Systems of Political Appointment by Civic Exchange

Systems of Political Appointment By: Ateesh Chanda August 2001

Contents

Section

Page

1. Introduction… … … … … … … … … ..… … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … .1 2. Civil Service Appointments in the United States … … … … … … … … … … … .....2 3. Civil Service Appointments in the United Kingdom… … … … … … … .… … … ...4 4. Hong Kong Civil Service Appointment Systems in Comparative Perspective… ...… … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … ..7 5. Political Realities… … … ..… … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … .… .....8 6. Recommendations for Reform… … … … … ..… … … … … … … … … … … ...… … .10 7. Conclusion… … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … .11

Appendix I… … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … .12 Appendix II… … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … 20

Introduction

1.1 Political appoint ees form an important part of most government structures. Although the vast majority of posts are filled by career civil servants from within the bureaucracy, a few of the key positions in each department may be filled from without. They are appointed outside of the merit-based bureaucratic structure, normally by the executive, and fulfil a variety of functions. This method of selecting candidates has numerous benefits, but misuse of appointment powers can potentially hinder efficient and effective government. The system of political appointment used, therefore, is an important and worthy area of study since it is that system that will determine the success or failure of politically appointed offices. 1.2 Selecting people from outside of the bureaucratic structure allows the government to draw from a much larger pool of highly skilled people. Although there may be qualified persons within the government, often the private sector offers those with more varied experience that can benefit the government. Also, for many positions it may be difficult to find people already in the government who have the necessary skills. For example, it is uncommon for civil servants to have skills in advocacy and public speaking 1 and, thus, in most parliamentary systems it is politicians in ministerial capacities that answer to parliament on behalf of their respective departments. Furthermore, a specific office or task may require the person to be outside the bureaucratic structure so that he or she may look upon it critically and impartially. In Hong Kong, the Independent Commissioner Against Corruption and the Ombudsman are two such positions. In both cases it would be inappropriate for the post to be held by a senior civil servant or someone else who is deeply entrenched in the bureaucracy. 1.3 Since the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984 and, at an increased rate, since the transfer from British to Chinese administration in 1997, Hong Kong, under the provisions set forth in the Basic Law, has been in a state of political transition. With the gradual shift towards a directly elected legislature and an evolving executive- legislature relationship the need to re-examine Hong Kong’s current systems of appointment to office becomes increasingly important and the system will need to adapt to the changing situation in the political arena. Hong Kong will have an advantaged position since many critical analyses of other countries’ systems have been and continue to be conducted. Thus, policy makers can evaluate aspects of different sys tems that may be suitable models for Hong Kong. Indeed the Legislative Council Panel on Constitutional Affairs has already begun an in-depth look at the future of Hong Kong’s political system and has ordered studies of various other political systems. 2 These studies will, however, broadly survey political systems as a whole while this report will focus only on systems of political appointment to the civil service. 1.4 The structure of this paper is set out in such a way so as to methodically examine the different systems used by the United States and the United Kingdom for 1

See Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor, Development of the Political System (2000), pp.5. Legislative Council Panel on Constitutional Affairs, Report on the development of the political system of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, June 2000 requested the Research Library Services Division of the Legislative Council Secretariat to conduct a study entitled ‘Systems of Foreign Government in Some Foreign Countries’. 2

selecting people for appointed positions in the civil service. The strengths and weaknesses of the systems will also be examined. The final sections will be Hong Kong-specific with a view to making recommendations for systems that might be suitable for Hong Kong.

Civil Service Appointments in the United States

2.1 In the United States civil service only the top- level positions are politically appointed. Other positions are filled from within the civil service by a strict set of procedures implemented to restrict the “ability of politicians to use civil service posts as patronage.” 3 However, within departments there are many positions at the Secretary, Assistant Secretary and Undersecretary level that are politically appointed (See Appendix I for a full list of appointed positions in the departments). In addition there are 61 independent agencies such as the Federal Reserve Bank, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Environmental Protection Agency, all of which have several politically appointed positions. In total, in the independent agencies alone, the President appoints 146 positions (See Appendix II for a full list of appointed positions in the agencies). The importance of the offices over which the President has power varies greatly from office to office. For example, the President appoints the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank, who is perhaps one of the most influential people in the international economy, but he also makes appoints the relatively inconsequential office of the Inspector General of the Railroad Retirement Board. 2.2 Regardless of the importance of the office, the process of appointment is the same. Article II, section 2, clause 2 of U.S. Constitution states that the President “shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, he shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States”. The Constitution is, however, ambiguous on the appointment of “inferior officers”, such as some of the appointed positions in the independent agencies, so Congress requires its approval for all Presidential appointments. 4 Having received the Senate’s support, the commission is signed by the President, sealed by the Secretary of State, and only then can the candidate be sworn into office. 2.3 The term of each appointee in most agencies is usually the duration of the appointing President’s term in office. Thus, there is a rotation at the highest levels of the bureaucracy every four to eight years. There are, however, some exceptions such as the Governors of the Federal Reserve Bank, whose terms last 14 years. To allow continuity, appointment is staggered so that one Governor retires every 2 years. 5 2.4 The question of the President’s powers to remove appointees from office has been somewhat problematic. Although the Constitution requires Senate approval for 3

Walter Kwok, Systems of Government in Some Foreign Countries: The United States (pp.10), Research and Library Services Division of the Legislative Council Secretariat 4 Eds. Leonard Levy and Kenneth Karst, Encyclopedia of the American Constitution, Macmillan Reference, pp. 109-111, the section entitled ‘Appointing and Removal Power, Presidential’ by Phillip B. Kurland 5 A publication of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, The Federal Reserve System: Purposes and Functions, pp. 4. See also http://www.federalreserve.gov.

