-economically more progressive Frontier party led by Emily Lau.48 Thus, it appears that both camps have had to deal with internal dissension, rather than avoiding it; allowing economic issues to divide parties and be consolidated by the existence of alternative parties differentiated by their socio-economic position, within each camp. Regarding the third cause of the previous marginalization of economic issues - the separation of business interests into the functional constituency arena - this has also been a valid reason 43

Previously in Hong Kong, the Liberal Party, representing business interests, has not participated in popular elections in the geographical constituencies, instead receiving their mandate from the functional constituencies. This has limited the range of policy proposals on socio-economic issues open to public debate. Kuan and Lau (2000) in Sing (2003) p. 255 44 Leung (1999) p. 269 45 Most notably, the Frontier and the FTU have absorbed votes based on social welfare issues and a grassroots approach, from the DP and the DAB, respectively. 46 South China Morning Post, July 25 2005: “Regrouping for the next battle”, by Kitty Poon 47 ”Sticking your neck out”, Michael DeGolyer July 1997; Hong Kong Transition Project: http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~hktp/july_97/july_97.pdf 48 Ma (2001) p. 570

in the past. However, increasingly, the Liberal Party has been striving to increase its degree of popular support. Party leader James Tien successfully participated in popular contestion for the first time in 2004. Analysts predict that this is only a beginning of the Liberal Party's expansion into the geographical constituencies, thus potentially adding substance to the economic dimension in election campaign debates. The final reason why social and economic issues have stood outside the partisan arena is the limited power of the Legco.49 Since parties never have the chance to govern and put their economic policies into practice, voters have nothing to base their decision on. The institutional argument is partly valid and explains why economic issues thusfar have not played a greater role. However, Sweden is actually an interesting case to compare with regarding the necessity of governing experience to achieve credibility on economic issues. The Swedish social democrats have been in government 65 out of the past 73 years, leaving the non-socialist bloc in practically permanent opposition. Nevertheless, the marginal difference between the blocs remains small and the non-socialist parties are actually identified as most credible on economic policies, despite their inexperience of governance. Even though the Hong Kong case is slightly different from the Swedish, since parties do not even have a chance of governing due to the constitutional set-up, the above example shows that governing experience and past performance may not be as important as assumed by Kuan and Lau. In fact, because of the institutional constraints upon the role of political parties, they have been forced to co-operate across the original China cleavage in order to exert pressure upon the government on other issues, for example along the socio-economic divide.50 For example, the DAB joined the DP in the last minute to oppose the government's proposal on tertiary education in 2003, a move which was interpreted as an attempt to distance the party from the government. 51 Thus, the institutional constraints do not necessarily preserve the China cleavage – at times, they rather promote co-operation on other dimensions. Since the parties have not had to create firm coalitions to prove ability to govern, leeway to co-operate with partisan opponents on individual issues has in fact been greater than in many Western democracies. Indications of change It appears that past reasons for marginalization of economic issues no longer are valid. Empirical evidence also increasingly indicates a prevalence of an economic dimension. There was a clear difference between the issues dominating the 1995 and 1998 elections. In 1998, political issues and particularly the “Anti-China” rhetoric were consciously replaced by economic issues in the campaigns of most candidates, although lack of differentiation and clarity remained a problem among them.52 Only the Democratic Party appeared to remain focused on democracy as their main issue. The success of the Frontier and the DAB in the 1998 elections can be seen as an indicator that parties with pronounced policies on social

Kuan & Lau (2000) in Sing (2003) p. 245 Cheng (1999) p. 38 51 Mingpao, December 22 2003: “DAB's about-face”, editorial 52 Parties were still failing to clearly display their positions on certain socio-economic issues, including unemployment, housing, and medical and welfare services, all perceived as major problems by the public. Ma & Choy (1999) in Sing (2003) p. 654; Kuan and Lau (2000) in Sing (2003) p. 255 50

welfare had a cutting edge.53 In fact, in 1998, 50 per cent of voters reportedly based their vote upon economic issues, while only 8 per cent considered Beijing to be the most important factor determining their decision between parties.54 With time, political parties increasingly managed to acquire the public's confidence on livelihood issues, despite institutional constraints. According to a survey issued by the Hong Kong Transition Project in 2002, 50 per cent of respondents said that the Legco had very little or no influence over taxes, an indication that parties were not seen as major actors on economic issues.55 However, 48 per cent said that Legco influence over taxes would increase with more directly elected legislators, and, significantly, that the assessment of taxes thereby would become more fair. The latter indicates that despite the inexperience of parties in governance, and despite current institutional constraints, voters have confidence in their ability to handle economic issues. Thus, it is too early to rule out the importance of economic issues in determining voting behavior. The number of directly elected Legco seats have increased gradually since the early 1990s. Voters are awaiting further constitutional reform and with this in mind, it would be strange not to let economic issues influence voting behavior, especially considering the increased economic worries since 1997. A survey issued by the Hong Kong Transition Project and Civic Exchange in September 2004 also points toward a small role for the economic dimension at first glance.56 Among those who responded that they definitely would vote in the Legco elections, worries about free speech, free press, the rule of law and corruption in Hong Kong were more common than among those who were less likely to vote. Regarding economic and environmental issues, the relation was quite the opposite. Those less likely to vote demonstrated a higher degree of worries than those inclined to vote. This could imply that citizens who are worried about the economy and the environment do not place confidence in the political system to solve their problems, and that constitutional and human rights issues dominate the reasons why people cast their votes. However, the data could be interpreted in a different way. Respondents who “definitely will vote” may be strong supporters of a particular party and trust its ability to solve economic problems, leading to a lesser degree of worries. This does not necessarily mean that economic issues mattered less than other issues – merely that a specific party has performed well on economic issues and therefore decreases the voters' worries. The rise of the economic dimension can also be seen through voters' identification with parties. Although there was a certain “identification gap” between political parties and voters in 2004, the gap appeared to be almost equally wide on both constitutional and livelihood issues, indicating that economic issues are no longer overshadowed by the political dimension to the same extent.57 Voters who did not feel represented by any particular party on livelihood issues amounted to 31 per cent, while the same number on political issues was 26 per cent. The parties' abilities to draw voters across camps, on issues other than democracy and Hong Kong's relation to China, in the 2004 elections also suggests the existence of additional 53

Out of the directly elected seats, DAB increased from 4 to 7, while the Frontier as a new party claimed 3. Wong, Timothy Ka-ying: “Issue Voting” in Kuan et al.,: ”Power Transfer and Electoral Politics”, pp. 105-129 55 HKTP: “The First Five Years – Floundering government, foundering democracy?”; May 2002 56 Civic Exchange/Hong Kong Transition Project, 9 September 2004: “Countdown to decision – The final days of 2004 Legco election campaign”; p. 24, Table 48 57 “Attitudes towards 2004 Legislative Council Election - Civic Exchange’s Preliminary Analysis of Polling Results”, 31 May 2004 54

dimensions in the party system. Significantly, parties such as the Frontier, the Article 45 Concern Group, the CTU and the ADPL all managed to attract voters who opposed a democratic camp majority in Legco.58 5.3 Sociological dimensions The economic dimension is sometimes – but not necessarily - linked to dimensions based on collective identity. Traditional sociological explanations of voting behavior tend to focus on collective identities, such as class, profession, religion, ethnicity or gender.59 Class is by far the most oftenly referred to in many Western democracies, laying the ground for the left-right socio-economic divide dominating most party systems. However, the key to understanding the role of class in the Swedish, and other Western party systems is studying the context of its origin. The extent to which class matters in Swedish politics today is largely a product of a “frozen” historical conflict, decreasingly being applicable to current conditions. According to recent electoral surveys, the extent to which voters identify with a specific class is more determined by their own perceptions than by their actual socio-economic position.60 How useful is class as an explanation for voting behavior in Hong Kong? Due to the youth of the Hong Kong party system, the socio-economic divide in Hong Kong cannot be expected to follow any specific class patterns as much as in Western democracies. According to surveys on social identification, class consciousness in Hong Kong decreases with lower ages, indicating a gradual decline. 61 The existence of a large middle class greatly limits the usefulness of class analysis, a homogeneity of interests being difficult to imagine. 62 The fact that 62 per cent of voters do not associate any specific party with the “middle class” indicates that class is not a dominating factor in party politics.63 Other issues, crossing class lines, appear to be more important, such as family bonds, achievement motivation and individualism.64 In fact, fading away of class consciousness may also be a result of that the class dimension in Hong Kong party politics has largely been a construct from above, orchestrated by Beijing.65 The presence of trade unions in party politics (most significantly the FTU and the CTU) may indicate otherwise; however, their relatively low level of public support indicates that they do not represent broad collective identities, but rather narrow specific issues and interests. The strength of the DAB, often claiming to represent the working class, does not appear to reside 58

