NOVEL CORONAVIRUS AND OTHER COMPLEX THREATS REQUIRE EFFECTIVE RESPONSE, CASE FINLAND

text: Dr. TIMO HELLENBERG CEO, Hellenberg International Ltd. PERTTI JALASVIRTA Partner, Cyberwatch Finland

Global novel coronavirus (COVID-19) has today (7.4.) infected more than 1,300,00 people worldwide and caused death of 75,000. The most confirmed cases worldwide are now in United States. Most of the modeling show that the peak of the death rate will likely hit both Europe and United States in next few weeks. For instance, the Finnish capital Helsinki has imposed a capital region quarantine until April 19 and the Russian capital Moscow has imposed a citywide quarantine until further notice.

THE TRANSFORMED OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

Complex exceptional situations and emergencies such as the novel coronavirus or Covid-19 has challenged bot the European Union and its Member States´. This is the use of these instruments at a local and municipal level in situations of disturbances under normal conditions, where the source, nature and duration of the threat are more difficult to determine.

In Finland, the Ministry of the Interior published in December 2017 the Finnish National CBRNE1 (CBRNE threat refers to chemical substances (C), biological pathogens (B), radioactive substances (R) and nuclear weapons (N) as well as explosives (E), along with incidents of misuse of other knowledge.) Strategy which aims to continuously improve the prevention and preparedness of CBRNE threats and situations in order to secure society and its vital functions and services. Efforts must be improved to meet the goals of the development and strategy. The cooperation between the public and private sector is essential for the further development of CBRN security cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region. The private sector’s interest in CBRN security needs to be quickly revived. Public support and intergovernmental cooperation alone cannot be the only action. The expertise of the private sector is needed to complement the expertise and actions of public authorities.

As technology solutions become more widely available with lower costs and CBRNE and cyber knowledge develop, it becomes increasingly more available for criminal and other gray area actors, leading to a significant increase in the potential of complex hybrid attacks. Critical infrastruc tures and vital societal functions can be effectively paralysed, for example, by a CBRNE-based targeted attacks. When these attacks take place, they will have very wide-ranging negative effects on the current networked society, at worst crippling the vital functions and services of society. The interdependencies are surprising and often only become apparent during the crisis. We have been able to monitor these multiplier effects with the rapid spread of the the novel coronavirus (COVID-19).

Interdependences in today’s networked world is very deeply integrated. The coronavirus pandemic has shown how the effects cumulate and the critical functions of society are rapidly overloaded, as well as how resource scarcity emerges as multiple threats materialise. These situations require PPP collaboration and contingency planning at the local level, as well as training to improve continuity management. The use and circulation of emergency stocks should also be considered in complex crises, in particular in healthcare preparation. Here, our security of supply system rises to an unpredictable value.

Finding operating models and management structures capable of meeting the functional requirements of the opera ting environment is of particular importance in countering various hybrid threats. A hybrid operating environment is characterised by accelerating rate of change, complexity, and partial unpredictability.

NATIONAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT

The protection of vital functions of society is directed, supervised and co-ordinated by the Government Council and the sectoral ministries in their administrative sphere. Each sectoral and responsible authority exercises its statutory powers to prepare and launch operations. The responsible authority shall direct the operational activities, initiate disaster management activities, be responsible for commu nications and report on the situation in accordance with agreed practices. Other authorities, state and municipal institutions are involved and provide official assistance to the extent necessary to manage the situation. The Govern ment and the ministries are supported by the Council of State’s command centre. It consists of an executive section, a Situation Center and Communications Center, the two latter of which are run by the Prime minister’s Office.

The Security Committee within the Ministry of Defence is a permanent and broad-based cooperative body on precautionary measures. Its role is to assist the Government and the Ministries. The Security Committee shall, where appropriate, act as an expert body in the event of any disruption in society.

The management of hybrid threat prevention has special features that are different from other normal and abnormal situations. The key factor is time. Preparing a hybrid attack can be done secretly and over a long period of time, but the attack itself can be carried out in a very short time and its effects are immediately apparent.

The key challenge relates to leadership, especially in the context of wide-ranging and severe malfunctions and their associated jurisdiction. There is no clear operational model and resources for practical action in the event of a hybrid operation disruption. We lack an efficient approach policy and the resources to determine what is most critical in maintaining critical infrastructure and securing critical operations in the event of disruptions that require quick

decisions. In other words, where national resources are primarily directed in the event of a disruption or which systems critical to vital functions in society are brought back up first. Municipalities have a central role in providing and maintaining critical services. Combating hybrid threats should be better taken into account in urban and municipal preparation, planning and risk assessments.

