CIAS Digest 2016 Volume 1 No.2

Cornell International Affairs Society Monthly Digest

April

2016

Volume 1 Number 2

A publication by the Cornell International Affairs Society

2 Table of Contents • The Need for Greater Missile Defense in East Asia Cris Lee, response by Joshua Mensah

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• Model United Nations Travel Team Spotlight

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• Beyond Brexit: The Failure of European Integration

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• CIAS Internship Spotlight

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• Why the U.S. Must Increase Aid to Combat Boko Haram

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• Last Month in CIAS

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Walter Rose

Marc Masson, response from Michelle de Leon

Joshuah Mensah

Emmanual Nimarko, response from Tanisha Mahopatra

Catherine Hwang

• A Case Against Impeachment – Removing Dilma Will Not Solve Brazil’s Corruption Problem 21 Alison Schonberg, response from Christopher Arce

• On Authenticity: How Model UN Helped Me Launch a Business, Quit my Job, and Fight for Better Meril Pothen

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3 The Need for Greater Missile Defense in East Asia Cris Lee ‘17, cl2272@cornell.edu The question of whether the current US missile defense posture is adequate in the Asia Pacific has been a lingering question in the minds of the United States policy makers.

During a recent hearing in Washington, DC, Pacific Command (PACOM) Commander Admiral Harry Harris noted the problem of North Korea and the increasingly provocative demeanor of China in his new plan to bolster the defensive position of both the US and its allies in the Pacific Rim.1 Besides Adm Harris, many have made the argument that the United States should expand the political and economic reach of its current efforts to arm American partners and allies. In the midst of rising tensions, there has been a current of reluctance in South Korea regarding the THAAD missiles, ground-based anti missile defense systems, claiming that the THAADs could cause greater danger by provoking Chinese fears. Indeed, Chinese officials have voiced their concerns by summoning the South Korean ambassador to Beijing and making it clear that China considered the move to be an unnecessary demonstration of US influence in South Korea.2 Even so, it is imperative that the United States deploys the systems if it hopes to reaffirm its commitment to its East Asian allies, and to prevent tensions from deteriorating even further.

There is merit to the criticisms given to the systems deployment. South Korea and China are going through a series of events that lead towards a rapprochement, admittedly due to the economic ties South Korea maintains with its neighbor. Gestures of friendship included Chinese President Xi’s visit to Seoul and a reciprocating visit, but North Korean provocations left much to be desired from the Chinese by the South Koreans.3 North Korea seems to be acting with impunity, which in turn suggests that China’s influence over the pariah state is limited.

The rise of North Korea’s missile activity is indicative of a regime that is seeking more leverage in negotiations. These patterns where seen during the rule of former leader Kim Jong Il, but since his son Kim Jong Un assumed power in 2012 the semantics of the North Korean relations with the outside world have changed drastically. China, North Korea’s major partner,

Eckstein, Megan. "Harris: PACOM Needs More Subs, Long-Range Missiles To Counter Chinese Threats - USNI News." USNI News. USNi, 23 Feb. 2016. Web. 08 Apr. 2016.

2 Ryall, Julian. "China Protests over South Korea's Plan for US Missile Defences." The Telegraph. Telegraph Media Group, n.d. Web. 08 Apr. 2016.

3 Brunnstorm, David. "China Must See Missile Defense Is 'live or Die' for South Korea: Seoul Official." Reuters. Thomson Reuters, 18 Apr. 2016. Web. 18 Apr. 2016.

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4 has signaled its dissatisfaction with North Korean policy, most noticeable when China did not invite North Korea to its victory parade while inviting South Korean leader Park Geun Hye.4 The diplomatic isolation that North Korea has faced due to a drastic change in Chinese policy seems to have resulted in more desperate tactics by North Korea aimed at maintaining leverage in international relations and seeking assistance from other states that are also economically isolated. Saber rattling against South Korea, including new personal insults directed against the South Korean leader, all point to an attempt by North Korea to signal its commitment to its own defense.5 The new North Korean disposition has been a continuing trait since the ascension of Kim Jung Un, but the new semi-bullying policy cannot be allowed to pass.

The understanding that North Korea is the primary destabilizing force, and that the priorities of several East Asian states are predicated on North Korean action, shows that the United States needs to demonstrate to its allies that treaty and rhetoric will be backed up by actual force. Failing to do so would result in a form of panic in Japan and South that may further the tensions in East Asia. In what was probably one of the most notable moments of US weakness in the region, the Nixon doctrine and the departure from Vietnam, South Korea and Japan had begun their respective efforts to acquire nuclear weapons.6 The crisis was averted with increased U.S. affirmations in exchange for Japan and South Korea’s forfeiture of nuclear programs. The prospect of South Korea and Japan obtaining nuclear weapons is still a reality, as both states have the capacity to acquire such weapons. The use of missile defense systems would provide evidence for the two states that the United States is not going to abandon its allies in the West Pacific. In turn, the affirmation seen through the deployment of the THAAD will dissuade South Korea or Japan from adopting defensive postures that would be seen as more provocative.

Additional missile defense is not only an investment for the security of East Asia, but also for the Continental United States. While in the early 2010s North Korean missiles were not

Tiezzi, Shannon. "South Korea's President and China's Military Parade."The Diplomat. The Diplomat, 03 Sept. 2015. Web. 18 Apr. 2016.

5 Foster-Carter, Aidan. "North Korean Rhetoric Has Reached New Heights – and the World Is Losing Patience | Aidan Foster-Carter." The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, 23 Mar. 2016. Web. 08 Apr. 2016.

