Surface Warfare Magazine - Spring 2017 by Surface Warfare Magazine

Surface Warfare Spring 2017 Issue 54

This issue:

Forward Visible Ready The Surface Force And:

The Necessity of the

Surface Force Strategy

SURFACE WARFARE SPRING 2017

Contents

Authorization

Surface Warfare is published quarterly from appropriated funds by authority of the Chief of Naval Operations in accordance with NPPR P-35. The Secretary of the Navy has determined that this publication is necessary in the transaction of business required by law of the Department of the Navy. Use of funds for printing this publication has been approved by the Navy Publications and Printing Policy Committee. Reproductions are encouraged with proper citation. Controlled circulation.

IF IT FLOATS

IT FIGHTS

Postmaster: Send address changes to Surface Warfare, SURFPAC Public Affairs Office, 2841 Rendova Road, San Diego, CA 92155. Surface Warfare (USPS 104-170) (ISSN 0145-1073) is published by the Department of the Navy, Commander, Naval Surface Forces, 2841 Rendova Road, San Diego, CA 92155. Periodicals postage paid at San Diego, CA, and additional mailing offices.

Cover Stories:

Surface Force News News:

16 • The Necessity of the Surface Force Strategy

4 • SNA Concludes Symposium 5 • SWOSU Fire Fighting Trainer Sends Through First Students

Charter

Surface Warfare Magazine is the professional magazine of the surface warfare community. Its purpose is to educate its readers on surface warfare missions and programs, with a particular focus on U.S. surface ships and commands. This journal will also draw upon the Surface Force’s rich historical legacy to instill a sense of pride and professionalism among community members and to enhance reader awareness of the increasing relevance of surface warfare for our nation’s defense. The opinions and assertions herein are the personal views of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official views of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense or the Department of the Navy.

2 • Commander's Corner

Surface Warfare Spring 2017 Issue 54

Contact:

Surface Warfare Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet Public Affairs Office, N01P 2841 Rendova Road San Diego, CA 92155 Phone: (619) 437-2735

Contributions and Feedback Welcome Send articles, photographs (min. 300 dpi electronic) and feedback to: surface_warfare_maga@navy.mil

Commander, Naval Surface Forces Vice Adm. Tom Rowden Deputy Commander, Naval Surface Forces Rear Adm. John Mustin Public Affairs Officer Cmdr. John Perkins Executive Editor MCCS Michael Mitchell Managing Editor MC1 Trevor Welsh Layout and Design MC2 Phil Ladouceur Mr. Nicholas Groesch

6 • Coronado Returns to Singapore Following Operations at Sea 7 • Navy Conducts Successful Missile Test Firing 8 • US Naval Academy Holds Ship Selection for Class of 2017 9 • New Tools for Surface Ship Commanding Officers to Recruit Talent to Wardroom

20 • Foward, Visible, Ready: The Surface Force 26 • Warrior Care: Readiness and the Forward Chaplain 30 • Surface Warrior: Ernest Evans 35 • Connectivity Conundrum: Getting the Latest PMS Docs Wherever You Are 37 • Leadership Literature: A Captain's Story of War at Sea

Feature Stories: Stories

38 • Deputy Dispatches: Type Commander Reserve 101

10 • Billet Based Distribution

38 • Voices From the Fleet

12 • Surface Action Group: A Key to Maintaining Maritime Superiority

Cover: USS Vella Gulf (CG 72) is underway conducting task force exercises in the Atlantic Ocean in preparation for an upcoming deployment. Photo by Ensign Chelsea Heard.

SURFACE WARFARE SPRING 2017

Commander's Corner

hope this update finds all the Sailors and civilian employees of the Surface Force well and in high spirits. We have a lot to be proud of in our community, and we have a lot to anticipate in the weeks and months ahead. Two months after our latest Surface Navy Association Symposium, and I am still getting emails from active duty, retired, and industry attendees talking about the palpable energy present there. The release of the Surface Force Strategy “Return to Sea Control” provided the backdrop for discussions about offensive operations, electronic maneuver warfare, and distributed logistics—all of which support the operational and organizational Distributed Lethality principles at the heart of our “return” to sea control. Since the symposium, there have been encouraging signs from our civilian leaders regarding the commitment to Surface Force

Editorial by

Vice Adm. Tom Rowden Commander, Naval Surface Force

readiness and modernization; these elements are essential to everything we do. Another key to everything we do is “Toughness”— one of CNO’s four core attributes meant to guide Navy leaders (the others being Integrity, Accountability, and Initiative). I think it is worth spending a little time with you on what toughness means to me. Toughness is not bravado. Toughness is not bluster. Toughness is not—as the CNO correctly says—an excuse for excess or abuse. No, toughness is a thoughtful and deliberate approach to preparing oneself and one’s shipmates for the rigors and stresses of combat. That being said, toughness is more than resilience. Toughness provides a crew with the means to fight through an attack and then battle back. Toughness in the Surface Force is a byproduct of training — realistic, stressful training—that builds upon skills already mastered and continuously challenges watch-teams to improve. When I think of toughness in action, I think of the crew of USS Mason during their recent deployment, and how it was subject to anti-ship cruise missile attacks

in the Red Sea last October. Calling upon the toughness gained by countless repetitions of simulated attacks, replicating the characteristics of the weapons they were most likely to face, the crew responded superbly – protecting not only themselves but other ships nearby. I could not be prouder of Mason; their cool response in combat absolutely embodies the meaning of toughness! Moving forward with our Surface Force Strategy, we’ve got a busy summer ahead of us. In June, we will have our second annual “Distributed Lethality Summit” in San Diego, building upon last year’s successful, tacticallyoriented program. In Washington, OPNAV N96 is hosting a series of workshops and wargames designed to refine the characteristics of the family of future surface combatants – an effort that will bring together acquisition, requirements, and fleet representatives. Thank you for all you do—the hours, the sweat, the hard work. I continue to be immensely proud of the performance of our ships around the world, and I pledge to keep doing all I can to make sure you have everything you need to accomplish your missions. *

Download the Surface Force Strategy “Return to Sea Control” at http://www.navy.mil/strategic/SurfaceForceStrategy-ReturntoSeaControl.pdf)

SURFACE WARFARE SPRING 2017

Surface Force News SNA Concludes Symposium ARLINGTON, Va. (NNS) -- The Surface Navy Association (SNA) concluded its 29th annual three-day symposium in Arlington, Virginia, Jan. 12. The symposium focused on distributed lethality to enable sea Story by control and facilitated professional MC2 Bill Dodge discussions between military & MC3 Deven members, industry representatives Leigh Ellis and lawmakers regarding surface warfare technology, tactics, training and career development. The first day commenced with welcomes, roundtable discussions and keynote addresses by Navy leaders, including Vice Chief of Naval Operations Adm. William Moran and Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy Steven Giordano. Vice Adm. Thomas Rowden, commander, Naval Surface Forces/Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, detailed his new Naval Surface Force Strategy and related it to the symposium's objectives. "It's all about deterring conflict, and that's what the strategy lays down," Rowden said. "The idea behind distributed lethality is to make all of our forces more lethal so any potential adversary not only has to worry about the aircraft carrier, but has to worry about all those submarines and all those surface ships, and the potential threat of those surface ships. Sea control is a foundational thing that enables everything we do in the United States Navy." Former Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus, in his final official address in office, spoke at the symposium on the second day. Mabus focused on the Navy's accomplishments during his tenure and encouraged the audience to continue acting on distributed lethality and sea control, the overarching symposium themes. "Distributed lethality makes the job of potential adversaries much more difficult," Mabus said. "We've got to be forward; we've got to be out there." Wednesday continued with a Coast Guard update, followed by a discussion panel on the takeaways from last year's inaugural 3rd Fleet Pacific Surface Action Group operations and current and future logistics in the mine warfare community. Marine Corps Maj. Gen. Christopher Owens, director, Expeditionary Warfare, also elaborated on ongoing efforts to leverage unmanned technology to decrease risk to Sailors from mines.

