The New Atheism: Dawkins, Dennett, Harris and Hitchens in a Sociopolitical Context by Daniel Nord

Daniel Nord, 871005-‐0116 Master’s thesis, 30 ECTS Spring semester 2013 Department of History, Stockholm University Supervisor: Inga Sanner

The New Atheism: Dawkins, Dennett, Harris and Hitchens in a Sociopolitical Context

Sammanfattning Denna masteruppsats behandlar den under 2000-‐talet uppkomna och mycket uppmärksammade religionskritik som går under namnet nyateismen. Tidigare forskning på området är ännu ytterst begränsad. Studien syftar till att skapa en förståelse av var idéer och argument framförda av fyra författare förknippade med nyateismen kan anses passa in i ett samtida sociopolitiskt sammanhang. Uppsatsen redogör för författarnas åsikter om den kristna högern i USA, islamistisk extremism, och religionen i det offentliga samtalet i väst. Med hjälp av sekundärlitteratur kan två möjliga tolkningar urskönjas. De framförda åsikterna kan antingen betraktas som jämförbara med de hos den samtida europeiska extremhögern. Enligt det andra alternativet kan de anses spegla ett antal europeiska och amerikanska skribenters reaktion mot vad som anses vara en bredare västerländsk vänsterrörelse i ideologiskt förfall.

Table of Contents Preface

1. The New Atheism?

2. Purpose, aims and questions

3. Sources and source criticism

4. Literature review

5. Theory

6. Method

7. Briefly about structure, terms, and style

8. Introduction to research results

9. The Christian Right in the United States 9.1 American culture war(s)? 9.2 Four Horsemen on American culture war issues 9.2.1 Education: evolution vs. creationism 9.2.2 Life: abortion, euthanasia, and stem-‐cell research 9.2.3 Philosophy: moral relativism vs. absolute morality 9.3 Conclusion: Four Horsemen on the Christian Right

24 25 28 29 31 33 37

10. Islamic extremism 10.1 War on Terror? 10.2 Four Horsemen on the War on Terror 10.3 More than just a few extremists? 10.4 Four Horsemen on the nature of Islamic extremism 10.5 Conclusion: Four Horsemen on Islamic extremism

38 39 43 47 51 54

11. Speaking critically about religion in the public sphere 11.1 Taboo to criticize religious belief? 11.2. Four Horsemen on criticizing religious belief 11.2.1. “Moderates” vs. extremists? 11.3 Taboo to criticize Islam? 11.4 Four Horsemen on criticizing Islam 11.5 Conclusion: Four Horsemen on speaking critically about religion in the public sphere

56 57 57 59 62 63 66

12. Context and conclusions 12.1 Scientific racists? 12.2 Anti-‐“Manichean” left? 12.3 Where to go from here

68 70 71 75

13. Bibliography

Preface At fifteen I had entered high school and made friends who had introduced me to Norway’s third largest export after fish and oil. Devil worship, ”corpse paint” makeup, and creative uses of pig blood during live shows were all eye-‐catching aspects of what went under the name of Norwegian satanic black metal. While it did contain selected musical elements to enjoy, black metal mostly provided plenty of material to be amused about. That was not how a number of the practitioners in our neighbor country had intended it. There were those who were releasing new records from within prison walls after having taken to church burning, according to their own testament firmly resolved to resist a Christendom that held Scandinavia enslaved. This subtle siege of minds in the most secularized part of the world1 was nothing to be resisted simply through non-‐ belief, but aggressively fought against with a muddy ideological cocktail of Satanism and Neopaganism. We were not won over to the cause ourselves (Devil worship appeared to be the equivalent of displaying one’s dislike for “Star Wars” by praying tribute to Darth Vader), but the Norwegian Satanists did have an impact: we had started to mockingly dissect religion. It took me a little while to get used to the realizations that followed. Unlike most of my peers, I had gone through confirmation one year earlier. Although this procedure had been nothing but an act of social convention without much or any thought attached to it, I had always presupposed that all sound people at least officially subscribed to the idea of a god (even if they, just like me, did not actively believe in one). Here, some of the most like-‐minded people I had met explicitly did not. If this was because social convention thirty minutes north of Stockholm was different from thirty minutes south of it, neither was nor is entirely clear. Yet for some reason, these already non-‐believers had arrived at the conclusion that the bible and its equivalents were all, as I remember one of them putting it, “fairytales.” I cannot definitely recall how I was reasoning around the subject at the time, but I do 1 Phil Zuckerman, “Atheism: Contemporary Numbers and Patterns,” in The Cambridge Companion to Atheism, ed. Michael Martin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 56, accessed May 22, 2013, doi: 10.1017/CCOL0521842700. Zuckerman puts the rate of atheists, agnostics and non-‐believers in Sweden as somewhere between 46-‐85% of the country’s population, followed by Vietnam (with a precise 81%), Denmark (43-‐ 80%), Norway (31-‐72%), and Japan (64-‐65%).

remember that it was the first time that I really did. My religious participation thus far had begun with singing in a children’s church choir in a suburb of the Swedish capital. A little later, during four and a half years in southwest Germany, I had been separated from my Catholic schoolmates to go the “Protestant” lesson. Finally, and back in my home country again, I had made it through confirmation. With the exception of my decision at nine to get baptized, these had all been more or less automated actions. At worst boring, and at best harmless. Now, after a couple of weeks of humorous scrutiny of primarily all matters church—hardly to its advantage—it appeared far from given that there was anything “sound” in subscribing to a deity. If openly proclaiming such newfound insights about the state of the universe has proven to be a daunting task for some still today, it certainly was not for me. Finding myself in Sweden in the year 2003, there could not have been a less dramatic standpoint to be made. Then came the American presidential election in 2008. I took an interest in the media coverage of this event as early as the 2007 primaries, and made it a habit to catch up with the latest American cable network clips that had been uploaded unto the Internet. Through the homepages of CNN, Fox News, MSNBC, and YouTube (running since 2006), access to this transatlantic election spectacle had become immediate. For a non-‐American, there could not have been a better way of being thrown into American politics—and of realizing the role religion played in it. Here, faith was a deal breaker, and atheists were regarded as one of society’s most distrusted groups.2 On the other hand, heated debates on talk shows would introduce me to a few personalities making the case for why religion did not belong in politics, and had even come to threaten world survival. I found out that these voices were responsible for a cultural phenomenon causing great stir in the United States and England. The “New Atheism” is a subject I have been fascinated with ever since, and the one I shall deal with in this essay.

2 Kimberly Winston, “Study: Atheists distrusted as much as rapists,” USA Today, October 12, 2011, accessed May 13, 2013, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/religion/story/2011-‐12-‐10/religion-‐ atheism/51777612/1.

1. The New Atheism? New Atheism is the name given to a movement made up of a group of writers which since 2004 have written critically about religion.3 Most prominently associated with the ideas and arguments of the New Atheism are English biologist Richard Dawkins (b. 1941), American philosopher Daniel C. Dennett (b. 1942), American neuroscientist Sam Harris (b. 1967), and English-‐American journalist Christopher Hitchens (1949-‐2011). Collectively, these writers are sometimes referred to as “The Four Horsemen (of the Counter-‐Apocalypse).” 4 Other New Atheists include American particle-‐physicist Victor J. Stenger (b. 1935), French philosopher Michel Onfray (b. 1959), and German philosopher Michael Schmidt-‐Salomon (b. 1967).5 In England and the United States especially, New Atheism books have sold in significant numbers, accompanied by heated debates in the media about aspects relating to the role of religion in society.6 New Atheism as a label is not without controversy. Among those rejecting it is Sam Harris, who in his 2004 book and movement forerunner The End of Faith does not explicitly mention even atheism. While Harris has proposed that naming something which is void of content—as he regards non-‐belief to be—is the equivalent of calling someone who does not subscribe to astrology a “non-‐astrologer,” it is however more specifically the New in New Atheism that is at times called into question. First coined by Gary K. Wolf in his article “The Church of Non-‐believers”7 from 2006, the term has been subject to a debate concerning the value placed behind it, and to what extent it has been used in a derogatory fashion. Wolf suggested that what made the atheism of figures such 3 Simon Hooper, ”The rise of the ’New Atheists,’” CNN, November 9, 2006, accessed May 19, 2012, http://articles.cnn.com/2006-‐11-‐08/world/atheism.feature_1_new-‐atheists-‐ new-‐atheism-‐religion?s=PM:WORLD. 4 Alice Gribbin, “Preview: The Four Horsemen of New Atheism reunited,” New Statesman, December 22, 2011, accessed May 24, 2012, http://www.newstatesman.com/blogs/the-‐staggers/2011/12/richard-‐dawkins-‐issue-‐ hitchens. The self-‐invented label “The Four Horsemen” was coined by Hitchens and first used during a filmed discussion in 2007 between Dawkins, Hitchens, Dennett and Harris. 5 Several of the named writers are active within more than one field; the professions mentioned here are only meant to give a picture of the New Atheists’ main areas of activity. 6 Book sales are a tricky matter. Suffice it to say here that the works by Dawkins, Harris and Hitchens have all made it high up on The New York Times Bestseller List and remained there for a significant time. 7 Gary Wolf, ”The Church of the Non-‐Believers,” Wired Magazine, November 2006, accessed April 4, 2013, http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/14.11/atheism.html.

as Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett and Harris new was what also made it ironic: a “prophetic attack on prophecy” and “extremism in opposition to extremism.”8 Put more mildly, another characterization of what might be novel about the New Atheists has been said to be the idea that “religion should not simply be tolerated but should be countered, criticized and exposed by rational argument wherever its influence arises.”9 The New Atheists themselves seem divided with regards to allegations of new aggressiveness. Victor J. Stenger has emphasized the need to speak out more forcefully than before,10 but Michael Schmidt-‐Salomon insists that the New Atheist polemic is not in any way more aggressive compared to that of earlier critics of religion, such as Friedrich Nietzsche. In comparison to the latter’s attacks on matters of church and god, Schmidt-‐Salomon has suggested that the criticism put forth by himself and others appears as “downright cuddly.” 11 This analysis corresponds well with that of Andrew Johnson, who contends in his albeit biased article “An Apology for the New Atheism” that an older school of atheists such as Bertrand Russell, H.L. Mencken and others “wore no kid gloves; the rhetorical forcefulness of their critiques of the evils of religion . . . is unmistakable.”12 The actual content of the New Atheism, too, has been suggested to be a repetition of what earlier critics of religion have already argued.13 However, Ian Borer provides a hint as to what it could be that sets the New Atheists apart from their older counterparts: “What is new about the New Atheists is their collective combative attempt to publicize their worldview, one that is very much based on Science as well as on observations of historical and contemporary religiously motivated atrocities.”14 [Added emphasis] I believe that this statement points to what is often forgotten in discussions about what makes the New Atheism new: the context in which it has emerged, and towards which it 8 Wolf, ”Church of the Non-‐Believers.” 9 Hooper, ”Rise of the ’New Atheists.’” 10 Douglas James Grothe, “Taking a Stand for the New Atheists: A Discussion with Victor J. Stenger,” Free Inquiry 30:3 (2010), 6-‐7, accessed May 13, 2013. 11 Michael Schmidt-‐Salomon, e-‐mail message to author, October 26, 2012.”[G]egenüber den harten Verrissen des Christentums etwa von Friedrich Nietzsche wirken die Kritiken von Dawkins, Harris, Hitchens oder mir geradezu kuschelig!” 12 Andrew Johnson, ”An Apology for the New Atheism,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 73:1 (2013): 6, accessed April 4, 2013, doi: 10.1007/s11153-‐012-‐ 9350-‐9. 13 Amarnath Amarasingam, ”Introduction: What is the New Atheism?,” in Religion and the New Atheism: A Critical Appraisal, paperback ed., ed. Amarnath Amarasingam (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2012), 2. 14 Ian Borer, ”The New Atheism and the Secularization Thesis,” in Amarasingam, Religion and The New Atheism, 135.