6 Iglauer, Philip. "Nuclear Weapons for South Korea." The Diplomat. The Diplomat, n.d. Web. 08 Apr. 2016.

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5 capable of striking the continental United States, the new Taepodong-2 models are expected to be.7 This eventuality was predicted by US intelligence as early as 1999.8 At present, North Korea continues to struggle with missile technology.9 Even so, the need for a preemptive installation of a working missile system is crucial. With an Anti-Ballistic Missile System that is still not adequate to defend the United States, the idea of sending missile defense abroad may not seem in the interests of the United States.10 However, the use of early warning systems in South Korea and Japan are capable of notifying the US of the possibility of attack from North Korea earlier than any other counterpart the US has in its disposal due to geographic proximity.11 The capacity to identify and target any projectile is distinctly in US interests as they provide the early warning systems that the United States may lack.

Missile defense acts as the decisive counter to the potential of a security dilemma as it acts as a defensive machine, rather than an offensive deterrent. The services that the missiles’ deployment gives to the United States is also a substantial bonus to strengthen the position of the United States and its allies in a troubled region. Despite what some may say, it seems that the missile deployment would be an overall benefit for the region as defensive deterrents.

"North Korea's Missile Programme - BBC News." BBC News. BBC, n.d. Web. 08 Apr. 2016.

"Fact Sheets & Briefs." Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy. Arms Control Association, Web. 08 Apr. 2016.

9 Fifield, Anna. "North Korea's Missile Launch Has Failed, South's Military Says." Washington Post. The Washington Post, 15 Apr. 2016. Web. 18 Apr. 2016.

10 "Fact Sheets & Briefs." U.S. Missile Defense Programs at a Glance. Arms Control Association, n.d. Web. 08 Apr. 2016.

11 Montague, Karen. "A Review of South Korean Missile Defense Programs." George C. Marshall Institute Policy Outlook (n.d.): n. pag. George C. Marshall Institute. George C. Marshall Institute. Web. 7 8

6 Response: The Need for Greater Missile Defense in East Asia Joshua Mensah ‘18, jam836@cornell.edu The author makes a case for increased involvement in East Asia in the form of military deterrence. Between the analysis of North Korea motivations and increasing security threats to the U.S. and East Asian allies, missile defense may have worth in checking tensions in East Asia.

The author's self admission of Chinese objections, as well as alternative options of East Asian involvement in the form of political and economic pressure deserve further consideration however. A missile defense system could risk blow-back from North Korea, and perhaps even China if they perceive U.S. action as an offensive threat. The missile defense system does not end disagreements as effectively as it deters aggression. Political and economic action will one day be needed in order to ensure long term security between all East Asian states and the United States.

Model United Nations Travel Team Spotlight Walter Rose ‘19, wsr46@cornell.edu TJ Ball is currently a freshman in the College of Arts and Sciences studying government. TJ is new to the Cornell International Affairs Society but has attended conferences such as PicSim at Princeton University and won an honorable mention. Here’s what he had to say about his experience on the travel team and experience with CIAS thus far:

Q: How long have you done Model UN and how did you originally get involved?

A: I've been doing Model UN since freshman year of high school. I first got involved with our county conference's organizational committee and later started attending conferences as a delegate as my passion for international affairs and global issues grew.

Q: What is your favorite aspect of Model UN? And what is best part of being on the Model UN team at Cornell?

A: What I enjoy most about Model UN is getting to look at controversial and complex issues from a variety of perspectives to develop a thorough understanding of the different cultural

7 factors that affect conflict resolution. I love being on the MUN team at Cornell because everyone shares my passion for learning about foreign cultures, and on top of that everyone is super fun, friendly, and easy to get along with!

Marc Masson is currently a junior in the College of Industrial and Labor Relations. He has been heavily involved in the Cornell International Affairs Society, representing Cornell at traveling Model United Nations Conferences, chairing and staffing both CMUNC and CIAS as well as serving on the executive board as Vice President of Public Relations last year. After attending PicSim, here’s what he had to say about his experience with CIAS and the travel team so far: Q: What do you think it takes to be a successful delegate at a Model UN conference?

A: To be successful at a conference, it takes a combination of preparation and perseverance.

Though some delegates might simply look up the Wikipedia page for their character or country before the conference, this is rarely enough to shine in committee. You have to know what your character/country would do, who in committee they would work with, how they would interact with the committee and the outside world, etc. The preparation you gain through researching your character/country and your topic before the conference is essential for leading discussion in committee, or controlling the mayhem if you’re in a crisis committee. As for the perseverance, you need to keep participating to your full capacity in the committee, even when it looks unlikely you’ll get an award or the debate has drifted away from your preferred topic.

You can always turn the situation to your advantage, bring your own idea to the table, and reshape the debate going on in the committee – just don’t give up.

Q: If you had to convince someone to do Model UN, what would you tell them?

A: I would tell them about how it’s a group of friends who share your interests and aren’t afraid to be a little nerdy at times. I would tell them about how much fun we have both on-campus and at conferences. I would also tell them about how exciting committee can be, whether you’re representing an editor for Buzzfeed in a struggle for dominance against the New York Times or the President of Bangladesh fighting for his country’s independence. Finally, I would tell them that you get as much out of MUN as you are prepared to put in – there are no commitments for you to do anything, but you’ll probably end up doing a lot simply because you enjoy it so much!

8 Beyond Brexit: The Failure of European Integration Marc Masson ‘17, mjm673@cornell.edu The debates around European integration may appear, at first glance, to be limited to the decisions of European Union (EU) national governments on whether or not to abandon some of their sovereignty to a supra-national EU governing body. This has most recently been politicized by the upcoming referendum in the United Kingdom that may lead to the island nation becoming the first to leave the European Union. Talks between Greece and its European creditors have also gotten a lot of spotlight, with EU leaders intervening in the negotiations taking place to avoid a Greek exit from the Eurozone. However, European integration is much more than the interactions among EU state leaders and European institutions – it’s how actors, both from state and civil society, interact with EU institutions to accomplish their goals. The reason why the European Union still appears more as a collection of countries rather than as a unified political entity, despite decades of work towards an ever closer union, is that its institutions function as technocratic administrators of the union rather than as representatives of European society as a whole.

