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STORM IN THE BACKYARD
Whenever and however the current conflict in Ukraine comes to an end, there’s no doubt that the Western Balkans and Serbia will be hit hard by the outcome. Previous elections, but also the current steps Serbia is taking in the foreign policy domain, will have political, economic and social ramifications for every citizen, but they will be decided by just one person.
What does the conflict in Ukraine imply when it comes to the new geopolitical division of the world map? What repercussions does it have for the position of Europe, and for the position of the region and Serbia? Will we ultimately end up closer to the East or the West, or pushed even further to the margins? Does this conflict create the possibility of changing the stances of America and Europe regarding Kosovo and the organising of Bosnia-Herzegovina, or is it a topic that’s being used by the ruling party to homogenise the electorate? On whom does Serbia’s positioning in the international community depend? These are undoubtedly issues that have entered our lives, whether we’re talking about decisions made at the top of the Serbian government or everyday conversations within families, among friends and on the street. Here our interlocutors – historians, foreign policy commentators, economists and political scientists – attempt to shed light on the possible consequences of the Ukrainian conflict for the reconfiguring of the geopolitical space and, thus, on the place of Serbia and the wider region on this new world map, with an awareness that the situation on the ground could shift before this edition of CorD even finds itself in front of readers.
ALEKSANDAR R. MILETIĆ
RESEARCH ASSOCIATE AT THE INSTITUTE FOR RECENT HISTORY OF SERBIA, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE CENTER FOR HISTORY STUDIES AND DIALOGUE
VERBALLY IN THE WEST, MENTALLY IN THE EAST
THE FOREIGN POLICY TURNAROUND OF VUČIĆ’S REGIME, LIKE THE ONE THAT OCCURRED AT THE TIME OF THE SIGNING OF THE BRUSSELS AGREEMENTS, COULD PAY OFF FOR HIM AGAIN THIS TIME, IN THE FORM OF EVEN BETTER RELATIONS THAT HE WOULD ESTABLISH WITH EU MEMBER STATES. OF COURSE, THE SUPPORT OF THE WEST WOULD ALSO MEAN CONSCIOUSLY TOLERATING THE UNDEMOCRATIC, AUTOCRATIC MANNERS OF THE GOVERNMENT IN ITS INTERNAL POLICIES.
In a geostrategic context, Ukraine’s resistance against the Russian invasion shows the final shifting of the borders of the former Eastern Bloc further eastwards. Namely, despite rife corruption and numerous institutional vagaries of its state system, Ukraine has constituted the principles of political pluralism, freedom of choice and changes of government, which places this country in juxtaposition to the authoritarian regimes of Russia and Belarus. Regardless of the outcome of its struggle, Ukraine has – mentally and practically – already become part of Central or Eastern-Central Europe.
In this geopolitical shift, Serbia – despite its pragmatic condemnation of Russian aggression at the UN General Assembly – still essentially persists, according to its internal organisation, in following Eastern European formulas. It thus might happen that our foreign policy will soon become more favourable to the West than to Russia or China, but I don’t see any upcoming changes that would raise the Serbian system of rule of law and political freedoms and responsibilities to the level of EU standards. The foreign policy turnaround of Vučić’s regime, like the one that occurred at the IT MIGHT HAPPEN THAT OUR FOREIGN time of the signing of the Brussels agreements, could once again pay off for him, in the form of even better relations that he would establish with EU member states. Of course, the support of the West would also POLICY WILL SOON BECOME MORE FAVOURABLE TO THE WEST THAN TO RUSSIA mean consciously tolerating the undemocratic, autocratic manners of OR CHINA, BUT I DON’T SEE ANY UPCOMING the government in its internal policies. When it comes to the influence of this conflict on changing the stances of the U.S. and Europe regarding Kosovo and the organising of Bosnia-Herzegovina, we can say that the Ukrainian crisis has homogCHANGES THAT WOULD RAISE THE SERBIAN SYSTEM OF RULE OF LAW AND POLITICAL FREEDOMS AND RESPONSIBILITIES TO THE enised the EU and the entire defence architecture of the Western world LEVEL OF EU STANDARDS organised around NATO. I think that, under such circumstances, the U.S. and the EU won’t allow the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina or Kosovo to destabilise. The changes that have occurred in Montenegro clearly emphasise the West’s attitude towards declared goals of creating the so-called Serbian world by violating the territorial integrity of neighbouring states. Likewise, the existing system of international relations will not allow changes to current institutional arrangements. Bosnia-Herzegovina cannot join NATO because that is opposed by the representatives of Republika Srpska; Kosovo cannot join NATO because some members of the alliance don’t recognise its independence. UN institutions are paralysed by Russia and China’s veto rights that they can deploy against any initiative coming from Western countries, and vice versa.