appointments, it is not clear what procedures were intended for processes of removal. One case in particular, Myers V. United States (1926), sheds some light on this issue. In this case, the President removed Myers from his position of local Postmaster, a politically appointed office. Myers sued on the grounds that his removal from office on executive authority alone was unlawful under the ‘Tenure of Office Act’ of 1876. Under this act Congress required Senatorial approval for the removal of officers who had been appointed with their consent. Chief Justice William Howard Taft, however, ruled that it was unconstitutional for Congress to try to limit the President’s removal powers and, as such, the ‘Tenure of Office Act’ was ruled unconstitutional. 6 It is now widely accepted that the President may remove from office whomever he chooses, although he is limited by the reality that removing one’s own appointees is rarely politically advantageous. 2.5 The executive- led nature of the U.S. political system is clearly reflected in the system of political appointments that it employs. In total the President has direct control over appointments to 495 offices in the various departments and independent agencies, not to mention his power to appoint Ambassadors. A key benefit of this system is that highly skilled and motivated people can be selected from many different areas such as academia and the private sector. Furthermore, the likelihood of an existing mutual respect between the President and the appointee can benefit the appointee’s department in that the President will trust, and thus be more inclined to follow, the advice of the appointee. The recent appointment of President Bush’s former classmate, Clark Randt Jr., as U.S. Ambassador to China, for example, may prove to be a wise choice since the Chinese government will be pleased to have the ear of someone with direct personal access to the White House. 2.6 There are, however, significant areas of concern. First, there is clearly room for using high- level posts as political patronage, in spite of the requirement of Senate support. In recent years several large political donors have been rewarded with Ambassadorial appointments. One such example from the Bush administration is the appointment of Howard Leach as U.S. Ambassador to France. Leach, a former investment banker, has reportedly donated US$282,000 to the Republican Party. 7 In addition it cannot fail to be demoralising to those civil servants who are very able and have given years of service, yet will not be promoted to the highest levels. Second, given the sheer number of positions the President has to appoint, it is impossible for him to really know and thoroughly consider whether a candidate is the most suitable for a particular post. Thus, his advisors will have suggested the vast majority of nominees. This seems to defy the purpose and diminish the honour and importance of an executive-appointed position. Additionally, there is growing criticism of the inefficiency of the process. The Brookings Institution, an independent think tank, has launched a program called The Presidential Appointment Initiative which aims to pressure the government into reforming the process, as it is on “the verge of collapse”. 8 They point to the fact that many positions can go unfilled for more than a year once the President enters office. It is clear that the U.S. appointment system is overextended and requires some kind of reform.

Op cit, Levy and Karst. See also: http://lawbooksusa.com/cconlaw/myersvunitedstates.htm USA Today, Bush Picks Ambassadors to European Countries, 18 June 2000. 8 The Presidential Appointee Initiative, To Form A Government: A Bipartisan Plan to Improve the Presidential Appointments Process, A Brookings Institute publication (2001), p. 1. 7

Civil Service Appointments in the United Kingdom

3.1 Since the Order in Council of 29 November 1884 there has been a code to ensure that the British Civil Service, commonly referred to as Whitehall, remains apolitical. The Order states that a servant of the Crown ‘standing for election in a constituency must resign his post when he announces himself as a candidate.’9 As such, the British executive appoints a far smaller number of people at the head of the civil service than does the American executive. Part of the reasoning behind this system is to ensure continuity in the civil service because of the uncertainty inherent in the parliamentary system. 10 Furthermore, Whitehall’s indifference to political life ensures that it will be readily willing to serve any government, regardless of its political complexion and, as such, the government of the day is expected to work with senior civil servants left behind by previous administrations. 3.2 The Prime Minister does, however, appoint the heads of the different branches of the civil service, who are Ministers, as well as the Permanent Secretaries, who are typically career civil servants. Ministers, some of whom are members of the Cabinet, are usually elected members of Parliament and accept final responsibility for a particular Ministry. They are answerable to Parliament and responsible to the Prime Minister, and are expected to resign should there be serious problems within their Ministry. 11 A Permanent Secretary, however, is responsible for the daily running of her Ministry and has only to answer to her respective Minister. This is a kind of dual system with the Minister responsible for the policy direction and other political facets of the Ministry and the Permanent Secretary responsible for the administration of the Ministry. 3.3 Although both Ministers and Permanent Secretaries are appointed by the Prime Minister, the differing natures of the positions require that different systems be used for the appointment process. Indeed, candidates for both positions are drawn from entirely different pools and the Prime Minister also has different amounts of power over the two offices. 3.4 The Prime Minister plays a far less involved role in the appointment process than does the U.S. President. In fact, there is a Senior Appointments Selection Committee that advises the Head of the Home Civil Service who, in turn, will pass on his recommendations to the Prime Minister, leaving the Prime Minister only to make the final decision. The Prime Minister’s level of involvement is his or her own choice. Whereas Winston Churchill never rejected the Head of the Home Civil Service’s nomination throughout the entirety of his second term between 1951-1955, Margaret Thatcher required the Head of the Home Civil Service to provide her with a list of nominations from which she would personally select the appointee. 12