Amandine Crespy and Mathieu Petithomme, in their book L’Europe Sous Tensions (2009), effectively demonstrate the full complexity of European integration. Through surveys, they find that the European Union appears as a distant political entity to many. Issues relating to the European Union are often ‘internalized’ into national debates by the media, national political parties, and heads of state.12 Additionally, the current strategy of European institutions to ‘sell’ a European civic culture by incentivizing the Europeanization of national civil society organizations appears ineffective. Even when civil society organizations rely on European Union funding or legislative action to support their activities, these resources are likely to be appropriated to support national rather than European objectives.13 Furthermore, the lack of appropriation of the European Union by the average citizen is the most obvious, as many feel unqualified to have an opinion on it, ignore the impact its presence has on their everyday lives, and consider it an immutable reality in their lives. The European Union appears as an institution belonging to qualified elites, not to the average EU citizen.14 The ideal of citizens appropriating the European project is far from realization, and the efforts that European

12

Crespy, A. and M. Petithomme (eds.). 2009. L'Europe sous tensions: appropriation et contestation de l'intégration européenne. Paris: Harmattan. P. 82.

13 Ibid. P. 57.

14 Ibid. P. 128.

9 institutions have put in place to encourage the appropriation of a European identity have proven to be ineffective, if not half-hearted.

The authors go on to point out that contestation within the European Union framework is ineffective for both European opposition parties and in most cases for European civil society organizations. Specifically, they highlight the inability of opposition parties within the European Parliament to articulate alternatives to the policies of the majority: ‘la dynamique gouvernement-opposition reste faible, ne leur permettant pas de se développer en une opposition parlementaire classique’.15 This is the case partly because national political parties often fail to relay debates at the EU level to national audiences. Even in the cases where these debates are relayed, they are framed in a national perspective rather than an EU perspective. On the other hand, this part also describes how coalitions of civil society organizations can lead successful opposition campaigns against EU policy proposals in cooperation with EU parliamentarians. This was the case in 2005, when labor union and the alter-globalist left succesfully pushed for a revision of the proposed EU Commission proposal to allow for a single market for services, otherwise known as the Bolkestein Directive, because they claimed it would foster an intra-EU race to the bottom in wages.16 Yet, the effectiveness of this framework for contestation relies on the cohesion of the non-institutionalized networks that are formed between actors in different EU countries. This cohesion is in jeopardy when a cross-national consensus can’t be reached, as when ATTAC (Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions and Aid to Citizens) France was not able build on its momentum to propose an alternative policy solution after successfully leading an EU-wide campaign against the proposed EU constitution. Its allies in other EU countries were sympathetic of ATTAC France’s goal, but national objectives took priority for them as a result of their nationally-concentrated membership and the often national scope of their activities. The benefit portion of the costbenefit analysis that is made by every member of a civil society coalition is made difficult of appreciate because of the uncertain national-level benefits of EU-level actions. As a result, the coalition broke up over the diverging priorities of other European ATTACs, and lost much of its ability to influence EU policy.17 The overarching argument that Crespy and Petithomme articulate is that the European Union is prey to complex dynamics of appropriation and contestation by a variety of civil society and political actors. Additionally, its controversy is not limited to its borders and extends into

15

Ibid. P. 192.

Ibid. P. 169.

17 Ibid. P. 153.

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10 neighboring countries to shape their internal political debates. Yet, as the authors point out, while the financial and institutional resources of the EU are often appropriated by unions and civil society organizations to serve their needs and those of their constituents’, ‘l’appropriation de l’Europe demeure aussi partielle que partiale’,18 its functioning is criticized by these social actors, as well as opposition members of the European Parliament, for limiting the ability of European society to have a voice in policy discussions at the European level. They contest the ‘elitist’ vision of EU governance espoused by Jean Monnet, one of the EU’s key founders, which saw citizen participation as secondary to effective supranational European governance.19 The general sense of disenfranchisement among European citizens in regards to the European governance structures supports this position and suggests that the European Union must earnestly democratize or remain a foreign political entity for many of its citizens.20 L’Europe Sous Tensions provides empirical support for the assertions of many civil society organizations, unions, and EU politicians today: there is a need for increased democratization within the EU governance framework if social integration of European civil society is to be realized. This need has become obvious in the context of the mass demonstrations that have recently occurred across Europe, with EU citizens rallying against the austerity policies prescribed by the European political elites. Labor unions have also been increasingly vocal in their criticism of the liberal economic policies being pushed the European Union and have targeted the European Parliament in the past to ensure that their voice is heard.21 Meanwhile, the strengthening of the European Commission’s ability to intervene in the affairs of member states raises the stakes for citizen control of the European Union governance institutions. In an unprecedented attack on the sovereignty of national governments, the European Commission has been given the power to impose fines of 0.1% to 0.2% of GDP on national governments for not following its policy prescriptions in regards to deficit reduction.22 These new developments are part of the EU’s ‘silent revolution’, as described by EU Commission President Barroso, which is leading to a much greater regulative control by the European Union over its member states’ economic policies.23 Despite the activities of the European Commission being increasingly thrown into the spotlight, the European Union has in fact become more 18

Ibid. P. 325.

Ibid. P. 219.

20 Ibid. P. 129.

21 Erne, R. 2008. European Unions: Labor’s Quest for a Transnational Democracy. Ithaca, N.Y.: ILR Press (an imprint of Cornell University Press). P. 188.

22 European Commission. 2015. 'The EU's Economic Governance Explained'. Europa.eu. Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-979_en.htm.

23 Phillips, Leigh. 2011. 'EU Ushers In 'Silent Revolution' In Control Of National Economic Policies'.

Euobserver.com.

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11 technocratic and autonomous, rather than more democratic and receptive to the concerns of European civil society. As Europe remains the subject of contestation by a variety of social movements and reformist political groups, as well as of renewed appropriation by labor unions and civil society to curb the increasingly liberal and technocratic nature of the European governance structure, Crespy and Petithomme’s book is still as relevant today as it was in 2009.