CNO Adm. John Richardson delivers remarks during SNA. Photo by MC1 Nathan Laird

"We are moving to using unmanned systems that have the capability to not only go off board ships, but over the horizon into minefields," Owens said. Members of the British, Canadian, Norwegian and Danish navies met for a luncheon to discuss the importance of interoperability between the U.S. and its allies, highlighting aspects of their respective navies as key to future cooperation. The symposium concluded Thursday with an awards luncheon and shipbuilding and maintenance panels, which explored the risks and benefits of introducing new technology into shipyards. "There is stability across all platforms, and we have some design changes, and the level of quality is good," said Rear Adm. William Galinis, Program Executive Officer, Ships, the office responsible for Navy shipbuilding. "We have a high level of quality in all of our shipyards, and we are pleased with where we are in progressing-going to 355 ships. From a shipbuilding perspective, the capacity is there." Vice Adm. Barry McCullough (Ret.), the president of SNA, offered closing remarks at the conclusion of the symposium, thanking participants and encouraging input for future symposiums. "We really value your participation, your ideas, and your questions, and we invite you to continue your part with us in the future," McCullough said. SNA was incorporated in 1985 to promote greater coordination and communication among the military, business and academic communities, which share a common interest in Naval Surface Warfare and support the activities of Surface Naval Forces. *

View archived video and imagery from the duration of the 29th SNA Symposium on the Navy Live blog at navylive.dodlive.mil/2017/01/09/sna-national-symposium-distributed-lethality-enabling-sea-control/

SWOSU Fire Fighting Trainer Sends Through First Students GREAT LAKES (NNS) -- Over 50 students were the first to go through the Live Fire Fighting Trainer (FFT) course at Surface Warfare Officers School Unit (SWOSU) Great Lakes, Feb. 22. The training will be delivered to over 10,800 surface Story & Photo by accessions Sailors attending SWOSU, Center for Brian Walsh Surface Combat Systems Unit Great Lakes, as well as Training Support staff members at the various commands across Great Center Public Affairs Lakes as they transfer back to sea duty, each year. The two-day curriculum encompasses classroom lessons pertaining to fire chemistry, fire party organization, portable extinguishers, protective equipment, as well as self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) during the first day, and live firefighting trainer labs cover wild hose, hose handling, and firefighting procedures during the second day. "The life of a ship and our shipmates may someday depend on the training our Sailors receive at our facility," said Senior Chief Petty Officer Eric Sanders, leading chief petty officer of damage control (DC) "A" school, SWOSU Great Lakes. "This course is designed to prepare each Sailor for qualification as a member of a shipboard damage control organization. We are very excited to be bringing the Great Lakes Firefighting Trainer back online. This will help support the fleet with basic firefighting skills for Sailors prior to reporting to their first ship or, in some cases, returning to the fleet." Attending the firefighting course while at a Great Lakes area command will save ships countless man-hours in planning, scheduling, and sending personnel to trainers prior to arriving to the command, or after they have already arrived. "It has been a long time coming," said Cmdr. Eric Williams, commanding officer of SWOSU Great Lakes, "and there has been quite a bit of preparation from all sides for us (SWOS and SWOSU) to deliver this added firefighting capability back into accession training and in support of fleet readiness. As commanding officer and a fleet engineer, I'm very excited not just in the project delivery, but also in the dedication, motivation, and skill of my staff. I've watched them over the past few months prepare and train vigorously internally with the goal and option being to have fun, but to 'get this right.'" Fleet Firefighter Trainer in Great Lakes was originally commissioned in 1996 to provide realistic training for students at DC "A" school until 2002, when all accession engineering students began receiving the training. The trainer provided live firefighting training continuously until 2006, when a combination of fiscal constraints and a requirement review determined the training was

met through other courses in the trainee pipeline. Subsequent increases in basic firefighting requirements created a situation where firefighting training in the fleet concentration areas were incapable of keeping up with fleet needs, ultimately resulting in a significant backlog. Discussions began in 2010 to determine the feasibility and cost associated with re-lighting the FFT in Great Lakes, but a plan of action was not agreed upon and placed into effect until SWOS Command; Commander, Navy Installations Command; Naval Facilities Engineering Command; and Naval Air Warfare Command, with resources from Surface Training Systems, hired Jacobs Engineering to scope the project and reconstruction efforts for the facility started in late 2015. "Shipboard life requires every Sailor to be a firefighter, if need be, and the training that we provide here is by far the most important training the crew of a ship can receive," Sanders said. *

SURFACE WARFARE SPRING 2017

Surface Force News

Coronado Returns to Singapore Following Operations at Sea CHANGI NAVAL BASE, Singapore (NNS) -Following a port visit in Muara, Brunei, and routine operations in the Sulu Sea and South China Sea, littoral combat ship USS Coronado (LCS 4) pulled pierside at Changi Naval Base in Singapore, Feb. 25. After completing the four-day port visit in Brunei, Coronado conducted Story & Photo by a passing exercise and visit, board, MC2 Amy search and seizure (VBSS) training Ressler at sea with Royal Brunei navy USS Coronado (RBN) patrol vessel Daruttaqwa Public Affairs in the South China Sea. The ship then transitted through the Balabac Strait and into the Sulu Sea for routine operations before heading back to port in Singapore. "Working alongside the RBN at sea gave our Sailors a unique opportunity to practice operational tactics and enhance bilateral capabilities with a regional partner," said Cmdr. Scott Larson, commanding officer, Coronado. "Training together increases our

interoperability and helps ensure that we are ready to execute real-world operations if called upon." Training at sea with a regional partner for the first time while deployed to U.S. 7th Fleet provided unique opportunities for the crew. Lt. j.g. Anthony Grayson, Surface Warfare Det. 2 officer in charge, talked about the importance of the VBSS training. "Working with the RBN gave the Coronado boarding team a chance to practice our skills onboard a vessel unfamiliar to our team," said Grayson. "We were able to conduct a realistic scenario while training alongside a trusted partner, raising the readiness of both participating groups by sharing methods and tactics." Once operations with the RBN were complete, the Coronado crew maintained a full schedule of unit-level training, including a crew-served weapons exercise, damage control and man overboard drills, small boat and flight operations, and engineering operational checks. Flight operations with the embarked MH-60S Sea

Hawk helicopter and MQ-8B Fire Scout unmanned helicopters were a primary focus of the underway according to Lt. Cmdr. Thanh Nguyen, officer in charge, Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron (HSC) 23 Det. 5. "Pilots, air crewmen, and maintainers were given the opportunity to refine their skills and proficiency at landing and operating on a ship operating at sea," said Nguyen. "The gunnery exercise also allowed our sailors to shoot and remain current on our weapons systems." The port visit to Brunei included multiple ship tours and a static display of the embarked MH-60S and MQ-8Bs for the Royal Brunei air force. Coronado Sailors also participated in a sports day with RBN counterparts, competing in a soccer game and tug-of-war match at the Naval Training Center in Muara, Brunei. Currently on a rotational deployment in U.S. 7th Fleet, Coronado is a fast and agile warship tailor-made to patrol the region's littorals and work hull-to-hull with partner navies, providing 7th Fleet with the flexible capabilities it needs now and in the future. On behalf of Commander, Task Force 73, Destroyer Squadron 7 serves as operational commander for littoral combat ships rotationally deployed to 7th Fleet, and conducts advanced planning, organizes resources, and directly supports the execution of maritime engagements such as the Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercise series, the Naval Engagement Activity (NEA) with Vietnam, and the multilateral Southeast Asia Cooperation and Training (SEACAT) exercise with Bangladesh, Cambodia, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. *

U.S. Navy Photo

Navy Conducts Successful Missile Test Firing WASHINGTON – The U.S. Navy conducted a successful structural test firing of the Surface to Surface Missile Module (SSMM) from Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) USS Detroit (LCS 7) Feb. 28 off the coast of Norfolk, Virginia. The test marked the first launch of a missile from the SSMM from an LCS as well as the first vertical missile launched from an LCS, as part of the developmental test program for the Surface Warfare Story from (SUW) Mission Package (MP). NAVSEA Office "The testing aboard USS Detroit was an important of Corporate milestone in advancing LCS capability, not only for the Communications LCS community but for the entire fleet. As small boat threats proliferate, the SSMM will give our ships added lethality," said Cmdr. Michael Desmond, Detroit’s commanding officer. SSMM utilizes the Army Longbow Hellfire Missile in a vertical launch capability to counter small boat threats. SSMM is the next delivery of capability for the LCS SUW MP, which achieved initial operational capability (IOC) in November 2014 with delivery of the Gun Mission Module (two 30mm guns) and the Maritime Security Module (11m Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat for Visit Boarding Search and Seizure). "This was another positive step forward in fielding of the next increment for the SUW MP," stated Capt. Ted Zobel, Mission Modules program manager. "The SSMM is a critical piece of the SUW MP and this event will allow us to move safely into developmental testing and soon to fielding this capability aboard LCS." When new or different ordnance systems are first installed on board Navy warships, a Structural Test Fire (STF) is required to determine if shipboard structures, equipment, and systems can operate satisfactorily after weapon firing and if any personnel hazards, such as toxic gas intrusion or damaging noise levels, exist during weapon firing operations. Specifically, STF verifies that the ship’s structure and equipment as well as the interfaces between ordnance and the ship are capable of withstanding the vibration, shock, noise, gases and other blast derivatives from ordnance firing. STF results will be used to evaluate and document safety requirements. The Surface Warfare Mission Package will begin developmental testing aboard USS Milwaukee (LCS 5) later this year and will culminate in operational testing and IOC in 2018. *

SURFACE WARFARE SPRING 2017

Surface Force News

US Naval Academy Holds Ship Selection for Class of 2017 ANNAPOLIS, Md. (NNS) -- Two hundred and forty-four U.S. Naval Academy (USNA) midshipmen selected the ships they will serve on after graduation during Ship Selection Night Jan. 26 in Alumni Hall. During Ship Selection, midshipmen first class assigned to the surface warfare officer (SWO) community choose Story & Photo by their first ship and homeport. MC2 Tyler "For SWO selects, this is the single biggest moment Caswell of their time at USNA other than commissioning," said USNA Lt. Nick Driscoll, Ship Selection coordinator for 2017. Public Affairs "This is a unique opportunity for these midshipmen to hand-select their ship and homeport. From now on, their time in the Navy will be spent putting in preferences and crossing their fingers that they get what they requested." The midshipmen Overall Order of Merit is used to organize the order for selection. The factors which go into Overall Order of Merit include each midshipman's academic, military, and athletic performance. "No matter what ship everyone chooses, we are all here to support the overall mission of sea control," said Midshipman 1st Class Jacob Wirz, who made the night's first selection of guided-missile destroyer USS Porter (DDG 78) homeported in Rota, Spain. "It's a great, fun-filled night, but this is just the beginning. We are still continuing to prepare and train for the challenges we will face when we arrive at the ships we've chosen."