Some tactical changes can be achieved along the way by pressuring the so-called international community, but I think substantial changes in the region can only come from within, through a weakening of the media, strengthening of institutions and changing of the value paradigm. In Serbia, for example, it is not enough to pressure them to order “their” tabloids to suddenly stop publishing pro-Russian content or, during the covid crisis, to suddenly stop the anti-vaccination campaign.
ALEKSANDAR POPOV
DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRE FOR REGIONALISM
IF THE WAR IN UKRAINE PERSISTS, THE POST-ELECTION PERIOD WILL MOST LIKELY SEE SERBIA HAVE TO CHOOSE BETWEEN ONE OF THE TWO CHAIRS THAT IT’S OCCUPYING. WHATEVER CHOICE IT MAKES, THERE COULD BE MAJOR UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
When this article is published, it will surely contain the statement that it won’t stand the test of such a short period of time between writing and appearing before readers. Everything depends on whether the whole thing will end with the negotiations that have been held in continuity since Russia launched its aggression against Ukraine and the agreement on Ukraine’s military neutrality, with appropriate international guarantees of its security (as currently calculated) or whether Russia will find itself bogged down in an enduring war, like America did in Vietnam during the 1960s.
If the first variation works out, there will be a renewing of the doctrine of limited sovereignty that applied during the time of the Soviet Union, which should instil fear in all the independent countries that formed in the wake of its collapse. This would also, in a way, represent a defeat for Zelensky, because it would raise the question of why he didn’t reach such an agreement before the aggression, when it was first offered by Russia. But it would also be a defeat for the West, which encouraged Zelensky to oppose Russia’s hegemonic plans without clear guarantees of Ukraine’s accession to the EU, and even less so to NATO.
Such a result would strengthen Russia, but also its imperialist appetites, while it would cause significant damage to the Western alliance’s credibility on the global political stage. In the second variation, Ukraine would, with Western support, ultimately emerge victorious, but lasting sanctions would completely change the picture of the world and have immeasurable IT’S HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT ALL WESTERN BALKAN COUNTRIES WILL ACCEDE TO THE EUROPEAN UNION ramifications not only for Russia, but also for those who imposed them, which is already evident in the form of supply shortages and high energy prices, which cause other price hikes and lead to shortages of basic essentials. Europe is currently more united IN A PACKAGE, UNDER AN URGENT PROCEDURE. IT’S MORE LIKELY THAT THE POLICY OF STICKS AND CARROTS WILL CONTINUE TO BE APPLIED, THOUGH than ever, precisely because of its resistance to Russian aggres- THIS TIME THERE MIGHT BE MORE CARROTS TO sion, but the question is whether that would remain so in the case that enduring sanctions damage their economies and cause dissatisfaction and even protests among dissatisfied citizens. FURTHER DISTANCE THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION FROM RUSSIAN INFLUENCE
When it comes to the region, it is proposed that Russia’s further malignant influence be prevented by all Western Balkan countries acceding to the European Union in a package, under an urgent procedure. I think such a scenario is unlikely, because the EU has already been burnt once – when it welcomed some former socialist countries into its ranks, in the first decade of this century, without having them first fulfil basic criteria for membership, primarily related to corruption and the rule of law. I’m of the opinion that the policy of sticks and carrots will continue to be used here (though this time there might be more carrots, in an effort to further distance the countries of the region from Russian influence). Perhaps the possibility that the crisis could spread to encompass the Western Balkans will encourage Western countries to accelerate the negotiation process between Belgrade and Priština, but also to present a clear plan of how to finally turn Bosnia-Herzegovina into a stable and functional state at the service of all its citizens.