Response: Beyond Brexit Michelle deLeon ‘18, mad354@cornell.edu This article clearly highlights the European Union’s struggle to establish a unified political body. To add, a closer EU would need to encourage, not just allow, the free movement of people so European citizens are more exposed to perspectives from other European countries; mixed perspectives encourage dialogue and action that innovate necessary, crosscultural solutions. In the face of international crises which challenge each country’s unique identity, how will the EU adapt its framework to be representative of Europe as a whole, instead of technocratic administrators?

12 Internship Spotlight Joshua Mensah ’18, jam836@cornell.edu Matt Mcgee is a Junior in the College of Arts and Sciences studying China and Asia-Pacific Studies and Government, with a special focus on US Military and foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific region. Matt has been invovled with CIAS since his freshman year and has chaired committes for both CIAC and CMUNC as well as currently serve as Director of Conference Development for CMUNC 2016. Last fall, he completed an internship with the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington D.C., which was coupled with an enrollment in the Cornell in Washington Program. Here’s what he had to say about his experience:

Finding the Internship Q: Considering your academic interests, how did you select your internship?

A: I applied to every interesting Asia-related internship I could find on the internet. Out of the offers I got, AMTI was definitely the best one, so that's what I chose. AMTI, as the name suggests, does a lot of work with Asia maritime issues, so I was researching a lot of military and diplomatic disputes, which fits perfectly with my academic interests.

Q: What was your application process like?

A: From what I can remember, there was a form on the CSIS website where I entered some basic information, and then I attached my cover letter and resume. A week or so after I submitted my application I got an email to set up an interview with the program director. It was all very relaxed, and the interview was mainly just discussing different parts of my resume. Over the next few days the director asked me to send her a few writing samples, and then she told me I got the job.

Q: How can someone prepare for applying to this internship?

A: AMTI looks for people with strong academic credentials and a proven interest in the AsiaPacific. Before applying I would recommend having spent at least a semester studying in China, and have strong Chinese language skills. Having an extensive academic background in Asia, particularly China, is probably the most important thing. Publishing several articles would also be very useful, as would having experience with website design and formatting.

13 The Internship Q: Describe your internship?

A: I interned with the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a prominent Washington think tank [located on Rhode Island Avenue in Dupont Circle]. I started July 1 and I actually stayed until midDecember when my semester at Cornell in Washington ended. CSIS, like most think tanks in general, helps create and inform policy on a range of issues. For example, projects I worked on at AMTI have been mentioned by prominent government officials, and have been cited in articles in just about every major international newspaper. Most of the work involved land reclamation in the South China Sea. Some of the major projects I worked on involved the Philippine arbitration case against China in the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague, the airpower capabilities of different countries who have disputes in the South China Sea, and the organizational structure for the different Chinese maritime policymaking bodies.

Q: How did you feel CIAS prepared for the internship?

A: CIAS helped me create an informed opinion on a number of topics that came up during my time at CSIS. Since I was one of only 3 undergraduate interns in CSIS, knowing people from CIAS interning in DC also helped me have a friend group while I was there.

Living in Washington Q: How did you find housing for your internship?

A: I procrastinated in looking for housing, so I lived at American University. I would recommend living at George Washington University or subletting if you intern in DC over the summer. During the fall semester I lived in the CIW building Q: Where did you go to eat during your internship?

A: I'm pretty frugal, so I packed my lunch almost every day. CSIS also lets staff eat all of the food leftover from events, which was always a nice snack (or lunch depending on how popular the event was). On the days I did go out, there are tons of good restaurants in the area. The three places I went to the most are Jack's Fresh, which is a self-serve restaurant on Rhode Island Ave; Triple B Fresh, which is a Korean restaurant on Dupont Circle; and Rasoi Indian Kitchen, which is on K Street and has a really good lunch buffet.

14 Why the U.S. Must Increase Aid to Combat Boko Haram Emmanual Nimarko ‘19, en249@cornell.edu The United States’ foreign policy regarding the Nigerian terrorist organization Boko Haram must be fully re-assessed in order to successfully help abate the rise of the radical group. Even after a massive social media campaign in the U.S. following Boko Haram’s capture of 209 Chibok schoolgirls led to the popular hashtag “BringBackOurGirls”, the U.S. still didn’t move towards effective and decisive action against Boko Haram. This lack of action was criticized by the former American ambassador to Nigeria, John Campbell who stated that: “The United States cannot be indifferent.”1 The U.S. government’s response has so far been limited to providing the Nigerian government with intelligence, and allocating $45 million of aid for military training that is shared between Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, Niger and Benin.24 The U.S. has also provided intelligence and this lackadaisical response to such a massive human rights violation illustrates the general lack of effective U.S. policy towards African conflicts. After a massive social media campaign in the U.S. following Boko Haram’s capture of 209 Chibok schoolgirls characterized by the hashtag “BringBackOurGirls”, the U.S. still didn’t move towards effective and decisive action against Boko Haram. This lack of action was criticized by the former American ambassador to Nigeria, John Campbell who stated that: “The United States cannot be indifferent.”24 This article will discuss the reasons cited for this surprising lack of involvement, why those reasons fail to stand up to scrutiny and why increasing military aid is in the best interest of America for obtaining its foreign policy objectives.

In order to understand why intervention will be useful, one has to understand the origins and sharp rise of Boko Haram. In the early 1980’s, the Maitatsine movement was spurred by the political and religious rhetoric of Muhammadu Marwa whose polemic sermons against the West caused him to obtain a rather large following, creating the origins of what we call today Boko Haram.25 The name itself illustrates a pejorative for secular values and can be figuratively translated to “Western education is a sin.”26 Boko Haram and the Maitatsine movement both resented the secular Nigerian government and acted on this resentment with outbreaks of violence. To appeal to the majority Muslim population of northeastern Nigeria, the government allowed the introduction of Sharia law in twelve northern Nigerian states in 1999.27 This policy only quelled the violent protests for a little while. By 2003, Boko Haram had formally developed into a terrorist group whose official aims were to purge Nigeria of western influence and http://www.cfr.org/nigeria/us-policy-counter-nigerias-boko-haram/p33806 http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/archives/asb/ASB-20.pdf 26 http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-magazine-monitor-27390954 27 http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/archives/asb/ASB-20.pdf 24 25

15 pursue a jihad, or holy war, against the West. The group suffered a massive loss on July 26, 2009 when its leader was captured and most of its forces were killed in a security raid on their hideout.