Anson, The Law and Custom of the Constitution, volume II, (1935), p.230. Michael Duggett, The Evolution of the UK Civil Service 1848-1997, p.2. This paper is available from the British Council website: http://www.britishcouncil.org/governance/manag/civil/ 11 Colin Pilkington, Issues in British Politics, St. Martin’s Press (1998), p.195-8. This practice is declining, however, and the case of Home Secretary Michael Howard has been pointed to as the end of the tradition. In this case, despite three grave errors in three days in Her Majesty’s Prisons, Howard refused to resign and instead dismissed the Director General of the Prison Service, Derek Lewis. 12 Kevin Theakson, The Civil Service Since 1945, Blackwell Publishers (1995), p.27. 10

3.5 The Senior Appointments Selection Committee consists primarily of a small number of Permanent Secretaries and reviews all suitable candidates from within the civil service. 13 Sir Edward Bridges, former Head of the Civil Service, described the group’s task in the following way: … the job of giving advice to the Prime Minister in these cases is not a matter of forming an order of merit of the candidates for a particular post, nor indeed of forming an order of merit of the candidates for a succession of several posts. The task is much more complicated. It is much more like that of placing the members of a cricket eleven in the field in the way which will give the strongest result for the team as a whole. It is no good settling that a particular man is the best slip fielder in the eleven if you find that you have got to ask him to keep wicket. 14 This team strategy can be pursued because the majority of posts are filled by civil servants who have had several years of experience in the bureaucracy whereas in the U.S. system the candidates are considered independently of nominees for other positions since most have skills and experiences that are suited to only one department. Thus the British system is more integrated than the U.S. system. Additionally, Permanent Secretaries are highly experienced, the vast majority of them having more than 25 years of experience in the civil service. 15 Despite that fact, positions can be filled from outside of the bureaucracy, through ‘open competition’. Such entrants account for about 30% of civil service appointments. 16 3.6 The appointment of Ministers is a more straightforward process than the appointment of Permanent Secretaries. The Prime Minster must choose ministers from amongst Members of Parliament. Members of both the House of Commons and the House of Lords are eligible. The Prime Minister has complete control over their appointments and removals, so Ministers chosen from the Commons have the mandate of the people, being directly elected members of Parliament, as well as the Prime Minister’s mandate. Members chosen from the Lords have less of a mandate since they are not elected. Indeed, since the Prime Minister chooses names for the Queen’s Honours lists, he can make anyone from outside of the government eligible to be a Minister by making him or her a Peer. Although such power was not intended by granting the Prime Minister the control over State Honours, there have been cases where members of the public were made Lords and then appointed Ministers. 3.7 The British Civil Service is widely regarded as one of the greatest assets of Her Majesty’s Government. Indeed, Lady Thatcher writes of ‘the sheer professionalism of the British Civil Service, which allows governments to come and

Elyssa Wong, Systems of Government in Some Foreign Countries: The United Kingdom, Research and Library Services Division of the Legislative Council Secretariat, 2000, p.10. 14 Quoted from Theakson, Op Cit., p.46. 15 Ibid, P.39. Three-quarters of Permanent Secretaries appointed in the period 1945-86 had been servants of the Crown for 25 years or more at the time of appointment. 16 Wong, Op Cit.

go with a minimum of dislocation and a maximum of efficiency’. 17 This stability begins at the highest level of administration so that, although Permanent Secretaries benefit from the mandate that comes with executive appointment, their promotion through the ranks and their experience in bureaucracy ensures that they are reliable and very well suited to the office to which they are appointed. The importance of this continuity is reflected in former Leader of the Opposition Clement Atlee’s comments about winning the leadership of the country from Conservative Prime Minister Winston Churchill: … when I succeeded Mr. Churchill as Prime Minister and returned to the Conference at Postdam, I took with me precisely the same team of civil servants, including even the Principal Private Secretary, as had served my predecessor. This occasioned a lively response among our American friends who were accustomed to the American system whereby the leading official advisers of the President and the members of his Cabinet are usually of his and their own political colour. The incident brought out very forcibly the very special position of the British Civil Service… I do not think that this remarkable attribute of impartiality in the British Civil Service is sufficiently widely known nor adequately recognised for what it is – one of the strongest bulwarks of democracy. 18 The strengths of the civil service which Thatcher and Atlee ardently proclaim are traceable to the high quality of leadership in Whitehall, provided for by good systems of appointment. Furthermore, the system used, to a large extent, prevents the Prime Minister from using his powers to reward political patronage (from outside of parliament), however, there is scope for abuse, as was discussed in the previous section. 3.8 The political appointment of Ministers ensures that the policies for which the government was elected are pursued, and in addition, it provides a political face for the Ministry and someone who is answerable to Parliament. This is important primarily because it guarantees that the civil service remains politically neutral and also because politicians are better suited to explaining and defending government policies and Ministry decisions than is a civil servant. The success of the system can chiefly be attributed to the duality in the leadership of the British civil service. This duality exists at two levels. First, there is a division of labour along political and administrative lines. Second, the dual leadership of Permanent Secretary and Minister unites change and continuity in the running of the Ministry. The Minister represents the public opinion of the day, since she is at least responsible to an elected Parliament, if not an elected member herself. The Permanent Secretary represents continuity since he is a long-standing bureaucrat who, through merit-based promotion has risen through the ranks of the civil service. This duality is the key component that makes 17

Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, Harper Collins, 1993. Quoted from Geoffrey K. Fry, Civil Service Systems in Comparative Perspective: Great Britain, a paper prepared for the School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana University, 1997, p. 3. This paper is available at http://www.indiana.edu/~csrc/csrc.html. 18

the British Civil Service so efficient and effective. That is not to say, however, that it is necessarily a better system than the one used in the United States. The United Kingdom, being a small and highly centralised country, is well suited to such a system. The federal system is employed in the United States because of its size and because of the historically more disparate political views held by peoples of different states. Consequently, the highly centralised system operated in the United Kingdom would be unsuitable and infeasible in the United States.