New Tools for Surface Ship Commanding Officers to Recruit Talent to Wardroom

Senior leaders from the surface warfare community -- including Commander of U.S. Fleet Forces Command Adm. Philip S. Davidson and Commander of Naval Surface Forces Vice Adm. Thomas S. Rowden -- joined representatives from fleet ships around the world in welcoming the midshipmen first class into the SWO community. "Give it everything you've got," said Rowden. "The men and women you will be leading will look to you for guidance. The Naval Academy has given you the best training and the best foundation you can be provided. You have all the tools in your toolkit to do the best you can at your job." During summer cruises, midshipmen embark upon Navy ships to get more experience as junior officers. Commanding officers of those ships can offer "blue chips" to midshipmen who especially impress them, which give them an automatic spot in that wardroom if they

choose to take it. Midshipman 1st Class Samantha Young was offered one for amphibious assault ship USS America (LHA 6) out of Norfolk. "I'm beyond excited I was able to select the ship I wanted," said Young. "USS America is deploying in July, and I'm excited to get there and try to make a positive impact on the crew." After choosing their ships, future junior officers continue to hone and develop their leadership and professional knowledge to prepare for their first duty assignments. "I'm going to take a little time to be around my friends and classmates; it's coming down to the last time we will all be together," said Midshipman 1st Class Taylor Kipilli, who selected guided-missile cruiser USS Port Royal (CG 73) out of Pearl Harbor, "but I'm still honing my leadership skills so I can bring the best me to the ship when I get out there." *

GREAT LAKES (NNS) -- More than 50 Naval ROTC midshipmen selected their first ships Nov. 15, but it was also the first time a ship was allowed to hand-pick a midshipman to join their wardroom. Guided-missile destroyer USS Sampson (DDG 102) selected Midshipman 1st Class Austin Hein, a senior Story by at the University of Missouri, to become a member of Scott Sampson's crew when he commissioned to ensign this Thornbloom past winter. NSTC According to Navy Personnel Command's surface Public Affairs warfare officer detailers (PERS-41), this was the first time commanding officers of surface ships were able to offer a spot in their wardroom to graduating NROTC midshipmen. "The purpose of this program is to put the ball into the hands of ship commanding officers," said Cmdr. Julie Grunwell, the head junior officer detailer for PERS-41. "If they really had an outstanding midshipman on board their ship for a Summer Cruise and they're looking ahead and thinking 'Hey, I'd like them to come back and work for me,' now they have an opportunity to make that happen." Hein had been hoping to serve on the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer after his experience with Sampson's crew during his senior Summer Cruise. "I'm very excited about my selection," Hein said. "I really enjoyed the ship while I was on it over the summer, and hearing that they offered me a job, I was pretty ecstatic about that and I was more than happy to go back there." Sampson's Commanding Officer, Cmdr. Tim LaBenz, wanted to encourage every command to take advantage of this opportunity. "First off, let me say that I am impressed with the incoming talent that exists in the surface warfare community," said LaBenz. "The opportunity to have a known-talent join your team is an all-around win, especially when you see them thrive firsthand during their time on board before they are commissioned. This new initiative is spot on! And I know Ensign Hein will be a great addition to our team." Ship selection is one of the most significant events for midshipmen as they take their first step toward joining the U.S. Navy surface warfare officer (SWO) community in the fleet. The more than 50 midshipmen reported to their new ships shortly after they graduated and were commissioned as ensigns in December. They will be joined this spring by more than 340 midshipmen at 73 NROTC units around the country who selected their first ships Feb. 13-15. Rear Adm. Stephen C. Evans, commander, Naval Service Training Command (NSTC) and his staff, headquartered at Naval Station Great Lakes, oversee the NROTC program. NROTC was established to develop midshipmen mentally, morally, and physically and to imbue them with the highest ideals of duty, loyalty, and Navy core values in order to commission college graduates as naval officers. The officers will possess a basic professional background, are motivated toward careers in the naval service, and have a potential for future development in mind and character so as to assume the highest responsibilities of command, citizenship, and government. *

SURFACE WARFARE SPRING 2017

BBD

* Photo by MC1 Justin Stumberg

Photo by MC3 James Vazquez

* Billet Based

Distribution

s this magazine is published, the Navy’s Billet-Based Distribution (BBD) system for enlisted manning has just had its first birthday. With the system in full implementation across the Surface Force for several distribution cycles, it is a good Story by time to take a look at what has changed in the manning Lt. Cmdr.Nick world with the advent of BBD. Hoffmann No More EDVRS SURFPAC The most noticeable change since BBD was implemented was the elimination of the decades-old Enlisted Distribution and Verification Report (EDVR). Instead of relying upon a monthly summary of enlisted manning (which was often time-late once the ship obtained it), shipboard leadership can now log on to a website and view, in near-real-time, their manning status. This increased accessibility allows all stakeholders in the manning process, from the ship’s personnel office to

the Bureau of Personnel to Fleet Forces Command, to view a timely, accurate snapshot of command enlisted manning. Cmdr. Robert Tryon, Executive Officer on USS Rushmore (LSD 47) states that “in my opinion, BBD is a better tool for understanding and organizing shipboard manpower and NEC (navy enlisted classification) requirements” than former tools like the EDVR. More Precision in Shipboard Manning BBD allows the personnel distribution system to assign Sailors to specific billets on ships, leading to a better “Fit” and increasing shipboard readiness. Instead of just being assigned a Sailor, commands are now assigned a Sailor who matches a specific billet, and has

(or earns enroute) the NEC codes needed to perform the mission. For example, a ship requiring a petty officer second class who is a qualified Air Intercept Controller will be detailed one, instead of being given a non-qualified Petty Officer Second Class or perhaps even a more junior Sailor. The Navy used the longestablished officer detailing process as a model – all billets for the enlisted crew are now identifiable (and fillable) by referencing a Billet Sequence Code, much as wardroom billets have been. This allows the chain of command to specifically pinpoint where manning gaps exist and direct attention to filling them. Interfaces With CMS-ID For the individual Sailor on the deckplates, not much change may be readily evident. The Sailor will still apply for orders and negotiate assignments via the Career Management System-Interactive Detailing (CMS-ID) web portal, much as has been done in the past. The behind-the-scenes difference is that CMS-ID and BBD operate from within the same web framework, and interface with each other. When a Sailor is cut orders, they appear in their new command’s BBD, listed as a Prospective Gain by reporting month. “BBD provides the ships complete transparency of the system and enables commands to track and verify training requirements before ever receiving the Sailors onboard. This will go a long way in minimizing training gaps and increasing readiness,” reports Mr. John Leavitt, who currently serves as Commander Naval Surface Force U.S. Pacific Fleet’s Personnel Readiness Assistance Team Director. In making manning information more accessible to commands in a more “real-time” manner while allowing for more targeted application of manning assistance, BBD has proven a game-changer for enlisted manning across the Surface Force. With this successful start, BBD is on track to be the cornerstone of the manning toolbox for years to come. *

SURFACE WARFARE SPRING 2017

Surface Action Group it

ai A K or ni ey Piece oferi ng p Maritime Su

hips and units from the Sterett-Dewey Surface Action Group (Sterett-Dewey SAG) departed Naval Base San Diego for a regularly-scheduled Story by deployment to the Western MC1 Trevor Pacific, Mar. 31. Welsh The command staff SURFPAC of Destroyer Squadron Public Affairs (DESRON) 31 and the Photos by Arleigh Burke-class guided- MC1 Will Gaskill missile destroyers (DDG) USS Sterett (DDG 104) and USS Dewey (DDG 105) deployed along with the embarked helicopter detachments from Helicopter Maritime Squadron (HSM) 49 and HSM 78.

SAG

SURFACE WARFARE SPRING 2017

The Sterett-Dewey SAG will operate with regional navies to conduct routine patrols, maritime security operations and theater security cooperation activities to enhance regional security and stability. In 2016, for the first time in many years, multiple guided missile destroyers were combined into a Pacific Surface Action Group (PACSAG) and deployed to the Western Pacific under operational control of U.S. 3rd Fleet. “The value of a SAG cannot be overstated,” said Capt. David A. Bretz, commander, DESRON 31. “We are building upon the successes and applying the lessons learned from the inaugural PACSAG deployment. We are ready and able to support a variety of exercises and missions with our partners and allies in support of maritime stability and security in the Western Pacific.” The International Date Line has long been the dividing border between 3rd and 7th Fleet areas of responsibility. Ships passing east to west would cross into 7th fleet and come under the operational control of that commander; conversely, a west to east transit held the same shift in command and control to 3rd Fleet. As part of the new 3rd Fleet Forward model, and in keeping with the inaugural PACSAG deployment, the Sterett-Dewey SAG will remain under 3rd Fleet control throughout its deployment. “What we’re doing is we’re experimenting with different command and control arrangements and different force relationships to be able to get the maximum amount of lethality, distributed lethality,” 3rd Fleet Chief of Staff Capt. John Beaver said in January at the annual Surface Navy Association conference. “We want to present a problem to a potential adversary beyond their ability to solve.” Third Fleet operating forward offers additional options to the Pacific Fleet commander by leveraging the capabilities of both fleets. This operational concept allows these numbered fleets to complement one another and provide the foundation of stability in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. “What is really unique is that instead of sending independent deployers out, which is what you would normally do with (DDGs), you’re deployed together as a SAG,” U.S. Pacific Fleet Commander Adm. Scott Swift said. “It’s part of that effort that you’ve been reading about called distributed lethality, meaning

SURFACE WARFARE SPRING 2017

Photo by MC3 James Vazquez

Photo by MCSN Daniel Jackson

the combined lethality of a SAG is much greater than an individual DDG, as impressive as an individual DDG is.” The maritime environment around the world is changing and in order to stay ahead of potential adversaries in tactics and technology, the Navy must be continuously developing new ways to achieve and maintain sea control. Distributed Lethality, now an operational and organizational principle driving the Surface Force efforts for achieving and sustaining sea control, is the principle component of the Surface Force Strategy, ‘Return to Sea Control’, that was released at this year’s Surface Navy Association Symposium. In an effort to maximize the capabilities of the Navy’s surface ships, this ongoing SAG initiative is a key enabler in achieving the Surface Navy’s mission to control the sea.