Although these data are difficult to interpret, since there are no corresponding data for previous elections, they indicate that in the 2004 elections, not only were there issues which cut across camp lines, but these issues also managed to draw votes. Civic Exchange/Hong Kong Transition Project, 9 September 2004: “Countdown to decision – The final days of 2004 Legco election campaign”; p. 15, Tables 28-37. 59 Holmberg (2002) p. 141 60 ibid. 61 Leung, Cheung & Drover (2001) p. 95 62 Leung (1996) p. 45 63 “Countdown to decision – The Final Days of 2004 Legco Campaign”, survey published by Civic Exchange & Hong Kong Transition Project, September 2004; p. 45 64 Leung (1996) p. 45 65 Beijing initially intended for Hong Kong's political parties to be divided upon class lines; the DAB representing the working class, the HKPA representing the capitalists and the New Social Forum representing the intelligentsia. However, as the subsequent merger of the DAB and the HKPA, and the decline of the New Social Forum, indicates that Beijing's construction had no natural foundation in the society of Hong Kong. The Standard, August 5 2004: “Touch of class” by Michael DeGolyer.

in any stable, collective identity, but rather the opposite – its ability to change and compete through its populist image.66 The reason why class remains a factor in Swedish politics is not only the historical social conflict between labor and employer, but perhaps most significantly, a conscious process of politization of the social conflict by political and social actors. 67 Region and religion are examples of traditionally significant identities, which have not been subject to the same degree of politization by domestic actors. 68 Politization is a process that takes time.69 Among the social conflicts prevailing in Hong Kong, it is not yet certain which are to be politicized and which are to remain dormant in civil society. Collective identities in a post-industrial society: Gender & profession According to Bartolino and Mair, the following conditions which must be fulfilled in order for a social conflict to become politicized70:

Results of practical politics must be symbolically or materially different between the two groups Transfer of values from generation to generation within group Physical and social closeness of people belonging to the same group

In Sweden, old social identities based on such as class are increasingly being replaced by new lines of conflict, based on post-modernist values. Some of the most significant examples are gender, age and ethnicity. The gender conflict can be viewed as political in several regards. It fulfils the criteria set up by Bartolino and Mair for the politization of social conflicts71: there are clear material inequalities between men and women, gender roles and stereotypes persist through generations through processes of socialization, and although men and women do not live physically separate in society, there are permanent conflicts of interest in issues such as pornography, size of public sector, weapon industry and attitudes towards the European Union.72 Although gender partly correlates with the left-right cleavage, this link is quite weak and varies form election to election. Thus, gender is a social conflict which has become politicized, but does not fit into the original cleavage of the party system. In 2005, the gender line of conflict materialized in the form of a feminist party, Feminist Initiative, supposedly standing outside the left-right divide.73 Although the electoral success of FI is yet to be seen, its emergence yet indicates that there are dimensions of social conflict which have not been completely absorbed by the original cleavage. Among the social identities prevailing in Hong Kong, a more nuanced picture can perhaps be given by studying profession, rather than class. Hong Kong, perhaps even more than Sweden, is an individualistic city with a reputation of high competitiveness and motivation. 74 The 66

This argument will be developed in the following case study. Sartori (1969); referred to in Holmberg (2002) p. 143 68 Holmberg (2002) p. 144 69 ibid. p. 143 70 Sartori (1969); referred to in Holmberg, (2002) p. 143 71 These are, as elaborate above: material inequality or difference, sustainability over time and generations, and physical and social closeness of people belonging to the same group. Bartolini & Mair (1990) 72 In Sweden, there are clear differences between men and women in their stance on these issues. Holmberg (2002) p. 155 73 http://www.fi.se 74 Leung (1996) p. 45 67

emergence and subsequent popularity of the lawyer-dominated Article 45 Concern Group/Civic Party indicates that a “professional image” is an advantage, rather than a barrier to achieving public support in Hong Kong. Profession appears to be a highly relevant social identity. But how significant is it as a political conflict? The true significance of profession as a politically relevant social conflict is difficult to find out in the unique context of Hong Kong, given the institutional predisposition towards profession through the functional constituencies. Indeed, they have created a superficial “closeness” among people belonging to the same professional group, making it difficult to judge against the above criteria for politization of social conflicts. There is however a possibility that the existence of functional constituencies has formed an additional layer of loyalties and conflicts upon the political arena, without being integrated with the party system. Any possible social and political conflicts related to profession would thus be channeled through the legislators elected through functional constituencies, many of whom are independent; thus “relieving” the party system of this potential line of conflict. The parties would thus be seen as channels for other conflicts of interest, which do not follow the lines of profession. However, the effects of functional constituencies upon reinforcing or creating collective, professional identities cannot be fairly assessed within the narrow scope of this study and remains a point of speculation. Nevertheless, this would no doubt be an interesting area of further study. 5.4 Post-materialist dimensions However, even “modern” constructed identities such as gender and profession are decreasing in their correlation with party preference in many industrialized countries. Individual experience rather than group belonging has come to determine voting behavior. Postmaterialist values have become increasingly important; and in Sweden, these can to some degree be seen as expressed through the emergence of the Green Party and the Christian Democratic Party, both of which are quite difficult to position in the left-right divide and do not correspond with any particular collective social identity.75 In addition, the word “left” in Europe is no longer strictly associated with socialist economic policies, as most large leftwing parties have shifted towards slightly “left” of the center. Rather, post-materialist issues such as minority rights and environmental issues are increasingly taking the place of the class dimension as the left's defining issue. The specific conditions for the emergence of a green dimension are further discussed in the case study of the Citizens Party. However, two main insights can be noted. First of all, the clear existence of environmental concerns among the people indicates that it is not a lack of interest which has prevented the green dimension from acquiring a greater role in Hong Kong – it is rather a lack of politization of environmental concerns. 76 Second, as the experience of the Green Party in Sweden also demonstrates, the previous structure of the party system itself appears to be less crucial than the above mentioned process of politization.

However, gradually, the Christian Democrats and the Green Party have become integrated into the original cleavage. Nevertheless their ideological foundations are delinked from a purely materialist approach and not least the Green Party has often acted a “balancing role” between the two blocs. 76 According to a survey published by the Hong Kong Transition Project and Civic Exchange, environmental issues, and particularly air and water pollution appeared to be one of the issues causing the highest level of general worry among respondents. “Halfway to where – The 2004 Legco Elections”, Hong Kong Transition Project & Civic Exchange, August 2004; p. 33.

5.5 Conclusion Four main insights can be drawn from the above discussion on the Hong Kong party system. Firstly, although the China/democracy dimension still constitutes the main cleavage along which parties emerge, it is decreasing in importance as a line of competition. Second, the economic dimension has appeared to be increasingly important after 1997. This shows that the party system is not yet frozen. Third, sociological explanations appear to be of little relevance in the Hong Kong party system. However, “new” collective identities such as profession are worth exploring. Lastly, as collective identities decrease in importance, there is room for new ideas in the party system. The lack of new dimensions in the Hong Kong party system is not because it is “frozen”, but because of the lack of politizing processes among local civil and political actors. However, this last insight carries the potential of change in the near future, enabling the Hong Kong party system to capture additional dimensions.