Boko Haram has come back in the public eye for many reasons. In 2010, Al Qaeda provided what was left of the group with weapons and training to revitalize the group and continue their jihad. Boko Haram then found a new leader in Abubakar bin Muhammad Shekau who formally proclaimed this jihad against the western influences in Nigeria and systematically freed hundreds of its people who were in prison the following year.28 Boko Haram now had the resources, people, and weapons to covertly carry out its mission. In the following months, the group played a role in numerous IED explosions in northern Nigeria that left hundreds dead and countless more injured. Throughout all of this, the U.S. still didn’t have Boko Haram on its list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Boko Haram continued to increase its scope of operations, especially following the mysterious death of Muslim Nigerian president Umary Musa Yar’Adua and the decision of his Christian successor Goodluck Jonathan to run in 2011.

They utilized their first suicide bomber in 2011 in the Federal capital of Abuja which only briefly caught the attention of Western media. This was a major milestone is Boko Haram’s operations because they now targeted government and places associated with the West; most of their prior attacks targeted places that served alcohol and churches. Throughout this massive escalation, the West still had not been put on notice. Boko Haram finally literally lived out its name by attacking UN offices in Abuja in 2011. This brutal attack instantly killed 25 people and injured 80 more.29 After this attack, the West still didn’t go forward with strong action.

Currently, Boko Haram has pledged allegiance to ISIS, greatly increasing the potential terror the group can cause through increased resources and legitimacy.30 Boko Haram has actually overtaken ISIS as the world’s deadliest terror group by killing over 11,000 people in 2015.31 The group can no longer be depicted as a lowly group of Islamic extremists but rather needs to be viewed as highly tactical group capable of causing a tremendous amount of destruction and unrest.

Many reasons have been cited as to the lack of U.S. involvement in resolving the crisis. Firstly, many argue that there are other areas of the world the United States needs to focus on before

http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/archives/asb/ASB-20.pdf http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/archives/asb/ASB-20.pdf 30 http://www.cnn.com/2015/03/12/middleeast/isis-boko-haram/ 31http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/2015-year-in-review/isis-owns-headlines-nigeria-s-boko-haramkills-more-ever-n480986 28 29

16 addressing Boko Haram. Although this could be the case, Boko Haram is still violating human rights and committing barbaric acts of terror day by day. According to the Pew Research Center, 82% of Nigerians, Christians and Muslim alike “detest” Boko Haram and over 72% see it as one of the most pressing issues in their region.32 The West, in particular the United States, has always expressed regret for a lack of intervention in the Rwandan genocide. The West, in particular the United States, has always expressed regret for a lack of intervention in the Rwandan genocide. Although it can be argued that Boko Haram hasn’t reached that level of extremism yet, it is imperative for the United States to increase its aid and intelligence-sharing to provide a strong counter movement to this clear breach of human rights. Regret of former inaction means nothing if it is going to be repeated in another time of urgent need.

Another reason that has been cited for a lack of U.S. involvement is corruption in Nigeria. The lack of transparency in the Nigerian government’s handling of foreign funds could be stated as a reason for reduced aid.33 However, the U.S. citing this as a valid reason is hypocritical and nonsensical, considering it has supported some of the most brutal and corrupt African regimes in the past. The United States supported brutal Congolese dictator Mobutu Sese Seko who amassed a gargantuan amount of personal wealth in office and brutally repressed political opposition while perpetuating a cycle of crippling poverty among his own people.34 Today, the United States supports President Teodoro Obiang of Equatorial Guinea who remains one of the most corrupt rulers in the world today and has declared himself a living god.35 The United States cannot support a corrupt and brutal regime while restricting help against those trying to fight human rights.

Although Nigeria’s corruption cannot be excused, it should not be reason for a lack of meaningful action against Boko Haram. There are many policy options the U.S. can implement to deter and ultimately destroy Boko Haram, such as putting boots on the ground in Nigeria and increasing monetary and military aid to the Nigerian government to help combat Boko Haram.The United States does not need to put boots on the ground against Boko Haram but rather implement a policy involving increased aid to the Nigerian military through training, weapons, and intelligence.

http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/03/24/as-nigerians-head-to-the-polls-6-facts-about-publicopinion/ 33 http://gga.org/publications/africa-in-fact-april-2013-foreign-aid 34 http://articles.philly.com/1991-10-30/news/25812893_1_president-mobutu-sese-seko-zaire-kinshasa-lastweek 35 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3098007.stm 32

17 The first policy option is putting boots on the ground in Nigeria. The potential losses from this policy are far greater than the potential gains. First and foremost, by putting boots on the ground, the U.S. can gain from acting swiftly and showing decisive action against Boko Haram. It can show the world that blatant human rights abuses are not accepted by the United States and that criticism of the U.S. overstepping its power isn’t enough for the U.S. to not display its military strength. After a lack of action regarding Bashir Al-Assad’s use of chemical weapons, it appears that the U.S. is greatly limited in its ability to deal with foreign threats due to the opinions of its citizens regarding international involvement.

Boko Haram is different since most Americans associate them with capturing over 200 innocent school girls. As a result, national opinion won’t be as negative regarding direct American involvement. Another positive result from this action is that it can show other African terrorist groups such as Somalia’s Al-Shabbab that direct U.S. action isn’t to be ruled out. Boko Haram also does not possess the same power of Al Qaeda or ISIS so it would not be as difficult for the U.S. to succeed in a military campaign.

However, this policy has the potential to become disastrous for the U.S. It would only bolster Boko Haram’s claims against the West and serve as a natural recruitment tool for the group.

