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EUROPEAN ELECTIONS RIGHT, RIGHT, FRONTAL

Right, Right, Frontal

Among the many consequences of the pandemic, economic crisis and war in Ukraine for Europe is the rise of right-wing movements that challenge the sustaining of political centrism and traditional left-leaning parties. Do such changes serve to additionally complicate the managing of the European Union and push the Western Balkans into a neglected corner, where there is also the basis for the rise of the right?

What could far-right parties’ recent victories in Europe mean for the EU and the region? Are election results in Italy and Sweden an anomaly or a symptom of the rise of the far right across Europe – marking the resurgence of far-right parties running on platforms of anti-immigration and nationalism? These are questions being asked by intellectuals and the general public around the world. In this issue’s Focus, we asked our interlocutors to add their own concerns to these universal ones. Specifically, we asked them to ponder the potential repercussions that the rise of the extreme right in Europe could have on the EU itself, but also on our region. Here are the responses of experienced diplomats, political scientists and experts most familiar with political situations in Europe.

DUŠKO LOPANDIĆ

DIPLOMAT AND VICE PRESIDENT OF THE EUROPEAN MOVEMENT IN SERBIA

SHOOTING STARS

ALTHOUGH “THE CENTRE IS STILL HOLDING ON” IN EUROPE, WE ARE INCREASINGLY SEEING THE APPEARANCE ON THE POLITICAL SCENE OF INSTANT RIGHT-WING OR FAR-RIGHT MOVEMENTS, WHICH HAVE IDEOLOGIES BASED ON THE TOPICS OF IDENTITY, HISTORICAL NATIONALIST RESENTMENT AND ANTI-IMMIGRATION POLICIES

The recent victory of Giorgia Meloni, leader of the right-wing Brothers of Italy party, like the rise of the extreme right in Sweden, serves to illustrate several trends that have been evident in Western democracies over recent decades.

The basic trend relates to the falling influence of traditional parties and the increasingly common appearance of so-called “instant movements” that achieve success at lightning speed, which nonetheless doesn’t guarantee their longevity in power. This is typical of Italy in particular, where traditional party structures have long since vanished from the political scene (Christian Democrats, Communists etc.) and been replaced by various newer movements (such as the Five Star Movement, Northern League). However, a similar thing is happening in other European countries, from France (Macron and the “quasi-disappearance” of the socialist party and traditional adherents) to Slovenia, which has, so-to-say, ‘specialised’ in the frequent selecting of completely new people to head the government. Giorgia Meloni’s party won only four per cent of the vote in elections just four years ago, only to win the most votes this time around.

Another trend that’s linked to the previous one relates to the rise of populism – largely right-wing or far-right populism, based on topics of identity, historical nationalist resentment and anti-immigration policies - which has become one of the constants of political life in many countries, including the U.S. However, observing the European Union as a whole, the “centre” continues to hold on, as shown by the European Parliament election of 2019, as well as recent elections in France, Germany and elsewhere.

The political changes in Italy will undoubtedly impact the political “ship” of the European Union universally and cause it to list more markedly to the right, though not to the extent that this will have a fundamental impact on current European policies, which are primarily dominated by the issues of the war in Ukraine and its ramifications on the energy market and economies, as well as discussions of the possible reform of the EU, internal disputes over the rule of law (Poland, Hungary) and the like. The character (generally unstable) of the Italian coalition, Italy’s dependence on financial support from the EU, but also the pro-NATO orientation of PM Meloni, are all elements that will contribute to the new Italian government acting relatively more moderately in Brussels.

On the flip side, the departure of Prime Minister Draghi and the disappearance of the so-called Macron-Scholz-Draghi “troika” will make it difficult to reach possible agreement on essential reforms to the Union, and thus also to possibly impact positively on EU enlargement policy. Although Italy traditionally supports EU enlargement and the integration of the Western Balkan countries into the EU, it has long been predominantly burdened by internal political issues. Its influence on EU enlargement policy is therefore extremely limited and indirect, which will probably also be the case with the new Italian government. THE DEPARTURE OF PRIME MINISTER DRAGHI AND THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE SO-CALLED MACRON-SCHOLZ-DRAGHI “TROIKA” WILL MAKE IT DIFFICULT TO REACH POSSIBLE AGREEMENT ON ESSENTIAL REFORMS TO THE UNION, AND THUS ALSO TO POSSIBLY IMPACT POSITIVELY ON EU ENLARGEMENT POLICY