6. Hong Kong party development 6.1 DAB The DAB is interesting to look at as a case study for several reasons. It is clearly a consolidated party in Hong Kong and is one of the parties emerging during the earliest stages of party formation in Hong Kong. It enjoys a high level of popular support 77 and has increased its mandate in every subsequent Legco election since the first it joined in 1995. In addition, the DAB has a relatively large membership,78 which is an uncommon trait among Hong Kong political parties. The China/democracy dimension China is often seen as the main reason for the formation of the DAB. Indeed, without Chinese support, it is quite improbable that it would have been established. However, Beijing's longterm resistance against political parties indicates that other factors played a crucial role in changing the minds of Chinese leaders. Ultimately, it was the rise and political party formation of the democrats which led to a “balancing” response in the form of the DAB.79 Without the politization of local actors and the success of the democrats in the 1991 elections, China would have preferred to completely avoid partisan politics. The role of China in the formation of the DAB has thus previously been somewhat exaggerated. Since the formation of the DAB, China can be seen as important in two main ways for its development; as an ideational factor, influencing the party's public image and stance on political issues, and as an organizational factor, providing resources and financial support. Comparatively, however, China does not so much attract votes as pull the strings behind the scene. The leadership of the DAB has strong ties with the Chinese government, some of them being members of the National People's Congress and Beijing's group of Hong Kong Affairs Advisors. The DAB is frequently used by the Chinese government as a megaphone in Hong 77

In contrast to for example the Liberal Party which is a traditional “elite party” gaining its support mainly through functional rather than geographical constituencies. 78 Leung (1999) p. 257 79 ibid.

Kong politics. 80 Furthermore, Beijing reportedly is heavily involved in behind-the-scenes lobbying in functional constituency elections. 81 In addition to the backing of the Chinese government, the DAB is also supported by Chinese companies in Hong Kong, which have strong interests in opposing democratization as it is perceived to cause economic and political instability by upsetting the Hong Kong-China relationship. Although the relationship with Beijing largely determines the state-party link, it cannot be seen as the most important factor determining the DAB's relationship with society. In fact, there are several indicators that the close relationship with Beijing has become a burden and that the DAB is increasingly having to change its approach on the issue in order to attract voters. Specifically, the DAB has found itself caught in between supporting Beijing and representing the people in opposition to the Hong Kong government. The DAB clearly suffered from an image-problem in the wake of the transition to China. It was perceived as backwards by the public and did not appeal to the mainstream, and also suffered problems of recruitment. 82 In comparison, the Young Turks of the Democrats, and after 2000 the Frontier, were at the time much more successful in appealing to the general public. As a South China Morning Post article expressed it in the run-up to the 2004 Legco elections: “When people think of the DAB, they associate them with the angry elederly people in Victoria Park.”83 Consequently, the DAB has been trying to change its public image, partly by distancing itself from Beijing. The increasing ambivalence of the DAB towards Beijing was demonstrated in early 2005, when legislator Choy So-yuk openly criticized the China-backed candidate for the role of Chief Executive, Donald Tsang.84 Choy was later reprimanded by fellow partisans and forced to take back part of her statements. However, Tsang's unpopularity among the leftists has caused even greater friction between the DAB and Beijing since his installation in June 2005, in March 2006 culminating in somewhat of an “anti-Tsang” campaign among proBeijingers.85 Another move which can be interpreted as a step away from Beijing is the merger in 2004 with the Hong Kong Progressive Alliance. By drawing closer to commercial and business interests and relying less on its traditional unionist base of members, the DAB is presenting a new image as a broadly based mainstream party, to compensate for its drop in popular support as a result of its support of Beijing in the Article 23 debate in 2003.86

Lam in Sing (2003) p. 231 South China Morning Post, August 10 2004: “United they stand” by Chris Yeung; The fact that Beijing is extending its active support to the Liberal Party supports the claim that class is becoming a less and less important factor in HK politics, see The Standard, August 5 2004: “Touch of class” by Michael DeGolyer 82 South China Morning Post, September 20 2000: “Split more likely as one of DAB's four kings abdicates”, by Quinton Chan 83 South China Morning Post, August 10 2004: “United they stand”, by Chris Yeung 84 South China Morning Post, April 28 2005: “Who's afraid of confrontation?”, by Michael Chugani 85 The “anti-Tsang” sentiment was however fully denied by DAB representatives, naturally to protect relations with Beijing. South China Morning Post, March 4 2006: “Tsang, pro-Beijingers play down talk of rift”, by Gary Cheung 86 South China Morning Post, July 25 2005: “Regrouping for the next battle”, by Kitty Poon 81

The economic dimension If Beijing is being toned down in the rhetoric of the DAB, something else must be used to compete for the votes of Hong Kong's electorate. According to Professor Michael DeGolyer, the key to the party's electoral success in 2004 was its ability to “deliver the political goods”, in other words, deal with the “bread-and-butter” issues.87 In 2004, the issues most directly associated with the DAB, in comparison to other parties, were: support of the Hong Kong government, speaking for the working class, housing issues and preserving Hong Kong's prosperity and stability.88 It appears that although being progovernment was clearly the issue were it scored the highest, the other issues giving the DAB a competitive advantage could all be found along the socio-economic dimension. Furthermore, due to the solid organizational base of the DAB, it has both the financial and personal resources to handle economic issues on a grassroots level, where it is visible to the public. The DAB has frequently used its foundation of leftist organizations and labor unions to educate people on its policies. This approach can be contrasted against for example the DP and the Citizens Party, the former lacking pronounced economic policies at large; the latter producing substantial research while failing to get its message across to voters, possibly in part due to lack of a grassroots organization.89 The recent DAB strategy of appealing more to mainstream voters and the business sector to improve its image can be seen as shift along the economic line of competition. However, the merger with the HKPA in 2004 could also be seen as an indication of that economic issues as pragmatic issues for the DAB and not a matter of principle. The DAB appears to be abandoning its traditional socio-economic identity in order to rely on a more pragmatic/populist approach. Other potential dimensions: The populist dimension The recent populist shift of the DAB is interesting to compare with the former left-wing mass parties of Western Europe; the Swedish Social Democrats being a typical example. Previous class-based radicalism has been replaced by a moderate conservatism. As many leftist parties in Europe, the Social Democrats of Sweden have abandoned their class-based rhetoric.90 Both the DAB and the Social Democrats are today largely conservative parties, intent on preserving the status quo: the DAB wishes to maintain the stability of a close relation to China, and the Social Democrats are determined to stay in government, as they have been during 65 out of the past 73 years. Combined with conservatism is also a certain degree of populism, which explains the parties' ability to change in order to appeal to as broad a category of voters as possible. One key to the success of the DAB may in fact lie in its ability to change; avoiding being weighed down by its socio-economically steady membership.91 In Sweden, this has been the main challenge 87

