POLARIZED PERSPECTIVES: HONG KONG’S STUDENTS IN THE EXTRADITION-BILL ERA BECKY ZHANG

Becky Zhang

POLARIZED

PERSPECTIVES:

HONG KONG’S

STUDENTS IN THE

EXTRADITION-BILL

ERA

THE NEW GENERATION

Hong Kong’s youth is once again at the forefront of the city’s burgeoning politics. Echoing the Umbrella Movement of 2014, recent uproar prompted by the suspended-but-not-withdrawn extradition bill has been spearheaded by young people, making up the core of Hong Kong’s sustained protests.

The young people of Hong Kong do not comprise a monolith, however; while mass media tend to display the pro-democracy activism of students, the narrative painted is incomplete. There exists a variety of stances on Hong Kong’s relationship with mainland China. While certain voices do outnumber others—as demonstrated by the record-breaking protest turnout of up to two million people on June 16 this year—it is also true that some voices are simply louder than the rest.

While assessing the complex nature of Hong Kong- -China relations, during a time when frictions are record-high and some refuse to even engage with opposing camps, one must heed the entire spectrum of public opinion—even those that may not align with the mainstream ideology—in order to better understand the issues at stake. IDENTITY CRISIS AND POLARIZATION

In 1997, Hong Kong was returned to China from Britain under the precondition that the region would retain partial autonomy for the next fifty years. This special autonomy would take the form of an independent judiciary, a partially popularly elected legislature, emphasis on the rule of law, and an aim toward universal suffrage. China would gain control over Hong Kong’s foreign affairs and military.

A sort of identity crisis has since emerged among Hong Kong citizens: many have grown accustomed to the greater freedoms inspired by British rule and some are unsure about their original allegiance to China. Critics believe that Hong Kong has seen significant economic, sociocultural, and political integration into mainland China in the first 22 years since its handover. They cite issues such as the kidnapped Causeway Bay booksellers, excessive police force, the Greater Bay Area plan—signaling active integration of Hong Kong into the mainland, and the allegedly unfounded removal of select legislators in 2016 as examples of Hong Kong’s eroding autonomy.

Since 1997, the shift in Hong Kong’s already-convoluted identity has heightened tensions between mainland Chinese and locals in Hong Kong. Other than

the occasional MTR scuffle or shopping-mall dispute, such conflicts take place rather notably on university campuses, which are increasingly populated with mainland students.

Large-scale protests such as those in 2003, 2014, and this year, combined with the increasingly efficient and accessible tool of social media, have demonstrated clear sociopolitical divides. These frictions have caused echo chambers, in which people share their opinions only with those who are like-minded. Less acute but also present is a fear of political discourse, where certain topics are dodged and discussed only among trusted circles.

Both of these phenomena contribute to political polarization, especially noticeable within the contained environments of university campuses. The rifts among Hong Kong’s university students are more often than not marked by regional origin; local Hong Kong students, mainland Chinese students, and other international students tend to separate socially, a product of various factors including language barriers, university practices, and cultural and political differences.

The last factor is especially relevant given Hong Kong’s recent landmark protests against Chief Executive Carrie Lam’s now “dead” extradition bill, which critics argue would erode the promised firewall between Hong Kong and mainland China’s legal systems, a precondition to the 1997 handover. Students, moreover, constitute a majority of those advocating for liberal democracy and resisting the central government’s tightening grip on the city. It is therefore crucial to consider the varying views of Hong Kong’s young adults, in particular those most directly attached to the issue: that is, the students who grew up in Hong Kong or mainland China. MAINLAND-LOCAL TENSIONS

As a precursor to the interview compilation and discussion, the following are significant indicators of mainland-Hong Kong conflicts on campus.

Student unions at Hong Kong’s universities have become more politically active due to the city’s increasingly contentious political status. These bodies of student government are populated by local Hong Kong students with similar political views, and concerns about lack of representation and prejudice against mainlanders and other nonlocal students have sprouted. A few cases in particular, where either mainland students or politically-moderate students have lost in elections, have demonstrated some local students’ widespread mistrust in mainland China.

Moreover, in recent years, “democracy walls” —

bulletin boards erected by university administrators initially to promote students’ free expression—have been a hot topic ever since pro-democracy, pro-independence and pro-establishment camps came to clash in the shared forums. Hong Kong Polytechnic University (PolyU) and Hong Kong University (HKU) administrators resorted to removing “extreme” signs calling for Hong Kong’s independence, a move which received backlash from some students and support from others who saw such radical views as dangerous or insensitive.