must be seen as a reaction. As Gavin Hyman points out in the introduction to his A Short History of Atheism, “few reading members of the Anglo-‐American public can have been unaware of the popularity of these books and of the ubiquity of these public debates on atheism.”15 Criticism of religion might of course resonate for several reasons. It could be philosophically challenging, or perhaps just entertainingly provocative. In order to proliferate in a high-‐tempo mass media climate, it might benefit from both those things. But for it to succeed in doing so, one can assume that it will need to be of more direct relevance to ongoing world events. Mark Rozell and Marci Hamilton argue that the New Atheists have “directed substantial public attention to controversies surrounding the role of religion in contemporary society.”16 When we talk about such controversies, we are engaging in social and political matters. What the New Atheists have to say about these matters is what I consider to have earned them their name, and it is also the focus of this study. We now turn to its purpose, and how I will proceed in achieving it. Finally, whether or not New Atheism is a valid label, I have decided to use it here. While acknowledging the reason of Harris’ non-‐astrologer argument regarding atheism at large, I propose that the main importance in any research is clarity. As New Atheism is used today in both media and academia in referring to a relatively well-‐defined phenomenon of which the above named writers are a part, I will avoid confusing matters by sticking with it.

2. Purpose, aims and questions The purpose of this master’s thesis is to gain a broader understanding of the New Atheism, more specifically of how the ideas (in the sense of views, or opinions) and arguments of a selection of New Atheist writers can be said to fit into a contemporary sociopolitical context. It is my previous understanding that the New Atheists voice a strong concern about the role of religion in society today. Practically, this means that they express opinions about certain social and political circumstances involving religion. My aim is to find out what circumstances these are, as well as how the writers’ own ideas and arguments on these issues can be understood within a sociopolitical context in 15 Gavin Hyman, A Short History of Atheism (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010), xiii. 16 See Mark J. Rozell and Marci A. Hamilton, “Introduction: Fundamentalism, Politics and the Law,” in Fundamentalism, Politics and the Law, ed. Mark J. Rozell and Marci A. Hamilton (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 3, accessed May 15, 2013, doi: 10.1057/9780230117624.

(Western) Europe and the United States. In previous research on the New Atheism, questions of this kind have been almost completely absent. Why should this endeavor be worthy of a research project? The terror attacks of September 11, 2001 have had an enormous impact on Western society, perhaps best mirrored in still ongoing debates in academia and elsewhere about whether one might speak of a “post-‐9/11 society.” One need not subscribe to the idea of such a break in history to acknowledge that questions of world peace, national security, and religion have been discussed more intensely and in a different light ever since. In particular, religion has stood out as a highly charged topic. Here, I believe that the New Atheists have been able to voice a unique commentary. To closer examine that commentary in a context should have at least two benefits. Firstly, it can lead to a better understanding of the nature of certain influential views expressed on one of the most central debates after 9/11. Secondly, it may also shed light on the contemporary sociopolitical climate in the West at a time of increasing social and political tensions in both Europe and the United States. I can think of few things that should be more important. For anyone who is interested in the said matters, I hope this essay will be an interesting read. Perhaps ironically, the issues most commonly associated with atheism—such as arguments against God’s existence—will be of lesser or no importance in this study. If Richard Dawkins should, for example, elaborate on Anselm’s 11th century argument (“there is a conceivable greatest thing, therefore god exists”) in his The God Delusion, he will engage in a timeless, logical exercise. Voltaire could have done the same. That such an argument was considered worth taking on might of course indirectly suggest something. But as the contemporary social or political significance of the action is in itself virtually non-‐existent, we will have to continue to look elsewhere. Should it turn out that Dawkins goes on to talk about the dangers of Islamic extremism in the 21st century, we have an opposite, perfect instance of a topic of contemporary sociopolitical relevance. (Also demonstrated by the fact that unless there were any prophecies, Voltaire will be silent on the issue.) It is thus both the contemporary as well as socially and politically charged issues that the New Atheists bring up that will seek our attention. Depending on where in the world we are, what is socially or politically charged will of course not be the same. Since the New Atheism is a Western phenomenon with a Western perspective, we will be dealing with matters of social and political importance

as they occur in the United States and Europe. Even here one can expect differences, but they will be limited. The following research questions can be seen as divided between (1) and (2) on the one hand, the results of which lead on to (3) and the over-‐arching research purpose of the study on the other: 1. ) What are the New Atheists’ primary concerns with religion in the 21st century? 2. ) What are the New Atheists’ primary concerns with attitudes in Western society towards religion in the 21st century? 3. ) Where do the ideas and arguments proposed by the New Atheists in relation to (1) and (2) fit into a sociopolitical context in the West in the 21st century?

3. Sources and source criticism In this thesis, I have decided to examine the ideas and arguments by Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, Sam Harris and Christopher Hitchens (The Four Horsemen). The sources consist of the writers’ books dedicated to criticism of religion, as well as other written and audiovisual materials available on the Internet, including articles, a two-‐ hour long filmed discussion, speeches and debates. Let us have a look at a very short presentation of who the Four Horsemen are. To the extent that I have been able to come across self-‐proclaimed political standpoints, these have been included also. This information is of no importance in this study, but may be of interest for the reader. Richard Dawkins (b. 1941) is an English evolutionary biologist. He was the Oxford University’s Professor of Public Understanding of Science between 1995 and 2008, and is the founder of The Richard Dawkins Foundation. Dawkins has said to support the Liberal Democrats in the United Kingdom.17 Daniel Dennett (b. 1942) is an American philosopher. He is currently the co-‐director of the Center for Cognitive Studies at Tuft’s University in Boston. I have not come across 17 Andrew Sparrow, “Richard Dawkins condemns British libel laws,” The Guardian, September 20, 2009, accessed April 4, 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/2009/sep/20/richard-‐dawkins-‐libel-‐laws.

any clearly expressed statements as to where Dennett stands politically.18 Sam Harris (b. 1967) is an American neuroscientist. He is the co-‐founder of Project Reason, a non-‐profit foundation promoting spreading of scientific knowledge and secular values. Harris has repeatedly described himself as a liberal.19 Christopher Hitchens (1949-‐2011) was an English-‐American journalist. After attending Oxford where he joined a Trotskyist group, he moved to the United States in the early 1980s. There he worked as a contributing writer for magazines such as The Nation, The Statesman and Vanity Fair. Hitchens claimed to be a “very conservative Marxist.”20 Why the above writers? In his article examining the New Atheists’ arguments, the afore-‐ mentioned Andrew Johnson decides to include the writings of Stenger instead of those by Dennett.21 Johnson argues that while Dennett is seen as part of the Four Horsemen, his book Breaking the Spell is less concerned with a debunking of religion and more with promoting a naturalist approach to it. Stenger, on the other hand, is more concerned with the former. This is true. But the purpose of Johnson’s undertaking is very different from this study. This essay will not evaluate arguments, but aims to trace arguments and ideas and put them into a wider context. Should Dennett differ from the other writers in his perspective, that is no reason for excluding him. I believe that there is more to the Four Horsemen than just a catchy brand. There is a certain inter-‐referencing in the writers’ books, and of interest for this study is a filmed discussion from 2007 in which they all take part.22 Any other choice of New Atheists 18 For an argument that he leans towards a liberal ideology, see: Tom Kershaw, “Daniel Dennett’s Religion and Political Views,” Hollowverse, last modified May 7, 2012, accessed May 13, 2013, http://hollowverse.com/daniel-‐dennett/. 19 See for example Sam Harris, ”Dear Fellow Liberal,” Sam Harris’ blog, April 2, 2013, http://www.samharris.org/blog/item/dear-‐fellow-‐liberal2. 20 Christopher Hitchens,”Questions for Christopher Hitchens – The Contrarian,” by Deborah Solomon, The New York Times, June 2, 2010, accessed April 4, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/06/magazine/06fob-‐q4-‐t.html?_r=0. 21 Johnson, ”An Apology for the New Atheism.” 22 Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, Christopher Hitchens and Sam Harris, Discussions with Richard Dawkins, Episode One: The Four Horsemen, filmed September 30, 2007 (Sherman Oaks, CA: Upper Branch Productions, 2008), DVD. Also available at: ”The Four Horsemen: Dawkins, Dennett, Harris, Hitchens,” YouTube videos, 58:05 and 59:10, posted by ”SpaceVulcan,” October 2, 2011,

would have been more arbitrary. For example, why one would adopt Johnson’s approach and include yet another English-‐speaking author is far from obvious. Instead, and probably more excitingly, Frenchman Michel Onfray or Schmidt-‐Salomon could have been considered. It has indeed been tempting to include such a continental aspect here. But numerically too few to allow for any proper comparison between contemporary criticism of religion in the English-‐speaking world and in two major European powers, I have decided to leave these authors out. Hopefully, other studies will involve them. Although the Four Horsemen occasionally tap into religion in more than one of their works, they have each (with the exception of Harris) written one book wholly dedicated to criticism of religion. I will be using the paperback edition of each of these (with slight corrections or revisions), as my choice to include additional sources up until today (spring of 2013) overrides the need for a strict reliance on first editions. In order of the original release dates, they are Sam Harris’ The End of Faith (2004),23 and his response to the feedback of that book, Letter to a Christian Nation (2006);24 Daniel Dennett’s Religion: Breaking the Spell (2006);25 Richard Dawkins’ The God Delusion (2006);26 and Christopher Hitchens’ God Is Not Great (2007).27 All books fall into the category of non-‐ fiction. Other than the considerably shorter Letter to a Christian Nation, they vary in length between some 300 (Hitchens) to 450 (Dawkins) pages. Given the nature of the sources and the purpose of this paper, several aspects of critical examination typically required of the historian emerge as irrelevant. For example, the evaluation of a source’s authenticity or tendency does not apply if the sources are 21st century non-‐fiction books criticizing religion. But as mentioned in the preface, my introduction into the New Atheism did not come through reading books, but mainly through hearing people speak. A wide range of interviews, debates and lectures by the authors are available on the Internet. On top of this, articles and blog posts http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xSYvsnbuFbg (Part 1); http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IDyA5duTNhM (Part 2). 23 Sam Harris, The End of Faith: Religion, Terror, and the Future of Reason, new ed. (London: Free Press, 2006). 24 Sam Harris, Letter to a Christian Nation, reprint ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 2008). 25 Daniel C. Dennett, Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon, new ed. (London: Penguin Books, 2007). 26 Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion, new ed. (London: Black Swan, 2007). 27 Christopher Hitchens, God Is Not Great: How Religion Posions Everything, 2nd ed. (London: Atlantic Books, 2007).