“Last year’s SAG was revolutionary and a huge step toward realizing distributed lethality; it was new, different, presented challenges, and was a milestone and its mistakes and lessons learned have prepared us for another, more capable and lethal SAG this year,” Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet Commander Vice Adm. Tom Rowden said. “We have the best ships and Sailors in the world. There is no question that the surface community serves as a primary integrator in today’s warfighting disciplines, from the tactical to the theater level – with capability for deterrence, sea control, and power projection around the globe.” The Western Pacific offers a range of challenges from natural disaster response to maritime security threats, having both 3rd and 7th Fleet controlling ships and aircraft strengthens the ability of the Pacific Fleet to respond to challenges and work with partners in the region. “Third Fleet was the forgotten fleet in the Pacific,” Swift said. “In fact, Bull Halsey, one of our most famous admirals in (WWII), commanded 3rd Fleet throughout the war and the vast majority of 3rd Fleet was forward deployed in the Pacific Islands fighting the island campaign all the way up to Japan. This is a little bit about returning to your roots — our roots — of

Photo by AW3 Coty Voll

having 3rd Fleet deploying forward throughout your entire cruise.” The Navy maintains a presence in strategic places across the globe to help preserve peace and security, and to advance partnerships. The Surface Force Strategy leverages the technological and tactical assets of the world’s most advanced warships and capable Sailors. “In the midst of a rapidly changing security environment in the maritime domain, our Navy is delivering new ships and weapons systems while, at the same time, improving our training and tactics to address these new and sophisticated threats,” said Rowden stated last November. “Our Surface Forces are executing exciting missions all over the world and those ships and Sailors play a vital role in shaping the future of the maritime environment.”

SURFACE WARFARE SPRING 2017

The Necessity of the

Surface Force Strategy "Existential threats... are going to come from countries who are trying to control the sea..." -Vice Adm. Rowden

merica is, and always has been, a maritime nation. Today, just like centuries before, the oceans are the key to our influence, our security and our prosperity. As the global economy continues to expand and become more connected, the U.S. Navy, and specifically the Naval Surface Story from Force’s ability to exert sea control SURFPAC when necessary – from the open Public Affairs ocean trade routes to the to the shallow littorals along continental coastlines, is vital to maintaining the free flow of goods over the world’s oceans and, ultimately, the economic stability of many countries. For the United States, with 25 percent of all U.S. jobs being directly or indirectly tied to global trade, sea control is a must. That being said, the global maritime security environment has entered a complex time where threats to navigational freedom are being presented in a broad array – from low-end piracy to well-armed non-state militant groups, as well as sophisticated adversaries being determined, at times, to unlawfully rule certain regions and resources.

SURFACE WARFARE SPRING 2017

U.S. Navy Photo

"This is not all about surface ships. This is about the combined capability of submarines, aircraft, aircraft carriers, and warships and the men and women who operate them."

USS Porter (DDG 78), right, in formation with USS McFaul (DDG 74), USS Arleigh Burke (DDG 51), USS Cole (DDG 67), USS Cape St. George (CG 71) and USS Anzio (CG 68). Photo by Lt.j.g. Caleb Swigart

So given this shift in the environment, how do we achieve and sustain sea control when necessary to protect the oceans – the lifeblood of the interconnected global community? On February 14, Commander, Naval Surface Forces, Vice Admiral Tom Rowden addressed this issue with Sailors and Marines Forces of the San Diego waterfront as he spoke to the merits of the recently released Surface Force Strategy. The strategy maps out Surface Forces’ return to sea control and provides more substance to the organizing and operating principle of Distributed Lethality. “If you’re going to control the sea you’re going to do it with ships because ships bring capacity and capability. Existential threats to the United States of America are going to come from countries who are trying to control the sea,” said Rowden. He began the conversation with a brief history discussion of how our current maritime environment was shaped – from the end of the Cold War to supporting the recent conflicts in the Middle East. “By 1992, the Soviet Union has ceased to exist. It’s dissolved and all of their submarines, ships and aircraft were tied up to the pier. And so, almost overnight, we woke up and we had this thing that had eluded us for decades – we had sea control. We had it in the Eastern Pacific, the Western Pacific, in the Indian Ocean, in the Arabian Gulf, the Mediterranean. We had it everywhere,” said Rowden. In the following decades, without an enduring threat to sea control, the U.S. Navy did what it does best, and that is to adapt to the strategic environment. Just as the visionaries of the ‘70’s saw that the Soviets could be pressured by offensive sea power, a new group of visionaries saw that the mobility, flexibility, and endurance of naval forces—compounded by the revolution in precision guided weapons—could act as a powerful enabler of the Joint, multi-domain fight. “We were afforded the luxury of being able to shift our emphasis, shift our investments to power projection ashore. So, over the years, we adjusted the flight deck of

our aircraft carriers quite appropriately. We adjusted the armament on our ships, we started to look differently at surface ships,” said Rowden. While participating in a series of high-level war game exercises several years ago, Rowden realized that decades of deemphasizing sea control meant the fleet had concentrated the lethality of the force on to the flight decks of our aircraft carriers. Consequently, the opposing force in the exercise focused almost exclusively on trying to kill the aircraft carrier and end its power projection abilities. Rowden’s response to their efforts was to successfully distribute his force of Littoral Combat Ships and go on the offensive – using these ships in an unforeseen manner to attack the opposing combatant ships. This immediately changed the adversary’s strategy and how they operated their ships. His success during the exercise may have been the genesis for a multi-year effort to develop the new Surface Force Strategy, as Rowden reconsidered how naval forces might be better employed. “I asked myself ‘Why don’t we distribute the lethality of the force back to the Surface Forces, back to the sea control assets, in order to complicate the problem for the adversary with respect to how it is they’re going to execute operations at sea, and perhaps even more important for their government, force them to invest differently,’” said Rowden, “How do we do this? We came up with this great concept called Distributed Lethality.”

Photo by MC2 Alan Gragg

Photo by MC3 Devin Langer

Could the U.S. Navy make adjustments to existing weapons systems to go on the offensive? The short answer was yes – by modifying a number of defensive weapons to also serve an offensive purpose, retrofitting ships to handle those capabilities, and backfitting various current computing systems to work on older IT infrastructure to enhance their capabilities, the lethality of surface ships was quickly enhanced. These improvements force an adversary operating at sea to not only calculate for the capabilities of the aircraft carriers, but now also the enhanced offensive capability of all U.S. Navy warships at sea. “Distribution of lethality is not necessarily about distributing the lethality of the force for the sake of distributing lethality. It’s distributing lethality of the force to enable sea control. That’s why the title of the Surface Force Strategy is ‘The Return to Sea Control.’ People read the strategy and they go, ‘Did we ever lose it?’ I don’t know. But we’re certainly facing more challenges,” said Rowden.