Even abroad, there have been clashes over Hong Kong’s relationship to China. After a student at Emerson College in the United States wrote a piece for the student newspaper (titled “I am from Hong Kong, not China”) rejecting her personal identification as a Chinese, mainland Chinese students from her university responded in anger and some wrote an article countering her piece, stating that the op-ed failed to properly inform readers about the political realities (that is, the political ties to China) of regions such as Hong Kong, Tibet, and Taiwan.

HKU Associate Professor of Sociology, Xiaoli Tian, from mainland China, cites scarce personal contact as the primary cause of divides between mainland and Hong Kong students. After interviewing a wide range of mainland Chinese students in Hong Kong and taking note of social spaces, she details that “fragmented daily living space, protected interpersonal space, and politicized online space” are the primary contributors to observed divisions.

Similarly, Professor Ke, who teaches economics at an established university in Hong Kong and chooses to remain anonymous, says that she has felt a significant sociocultural change between Hong Kong a decade ago and today. Having grown up in mainland China, she studied for a semester “abroad” at a university in Hong Kong and found the city exceptionally welcoming and open. Now, having returned to serve as a professor, she has observed a stark difference in the once-open nature of locals in Hong Kong, as well as a sharp decline in their interactions with mainland Chinese students and visitors. Professor Ke’s question is: What happened between 2004 and 2014 that brought about such a tangible change?

Research Methods

I had the opportunity to interview 13 students from four Hong Kong universities—HKU, Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK), PolyU, and Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (HKUST)—

regarding their perspectives on the S.A.R. and its future, as well as their experiences interacting with other opinions on campus. I also spoke with an economics professor, as previously mentioned, who is originally from mainland China. The interviews were mostly coordinated via personal networks, and thus there may be a bias toward more culturally international students. In addition, the timing of these interviews during the June and early July of the summer holidays, within a limited timeframe, made it challenging to access more students.

The presented interviews and my analyses of them are intended to be exploratory and qualitative. There are too few interviewees for the collected responses to be evaluated in any empirical scale, and most questions elicit reflective rather than measurable responses. Therefore, the following dissection of conversations with Hong Kong students is to be used simply for an increased understanding of the sampled students’ perspectives. It cannot be representative of any demographics on the whole.

That said, there is an intentional balance between interviewees who grew up in Hong Kong and in mainland China. Most sections of this paper are divided into local and mainland students’ responses. Furthermore, students interviewed attend a variety of universities, are studying in diverse courses, and are at varying stages in their academic careers (eight undergraduates, three postgraduates, and two recent alumni).

I will thus nonetheless offer patterns amidst the responses received, so that they might assist the reader in assessing and developing their own understanding of the political climate among today’s youth in Hong Kong. This compilation of responses also seeks to function as a “constructed” dialogue among a diverse group of students, who might not otherwise have the opportunity to discuss such topics with one another.

Interviewees: Details on interviewees below—their student status, university, field of study, etc.—may be used for reference while reading. Pseudonyms are used for privacy. From Hong Kong: (students listed attended international school in Hong Kong unless otherwise mentioned) - Cedric: undergraduate, HKU, humanities - Crystal: undergraduate, CUHK, professional - Daniel: undergraduate, PolyU, STEM , local school - Emma: undergraduate, HKU, professional - Kristine: undergraduate, HKU, STEM, originally from Singapore - Lisa: undergraduate, PolyU, professional, local school - William: undergraduate, HKU, professional From mainland China: (all students listed attended local school in mainland China) - Anthony: postgraduate, HKU, social sciences - Harry: postgraduate, HKU, social sciences - Jasmine: undergraduate, HKU, professional - Roger: postgraduate, HKUST, STEM - Sharon: alumna, HKU, professional - Zach: alumnus, HKU, STEM

I. The Key Aspect of HK-Mainland Relations

The interviewed students share what they each believe is the most critical aspect of the controversial and convoluted relationship between Hong Kong S.A.R. and mainland China. Responses vary: among local students, issues such as maintaining economic autonomy in Hong Kong and clarifying the implementation of “one country, two systems” are critical. To mainland interviewees, enforcing the notion of China as a singular entity and reshaping both parties’ mutual perceptions is vital.

