Anthropomorphic metaphors

Anthropomorphism is the term used to denote portrayals of God in terms of human capacities or attributes (anthropos – human; morphe – form).

The Waverley model of personality emerges primarily from an understanding of imago Dei in substantive terms. As outlined previously, this is taken as ‘five areas of functioning’ which we share with God as attributes in common, the exception being the physical area (although in Christ, God did have a body).

Although the image of God in man was broken and fragmented, it was not completely lost. Man still functions in the same way he was designed, albeit ineffectively. He is still a spiritual, rational, emotional, volitional and physical being. In other words he is still an Image-Bearer.70

This assertion is backed up with references to anthropomorphic scriptures. Due to the fact that such usage is central to Hughes’ theological method, some discussion of this approach is warranted here. The limits of the above method are not articulated by Hughes, whereas Gunton and Caird, amongst others, make the limits explicit. Indeed, Jüngel notes that an anthropomorphic critique precedes biblical writings and is found in context with the earliest known occurrence of the word ‘theology’. Having noted that the anthropomorphic metaphors cannot offer an exact comparison, both Gunton and Caird defend their use within theology as a necessary means of making transcendent realities clear via their description within our immediate world. Gunton makes his case partly by showing how science also uses metaphors to grapple with big themes, for instance, the universe described as a machine. His point is that if science, which claims a more precise language, requires ‘refuge’ in metaphor, how much more will the language of theology when grappling with metaphysical realities, require the use of metaphor. Specifically regarding anthropomorphic usage for descriptions of God, Caird argues that such methods help capture our experiences of a transcendent God, and enable us to ‘frame images’ which we subsequently use to celebrate and convey these experiences.

In the light of the above point, it is not surprising that for a counselling model developed within an organisation whose mission statement is: ‘Applying God’s Word to everyday life and relationships’, anthropomorphisms play a central role. For Hughes, relationship to God via personal encounter is crucial for healthy functioning (see Chapter 3, ‘Model of Health’). As Torrance points out, a loss of anthropomorphic language would jeopardise the importance of and access to intimacy, at least in terms of how such intimacy might, as Caird suggested, be spoken of and hence celebrated publicly or privately. Torrance also articulates ‘tensions’ around the use of anthropomorphisms in the context of refined theological reflection, ie ‘in advancing from the second to the third epistemological level’, by which he means from descriptions of God as He is towards us as Father, Son and Holy Spirit (economic) through to who He is in Himself (ontological). Such movement is unlikely for ‘lay people’ who may not possess such theological sophistication. It could be further argued that a model developed initially for pastoral care contexts requires a focus on aspects of God ‘in our realm’ (Emmanuel) as opposed to His ‘otherness’ which might not be experienced as having as much therapeutic immediacy. However, it could be the case that God’s transcendence and otherness has a vital function in retaining hope amidst calamity and chaos, ie debilitating experiences will not have the ‘last word’ as God is ‘bigger than them all’.

The above three issues are all grounds for the retention of anthropomorphic language within the context of a biblically-based counselling model. The argument thus stated is pragmatic, rooted in how Scripture might function for an individual. This approach however, need not be regarded as ‘less than ultimate (ontological) truth’, for as Jüngel asserts, anthropomorphic language needs to be seen as an expression of Scripture’s material content – God coming into our world ultimately in Christ in order to help us live differently.

Caird further believes that anthropomorphic language may serve us in attaining God’s creation purpose – for humankind to become like God, ie to image Him: ‘Man is created to become like God, and the ultimate justification of anthropomorphic language lies in the contribution it makes to the attainment of that goal.’71 From a more critical stance, Torrance argues against the use of anthropomorphisms in that they assume a general

continuity between God and human beings, and in so doing, de-emphasise differences. In general, it is clear that there is no universally accepted theory of interpreting theological language, especially the use of metaphor. McFague puts forward the view that metaphor as a device is largely superfluous and instead ideas could be stated directly. Rae has noted the concern that Scripture itself conveys regarding people’s tendency to portray God in human terms. The prohibition of idolatry in Exodus 20:4 makes this clear. Thus the concern not to diminish the otherness of God is at stake. To this end, Heschel points out that such a concern was an anathema for Jewish believers, where the dissociation of God from humankind was a clear presupposition, unlike Greek ideas from where such concerns were imported. Additionally, Heschel alerts us to the difference between anthropomorphic conceptions and anthropomorphic expressions. The use of the latter does not necessarily prove belief in the former. As long as this distinction is held in mind, we can fruitfully embrace this language as a valid descriptive and explanatory category. Heschel explains:

Pathos is a thought that bears a resemblance to an aspect of divine reality as related to the world of man. As a theological category it is a genuine insight into God’s relatedness to man, rather than a projection of human traits into divinity, as for example in the God images of mythology.72

Whilst we can be clear that metaphors of any type, including anthropomorphisms, are not precise or straightforward descriptions of the objects in view, they are, as Heschel has noted, still ‘genuine insights’ rather than mere projections invented by humankind. Understood as part of God’s gracious accommodation of our finite realms of thought, anthropomorphisms within the Waverley Model must be embraced as ‘explanatory tools’, albeit not literal ones and so not rejected as ‘empty’ or ‘worthless’.