FRUITLESS ELECTIONS

The insistence of the international community that Serbia take a clear stance on the conflict in Ukraine could have far-reaching ramifications for the mapping of the domestic political scene, though it remains unclear what could result from the government’s discomfort and the opposition’s impotence when it comes to finding an answer to a question that’s crucial to the future of the country

The Serbian answer to the question of how it will determine its position on the war in Ukraine has seemingly halted and cast into shadow all processes on the country’s internal political scene. The results of the very recent presidential, parliamentary and local elections sound like “old news” under these new circumstances in which foreign policy responses dictate the composition of the future Serbian government and the conditions of cooperation between the government and opposition. The price of the ruling party’s continuous satanizing of the opposition is more striking than ever. It has ensured that the party is today tormented in its struggle to find provisional support for the operation of transferring responsibility in making far-reaching decisions and is being forced to rely more on the opposition’s thirst for power than on high-quality interlocutors of European origin who could point the way to a sustainable solution that’s “of critical importance to the future of the country”, as one Focus interlocutor defined it. Here CorD’s four Focus interlocutors deal, in different ways, with unpacking and resolving this puzzle.

DUŠKO RADOSAVLJEVIĆ

POLITICAL SCIENTIST

REGRET COMES TO HE WHO TAKES AND HE WHO DOESN’T

IF OPPOSITION LEADERS DON’T AGREE TO HELP VUČIĆ NAVIGATE HIS WAY ACROSS TO THE OTHER SIDE OF THE POLITICAL SHORE, THEY WILL BETRAY THEIR OWN PROGRAMME, BUT IF THEY DO AGREE, THEY’LL FIND THEMSELVES DECLARED TRAITORS BY THEIR OWN VOTERS

Serbia has rightly been forced into a corner – figuratively speaking, it has painted itself into a corner and now has nowhere to go, except to spoil that which was done wrongly. Specifically, since the multiparty system was introduced to Serbia, numerous political options have taken political positions as an alibi: for manipulation of the unresolved Kosovo issue; an impetuous and arrogant attitude towards neighbours, particularly former Yugoslav republics; an unwillingness to enable, and active prevention of, the decentralisation of the state; a propensity for tycoons and neoliberal policies; “hooking on” to regimes that openly violate human rights; showing admiration for Eastern and Far Eastern political partners while disregarding the fact that the state and society’s economic, political and other interests lie in stronger and deeper cooperation with the countries of the EU, the UK, Canada and the U.S. And of course, when it is in the interest of Serbia, in stronger and deeper cooperation with all other countries, such as the BRICS nations and all other principled countries, in which we include the remnants of the once highly reputed Non-Aligned Movement. So, everything THE IMPETUS TO CHANGE FOREIGN POLICY is based on interest, appreciation and respect, and not on the PRIORITIES MUST FIRSTLY COME FROM THE basis of servility, so-called “fraternal assistance” and some unspoken and unproven love! That’s why it’s vital to end such a policy, which is essentially a policy of the mentally impoverished, who explains OPPOSITION, WHICH IS QUITE DIFFICULT GIVEN THAT A SIGNIFICANT PROPORTION OF THE OPPOSITION IS MORE PREPARED TO “SNATCH” that something will happen to us, that we will live better, just because someone loves us (“eternal love”), or just because we believe that someone loves us. Of course, this isn’t as much a delusion as it is a scam to win over certain categories of voters A SMIDGEN OF POWER THAN TO STRIVE TO CHANGE SERBIA PATIENTLY, TENACIOUSLY AND METHODICALLY in Serbia, and it’s one that’s been manipulated for too long!

The impetus to change foreign policy priorities must firstly come from the opposition, which is quite difficult given that a significant proportion of the opposition is more prepared to “snatch” a smidgen of power than to strive to change Serbia patiently, tenaciously and methodically. In Serbia, twenty grams of power has always been worth more than two kilos of brains, then wait to see who hold on! Whatever the case, it is more realistic for this undertaking, compelled – as noted, to be taken on by the unquestionable master of Serbian political life, who is ready to “disavow” his most loyal voters – most of whom are losers of transition – to stay in power for a little longer. Naturally, as a very shrewd player, he will try to draw certain opposition players into this dance. This tactic, of throwing the ball into the opposition’s court, is also a Serbian political speciality. If they don’t agree to help Vučić navigate his way across to the other side of the political shore, they will betray their own programme, but if they do agree, they’ll find themselves declared traitors by their own voters. Whichever way you turn, something gets left behind. Nothing new and nothing original in the arena of Serbian politics. “Lord, how quickly darkness falls here” (Danilo Kiš).