4. Hong Kong Civil Service Appointment Systems in Comparative Perspective 4.1 Since the end of British sovereignty over Hong Kong in 1997, the systems for appointing the heads of divisions of the civil service have been provided for by the Basic Law. Under Article 48, clause 5, the Basic Law specifies that the Chief Executive “shall exercise the following powers and functions: To nominate and to report to the Central People’s Government for appointment the following principal officials: Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries of Departments, Directors of Bureaux, Commissioner Against Corruption, Director of Audit, Commissioner of Police, Director of Immigration and Commissioner of Customs and Excise; and to recommend to the Central People’s Government the removal of the above-mentioned officials;” Thus, it is clear that, though the Chief Executive is the head of the government of the Region, the Central People’s Government has the final decision in choosing who will work under the Chief Executive. 4.2 Although traditionally career civil servants have filled the top posts in the civil service, and indeed the Basic Law requires lower posts to be filled by career civil servants, it does not specify that the higher posts must be filled from within the civil service. Indeed Secretary for Justice Elsie Leung was appointed from outside of the bureaucracy. She has, however, proved to be a very unpopular choice, particularly among civil servants, 66% of whom have indicated some level of dissatisfaction with her performance, and also, to a lesser extent, among the general public, 55% of whom expressed dissatisfaction with her performance. 19 4.3 If we can interpret Secretary Leung’s unpopularity among civil servants as an indication, in part at least, of their resentment at being led by someone who has not had to prove herself through years of service to the government, then it shows that perhaps having the top positions in the civil service wholly politically appointed is not suitable for Hong Kong.

Poll-arization: Election Politics and the Politicizing of Hong Kong, The Hong Kong Transition Project, 2000, P.80. This study shows that 29% of civil servants were “very dissatisfied” and 37% were “somewhat dissatisfied”. Non-civil servants were slightly less critical with 19% “very dissatisfied”and 36% “somewhat dissatisfied”.

4.4 It should be noted however, that political appointments have been very successful in some areas. The office of the Commissioner Against Corruption, for example, is politically appointed and the Commission Against Corruption has been and continues to be widely regarded as one of the greatest assets of the Hong Kong government. It is noted particularly for its good leadership. Similarly, the Equal Opportunities Commission is noted for the good leadership of Anna Wu. This is a particularly good example of the success of a political appointment because Commissioner Wu has openly disagreed with and criticised the government for its education policy as well as its rejection of the anti-racism legislation. This shows that it is possible for very able and independent minded persons to be politically appointed and lead divisions of the civil service successfully. 4.5 In recent years there have been widespread calls for Hong Kong to adopt a “ministerial system”. A motion in Council on 12 January 2000 called on the government to conduct a public consultation on the matter. 20 The issue is complicated by the lack of a definitive definition of the term “ministerial system”, as has been pointed out by many of the submissions to the public consultation on the “Development of the HKSAR’s Political System”, as well as by Chief Executive Tung Chee Hwa. 21 It is generally accepted, however, that the term refers to a system based on the Whitehall model. 4.6 Professor James T.H. Tang contends, however, that there is no need for the adoption of a ministerial system because “Secretaries of government bureaux” are Hong Kong’s de facto Ministers. He points to the fact that they “are recognized as such by foreign governments when they travel abroad for official business.” 22 Although, due to lack of anyone in their place, the senior- most civil servants may sometimes be considered Ministers, they are not because they do not fit the accepted definition of being politicians appointed by the executive from amongst the members of the legislature and, perhaps more importantly, they do not serve the same functions as Ministers traditionally do. Thus, strictly speaking, it is incorrect to label such senior civil servants as Ministers.

Political Realities

5.1 Although the Hong Kong civil service is largely drawn-up along Whitehall lines, the structure of the Hong Kong government as a whole is dissimilar to the Westminster model. Tang points out that, [s]ince the Chief Executive and the Legislative Council in Hong Kong are selected by two different and separate 20

The motion passed read: “That this Council urges the Executive Authorities to conduct a public consultation as soon as possible on the relationship between the executive and the legislature, the ministerial system and the election of the Chief Executive and the Legislative Council by universal and equal suffrage”. 21 Question and Answer Session held in Council on 13 January 2000 22 James, T.H. Tang, Submission to the Public Consultation on “Development of the HKSAR’s Political System” for the Panel on Constitutional Affairs, Legislative Council, P.2. LC Paper No. CB9(2)1155/99-00(03)