provide further valuable insight into the writers’ lines of argument. In terms of source selection, however, this opens up for a much trickier situation: How does one proceed here, with in some cases randomly uploaded Internet material? One option would be to limit the additional sources to just the Four Horsemen discussion, or to decide to only include, say, appearances on American talk shows. But can one count on all of these talk-‐ show appearances being available? Even if they are, what would this criterion mean if it turned out that Dawkins regularly appears on talk shows and Dennett does not? I have concluded that a systematic selection of Internet material does not make much sense, and am thus left with two options. Either I leave online material out of the study, or I choose to include it while acknowledging the systematic weakness of this procedure. I have decided in favor of the latter, as to disregard hours of the New Atheists’ elaborations seems to me to be the less reasonable choice when answering the research questions. The requirement I set up for including sources other than the books is that they date from after September 11, 2001, and that they can reasonably be viewed as part of the New Atheism. After all, it is not the purpose of this research to cover everything the Four Horsemen have ever written, but to make sense of a certain set of ideas and arguments which they have been part in proposing.

4. Literature review The great bulk of writings on the New Atheism have been responses to it, typically by other atheists or Christian scholars. These books, usually looking to persuade the reader that Dawkins et al. are either “right” or, more commonly, very “wrong,” tend to be extremely biased in either direction. I have found that such works are not at all helpful here. Only little research has been carried out on the New Atheism so far.28 The most complete work as of yet is a compilation of essays edited by Amarnath Amarasingam entitled Religion and the New Atheism: A Critical Appraisal.29 These essays mainly aim to criticize several aspects of the Four Horsemen writings from a sociological or theological perspective, of limited relevance here. However, they also raise some more general points about the nature of the New Atheism. We saw Borer suggest that the focus 28 Amarasingam,”Introduction: ”What is the New Atheism?,” in Amarasingam, Religion and the New Atheism, 2. 29 Amarasingam, ed. Religion and the New Atheism.

towards contemporary religious atrocities might be one thing that sets the New Atheists apart from older atheists. More concrete hints about the writers’ concerns with contemporary religion are available in a book by Arthur Bradley and Andrew Tate entitled The New Atheist Novel: Fiction, Philosophy and Polemic after 9/11.30 The authors, who declare to be a Christian and an atheist, warn ahead that they will not subscribe to "the normal codes of academic politesse."31 While politeness should certainly not be a criterion for academic study, one cannot help but wonder where the difference lies between "spared academic politesse" and, say, "polite religious responses." (Apparently, religion is a topic on which one just has to speak one’s mind.) Still, and despite somewhat confusingly asking what is new about the New Atheism and why it has been successful, as if these were the same question, Bradley and Tate provide interesting conclusions about what it is that motivates the New Atheists in their criticism. They propose that the New Atheist polemic can be seen as “a response to a very specific cultural and political climate: the so-‐called return of the religious in the supposedly secular West.”32 Firstly, what the authors view as most crucial for the movement’s emergence is September 11, 2001 and the al-‐Qaeda terror attacks. They see Islamic extremism, or possibly even just Islam, as the New Atheists’ most defining concern. Secondly, they point to the peaking cultural and political power of the Christian Right in the United States during the first term of the Bush administration.33 The release of Harris’ End of Faith in 2004 of course coincided with a period in American politics which has since been commonly viewed as particularly influenced by religion. Bradley and Tate also argue that the New Atheists talk of “the dangers of Political Correctness” and share “contempt for what they see as the modish mumbo jumbo of postmodernism and ‘New Age’ philosophy.”34 That critics of religion would not think highly of New Age is less surprising, but it is not clear how the alleged aversion against political correctness or postmodernism is to be understood. Amarasingam says that what the New Atheists see as most dangerous in society is a tolerance of intolerance 30 Arthur Bradley and Andrew Tate, The New Atheist Novel: Fiction, Philosophy and Polemic after 9/11 (London: Continuum, 2010), accessed May 21, 2013, ebrary (ID: 10495202). 31 Bradley and Tate, New Atheist Novel, 14. 32 Bradley and Tate, New Atheist Novel, 3. 33 Bradley and Tate, New Atheist Novel, 3-‐5. 34 Bradley and Tate, New Atheist Novel, 2.

often hiding behind relativism or multiculturalism.35 These are bodies of thought sometimes associated with postmodernism. To summarize, and to provide us with a more comprehensive view, I will propose a hypothetical framework. It is based on what has been suggested in the previous research, combined with my own previous understanding. I have decided to look at the sources to find out in which way the New Atheists’ primary concerns can be said to be about 1. the Christian Right in the United States; 2. Islamic extremism; and 3. a (perceived) social taboo of speaking critically about religion in the public sphere. In other words, the answer to my first research question, about the Four Horsemen’s concerns with religion in the 21st century, I hypothetically regard to be (1) and (2). Further, and answering the second research question, with respect to the writers’ concerns about attitudes in society towards religion today, I suggest (3). To properly answer that question, however, it will be necessary to find out what attitudes in society are seen to cause that social taboo. Here, it remains to be seen if postmodernism or other concepts are seen to play a role. I have consciously left out speculations about how the New Atheists’ ideas and arguments may finally be understood in a sociopolitical context. This leads on to the next question. Where does one turn to get a picture of the wider sociopolitical reality in the West today? Contemporary sensitive matters have a tendency of not being dealt with very objectively. As a researcher one can do neither more nor less than be aware of this. Except for the always demanded care in selecting one’s material, there is a need for even more vigilance in determining what it is that a certain text can add to the research project. A comparison of political labels in the United States and Europe by a political scientist can help bring some rather objective clarity to differences in the meaning of such labels between different places. A book on the contemporary European Zeitgeist by a French philosopher who is not happy with it will be the very opposite of objective, but it may serve a purpose in uncovering a bigger picture of what could animate religious critics today. I shall return to this topic in the 35 Amarasingam,”Introduction,” 8.

section on method. We now proceed to look at theory.

5. Theory The analogy which likens theory to a flashlight in a dark room of objects is quite fitting. Understood in this way, theory can lead to one of two things: It can either cast light on the study object that illuminates the latter. Alternatively, the beam of light might decide straight away what one is going to find, so that whatever is hiding in that room and whatever shape it has, it will be round and surrounded by darkness. Theory use in the humanities today is common practice, yet historians typically seem somewhat uncomfortable in adopting theory other than as light framework(s). Perhaps in an attempt to make theory use more accessible to students, it is sometimes suggested that choosing whether or not to incorporate theory into the research is not really optional. The argument goes that with theory being a sort of perspective with which we approach history—our outlook on how certain things are and work—some version of it will unavoidably be present in the research. For the researcher it is then a question of sorting out what perspective that should or could be. The “inescapable mind-‐set” is in part the topic of Quentin Skinner’s classic article “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas.”36 However, Skinner treats the dilemma as constituting a serious problem only when the historian (of ideas) lets it run amok due to a flawed methodology. He exemplifies with the practice among some to try to get to the meaning of older texts while falsely assuming that the concepts they discuss do not change their meaning over time. The solution to the resulting anachronistic interpretations instead lies in tracing a writer’s intention, something that can be done only through understanding both the linguistic and social context in which the text was written. Skinner’s elaboration is yet another reminder of the close tie between theory and method. His point, equally valid about any historical research, does not dispute the need for a conscious modus operandi. But it does put into doubt the necessity of forcing such awareness by adopting a (on top of all rather “diluted” form of) theory, when a more rigorous methodology—with an emphasis on understanding a research object’s context—would work in its place. 36 Quentin Skinner, “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas,” History and Theory 8:1 (1969), accessed May 15, 2013, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2504188.

So what about more “proper” theory? It is my belief that it is apt to adopt a theoretical framework for one’s research if one believes it to be helpful in increasing the understanding of the research object, or in highlighting any specific aspect of it that sparks interest. Given the purpose of this essay, I find it difficult to see in what way a theory could be advantageous. The particular aim of this study does, for example, not open up for any meaningful inclusion of otherwise thematically related theories, such as the hotly debated secularization thesis.37 Similarly, the vastly different perspective of network theory could only have offered an interesting approach had it been my purpose to say something about where the writers position themselves (as actors). The last part of the hypothesis, on speaking critically about religion in the public sphere, appears to invite theorization on the characteristics of that sphere and the place of religion in it. Indeed, Lee Marsden and Heather Savigny have attempted a theorization of the interaction between what they view as the categories of media (crucial in influencing public opinion and discussion in the public sphere), religion and conflict.38 However, I will not be focusing on role of the media here, nor do I think that it is necessary to dive into deep interpretations of the nature of the public sphere. Regarding the latter, I simply refer to what Jürgen Habermas has called the phenomenon that “emerges already in simple interactions,”39 that is, basically any social setting (perhaps with the exception of an atheist convention).