Asked what the she thinks is the key aspect of Hong-Kong-mainland relations, local student Crystal puts it simply: “Hong Kong people feel that it’s unfair that they promised us 50 years of special status, and now they are moving so fast. They are angry that China is going back on its promise.” Along the same vein, Kristine attributes the controversy to “a lack of clarity” and “the many gray areas in the ‘one country, two systems’ law.”

Cedric thus highlights the importance of Hong Kong retaining the freedom it should have while also working together with China “because we have to.” “Hong Kong would go to crap without China right now,” he says, “So it’s more about working together without losing the values of freedom, democracy, and whatnot.”

To Emma, however, the most important thing is specifically keeping Hong Kong’s financial situation “relatively independent” from China’s. William, too, worries that as the two economies get linked further, Hong Kong companies will hire more mainlanders and immigrants, thereby disadvantaging local people and even altering Hong Kong’s working culture. He says, “[Hongkongers] worry that, with economic growth, how much of it is just going to the Chinese people coming here to work?”

Daniel, on the contrary, argues that society must rearrange its priorities: “It is not actually about the issues but about the attitude. Most people here are putting efforts into earning money, which is regarded as the core value. There are tons of problems going on, yet money is still the first priority. ‘I have to work and I have to earn money, or else I will lose my job!’ But you will even still lose your job, you will be arrested by China, if you are still neglecting society and neglecting what’s happening around you. You are still being affected—politics is everywhere.”

According to mainland student Anthony, the following is critical: “Hong Kong is in a passive position; things are increasingly decided by Beijing. They stand still, keep the hard line, and deal with any uprisings.” He adds, “It’s very different from 2003, when at least the liberal party responded to public protests. There is a paradigm shift in the way they deal with Hong Kong and Taiwan… they don’t care that much about popular opinion. They care whether their strategy is successful. Increasingly, they realize they’re not able to win the majority’s hearts. What they can do is remain strong, and they tend to believe that over time the majority will surrender.”

Local student Emma echoes Anthony’s observations: “I do feel that China has been extending its soft power quite a bit. In the past, they really did care about how China was presented to other countries, but nowadays it feels more and more like they’re strong enough to not need that—not need to save face as much. They’re more determined to state their sovereignty, and to them, the fact that other countries might have an opinion about Hong Kong’s political climate is a threat to that sovereignty.”

Mainland-Chinese Zach says that the issue of Hong Kong-mainland relations stems primarily from local perceptions. “It’s all about how Hongkongers perceive the mainland—is mainland China a good partner to grow with, an enemy to be defeated, or…?”

To this question Jasmine would respond that Hong Kong must see China as one whole. “We were taught in school that there is only one China and there will always be one China only. Hong Kong is a part of China,” she says. “This is mainly the political standpoint of China, and it’s also my own political view. Maybe I’m biased—I acknowledge that. I’m quite influenced by my upbringing.”

Recognizing one’s biases can serve little more than superficial purposes, however; arguably, to truly confront and reckon with biases one must actively strive to counterbalance them, either via reading opposing media platforms, talking to different people, or endeavoring to play devil’s advocate. This understandably is easier said than done, and even when executed may not bring ideal results. Some may also believe that personal biases are essentially inerasable—that they are so deeply embedded into our mindsets—or that they are mutable, but still inescapable—no completely objective thought-space exists for one to think completely bias-free. Even in trying to take in diverse perspectives, while equipped with a certain lens from the outset, one might only become further locked in their original stance. Moreover, biases can be tied less to ideology and more to personal interest, which can be even more difficult to separate oneself from.

While Jasmine defends the “one China” view, Roger instead focuses on clearer legal processes as a key to Hong Kong and China’s relationship: “It’s important that everyone knows what this [extradition bill] is actually doing and what are the consequences for Hong Kong and China. There needs to be transparency and enough information, because people tend to just follow the masses.” He adds, “The judicial process in China should be clearer to gain Hong Kong’s trust that China is a decent place. Obviously, China was pretty questionable before—especially before the country opened up. But times have changed, and China is not as dark as people think.”

II. Assessing the Pro-Democracy Movement

Almost half of the 13 students interviewed, from opposing political camps, bring up their own doubts regarding the practicality and potential of the anti-establishment movement.