Secondly, it would potentially undermine progress made by institutional liberalism by potentially not soliciting the approval of the U.N. or other international institutions. This action can have far-reaching implications by attracting the ire of China, a rising power whose influence in Nigerian economics is growing at a rapid pace. By directly involving itself in Nigeria through boots on the ground, the U.S. adds to its realist battle with China that has already seen movement in the South China Sea. Intervention also greatly affects domestic politics within Nigeria. Nigeria recently elected a Muslim as president who is attempting to slowly terminate the ever-growing corruption in Nigeria. Direct U.S. intervention will undermine the legitimacy of this new president to many northern Muslims who would only see it as Western pandering and could lead to an escalation in violence. Direct intervention also does nothing to address the rampant corruption and lack of infrastructure plaguing northern Nigeria. It only exacerbates this lack of infrastructure through a potent military campaign that will destroy a lot of the progress made in the last few years. It does not solve the issues of corruption that affect the most populous and economically powerful country in Africa.

This policy can also illustrate to other extremist groups that Nigeria and other African countries do not have the resources or ability to deal with insurgent groups and can impede on the government’s sovereignty over Nigeria, especially in the majority Muslim north. Many of the Nigerian population would only see this policy as a response to the government in Abuja’s incompetence and it could cause even more unrest within the nation. Finally, but perhaps most

18 important,

direct

intervention

does

nothing to address the cause of Boko Haram and why it antagonizes western education in the first place. Direct intervention can be a swift and effective way to eradicate one head of Muslim extremism in northeastern Nigeria, but another two heads will replace it as illustrated by Boko Haram’s ability to take heavy losses but still resurface since the early 1980’s, late 1990’s and late 2000’s. Direct military intervention by the U.S. just perpetuates the cycle of violence and will do nothing to help the future of those currently affected.

The positives of implementing a policy of increased military aid far outweigh the potential negatives. First, it would show the government in Abuja and that the United States supports its empirical claim to statehood and has no problem bolstering its military to create an effective force that can keep peace. The government in Abuja can spin this help domestically as a way of showing their ability to enter beneficial agreements with Western powers which has been a major criticism of the Nigerian government in the past.36 This policy also gives the United States an advantage in liberal institutions such as the U.N. Since Nigeria is the most powerful west African country by most economic metrics,37 it wields significant power in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African bloc of the U.N. By implementing the proposed policy, the U.S. can gain much needed African influence in these institutions to carry out its future geopolitical moves. Lastly, the U.S. benefits in an ideological lens. By increasing the level of action against a group whose main belief is bashing the ideologies of the West, the U.S. can show that it is a champion for education and human rights which can help it in its greater battle against Islamic extremism in other places. The ideological battle between the West and Islamic extremism lies at the core of the world of international politics today, and this action will help champion the U.S. as the beacon for democracy and Western values.

There are a few negatives that would result from implementing this policy. If increased aid expedites the destruction of the terror group, Boko Haram can use it as a way to bolster its claims against the West and use it as a means of recruitment by spinning it as U.S. yet again destroying the lives of innocent Muslims. While it can help bolster claims to sovereignty, it can also illustrate that the Nigerian government isn’t able to act effectively to deal with its own problems. Implementing this policy can remind the populace of the ugly history of dependence and Nigeria’s current inability to effectively deal with such a pressing matter. This important

http://www.nairaland.com/2203562/underdevelopment-africa-europe-washington-alcott http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21600685-nigerias-suddenly-supersized-economy-indeedwonder-so-are-its-still-huge

36 37

19 drawback is the most important one of implementing this policy as it will just highlight the lack of effective progress regarding many of Nigeria’s issues within the last few decades.

A policy of increasing military aid to the Nigerian government to assist the military in its fight against Boko Haram will compromise a strong response against the threat posed by the terror group. Although there may be positives to other policy choices, direct military intervention is more likely to exacerbate the current violent situation. For the purpose of stopping the terror of Boko Haram, a policy of increased military aid is the appropriate choice.

Response: Why the U.S. Must Increase Aid to Combat Boko Haram Tanisha Mahopatra ‘18, tm525@cornell.edu Problems associated with American intervention in Nigera to combat Boko Haram are manifold. In addition to precedents of general conditions being catastrophic after withdrawal of such aid - economic or military, and the possibility of the presence of American military arising anti west sentiments in the troubled region, there are other complications to the situation. The author proposes supplying economic aid rather than military; however, the author himself also cautions against the Nigerian government being notoriously corrupt. President Goodluck Jonathan has been accused of corruption, violence, and even war crimes. Amnesty International has condemned the lack of accountability of Nigerian security forces and human rights violations on their part. In this light, pumping in foreign aid to a government that is clearly incapable of accounting for rightful use of such aid may not be the wisest option.

20 Last Month in CIAS Catherine Hwang ‘18, sh928@cornell.edu March was an exciting month for the Cornell International Affairs Society (CIAS), with traveling conferences, awards, and big events. Most notably of the various events, CIAS cohosted the Careers in the Public Service Expo with the Roosevelt Institute on March 10, 2016, marking the second annual occurrence of the event. The expo emphasized and brought to attention the importance of considering careers in the public sector instead of only business and enterprise, which often seems to be a greater focus at Cornell. The expo brought into focus in the multitudes of opportunities in the public sector, with many internships and career paths that are not only within the United States but also internationally.

CIAS also saw extremely successful traveling delegations at the Brown University Crisis Simulation (BUCS) and the Pennsylvania United Nations Conference (PUNC). At BUCS, Anant Sriram and Zhun Che won Outstanding and Best Delegate, respectively. At PUNC, Alison Schonberg, Hunter Moskowitz, and Cris Lee received Best Delegate, Honorable Mention, and Honorable Mentioned respectively and the delegation brought home Best Small Delegation for the second consecutive year.