6. Method What is the difference between an argument and an idea? In the best of worlds, good arguments support good ideas. Generally, the difference lies with the statement made; an argument is used to back up a truth claim, whereas an idea is an opinion held to be true (i.e. that very truth claim). Thus, we might primarily think of arguments when 37 For an analysis of what the New Atheism might mean for this debate, see Ian Borer, ”The New Atheism and the Secularization Thesis,” in Amarasingam, Religion and the New Atheism. 38 See Lee Marsden and Heather Savigny, “Towards a Theorisation of the Link Between Religion, Media and Conflict,” in Media, Religion and Conflict, ed. Lee Marsden and Heather Savigny (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), accessed May 21, 2013, ebrary (ID: 10343287). 39 Jürgen Habermas, ”Öffentlicher Raum und politische Öffentlichkeit,” Neue Zürcher Zeitung, December 11, 2004, accessed May 17, 2013, http://www.nzz.ch/aktuell/startseite/article9Z0Q0-‐1.346787: ”Das allgemeine Phänomen des ‘öffentlichen Raums’, der schon in einfachen Interaktionen entsteht . . .”

ontological questions are discussed: the world is not 6000 years old because we have findings dating much longer back in time. But they, hopefully, will also be present to legitimize ideas. Such an idea might be that religious thinking leads to tribalism. The claim may be backed up by an argument saying that this is so because the monotheistic scriptures are non-‐compatible. Many times, it may be sufficient to simply speak of “views” (as I have also done here already), but the distinction between ideas and arguments could become crucial if it should turn out that two people take the same position on an issue for (seemingly) different reasons. I will begin by systemically going through the book sources in search for all ideas and arguments brought up. The findings will then be matched to the research questions. The content of the book sources will “lead the way,” before other written or audiovisual material available on the Internet will serve as complementation. How does one identify ideas and arguments, and how does one go on to appropriately understand them? As Göran Bergström and Kristina Boréus point out, it can often be that premises, arguments and even positions are implicit in arguing texts.40 Even when a statement is more explicitly articulated, we require, as with any qualitative research, interpretation to make sense of it. Fiona Devine emphasizes how the responsibility here lies with the person undertaking the research “to make the interpretation of the data as explicit as possible in the development of an argument using systematically gathered data.”41 I consider one way of meeting this criterion to be a sufficient provision of quotes from the sources. Another is to explain with as much clarity as possible the own line of thought. How does one fit ideas and arguments into a context? I have already pointed to the intricate task of coming to terms with the characteristics of that context itself. Academic research in various fields may be helpful here, but many times it will also be journalists or philosophers that give an interpretation of contemporary society, especially when it comes to the social climate. If one finds wildly different interpretations, it may be meaningful to examine how a certain set of ideas and arguments fit into each of the interpretations respectively. With political ideas, the matter is a little different. Here, we would want to “measure” 40 Göran Bergström and Kristina Boréus, eds., Textens mening och makt: metodbok i samhällsvetenskaplig text-‐och diskursanalys, 3rd ed. (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2012), 113-‐117. 41 Fiona Devine, ”Qualitative Methods,” in Theory and Methods in Political Science, 2nd ed., ed. David Marsh and Gerry Stoker, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 207.

different standpoints in a more concrete way. What political spectrum is best suited for that? The most common spectrums applied in the West today are the European one of left-‐right and the American one of liberal-‐conservative.42 Because especially the former is at times contested for being too one-‐dimensional in times of multidimensional politics, it has been suggested that other (vertical) axis, such as “authoritarian-‐ libertarian,” ought to be complementary applied.43 As research should preferably challenge existing conceptions of politics and political labels as they are commonly reinforced in the media and elsewhere, would it be in place to adopt such a political spectrum of a more complex character? Here reigns a delicate balance. As much as it as a goal of this study to look for nuance, one cannot begin such a search without reference points. Hans-‐Dieter Klingemann has shown that in Europe, between 75 % (Spain) and 95 % (Sweden) of the population orients itself on the left-‐right dichotomy to distinguish political issues.44 That is, reference points in terms of what it means politically to take a certain position on an issue are likely to be along that one-‐dimensional spectrum. Piero Ignazi argues that the dichotomy left-‐right is still very much valid in European politics today, and applicable as a legitimate tool for analysis.45 With regards to American politics, I believe that the political reference points (as I shall call them from now on) are even clearer, since possible positions one may occupy on the liberal-‐conservative spectrum are typically seen to be either “liberal” or “conservative.” Thus, settling for anything beyond the conventional spectrums ahead of the research would be an invitation to loosened footholds. But how does one determine what is left and what is right, liberal or conservative? Bergström and Boréus elaborate on using ideal types to analyze ideas and ideology. 46 The ideal type, as developed by Max Weber, is used to clarify certain important components of real world phenomena by measuring and comparing these components

42 Ian Adams, Political Ideology Today, Politics Today (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), 33. 43 One such chart is ”The Political Compass” by the organization Pace News Limited. See: ”The Political Compass,” Pace News Limited, last modified September 2, 2012, http://www.politicalcompass.org/. 44 Hans-‐Dieter Klingemann, ”Party Positions and Voter Orientations,” in Citizens and the State, ed. Hans Dieter Klingemann and Dieter Fuchs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 192. 45 Piero Ignazi, Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 1-‐7; 18, accessed May 15, 2013, doi: 10.1093/0198293259.001.0001. 46 Bergström and Boréus, Textens mening och makt, 460-‐468.

to a constructed ideal working as a limit concept.47 Bergström and Boréus suggest that by establishing central traits of political ideologies through the use of secondary literature and central texts promoting these ideologies, it becomes possible to use the ideal type as a sort of grid when examining one’s sources. If the findings match an ideal type, they can be fitted into the category of political ideology it represents.48 The authors take the example of studying the ideological changes of the Swedish Moderate Party: As these changes are not likely to include the embracing of any socialist ideas, limiting the ideal types to the ideologies of social liberalism, neoliberalism, and conservatism will be sufficient.49 The ideal type definitions here are comprehensive but generic, describing what the said ideologies proclaim about the relationship between the individual and the state, personal freedom, and so on. To trace the “roots” of classical ideologies in an effort to analyze the meaning of contemporary political viewpoints is to miss out on the importance of context described by Skinner. As Ignazi suggests about the dichotomy of left-‐right, it is “the interaction between political thinkers, party elite, and mass public [that] will provide it with the real meaning.” 50 This is a very important point. But if the use of ideal types appears as inadequate for the purpose of this study, the conceptual thinking behind how ideal types should be constructed still carries relevance. To be able to position the New Atheists’ ideas and arguments politically, I will thus take into account the positions of party elite and mass public (through secondary literature, including polling data), but also be aware of the influence of political thinkers (Bergström and Boréus’ central texts). The question then remains whether to use the European or the American political spectrum, or both. How, if indeed at all, are they different? In American politics, we might occasionally hear about the “right-‐wing,” referring to 47 Max Weber, “Die ´Objektivität´ sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer Erkenntnis,“ in Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre, 4th ed., ed. Johannes Winckelmann (Tübingen: Mohr, 1973), 194: “[Der Idealtypus] ist ein Gedankenbild, welches nicht die historische Wirklichkeit oder gar die »eigentliche« Wirklichkeit ist, welches noch viel weniger dazu da ist, als ein Schema zu dienen, in welches die Wirklichkeit als Exemplar eingeordnet werden sollte, sondern welches die Bedeutung eines rein idealen Grenzbegriffes hat, an welchem die Wirklichkeit zur Verdeutlichung bestimmter bedeutsamer Bestandteile ihres empirischen Gehaltes gemessen, mit dem sie verglichen wird.” 48 Bergström and Boréus, Textens mening och makt, 461: ”[Idealtyper] bygger dels på sekundärlitteratur där ideologier och idéhistoriska trender presenteras, dels på litteratur som brukar betraktas som central för var och en av ideologierna. . . . [Idealtyperna] kan liknas vid ett raster, de sorterar innehållet i texten till olika fack.” 49 Bergström and Boréus, Textens mening och makt, 460. 50 Ignazi, Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe, 8.

conservatives, and “left-‐wing,” describing liberals. But as Hans Slomp explains, there is a shift towards the left in European politics: “The American political spectrum as a whole is more ‘conservative’ on both lines than the European one. The European labor movement has widened the left part of the horizontal line, and in so doing, it has pulled the whole political spectrum to the left.” 51 Aside from Slomp’s assertion that European politics in practice leans more to the Democratic (American left-‐wing, predominantly liberal) than Republican (American right-‐wing, predominantly conservative) side, this means that even theoretically, there is no perfect way conducting translations between the American and European political spectrums. This leaves us with two possible alternatives. The first is to choose either the European or the American perspective. The second possibility consists of using either or both depending on the topic discussed. What about the first option? Let us remember the hypothesis. If one were to choose the European spectrum, would this be meaningful in dealing with the religious conservatism of the American Christian Right? Furthermore, when one gets onto the topic of Islam in the public sphere, would it be fitting to adopt only the American perspective and disregard European politics at a time when Islam is arguably more politicized in Europe? It could be done. But here, too, one is likely to miss out on the very thing this essay seeks to capture: context. Thus, although counter-‐intuitive, I think I am compelled to deal with both perspectives in order to make sense of the matters discussed. This means that the choice of political spectrum—American, European, or both—will depend on which context I regard a certain topic to be a part of. I will continuously motivate my choices. Before we head into the main section of this paper, let us take an example of what the tracing and positioning of a non-‐religious political standpoint on an issue could look like. After the Sandy Hook school shooting in Newtown, Connecticut in December of 2012, a fierce debate erupted in the United States on gun control. Let us assume that we have established that in the West, this is a political issue in the United States but not in Europe. Consequently, the appropriate political spectrum to apply is one of liberal-‐ conservative. Further, let us hypothetically assume that with the help of central texts and secondary literature, we have been able to establish two political reference points on the issue of gun control. One of these is the view that guns pose an acute danger to 51 Hans Slomp, European Politics into the Twenty-‐First Century: Integration and Division (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000), 33.

society and should be banned or strictly limited. This is the liberal position. The other view is that guns do not pose an acute danger to society and that limits or bans on them are not desirable. This is the conservative position. Taking part in the debate on guns was Harris, who declared to be a gun owner himself, supposedly “stand[ing] on both sides” of the debate. In a blog post, he suggested that coverage of the Newtown tragedy and its aftermath has been generally abysmal. In fact, I have never seen the “liberal media” conform to right-‐wing caricatures of itself with such alacrity. I have read articles in which literally everything said about firearms and ballistics has been wrong . . . When a massacre is under way, nothing can substitute for the presence of other armed men and women who have been trained to fight with guns. That is why one bothers to call the police. And those who are horrified at the idea of stationing a police officer in every school should be obliged to tell us how long they would like to wait for the police to arrive in the event that they are needed. 52

The statement matches the conservative position. But when we look at Harris’ appearance on American talk show Real Time with Bill Maher, that picture is challenged: I’m for everything that gun control advocates want. I’m actually for more. I think it should be like getting a pilot’s license. I think you should require training to get a license to have a gun. So, but… even if you did all of that, the problem is, we have 300 million guns on the ground, no one is talking about a way of getting those back. [Added emphasis]

On whether weapons could work as an “equalizer” between men and women in society, Harris went on to say: So this is where NRA [National Rifle Association] propaganda is narrowly true. And it’s inconvenient, I mean, the NRA is an odious organization, and I think they should just be crushed. . . . The problem, however, is that [NRA executive president] Wayne LaPierre, as goofy as he is, makes sense when you’re talking about the reality of what needs to happen when bullets are flying.53

We can see that Harris’ views on gun violence partly coincide with the National Rifle 52 Harris, ”The Riddle of the Gun,”blog, January 2, 2013, http://www.samharris.org/blog/item/the-‐riddle-‐of-‐the-‐gun. 53 Harris, “Gun Debate with Bill Maher and Cory Booker, ‘Gun Nuts Have Many Good Points,’” LiveLeak video, 10.51, from appearance on Real Time with Bill Maher televised by HBO on February 2, 2013, posted by dcmfox, February 2, 2013, http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=fe1_1359849816.

