Year Of Turmoil

It would be tough to expect the anti-Vučić, pro-Putin Right and the liberal, pro-Western opposition to be able to form a functional alliance to oppose Vučić. This is in stark contrast to the 1990s, when it was possible for the right and civic Serbia to form an alliance against Milošević because the then right-wing opposition was pro-Western. A pro-Western right is today the commodity in shortest supply on the Serbian political market of synergy to a higher level, it would be tough to expect the anti-Vučić, pro-Putin Right and the liberal, pro-Western opposition to be able to form a functional alliance to oppose Vučić. This is in stark contrast to the 1990s, when it was possible for the right and civic Serbia to form an alliance against Milošević because the right-wing opposition was pro-Western. A pro-Western right is today the commodity in shortest supply on the Serbian political market. And that space can only be filled by Vučić, if he wants or must. It seems somewhat tragicomic when Serbian supporters

Vučić’s influence over political gravity on the quantum vacuum of Serbia’s multiparty system could, in the best-case scenario, redefine and strengthen the politics of the centre in Serbia, even if that would be forced and fake of the cult of Vladimir Putin attack Vučić for trampling all over democracy, just as liberals and leftists in Serbia who criticise the West and NATO can only serve as Putin’s useful idiots.

Despite having improved his rating with the creating of the cult of Putin, today Vučić has no need of his image as “little Putin” because that suggests he holds a puppet position and opens up Vučić’s “soft underbelly” of the Serbia of the ‘90s, which is used by Albin Kurti in particular. However, emancipating Vučić from Putin is a de- manding job, even for a technician of government and public opinion like the Serbian president. And that would be the most important loyalty test for the members of Vučić’s Serbian Progressive Party. That’s because, according to Demostat’s research, introducing sanctions against Russia would likely lead to even larger demonstrations against Vučić than any Vučić action implying his acceptance of the West’s plan for Kosovo.

The turbulent parliamentary session on Kosovo and the demonstrations of the right held on Serbian Statehood Day additionally shifted the political panorama and atmosphere. And the question of the pro-Western part of the opposition that must become inclusive for SNS is whether Vučić still sees Serbia in the West. Would another pro-Russian election campaign by Dačić be convincing? Despite media brutally warning Dačić and his Socialist Party of Serbia that they aren’t sufficiently loyal, and the stoic response to their helplessness, it is hard to imagine a new Vučić coalition and a pro-Western partner for SNS if SPS is no longer there. Because there would be no unity whatsoever without them.

Vučić’s influence over political gravity on the quantum vacuum of Serbia’s multiparty system could, in the best-case scenario, redefine and strengthen the politics of the centre in Serbia, even if that would be forced and fake. If elections are held in Serbia this year, that certainly won’t only be Belgrade local elections, as Vučić promised Đilas. And even if they were only local Belgrade elections, there would still be more election talk about the imposing of sanctions against Russia and the situation regarding Kosovo than about the relocating of the city’s zoo.

MARIYA GABRIEL

EUROPEAN COMMISSIONER FOR INNOVATION, RESEARCH, CULTURE, EDUCATION AND YOUTH