processes, we are not a parliamentary system. But features in our system also resemble a parliamentary system… [for example,] the Basic Law also stipulates that the HKSAR government should be accountable to the Legislative Council. 23 This illustrates, to an extent, the difficulty that Hong Kong will face, having an executive- led system with some parliamentary features. 24 Serious questions are raised about the implications on the executive- legislature relationship. The nature of that relationship is already somewhat confrontational, and with the democratisation of the Legislative Council it will be further strained since, at least initially, legislators will have more of a mandate than the Chief Executive. Thus, the relationship between Ministers and the executive will be difficult since the elected Ministers will be accountable to a non-elected executive. 5.2 Even once both the Chief Executive and the Legislative Council become fully elected through universal suffrage, it would still be problematic for Ministers to be selected from the Legislative Council since the executive may not be of the same political hue as the majority of the members of the Council. Since the Ministers would have to be answerable to the Legislative Council it would not do for them to be chosen from amongst the opposition of the chamber. This indicates that perhaps some aspects of the Washington model may be appropriate for Hong Kong. 5.3 At present, the civil service is in the awkward position of having no specific political master, but having some degree of responsibility to three, often opposing, groups. The civil service is accountable to the Legislative Council, which at present only loosely represents the views of Hong Kong people; it is responsible to the Chief Executive, who is often at odds with the Legislative Council; and finally, it is appointed and removed by the Central People’s Government. Thus, some kind of reform needs to be made to make the different groups’ authority over the civil service more defined. 5.4 A further complication to which Professor Yash Ghai points is that, like in other colonies, policy- making was and has continued to be the domain of civil servants. 25 Thus, were a ministerial system adopted, the top civil servants would be in the unfamiliar position of having policy direction controlled by politicians. With democratisation and the growth of party politics in Hong Kong, however, the civil service will need to be reformed so that it is more responsive to public opinion, under the supervision of elected politicians.

Tang, Op Cit. Hong Kong Bar Association, Development of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region’s Political System, submission to the Panel on Constitutional Affairs, p.3. The association contends that there is no “support for the so-called ‘executive-led government’ in the Basic Law, if this phrase means that the Executive shall prevail over the Legislative Council. Instead, what we find in the Basic Law is an elaborate system of checks and balance grounded upon the principle of separation of powers.” I disagree with this argument because, although there are checks and balances, the Chief Executive has far greater powers than the Legislative Council, chief of which is the right to introduce legislation. Furthermore, the United States also has systems of checks and balances and a greater division of powers than Hong Kong does but is still said to be an executive-led system. 25 Ghai, Op Cit. 24

Recommendations for Reform

6.1 Given the realities that Hong Kong has an executive-led system and that the executive and legislature are elected by different processes, the only feasible system would be one whereby the heads of departments are selected by the executive from outside of the legislature. However, because of the civil service’s historically strong position in the government and its disinterestedness from politics, career civil servants are best left to manage administrative matters. Thus, it seems that a combination of the Whitehall and Washington models may be the most successful for Hong Kong. 6.2 Hong Kong has a very able and efficient civil service so it seems unnecessary, for administrative purposes, for the Secretaries of Bureaux to be politically appointed. Either a wholly internal process could be used for the higher- grade appointments, as is done for middle and junior grade civil servants, or it could be partially internal, as in the United Kingdom, with the executive making the final choice. Using a wholly internal process ensures that the executive does not show political favour to any civil servant. 6.3 The person who is in-charge of the policy direction of the department and politically responsible for its running, whether he is given the title of Minister or another title, could be wholly appointed by the executive. Whether we chose to interpret “executive” as the Chief Executive or the Central People’s Government, however, is a more complicated matter. It would seem to make more sense, though, for the Chief Executive to choose the people who will work under him for himself. This would have the added advantage of extricating the civil service from it responsibility to the Central People’s Government, which just seems to put added pressure on it. Another issue that needs consideration concerns the exact process by which Ministerial 26 appointments will be made. Since Ministers will be primarily accountable to the Chief Executive it would be most pragmatic for these appointments to be made by the Chief Executive himself. However, since Ministers will be answerable to the Legislative Council it would make sense for the Chief Executive’s appointment decisions to require the Council’s backing. This will also serve to ensure that appointees merit their positions and are not given as patronage. In terms or processes of removal I would continue along U.S. lines and not require the legislature’s approval for the removal of appointees from office because the Chief Executive will be the one who will be working most directly with the Ministers so if he is displeased with their performance then the Legislative Council should not interfere with his decision. 6.4 This system seems to have three main advantages. First, civil servants would continue to have the comfort of being directly responsible to and directed by a fellow career civil servant. Second, with a political appointee at its head, departments would become more responsive to the wishes of the people of Hong Kong, a break from its position in the colonial administration. Third, the civil service would be given a political face that would be better able to explain and justify department decisions to the Legislative Council, as well as the general public.

For lack of a better term I will refer to these appointees as Ministers.

Conclusion

7.1 Both British and American systems for political appointments have their strengths. The American system allows the government to benefit from the experience and knowledge of highly skilled persons who come in from the private sector. The duality of the British system ensures the efficient and effective administration of the civil service while ensuring that it is politically responsive. 7.2 The need for the reform of the Hong Kong system cannot be denied. With the democratisation of Hong Kong the civil service will need to adapt to become a cohesive part of the future democratic order. The civil service can no longer work entirely independently of political opinion. 7.3 Hong Kong’s very special governmental structure necessitates a system that is specifically tailored to it. The introduction of a Westminster style “ministerial system” would be inappropriate because of the difference between the parliamentary system and the system that is used in Hong Kong. The civil service’s detachment from politics and the central role it has traditionally played in the administration of Hong Kong also makes a wholly Washington style system inappropriate. 7.4 The reforms recommended in the previous section combine the strengths of the Whitehall and Washington models, and is it is also suitable for Hong Kong’s unique structure.

