ADDRESSING THE DOKDO/TAKESHIMA TERRITORIAL DIS PUTE TO IMPROVE SOUTH KOREA-JAPAN RELATIONS KAYLIN KIM

Kaylin Kim

ADDRESSING THE DOKDO/ TAKESHIMA TERRITORIAL DISPUTE TO IMPROVE SOUTH KOREA-JAPAN RELATIONS

I. Introduction

Known as Dokdo in South Korea and Takeshima in Japan, this group of small islets in the East Sea/Sea of Japan is currently controlled by South Korea, and the islets’ sovereignty is contested by Japan. Located 87 kilometers away from the South Korean island Uleungdo and 157 kilometers away from Japan’s Oki Island, the islets are composed of two large rocks and 33 smaller rocks with a total territory of 0.186 kilometers squared (Atanassova-Cornelis). The sea around the islets are rich with fish, methane hydrate, phosphate rocks, natural gas, and other precious mineral resources (Jung).

The Dokdo/Takeshima territorial dispute has been a constant source of tension between Japan and Korea since the 20th century, when Japan’s empire was broken apart at the end of World War II. It permeates into social, cultural, and political spheres of Korean and Japanese societies (Atanassova-Cornelis). Therefore, this dispute is key to understanding South Korea-Japan relations and why diplomacy between the two countries has faltered.

The status quo in South Korea-Japan relations is hostile and stagnant. For Koreans, the Dokdo/Takeshima land dispute invokes strong nationalist sentiment and resentment over the Japanese colonization of the Korean Peninsula from 1910 to 1945. This issue unites Koreans across ideological and political spectrums, as the islets have been “internalized into Korea’s cultural narrative” and are now “a part of Korea’s own identity and the mark of the emotional trauma of Japanese oppression and occupation” (Kozisek). On the other hand, Japan’s official stance is that Takeshima is “indisputably an inherent part of the territory of Japan, in light of historical facts and based on international law” (“Japan’s Consistent Position”). Nationalist sentiment and propaganda generated by the government perpetuate the claim that the islets are rightfully Japan’s (Kozisek). Both liberal and conservative governments in Japan have claimed that the islets are Japanese territory and argue that South Korea’s control of the islets constitutes an “illegal occupation” (Tasevski).

After exploring historical precedent and political and cultural manifestations of the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute, I will propose de-escalatory measures to be enacted by the two nations. The measures I propose encourage a mutually beneficial resolution to the dispute, facilitate productive conversations on other bilateral issues, and manage tensions between the two countries in the long term.

II. Historical Background and Status Quo

South Korean claims over Dokdo/Takeshima are “derived from numerous historical documents and maps repeatedly discredited by the efforts of Japanese researchers” (Kozisek). South Korea’s evidence suggests that the islets have “been a part of Korea as early as since the 6th century AD during the Three Kingdoms Period” (Kaikobad). However, in 1904, Japan incorporated the islets as terra nullius (Latin for “nobody’s land”) and went on to colonize the rest of the Korean peninsula in 1910. During the 35 years of Japanese rule, Koreans were required to take Japanese names and speak in Japanese. Additionally, Japan utilized Koreans for forced labor and, in the case of thousands of women, Japanese military brothels, which also contributes to modern-day tensions between the two countries (Tasevski).

Japan’s claim is that evidence of Japanese bamboo harvesting and sea lion hunting on and around the islets in the mid-17th century is sufficient to constitute Japanese control of the islets until their formal incorporation into the Shimane Prefecture during Japan’s occupation of Korea (Bowman). As a result, there was no prominent dialogue about the status of the islets until after World War II (Kozisek).

In the post-World War II era, the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute can be simply described as being “set off by different interpretations of Japan’s renunciation of the formally occupied territories” (Kozisek). For example, since the islets were not explicitly mentioned in both the World War II era 1943 Cairo Declaration and the 1945 Potsdam Declaration, their status remained unclear (Kozisek). In 1951, the San Francisco Treaty was ratified to re-establish relations between Japan and the Allied Powers, end Japan’s occupation of other lands and Japan’s position as an imperial power, and specify details of settlement of war-related issues (Price). It also said that Korean territory that Japan gained unlawfully through colonization should be returned. Article 2 of the treaty states that Japan would renounce all right, title, and claim to Korea, including the islands Quelpart, Port Hamilton, and Dagelet (Lee). Because the Dokdo/Takeshima islets were not included in the treaty, Japan argues that the islets remained Japanese territory (Bowman). In 1951, the Korean ambassador to the United States requested that the U.S. Secretary of State amend Article 2 to include the Dokdo/Takeshima islets, but Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk stated that the United States did not have information that showed the islets were part of Korea (Lee). Some argue that this omission implies that the victors of World War II did not intend to return the islets to Korea (Lee). However, in his 2013 article in the Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, Garret Bowman argues that this omission