-Vice Adm. Rowden

He explained that while surface ships will play a huge role in the Navy’s return to sea control they’re not the only players on our team. “This is not all about surface ships. This is about the combined capability of submarines, aircraft, aircraft carriers, and warships and the men and women who operate them. This is about making everybody more lethal and understanding that we’re headed into a fight for sea control. It’s not about controlling all the sea, all the time. You need to control the sea, you need to control, for the amount of time you need to control it, and then relinquish control [at your choosing].” Ultimately, the Surface Force Strategy was created to help the Sailors carrying out the sea control mission and Rowden intends to do everything within his power to ensure they are combat ready. He told the crowd, “As we talk about the organizing principle of Distributed Lethality, as we talk about the return to sea control and the driving investments associated with that, we’re starting to see some big payoff. This is all about YOU and making sure you have the talent, the tools, the tactics, and the training in order to get the job done!” *

SURFACE WARFARE SPRING 2017

We are entering a new age of

SURFACE WARFARE SPRING 2017

Seapower

Story by

Foward•Visible•Ready

Lt. Cmdr. Jason Garfield

USS Normandy (CG 60)

Lt. Cmdr. Christopher de Angelis Chief of Naval Operations Staff

Surface Force The

USS Rafael Peralta (DDG 115). U.S. Navy Photo

SURFACE WARFARE SPRING 2017

Photo by MC1 Tim Comerford

he timely release of the Surface Force Strategy: Return to Sea Control comes at a turning point for the Navy. With increasingly congested sea lanes and recent attempted missile attacks against U.S. ships, the approach outlined by Vice Adm. Tom Rowden reemphasizes the call for sustained sea control – at the time and place of our choosing – and puts the Surface Force on a path toward a more lethal and distributed fighting force. This makes it an exciting time to be a part of the Surface Navy. And from the warfighter perspective, we can make some immediate changes on the waterfront to do our part in executing the Strategy. The way ahead is spelled out explicitly: enhanced combat power will ultimately result from a renewed emphasis on tactics, talent, tools, and training (T4). While we have always tried to balance these force attributes, the lens through which we look at them has changed. We will no longer work in warfare stovepipes on the tactical level. Now, more than ever, the tools the Navy are advancing will include systems capable of producing effects chains across several warfare domains. Where the Strategy calls for the “right mix of resources to persist in a fight”, we are making investment decisions that will allow for Adaptive Force Packages—deployment packages that allow assets to split off from a group of ships without

TACTICS TALENT TOOLS TRANING

Photo by MC3 J. R. DiNiro

commanders stressing a capability loss based on the weapons load or sensor package in any single unit. We will soon see a synergy that until now was unachievable, because we lacked cross-domain weapons and the interoperability that allows for a more netted force. While net-centric warfare and the ideas of leveraging information sharing have been discussed in Navy academia and executive documents for decades, an articulable endstate with the right mix of tools and tactics has been elusive. We are finally pivoting to allow for those concepts to emerge with the concentration on T4. We are moving toward an operational baseline where almost any sensor can be paired with multiple weapons systems for cooperative tracking and targeting. This will be a force multiplier and makes the objectives of a more lethal, disaggregated surface force a reality. Warfighters are just starting to get the tools to carry out the Distributed Lethality concept, and we have taken significant steps to retain top talent in the Surface Warfare officer (SWO) community. However, the Strategy is a call for our community to ensure the tactics and training also continue to follow closely. The various Warfare Development Centers are pushing to introduce and refine new tactics to improve our Fleet’s warfighting capability.

Photo by MC1 Maddelin Angebrand

Photo by MC3 Brianna K. Green

To take advantage of the work being done by the centers, it is crucial we leverage the current Basic and Advanced Training Phases to transform into a more effective fighting force. The priority on training must be the primary driving force to meet the intent of our Surface Force leadership and ensure the Strategy works in concert with lines of effort laid out in the CNO’s “A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority” – warfighting, learning faster and strengthening our Navy team. With the Naval Surface and Mine Warfighting Development Center (SMWDC) fully stood up, the tactics will be ready and accessible to our combat teams. The Strategy requires that we continue to press for more intense training and the application of those tactics under stressful and complicated warfighting scenarios.

The introduction of SMWDC’s Surface Warfare Advanced Tactical Training (SWATT) into the training cycle is an important step in achieving those goals. Understandably, the 36-month timeframe of the Optimized Fleet Response Plan is based on global security requirements and current Fleet size so the duration cannot easily be altered. However, the correct level of attention on tactical training events and the planning, briefing, execution and debriefing process is a variable in our control and it cannot be stressed enough. All too often, a ship may move through the training cycle where the goal is not technical system mastery, effective drills, or procedural understanding, but rather a mindset to just get through the event. This basic approach may allow us to meet minimum

standards to attain readiness for major combat operations, but the Strategy calls on us to take training a step further if we are going to deter and deny aggressors in a complicated, denied warfighting environment. Winning teams are never content on just getting by with the minimum standard. Instead, they seek excellence in every facet of the game. What the Strategy should mean to warfighters is that we can only win with true tactical excellence despite our adversaries continually advancing at a rapid pace. The warfighting and combat capability of a unit and strike group may be realized to some degree during an integrated phase of training. However these advanced events only provide opportunities to nearterm deployers, with little time to refine skills.

SURFACE WARFARE SPRING 2017

Photo by MC3 Devin Langer

U.S. Navy Photo

USS Sterett (DDG 104). Photo by MC2 Nathan Serpico

Ships not only need to take part in SWATT, but they also must take it upon themselves to make realistic and more frequent tactical training a priority regardless of what phase of training they are in. The SWO Boss can provide the tactics, help to retain the talent, and provide the tools, but it’s on the ships to take a hard look at how effectively they are training within their own unit’s to bring it all together. It may be too drastic to say that our force has gotten soft over the past twenty years of relatively unchecked operations throughout the world, but it is fair to say that a complete generation of SWOs and Sailors has advanced without the need to worry about truly opposed naval operations. The desired end-state explained in the Strategy is likely not a surprise to any SWO or Sailor,

“to achieve and sustain sea control at the time and place of our choosing to protect the homeland from afar, build and maintain global security, project the nation power of the United States, and win decisively.” We’ve embraced the spirit of this objective for quite some time, but our Navy has not been challenged in decades. The Strategy ought to serve as a necessary reminder and call to action for our community to make sure we are ready, for the possibility of peril exists as we face technologically advanced adversaries who are fielding new weapons at a rapid pace. The Strategy provides us with clear objectives and an avenue to achieve success. Now it’s on us to put warfighting first and be ready on arrival. *

SURFACE WARFARE SPRING 2017

Warrior Care Readiness and the Forward Chaplain

SURFACE WARFARE SPRING 2017 Photo by MC3 Ford Williams

ith approximately 50 percent of the Navyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s enlisted force being 25 years old or younger, it is likely we have all came across that young shipmate at sea feeling isolated and tired -- physically, they perform their Story by job but mentally they fret about Lt. Cmdr. regional tensions in the Western G. Alan Fleming Pacific and Middle East, where their & Lt. Kevin ship is or plans to do operations. Wilkinson They lack familiarity with what a DESRON 31 real-world, kinetic battle may entail Staff Chaplains and the mindset they must possess to confront it.

SURFACE WARFARE SPRING 2017

Photo by MCC Jay Pugh

Today’s global maritime challenges require us to prepare and train for crisis response. The Surface Warfare culture inspires all surface Sailors -- including chaplains -- to operate forward and sustain visibility through presence, while maintaining readiness. Different from the Operational Stress Control training provided during deployment preparation, it is an ingrained, enduring mental, physical and emotional toughness that gets a Sailor through the fight. Therefore, we must train and condition our Sailors for the reality of chaos and possible ensuing loss incurred in battle. Driven by a strategic vision, Commander, Naval Surface Forces Vice Adm. Tom Rowden released the Surface Force Strategy earlier this year featuring the operating and organizing principle of Distributed Lethality (DL). Rowden highlights that DL is accomplished by increasing individual unit lethality and distributing the force across a wider expanse of geography and “drives change across all elements of our community – namely Tactics, Talent, Training, and Tools (T4).” Simply put, T4 is the framework needed to successfully achieve the overarching vision. The resulting questions of, “Who will deliver these great capabilities and capacities for maritime superiority?” and “Who will be the sinew and muscle during crisis and potential violent conflict?” share a common element – who. It will be our surface warriors -- they will be the frontline in delivering DL. Consequently, the work of chaplains must adapt to fully address T4 and strengthen the people they are called to serve. From a tactical perspective, our engagement must adjust to accommodate support of the fast and adaptive warfighting scenarios for which our Sailors are being trained. This means our shift in efforts must begin with chaplains being fully present on the deckplates with the warfighter. Unfortunately, current manpower constraints can not support all deployed surface ships with a full-time chaplain. To gather an appreciation of need, a guided-missile destroyer (DDG) deploys with approximately 325 Sailors, and there are 36 DDGs in the Pacific Fleet alone; at a minimum, 5000 destroyer Sailors (comparable in number to an underway aircraft carrier crew) may be deployed at a given time into harm’s way. And unlike their deployed carrier counterparts, they are without fulltime chaplains. Since the Navy does not deploy a carrier without chaplain support, we should consider providing more support to our guided-missile cruisers and destroyers. From a talent perspective, it is crucial to support our Sailors with “forcemultiplier” chaplains as DL takes a more offensive approach to maritime superiority. DDGs will continue to play a central role in surface action groups, and carrier and expeditionary strike group operations -- why send them “over the horizon” without full-time resiliency chaplain support? A sober reality remains: the world is unstable, full of state and non-state actors flexing their own power and unafraid to test our combat resilience (e.g. USS Mason). Surface sailors will need constant support from the chaplains; and for our talents to be truly effective, our engagement must be personal and face-to-face – being present where it matters, when it matters and with what matters.