Roger, like some of his mainland peers, argues that the recent Hong Kong protesters are not pragmatic enough. He asks, “What exactly are they opposing? Is it the extradition bill, police violence, or anti-democracy camps? They are now going to protest democracy, and they’ve forgotten why they went out to oppose the bill in the first place.”

He continues, “The mainland doesn’t really want to harm Hong Kong; it’s their own people. Hong Kong needs to think carefully about what policies are really going to benefit them, and not just fight for democracy.” Mainlander Zach concurs: “I’ve seen very few constructive opinions on how they need to mend the bill’s loophole. No one is issuing alternatives; they’re just paralyzing the traffic and making this city look ugly instead of better.”

Though he supports the anti-establishment movement, mainland student Anthony says, “The movement in Hong Kong is a blueprint; the whole thing is too handicapped by a moral agenda, with very little strategic thinking. It’s a campaign doomed to fail.” Anthony’s comments raise questions about how the movement ought to be executed if aiming to succeed, including the idea of less innocuous methods such as violence as a protest strategy.

Even Daniel, a local student dedicated to the pro-democracy camp, agrees that the movement lacks a clear objective: “Most of us have the same opinion that something should be changed in Hong Kong, although we can’t tell what specifically.”

III. What Will Happen in 2047?

Under the Sino-British Joint Declaration signed in 1984, Hong Kong’s highly autonomous legal and judicial systems are set to “remain unchanged for 50 years” from 1997 onward. In 28 years, China will no longer be legally bound to this agreement. Students reflect on the implications of this, with relatively anxious and pessimistic outlooks offered by those who grew up in Hong Kong.

According to Hongkonger Cedric, “There will be chaos in terms of political movements, and a massive clash of opposing ideologies. Physically, it will be a very overt change because China will easily just say, ‘All the policies apply to you. All your freedom’s lost.’”

Daniel agrees that integration cannot happen smoothly. “I regard Hong Kong more as a culture than a country, region, or whatever,” he says. “This is not about land; it’s about acceptance as a Hong Kong people. When the government tries to blend two cultures (Hong Kong and the mainland), they should know that there are differences behind them. We are born in different areas, with different environments and educa

tions. And if the government puts too much force on integration, then it won’t be good. There will be resistance.”

Emma is equally pessimistic, though slightly more ambivalent: “Yes, Hong Kong in 2047 will be part of China again. To what extent that is is really up to China… though I do think there are enough people in Hong Kong that care about Hong Kong’s future so that we won’t just be completely subsumed by China in 2047.”

Crystal argues, “I don’t think China is going to give up—I think by 2047, integration will happen. And that was the agreement, after all.”

Like some of his peers, Cedric says this integration is already in the works: “I definitely see various physical manifestations of China slowly taking in Hong Kong, even though there was the whole 50 years of no change thing. There’s the Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macao Bridge… and the border to Shenzhen is slowly coming down.”

While William says he doesn’t know enough to comment on 2047, he offers, “I’ve heard that we can remove the ‘one country, two systems’ thing. I’m not too sure about that, but if we can’t, then I really hope China’s development by then will have less of a gap (from a legal perspective) with Hong Kong, so it won’t be as bad of a transition.”

Most mainland students say they haven’t thought about 2047 before, with graduate student Roger being unaware of the 50-year contract of “one country, two systems.”

Sharon sees 2047 as a definite bearer of change; she believes the Chinese government will be more involved in Hong Kong’s affairs, though she is unsure on what grounds they will collaborate and hopes that both sides can have a say in their mutual affairs. “Of course there will be more integration and the two places will become more similar,” she says. “I think that’s a natural evolvement.”

To Harry, the expiration of the contract may go one of two ways. If all goes well, he says, people will start to accept the fact that Hong Kong people are Chinese citizens. “Since Beijing will understand that the locals will no longer challenge the ‘one China’ policy, then they will grant more freedom to Hong Kong and let people do what they want,” he adds. “Most mainlanders don’t care how locals want to run Hong Kong, I think. it’s not my business at the end of the day.” If things go wayward, Harry has the following vision of 2047: “Beijing will totally ignore Hong Kong’s interests, and Hong Kong won’t allow debates with Beijing about policy. It becomes all emotions, throwing rocks at each other.” (Ironically, his description already matches some people’s views on the present situation.)