Appendix I Politically Appointed Positions Within Departments of the U.S. Government

Secretary of Agriculture Assistant Secretary for Administration Undersecretary of Food, Nutrition and Consumer Services Undersecretary for Rural Development Undersecretary for Farm and Foreign Agriculture Undersecretary for Marketing and Regulatory Programs Deputy Secretary Undersecretary for Research, Education & Economics Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations Administrator, Rural Utilities Service Undersecretary for Natural Resources & Environment Undersecretary for Food Safety Chief Financial Officer General Counsel Inspector General Secretary of Commerce Under Secretary for Export Administration Assistant Secretary for Import Administration General Counsel Assistant Secretary Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs Assistant Secretary for Export Administration Deputy Secretary of Commerce Under Secretary for Economic Affairs Assistant Secretary for Economic Development Undersecretary for International Trade Assistant Secretary for Technology Policy Assistant Secretary for Export Enforcement Assistant Secretary for Market Access and Compliance Undersecretary for Intellectual Property and Dir., US Patent & Trademark Office Chief Financial Officer and Assistant Secretary for Administration Assistant Secretary for Trade Deve lopment Assistant Secretary for Communications and Information Undersecretary for Technology Director, Bureau of the Census Undersecretary for Oceans and Atmosphere Assistant Secretary for Oceans and Atmosphere Chief Scientist Inspector General Director, National Institute for Standards and Technology Secretary of Defense Deputy Secretary

Undersecretary, Comptroller Undersecretary for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics General Counsel Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs Assistant Secretary for Force Management Undersecretary for Personnel and Readiness Undersecretary for Policy Assistant Secretary for International Security Policy Principal Deputy Undersecretary for Policy Secretary of the Air Force Secretary of the Army Secretary of the Navy Undersecretary of the Navy Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs Assistant Secretary for Acquisition, Research and Development (Air Force) General Counsel, Navy Assistant Secretary for Financial Management and Comptroller, Air Force General Counsel, Army Director, Operational Test and Evaluation Assistant Secretary for Financial Management & Comptroller, Navy Deputy Undersecretary for Acquisition and Technology Deputy Undersecretary for Logistics and Material Readiness Assistant Secretary for Manpower & Reserve Affairs, Navy Assistant Secretary for Civil Works, Army Assistant Secretary for Manpower & Reserve Affairs, Army Assistant Secretary for Command, Control, Communications & Intelligence Director, Defense Research and Engineering Assistant Secretary for Research, Development & Acquisition, Navy Inspector General Assistant Secretary for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, Installations & Environment, Air Force Assistant Secretary for Installations & Environment, Air Force Assistant Secretary (Navy) for Installations & Environment Assistant Secretary (Army) for Installations & Environment General Counsel, Air Force Assistant to the Secretary for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs Assistant Secretary for SOLIC Assistant Secretary for Health Affairs Assistant Secretary for Reserve Affairs Assistant Secretary for Space Undersecretary of the Air Force Undersecretary of the Army Assistant Secretary fo r Financial Management & Comptroller Assistant Secretary for Acquisition, Logistics & Technology, Army Secretary of Education Deputy Secretary of Education Undersecretary of Education

Assistant Secretary for Elementary and Secondary Education Assistant Secretary for Vocational and Adult Education General Counsel Assistant Secretary for Educational Research & Improvement Assistant Secretary for Legislative and Congressional Affairs Assistant Secretary for Intergovernmental & Interagency Affairs Assistant Secretary for Special Education and Rehabilitative Services Commissioner, Rehabilitation Services Administration Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights Chief Financial Officer Inspector General Assistant Secretary for Postsecondary Education Commissioner, Education Statistics Secretary of Energy General Counsel Undersecretary of Energy Chief Financial Officer Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management Deputy Secretary of Energy Assistant Secretary for International Affairs and Domestic Policy Assistant Secretary for Conservation & Renewable Energy Assistant Secretary for Congressional & Intergovernmental Affairs Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs Director, Economic Impact/Diversity/Minority Economic Impact Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, National Nuclear Security Administration Administrator, Energy Information Administration Assistant Secretary for Environment, Safety & Health Assistant Secretary for Fossil Energy Inspector General Director, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management Director, Office of Science Secretary of HHS Assistant Secretary for Legislation Assistant Secretary for Family Support Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs Assistant Secretary for Planning & Evaluation Administrator, Health Care Financing Admin. Deputy Secretary of HHS Assistant Secretary for Management & Budget General Counsel Inspector General Assistant Secretary for Aging (Commissioner for Aging) Commissioner, Administration for Children, Youth & Families Administrator, Substance Abuse & Mental Health Service Commissioner, Administration for Native Americans Director, National Institutes of Health Commissioner of Food & Drugs

Secretary of HUD Deputy Secretary HUD Assistant Secretary for Community Planning and Development Assistant Secretary/Federal Housing Commissioner President, Government National Mortgage Association Assistant Secretary for Fair Housing & Equal Opportunity Chief Financial Officer General Counsel Assistant Secretary for Public & Indian Housing Inspector General Assistant Secretary for Congressional & Intergovernmental Relations Assistant Secretary for Administration Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs Director, Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight Director, Office of Multifamily Housing Assistance Restructuring Assistant Secretary for Policy Development & Research Secretary of Interior Deputy Secretary of Interior Solicitor Assistant Secretary - Policy, Management & Budget Assistant Secretary - Water & Science Assistant Secretary â&#x20AC;&#x201C; Indian Affairs Director, National Park Service Commissioner, Bureau of Reclamation Director, US Fish & Wildlife Service Assistant Secretary - Fish, Wildlife & Parks Director, Office of Surface Mining Reclamation & Enforcement Special Trustee for American Indians Inspector General Director - Geological Survey Assistant Secretary - Land & Minerals Management Director, Bureau of Land Management Commissioner- Bureau of Indian Affairs Attorney General Deputy Attorney General Solicitor General Asst. Attorney General for Legislative Affairs Asst. Attorney General, Antitrust Division Asst. Attorney General for Legal Policy Asst. Attorney General for Civil Rights Asst. Attorney General for the Criminal Division Asst. Attorney General for the Office of Justice Programs Asst. Attorney General for Environment & Natural Resources Division Asst. Attorney General for the Civil Division Asst. Attorney General for Tax Division Director, National Institute of Justice Director of the Bureau of Justice Assistance