TACTICS TALENT TOOLS TRANING

U.S. Navy Photo

Photo by MC3 Amanda Chavez

Our faithful use of the Chaplain Corps (CHC) demonstrates what it means to be spiritually healthy and resilient. It is using the CHC talent to engage the crew at morning quarters, in their work spaces, while serving chow, visiting the smoke pit, confidential counseling sessions, and closing each night with the evening prayer blessing. Essentially, chaplain support provides our brave surface warriors with a necessary outlet in a demanding mission and, at times, unstable environment. The goal of the CHC is to seek to deliver ever-present care and a determined will to strengthen our shipmates. From a tools perspective, like the Surface Warfare community making great investments in equipping the fleet to win in combat, our chaplains must invest in the tools necessary to train and equip Sailors in combat resiliency – investing in the only asset the CHC possesses, its people. This means providing and caring for our Sailors as historically done while also designing and procuring the tools necessary to build internal strength in our sea warriors. We will be equipping our chaplains for long-range impact as we shape and mold the Sailors. Providing resiliency tools, the chaplain’s obligation is to prepare integrated training wherein Sailors gain the combat toughness necessary for victory and long-term health. The Navy has a storehouse of combat experience to call upon; we

are skilled at training our Special Operators (SO) to maintain toughness and resilience in the harshest, and at times desolate, combat areas in the world. The Surface Force must do no less for our warriors if our expectation is for them to maintain a strong combat mindset in the midst of violence and chaos during battle at sea, the kind of disarray that comes to life on the pages of “The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors” and “Neptune’s Inferno.” To be effective, resiliency training must dovetail with the warfighting proficiency and professional confidence gained from other formal training, and should capitalize on the training and combat experience of our SOs, Marines, Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD), and Fleet Marine Force (FMF) Corpsmen. Realistic training replicating the challenges of combat is an essential element for setting Sailors up for success. Competence breeds confidence, and it is imperative that our Sailors be confident in their ability to We propose a formal training course that is maintain a tough and resilient based on current research and experiences from mindset during life at sea. A combat subject matter experts (SMEs). These formative mindset finds its core in mental, resources appropriately balance military experience emotional, physical and spiritual with scholarly research. More importantly, they strength which must be developed prepare our warriors for violence with physical and practiced, both through and psychological tools, while also strengthening training and daily living. their humanity. For example, we recommend the That young, tired shipmate isn’t following resources: going to find the path to holistic health on their own – it requires • Steven Pressfield’s “The Warrior Ethos” intervention, sometimes of the • David Grossman’s “On Combat, the Divine kind. A destroyer squadron Psychology and Physiology of Deadly commodore once noted, “we need Conflict in War and in Peace” chaplains…they help us to keep • Dr. Michael J. Asken and Grossman’s our soul.” Soul, that inner person, “Warrior Mindset: Mental Toughness Skills which transcends the temporal, for a Nation’s Peacekeepers” is the means by which we are strengthened for the here and now. That which is at the foundation of your life; that which gives you peace, joy, and strength; that which is the wellspring of resiliency. The human soul must be maintained so that though “we are pressed on every side by troubles, we are not crushed. We are perplexed, but not driven to despair...” By providing chaplains on future deployed DDGs our Sailors will receive the resiliency training and moral support that they need and deserve. “Every Sailor, Every Day.” *

SURFACE WARFARE SPRING 2017

Surface Warrior

SURFACE WARFARE SPRING 2017

“In no engagement of its entire history has the United States Navy shown more gallantry, guts and gumption than in those two morning hours between 0730 and 0930 off Samar.” – Rear Admiral Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II

first read those words long before I joined the U.S. Navy. Before I was in kindergarten, my father, who served in Korean waters during that conflict, would drill me on a couple hundred ship recognition silhouettes he’d made as a draftsman in the Navy. His father had enlisted in the Navy during World War I and then fought in the Pacific with the Story by Seabees. Both instilled in me a love of Rear Adm. Naval History that exists to this day. Sam Cox (Ret.) By the time I was in the fourth grade, Naval History I’d read all 15 volumes Morison’s and Heritage epic work, including a well-thumbed Volume XII, “Leyte.”

other kids had

sports heroes

mine was

Ernest Evans -Sam Cox

SURFACE WARFARE SPRING 2017

Other kids had sports heroes. Mine was Cmdr. Ernest Evans, the skipper of the Fletcher-class destroyer Johnston (DD 557) and one of the many heroes of the Battle off Samar on October 25, 1944. Surprised by an overwhelming Japanese force of four battleships, eight cruisers, and many destroyers, Evans nevertheless chose to attack rather than flee. He understood the stakes. If the Japanese got through to General MacArthur’s troop transports and supply ships, the landing at Leyte would become a disaster. Evans had previously told his crew that he would never run from a fight; he was true to his word, and he did not wait for orders. His gallant actions bought desperately needed time for the escort carriers he was charged with protecting to survive long enough to launch aircraft. In conjunction with the incredibly heroic actions of the rest of the destroyer and destroyer-escort screen, Evan’s USS Johnston inflicted enough physical and psychological damage on the Japanese to turn the tide of the desperate battle. Ernest Evans’ actions inspired me as a kid, and throughout my 37-year navy career. Ernest Evans may have been a United States Naval Academy graduate, but he came about it the hard way. A Native American with Creek and Cherokee bloodlines, he experienced the prejudices prevalent during his youth growing up in Muskogee, Oklahoma. With hopes of becoming a Marine officer, Evans sought entry into the Academy but was not selected. Undeterred, he enlisted in the Navy. After more than a year of service, Evans was accepted into the Academy’s Class of 1931 through a fleet competition. During the Oct. 27, 1943, commissioning ceremony of Johnston, Commanding Officer Evans made his mission clear to the Sailors assigned to the ship: “This is going to be a fighting ship. I intend to go in harm’s way, and anyone who doesn’t want to go along had better get off right now.” No one did. As commanding officer, Evans was the rare leader who “appreciated the hidden nature of things, the power of the unseen over the tangible,” according to those who served with Evans, as quoted in The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors, by James D. Hornfischer. He never exploded in anger and seldom upbraided a subordinate in front of others for poor performance. He gave his men the opportunity to fail, knowing they would learn and not fail him again. His devotion to protecting the Marines fighting onshore went beyond providing them cover with the allotted amount of ammunition. He often ordered his ship in so close to shore it was hit with small arms fire. When Evans demanded more ammunition, he climbed into a wooden gig and motored over to the task group’s flagship to request it in person. And he got it. On Oct. 20, 1944, Evans and his Johnston crew joined

SURFACE WARFARE SPRING 2017

a fighting man

The skipper was

from the

soles of his broad feet to the ends of his straight black hair. -Robert Hagen

the Seventh Fleet’s Escort Carrier Task Unit 77.4.3, which went by the call name “Taffy 3.” Taffy 3 was defending the north Leyte Gulf, east of Samar and off San Bernardino Strait, and the Leyte beachhead of General MacArthur’s “return to the Philippines.” At dawn on Oct. 25, 1944, a pilot flying patrol was surprised to see the Japanese Center Force steaming into Leyte Gulf. The remaining force of four Japanese battleships, eight cruisers, and at least 12 destroyers had reversed course under cover of darkness and transited through the unguarded San Bernardino Strait. There was no question what decision Evans would make, despite having only two hours of fuel. “All hands to general quarters. Prepare to attack major portion of the Japanese fleet. All engines ahead flank. Commence making smoke and stand by for a torpedo attack. Left full rudder.” Every ship in Taffy 3’s screen performed with extreme heroism that day, but as the Gunnery Officer of Johnston, Robert Hagen noted, “we were

the first destroyer to make smoke, the first to start firing, the first to launch a torpedo attack. . . .” Once the Johnston got to within the range of its 5-inch guns, under a hail of Japanese fire, she fired more than 200 rounds and 10 torpedoes at Japan’s heavy cruiser, Kumano. Many shells and at least one torpedo hit, and the Kumano later sank. But Japanese shells found their mark as well. Johnston was shattered, the damage and casualties were horrific, and Evan’s himself was seriously wounded. Despite grave damage, greatly reduced speed and firepower, and no remaining torpedoes, Evans nevertheless chose to bring Johnston out of the refuge of a rain squall and commenced a second attack on the Japanese, supporting the Hoel, Heerman, and Samuel B. Roberts as they were valiantly sacrificing themselves to protect the escort carriers. In the ensuing melee, limping along on one boiler, Johnston fired nearly 30 rounds in 40 seconds into a 30,000-ton battleship.

Evans then noticed Japanese ships had targeted the escort carrier Gambier Bay (CVE 73). Hagen said his skipper “gave me the most courageous order I’ve heard: ‘Commence firing on that cruiser, draw her fire on us and away from Gambier Bay.’” Hagen continued, “We were now in a position where all the gallantry and guts in the world couldn’t save us, but we figured that help for the carrier must be on the way, and every minute’s delay might count.” In The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors, Capt. Bob Copeland, the commanding officer of Samuel B. Roberts, describes the moment he watched Johnston limp by slowly, with her captain calling orders down the hatch where sailors were turning her rudder by hand. He was stripped to the waist and covered in blood with his left hand wrapped in a handkerchief. When he saw Copeland, he waved. One by one, Johnston took on the Japanese destroyers, bluffing them into thinking she had torpedoes. After the first two turned away, the rest broke off to get out of Johnston’s gun range to launch torpedoes. All missed. The charge ended Johnston’s improbable two-and-a-half-hour battle. Surrounded by enemy ships and dead in the water with no boilers or power, Evans made the call at 9:45 a.m. to

abandon ship. Twenty-five minutes later, the destroyer rolled over and began to sink. One survivor said a Japanese destroyer captain saluted the ship as she went down. Of Johnston’s crew of 327, only 141 survived. Johnston wasn’t the only ship sacrificed that day. Both Hoel and Samuel B. Roberts sank, along with Gambier Bay, and Heerman was pounded to a hulk. Taffy 3 did its damage, though, sinking two enemy cruisers while stopping the Central Fleet in the Battle off Samar. Evans was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor, and his ship received six battle stars for her service in World War II and the Presidential Unit Citation. In sacrificing his ship, most of his crew, and his life, Evans set an example of incredible resolve, followed by many others that horrible day, that turned an almost certain catastrophe into a hardfought victory. “The skipper was a fighting man from the soles of his broad feet to the ends of his straight black hair. He was an Oklahoman and proud of the Indian blood he had in him,” Hagen said. “The Johnston was a fighting ship, but he was the heart and soul of her.” I wanted to be part of the history that included people like him, and that is why I joined the U.S. Navy. *