was “more likely the result of the Allies recognizing that not enough information was known at that time to establish sovereignty for either Japan or Korea” (Bowman).

In response, South Korea produced evidence supporting their sovereignty over the islets in the form of “written histories, Japanese-created maps, and Korean government publications dating back to 1454” (Bowman). For example, according to South Korea, Dokdo was recognized as Korean territory by the Japanese in 1696, after a dispute between Japanese and Korean fishermen (Genova). Thus, they argue the islets were returned to South Korea at the end of World War II as part of the San Francisco Treaty. However, Japan and South Korea interpret the historical evidence mentioned above differently, and their conflicting interpretations and unclear evidence mean that a present-day “international tribunal is more likely to focus on Korea’s use and control [of the islets] since the 1950s” (Bowman). In order to press its sovereignty claims, South Korea built a lighthouse, helicopter landing pad, and deployed police officers to the islets in the early 1950s (Atanassova-Cornelis). Subsequently, in 1954 and 1962, Japan proposed to transfer the land dispute to the International Court of Justice. However, South Korea rejected this proposal and stated that there is no existing legal dispute in the first place. Since the 1950s, Korean government presence on and around the islets has only increased, as the Korean Coast Guard is now stationed there on a permanent basis (Atanassova-Cornelis). Currently there is a Korean military base on the eastern islet where soldiers live in rotation (Genova). Police officers patrol the islets and the ocean space around them (Kozesik).

Since the 1990s, “South Korean politicians have frequently relied on anti-Japanese sentiments for various political purposes,” therefore perpetuating the Dokdo/Takeshima conflict throughout the following decades (Kozesik). North Korea has also “strongly condemned Japan” for its claim to the islets and stated that “Tok [Dokdo] Island is [an] inalienable part of Korea both in name and reality.” The North Korean Central News Agency declared in 2019 that if “Japanese reactionaries keep going reckless for overseas territorial expansion, defying repeated protest and rejection by the DPRK and other countries around it, they will face earlier isolation and self-ruin” (Yonhap).

In 2008, Japan proposed for a second time to transfer the land dispute to the ICJ and South Korea rejected it yet again, on the same grounds that they rejected the proposal in 1954 and 1962. South Korea’s refusal reflects the Korean government's position that “as long as they have effective jurisdiction, there’s no point taking the risk that they may lose the islands,” and allowing the case to be heard at the ICJ would potentially legitimize Japan’s claims to the islets (Park).

The sixty-eight-year status quo of South Korean sovereignty over the islets solidifies Korea’s claims, and under contemporary international law, the international community tends to agree that Korea’s claims are stronger than Japan’s (Bowman). It is ultimately history, specifically Japanese colonization of Korea in the early 20th century, that is responsible for South Korea’s fierce national pride for the islets. From Korea’s point of view, “losing ‘Dokdo’ would be akin to the post-facto legitimization of Japanese colonial rule” (Park). In Japan’s perspective, the islets were always theirs, and Japan has also used the islets to foster national pride and awareness to restore Japanese ownership of the islets.

III. Political and Cultural Manifestations of the Dokdo/Takeshima Dispute

The Dokdo/Takeshima dispute provokes fierce nationalism on both sides, and is one of the main sources of tension between Japan and Korea. Today, propaganda regarding the Dokdo/ Takeshima land dispute permeates both South Korean and Japanese politics and culture.

South Korea pursues strategies to legitimize its claims to the Dokdo/Takeshima islands. For example, National Geographic photographer Tim Franco said that “every time you arrive in South Korea and take the train from the airport to the town, there are videos talking about the Dokdo saying they are the most beautiful islands in the country and that South Korea rightfully owns them” (Tasevski). In South Korea, there is a well-known children’s song, “Dokdo is Our Land,” on which the popular “Jessica jingle” in Bong Joon-ho’s Oscar-winning movie “Parasite” is based.