Association, possibly the clearest instance of the conservative position. Yet at the same time, Harris forcefully renounces the organization. He agrees with gun control advocates on the need for regulations (possibly proposing even stricter ones), but does not consider the option of banning guns altogether given how widespread they are. What are we to make of this? I have taken this rather difficult example to show that with the established political reference points, we simply could not determine where Harris’ standpoint on the gun control issue fits in on the political spectrum. Whether his views on religious matters will pose an equally difficult task remains to be seen.

7. Briefly about structure, terms, and style I have decided not to define a number of more general terms in this essay. It would demand considerable space and probably not be very helpful to get to the bottom of the meaning behind “religion,” “politics,” and other terms. Only when definitions are decisive, I will discuss them in more detail. In terms of citing, I have chosen to adopt the style used by Alan Sokal in his Beyond The Hoax.54 Sokal, who continuously provides quotes from Harris’ The End of Faith, at times chooses to put even shorter quotes within separate paragraphs. Although this is not strictly according to citation rules, I find this breach of protocol to be outweighed by an improved readability. Unless otherwise stated, any translations from German or Swedish into English are my own.

54 Alan Sokal, Beyond the Hoax: Science, Philosophy and Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

8. Introduction to research results The sources show the Four Horsemen approaching religion from a wide range of perspectives. One finds here purely historical accounts of the Middle East around the supposed birth of Jesus (Hitchens), but also philosophical elaborations on what actions ought to be considered if present-‐day religious fanatics should acquire nuclear weapons (Harris). The topics discussed in the books are several: the nature of religion; the nature of religious belief contrasted to the nature of non-‐belief; religion and civil society; religion and secularism; religion and politics; religion and science, religion and morality; what could substitute religion in a potential need for spirituality; and speaking critically about religion in the public sphere. I must again remind the reader that only a few of all topics relate to the research questions in this essay. The hypothesis set up in the literature review I consider confirmed. We will thus focus on what the Four Horsemen say about the Christian Right in the United States, Islamic extremism, and speaking critically about religion in the public sphere. A reservation I would like to make concerns the chapter on Islamic extremism; part of the discussion on this topic centers on the question of whether Islamic extremists really are very extreme. At the beginning of each chapter, I will provide a short background discussion of each topic. We then move on to see what social or political controversy it entails in the West today. This opens up for a discussion on context, unto which the content of the sources can then be compared. This essay will not deal with comments on some religious elements perceived as problematic (still) today. These include fanatical Jewish settlers on the West Bank, mentioned only to some degree; religious promotion of genital manipulation as well as opposition to vaccination and condoms on religious grounds; clergymen and clergywomen’s psychological or physical abuse of children, and studies trying to test for prayer effectiveness. I have concluded that while these issues may not be any less serious in their nature, they do not constitute the writers’ primary concerns.

9. The Christian Right in the United States In the United States, the term Christian Right refers to “a social movement that attempts to mobilize evangelical Protestants and other orthodox Christians into conservative political action.”55 The Christian Right’s core constituency consists of white Evangelicals, especially from the movements of fundamentalism and Pentecostalism. Since as early as the 1920s, the fundamentalists have made short-‐lived attempts to build grassroots support.56 Particularly motivating better organization among all religious conservatives was the cultural revolution of the 1960s, when efforts were made to influence public policy questions relating to sexual freedom, feminism and de-‐segregation. 57 In the 1990s, the Christian Right grew stronger following increased corporation between several Christian groups. At this time, the movement also adopted a more mainstream rhetoric, and began making “liberalist” claims to what were argued to be threatened rights.58 The term “political fundamentalism” refers to “the new fusion of evangelicalism and foreign policy activism that characterized the Bush administration after 9/11.”59 During that time, George Bush together with many appointed officials put a new emphasis on faith, seemingly challenging the American separation of church and state. Painting a worldview in binaries of good and evil, the administration managed to legitimize their (international) politics domestically. It has been suggested that this led to reduced reasoned debate in the country, paving the way for the U.S. invasion into Iraq.60 Worth pointing out is a tendency today to speak of Christian fundamentalists and the Christian Right as if they were synonymous. Clyde Wilcox and Carin Robinson list three reasons why the Christian Right is seen as controversial in the United States today: its social agenda, which includes some of the most heated issues in the country; the involvement of religion in what some regard to be 55 Clyde Wilcox and Carin Robinson, Onward Christian Soldiers?: The Religious Right in American Politics, 4th ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2011), 8. 56 Wilcox and Robinson, Onward Christian Soldiers, 31; 48. 57 See Dirk Nabers and Robert G. Patman, “Bush’s political fundamentalism and the war against militant Islam: the US-‐European divide,” in Muslims in the West after 9/11: Religion, Politics and Law, ed. Jocelyne Cesari (New York: Routledge, 2010), 70. 58 Wilcox and Robinson, Onward Christian Soldiers, 49-‐51. 59 Nabers and Patman, “Bush’s political fundamentalism,” 67. 60 Nabers and Patman, “Bush’s political fundamentalism,” 67-‐87.

a secular society; and finally its rhetoric.61 What exactly is it about the movement that the Four Horsemen are reacting to? In part, it is the Christian Right’s influence on foreign policy. Harris talks of a “religious cynicism” that has long had Christian fundamentalists engaged in U.S. policy in the Middle East. He says that these fundamentalists support Israel with the goal of a re-‐built Salomon’s Temple, the second return of Christ and the Jews’ final destruction.62 But a more visible concern relates to the Christian Right’s preoccupation with social and moral issues in domestic politics. Dawkins, who sets out to deal first and foremost with Christianity in his book—as this is the religion he claims to be most familiar with63— goes on to call the Christian Right the “American Taliban.”64 He suggests that anyone seeking to understand the published statements of scientists on religious matters would do well not to forget the political context: the surreal culture wars now rending America. 65

This statement points us into the right direction. Because the topic of the Christian Right’s involvement in foreign policy matters largely overlaps with that of Islamic extremism, we will concentrate here on domestic issues. For that, we turn to the so-‐ called American culture war.

9.1 American culture war(s)? In Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America, Morris P. Fiorina et al. describe how the term “culture war” has commonly appeared in discussions of American politics ever since a famous speech in 1992 by then-‐Republican presidential candidate Pat Buchanan.66 The culture war refers to moral and religious conflicts that are seen to have replaced the twentieth century economic ones.67 Fiorina et al. provide an abundance of examples of how media portrays the population in the United States as evenly divided between conservatives and liberals along a number of culture war conflicts. Pointing to the U.S. presidential election in 2000, the authors say that political commentators tried 61 Wilcox and Robinson, Onward Christian Soldiers, 13-‐14. 62 Harris, End of Faith, 153. 63 Dawkins, God Delusion, 58. 64 Dawkins, God Delusion, 326. 65 Dawkins, God Delusion, 94. 66 Morris P. Fiorina, Samuel J. Abrams and Jeremy C. Pope, Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America, 3rd ed. (London: Longman, 2010), 1-‐2. 67 Fiorina et. al, Culture War?, 2.

to show that the probability that a white, gun-‐toting, born-‐again, rural southern male voted for Al Gore was about as tiny as the probability that a feminist, agnostic, professional, urban northern female voted for George W. Bush, although few asked how many Americans fell into such tightly bounded categories.68

According to popular conception at least, the Christian Right is seen as firmly based on the conservative side of the American culture war. But as the subtitle of the book by Fiorina et al. hints at, the authors do not buy this description of the political climate in the United States. Quite to the contrary, they argue that the idea of a culture war is incited by media looking for the sensationalizing effect of conflict, when the country is not very divided on moral and religious issues after all. Wilcox and Robinson echo the suggestion, arguing that the notion of a culture war must be considered oversimplified; as they point out, some Catholics within the Christian Right may be divided over abortion or the death penalty (two typical culture war issues).69 While it is important to acknowledge this, and to be careful in drawing conclusions, we can deduce from the concept of the American culture war—imagined or otherwise—that there are today moral and religious issues for which we could not find better political reference points. Even Fiorina and his colleagues do not shy away from using the labels of liberal and conservative as stereotypical positions in their analysis. Which are the culture war issues? There is no definitive answer. Reoccurring examples in academia or newspaper articles tend to be gay rights, abortion, and affirmative action. The quote by Fiorina et al. provided above hints at another two: feminism and gun politics. If one really wishes to broaden the horizon, Culture Wars: An Encyclopedia of Issues, Viewpoints, and Voices edited by Roger Chapman provides around 850 entries on everything from globalization to Frank Zappa.70 Within the Four Horsemen sources, I have narrowed down the culture war issues sufficiently discussed and thus relevant for examination to six: evolution vs. creationism, abortion, euthanasia, stem-‐cell research, and moral relativism vs. absolute morality. One “conflict” sometimes mentioned as part of the culture war I have chosen not to examine closer. This is what I consider to be the 68 Fiorina et. al, Culture War?, 4. 69 Wilcox and Robinson, Onward Christian Soldiers, 27. 70 Roger Chapman, ed., Culture Wars: An Encyclopedia of Issues, Viewpoints, and Voices (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2010).

more over-‐arching dichotomy between religion and secularism. It is a premise for this study that the Four Horsemen advocate the latter, which would mean that they here take the liberal position.71 What is the conservative or liberal position on the other issues? In the United States today, this is seen as self-‐evident to the point that it is rarely explicitly mentioned in the media or even academia. However, both Fiorina et al. and Chapman provide sufficient insight into these matters, and I shall rely on their descriptions. Thus, the liberal position is the one supporting evolution, abortion, euthanasia, stem-‐cell research, and moral relativism. The conservative position is the one supporting creationism; opposing abortion, euthanasia and stem-‐cell research; and supporting absolute morality. There are several ways in which one can support or oppose something. As Fiorina et al. suggest, one can be morally opposed to abortion but still advocate its legality.72 Such distinctions, where relevant and made, will be pointed out. Overall, legality must be seen to weigh heavier in determining a political position. Before we go on to look at where the Four Horsemen position themselves on the culture war issues, let us again briefly consider the context. Certainly, just because we do not hear of a similar European culture war, one should not presume that some of the discussed issues are not relevant within a European context. In his article “Why We Have Culture Wars and the Europeans (Apparently) Do Not,” Peter Baldwin argues that Europe might only seem to “bask in sunny consensus” with regards to moral issues, when it is in fact only within each of Europe’s nations that there is a fairly high level of agreement. 73 Were the EU, on the other hand, to agree on exporting Scandinavian-‐style abortion to the rest of its member states, Baldwin suggests this would likely cause uproar. It is true that some of Europe’s right-‐wing and far-‐right parties, the latter to whom we shall return to later on, have a social agenda advocating conservative, 71 For a reminder of the imperfectness of this political reference point, however, see a discussion entitled “Does Secular Humanism Have a Political Agenda?” from the Secular Humanism Conference in 2012. The question was debated by four people, each with a conservative, progressive, libertarian and radical left-‐wing orientation, respectively. “Does Secular Humanism Have a Political Agenda? at Council for Secular Humanism Conference 2012,” Lanyrd, accessed May 14, 2013, http://lanyrd.com/2012/council-‐for-‐ secular-‐humanism-‐conference/sccxct/. 72 Fiorina et. al, Culture War?, 81. 73 Peter Baldwin, “Why We Have Culture Wars and the Europeans (Apparently) Do Not,” The Huffington Post, August 9, 2010, accessed May 14, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/peter-‐baldwin/why-‐we-‐have-‐culture-‐ wars_b_675727.html.