SURFACE WARFARE SPRING 2017

The Connectivity Conundrum

SURFACE WARFARE SPRING 2017

Getting the Latest PMS Docs Wherever You Are

e honest, hasn’t the internet spoiled you? It’s easy to forget how this technology has connected us to so many things at the touch of a button. We can shop online, pay bills, get smarter, and generally amuse ourselves for hours on end if we like. Remember the days of dial-up when loading one page could sometimes take upwards of 2 or 3 minutes? Those are long gone. Now we can check the web while Story by standing in line at the grocery store. The internet has really changed how William Kelly we use technology to communicate and receive information today. The Naval Sea Systems internet makes information and data readily available and we expect our Command software applications to automatically download new content, updates, and information without having to think about it. Whether it is your home computer, tablet, or smart phone – the operating system, virus scans, content updates, and the latest downloads are continually being updated while you are focused on other tasks. It is easy to get annoyed if you have to click “OK” to tell your computer or mobile device to perform a synchronization.

Photo by MC3 Brianna K. Green

SURFACE WARFARE SPRING 2017

Leadership Literature A Captain's Story of War at Sea Connected or not, you'll still be able to have access to your PMS documents Who has time for that? We just want our devices to do it so we always have the latest-and-greatest applications when we need them. Incredibly, this idea of continuous updating is something current Navy 3-M systems are not capable of. This is due to limited bandwidth and warfare systems having priority on ships. It is the main reason the Fleet receives Force Revisions via the mail and heavily contributes to the paperwork and administrative burdens Sailors deal with today. The Future of PMS (FoPMS) is trying to change this. FoPMS is a modernization of the Navy’s Planned Maintenance System. It’s a six year project whose ultimate goal is to reduce the administrative burdens that current PMS places on Sailors. There are numerous innovative ideas being explored for the FoPMS project including Leadership Dashboards and a better way to receive Sailor feedback. Connectivity is key to a modern Planned Maintenance System. It is not unreasonable to think the latest PMS documents and status updates should be available 24/7. Therefore, near real-time ship-to-shore data communication is the goal for the future. So how do we get there? By Identifying the roadblocks that make this goal difficult to achieve. But it’s not only being connected. As we’ll see, it’s also about being able to work in a disconnected mode as well. As it stands, smaller Navy platforms often struggle with the amount of bandwidth, or internet connectivity, they have available at any time. This problem is going to increase as new system designs, like FoPMS, create additional demands on that limited bandwidth. Also, these new demands often outpace the growth of the bandwidth for most platforms. Since FoPMS is a Navywide program, there are other units that have bandwidth challenges too like submerged submarines and forwarddeployed Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) units. These units are often in locations that may limit the use of internet connectivity. Additionally, the latest Cybersecurity threats also challenge our ability to have continuous virtual communication. We need to plan for a disconnected capability that enables PMS support while our expeditionary warfighters are on missions that require them to operate offline.

The FoPMS approach will maximize the benefits of internet connectivity when it is available and to always allow for the applications to run locally without internet connection. When the communications pipeline is open and available, the FoPMS system will upload the latest PMS status updates and feedback reports, while automatically downloading the latest PMS logistics documents and updates. However, when the communications are not available, the local server will continue to provide the essential PMS applications without the Sailor needing to know that the operational mode has changed. Think of it like you would your email. You don’t have to be connected to draft emails, read emails or access downloaded files, but once you’re connected, your email system is smart enough to send everything and update your inbox. That’s what FoPMS will do for updating items like PMS documents, metrics, shore-side reports and other PMS applications. The Future of PMS will provide automatic Force Revision updating capability to SKED via the internet, eliminating the manual DVD process used today. Automatic updating through the internet will also ease the burden of having to apply Force Revisions to onboard equipment and identifying applicable PMS changes to virtually eliminate the need for pen-and-ink line-outs. Delivery would be at the speed of the internet and not at the mercy of the mail service. It’s time to harvest the technology that is currently available to make this possible. It is extremely important that FoPMS provide seamless PMS capability to customers like those in NECC who must operate their PMS system while deployed and disconnected from the internet. When the mission and connectivity allows, these activities can link to the internet to get the latest and greatest PMS documents. The flexible architecture planned for the Future of PMS will be designed to provide the best functionality while supporting the widest range of platform configurations and security postures. Internet technology has come a long way. It’s time for Navy PMS to catch up and get a little spoiled too. *

ave you been in a war at sea? Review by Very few in our Navy of today Capt. Scott have, including me. By reading Robertson about combat at sea from those Commanding who have experienced it, we can Officer, harden ourselves for combat in the Surface Warfare Officer's School maritime environment. Capt. David Hart Dyke was commanding officer of the HMS Coventry, a Type 42 destroyer, which played a critical role during the 1982 Falkland Islands War against a bold and capable Argentinian military. Four Weeks in May is an enthralling recount of the events and emotions experienced by Coventry’s captain and crew. The book follows them from the time they first learned of the invasion of the United Kingdom-owned Falkland Islands by Argentina, to their preparations for entering the unanticipated war, and then to actual combat operations. HMS Coventry proved her grit in repelling and enduring many fast and furious air raids by enemy forces, but on May 25, 1982, she succumbed to a tenacious attack by two Argentinian tactical aircraft and was sunk after sustaining extensive battle damage. Dyke’s frank talk about the strain of being in a combat zone for prolonged periods of time had a powerful impact on me. He freely shares his thoughts on the struggles of a ship captain juggling how best to meet the missions assigned to Coventry, missing his family back home, and his concerns for the wellbeing of his sailors. He identifies poignant aspects of leadership that are applicable to modern-day warfare at sea such as the importance of putting on a confident face for the crew when confronted by uncertainty; being prepared for the varying ways people will react when in high-stress combat; and insight into the emotional rollercoaster

crewmembers go through when they witnessed other units in the Task Force took battle damage, sank, and watched their fellow shipmates too die. Four Weeks in May presents to the reader real world challenges faced by the Royal Navy during the war in 1982 that are quite relevant to our Navy today. For example, the Task Force had to frequently conduct underway replenishments at night, in complete radio silence, and in poor weather conditions in order to avoid being targeted by enemy submarines. Decision making had to be made to defend the Task Force under extreme pressure, with only fractions of seconds to decide whether to fire the ship’s missiles or to utilize Harrier fighters overhead under control of his Air Controller. Dyke calls out three factors as to why Coventry was successful in battle and so few of the crew perished in the final attack: good training, discipline, and high morale. This is profound wisdom from a combat-experienced captain. There was one final aspect that made Four Weeks in May a joy to read. Throughout the book, Dyke interweaves the thoughts and observations from his sailors that so eloquently captured their feelings and fears as well as their sense of duty, courage, and honor. This book resonated deeply with me because it was a window into modern naval combat. It reaffirms that warfighters must know their systems, tactics, and truly train as accurately as you can. It strengthened my commitment as a leader to always focus on ensuring we are ready to conduct prompt and sustained combat operations at sea and win. Four Weeks in May is highly recommended for all Surface Warriors, regardless of rank or rate. Our return to the vital U. S. Navy mission of Sea Control will not be complete without a force that is manned with people who understand the challenges-and fully appreciate the viciousness of combat at sea. *

SURFACE WARFARE SPRING 2017

Deputy Dispatches

RC2C: Your RC Sailors are Seagoing Sailors RC support isn’t limited to in-port periods and pierside availabilities, though both provide opportunities for you to benefit from close integration with your reserve team. But even more importantly, to address critical afloat billet shortages we’re creating opportunities for your RC team to provide relief to our afloat crews in short, medium and long duration fills. In fact, I’ve committed to Vice Adm. Rowden and our Chief of Navy Reserve, Vice Adm. Luke McCollum, that the Surface Warfare Reserve Enterprise will evolve to provide far more underway support to the waterfront than we have historically delivered. We’re calling this initiative “RC2C” - getting our RC to Sea. The RC2C initiative exists for one reason, and one reason only - to help you, our afloat warfighters. How can you get your RC to sea? Without providing a thesis on duty status types, or the permutations of funding sources available to you, let’s focus on the two types of support that will account for nearly all of your reserve interactions.

Type Commander Reserve 101

t’s a pleasure to address the many talented readers of the waterfront’s finest magazine! As your Deputy Commander, my mission obviously centers around support to the SWO Boss, Vice Adm. Tom Rowden. As a collateral duty, I serve as his principle advisor on Reserve Affairs, as well as the Surface Warfare community leader for the reserve force. In this role, as your “Reserve SWO Boss,” and in this section of our community magazine, my objective is to make each of you smarter on the awesome potential available to you via your Surface Force reserve component (RC) enterprise – and introduce you to the process for maximizing the support your reserve team provides.