Based on conversation with Professor Michael DeGolyer, Hong Kong Baptist University, March 27 2006 Civic Exchange/Hong Kong Transition Project, 9 September 2004: “Countdown to decision – The final days of 2004 Legco election campaign”; Table 74 p. 45 89 This according to e-mail exchange with Christine Loh, Citizens Party founder, chairperson and legislator 90 Lipset in Diamond (2001) p. 62 91 Mair (1997) p. 16 88

for the Social Democrats. Although they remain the largest party, decreasing levels of party identification based upon collective identities has led to a decrease in popular support, and increased reliance on issues and image, which are more flexible by nature. Support for the DAB is likely to follow the same path, being more subject to change between elections. The most obvious difference between the Swedish and Hong Kong cases, however, is that while the Social Democrats are inherently pro-government, the DAB is increasingly basing its populism on an anti-government approach. In 2003 after the rock-bottom fall in popular support following the DAB support to Beijing's widely unpopular Article 23 legislation proposal, Ma Lik who later became chairman of the party, argued that in order to regain its popularity, the DAB must choose between the siding with the people, or, as previously, unconditionally supporting the Beijing-backed Hong Kong government. 92 It is becoming increasingly clear that the DAB chose to follow Ma's advice, although the party seems internally divided on the new strategy. The balance between the two roots of success – backing from Beijing, and a grassroots approach – is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain. Although the DAB managed to combine the two in the 2004 elections, the conflict of interest is likely to persist and may be a cause of instability in the future performance of the DAB. Party organization The success of the DAB can partly be explained by its long-term focus on district-level work and a strong grassroots organization.93 This has been enabled through financial support by the Chinese government and Chinese-sponsored corporations.94 The DAB had more than one thousand members at the point of its formation in 1992, making it stand out in the Hong Kong context where a party membership base of over 500 is seen as exceptional.95 Through district-level units, the DAB has been able to mobilize its members to a greater extent than other parties. The feature of hosting policy study groups has been most successful within the DAB, meeting regularly and being able to draw participants. Among the DP and the ADPL, by contrast, similar study groups can be considered a failure.96 The grassroots approach of the DAB may in fact have decreased the sense of unity within the party as a whole. Actually knowing, or knowing of, an individual candidate on the district level may be more important than his or her party affiliation. Even the DAB's relation to Beijing does not prevent it from attracting votes based on the image of certain candidates. For example, environmental NGOs have been inclined to trust DAB Legco member Choy Soyuk on a number of environmental issues, despite the party's generally low profile in this field.97 Party platform and ideology appear to be less important than private contacts. As one environmental NGO representative expressed it: “The only thing you can count on is that the democrats will be in favor of democracy. Everything else is fluid.”98 92

The Standard, July 12 2003: “DAB must change”, by Ma Lik South China Morning Post, February 17 2005, Editorial: “Merger could be first step towards two-party system” 94 Leung (1999) p. 272 95 Kuan and Lau (2000) in Sing (2003) p. 251 96 Choy in Cheng (1999) p. 135 97 Interview with Annelise Connell, Clear The Air Chairperson 98 Interview with Annelise Connell, Clear The Air Chairperson 93

Another indication of the importance of individual candidates for DAB success can be found in surveys on voters' perceptions of the party. Specific party-related issues appear to have played little role in explaining the popular support of the DAB. The DAB scored the highest on respondents' dissatisfaction with performance among all the parties in Hong Kong in August 2004, with 80 per cent.99 The same figure for the DAB in August 2000 was 49 per cent. Nevertheless, the party actually increased its electoral support between the 2000 and 2004 elections. This seemingly paradoxical result can possibly be explained by the prominence of person over party in the eyes of voters. The success of the DAB could at least partly be explained by its ability to gain the confidence on voters based upon the image of individual legislators, despite a negative impression of the performance of the party as a whole. Civil society relations Beijing support in itself is not sufficient to explain the DAB's organizational successes. Building upon already established civil society groups, such as labor unions and leftist organizations, appears to have been key to DAB strategy, saving the party from a great deal of work establishing its own structures. However, at the point when co-operation was established, the civil society groups had already reached a certain point of politization on a grassroots level, facilitating the integration with party structures.100 If the grassroots do not actively take part in the process of integration with political parties, there is a risk of split between the two, particularly if the co-operation mainly exists between leaders. Nevertheless, the organizational strategy of the DAB could possibly used as a model for other parties in Hong Kong wishing to strengthen their ties with civil society. The challenge is to find civil society groups and issues having reached a sufficient degree of politization. Conclusion DAB The DAB shows that the Beijing dimension matters more as an organizational factor, than as a way to attract votes. The economic dimension has been important to the DAB in the past, given the leftist tendencies of its membership base. However, the party's previous positions on both Beijing and the economy are partly being sacrificed in an attempt to gain a more mainstream image. By adopting a populist approach, the DAB is following the patterns of many formed left-wing mass parties in Western Europe. In the face of fading collective identities, image appears to be the new – but clearly more instable - basis of public support. The effects of the shift were positive in terms of increased electoral support in the 2004 elections. However, the long-term effects upon the grassroots foundation of the party are yet to be seen. Beijing financial support has been important, but not the only factor, determining the DAB's organizational success. The DAB shows that although Hong Kong parties by large resemble electoral-professional parties101, rather than mass parties, relations with civil society are still important, not so much to reinforce collective identities as to establish contacts to enhance the image of individual candidates. 99

Civic Exchange/Hong Kong Transition Project, 9 September 2004: “Countdown to decision – The final days of 2004 Legco election campaign”; p. 11, Table 24 100 Leung (1999) p. 257 101 This label is assigned in Cheng (1999).

6.2 Citizens Party The Citizens Party was founded in 1997, with environment, education and equal opportunity issues as its profile issues.102 Christine Loh became the party's only Legco member in the 1998 elections; however, after her withdrawal from party politics in 2000, the party was no longer represented in the Legco and experienced somewhat of a decline. Alex Chan assumed chairmanship after Christine Loh, and was succeeded by Joseph Wong in 2005. In early 2006, the party still had a formal organization, however, its activities were limited to research and members had little ambition to participate in elections.103 Thus, two phenomena are to be explained – the party's emergence, and its lack of consolidation. The China/democracy dimension The Citizens Party emerged after the “Foundation Moment” of the Hong Kong party system and thus did not have an automatic position along the China dimension. It did not place the relation to China as a high priority in its rhetoric. The party's election materials from the 1998 Legco elections perhaps gives some insight into its general approach, promoting “dialogue and open-minded Hong-Kong China relations”. 104 However, a reference to stable China relations was almost compulsory in any Hong Kong party manifesto at the time and does not say a great deal of how its approach compared to that of other parties. The word “openminded” indicates a contrast to previous narrow-mindedness, although this is merely a point of speculation and cannot be assumed. The fact that several of the Citizens Party's founding members did not have a principled stance on democracy and Hong Kong's relation to Beijing is perhaps a stronger indicator of that other issues were regarded as more important for the party's profile.105 According to Loh, she was personally accused of being too compromising towards Beijing in 1996 by the rest of the pro-democracy camp. 106 The fact that she was allowed to visit China, in contrast to several DP legislators, indicates that Beijing did not view the Citizens Party as much of a threat.107 The relatively pragmatic stance of the Citizens Party towards Beijing could be seen as an indication that it was still competing along this specific line of competition, differing from the more “radical” approach of the Democratic Party. However, the fact that the party itself did not actively promote its differentiated approach as a competitive advantage indicates that voters were drawn to the party on other grounds, leading to less, rather than more polarization within the Hong Kong party system.108 The emergence of the Citizens Party can therefore not be explained with only the China/democracy dimension in mind.

102

This according to e-mail exchange with Christine Loh and interview with Joseph Wong, both founding members of the Citizens Party. 103 Interview with Joseph Wong, Citizens Party Chairman 104 1998 Citizens Party election folder. 105 According to Joseph Wong, founding member and Citizens Party chairman from 2005, he and several other members did not have a firm opinion on democratization and saw other issues, such as the environment, as more important. 106 Note: This was during her time as an independent legislator, before the Citizens Party was formed. E-mail exchange with Christine Loh, March 25 2006. 107 This according to e-mail exchange with Christine Loh, March 25 2006. 108 The same was true for the ADPL, belonging to the pro-democracy camp but emphasizing livelihood issues.