At home in Ithaca, CIAS has been busy preparing for this year’s approaching Cornell Model United Nations Conference, with a pump-up party, training sessions and the logistics meetings in early April. This year’s conference is slated to have over 750 delegates, and the secretariat is putting together last-minute details for another successful conference. With CMUNC, more traveling conferences, and interesting discussions at general body meetings, April is looking to be exciting for CIAS.

21 A Case Against Impeachment – Removing Dilma Will Not Solve Brazil’s Corruption Problem Alison Schonberg ‘16, ars283@cornell.edu Over the past month, American media outlets have been dominated by Brazilian scandal; from widespread money laundering, to Lula da Silva’s corruption probe, to Dilma Rousseff’s impeachment, every day seems to bring new, often comical, developments.

Very few sources have synthesized reports, however, and provided a reasonable response to the following questions: 1) what are the next steps in the impeachment process, and will impeachment actually address systemic corruption; 2) how will Rousseff’s potential impeachment affect the Brazilian economy, which is currently suffering from a weak Real and contractionary growth; and 3) will Vice President Michel Temer and a new governing coalition be any more successful than the ruling Worker’s Party at containing disease, lowering the public deficit, and targeting corrupt officials?

In other words, most sources have focused on short-term newsworthy moments, like when Rousseff accused her opponents of inciting a coup, or when former President Lula da Silva was detained by the federal police force. While these news blips are certainly exciting and make for great entertainment, they offer limited analysis on the scope of Brazilian corruption, and fail to contextualize emerging scandals. For instance, is Brazilian corruption mostly confined to the Workers’ Party, or is it more extensive? Is impeachment a significant step toward reform, or does it only target one part of the problem? Why should we care about these cumulative stories in the long term, when the impeachment process will only last through May, and Rousseff’s successor is already clearly delineated? In order to fully understand the scope of these issues, and move past click-bait headlines, let’s delve a little deeper into each of these questions.

Context: Why Target Dilma Rousseff and the Worker’s Party?

To provide some brief context, President Dilma Rousseff has been accused of “breaching budget laws”, borrowing money from state lending institutions in 2014 for indefinite periods of time, and using these funds to artificially inflate the Brazilian budget and temporarily decrease the public deficit. Rousseff’s calculus was pretty straightforward – borrow intensely during an election year, provide a short term boost to government spending, and firm up support among union members, welfare recipients, and average working families, (the Workers’ Party’s main constituents).

22 Immediately

following

reelection,

Rousseff’s governing party came under closer scrutiny for involvement in the Petrobras scandal. In case you’re unfamiliar, the scandal was first uncovered in 2014, and revealed large scale money laundering and government collusion at the state’s oil company. For roughly ten years, Petrobras executives colluded with both government officials and contractors; Petrobras paid higher contract prices to a select few companies, and received bribes for preferential treatment. In other words, Petrobras executives paid some contractors more than others, and expected a hefty bribe in exchange for their long term support. In addition to splitting contract profits between Petrobras executives and contractors, the state oil company also funneled about 3% of contract revenue to Worker’s Party and coalition campaign funds.

But what does Petrobras have to do with President Rousseff? For one, Rousseff was Chairman of Petrobras’s Board of Directors between 2003 and 2010. More importantly, though, her governing Workers’ Party dominated executive roles at Petrobras during the same period, and bears much of the blame for corruption. Rousseff’s opponents – including former coalition partners in the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB) and the Progressive Party (PP) – have managed to lump both scandals into one, using Rousseff as a scapegoat for the 2014 budget scandal and the ten-year Petrobras scheme. Even though there are no clear links between fraudulent Petrobras contracts and Dilma Rousseff, she has received the brunt of criticism for contract inflation, Petrobras’s subsequent stock failure, and more systemic corruption in the governing coalition.

On Sunday, April 17, 2016, Brazil’s Lower House of Congress capitalized on this link – that Dilma Rousseff was somehow responsible for Petrobras, Workers’ Party, and campaign funding corruption – and acted decisively in a congressional vote. The body charged Rousseff with breaking budget laws, and urged her impeachment to move forward. Next month, the Senate will determine whether or not to accept her impeachment case, suspend her term, and start a trial.

Is Rousseff the Root of the Problem?

Now, let’s assume that President Rousseff’s critics are right; she violated the country’s budget laws in 2014, misappropriated state funds to support her own campaign, and failed to reign in a corrupt Workers’ Party at Petrobras. Does one person’s impeachment really address more systemic issues? I would argue firmly in the negative. Dilma Rousseff is just one of many bribetaking, budget-manipulating politicians in the current administration. More than half of Brazil’s Lower House and Senate are under investigation for fraud, money laundering, tax evasion, and other forms of corruption. These members aren’t confined to Rousseff and the Worker’s Party,

23 but also include the current President of the Senate, the Speaker of the Lower House, and several leaders in the PP and the PMDB, which is led by Rousseff’s likely successor.

What does this say about the impeachment process and prospects for long term reform? If the impeachment and anti-corruption movements are spearheaded by corrupt officials, how successful can they be? Lower House Speaker Eduardo Cunha is perhaps the most infamous example

of

an

impeachment

advocate with a clear conflict of interest.

If

he

lobbies

successfully

for

impeachment

Rousseff’s and

gathers

enough public support before a Senate vote, he could launch his own party (PMDB) into the presidency,

claim

credit

for

Rousseff’s ouster, and detract attention

from

his

indiscretions.

own

Protesters demand Rousseff's impeachment in Sao Paulo, Brazil, in November 2014. Source: NPR

Dilma Rousseff’s impeachment and a new PMDB government also call into question the entire future of anti-corruption. As Rousseff’s successor, PMDB President Temer will have to appoint a new cabinet, including a Minister of Justice, who could either continue anti-corruption raids, or grant amnesty to some PMDB officials from the previous administration.

Prospects for the Future: Will Temer Bring Change?