Administrator, Office of Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Prevention Commissioner, Immigration & Naturalization Service Director, Office for Victims of Crime Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration Director, Community Relations Service Special Counsel, Civil Rights Division Vice-Chairman, US Parole Commission National Commissioner, US Parole Commission Regional Commissioner, US Parole Commission Regional Commissioner, US Parole Commission Director, FBI Asst. Attorney General of Legal Counsel Chairman, Foreign Claims Settlement Commission Associate Attorney General Inspector General Member, Foreign Claims Settlement Commission Member, Foreign Claims Settlement Commission Director of the Bureau of Justice Statistics Deputy Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration Director, US Marshals Service Secretary of Labor Assistant Secretary for Policy Asst. Secretary for Admin. and Management Asst. Secretary for Congressional and Intergovernmental Affairs Asst. Secretary of Labor Asst. Secretary for Mine Safety and Health Director, Women's Bureau Deputy Secretary of Labor Solicitor of Labor Asst. Secretary, Occupational Safety & Health Administration Asst. Secretary for Employment Training Administration Asst. Secretary for Veteran's Employment & Training Service Commissioner of Labor Statistics Asst. Secretary for Employment Standards Administration Administrator, Wage and Hour Division Chief Financial Officer Inspector General Asst. Secretary for Public Affairs Asst. Secretary for Pension & Welfare Benefits Administration Secretary of State Undersecretary for Political Affairs Undersecretary for Management Deputy Secretary of State Legal Advisor Undersecretary for Arms Control & Intl. Sec. Asst. Secretary for E. Asian & Pacific Affairs Asst. Secretary for Political Military Affairs

Representative to the United Nations Director General of Foreign Service Undersecretary for Global Affairs Assistant Secretary for the Near East Chief of Protocol Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Coordinator for Counterterrorism Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Inspector General Assistant Secretary for Intelligence & Research Assistant Secretary for Legislative & Intergovernmental Affairs Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Assistant Secretary for South Asian Affairs Commissioner, International Joint Commission Assistant Secretary for Administration Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs US Representative for U.N. Management and Reform Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation Assistant Secretary for Oceans, International Environmental & Scientific Affairs Alternative Representative for Special Political Affairs US Representative for Economic & Social Affairs Deputy to US Ambassador & Permanent Representative to the UN Counselor to the Department Assistant Secretary for International Organizations Affairs Undersecretary for Economic & Business Affairs Assistant Secretary for Economic & Business Affairs Assistant Secretary for Arms Control Assistant Secretary for Verification & Compliance Special Representative for Nuclear Nonproliferation Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs Chief Financial Officer Ambassador at Large for Internationa l Religious Freedom Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics Matters Assistant Secretary for Population, Refugees & Migration Secretary of Transportation Deputy Secretary of Transportation Asst. Secretary for Budget and Programs Asst. Secretary for Government Affairs Administrator, Federal Railroad Administration Administrator, Federal Transit Administration General Counsel Administrator, Research and Special Programs Administration Administrator, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 17

Administrator, Federal Highway Administration Administrator, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration Associate Deputy Secretary Assistant Secretary for Transportation Policy Assistant Secretary for Aviation & International Affairs Inspector General Administrator, Maritime Administration Deputy Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration Member, Surface Transportation Board Secretary of the Treasury Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs & Public Liaison General Counsel Undersecretary for International Affairs Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Undersecretary for Domestic Finance Undersecretary for Enforcement Treasurer of the United States Assistant Secretary for Financial Markets Director, US Mint Commissioner of Customs Assistant Secretary for Financial Institutions Director, Office of Thrift Supervision Chief Counsel, IRS Director, Community Development Financial Institutions Fund Inspector General Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration Assistant Secretary for International Affairs Assistant Secretary for Enforcement Assistant Secretary for Economic Policy Assistant Secretary for Management & Chief Financial Officer Secretary of Veteran's Affairs General Counsel Asst. Secretary for Public and Intergovernmental Affairs Deputy Secretary of Veteran's Affairs Undersecretary for Memorial Affairs Assistant Secretary for Congressional Affairs Assistant Secretary for Human Resources & Administration Assistant Secretary for Policy & Planning Assistant Secretary for Management Assistant Secretary for Information & Technology Inspector General Undersecretary for Benefits Director, OMB USTR Deputy Director, OMB

Chairman, Council of Economic Advisors Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs Deputy USTR Deputy USTR Administrator, Office of Federal Procurement Policy Deputy USTR Member, Council of Economic Advisors Chief Agricultural Negotiator, Office of USTR Chairman, Council on Environmental Quality Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy Director, Office of Science & Technology Policy Deputy Director, ONDCP Deputy Director for State & Local Affairs, ONDCP Executive Associate Director & Controller, OMB Deputy Director for Management, OMB Member, Council of Economic Advisors Member, Council on Environmental Quality Member, Council on Environmental Quality Associate Director, Environment, Office of S&T Policy Associate Director, National Security & Int'l Affairs, Office of S&T Policy Associate Director, Science, Office of S&T Policy Associate Director, Technology, Office of S&T Policy Deputy Director for Demand & Reduction, ONDCP Deputy Director for Supply Reduction Public Printer, GPO Librarian of Congress