If the China factor cannot explain the emergence of the Citizens Party, can it perhaps explain its failure to consolidate? Is a principled and outspoken approach towards Beijing necessary to survive in the polarized Hong Kong party system? Was the environmental profile of the Citizens Party unable to fit into a party system dominated by the China dimension? As the following section shall show, it appears that it was not so much the features of the party system, as it was factors specific to the individual party, that contributed to its decline after 2000. The economic dimension The year of 1997 was a tumultuous year in Hong Kong’s history in several ways. The emergence of the Citizens Party must be viewed in the context of two major factors: the reunification with China, and the Asian Financial Crisis. After 1997, there was a marked increase in worry about personal standard of living, as well as Hong Kong's economic prospects as a whole.109 Loh's background as a senior manager in a multinational, however, gave the Citizens Party a certain credibility among the business sector which other pro-democracy parties may not have enjoyed at the time. 110 Its emphasis on free-market principles and fostering a competitive business climate partly attracted support from the business sector, shown through donations to the party. 111 In addition, the Citizens Party was the only party to annually publish an alternative budget. The crucial point is how its position on economic issues was perceived by the public and if it managed to compete along the economic line of competition. Two main factors appear to have prevented the Citizens Party from competing by its economic policies. First, there is its stance on democracy and the business sector's fears of confrontation with Beijing. Second, the Citizens Party had trouble reaching out to the public with its economic policies.112 The latter may be a rather common feature of media logic, and not specific to the Hong Kong context. Parties often find it difficult to attach more than one or a couple of issues to their public image. Considering that the Citizens Party already had identified the environment, education and equal opportunities as its key issues, difficulties competing on economic issues can be understood in this light. Other potential dimensions: The green dimension The Citizens Party appears to be somewhat of an anomaly in the Hong Kong party system, considering that its key issues did not relate directly either to the China/democracy dimension, or to the secondary economic dimension. The most relevant dimension to associate with its profile would be a green dimension. In the Hong Kong context, it was clearly the party most associated with environmental issues. Can then the inability of the Citizens Party to consolidate be explained by its green profile and the lack of a green dimension in the Hong Kong party system?

109

Civic Exchange/Hong Kong Transition Project, 9 September 2004: “Countdown to decision – The final days of 2004 Legco election campaign”; Tables 11 & 12 pp. 18 & 20 110 South China Morning Post, May 25 1997: “Citizens Party no economic light-weight”, by Mark Sharp 111 This according to e-mail exchange with Christine Loh, March 25 2006 112 This according to e-mail exchange with Christine Loh, March 25 2006

The “alternative agenda”113 of the Citizens Party makes it relevant to relate to the recent wave of post-materialism leading to party formation in many Western democracies. In these countries, immaterial values are correspondingly difficult to position within the traditional socio-economic left-right dimension. The emergence of the Green Party in Sweden, where the left-right cleavage has been among the most stable in the world, is an interesting case to compare with the Hong Kong experience. It shows that even a remarkably stable and “frozen” party system, with a history of a hundred years, does not necessarily form a barrier for parties emerging on issues along new dimensions. The formation of the Swedish Green Party was partly facilitated by a general trend of diminishing collective identities, along with processes of individualization and modernization. 114 Structural changes allowed for individual issues to become increasingly important. There is reason to believe that Hong Kong is following some of the same patterns. There is a clear indication of increasing worries on environmental issues among Hong Kong citizens.115 Non-material issues are on the rise in Hong Kong as elsewhere, although perhaps not as manifest through alternative lifestyle movements among young people as in many European countries. 116 Nevertheless, it seems that ideational discrepancies and a lack of interest in environmental issues cannot entirely explain why the green dimension failed to consolidate in the form of a political party in Hong Kong. Civil society relations However, just as crucial for the emergence of the Swedish Green Party as ideational trends, was the initial process of politization and mobilization of civil society, prior to party formation. Co-operation between political parties and civil society on environmental issues became regularized after the referendum on nuclear energy in 1980, as the opposition gathered in a broad coalition consisting of both political groups, civil society organizations and individuals.117 Parts of the coalition later on remained institutionalized and resulted in the establishment of the Green Party in 1981. It has since then generally maintained its close relations with civil society groups and environmental NGOs, and is still in part viewed as a grassroots movement. In Hong Kong, by contrast, the ties between civil and political society on environmental issues were historically quite weak. The Citizens Party had little contact with environmental organizations, mainly providing them with research and information on issues being dealt with in the Legco.118 Furthermore, the lack of co-operation among environmental NGOs, and, not least, their fear of becoming too closely related with political parties119, contributed to the 113

South China Morning Post, Sunday March 29 1998: “Party cites “alternative agenda”” Holmberg (2002) p. 144; Clark & Lipset (2000) 115 “Halfway to where – The 2004 Legco Elections”, Hong Kong Transition Project & Civic Exchange, August 2004; p. 33 116 Perhaps due to the lack of a unified green movement and the fragmentization of environmental NGOs. In Sweden, a large proportion of the Green Party's voters are young women, often linking their political views to an alternative lifestyle of vegetarianism and a non-consumerist philosophy. Holmberg (2002) p. 156; Diamond (2001) p. 29 117 However, environmental activism had been a common feature of Swedish society since the late 1960s. The fact that the same “awakening” of civil society on environmental issues in Hong Kong came at least two decades leader indicates that it may need longer time for the green dimension to integrate with partisan politics. Lui & Chiu (2000) in Sing (2003) p. 523 118 This according to e-mail exchange with Christine Loh, Citizens Party founder and former Chairperson 119 According to Sing, civil society groups have avoided close relations with parties out of fear of being controlled by their agendas. From e-mail exchange with Sing Ming; . According to Albert Lai and Annelise 114

lack of politization of the green dimension in Hong Kong. Although a few of the environmental NGOs, such as Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth, clearly have a political agenda, they are not yet viewed as a unified voice on the political scene. There are also indications that the economic dimension has been a barrier against further cooperation among green groups in Hong Kong. Reportedly, their failure to present a united front during a presentation at the Legco was due to a split on how much burden should be placed on businesses for providing consumers with environmentally hazardous power.120 It is possible to conceive that the Citizens Party's business-oriented economic policies were not in tune with some of the more radical environmental groups, although this is merely a matter of speculation from the side of the author. Party organization In addition, other organizational constraints also appear to have contributed to the decline of the Citizens Party. Its rather narrow membership base have affected its public image negatively, at times being accused of being an elite party. 121 This has generally always been a problem of Hong Kong parties. In any case, the fact that the Citizens Party consists of mainly middle-class academics, many with PhDs, did not help. The fact that all meetings were bilingual and that many members were Western may have decreased its appeal to the general Cantonese-speaking public, further failing to project a “grassroots” image. 122 Generally, the party lacked members with time to commit to party activities, a common problem among Hong Kong parties as well; however, perhaps particularly acute in the Citizens Party where most members were highly active professionals and academics. The development of the party organization has not been a major goal in recent years, according to chairperson as of 2005, Dr. Joseph Wong. 123 Emphasis has rather been laid upon policy research and internal discussions. The lack of an organizational focus may at least in part explain its recent failure in electoral terms. Furthermore, the dependence of the Citizens Party on one single public figure was also a disadvantage for the party's development at times. Small parties in Hong Kong have generally relied heavily on their leadership. 124 This tendency has been enhanced by a strong reliance on the media in Hong Kong, and overall international trends towards increased image voting. 125 Several members and voters of the Citizens Party were, as founding member Joseph Wong put it, “Christine fans” and thus left the party in 2000 when she stepped down as a legislator.126 The high profile of Christine Loh as an independent legislator and former businesswoman was obviously a great advantage for the Citizens Party in its early Connell, this fear was shared by many environmental NGOs in Hong Kong, at times viewing association with political parties as detrimental to the causes they were advocating. From interviews with Albert Lai, Civic Party founding member, and Annelise Connell, Chairperson Clear the Air 120 Interview with Annelise Connell, chairperson Clear the Air 121 South China Morning Post, August 25 1997: ”Christine Loh urges political overhaul”, by Rodger Lee 122 Interview with Joseph Wong, Citizens Party chairman 123 Interview with Joseph Wong, Citizens Party chairman 124 Apart from the Citizens Party, this has appeared to be true for the Frontier and Emily Lau, as well as the ADPL and Frederick Fung; NDI Hong Kong Pre-election Report # 4, May 15 1998; http://www.accessdemocracy.org/library/207_hk_rpt4.html#campaign 125 Hong Kong has the highest proportion of newspaper readers in the world; Interview with Michael DeGolyer. According to Holmberg, for parties with a narrow membership and a weak sense of collective identity, image is becoming increasingly important as the media's role is strengthened. Holmberg (2002) p. 156 126 Interview with Joseph Wong, Citizens Party chairman