As mentioned above, if Dilma Rousseff is successfully impeached, her Vice President will succeed her by the end of May. He will have to form a new Cabinet and governing coalition, and deal with a growing host of economic and social issues, including the Zika virus, the 2016 Olympics, widespread dissatisfaction with corruption, a 3.8-4% anticipated dip in GDP, and over 10.2% unemployment.

Contrary to most media predictions, Temer is likely to be even less successful than his predecessor, and face a host of new challenges. First, the Workers’ Party has called Rousseff’s ouster a coup d’etat, and is unlikely to support the PMDB in a governing coalition. In the best

24 case scenario, the Workers’ Party will form a new opposition, but still actively participate in both the Lower House and the Senate. In the worst case scenario, Rousseff and her supporters will encourage public protests, call attention to Cunha and other corrupt PMDB politicians, and actively upset any attempt at a smooth transition by the Temer administration. Next, Temer must assemble a Cabinet of twenty-four ministers, and manage a prompt response to a falling Real, another potential series of reverse swap contracts, and unemployment. There is likely to be a lag between appointment and real policy implementation, not only because of Temer’s sudden shift to the presidency, but also because of long-term distractions and public expenditure sinkholes like the Summer Olympics, which can only further alienate Temer from the Workers’ Party.

Response: A Case Against Impeachment Christopher Arce ’19, cga39@cornell.edu The author makes an interesting case against impeachment-- specifically, the idea that impeachment will fail to address the underlying, perhaps inherent, problem that exists in the institutional structures of the Brazilian government. The author successfully proves that there are systemic, ingrained flaws in the government that birth a lack of accountability that will not be solved by impeaching the president, and the problems that Temer, Rousseff’s potential successor, would face would not exactly help either. As a suggestion moving forward, it would be really interesting to see what future authors think about how the systematic aspects that yield a propensity towards corruption and poor governing can be challenged and rectified, beyond impeachment.

25 On Authenticity: How Model UN Helped Me Launch a Business, Quit my Job, and Fight for Better Meril Pothen, Class of 2013 Model UN is a crazy power trip. For four days, you embody the perspective, powers, and fears of another person or country. We relish this idea of putting aside our pedestrian selves and diving into grandiose speeches, gusty action, and fearless advocacy for what our character believes. It’s exhilarating, and because it’s temporary, the risk of failing and facing the circumstances is nearly obsolete (and if you do fail, it’s nothing that a few well-crafted notes to crisis can’t fix). The invincible high is transient however, and once the gavel is won and the hangover from Saturday night fades, we’re back in our own shoes.

I wasn’t super into my shoes when graduation came around for me in 2013. I’d be leaving my CIAS family, my friends were scattering all across the country, and I was moving back home.

Sure, I was excited about my new job, but the inferiority complex from not going off to med school like my parents hoped ran deep and my confidence was at an all-time low. I threw myself into my work, quickly developing a positive reputation and being staffed on the most challenging projects. I was promoted ahead of schedule and had strong relationships with my managers and directors, but still felt stagnant and unfulfilled.

Being the MUN dork that I am, my pep talks usually go along the lines of, “You eradicated AIDS in Botswana! And remember the time you became President of Brazil in three committee sessions? You’ve got this, these growth forecast models have nothing on you.” (Totally serious, I’m really that dorky.) Sure, I had strong accomplishments from my real life to draw on, but my MUN experiences always felt more bombastic. I gravitated towards these because they exuded a confidence I didn’t see in my regular life. Model UN helped me find confidence in myself, by reflecting on the confidence of all the characters I’d played over the years.

MUN inspired me to be bold. In December 2014, I converted my lifelong love for details and baking into a full-fledged business (shout out to co-founder Michele Pothen!). A year and a half later, Sweet Cardamom has a strong following and many repeat clients. We’ve shipped cookies, boozy cupcakes, and French macarons all across the country and catered everything from tiny birthday parties to huge corporate events. Most recently, we helped a Naval Aviator celebrate his Winging Ceremony, completed a pro bono order, and even put together a cookie collection for CMUNC!

26 While juggling this fledgling business, I was also living the startup life with a health technology company based in Manhattan. I loved the nature of my work, using technology to better the patient experience, but struggled with the common startup pitfalls; a lack of structure, inexperienced management, and absolutely ridiculous hours. It was conference-level stress every day, without the incredible CIAS family to fall back on when it became almost too much. After a year of hotel rooms, 12-15 hour work days (plus weekends, because startup), and terribly unsupportive leadership, I was the most stressed out and unhealthy I’d ever been. So, I summoned up the MUN courage and went bold—I quit, without a plan.

My exit was not quiet, I had countless conversations with many company leaders, some heated and some mature. I laid out well-thought arguments, shared my perspective, and inspired others at the company to also come forward. Just like in MUN, some people wrote me off and others took my thoughts to heart. But most importantly, I advocated for myself in a way that I never thought I would in a work environment. By debating circles around my doubters and maintaining poised professionalism, I demanded better for my peers.

I left the startup life at the end of February and since then, I’ve thrown myself into Sweet Cardamom and getting my health back on track. The past few months have been both terrifying and freeing, I no longer had a full-time job as the center of my life. With the rug pulled from under me, I went into crisis committee mode and leveraged my strengths and leaned on my network to get my agenda realized. I built out Sweet Cardamom even further, worked my Cornell contacts for opportunities, and spent every waking minute learning as much as I could about both the food and healthcare industries. In June, I’ll be moving down to DC to start a new role in healthcare consulting.

I attribute much of my resilience while at work and creativity during these last few months to Model UN. MUN taught me to embrace other perspectives, solve problems, and be doggedly headstrong when needed. It showed me the importance of asking questions and building strong relationships. Most significantly, MUN taught me to take obscenely scary risks based solely on trust and confidence in myself.

Since quitting my job, I had to create my own portfolio and advance with little to no guidance.

In a way, I had my own little crisis committee, and I was the delegate, the chair, and the crisis director. Thanks to CIAS and the real-world skills I learned in MUN, I’d like to think I gaveled, and I can’t wait to include this experience in my next pep talk.