5 minute read
How deep is your deep pack inspection?
how deep is your deep packet inspection?
An industrial control system (ICS) operates on proprietary technologies designed to run autonomously for a long service life. The software and hardware on these older systems were often designed without security considerations because these systems were isolated within the factory. This isolation created a false sense of security despite numerous vulnerabilities that would make these devices open to a cyber security vulnerability. This poor security design situation, coupled with a lack of awareness within industrial control systems still persists.
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Traditional firewalls based on access control will not help always be sufficient to secure an ICS Network. Transactional information in industrial protocols exists in the application layer. An example is Modbus/TCP where Modbus function information is carried in the application payload. Traditional insecure serial based protocols such as Modbus and DNP3 are riding on open standards such as TCP/IP, which multiplies the security risk by having more devices and protocols running across a network.
Deep packet inspection (DPI) of traffic is needed to secure the ICS. Deep packet inspection evaluates the contents of a packet using configured rules to determine what to do with these packets in real time.
Think of an envelope in snail mail. You can recognise it as an envelope, and you can even see who it is from and where it is going. This could be mapped to a standard firewall where you can limit the IP address by source and destination, and even port information, but that is as complex as it gets. In terms of this example, the content inside the sealed envelope, such as a friendly letter, is where the real information lies protected; this is where DPI really occurs.
In terms of a firewall with DPI technology, this is what is actually happening. The firewall looks at the specific letters, if you will, in that packet on the wire. But how does a signature-based system (such as Snort) differ from a truly protocol-specific DPI engine?
Signature-based deep packet inspection: A reactive, packet matching strategy
Going back to the envelope and letter analogy, in the case of a signature-based approach, it is akin to saying that the letter can only have certain words in a certain order, and they can only be presented in this specific way.
A signature-based system is a reactive system in which a vulnerability (vuln) must already be known so as to be able to design the signature to identify it, which in turn also implies that the vuln is already out in the wild. This signature functions by essentially being overlaid on a packet (mapping a set of bytes against a known byte pattern) of a specific vulnerability.
There are two ways you could utilise the signaturebased approach. You could use it to identify known vulnerabilities (blacklisting) and thus your signatures only identify those specific anomalies and allow everything else through the firewall – this means it would certainly not catch any new or non-published vulnerabilities.
On the other hand, if you built a signature list to allow only a certain packet set -- meaning you would have a very large signature database -- (whitelisting) and drop all packets that are not in that set, then your protective mechanism is only as good as your allowed set of signatures. To be truly effective, those allowed signatures would have to be as detailed as possible.
Signatures are not simple to write and should be as granular to a specific plant as possible; that means the plant operator or engineer would have to write a custom signature. In my mind, this is a stretch too far. This is why the signatures are usually just blacklisted items with the default policy to allow everything else. In general, signatures come in the form of a large database to be updated weekly or daily (think virus software). This also means some process must be in place to actively grab these signature files and bring them to a plant floor to be pushed out to the security devices. As we all know, the plant network should be well segmented and thus no direct Internet connection should reach the ICS. Signature-based DPI is prevalent in the IT world and is heavily used by Internet service providers (ISPs). One common use would be for BitTorrent traffic. u
Protocol-specific deep packet inspection: A proactive “all-knowing” strategy
On the other hand, in a DPI system that validates a protocols structure, the sequence of packets and proper byte values is far more robust than a signature-based system. In fact, it can also be used to limit specific register ranges of a protocol, or even validate that a specific value at a specific range can only be x,y,z, for example.
This ‘all knowing’ knowledge of the protocol is proactive rather than reactive in that it can potentially protect vulnerabilities in a PLC’s protocol implementation without having to be updated. In addition, it could theoretically protect against vulnerabilities not yet known. This is because it would already have the ability to catch an ‘off-by-one’ error or a buffer overflow since it is already validating maximum size of fields as outlined in the protocol specification.
Hirschmann’s Tofino appliance implements deep packet inspection for a range of industrial protocols that combine protocol specific DPI with a traditional stateful inspection firewall. It allows you to select the protocols and load them to the device as required to meet the security needs of different applications.
Deep packet inspection: Important for defence in depth
In the SCADA/ICS industry there is a real need to enhance or implement security, even more so now that everything is rapidly becoming interconnected. Both signature-based and protocolspecific DPIs provide additional layers of filtering. Before DPI, a plant engineer could only require the firewall to open a port and let every read or write command flow down to their PLC.
Signature-based DPI has a role to play in Defence in Depth, though it is difficult to keep the signatures up-to-date in industrial networks that are segmented from the outside world and highly sensitive to change. However, the depth of an implementation is more important than breadth. A firewall vendor may say they support 500 protocols, but to what extent? Validating a single byte in one protocol does not mean ‘you support DPI’ for that protocol.
Protocol-based DPI is more robust and gives plant engineers the ability to limit the use of a write command or block writes entirely for a specific industrial protocol. It is also more suited to the industrial environment, as it does not require engineers to write signatures and it can provide protection to PLCs without requiring frequent updates.
Depending on a single defence, such as perimeter firewall, is building a security solution based on a single point of failure. Make sure that your facility has a proper Defence in Depth design where the network, control devices and systems are collectively hardened - thereby providing reliable security for the plant floor.