With regard to Serbia, if the war in Ukraine persists, during the post-election period Serbia will most likely have to finally choose between one of the two chairs that it’s occupying. Whatever choice it makes, there could be major unintended consequences. If it chooses the EU, Serbia will be resented by Putin, particularly given that he considers us as being indebted to him for many reasons. If we opt for Russia, we should forget about EU membership, but also rich European funds. We’ll see that we would have been better off if we’d chosen one stable chair in the first place, and cultivated good relations, but not special ones, with all others.
BOŠKO JAKŠIĆ
JOURNALIST
ON THE BRINK OF A NEW COLD WAR
IN A COUNTRY WHERE ALMOST EVERYTHING IS DEPENDENT ON ONE MAN, THE CHOICE OF SERBIA IN THE WEST OR SERBIA IN THE EAST ALSO FALLS UNDER THE DOMAIN OF HIS DECISION-MAKING. OUR FUTURE POSITION DEPENDS TO THE GREATEST EXTENT ON POLITICAL WISDOM, AN ABILITY TO OBSERVE THE GLOBAL SITUATION WITHOUT CHEERING AND EMOTIONAL FAVOURITISM, AND DIPLOMATIC SKILLS THAT ARE BEING PUT TO THE TEST IN A WAY THAT HASN’T BEEN SEEN FOR A LONG TIME.
From the outset, President Vladimir Putin used Kiev as the location from which to send a message to the West: Moscow doesn’t recognise the unipolar world ruled by the United States; NATO’s eastward expansion must stop at Ukraine’s borders, after which negotiations must begin on a new security architecture for Europe.
These demands essentially contain nothing new, because the ruler of the Kremlin has been repeating them for 15 years, since the security conference in Munich. Putin supplemented his script in 2008, when he intervened militarily in Georgia, and printed a new edition in 2014, with the annexation of Crimea.
With his aggression against Ukraine, Putin has once again demonstrated his readiness to violate international law – which is in the DNA of great powers – and that he has no intention of stopping the invasion or negotiating until his key first-phase demands are met: Ukraine’s demilitarisation, the de-nazifying of the country’s regime and the permanent loss of Crimea.
Broader negotiations would then follow in the second phase, which would include a repeat of the Conference on European Security and Cooperation that culminated half a century ago with the Helsinki Act. Only then could we discuss some new geopolitical map of Europe.
Despite everything seeming to indicate rarely seen Western unity, the U.S.’s European allies have been practically capitulated into action under the pressure and demands of the Americans who are in a position to monitor the Ukrainian conflict from a comfortable distance or lead sanctions against Russia – the collateral price of which, particularly when it comes to energy, will once again be paid by Europe.
Pax Americana actually represents the preserving of the existing status quo, which leads directly to a new Cold War that this time wouldn’t spare the Western Balkans, but rather would turn the region into a peripheral but important part of the frontal conflict.
Under such complicated circumstances, Serbia is calculating that it could preserve its proclaimed yet unacknowledged military neutrality, with the idea that it would thereby be able to maintain some kind of political balance.
If the Ukrainian conflict is resolved relatively quickly, that could be possible, but if the geopolitical tension persists, Belgrade wouldn’t have the luxury of continuing to stick to the aisles. In a country where almost everything is dependent on one man, the choice of Serbia in the West or Serbia in the East also falls under the domain of his decision-making.
What repercussions could that have on the pacifying of the two most troubled parts of the region: Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina? Actually only minor ones, because the West and Russia have conflicting views on these issues that are not diminishing, though if they mutually sharpen that could shift the Western Balkans further away from lasting peace. This doesn’t mean that the alternative is some new war, despite regional leaders not abandoning their propagating of nationalism, which – as a rule – they utilise for election purposes.