Anthony, on the other hand, doesn’t necessarily see 2047 as groundbreaking: “I don’t believe in everything changing in 2047. I don’t think it’s going to happen. It’s always smart for Beijing to maintain ‘one country, two systems,’ no matter how fake it is. There are certain parts to it, such as this legal autonomy, etcetera, that have to stay, and the Hong Kong public isn’t ready for that kind of violent uprising.” (Note that this response was given prior to the record-breaking extradition bill protests.)

Likewise, Zach says that if the next three decades see little change, then Hong Kong might just retain its special status.

IV. Is Independence Viable?

While the interviewed students unanimously believe that independence is not a viable option for Hong Kong, those from Hong Kong credit this to logistical obstacles, while those from the mainland tend to argue against its fundamental intentions. To Hongkonger Cedric, the current “one country, two systems” setup, though flawed, is preferable to independence because there exist too many variables that need to be accounted for.

Daniel, also a local, elaborates on the predicament facing the minority who do advocate for independence: “China is too much to deal with. We don’t have armies, even though we have a distinct political system, ministry, and currency.” He suggests, however, “I would hope that people could choose what Hong Kong would be. There should be referendums, or there should be platforms for people to share their opinions on the future of Hong Kong. They should self-determine.”Though Daniel admits that there would be flaws to the idea of referendums, he says they would still be preferable to the situation now, with only “one-sided opinions flooding around.”

Emma points to other unsuccessful Chinese independence movements. “I don’t think Hong Kong can separate from China,” she says. “Taiwan still struggles to have that distinction. It’s just not the direction Hong Kong is heading toward… I think the Chinese government is really, really strong now.” While the mainland students also agree on the impracticality of independence, most also suggest the moral wrongness of such an act.

Social sciences student Harry highlights the specific ways in which Hong Kong is bound to China: “When you have most of the drinking water, the agricultural products coming from the mainland, then how can you

have independence?” He adds that Hong Kong prosperity cannot be achieved without the mainland given mainland businesses’ heavy involvement in Hong Kong markets.

Sharon cites a need for drastic reform before one might consider the option of independence. “When independence is viable,” she says, “the social situation will have already changed much from right now. If the two societies change to all democratic systems, nation-states, then I guess it’s possible. But even independence wouldn’t have too much significance by that time; by then, independence wouldn’t do much because the two would still need to collaborate on a lot of things.” One or two mainland students express vague sympathy for the pro-independence camp, however. Anthony’s view stands out: “I don’t think that their belief in independence is that naïve. Their statement merely means that independence is a valid, legitimate request. They are not naïve at all; they probably know more than I do.”

While Roger opposes independence, he says it is not because of the “one China” idea. He offers, “I can understand why the people want independence, like Tibet or Taiwan. These desires are normal.” However, he argues, “Once a government is actually independent, is it really good? It doesn’t necessarily help the masses, unless the government is good and the leaders are good. But if you separate and your leader is bad, then who can help you, guide you?” Roger arrives at the following conclusion: “For a society, it’s more important that it avoids variation than its overall average. People would rather have a slightly poorer, tougher society than have greater instability.”

V. Economic vs. Sociopolitical Interests

Roger brings up the critical issue of navigating economic and stabilizing interests with more ideological and sociopolitical ones. Some of the interviewed students share their thoughts on the matter, raising difficult questions about how countries ought to be governed.

Local student Kristine, originally from Singapore, sees Hong Kong politics almost as a game of thrones, relating more to issues of stability and control than any universal ideals. “I feel less inclined to be politically engaged in the issues here, as opposed to those where people's direct well-being is affected,” she says. “The life here is arguably of good quality, with access to clean water, amenities, healthcare, etcetera, and so that contributes significantly to my lack of engagement with the politics here.”

Kristine continues by comparing local politics to the issues she believes have a stronger influence. She reasons, “I think with politics in places like the U.S.—maybe take the recent abortion issue as an example—there's a direct impact on the people of Alabama the moment the law is passed, in that people can be denied abortions and could die, etcetera. In the case of Hong Kong, there are looming fears of China's tightening grip. Taking the current issue with the extradition bill as an example, there are arguably pros and cons in passing it, and any repercussions or fears (such as China extraditing people on the basis of pro-democracy beliefs) are much further away than the direct repercussions of the abortion law in the U.S.”