stages. However, an overly reliance on image for a party's success is apparently a danger in Hong Kong, as in the case of other countries. The Swedish Christian Democratic Party is one example out of many. The party leader Alf Svensson left his position after more than thirty years in 2004, creating somewhat of a â&#x20AC;&#x153;crisisâ&#x20AC;?, both in terms of succession and in terms of party identity. At the time, the Christian Democratic Party could already be considered a consolidated party and had had sufficient time to build an organization capable of handling the change of leadership, although the party nevertheless did witness a sharp drop in popular support. The Citizens Party, having spent only two years as a party with Legco representation, had a weaker organization and thus had greater problems handling the critical moment of changing leadership. Conclusion In conclusion, the China factor hypothesis does not appear to be able to completely explain neither the Citizens Party's emergence, nor its failure to consolidate. Even in party systems with extremely stable cleavages, environmental issues and parties have been able to add a green dimension to politics. Instead, party-specific organizational factors, along with a general lack of mobilization and politization of the green dimension in Hong Kong, appear to carry the largest explanatory power for the Citizens Party's decline. General features of small parties in Hong Kong, such as lack of resources, an unwillingness to stand for election127 among members, and overly reliance upon one central public figure, along with party-specific problems such as a narrow socio-economic background of members, and an overly emphasis of research over grassroots activities, all contributed to the decline of the Citizens Party. Also, its weak ties with civil society appear to have made it more difficult to add a green dimension to Hong Kong politics. It did not have the advantage of a defined collective identity as a foundation of support. Thus, the Citizens Party had several disadvantages at its outset. These were perhaps not impossible to overcome â&#x20AC;&#x201C; however, with its narrow organizational base, the Citizens Party simply did not have the resources to do the grassroots work required to overcome its structural disadvantage. 6.3 Article 45 Concern Group/Civic Party Choosing the Article 45 Concern Group/The Civic Group as a case study comes with certain constraints. Most significantly, due to the youth of the party, there is little data to use for analyzing its success. However, to compensate, studying the Civic Party is rewarding just because little research has been performed so far. Also, the availability of primary sources, not least in the form of interviews, is a great advantage. In addition, the Civic Party is interesting because at the time of study, it had just gone through the critical transformation from political group to political party. The China/democracy dimension The Article 45 Concern Group, which transformed into the Civic Party in March 2006, was born out of popular struggle on an issue closely connected to Hong Kong's relation to Beijing; the proposed Article 23 legislation threatening the freedom of Hong Kong civil society. Its founding members were legal experts gaining public support in their defense of Hong Kong's independence, rights and liberties in the face of the unpopular, Beijing-backed chief 127

Interview with Joseph Wong, Citizens Party chairman

executive Tung Chee-hwa. As a consequence, the Article 45 Concern Group had a natural link to the China/democracy cleavage. As the Concern Group ran for election for the first time in the Legco election in 2004, it maintained its outspoken profile on democratization. Audrey Eu and Margaret Ng, both individual legislators belonging to the group, were perceived as quite vocal in their opposition against Beijing. 128 In election manifestos, increased public mobilization for democracy was presented as the only way to change the position of Beijing, a view which left relatively little room for compromise.129 As founding member Gladys Li expressed it: “Do they (voters) know that legislators have virtually no influence over policy making? Because if they don’t know that, they will go on blaming the legislators for not doing things that constitutionally, and legally, they can't do…to me, there is an absolutely unbreakable link between universal suffrage and air pollution…”130. This view should be contrasted against the more pragmatic stance of for example the Citizens Party and the ADPL, both belonging to the Democratic Camp but advocating a more cooperative approach towards Beijing as this supposedly would allow for more maneuvering space. A practical example of how the Article 45 Concern Group legislators chose a principled opposition against the Hong Kong government, and indirectly Beijing, rather than cooperation was in December 2005 when the Legco voted against Donald Tsang's package for constitutional reform. However, in the media, the Article 45 Concern Group/Civic Party was portrayed as more “moderate” in its relation to Beijing than for example the DP. One reason may be that the Civic Party's platform does not contain a reference to the Tiananmen incident of 1989, which triggered questions on if the party was trying to avoid the issue as a tactical move. Furthermore, the party's decision not to set up a timetable for universal suffrage, as the other pro-democratic parties have done, and instead advocating universal suffrage “as soon as possible” has also been perceived as a way of gaining more space to bargain.131 Nevertheless, the high profile of the Concern Group during the Article 23 debate suggests that voters should have a clear view of its principled stance on democratization and relation to Beijing. Surveys show that the Article 23 Concern Group and the Democratic Party were the two parties voters associated most with these issues.132 It appears that in practice, the “moderate” approach of the Article 45 Concern Group towards Beijing may be more rhetoric, image and style than an actual differentiation in positions and viewpoints.

128

Interview with Gladys Li, Civic Party founding member From Article 45 Concern Group Leaflet: “Universal Suffrage – a Fresh Start to Better Governance”, 2004 Legislative Council Election (Hong Kong Island) 130 Interview with Gladys Li, Civic Party founding member 131 South China Morning Post, March 20 2006: “Beijing will not see us as enemy, says Civic Party”, by Jimmy Cheung 132 Civic Exchange/Hong Kong Transition Project, 9 September 2004: “Countdown to decision – The final days of 2004 Legco election campaign”; Table 74 p. 45 129

The economic dimension The economic dimension did not appear to be a priority of the group before its transformation into a party. 133 Nor did voters appear to view it as an important reason for voting for the group members. While individual legislators have held high profiles in certain economic issues134, the Concern Group as an entity did not display a unified set of economic principles in advance of the 2004 Legco elections.135 Considering the Group's electoral success, the lack of economic focus did not seem to matter. Although voters identified more with the DP than with the Article 45 Concern Group on livelihood issues,136 the latter managed to achieve the highest popularity ratings ahead of the 2004 elections and did relatively well in the elections, while the former experienced a setback from previous years, obtaining only seven legislators through the geographical constituencies. The group's transformation into a party implies several challenges relating to the economic dimension. Primarily, achieving internal agreement upon “peripheral” issues which were originally not a unifying factor (in contrast to for example democratization) is a challenge to all newly emerging parties. Although the Civic Party managed to present a set of economic principles as it was established formally in March 2006, the real challenge awaits as these rather vague principles are put into practice. As founding member Gladys Li expressed it: “It is very different and it is something we are going to have to work on, how we formulate our views on economic issues. It is yet untried. That is the only honest answer I can give.” In several aspects, the economic challenges of the Article 45 Concern Group can be compared with the problems facing the Swedish party “Junilistan”, a relative elite group of professionals running for the first time in the 2004 elections to the European Parliament and achieving three mandates, thus becoming the third to largest party. Their main issue at the point of emergence was a skeptical approach to deeper Swedish participation in the European Union, while remaining relatively undecided and diffuse on socio-economic issues, standing outside the traditional Swedish left-right cleavage. Currently, one of the greatest obstacles facing Junilistan is gaining the public's confidence on economic issues. The party's decision to participate in the parliamentary elections in 2006 will cause a much greater public scrutiny of economic policies. In 2008, the Civic Party can be expected to go through somewhat of the same trial. In Hong Kong, voters appear to greater expectations on a political parties than on loosely co-ordinated political groups, due to the historical bias against partisanship. This may explain why the Concern Group was able to achieve electoral success despite a lack of coherent economic policies.