Christian values. As José Pedro Zúquete has shown, Flemish party Vlaams Belang has said to support the equivalent of the American conservative view points on social issues—if not on purely religious grounds, then at least based on an idea that Christianity makes up Europe’s moral foundation.74 Zúquete argues that an emphasis on Christian values in Europe’s extreme right-‐wing parties is “underway.”75 Although his article was written in 2008, that statement must be considered accurate still today. The fact remains that we do not have anywhere near as clear European political reference points for the various positions of the culture war issues to be examined here. This is not surprising given that it is the Christian Right that works as a significant force behind the United States’ social conservatism. Slomp says that the Religious Right in Europe is “very small,” consisting of only some ultra-‐right Catholics and “biblical” Protestants.76 William Wallace makes a similar assertion, pointing out that the Christian Right is thus “a phenomenon that is very hard for Europeans to understand.”77 According to a 2011 survey in The Guardian, “an overwhelming majority of Europeans describe themselves as liberal – even on issues such as gay rights.”78 A pointed out exception was a narrow plurality opposed to immigration from outside the EU, a topic we shall return to later on. Let us now get to the task.

9.2 Four Horsemen on American culture war issues We shall begin by examining the culture war conflict over evolution and creationism, which I have categorized as an issue of “education.” We then move on to the “life issues” of abortion, euthanasia and stem-‐cell research. Finally, we end on the “philosophical” conflict over preferred moral worldviews.

74 José Pedro Zúquete, “The European extreme-‐right and Islam: New directions?,” Journal of Political Ideologies 13:3 (2008): 327, accessed May 14, 2013, doi: 10.1080/13569310802377019. 75 Zúquete, “The European extreme-‐right,” 327. 76 Slomp, European Politics, 40. 77 William Wallace, “The European Mistrust of American Leadership,” in Patriotism, Democracy and Common Sense: Restoring America’s Promise at Home and Abroad, ed. Alan Curtis (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005). 78 Julian Glover, “Most Europeans see themselves as liberal, Guardian poll shows,” The Guardian, March 13, 2011, accessed May 14, 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/13/european-‐union-‐immigration-‐ survey.

9.2.1 Education: evolution vs. creationism The Four Horsemen’s position in this conflict might seem as obvious as in the one of religion and secularism. Still, this is a more concrete issue, worthy of attention. The positions, again, are liberal for evolution and conservative for creationism. The evolution-‐creationism controversy has a long history going back in the United States.79 Still thriving today, it mainly concerns teaching in public schools.80 Ever since judicial blows against the teaching of creationism in the 1980s, one might hear of the religious alternative to evolution as “Intelligent Design.” While some have pointed out that these phenomena should not be deemed identical,81 such differences are hardly of importance here. Dawkins says that in parts of the United States, science is under attack from a well-‐organized, politically well-‐ connected and, above all, well-‐financed opposition, and the teaching of evolution is in the front-‐line trench.82

However, he also spends several pages fiercely attacking the British government for subsiding, and Tony Blair for defending, a creationist school in England. Dawkins is appalled by literalist teachings not only because they run counter to his own scientific worldview, but also as a result of his understanding that they constitute psychological child abuse. Pointing to the physical abuse he says is now commonly associated with some denominations (and which he says to have experienced himself), Dawkins says that it is not impossible that stories of hell and torment can cause the greater trauma.83 Hitchens voices similar concern about teaching children the creationist worldview: By all means let anyone who believes in creationism instruct his fellows during lunch breaks. But the conscription of the unprotected child for these purposes is something that even the most

79 Eugenie C. Scott, Evolution vs. Creationism: An Introduction (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 1. 80 Peter Slevin, “Battle on teaching evolution sharpens,” Washington Post, March 14, 2005, accessed May 14, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-‐ dyn/articles/A32444-‐2005Mar13.html. 81 Daniel Engber, “Creationism vs. Intelligent Design: Is there a difference?,” Slate, May 10, 2005, accessed May 14, 2013, http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2005/05/creationism_vs_i ntelligent_design.html. 82 Dawkins, God Delusion, 91. 83 Dawkins, God Delusion, 372-‐379; 357.

dedicated secularist can safely describe as a sin.84

He lists the activities of Intelligent Design proponents as contributing to “a huge menacing lurch forward by the forces of barbarism” taking place during his writing of God Is Not Great.85 Dennett has repeatedly been careful to make a distinction between those preaching and those trusting their preachers.86 In Breaking the Spell, he takes the opportunity to address readers belonging to the latter category, and implicitly suggests that there would not be any evolution controversy if people would take to heart the scientific rebuttals of the “shoddy arguments and . . . apparently deliberate misrepresentations and evasions” by Scientific Creationists and Intelligent Design proponents.87 In a 2007 debate on Religion and Politics, Harris mentioned polls showing that 53 % of Americans are creationists.88 Suggesting an ironic charge of arrogance against atheists by those who deem themselves better equipped to understand the world through the book of Genesis, he concluded: I mean, this would be amusing—this kind of covert arrogance—if we were not having such a disastrous effect; if we were not impeding the teaching of science in this country. Thirty percent of biology teachers don’t even mention evolution because it is such a hassle to deal with the religious lunacy of their students and their [students’] parents!89

As expected, we can see that all Four Horsemen agree that the creationist worldview is a falsehood. In addition, Hitchens and Dawkins put special emphasis on the immoral nature of teaching creationism to children. On this culture war issue, all writers’ views match the liberal position. We now move on to the life issues. 84 Hitchens, God Is Not Great, 52. 85 Hitchens, God Is Not Great, 282. 86 See Dawkins et al., Discussion, Part 1, around 31:20: ”I do get very anxious about ridiculing the beliefs of the flock. . . . They’ve delegated authority to their leaders, and they presume their leaders are going to do it right.” 87 Dennett, Breaking the Spell, 61. 88 Such polls are common. Charles Arthur Willard comments that polls show a majority of Americans believe creationism should be taught in schools. See Charles Arthur Willard, Liberalism and the Problem of Knowledge: A New Rhetoric for Modern Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 128. 89 Harris, “The Arrogance of Creationism – Sam Harris,” YouTube video, 2:56, from debate with Chris Hedges in Los Angeles on May 22, 2007, posted by “valsyrie,” November 28, 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LkCdmd80shg.

9.2.2 Life: abortion, euthanasia, and stem-‐cell research Abortion, euthanasia and stem-‐cell research are some of the most prominent topics within the culture war debate. Once more, the positions are liberal for support and conservative for opposition. Since the notorious 1973 Supreme Court decision in the case Roe v. Wade, whereby all restrictions on a woman’s right to end a pregnancy in the first trimester were repelled, abortion remains the possibly most defining of all culture war issues.90 Dawkins juxtaposes what he says is the Christian Right’s view on abortion to the movement’s support for the death penalty. He states that The born-‐again George W. Bush . . . is typical of today’s religious ascendancy. He, and they, are stalwart defenders of human life, as long as it is embryonic life (or terminally ill life) – even to the point of preventing medical research that would certainly save many lives.91

Dawkins says that what should determine the moral status of abortion is the suffering of nervous systems, and that the suffering is going to be higher with the mother rather than the child.92 He says that even if some may argue that abortion invites “slippery slope” arguments, this is not what the religious opponents of abortion are concerned about: “For them, the issue is much simpler. An embryo is a ‘baby’, killing it is murder, and that’s that: end of discussion.”93 Harris similarly focuses on the suffering of nervous systems as he writes to the imaginary Christian reader in Letter to a Christian Nation that while abortion is an ugly reality, and we should all hope for breakthroughs in contraception that reduce the need for it, one can reasonably wonder whether most aborted fetuses suffer their destruction on any level. One cannot reasonably wonder this about the millions of men, women and children who must endure the torments of war, famine, political torture, or mental illness . . . If you are worried about human suffering, abortion should rank very low on your list of concerns.94

Dennett has a rhetorical motive comparable to that of Dawkins’, suggesting that the protection of the unborn child ends at birth with the following risk of indoctrination by 90 Fiorina et al., Culture War?, 79. 91 Dawkins, God Delusion, 329. 92 Dawins, God Delusion, 331. 93 Dawkins, God Delusion, 332. 94 Harris, Letter, 36-‐37.

the parents. 95 He is here of course only pointing out what he regards to be a hypocritical stance, not per se making a statement with regards to his own position on abortion. Neither does Dennett’s repeated negative mentioning of the killing of abortion doctors and the bombing of their clinics by fundamentalists necessarily reveal his stance. In a 2008 debate with creationist Jay Richards, Hitchens said to be “pro-‐life” (against abortion).96 In God Is Not Great, he dismisses propositions—as he says there have been by feminists—that a fetus is nothing but a “growth on or in the female body,” as nonsensical.97 However, he goes on to say that all thinking people recognize a painful conflict of rights and interests in this question, and strive to achieve a balance. The only proposition that is completely useless, either morally or practically, is the wild statement that sperms and eggs are all potential lives which must not be prevented from fusing and that, when united however briefly, have souls and must be protected by law.98