While comparing local politics to U.S. politics, which tends to take place on the international stage, Kristine raises questions regarding recent foreign “interference” or “intervention” regarding Hong Kong events. Should recent clashes in Hong Kong matter on a global scale, as issues in the U.S. tend to do? To answer this demands an answer to whether Hong Kong’s democratic movements are intrinsically connected to similar struggles around the world. Alternatively, the question can be answered by whether one sees China as a major global force to be reckoned with. William takes a distinct stance from other local interviewees, arguing that countries cannot implement such sociopolitical ideals before first setting a basic standard of living via economic growth. Doing so, he says, would actually delay the process of democratization. Addressing the risks of liberal democracy, he says, “If you let a really big group of uneducated people elect their government, then it is so easy to bribe them.” On the other hand, William argues, authoritarian government seems to be effective in China. “In order to be a CCP member, you have to be a socially upstanding member, someone people look up to,” he says. “It’s actually an honor to become a CCP member, so I think the Chinese government on the whole is being ruled by competent people with the right qualities.”

William continues, “The Chinese government, on the whole, is doing a good job—from an economic point of view, and culturally and technologically. 70 to 80 years ago the country was a mess, and now it’s getting better and better.” He admits, “It’s committed a lot of crimes in its history, it’s not been perfect, but what country has been perfect on its way to development?”

Of the mainland students interviewed, Sharon feels unsatisfied with the question posed, arguing, “Economic benefits

and morality are not an A or B option. We need both, and the two must exist at the same time. I think it’s a strange thing to think that one is more important.” With audible conviction, she observes, “Taking care of economic needs is actually a moral action.” To Sharon, mainland China and Hong Kong have comparable issues to confront. She argues that China generally has more economic needs, even though “Hong Kong actually has severe poverty as well,” though China also has a lot of human rights issues. “Similar issues exist,” she says. “Maybe they just look different on the surface.”

Harry, a graduate student in the social sciences questions the prioritization of liberal ideals. “As long as you don’t challenge political authority, you can do a lot of things you want to do,” he says. “I know that’s not the standard definition of human rights or freedom—but overall you have a lot of economic freedom.”

Roger similarly argues for a balance between democracy and stability. “I think Hong Kong has excess democracy right now,” he asserts. “Before, the mainland was very closed off, and that threatened Chinese stability. Now Hong Kong is so chaotic, and I think there need to be changes to adjust and re-stabilize.”

Anthony feels more ambivalent about the sometimes-opposing notions of economic goals and political ideals. “It’s much more complicated than what’s right or wrong, simply put,” he says. “Of course, putting stability over everything else is ridiculous, but having no place for stability in any political deliberation is too thoughtless. There is a limit to which you can keep this friend-enemy framework. It can’t go on; once the [political] movement is over, the economic interest comes back.”

To Zach, stability is always at stake. “Going from non-democratic to democratic is not a smooth transition,” he says, saying that countries usually lack “a good enough mechanism” to undertake the transition while maintaining economic growth. “At least in the short term, they will have a bit of a tough time. Whether it will recover at all will depend on the future.”

VI. Changes in Perspective While Studying "Abroad"

Students from mainland China were asked about how studying in Hong Kong has—or has not—influenced their sociopolitical perspectives. All six students say they have developed an understanding of, though not an agreement with, the distinct and more liberal opinions of local students. Amidst this reflection, students say they have recognized the challenging complexity of political beliefs and advocacy. Unlike the other interviewees, Anthony highlights his behavioral changes since moving from China to Hong Kong for university: “When I go back to the mainland, I do feel the difference in how people treat each other. I feel that when I go back to China, I often behave differently than what I’d behave in Hong Kong. Hong Kong is rule- -abiding, and China is less so.”

Other mainland students discuss how they have developed sympathy for local students. “Now I understand better what Hong Kong people are opposing when they oppose the extradition bill,” says Roger. “It’s not about the bill; it’s about the oppression of democracy. Coming to Hong Kong, I’ve gained more understanding on how they think, their logic. I still think they’re overdoing it, though. I just see why now.”

Similarly, Zach says, “In Hong Kong I have more information than I may be able to get in China, helping me see that part of what they are doing makes sense. If I were back in China, it would be much more difficult to really see the reasons behind what Hong Kong people are doing.”

Half of the students interviewed, independent of their regional origin, say they have recently acknowledged the deep complexity of political frameworks and have thus accepted the coexistence of multiple truths. “Before I left China for my postgraduate, I did believe Beijing was correct,” says Harry. “After studying overseas, I see more legitimate claims by other perspectives. [That’s] not to say Beijing is incorrect, but there are a lot of correct ideas and arguments. Unfortunately, these arguments clash, but most of them are correct.”