South Korea also boasts several museums dedicated to the islets such as the Tokto Museum in Seoul, Tokto Museum on Ulleung Island, and the Tokto Research Institute (Palmer). The museum on Ulleung Island draws more than 125,000 visitors each year (Palmer). The islets are a popular tourist spot for South Korean citizens (Kozesik). Tourist visits are brief, around 20 minutes and are often seen as a “patriotic duty” (Hancocks). Dokdo’s prominence in Korean culture goes as far as having businesses commercialize and profit off of representations of the islets. Advertisements, Dokdo related knick-knacks, souvenirs, gifts such as “spoons, notebooks, socks, hats, and shirts,” and even food such as shrimp and squid, bear the name Dokdo (Palmer). Shrimp and squid fished in Dokdo waters are “said to be the tastiest in all of Korea.” Conservative media in Japan disapproved of South Korea’s decision to serve ‘Dokdo shrimp’ at South Korea’s state banquet for U.S. President Donald Trump in 2017 (McCurry). Dokdo has also been featured in the cuisine at inter-Korean summits; at a 2018 summit dinner South Korean President Moon Jae-in and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un were served “mango mousse…with a chocolate map of the peninsula with a Dokdo-shaped dot” (Genova).

Japan currently has a number of programs to educate the public about its claims to Dokdo/ Takeshima. In 2005, the Shimane Prefecture of Japan declared an annual prefectural memorial “Takeshima Day” designated on February 22, the day the islets were declared Japanese territory in 1905. On Takeshima Day the Japanese government encourages citizens to learn about the land dispute and Japan’s ownership of the islets. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s administration was criticized for sending high-ranking officials to said Takeshima Day celebrations. In response to the announcement of Takeshima Day in 2005, two Korean protesters each sliced off one of their fingers outside the Japanese embassy in Seoul to protest, and in 2012, a Korean man rammed his truck against the gate of the Japanese embassy to protest Japan’s claim to the islands (Tasevski). In 2008, Japan’s Ministry of Education encouraged teachers to instruct their students that the islets were a part of Japan, and issued a manual to Japanese textbook publishers. In response, South Korea recalled its ambassador from Tokyo. Japan recalled its ambassador to Korea from Seoul in 2012 after South Korean President Lee Myong-Bak became the first South Korean president to set foot on the islets (Tasevski).

In both nations, the number of people directly affected by historical issues in the past century is slowly diminishing. Therefore, issues like the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute, which in part stems from controversies in the 20th century, “remain stored in the nations’ discursively constructed collective memories from which they can be reactivated and utilized by younger generations, resulting in reactions stronger than ever before” (Kozisek). This results in a dangerous tendency for nationalist hatred for the other nation, and such thought patterns and emotional value are attached to this land dispute in order to incentivize society to produce evidence supporting their side (Kozisek).

IV. A Solution

Pacific Forum researchers Dong-Joon Park and Danielle Chubb argue it is important to “understand the strong emotional significance of the islands and the role national identity plays” in both nations, but especially in South Korea. As Park and Chubb point out, any South Korean concessions on the Dokdo issue would be “akin to political suicide,” while meanwhile it is highly unlikely Japan will hand over sovereignty.” Park and Chubb conclude “for as long as the two countries remain unable to even begin public conversation over the matter, diplomatic relations will improve only very slowly, if at all” (Park).

Some scholars argue that full demilitarization and neutralization of Dokdo and joint management of the natural and marine resources on and around the islets is the best solution to the land dispute (Kim). However, I agree with Sungbae Kim, a writer for The Journal of East Asian Affairs, that a joint management solution “overlooks the complexity and gravity” of the Dokdo-Takeshima dispute and that this conflict is not a “typical territorial dispute” (Kim). A joint management solution is naive because it ignores the emotional and sensitive nuances weaved into this unique land dispute, and fails

to address the root of the problem.

Therefore, in order to solve the dispute in the context of both South Korea and Japan’s negotiation limitations, both nations should take more comprehensive measures to address the dispute and commit to a gradual, long-term, and sustained process of bilateral reconciliation based on reduction of harmful and hateful nationalistic rhetoric and antipathy. De-escalatory measures must be taken in order to foster the environment needed for a peaceful and conclusive resolution to this land dispute and create the right set of conditions to positively impact bilateral relationships on other issues and manage tensions in the long term.