Source: The Brookings Institution

Appendix II Politically Appointed Positions Within The Independent Agencies of the U.S. Government Administrator, EPA Director, FEMA Director, US Agency for Intl. Developme nt General Counsel, EPA Administrator, Small Business Administration President, Overseas Private Investment Corp Governor, Federal Reserve System Member, FTC Administrator, General Services Administration Director, OPM Deputy Administrator, EPA Commissioner, FERC Commissioner, FERC President, Export-Import Bank Assistant Administrator for Air & Radiation, EPA Commissioner, Federal Communications Commission Commissioner, Federal Communications Commission Commissioner, Federal Communications Commission Director, Trade & Development Agency Member, Authority, Federal Labor Relations Authority Assistant Administrator for Water, EPA First Vice President & Vice Chair, Export-Import Bank of the United States Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Director, Institute of Museum & Library Services, Nat'l Foundation on the Arts & the Humanities Director, Selective Service System Assistant Administrator for Asia & the Near East, USAID Assistant Administrator for Prevention, Pesticides & To xic Substances, EPA Chairwoman, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Chairman, Securities & Exchange Commission Federal Co-Chairman, Delta Regional Authority General Counsel, National Labor Relations Board Chairman, National Endowment for the Humanities Executive Vice-President, OPIC US Exec. Dir. of the Int'l Bank for Reconstruction & Development Assistant Administrator for Policy & Program Coordination, USAID Assistant Administrator for International Activities, EPA Commissioner, Social Secur ity Administration Assistant Administrator for the Bureau of Humanitarian Response, USAID Governor, Federal Reserve System Inspector General, General Services Administration Chief Executive Officer, Corporation for National & Community Service 20

Executive Director, Inter-American Development Bank Assistant Administrator for Solid Waste & Emergency Response, EPA Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board Member, National Transportation Safety Board Assistant Administrator for Enforcement & Compliance Assurance, EPA Commissioner, Nuclear Regulatory Commission Assistant Administrator for Legislative & Public Affairs, USAID Assistant Administrator for Global Programs, Field Support & Research, USAID Assistant Administrator for Europe & Eurasia, USAID Governor, Federal Reserve System Director, Tennessee Valley Authority Director, African Development Bank Deputy Commissioner, Social Security Administration Federal Co-Chairman, Appalachian Regional Commission Alternate Federal Co-Chairman, Appalachian Regional Commission Director, CIA Deputy Director, CIA Deputy Director for Community Management, CIA Statutory Inspector General, CIA General Counsel, CIA Assistant Director for Administration, CIA Assistant Director for Analysis & Productio n, CIA Assistant Director for Collection, CIA Chairman/CEO, Chemical Safety & Hazard Investigation Board Member, CSHIB Commissioner, Commodity Futures Trading Commission Commissioner, Commodity Futures Trading Commission Commissioner, Consumer Product Safety Commission Commissioner, Consumer Product Safety Commission Chief Financial Officer, Corporation for National & Community Service Inspector General, Corporation for National & Community Service Director, Court Services & Offender Supervision Agency Chairman, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Member, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Chief Financial Officer, EPA Assistant Administrator for Environmental Information, EPA Assistant Administrator for Administration & Resources Mana gement, EPA Inspector General, EPA Assistant Administrator for Research & Development, EPA General Counsel, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Member, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Member, Board of Directors, Export-Import Bank of the United States Member, Farm Credit Administration Board Vice-Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Inspector General, FDIC Commissioner Member, Federal Election Commission Commissioner Member, Federal Election Commission Deputy Director, FEMA 21

Inspector General, FEMA Associate Director, Preparedness, Training & Exercise Directorate, FEMA Administrator, Federal Insurance Admin., FEMA Administrator, US Fire Administration, FEMA Associate Director, Mitigation Directorate Member, Federal Hous ing Finance Board Member, Federal Housing Finance Board Member, Federal Housing Finance Board General Counsel, Federal Labor Relations Authority Commissioner, Federal Maritime Commission Commissioner, Federal Maritime Commission Director, Federal Mediation & Conciliation Service Commissioner, Federal Mine Safety & Health Review Commission Commissioner, Federal Mine Safety & Health Review Commission Governor, Federal Reserve System Vice-Chairman, Merit Systems Protection Board Administrator, NASA Deputy Administrator, NASA Chief Financial Officer, NASA Inspector General, NASA Archivist of the United States, National Archives & Records Administration Member, National Credit Union Administration Member, National Credit Union Administration Chairman, National Endowment for the Arts Member, National Labor Relations Board Member, National Labor Relations Board Chairman, National Mediation Board Deputy Director, National Science Foundation Member, National Transportation Safety Board Inspector General, Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commission Member, Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission Commissioner, Office of Navaho and Hopi Indian Relocation Deputy Director, OPM Inspector General, OPM Board Member, OPIC Board Member, OPIC Board Member, OPIC Board Member, OPIC Board Member, OPIC Board Member, OPIC Board Member, OPIC Board Member, OPIC Director, Peace Corps Deputy Director, Peace Corps Commissioner, Postal Rate Commission Inspector General, Railroad Retirement Board Commissioner, Securities & Exchange Commission Commissioner, Securities & Exchange Commission 22

Commissioner, Securities & Exchange Commission Deputy Administrator, Small Business Administration Chief Counsel for Advocacy, Small Business Administration Inspector General, Small Business Administration Inspector General, Social Security Administration Deputy Administrator, US Agency for International Development Inspector General, USAID Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Management, USAID Assistant Ad ministrator for the Africa Bureau, USAID Assistant Administrator for Latin America & the Caribbean, USAID Commissioner, US International Trade Commission

Source: The Brookings Institution