Jasmine, also from mainland China, has undergone a similar transition: “I’m starting to consider more possibilities. There was never one way, and this is not the only way we’re going to go for the country to develop. There are always many more possibilities.”

Likewise, Hong Kong-raised Cedric says that his views are “always shifting” and “open to new perspectives.”

Local student William shares his take on evaluating moral truth: “I’m very wary that what is popular does not necessarily mean something is right. Whenever I see something where 100 percent of people agree, for example against the extradition bill, I become wary. Why is nobody saying the opposite thing?”

“My views right now are actually not that strong— they’re very nebulous. My only view is that if you have a strong view on something, you might be wrong,” he chuckles. (Cedric’s views are similar; he has “opinions on other people’s opinions on politics,” and not necessarily

his own opinions on politics.) William continues, “The world is a really complicated place. If you want to change something, you don’t actually know what the consequences are. As people who just have a high school or university education, we don’t know enough about the world to know what is good for it. We don’t have enough experience to really affect change, so the best thing to do is, before you ask the world to change, first work on your immediate environment—ourselves, our family—and then change the bigger thing to be better.”

Along the same vein, mainland student Sharon says that arguing with impassioned hostility is neither effective nor inclusive. “I no longer have strong opinions like that,” she says. “I hope I can develop a more human way of understanding things, of treating other people. Right now, I think this is more important than discussing—or getting involved in—social issues.”

Mainland student Anthony, visibly distressed by the political turmoil in Hong Kong, represents a greater population of its youth today: “I have suffered from what went on in the first few years of the Umbrella Movement. Since then, I have started to think of my ways of contributing to society very differently.” While initially planning for a career in academia, he is now considering contributing more directly via other junctures and spheres. “But I need to take care of myself,” he stresses.

Lisa, a Hong Kong local, also highlights the importance of self-care: “You need to protect Hong Kong, but first you have to protect yourself.”

Anthony struggles greatly in deciding what is right and wrong. “I think Hong Kong’s political reality is very much a deadlock,” he admits. “One can never be that simple-minded in terms of what ought to or ought not to be done. In fact, I think anyone who takes these things seriously cannot escape the constant battle they are situated in—because anything you do will backfire and doesn’t seem to be entirely free from doubt.” “That complexity,” he sighs.

Conclusion

THE FORMATION OF DIVERSE PERSPECTIVES

The students’ varied responses suggest that the following key factors impact the formation of their political views: Cultural and Academic Upbringing

All mainland students interviewed depict their environmental and educational upbringing as pulling them toward acceptance of and a lack of engagement in their country’s politics. Many of the local students similarly state that Hong Kong’s preprofessional culture does the same, though to a lesser extent, and beginning only toward the end of their secondary school studies.

Students regardless of regional origin discuss the substantial impact of comprehensive liberal studies on their political “awakenings.” Moreover, students studying the social sciences and humanities at university tend to be more informed—and opinionated—on current events; they tend to be more pro-democracy. Parents’ Political Views

Almost all students acknowledge that their parents’ ideologies have largely impacted their own, although they also unanimously highlight the sociopolitical singularity of their own generation. Parents’ stances tend to align with their children’s cultural and academic upbringings, unless the children are immigrants or expatriates. Socioeconomic Status and Personal Stakes

Financial needs tend to trump ideological objectives, and thus students such as Lisa and Sharon have either edged away from local politics or made plans to do so in the future. Conversely, students who are politically engaged will either prioritize political ideals over economic goals or simply “vote with their feet” and move abroad. Those who do the latter usually have ample financial support and a more international background. While this may contribute to a more open-minded and global approach to politics, these students may hardly implement such values through advocacy in Hong Kong before they leave. Students who attended local school or will remain in Hong Kong have more stakes in local politics and thus tend to have stronger opinions; however, they may feel less comfortable voicing such opinions due to their personal investment in the topics discussed. Media and Technology

Social media and news sources, combined with students’ tendency to selectively read, can additionally strengthen—and narrow—political views on either side, potentially contributing to the polarization of opposing camps. THE IMPORTANCE OF DIALOGUE

In the introduction of this paper I called the dissected interviews a “constructed” dialogue among vastly different young people. Such a conversation—or cooperative interaction, if you will—between such opposing ideas would seem quite far-fetched today. This paper’s ability to compile conflicting perspectives is largely attributed to the interview style, in which students were asked questions and listened to without interruption, judgement, or rebuttal. If their responses were vague or seemingly unfounded, I only asked for clarification.