To realize these measures, three steps must be taken: harmful national rhetoric must be lessened on both sides, Japan should acknowledge Korean sovereignty, and South Korea needs to collaborate actively with Japan. A symbiotic relationship can only be achieved by reducing harsh nationalist rhetoric on both sides and lessening antipathy toward each other. Early sacrifices need to be made on both sides in order to reap the immense benefits from a strong South Korea-Japan relationship in the long-term.

First, both countries, especially South Korea, need to acknowledge how historical prejudice and fierce nationalism over the islets are tainting South Korea-Japan relations and seek to lessen animosity towards each other. The reason why many South Koreans are protective of Dokdo/Takeshima is because South Korea’s ownership of the islets strengthens the legitimacy of South Korea as a state: it symbolizes overcoming Japanese colonization. Thus, cooperation and attempts at rapprochement will not be successful, as long as Japan is still perceived as a threat to Korean autonomy in South Korean society. Fierce nationalism prohibits citizens from transcending nationalist animosity for the other and prevents them from realizing that a peaceful solution can be reached. Propaganda must be halted and if Korea and Japan allow this status quo to intensify, hatred for the other will become more and more internalized in national identity and will only worsen relations.

Second, to achieve a win-win solution for both sides, Japan should make a strategic sacrifice by accepting Korean sovereignty of the islets and acknowledge that Korea’s claims are directly linked to South Korean resentment due to Japanese colonization of the Korean Peninsula. Making concessions to Korea would likely hurt the popularity of Japanese policymakers due to the nationalistic fervor surrounding the dispute, and perceived concessions would also hurt South Korean politicians for the same reasons. However, accepting Korean sovereignty will strengthen unstable South Korea-Japan relations, lessen animosity in future trade and political disputes or discussions, and provide an opportunity for Japan to take the initiative in promoting regional stability. As Bowman suggests, “Japanese leaders do not have to completely renounce national pride in order to resolve the issue and focus on the future.” Additionally, if Japan is not willing to engage in a military clash over the islets, “its attempts to make it a disputed territory will be futile,” and the more “Japan problematizes this issue,” the more the Korean government will “stiffen its resolve” (Kim). A pragmatic compromise in which Japan recognizes Korean sovereignty over the islets does not undermine Japanese national identity but rather fortifies it. Japan will be taking a bold step forward in setting a precedent “by endorsing recent territorial control as the territorial control as the decisive factor in island disputes,” and this will allow Japan to “better legally and politically protect islands it already controls in any disputes against China” (Park). It is understandable that Japan is not willing to give up on the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute because they believe this may “hinder Japanese claims against China over the Senkaku Islands” (Bowman).

However, it is strategically wiser for Japan to strengthen its ties with Korea if they wish to maintain a strong front in the face of China’s claims. Since Japan’s historical claims are weaker than South Korea’s and the international community will most likely favor South Korean sovereignty of the islets in a legal battle because of the status quo, it is in Japan’s best interest to acknowledge Korean sovereignty. Rather than view this as a defeat, Japan should use this as an opportunity to decrease tension in its relationship with Korea and the region as a whole. Additionally, by resolving the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute, Japan could apply the status-quo framework a to its land dispute with China over the Japan-controlled Senkaku Islands. Thus, by acknowledging Korean sovereignty, Japan would establish a precedent that could bolster its position in the Senkaku Islands (Bowman).

Third, South Korea must recognize that Japanese claims to the islets are not vain attempts to simply aggravate the Korean Peninsula. South Korea needs to lend a listening ear and a willingness to improve South Korea-Japan relations for the sake of their nation, its future, and regional stability. It would also require South Korea to accept Japan’s actions to rectify relations instead of relitigating past settlements regarding Japan’s past actions and condemning allegedly insincere apologies. South Korea should stop dismissing Japan’s Dokdo/

Takeshima claims and accept a proposal to bring the issue to the ICJ. The South Korean government needs to demonstrate to its citizens that “Japan isn't ignoring the link between their claims to the islands and the 20th-century colonization of the country” (Park). This will help shift domestic conversation and lessen animosity towards Japan in order for cooperation and productive conversations to take place.