MILAN BLAGOJEVIĆ

RESEARCHER AT THE INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

THE RIGHT HAS DE-RADICALISED AND MOVED CLOSER TO THE POLITICAL MAINSTREAM

THE RISE OF THE RIGHT COULD CERTAINLY COMPLICATE DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES AT THE EU LEVEL, AND WE CAN ASSUME THAT THE CONSERVATIVE HUNGARIAN-POLISH BLOC WILL NOW BE LESS ISOLATED ON SOME ISSUES

Iwouldn’t say that the election success of the far right in these two states comes as a surprise. Sweden’s Sverigedemokraterna party entered the national parliament back in 2010, with 5.7% of the vote, and has been growing constantly since then, while the right has never ceased to remain relevant in Italy. The agenda of the election in Sweden, instead of socio-democratic themes of the environment and social justice, was dominated by the issues of crime and the energy crisis, which is precisely what the right owes its rise to. Anti-immigration sentiment has also long been present in Italy, where voters didn’t so much choose between left and right as between rival right-wing options. What is nonetheless interesting is how the far right successfully “rebranded” itself in both cases. Realising that its extreme stances would forever condemn it to the political margins, the far right has de-radicalised itself and moved closer to the political mainstream. Voting for such parties became less taboo as they became ever-more desirable coalition partners. Sweden’s Sverigedemokraterna party, which in 2006 changed its party logo to a more harmless flower symbol, won 20.5% of the vote, while the Brothers of Italy party, which distanced itself (at least nominally) from the neo-fascist Italian Social Movement that represents its roots, will – with 26% of votes – be the largest party in the parliament.

The rise of the right could certainly complicate decision-making processes at the EU level, and we can assume that the conservative Hungarian-Polish bloc will now be less isolated on some issues. Giorgia Meloni, for example, has allies in Spain’s Vox party, while the leader of Romania’s AUR openly expresses admiration for her. Importantly, as in the case of the 2016 U.S. elections, the success of the right can be interpreted as the revenge of the “little man” and a signal to European bureaucrats and liberal elites that ignoring him will create a vindictive and bitter electorate that will benefit populist parties.

When it comes to the Western Balkans, I would dare to claim that it’s irrelevant whether the EU is dominated by Eurooptimistic or Eurosceptic forces. With further expansion, the EU becomes increasingly difficult to manage, and individual experts point out that this has troubled the Union since 2004. Best testifying to enlargement fatigue is the statement of French President Macron – “if it isn’t functional with 28 members, how do you think it will function with 33 or 34 members?” European politicians simply don’t know what to do with this region, and it seems that their best strategy for now is to postpone the decision until some unspecified future juncture. The only difference I see is that Eurosceptic governments would be more honest and open about their unwillingness to expand further. WHEN IT COMES TO THE WESTERN BALKANS, I WOULD DARE TO CLAIM THAT IT’S IRRELEVANT WHETHER THE EU IS DOMINATED BY EUROOPTIMISTIC OR EUROSCEPTIC FORCES… THE ONLY DIFFERENCE I SEE IS THAT EUROSCEPTIC GOVERNMENTS WOULD BE MORE HONEST AND OPEN ABOUT THEIR UNWILLINGNESS TO EXPAND FURTHER

ZORAN MILIVOJEVIĆ

CAREER DIPLOMAT AND ASSOCIATE OF THE CENTRE FOR STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVES

END OF THE LEFT’S DOMINANCE IN EUROPE

THE SHADOW OF UKRAINE, WITH ALL THE ALREADY-EVIDENT RAMIFICATIONS ON THE SITUATION AND EFFECTS IN EUROPE, CERTAINLY PROVIDES NEW MOTIVATION FOR THE RIGHT, WHICH IN THE PERIOD AHEAD WILL BE TANGIBLY EXPRESSED IN VARIOUS SPHERES, FROM GEOPOLITICS TO CULTURE

The most recent major success of the left in Europe was achieved a year ago, with the victory in Germany of the socalled “Traffic light coalition” of the Social Democratic Party, the Greens and the Free Democratic Party. After that, in the first half of this year, the right-wing Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Alliance won Hungarian elections convincingly. Poland’s ruling Law and Justice [Prawo i Sprawiedliwość] Party consolidated its ruling position, while in early autumn Sweden’s rightwing Sverigedemokraterna ‘democrats’, followed by Italy’s right-wing coalition, achieved victories and created the conditions to snatch power from the previously ruling left in those countries. This year’s breakthrough of the right marked, in a certain way in a political sense, the end of the left’s dominance in Europe. The reasons for the rise of the right in Europe are multidimensional in every sense. However, there are predominantly four reasons that, in my opinion, encouraged this breakthrough significantly and made it possible.