DRAGAN ĐUKANOVIĆ

PRESIDENT OF THE CENTRE FOR FOREIGN POLICY AND PROFESSOR AT THE UNIVERSITY OF BELGRADE FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCES

NEW SERBIAN GOVERNMENT MUST BE CLEARLY PRO-EUROPEAN

BOTH NEIGHBOURING STATES AND LEADING WESTERN COUNTRIES LIKE THE U.S. OR GERMANY WILL CONTINUE TO INSIST THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT OF SERBIA CLEARLY DETERMINES ITS GEOPOLITICAL STANCE. THIS ALSO IMPLIES, FIRST AND FOREMOST, A CLEAR DECLARATION ON SANCTIONS AGAINST RUSSIA, BUT ALSO AN UNAMBIGUOUS EXPRESSION OF ITS EUROPEAN INTEGRATION ASPIRATIONS

Given that the war in Ukraine has caused a fundamental shift on the geopolitical scene in Europe and around the world, and somehow created a new Cold War-like division in Europe, Serbia is also expected to clearly determine and declare the foreign policy course it wants to pursue. In that sense, a certain degree of tolerance was evident – primarily due to pre-election activities – when it comes to the question of Serbia making a clear foreign policy commitment regarding restrictive measures imposed on the Russian Federation, but also regarding the Ukraine crisis generally.

Considering our real-world position surrounded by EU and NATO member states, it is to be expected that not only neighbouring states, but also leading Western countries like the U.S. or Germany, will continue striving to influence the new

Government of Serbia to clearly determine its geopolitical stance. This also implies, first and foremost, a clear declaration on sanctions against Russia, but also an unambiguous expression of its European integration aspirations. Considering the degree of hesitation on this issue that’s been evident to date, I don’t think it will be viewed with benevolence following the formation of the new government. Thus, those who constitute the executive will be expected not only to be pro-European declaratively, but also to demonstrate their pro-European credentials clearly. Of course, when it comes to the domain of foreign policy, the new government will also be expected to consolidate relations with our neighbours in the Western Balkans and Southeast Europe. Special emphasis will be placed on normalising relations with Kosovo, because it seems that, at this current geopolitical juncture, accelerating the process of normalising relations between Belgrade and Priština will also occupy a very important place in the foreign policy agendas of the U.S. and EU. It’s also clear that the new Serbian government will have to take on the energy diversification issue, which implies reducing the Russian Federation’s dominant influence when it comes to supplying gas. Alongside this, it seems to me that the issue of functional regional cooperation will come to the fore, and along with it the resuscitating of the Berlin Process and - as its construct - the Common Regional Market, but also some kind of harmonising of its operation with the Open Balkan initiative, which has been developing over the last three years. In a broader context, it is clear that the new Government of Serbia will be expected to continue to sign our country up to the declarations adopted by international organisations, like the UN General Assembly, the Council of Europe and the OSCE, related to further developments in the war in Ukraine. I BELIEVE THAT THE ISSUE OF FUNCTIONAL REGIONAL COOPERATION WILL COME TO THE FORE IN THE PERIOD AHEAD, AND ALONG WITH IT THE RESUSCITATING OF THE BERLIN PROCESS AND - AS ITS CONSTRUCT - THE COMMON REGIONAL MARKET

SREĆKO DJUKIĆ

DIPLOMAT, FORMER AMBASSADOR, MEMBER OF THE EPUS FORUM FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WILL PROVIDE THE IMPETUS IN EITHER/OR DECISIONS

THE COUNTRY’ PRO-RUSSIAN AND ANTI-EUROPEAN POLITICAL SCENE CAN BE RECONFIGURED, BUT NOT IN ONE FELL SWOOP AND NOT SOLELY BY THE RULING PARTY OR ONE MAN

Alesson not learned is repeated. Serbia is once again facing the “greatest” foreign policy ordeal. Ukraine, and actually Russia, is the new test for Serbia, but also a key internal question: (un)willingness to sanction Russia, as the “main element of the path to Europe”.

Serbian foreign policy has hit a wall, after trying to sit on two chairs. Serbian society has long been offered illusions about Russia, as some alternative to a realistic, possible and sustainable European policy. And we thus find ourselves in the middle of a maelstrom, swirling in a whirlwind, powerless against either side.

But Ukraine is connected to the Kosovo issue, and the one connecting them is Russia, which has gained a status as the sole guardian of Kosovo, which is reason enough to reject the imposing of economic, personal and other sanctions against the Russian Federation for its invasion of Ukraine following Serbia’s triple political vote in the UN General Assembly.