Story by

Rear Adm. John B. Mustin

Deputy Commander, SURFPAC

I’m a big fan of simplicity. With that in mind, here’s what I want you to take away from this article: 1. Your reserve force exists to support our warfighting capability and capacity 2. Your reserve force includes over 3,000 SURFOR-specific billets 3. Your reserve force is trained and equipped to support you on the waterfront 4. Most importantly – your reserve Sailors can, and should, support you underway The SURFOR Reserve Enterprise Organizational Structure The CNSP and CNSL RC organizations mirror one another in organization/structure, and it’s no surprise the missions, functions and tasks they perform are closely aligned. Each Type Commander’s reserve complement includes units assigned to headquarters and waterfront maintenance support; the Afloat Cultural Workshop (a reserve-only mission); littoral combat ship units spanning squadron, mission module and Seaframe units (20 total, with 800 current billets growing to 1000 by end of FY18); Assault Craft Units; Beachmaster/Beach Groups; Tactical Air Control Groups and Amphibious Construction Battalions. CNSP also includes a reserve Naval Surface and Mine Warfighting Development (SMWDC) mine warfare unit, and you will see new RC units supporting each of SMWDC’s mission detachments, as well as their headquarters, as we grow our support to that critical mission over the next few fiscal years.

How Your RC Sailors Can Help Reserve Sailors provide strategic depth and operational capacity—mapped to valid requirements. And with 3150 waterfront billets, they’re doing great work every day for your peers. Here are a few examples of the types of support your SURFOR RC Sailors are executing today to support our Navy’s warfighting readiness: • • • • • • • • •

ATFP watchstanding 3M maintenance execution Inspections / certifications preparations Exercise support Underway watchstanding Forward-deployed unplanned loss fills In-theater logistics support Surge support for manning shortfalls Individual Augmentation / mobilization

a. Contributory support. Title 10 of US Code provides a minimum threshold of support every reserve Sailor must provide annually. For ease of discussion that support is simply 14 days of Annual Training (“AT”: think of it as two weeks of active duty) and one weekend per month, known as “drill periods” or “drills.” Many Sailors “flex drill,” which means they can mix and match how they perform those weekend allocations – for instance, come in from Monday to Friday (5 days) in a row, consuming 2.5 months of drills. So generally you can seek short duration support for underway periods in the 1 to 30-day range as regularly contributory support.

b. Surge Support. Your RC sailors also can provide longer duration support in surge situations, assuming valid requirements, schedules and funding are aligned. For example, at CNSP each of the last four years we’ve averaged 39 Sailors providing 113 days of afloat surge support. This year we’ll see that number increase as a result of critical afloat billet gaps. Your RC Sailors want to help you here!

There are many more nuanced ways your RC team can provide support – the key is to speak to your Immediate Superior in Command (ISIC) or Type Commander (TYCOM) Operational Support Officer to learn more. But before you do, remember the entering argument for that conversation is a valid requirement. No requirement means no budget…which means no support. Your Call to Action Evaluate your reserve support today. If what you are reading is new or confusing, or you’re unfamiliar with how your reserve team can support you, you’re already behind – and failing to take advantage of the incredible potential, talent and availability of your Navy’s reserve force. Like other TYCOM manning actions that address manning shortfalls in your crews, your RC force can provide a surge support mechanism to address gaps ranging from a few weeks to a few months. Speak to your ISIC or TYCOM Operational Support Officer to learn more. Keep up the great work leading the world’s finest Navy. I look forward to seeing you on the waterfront. And remember, it’s a great time to be a Surface Warrior. *

CNSF Reserve Units CNSF Reserve Enterprise: 71 Units, 3150 Billets CNSP Reserve: 33 Units 1430 Billets CNSL Reserve: 38 Units 1720 BIllets CNSP CNSL 9 6 Afloat Culture Workshop 108 102 HQ & Readiness Dets 483 316 LCSRON ONE & TWO 49 92 TACGRU ONE & TWO 0 34 SMWDC 29 35 BEACHGRU ONE & TWO 742 535 PHIBCB ONE & TWO 89 94 BEACHMASTER Units 211 216 ASSAULT CRAFT Units

Everett Great Lakes Minneapolis Green Bay Sacramento

Des Moines

Buffalo Erie New York

N. Canton

Baltimore

Norfolk/VA Beach

Ventura County/Moreno Valley/ Los Angeles St. Louis San Diego

Phoenix

Raleigh Dallas/Ft. Worth San Antonio

Houston

Pensacola

Mayport Tampa

SURFACE WARFARE SPRING 2017

Voices From the Fleet

Command Changes

riginally, LCS Crew 214’s commissioning ceremony was about ball caps. Before the rehearsal, I told my crew, “If you have any family or friends who will be with us today—in person, or in spirit, and you want me to mention them by name, let me know.” Then, one Sailor approached me, “Ma’am, my mom couldn’t be here today. Could you stream it on Facebook Live?” So, I handed my cell phone to a friend seated in the bleachers at our ceremony, November 10, 2016, on the grass next to the Vietnam Memorial at Naval Amphibious Base Coronado, and we went live. Our attendance of 50 turned into close to 500. The littoral combat ship program Story by has been going through transitions, Cmdr. Emily one of which is assigning a crew Bassett to only one ship, and adopting a Commanding blue-gold rotation. Crew 214 is Officer, the pre-commissioning crew for LCS Crew 214 Manchester, and our identity is all about Manchester, New Hampshire. We’ve visited the city and met the city’s mayor. Our ship sponsor, New Hampshire Senator Jeanne Shaheen, sent a personal note for our ceremony’s program. As a crew, we designed the ship’s crest, the brow banner and the ball caps. Now, we wanted to make a special moment out of sun-downing the 8-point standard Navy NWU cover, and replacing it with our “USS Manchester” ball caps. I would read my orders and don my command-at-sea pin. Turns out, it wasn’t just about ball caps. It was about character, competence and connections. Capt. Jay Hennessey, commanding officer of Naval Special Warfare Center, was our guest speaker. To many of us, SEALs are the epitome of character and competence. But beyond that, he told us about the importance of connection of teammates and crewmates. He said, “Teammate. It’s synonymous with crew. It’s synonymous with shipmate. Teammate, for me, in Naval Special Warfare, is the highest accolade I could pay someone. Because when I call someone a teammate, I mean they have three things. They are a person that is trustworthy, that is competent, and a person with whom I want to serve. You can’t do two of the three. You can’t be trustworthy and competent, but someone we don’t like. You’ve got to have to have all three.” Then, he broke with his normal protocol of handing

Photo by MC2 Christopher Veloicazza

out a personalized command coin after a job well done, after a Sailor has demonstrated excellence as a teammate. Instead, he handed out two coins to two crew members telling them he expected “excellence in advance,” and that he was investing in these two Sailors, that they would spread their competence, their trustworthiness, and their desire to be wanted as a teammate by the rest of the crew. As command senior chief and I handed out Manchester ball caps, each Sailor exchanged a ball cap for a word: a character trait they wanted to develop while part of our crew. I was deeply moved by each Sailor’s word. I heard dependability, patience, trustworthiness, diversity, leadership, empathy, flexibility, perseverance, fairness, loyalty humility. Remarkably, there was no trait I heard twice. The executive officer and I exchanged traits. He called “Uncover. Two,” and “Cover. Two,” and in unison, we donned the cover of our new ship. After that simple ritual, I felt a deep connection with my crew. Then, while I spoke, that connection spread to our gathered guests. A few Sailors broke ranks and handed out small tokens to each guest. They were candles, in a clear glass with a sticker of the Manchester crest on one side and one sticker of the crew logo on the other. Light these candles, I said, and remember that you are with us in spirit in the future as you are with us physically today. Then, I turned to my scribbled notes and named the honored guests: parents, siblings, in-laws, grandparents, a mother watching us on Facebook Live, and even one Sailor’s late grandfather whom he wanted remembered. I realized how deeply connected we all are. It wasn’t just about the ball caps. *

Capt. David Bretz............................................................Destroyer Squadron 31

December 2016

Capt. Benjamin Allbritton................................................. USS Boxer (LHD 4) Capt. Kavon Hakimzadeh.................................USS Mount Whitney (LCC 20)

Capt. Jeffrey Craig.......................................................USS Anchorage (LPD 23)

Capt. Ken Coleman................................................Afloat Training Group Pacific

Cmdr. Joshua Menzel.................................................USS Spruance (DDG 111) Rear Adm. Cathal O'Connor............................... Expeditionary Strike Group 3

January 2017

Capt. Jeffery Cronin...................................... Mine Countermeasures Squadron 3

Cmdr. Leslie Sobol......................................................USS Gonzalez (DDG 66) Cmdr. Troy Denison...................................................USS Truxton (DDG 103)

Cmdr. Simon McKeon........................................ USS Curtis Wilbur (DDG 54)

Cmdr. Michael Mortensen..........................................USS Gridley (DDG 101) Lt. Cmdr. Richard Mayer............................................... USS Hurricane (PC 3)

Capt. Christopher Budde............................................. USS Port Royal (CG 73)

February 2017

Cmdr. Steven Wasson................................................. USS Ashland (LSD 48)

Cmdr. Stephen Aldridge.................................................USS Mason (DDG 87)

Cmdr. Anthony Webber...............................................USS Dewey (DDG 105) Cmdr. Zoah Scheneman..................................... Afloat Training Group Atlantic

Lt. Cmdr. William Stewart................................................... USS Squall (PC 7)