First and foremost, the pandemic – with its economic and socio-psychological effects and consequences – raised the role of state and parastate mechanisms significantly, and – alongside the important absence of solidarity – created a favourable environment for ideologically right-wing political trends on Europe’s political scene. This applies in particular to sovereignty movements, which are opposed to neoliberal left tendencies in the European political milieu. That process has not yet ended, while the shadow of the pandemic, with its consequences and possible effects, continues to hover over everything.

Furthermore, the socioeconomic consequences of the 2008-2009 Eurozone crisis have not yet been fully alleviated. Greece has only just emerged from the fiscal control regime. This situation, combined with the effects of the pandemic, continues to have effects in that area, impacting on the strengthening of sovereignty tendencies.

Subsequently, there is the migrant crisis, the consequences of which – dating back to 2015 - have still not been overcome in the political and socioeconomic sense, and a consistent policy at the EU level has not been fully defined, let alone implemented. On the contrary – there are threats of a new wave, the political climate is sharpening, and radical tendencies, among them rightwing ones – including negative tendencies like xenophobia - are objectively growing. They include national tendencies in the positive understanding, but also nationalist ones in the negative understanding of the state of growth, which favours the right. If this new wave comes to life, which is more realistic than uncertain, it will strengthen right-wing tendencies and political movements at the level of the EU and Europe as a whole. It will further deepen the problem of immigration policy and the functioning of the EU, as well as social animosity across the continent. In this context, movements based on the model of the Swedish and Italian experience are assured. THE WAR IN UKRAINE PRODUCED ANOTHER CRISIS: THE CRISIS OF THE ROLE AND IDENTITY OF THE EU IN THE EUROPEAN AND GLOBAL CONTEXT. SPECIFICALLY, FULL DEFERENCE TO THE U.S. AND THE ABSENCE OF THE CREDIBLE POSITIONING OF BRUSSELS/ EU ON A TOPIC OF PAN-EUROPEAN INTEREST, AND WITH CONSEQUENCES THAT EUROPE IS ALREADY FEELING DIRECTLY IN TERMS OF THE GENERAL ECONOMY, ENERGY, STANDARDS, SOCIAL SITUATION ETC., HAS A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT ALONG THE ROUTE BETWEEN THE CENTRE/BRUSSELS AND MEMBER COUNTRIES

To conclude, with the tectonic changes on the European geopolitical scene following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24th February, extremely realistic conditions for this trend of the rise of the right to continue were created, for the simple reason that the national theme and interest in the sharpened international situation, such as the current war in Ukraine, undoubtedly favour them coming to fruition as a matter of priority. Among other things, if there is a direct cause-and-effect relationship between the war in Ukraine, i.e., on the territory of Europe itself, and the strengthening of the right, then this is confirmed unequivocally by the victories of the right in Sweden and Italy. Quite simply, a crisis of this type in the neighbourhood, as a rule, THE WESTERN BALKANS ARE ALREADY SUFmobilises national corps and favours right-wing sovereignty op- FERING ALL THE CONSEQUENCES OF CURRENT tions. The war in Ukraine produced, among other things, another crisis: the crisis of the role and identity of the EU in the European and global context. Specifically, full deference to the U.S. and the absence of the credible positioning of Brussels/EU on a topic of EVENTS, DUE PRIMARILY TO THE REGION’S DOMINANT INTERDEPENDENCE WITH THE EU, IN A POLITICAL, SOCIOECONOMIC, SECURITY AND pan-European interest, and with consequences that Europe is EVERY OTHER SENSE. IN THAT CONTEXT, THE already feeling directly in terms of the general economy, energy, standards, social situation etc., has a significant impact on the RISE OF THE RIGHT SEEMS INEVITABLE TO ME political environment along the route between the centre/Brussels and member countries. There is an obvious increase in resistance to the centre/Brussels, due to the policy regarding the war and its consequences, which objectively strengthens the sovereignty tendencies at the foundations of the EU. The shadow of Ukraine, with all the already-evident ramifications on the situation and effects in Europe, certainly provides new motivation for the right, which in the period ahead will be tangibly expressed in various spheres, from geopolitics to culture, education and those domains that touch the very social roots and national interests of individual players on European soil.

The Western Balkans are already suffering all the consequences of current events, due primarily to the region’s dominant interdependence with the EU, in a political, socioeconomic, security and every other sense. In that context, the rise of the right seems inevitable to me. To what extent and with what connotations will also depend to a large extent on the effects of the aforementioned interdependence, but also on the pace and scope of development and the consequences of the current crises. It is already indisputable that national and sovereignty tendencies are growing visibly, and it should be noted in conclusion, to provide an objective picture, that the left in our region isn’t immune to this either.

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