In terms of legality, then, Hitchens position on abortion is still the liberal one. Euthanasia is a topic easily confused with assisted suicide. The former refers to the termination of a life by a doctor at the request of the patient, and is illegal in all of the United States. The latter refers to suicide with the assistance of a doctor, and is currently legal in Montana, Oregon, and Washington.99 Of the four writers, it is Harris and Dawkins that tap into this subject, both defending even the “stronger” option of euthanasia. Harris argued on Fox News talk show “The O’Reilly Factor” that the decision to terminate one’s own life should be that of each individual.100 Dawkins repeats the possible objection of “slippery slope arguments,” but states that When I am dying, I should like my life to be taken out under a general anaesthetic, exactly as if it were a diseased appendix. But I shall not be allowed that privilege, because I have the ill-‐luck to be

95 Dennett, Breaking the Spell, 326. 96 Hitchens, “Christopher Hitchens Vs. Jay Richards FULL and FIXED,” YouTube video, 1:30:42, from debate with Jay Richards in Stanford, January 27, 2008, posted by “ChristopherHitchslap,” October 19, 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KZTzZyloR8w, around 1:04:00. 97 Hitchens, God Is Not Great, 220-‐221. 98 Hitchens, God Is Not Great, 222. 99 For a concise description of this matter, see: ”BBC – Ethics – Euthanasia: Forms of Euthanasia,” BBC, accessed May 14, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/ethics/euthanasia/overview/forms.shtml 100 Harris, “Sam Harris: The O’Reilly Factor ’05 (FOX),” YouTube video, 5:42, from appearance on The O’Reilly Factor with Bill O’Reilly televised by FoxNews on March 31, 2005, posted by “worldinformant,” August 11, 2010, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vDczsn0e1o4.

born a member of Homo sapiens rather than, for example, Canis familiaris or Felis catus. At least, that will be the case unless I move to a more enlightened place like Switzerland, the Netherlands or Oregon. Why are such enlightened places so rare? Mostly because of the influence of religion.101

In the United States, stem-‐cell research was never completely banned, but has had several regulations put on its use and funding. Some of those regulations Barack Obama lifted in 2009.102 Dennett mentions stem-‐cell research only within a wider argument. He suggests that those who hold non-‐negotiable moral standpoints with reference to religion cannot be considered serious in a discussion on moral issues, and takes as an example a person’s opposition to stem-‐cell research due to personal religious beliefs.103 Dawkins considers it inconsistent that there is organized opposition to stem-‐cell research when few question the legality of in vitro fertilization. He dryly notes about this opposition that there are those who “cannot see the moral difference between killing a microscopic cluster of cells on the one hand, and killing a full-‐grown [abortion] doctor on the other.”104 In Letter to a Christian Nation, Harris is very clear in his position on the subject as he addresses the religious reader: Given the accommodations we have made to faith-‐based irrationality in our public discourse, it is often suggested, even by advocates of stem-‐cell research, that your position on this matter has some degree of moral legitimacy. It does not. . . . We should throw immense resources into stem-‐cell research, and we should do so immediately.105

We now move on to the philosophical issue. 9.2.3 Philosophy: moral relativism vs. absolute morality That we find competing for the status of a preferred moral worldview the concepts of absolute morality and moral relativism may appear somewhat baffling. If other culture 101 Dawkins, God Delusion, 400. 102 Christine Vestal, ”Stem Cell Research at the Crossroads of Religion and Politics,” The Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, July 17, 2008, accessed May 14, 2013, http://www.pewforum.org/Science-‐and-‐Bioethics/Stem-‐Cell-‐Research-‐at-‐the-‐ Crossroads-‐of-‐Religion-‐and-‐Politics.aspx. 103 Dennett, Breaking the Spell, 296. 104 Dawkins, God Delusion, 332-‐333. 105 Harris, Letter, 31-‐32.

war conflicts did have more of an either-‐or character to them, this one seems to ignore several further alternatives. Here, to “be on the side” of moral relativism means to be of the opinion that there are no absolute truths, and that what is morally right or wrong behavior varies (more than in a descriptive sense), chiefly from society to society.106 This is the liberal position. On the other hand, to advocate absolute morality in the culture war is to view Christian ethics as the key to absolutely right and wrong behavior.107 This is seen as the conservative position. Together with other variants of relativism, moral relativism typically comes up in discussions of postmodern philosophy.108 Because we have seen that both postmodernism and relativism might be part of the Four Horsemen’s concerns regarding religion in the public sphere, I will try to minimize possible overlap of content and focus strictly on moral relativism here. Morality is a central topic in all four writers’ books. The focus generally lies with the origin of morality, why religion is not seen to be a requirement for distinguishing right from wrong (but may even have a negative effect on determining this), and what moral view the writers think should preside in society. Dennett draws a picture of Americans’ conception of morality that seems to conform to the description of this culture conflict. He suggests that many people in the United States believe American values should be exported to the rest of the world, and argues that the only alternative they can see to this is truly shocking, a moral relativism that holds that whatever a particular culture approves of—polygamy, slavery, infanticide, cliteridectomy, you name it—is beyond rational criticism. Since such relativism is intolerable, in their eyes, imperialist universalism must be endorsed.109

Dennett has said that religion is not necessary to distinguish right from wrong, but that he is “completely agnostic” on whether religion makes the world behave better or 106 Encyclopaedia Britannia Online, s.v. ”ethical relativism,” accessed May 15, 2013, http://www.britannica.com.ezp.sub.su.se/EBchecked/topic/194016/ethical-‐relativism. 107 Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, s.v. ”moral theology,” accessed May 15, 2013, http://www.britannica.com.ezp.sub.su.se/EBchecked/topic/391754/moral-‐theology. 108 Encyclopaedia Britannia, Online, s.v. ”postmodernism.” http://www.britannica.com.ezp.sub.su.se/EBchecked/topic/1077292/postmodernism. 109 Dennett, Breaking the Spell, 375.

worse.110 Morality motivated through a heavenly reward is something he suggests philosophers today agree about as morally bad.111 For Dennett, morality is something humanity must come together around and decide. Given this scenario, those who are non-‐receptive to argument because they claim to possess absolute truths cannot expect to be listened to (not even if they should be in the right).112 Dennett’s suggestion that moral relativism is “rampant” in some areas of academia today indicates that he may not be very fond of that position either.113 Dawkins sees morality as stemming from the evolutionary process. He explains that evolution favored species that either cared for those with the same genes or who benefited from symbiotic relationships with others. Together with the human (and some other species’) ability of gaining a reputation of being altruistic, perhaps also through self-‐sacrificing demonstrations of superiority, this is what Dawkins views as the foundation of morality. Initially only available to the in-‐group, early rules of thumb behavior has continued into our modern, anonymous societies through a type of “misfiring.” Just as humans today feel pity towards a stranger, or sexual lust regardless of a partner’s actual fertility, the drives are still there due to “Darwinian mistakes: blessed, precious mistakes.”114 Apart from relying on a naturalist explanation for morality, Dawkins, like Dennett, is not impressed with behavior resulting from ambitions to please God. Neither is he sympathetic to moral prescriptions in the Bible. Although not shocked with stories in the Old Testament, he wonders why anyone today would want to model a life on and enforce on others “the same evil monster.”115 Dawkins views the New Testament as no better with its introduction of the concept of original sin. He goes on to quote physicist Stephen Weinberg (as does Dennett), saying that while good people will always do good things and bad people bad things, “for good people to do bad things – that takes religion.”116 On an Australian talk show in 2010, Dawkins responded to a question about whether atheists could tell right from wrong without reference to absolute morality: 110 Dennett, “Two Views on Morality: Educator Mynga Futrell and Philosopher Daniel Dennett,” YouTube video, 5:14, interview on unknown date, posted by “thebrightsnet,” August 8, 2012, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_BW2oq0AEk8. 111 Dennett, Breaking the Spell, 281. 112 Dennett, Breaking the Spell, 295-‐296. 113 Dennett, Breaking the Spell, 375-‐376. 114 Dawkins, God Delusion, 245-‐254. 115 Dawkins, God Delusion, 282. 116 Dawkins, God Delusion, 283; Dennett, Breaking the Spell, 279. Between them, there is a slight variation in wording.

The absolute morality that a religious person might profess would include, what? Stoning people for adultery? Death for apostasy? Punishment for breaking the Sabbath? These are all things which are religiously based absolute moralities. I don’t think I want an absolute morality! I think I want a morality that is thought out, reasoned, argued, discussed, and based upon—you could almost say— ‘Intelligent Design!’”117

Hitchens proposes that morality is innate in human beings. In a debate in 2007, he commented on an imaginary suggestion that the Jewish people did not receive godly instructions of morality until arriving at the mount of Sinai: I will say to you: they wouldn’t have got that far. . . . There has been no revelation of this [our moral understanding]. It doesn’t come from on high. It’s innate! It’s one of the things that makes up for being a primate. There are some people who don’t have it, but we call them psychopathic. And, we have to reason it.118

Hitchens views the “golden rule” a charitable concept. In contrast, he thinks religion is immoral in its original precepts since it cherishes blood sacrifice and atonement. Moreover, it presents humans to impossible tasks and rules. A person’s (in)ability to complete and follow those tasks and rules determine whether he or she will face eternal reward or punishment.119 Harris argues that religion works as “one of the great limiters of moral identity.” 120 This, he says, is because religious believers will differentiate themselves from those of other religions. He suggests that what is morally good directly relates to the wellbeing of conscious creatures, and throughout Letter to a Christian Nation he returns to the importance of the suffering of nervous systems. Harris proposes that a scientific understanding of the mind can provide new insight into what is objectively morally good or bad.121 He devotes considerable attention to describing why he thinks moral relativism is “nonsensical,” and even self-‐contradictory as a rationale for tolerance of 117 Dawkins, “Richard Dawkins on absolute morality,” YouTube video, 2:33, from appearance on Q&A televised by Austrialia’s ABC TV on March 8, 2010, posted by “Skepgnostic,” May 2, 2010, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VgHoyTvyh4o. 118 Hitchens, “Hitchens – Morals,” YouTube video, 4:52, from debate with John Haldane at Oxford on May 12, 2010, posted by “FluffyAtheist,” December 10, 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hJQgf9CwsYE. 119 Hitchens, God Is Not Great, 205. 120 Harris, End of Faith, 176. 121 Harris, End of Faith, 173-‐176; 185-‐187.

diversity: Moral relativists generally believe that all cultural practices should be respected on their own terms, that the practitioners of the various barbarisms that persist around the globe cannot be judged by the standards of the West, nor can the people of the past be judged by the standards of the present. And yet, implicit in this approach to morality lurks a claim that is not relative but absolute. 122

Overall, the Four Horsemen appear to see morality as a natural phenomenon. Secondly, and following from it, they do not view religion as a requirement to live morally. To the contrary, it might even lead to bad behavior. Thirdly, strong emphasis is put on the need to reason around what is good and bad. The writers thus do not subscribe to either absolute morality or moral relativism, and therefore cannot be said to take any one side in this culture war conflict. What moral view do they advocate? It appears to be a Universalist consequentialism; the belief that morality is the same everywhere and should be judged based on the intent behind actions.