133

Interview with Gladys Li, Civic Party founding member Most significantly, Ronny Tong has been active in fair competition issues while Alan Leong has been vocal on minimum wage. 135 Specifically, it did not have a specific stance on new taxes or labor, according to a study by think tank Synergynet; The Standard, September 8 2004: “Platforms of parties too vague” by Matthew Lee 136 Civic Exchange; May 31 2004: Attitudes towards 2004 Legislative Council Election; Civic Exchange's Preliminary Analysis of Polling Results; p. 2 134

Economic issues could also prove to become a bridge to certain parts of the business sector, currently voting for the pro-Beijing bloc. According to a survey published by the Hong Kong Transition Project, legislator Alan Leong from the Article 45 Concern Group was able to attract voters from the pro-Beijing bloc in Kowloon East district in the 2004 Legco elections.137 With a stronger economic profile, its ability to draw votes across camps may be even greater. However, its transformation into a party may affect its image “negatively” by being perceived more of a threat by Beijing, thus scaring off any potential voters from the pro-Beijing bloc. This is however at present merely a point of speculation. Other potential dimensions: The “professional” dimension A recurring theme in the analysis of the Article 45 Concern Group's success appears to be its image. This is generally an important factor in Hong Kong, given the short history of parties and lack of long-established party identities, the great importance of the media, and the weak links between political and civil society. The image factor, however, appears to be particularly important in the case of the Concern Group/Civic Party, given its lack of differentiation on many issues, and a lack of any particular collective identity as a basis for party membership. Repeatedly, words such as “rationality” and “professionalism” appeared in the party manifesto, in newspaper reviews and accounts, and in conversations the author of this paper held with founding party members. At times, the Concern Group implicitly was contrasted against the more radical and confrontational image of the DP, tarnished by personal scandals.138 Even in relation to specific issues, the group's main contribution was not said to be new viewpoint or idea, but rather a new approach or method: “…you can't pretend that the economy is unimportant but I think what we can try and do is to introduce a bit more rationality into the debate, and to introduce some different perspectives, ways of looking at things…”139 Related to the professional image of the Civic Party is the law background of many of its founders and all four of its legislators, clearly being an important factor for its success.140 This does not necessarily imply that profession mattered as a collective, social identity, since it is the party founders, rather than its voters, that belong to the specific category. The historically high level of respect for the rule of law and civil liberties in Hong Kong, along with the large proportion of professionals among the population suggests that the professional image of the Civic Party is an advantage, rather than a burden. In Sweden, although the profession of a candidate usually appears on ballot tickets along with name and age, the professional background of politicians is generally viewed as less important than their political views and party belonging. In an international comparison, the level of education of Swedish members of parliament and government ministers was reported to be exceptionally low, several ministers not having completed their secondary schooling. In Hong Kong, by 137

Civic Exchange/Hong Kong Transition Project, 9 September 2004: “Countdown to decision – The final days of 2004 Legco election campaign”; Tables 32 & 33 p. 16 138 The Standard, August 17 2004: “Democrat jailed in China”, by Cannix Yau & Teddy Ng 139 Interview with Gladys Li, Civic Party Founding Member 140 The law background first and foremost facilitated contacts and co-operation among the group's founders, who came to know each other as part of the Hong Kong community of barristers. In fact, Gladys Li, Alan Leong and Ronny Tong had all held the position of Chairperson of the Hong Kong Bas Association.

contrast, education and profession are highly valued and contribute to the overall public image of a politician, as indicated by the popularity of the Article 45 Concern Group/Civic Party. Party organization Several organizational factors appear to have facilitated the emergence of the Civic Party. First of all, the high public profile of its founders has been a significant advantage. The public recognition Ronny Tong, Alan Leong, Margaret Ng and Audrey Eu obtained during the Article 23 debate in 2003 has been enhanced by their experience as legislators since the 2004 Legco elections. Indeed, several parties in Hong Kong have followed the same pattern.141 Few politicians have reached high public positions by climbing the “party ladder”, as is still the case in Sweden. Rather, individuals become affiliated with parties, or even form parties of their own, after reaching a certain point of individual recognition and success. Perhaps this is due to the negative connotations partisanship still evokes. In Hong Kong, a high public profile is valued higher than a long party record, the latter at times even being seen as a burden. From this perspective, new parties in general, and the Civic Party with its high profile leaders in particular, appears to hold a certain organizational advantage. Second, the Civic Party is spreading its risks and avoiding becoming a “one-person-party” by profiling four independent legislators from the start, each with their own portfolio of issues. 142 However, their individual high profiles, and the differences among them risks leading to a diluted joint platform and difficultiescreating a distinct party identity. Maintaining loyalty even when the organization appears to burden previously independent legislators is one of Civic Party's greatest challenges, due to its distinct organizational features. The Swedish party Feminist Initiative experienced some of the same difficulties due to the wide discrepancies among the agendas of its founders. FI was greatly tarnished by internal disputes under its first year of operation and several of its founding members chose to leave the party rather than give up their individual portfolios. However, the fact that the Civic Party legislators have a history of co-operating, and more of a similar background than the members of FI, suggests that it will not be challenged to the same extent. Another organizational challenge lies in the transformation from group to party. The difficulty of gaining credibility as a political party among the public creates an invisible “barrier of entry” to the party arena. Advocating an issue in the form of an NGO may be easier in terms of obtaining public support. There are several indications that independent legislators are viewed as less “political” and more approachable than political parties. As one representative of an environmental NGO expressed it: “Now that the Civic Party is a party, I see them differently. When they were a bunch of individuals working together, I had more respect for them.”143 Albert Lai, one of the founding members of the Civic Party, changing the image of political parties is one of the new party's greatest challenges.144

141

Christine Loh and the Civic Party, and Emily Lau and the Frontier, are two examples. Standard, August 9th 2004: “Five hopefuls for joint office approach”, by Michael Ng Article 45 Concern Group in the Legco Web Page; http://www.article45-legco.org.hk/public/main 143 Interview with NGO representative. 144 Interview with Albert Lai, Civic Party founding member 142

Civil society relations As both the Article 45 Concern Group and the Swedish Junilistan show, close connections with civil society do not appear to be crucial for electoral success. Following the typical populist party pattern, both parties/groups show that a group of professionals can ride on a rising wave of popular support for an issue and compete on equal conditions with political parties already having established links into civil society.145 Partial explanatory factors for initial success appear to be the personal image of individual candidates and an issue evoking popular mobilization, not so much for the issue in itself but rather as a chance to claim the media spotlight. The conditions for party consolidation are however quite different from the conditions for party emergence. What happens when famed individual politicians are replaced by less wellknown candidates? This phenomenon has been experienced by both Hong Kong and Swedish parties, in the cases of the Citizens Party and the Christian Democrats, respectively, as discussed in the previous section. It appears that image is not sufficient to consolidate and acquire stable public support. The Civic Party stated in March 2006 that establishing close relations with civil society was one of its primary goals. 146 However, this attempt does not equal creating a grassroots movement. The party will still be rooted in a rather “elite” group of professionals. The Civic Party's attempts to co-operate with civil society are important, but risky projects, since they are orchestrated from above and based upon co-operation between specific individuals, rather than a result of natural co-operation between grassroots in advance of party formation, as in the case of the Swedish Green Party. As Gladys Li, founding member, explained the Civic Party's strategy towards civil society: “[that is]deliberately why we have drawn in people like Albert Lai…because they have good, strong, NGO links….And so I think that’s the only way we can do it – by drawing people in, to the party.”147 According to Albert Lai, chairman of the Hong Kong People's Council for Sustainable Development and founding member of the Civic Party, the appeal of the Civic Party is not so much its political platform or its issues as its youth; providing Lai and people with his background in environmental NGOs with a chance to influence the agenda.148 This outlook indicates a relationship of mutual benefit, although the question remains which parts of civil society in practice will be able to influence the Civic Party's agenda. The fact that Lai knew several of the Concern Group members personally indicates that the co-operation is not typical of Hong Kong NGOs and parties. Conclusion In conclusion, the study of the Article 45 Concern Group/Civic Party has demonstrated that issues and image do not necessarily correlate in the Hong Kong party system. Although a principled stance for democracy and against Beijing was seen as something positive by the public, this was not the party's main competitive advantage. In other words, although the 145

Diamond (1999) http://www.civicparty.org.hk 147 Interview with Gladys Li, Civic Party founding member 148 Interview with Albert Lai, Civic Party founding member 146