With intentional space and time to think on these challenging questions and topics, interviewees communicated their thoughts clearly—even ones they didn’t realize that they had. The honesty, composure, and thoughtfulness of each student interviewed demonstrates solid potential for important discussions between differing camps among youth— and across generations—in Hong Kong. Most interviewees admit that they tend not to participate in such controversial conversations in real life. For instance, while mainland student Roger is perplexed by opposition to the extradition bill, he admits to lacking a wholistic view on the issue: “I don’t really have Hong Kong friends, though, so I don’t really know what they actually think about this.”

Harry is one of the few students interviewed who is able to disagree strongly with a friend, also from mainland China. He attributes their success in part to their shared “base knowledge” and the energy and respect they invest into such heavy discourse. They both, moreover, share a similar regional background and are studying the social sciences. “We disagree,” he says, “but during this process we understand why we have different views based on different interpretations of the same facts. It takes time, patience, and willingness to explain and disagree constructively.” LOOKING FORWARD

Regardless of regional origin, most interviewees view Hong Kong’s current political and social tensions as nondurable. Almost all students who stay updated on political issues are pessimistic, with mainlanders tending to be less engaged and therefore more ambivalent toward, or accepting of, their present conditions of governance. The responses of the twelve university students support the notion that “one country, two systems” has been subject to vastly different interpretations, due to its contradictory definition and ambiguous implementation. This has caused the pro-government and pro-democracy camps to hold drastically different ideals for Hong Kong because of their respective emphases on the former and latter parts of the term. Going forward, both the Hong Kong and central governments must make stronger efforts to elucidate and legitimize the legal foundations behind their complex and strained relationship. There remains a gaping lack of consensus on the Hong Kong-mainland China arrangement, which is only abetted by the enigmatic nature of the CCP’s procedures and their structural ability to enforce their will without widespread public knowledge or consent.

The indefinite nature of “one country, two systems” is additionally tied to undefined motives behind anti-government protests, which have since evolved from the Umbrella Movement to the present pushback against Hong Kong’s extradition bill. Some of the students interviewed worry that since the movement has grown to be increasingly leaderless, it may appear mercurial, even diluted, in that it lacks a clear vision or set of goals, and each person may be in it for rather different reasons. Perhaps protestors and activists may have to refine their demands and sharpen as a collective in order to be regarded as more legitimate or effective.Based on this sample of university students from contrasting upbringings, it is evident that young people who grew up in Hong Kong are raising substantial questions regarding the way their region is governed. In a broader lens, the Hong Kong-mainland conflict can be viewed as a case example of two highly oppositional value systems clashing in an unclearly governed territory, locked in an intensifying identity crisis. Students interviewed raise important and challenging questions: When is stability more important than democracy? Are the two always at odds with one another? What types of freedom might be more pressing than others?

Without a clear direction ahead, it is unsurprising that both groups have polarized and grown at odds with one another. The tensions among young people studying at universities in Hong Kong is not dissimilar to those at the higher level among government officials and elites—different camps are approaching the issue that is Hong Kong’s relationship to China with completely different priorities. To this end, there is nebulous direction as to what may follow. Hong Kong will continue to teeter in mainland China’s partial grip until there is some way forward, either compromised or directed by the top down. Whether that clarity comes in the form of a rigid tightening of controls or the enactment of democratizing policies is uncertain. What’s certain, now, is merely the unsustainability of the present moment and of the two regions’ rancorous sociopolitical tensions.

Until the local and central governments respond comprehensively to those protesting on the streets and taking part in university and local activism, many of Hong Kong’s people will continue to make their wants heard. As Taiwanese presidential elections approach in the following year and the CCP, under Xi’s tightening leadership, faces heated frictions with the U.S. while rapidly expanding its global reach, there is little understanding as to what might happen next. Lam’s extradition bill has opened a Pandora’s Box that will only continue to complicate HK-mainland relations until something sweeping is done to stop the bleeding.

Bibliography Tian, Xiaoli. (accepted and in press) “Space and Personal Contacts: Cross-Group Interaction between Mainland and Local University Students in Hong Kong,” pp. 13. Journal of Social and Personal Relationships.