When it comes to Serbia, our future position depends to the greatest extent on political wisdom, an ability to observe the global situation without cheering and emotional favouritism, and diplomatic skills that are being put to the test in a way that hasn’t been seen for a long time. IF PAX AMERICANA SURVIVES, WHICH ACTUALLY REPRESENTS THE PRESERVING OF THE EXISTING STATUS QUO, THAT WOULD LEAD DIRECTLY TO A NEW COLD WAR, THAT THIS TIME WOULDN’T SPARE THE WESTERN BALKANS, BUT RATHER WOULD TURN THE REGION INTO A PERIPHERAL BUT IMPORTANT PART OF THE FRONTAL CONFLICT
VLADIMIR GLIGOROV
ECONOMIST AND POLITICAL SCIENTIST
AWAITING THE ASSIGNING OF DESTINY
HOW POLITICAL CHANGES WILL LOOK FOLLOWING CONTRASTING OUTCOMES OF THE CONFLICT IN UKRAINE WITHIN CERTAIN COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY SERBIA, WILL DEPEND PRIMARILY ON POLITICAL DECISIONS THAT WILL BE MADE. SERBIAN POLITICS IS TRADITIONALLY INDECISIVE, SO THIS TIME AROUND IT WILL AGAIN PROBABLY WAIT FOR THE DECISIONS TO BE MADE BY OTHERS, AND THE PUBLIC WILL COMPLAIN ABOUT THE INJUSTICE OF THE WORLD, THE WESTERN WORLD OF COURSE.
The idea of a new world order provides strategic motivation for Russian aggression against Ukraine. The question, of course, is whether the means lead to the end.
What is the end goal? Viewed politically, the Russian authorities are striving for a balance of power that could be called a world council, i.e., the best formal agreement between the great powers regarding the division of spheres of influence and the procedure by which they would agree about governing the world. And how to govern Europe, especially when it comes to Russia and America.
The economic aspect of this strategy is unclear. That’s because it could be the very opposite of trade and investment globalisation, and would be replaced by some kind of regionalism, or economic cooperation within economic blocs. The problem with this is that it’s uncertain whether it would suit China. And alliance with China is certainly an essential condition to even discuss the idea of establishing a new world order. The aggression against Ukraine was intended to demonstrate that IT ISN’T CERTAIN WHETHER THE NEW WORLD ORDER THAT WILL EMERGE WILL BE THE ONE THAT THE RUSSIAN AUTHORITIES ARE STRIVING FOR OR SOME Russian interests must be respected, because it will be seen that the world OTHER. IF THE SECOND OPTION OCCURS, A NEW cannot ignore its military power and importance to the world economy, primarily as a supplier of energy and raw materials, and to some extent also food. The success reflected in the accepting of the establishing of a WORLD ORDER WITH REDUCED RUSSIAN INFLUENCE WILL EMERGE. WHEN IT COMES TO THE BALKAN new world order that would recognise Russia’s global role, and above all its COUNTRIES, THE IMPORTANCE OF THE EUROPEAN European role, would require (i) the political will of the Russian people, (ii) a swift military victory in Ukraine, and (iii) economic disruption, primarily in Europe, as a result of rising prices of Russian imports. As things currently stand, none of these three conditions have been met by the military agUNION WILL INCREASE, AS WILL THE DAMAGE TO THOSE COUNTRIES THAT HAVE REMAINED OUTSIDE IT, FOR ONE REASON OR ANOTHER gression launched against Ukraine. The occupation of Ukraine is persisting, there is a fear that political support could be lost among the Russian people and the elite, while the economic consequences of very strict, comprehensive and unanimous sanctions are proving tougher for the Russian economy than for Europe’s, not to mention the American economy.
It isn’t certain whether the new world order that will emerge will be the one that the Russian authorities are striving for or some other. If a convincing victory doesn’t come in the war in Ukraine, and the political outcome is detrimental to Russian military goals, coupled with the economic problems that Russia will face, the order that will be established following Russia’s relative failure in demonstrating its might will be detrimental to Russia’s influence in Europe and around the world. This will be partly due, and probably most importantly, to increased unity in the European Union and NATO. China’s influence will increase, particularly if it remains committed to preserving the global economic system, because it has a great interest in exporting and investing in foreign countries. Thus a new world order will be created with diminished Russian influence, which must have consequences for the Russian economy and political scene.
It isn’t difficult to see what the consequences will be for the Balkan countries. The importance of the European Union will increase, as will the damage to those countries that have remained outside it, for one reason or another. How political changes will look like in certain countries, especially in Serbia, will depend primarily on the political decisions that will be made. Serbian politics is traditionally indecisive, so this time it will probably wait for others to make decisions, and the public will complain about the injustice of the world, the West of course.
How political changes will look within certain countries, especially Serbia, will depend primarily on political decisions that will be made. Serbian politics is traditionally indecisive, so this time around it will again probably wait for the decisions to be made by others, and the public will complain about the injustice of the world, the Western world of course.