If Japan does not want to simply concede the islets, South Korea should accept their proposal to take this case to the ICJ. Japan has little to gain by submitting this issue to the ICJ, but if they still want to propose sending this case to the ICJ, South Korea should know that they do not have much to lose. Not only are Japan’s historical and legal claims over Dokdo/Takeshima substantially weaker than Korea’s, but under modern customary international law, “territory belongs to the country that can make a showing of effective control” (Bowman). Due to the “contested and inconsistent use of Dokdo/ Takeshima before the 20th century,” the ICJ will most likely focus on South Korea’s “use and control since the 1950s” (Bowman). Moreover, the “international community tends to agree that Korea’s claims are stronger than contemporary international law” and that South Korea’s constant and strong presence on the islets is “determinative of effective control” (Bowman). Therefore, “given the inherent harm in disrupting a sixty-year status quo,” ICJ’s decision would “most likely be found in Korea’s favor” (Bowman).

Taking this case to the ICJ will only strengthen the legitimacy of South Korean control of the islets and the benefits of taking this case to the ICJ and receiving international support outweigh any domestic political risks or losses. South Korea may need to make compromises or sacrifices, but if the islets are rightfully Korea’s, then there should be no hesitation in wanting to further prove their sovereignty through the ICJ. This will ultimately help put an end to the land dispute and allow South Korea and Japan to actively listen to each other’s claims, and hopefully, allow both nations to develop beyond this issue and work on strengthening their relations. The islets will continue under South Korean sovereignty and Japan will be strengthening regional stability by encouraging multilateral collaboration, which will help address current security affairs, such as the People’s Republic of China and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

It should be understood that fostering stronger relations between South Korea and Japan will be a prolonged process, and not limited to a sole administration. Especially because of the sensitive nuances of the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute and its social and political implications, Japan and South Korea must take strengthening relations in their own hands, as they understand the situation best. Prioritizing increased cultural, economic, political partnership between South Korea and Japan is vital and may help change hostile stereotypical images between the two nations. In a broader perspective, the two nations share strategic interests and goals in the East Asia region. They both hope to protect their respective territories and strengthen their presence against the rising power of the People’s Republic of China and the unpredictable Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and collaborations on those issues can occur with a fortified bilateral relationship (Emmers).

Furthermore, South Korea would be more willing to settle on issues of resource rights and economic boundaries. In 2004, South Korea imported over $46 billion from Japan while exporting $21 billion, and these numbers have increased nearly every year since the 1960s (Bowman). In order to preserve, grow, and benefit from this positive economic relationship, Japan should not forsake its beneficial economic relationship with South Korea in favor of the islets. This would allow Japan to make priorities in the right areas and support Japan’s broader interest in regional stability.

V. Conclusion

South Korea and Japan are natural strategic allies when given the current geopolitical environment in East Asia, especially with China’s rising dominance. Therefore, a resolution of the Dokdo/Takeshima sovereignty dispute through the de-escalatory measures proposed

Terriitory pole of Takeshima, Shimane-pref, Source: DokdoTakeshima on Wikimedia Commons under CC

above would not only strengthen South Korea-Japan relations but also their presence in East Asian political issues. Japan should take the initiative in promoting regional stability by acknowledging Korean sovereignty, because their claims are unlikely to gain legal recognition and doing so is in their best interest in terms of regional security. South Korea should pursue reconciliation with Japan and both countries need to reduce harmful nationalistic rhetoric to realize that strengthening relations with each other will only be beneficial for economic, political, and cultural prosperity. The Dokdo/Takeshima dispute provides a unique opportunity for reconciliation, political power, and cultural and social growth for both nations.

In the context of historical prejudice and fierce nationalism in the Japan-South Korea relationship, one misstep in the resolution process could cause a dangerous conflict. As such, my proposed solution of first lessening nationalist hate before moving toward reconciliation on the territorial issue seeks to help improve relations between the two nations. Dialogue is always more important than an uneasy and disputed consensus, and reducing hateful rhetoric is the first step forward in reaching a compromise that benefits parties. The Dokdo/Takeshima dispute is the first step in the process to improve South Korea-Japan relations, and any growth may help decrease tensions on other bilateral issues and facilitate multilateral cooperation on other geopolitical issues in East Asia such as North Koran missile testing and countering the rise of China.

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