Civic Party to a certain extent confirms the survival of the China dimension, the model is too simplistic to capture all the ways in which parties compete with each other today. Rather, it was image, rather than position along a specific political dimension, that appeared to be most important in explaining the sudden success of the Article 45 Concern Group. High profile leadership and professionalism appear to be keys words for understanding the group's success in building a public image. However, several challenges on both ideational and organizational levels await the Civic Party as it goes through the crucial process of transformation from group to party. Although the economic dimension did not appear to be important for its initial success, expectations from voters will be higher now that the Concern Group is a political party in a formal sense. The Civic Party will also have to the shape the profiles of its individual legislators into a common party image, in order to have something to pass on to the next generation of party leaders. This includes building strong, organizational â&#x20AC;&#x201C; as opposed to individual - ties with civil society, ties that will survive a change of leadership in both spheres. These organizational and local political factors, and not Beijing, appear to be the most crucial in determining the future success of the Civic Party. 6.4 Conclusion Table 1.4 Factors affecting the development of the DAB, the Citizens Party & the Civic Party

DAB

China/democracy dimension Decreasing in importance, being downplayed in rhetoric

Citizens Party

Little importance, no prominent role in rhetoric

Article 45 Concern Group/Civic Party

Important as defining idea, does not entirely explain success

Economic dimension Important on grassroots level, recently more pragmatic Developed on research level, but not a main line of competition No clear economic profile, may become challenge

Other dimensions Populism, conservatism, antigovernment Green dimension

Professionalism

Party organization Strong grassroots organization, backed by Beijing Strong leadership, â&#x20AC;&#x153;one-personpartyâ&#x20AC;?, lack of resources Strong leadership, spreading risks

Civil society relations Strong ties with labor unions & leftist organizations

Generally weak ties

Civil society ambition, difficulties reaching grassroots?

Despite the shifting experiences of the three case studies, there are several general insights to be made. How parties relate to the China dimension is no longer as important as it previously was. The DAB is increasingly questioning its relationship with Beijing, and trying to focus on other issues. The Citizens Party emerged completely outside the China dimension, and neither its emergence nor its failure was closely related to its stance towards Beijing. Although the Civic Party partly confirms the domination of the China dimension, it shows that other factors, such as image, is more crucial for party success. Finding a general pattern on the importance of the economic dimension for party development is more difficult. For the DAB, social welfare on a grassroots level has been a

winner, although the party is becoming increasingly pragmatic in relation to economic issues as a whole. The Citizens Party took economic issues seriously, but was never able to compete along this dimension, due to organizational limitations and a strategic focus on other issues. The Article 45 Concern Group/Civic Party proved that success is possible without economic clarity, although this may change along with the formal transformation form group to party. Overall, economic issues seem to matter, but are not sufficient on their own to guarantee a party's success. When combined with a strong organization, they can however prove to be crucial. All three case studies indicate that collective identity, in a sociological sense, plays a relatively small role as a factor in party development. Instead, the populist approach of the DAB and the professional approach of the Civic Party indicate that image is much more crucial. Both parties have partly relied on the charisma of individual candidates, rather than on a coherent party platform, as a key to success. This is largely following the trends of parties in other democracies, where populist parties are on the rise. However, a consequence of an increasing reliance on image is a greater instability in voting patterns. Balancing between a shift towards the mainstream, and maintaining a stable membership and a conservative approach, is the main challenge for the DAB, leaving it wobbling between two abysses. For the Civic Party, the balancing act is between relying on high public profiles of the past, while building a sustainable organization for the future. An increasing importance of image, however, does not preclude a role for grassroots and civil society. As the DAB demonstrates, contact with grassroots may well be a way to “sell” a certain image. The lack of organizational strength and civil society contacts of the Citizens Party may one of the causes of its failure. These particular areas may become a key to the Civic Party's future success, depending on the nature of the relationship between civil society groups and the party. Lastly, the notion that the Hong Kong party system is frozen appears to be far from the truth. Although parties still emerge along a China/democracy dimension, this same dimension is far from the only determinant of what parties say, what voters perceive and – ultimately – if parties succeed. There is still room for new dimensions within the party system, the economic dimension being the closest at hand. Depending on the strength of co-operation between civil and political society, the green dimension may be the next.

7. List of references Bibliography Cheng, Joseph Y.S. (1999): “Political Participation in Hong Kong: Theoretical Issues and Historical Legacy”; City University Press, Hong Kong Diamond, Larry & Gunther, Richard (ed.) (2001): “Political Parties and Democracy”, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore Holmberg, Sören & Oscarsson, Henrik: ”Svenskt väljarbeteende” (Swedish voting behavior); part of 2002 Electoral study; performed by Gothenburg University and the Central Bureau of Statistics (SCB) Kin-sheun, Louie (1992): “ Politicans, Political Parties and the Legislative Council” in Sing Ming (ed.) (2003) “Hong Kong Government and Politics”, Oxford Universtiy Press, Oxford Lam, Jermain T. (1997): “Party Politics in Hong Kong during the Political Transition” in Sing Ming (ed.) (2003) “Hong Kong Government and Politics”, Oxford Universtiy Press, Oxford Lau Siu-kai & Kuan Hsin-chi (2000): “Partial Democratization, “Foundation Moment” and Political Parties in Hong Kong” in Sing Ming (ed.) (2003) “Hong Kong Government and Politics”, Oxford Universtiy Press, Oxford Leung, Benjamin K.P. (1996): “Perspectives on Hong Kong Society”, Oxford University Press, Hong Kong Leung, Joan Y. H. (1998): “Political Parties: Public Perceptions and Implications for Change” in Scott, Ian (1998): “Institutional Change and the Political Transition in Hong Kong” Leung, Joan Y. H. (1999): “State & Society: The Emergence & Marginalization of Political Parties in Hong Kong”, University of Hong Kong PhD Thesis Leung, Kwan-kwok, Cheung Chau-kiu & Drover, Glenn (2001): “Trajectories of Modernization and Postmodernization in Hong Kong and Beijing”, Department of Applied Social Sciences, City University of Hong Kong Ma Ngok (2001) “The Decline of the Democratic Party in Hong Kong”, Asian Survey, 41: 564-83 Ma Ngok & Choy Chi-keung (1999): “Party Competition Patterns: The 1995 and 1998 Campaigns Compared” in Sing Ming (ed.) (2003) “Hong Kong Government and Politics”, Oxford Universtiy Press, Oxford Mair, Peter (1997): “Party System Change: Approaches and Interpretations”, Oxford University Press, Oxford

Scott, Ian (ed.) (1998): “Institutional Change and the Political Transition in Hong Kong”; Macmillan Press Ltd., Wiltshire Sing, Ming (2004): “Hong Kong's Tortuous Democratization”, RoutledgeCurzon, London Sing, Ming (2003): “Governing Elites, External Events and Pro-democratic Opposition in Hong Kong (1986-2002)”, Government and Opposition, Volume 38 Issue 4, October 2003 Sing, Ming (ed.) (2003): “Hong Kong Government & Politics”, Oxford University Press, Oxford

Interviews conducted: Gladys Li, Civic Party Founding Member, Hong Kong, March 11 2006, 11:00 AM – 12:30 PM Alex Chan, Citizens Party Former Chairman, Hong Kong, March 11 2006, 3:00 – 4:30 PM Joseph Wong, Citizens Party Current Chairman, Hong Kong, March 23 2006, 2:30 – 3:30 PM Michael DeGolyer, Hong Kong Baptist University Professor, March 27 2006, 11:30 AM – 12:30 PM Albert Lai, Civic Party Founding Member, Hong Kong, March 30 2006, 4:00 – 4:30 PM Annelise Connell, Clear the Air Chairperson, Hong Kong, March 31 2006, 3:00 – 4:00 PM

Other materials cited: Hong Kong Transition Project/Civic Exchange surveys: http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~hktp/tindex.html Newspaper articles from: South China Morning Post The Standard Ming Pao Through http://wisesearch.wisenet.com