MULTIPLE EFFECTS

Crisis management must have the accurate situational awareness in order to be able to take timely decisions. Decision-makers need to understand the role of transport and aerial personnel similar to that of hospital care staff, for example in the spread and treatment of the coronavirus. For example, most of the cases detected so far have come to Finland via air and thus place cabin crew in a special position in respects to the coronavirus exposure.

According to experts, in the instance of a droplet infection on an airplane, the infectious virus spreads one row forward and one backwards. The turnaround process of an aircraft usually takes one hour and cleaning the aircraft around ten minutes. It is easy to deduce that, as we know the life expectancy of the virus on surfaces, the new passengers on the same rows of seats are exposed to the virus. This is repeated over and over again in the airplane from one airport to another and at some point, most of the airplane may be spreading the virus, and not just from human to human anymore. A similar risk is also posed by the flight crew, as they use the same toilet facilities as the passengers.

”TO BE DONE” SUGGESTIONS:

1. The novel coronavirus (COVID-19) will have vast effects on the global economy and politics. Simultaneously there is upcoming tendency for a rising trend in international hybrid influence.

2. Many new digital innovations are introduced into the healthcare industry at an accelerating pace, with the goal of cost and operational efficiency. While focusing on productivity through new innovations, it is easy to underestimate and forget the impact of cyber threats.

3. The research data collected from healthcare personnel is valuable in the hands of outsiders. Health care ranks among the top five targets of cyber-attacks. Traditionally, healthcare has focused on patient and device safety, but preparedness for cyber and hybrid attacks has not been a priority.

4. The coronavirus pandemic demonstrates that in the current situation, the capacity of available healthcare at national and even European level has been rapidly exhausted. The differences are very large and the spread rates vary greatly from country to country, which affect the spread and consequences of the crisis.

5. We are facing major challenges and diverse training needs to be increased. Attitudes towards competence develop ment in organizations must change. Risk analyses should be routinely in use. New threats are constantly changing, and new ones are emerging in the around-the-clock digital world. Organizations need to go through the process of continuous competence development and respond to the challenge of digitalisation. Training and skills development are great opportunities and inexpensi ve ways to invest in organizational resilience. This ensures that the organization’s personnel are a strength in the preparation for cyber and hybrid attacks.

6. Particularly detrimental is the “I have nothing to hide” attitude, which leads to the person becoming the target of influencing. Digital services and platforms have made each of us have a significant amount of information available online. If our digital status changes to the interest of criminals and other actors in the network, it is quick and easy for individuals to influence the organization and the network as a whole.

7. The resources of state actors and cybercrime are multiplied compared to public procurement law enforcement agencies and other authorities as well as the private sector actors. Criminal and state actors have the opportunity to hire the best resources, invest in the development of cyber-attack methods and weapons, set up legitimate businesses and start-up companies as a cover to achieve their goals.

8. In an asymmetric and rapidly advancing crisis situation affecting the governmental sector, such as the coronavirus pandemic, silo-like decision-making machinery does not work. According to the audit report of the National Audit Office, in a widespread cyber-violation situation, countermeasures to large-scale attacks on several branches of the government have not been planned or accounted for. Against this backdrop, experts from the National Institute for Health and Welfare (THL) do not have the opportunity to take the lead if it is not found in the Government itself. The current pandemic is a good example of the capacity of silo-like operating models to deal with a rapidly evolving crisis, which is interpreted as sector-specific in Finland, but which is by definition a multi-dimensional crisis that requires decisions and action by the Prime Minister and the entire Government.

9. Nowadays, administrative sectors primarily look at security for their own needs, leaving out the broader societal perspective. Therefore, in addition to the administrative solutions already existing in the current environment of hybrid threats, Finland must create a Prime Minister- centered strategic crisis management model, starting with accountability, front line leadership and supporting mechanisms within the Government. It is important to ensure clear leadership and leadership responsibilities, and not leave the mana gement to the responsibility or coordination of the administration.

10. In this new operating environment, the prime ministerial and governmental leadership model requires the ability to create and build situational awareness as a basis for decision-making and action. Building a coherent and shared situational awareness requires shared situational awareness, centralised and well-networked leadership.

11. At national level, an evaluation model should be established to measure which vital functions in society are in place and at what time and how they can be validated in the event of disruption or exceptional circumstances. The measures to be taken shall safeguard and ensure the continuity of activities essential to the functioning of society as close to normal conditions as possible under all circumstances.

12. The overall goal in Finland should be to improve the resilience of the vital functions and services of society to the municipal and citizen level. The aim must be to increase the hybrid capacity of Finnish municipalities and local actors to a) identify, b) capture / respond to, and c) prepare for a new kind of global security threat, the hybrid threat.