The Government of Serbia is aware that any decision to impose sanctions against Russia would leave it among the minority in Serbian society, which undoubtedly has a pro-Russian orientation and has strongly supported Russia for years. Russia is seen as the mythical protector of Serbia and an irreplaceable grenadier SYSTEMATICALLY DESTROYED AND SATANIZED, of Kosovo, omnipotent, along with gas and oil that render Serbia TODAY’S PRO-EUROPEAN OPPOSITION IS IN completely dependent on Russia. The country’ pro-Russian and anti-European political scene can be reconfigured, but not in one fell swoop and not solely by the ruling party or one man. They generated that dominant internal NO POSITION TO ADDRESS THE PROCESS OF RECONFIGURING DOMESTIC POLICY AND EUROPEAN VALUES scene that fits their own character and deeds. That’s why proEuropean forces in the country are almost invisible. Their influence is imaginary and conscious, and not accidentally limited. An opposition scene in Serbia, in the true sense, barely exists. It has long been destroyed systematically and satanized, in parallel with the cultivating of the cult of a single party, single policy, single person. Such a pro-European opposition is in no position to address the process of reconfiguring domestic policy and European values that are of critical importance to the future of the country. That is dependent exclusively on the government’s readiness to restore the deprived political and democratic rights and place of the opposition in Serbian society, in the domestic and foreign policies of the country.

The government is verbally ready to share the burden of Ukraine, as the biggest and most pressing issue, with others in the country, in an attempt to fake some post-election reconfiguring of its own ranks and relations with the opposition. The government is not ready to go it alone in confronting the majority opinion in our society, which supports Russia and anti-European policies. The trigger for changes to occur on the domestic front will probably come, once again, from the international environment, as is always the case when Serbia faces an either/or choice.

ZORAN STOJILJKOVIĆ PH.D.,

PROFESSOR AT THE UNIVERSITY OF BELGRADE FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCES

FORCED (HALF)CHANGES

THE POST-ELECTION POLITICAL SCENE, CONFRONTED BY THE CERTAINTY THAT IT MUST IMPOSE AT LEAST SYMBOLIC SANCTIONS ON RUSSIA, WILL ITSELF EXPERIENCE CHANGES, AND THEY WILL COME AT THE LEVEL OF THE RULING PARTY, THE OPPOSITION AND THE ELECTORATE

The traditional lines of political division in post-communist European societies have changed over the last three decades, and even been overshadowed by EUropeanisation processes. The division between Euro (Atlantic) integrationists and proponents of national populist sovereignty cuts through the fields of the understanding of the nation state, democracy and the rule of law, but also economic and social development models and dilemmas around desirable recipients of subsidies and investments in infrastructure.

Serbia and its policy of manoeuvring between the influences of the EU, U.S., Russia and China is, in this regard, a special example that’s justified by the history and memory of NATO aggression, Russia’s support for Kosovo and investments coming from “brotherly China”. Over the past decade, this mantra has served a hybrid regime that’s formally pro-EU integration to ease the pressure applied on it from the West, over its many democratic shortcomings, by fuelling pro-Eastern sentiment. The war in Ukraine and its visible consequences – imperial games around the redistribution of power, Russia’s (self) expulsion from Europe, recession in Europe and U.S. political mentorship – represent a situation that’s behind us. The policy of conditionality has almost assumed its ultimate form. Stabilocrats, who have solved little and produced a few problems in the region, have been shoved up against the wall.

The post-election political scene, confronted by the certainty that it must impose at least symbolic sanctions on Russia, will itself face three types of changes. President Vučić, as currently the only legal actor, will strive to ease the open external imbalance by reducing internal tensions and expressing a “readiness” for a controlled dialogue with the pro-European opposition, relying on its proverbial weakness and fragmentation. The sharing of responsibilities is becoming the government’s preferred scenario. Within the ruling party and the ruling coalition, those promoting anti-Western policies will be demoted to alternate positions, i.e., to practical invisibility. Sharp reciprocal confrontations in public, however, should not be expected.

The call for dialogue that’s in the national and state interest will practically create an additional division between realists and fundamentalists, particularly among the ranks of the opposition.

Among Serbia’s citizenry, following the further rise of existential fears, apathy and political cynicism, we will reach a more noticeable political reclassification and the quest for new political favourites. And this time around they won’t be infinitely trusted. THE POLICY OF MANOEUVRING BETWEEN THE INFLUENCES OF THE EU, U.S., RUSSIA AND CHINA, WHICH SERBIA HAS PROMOTED OVER THE PAST DECADE, IS NOW BEHIND US