9.3 Conclusion: Four Horsemen on the Christian Right We can conclude that the results are unanimous. Whenever a writer’s view matched any of the positions, it was the liberal one. On the issue of morality, none of the writers matched any of the positions. The only instance of differing moral and legal positions were Hitchens’ comments on abortion. Interestingly, Fiorina et al. suggest in a separate chapter on abortion that most Americans are “pro-‐choice, buts.” This more moderate or centrist view supports the right for a woman to abortion, but rarely in every possible circumstance.123 In sum, the Four Horsemen’s ideas and arguments on the issues related to the Christian Right’s involvement in domestic politics fall on the liberal side of the liberal-‐conservative spectrum. We now move on to the chapter on Islamic extremism.

122 Harris, End of Faith, 179. 123 Fiorina et al., Culture War?, 92.

10. Islamic extremism Islamic extremism, or Islamism, refers to a conservative Islamic ideology that stresses the need “to convert the entire world to Islam and create an Islamic political order where all humanity is subject to God’s Law.”124 In their emphasis on conversion and the longing for the return to a more traditional society, Islamic extremists are not very different from Christian fundamentalists.125 As with their counterparts within other religions, Islamic extremists vary in their beliefs, motives and modes of engagement. Since September 11, 2001, a branch of Islamic extremism that has received enormous attention in the West is Islamic terrorism. Modern Islamic suicide terrorism can be traced to that of Hamas and Hezbollah, starting in the early 1980s. Following U.S. presence in Arabia during the first Gulf War, but also a perception among extremists to be standing on their own in combating Americans after the fall of the Soviet union, the decisive organizational step was Osama bin Laden’s co-‐founding of al-‐Qaeda in 1991. This event has been described as marking a new beginning both for Islam and terrorism.126 The approach taken by bin Laden and al-‐Qaeda has further been explained as one of “jihad international”; while attacks up until the group’s founding had been carried out in the Muslim world, primary targets now came to include America and the West.127 The radicalism of al-‐Qaeda and other forms of Islamic extremism resembling it—most famously practiced by the Saudi (Wahhabi) establishment and the ruling Iranian regime—is based on ideas of a more authentic Islam than generally practiced throughout the world. It emphasizes that the West, and America as the leader of it, makes out the “Lands of the Unbelievers”: a degenerate, yet threatening civilization prolonging the tradition of the Crusaders.128 To what extent does Islamic extremism entail political conflict in Western society? As Jocelyne Cesari has pointed out, the reactions to Islamic terrorism have differed greatly 124 Brian R. Farmer, Understanding Radical Islam: Medieval Ideology in the Twenty-‐First Century (New York: Peter Lang, 2007), 35-‐37. 125 Oliver Roy, The Failure of Political Islam (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), 5-‐6. 126 Bernard Lewis, The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror, Modern Library ed. (New York: Modern Library, 2003), 137-‐164, accessed May 22, 2013, ebrary (ID: 10032085). 127 John L. Esposito, Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam, paperback ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), xii, accessed May 22, 2013, ebrary (ID: 10085340). 128 Lewis, Crisis of Islam.

between the United States and Europe. While the American response became the so-‐ called War on Terror, Europe went on to sharpen anti-‐terrorism laws and halt immigration.129 Overall, Europeans have been less concerned with terrorism and more with the implementation of sharia and practical matters such as headscarves.130 It is my belief that political conflicts in the West involving Islamic extremism (or perceived threats of such extremism) build on these differences. In the United States, disagreement may erupt over the country’s military presence in parts of the Middle East, whereas the debate in Europe primarily rages over Muslim immigration and the threat of “Islamization.” Consequently, I shall deal with these different political contexts separately. Although some of the Four Horsemen’s comments on Islamic extremism may be relevant in both the American and European context, I will try to distinguish their comments concerning the need to fight Islamic extremism (relevant within American politics) from those on how they view the nature of Islamic extremism (relevant within European politics). We shall begin with the political context in the United States.

10.1 War on Terror? The “Global War on Terror” (more commonly “War on Terror,” sometimes “War on Global Terrorism,” “War on Terrorism,” and since the Obama administration “Overseas Contingency Operation”) is a phenomenon without any clear-‐cut definition.131 It is typically seen as referring to the U.S. military campaign launched by the Bush administration to combat Islamic terror cells and states believed to support them after the events of September 11, 2001.132 The description of a war on terror or terrorism is itself highly contested. British journalist and author Jason Burke has pointed out that because terrorism is a tactic, a 129 Jocelyne Cesari, ”Securitization of Islam in Europe,” in Cesari, Muslims in the West after 9/11, 20. For a thorough examination of such anti-‐terrorism activities in Europe, see Marianna Wade and Almir Maljevic, eds., A War on Terror?: The European Stance on a New Threat, Changing Laws and Human Rights Implications (New York: Springer-‐Verlag, 2010). 130 Cesari, ”Shari’a and the future of secular Europe,” in Cesari, Muslims in the West after 9/11, 169-‐170. 131 Jeffrey Record has called the term ”frustratingly unclear,” see Jeffrey Record, Bounding the Global War on Terrorism (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2003), accessed May 15, 2013, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub207.pdf. 132 Stuart Croft, Culture, Crisis and America’s War on Terror (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 101.

war on terrorism is “effectively nonsensical.”133 He has explained how initial plans within the Bush administration suggested names of “a War on Radical Islam” or “a War on Islamic extremism”; an alternative name for the said events as well as the title Burke’s book covering them is The 9/11 Wars.134 Although it has been argued that the War on Terror has encompassed diplomacy, finance and homeland security, most public attention has been directed towards the military interventions in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003.135 Thus, if we want to understand the political significance of supporting or opposing military intervention against Islamic terror cells or states with a (imagined or real) link to them, it is crucial to come to an understanding of the political environment in the United States surrounding these events. Because this is a climate that has gradually but steadily changed due to disappointment about the democratization processes in Afghanistan and Iraq, I will focus on the political landscape as it appeared prior to, or right at the beginning, of the invasions in my search for political reference points. What the Four Horsemen say about the War on Terror may many times date from after the respective invasions, but I do not believe that it is very meaningful (or even possible here) to determine how the political situation in the United States with regards to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq has developed up until today. If the writers’ views on the War on Terror appear to have changed over time, this will be pointed out. Military interventionism has been a hot topic in the United States at least since the mid-‐ 1970s. The “Vietnam Syndrome” designates the widespread suspicion that emerged in the country against plans of military operations after the disastrous outcome of the Vietnam War.136 The new suspicion was not shared by everyone. Since the Vietnam War, it is generally neoconservatives, a branch of conservatives seen to differ from the larger group on free market, individual and foreign policy issues, that have been advocating military interventionism (for example in the First Gulf War). However, Inderjeet Parmar 133 Jason Burke, Al-‐Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam, updated ed. (London: Penguin Books, 2004), 22. 134 Jason Burke, The 9/11 Wars (London: Penguin Books, 2012), 47. 135 Robert P. Watson, “The Politics and History of Terror,” in America’s War on Terror, 2nd ed., ed. Tom Lansford, Robert P. Watson and Jack Covarrubias (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009) 10. 136 William Schneider, “The Vietnam Syndrome Mutates,” The Atlantic, April 25, 2006, accessed May 15, 2013, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/04/the-‐ vietnam-‐syndrome-‐mutates/304891/.

argues that after 9/11, the neoconservatives’ outlook simply “captured and articulated the conservatives’ mood.”137 Could it be that the War on Terror offers up political reference points similar to those in the American culture war? In his book Terror and Liberalism, Paul Berman powerfully illustrates why some fifteen years after the Vietnam War, and ahead of the First Gulf War in 1991, American liberals were almost unanimously opposed to intervention: In the entire country, maybe fifteen or twenty persons seemed to uphold positions like mine, pro-‐ war and left-‐wing. . . . Rumor brought me the news that, somewhere in America, an ex-‐Trotskyist Arab-‐American likewise favored the war, on properly left-‐wing grounds. One of the liberal editors of the American Prospect adopted a view like mine. . . . Our ranks were less than imposing.138

However, in 2002, George Packer went on to ask in an article called The Liberal Quandary over Iraq why there was no organized liberal opposition towards the prospects of an intervention in Iraq. What had happened between 1991 and 2003? Packer argued that liberal intellectuals had changed their minds following the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, and had now turned into hawks advocating interventionism (as opposed to doves, opposing it).139 He went on to say about these liberals that many of them had cut their teeth in the antiwar movement of the 1960's, but by the early 90's, when some of them made trips to besieged Sarajevo, they had resolved their own private Vietnam syndromes. Together—hardly vast in their numbers, but influential—they advocated a new role for America in the world, which came down to American power on behalf of American ideals.140

Among the prominent intellectuals mentioned in the article, both supporting an invasion into Iraq, were Paul Berman and Hitchens. The writers’ pro-‐war stance, including their 137 Inderjeet Parmar, “Foreign policy fusion: Liberal interventionists, conservative nationalists and neoconservatives — the new alliance dominating the US foreign policy establishment,” International Politics 46 (2009): 203, accessed May 15, 2013, doi: 10.1057/ip.2008.47. 138 Paul Berman, Terror and Liberalism, paperback ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004), 7-‐8. 139 The term (war) hawk dates back to the American civil war, referring to a person who advocates military interventionism. Those proposing non-‐interventionism are called doves. 140 George Packer, ”The Liberal Quandary Over Iraq,” New York Times, December 8, 2002, accessed May 15, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/08/magazine/the-‐ liberal-‐quandary-‐over-‐iraq.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.

arguments to motivate it, may not have been distinguishable from the neoconservatives’ emphasis on the need for democratization in the Middle East. But proposing in newspaper articles, public debates and what can be seen as other central texts what a liberal position ought to stand for, they cannot simply be dismissed as having “become” neo-‐conservatives.141 It would however be misleading to focus the intricate task of understanding the political climate in the United States surrounding the Iraq War without first examining the case of Afghanistan. One of the most debated aspects prior to the invasion into Iraq was the question of whether there actually was any link between the Saddam Hussein regime and al-‐Qaeda. Such doubts did not apply to Afghanistan, and in this sense the invasion there must be viewed as more closely tied to the War on Terror. Stuart Croft argues that after September 11, 2001, a new national discourse emerged in the United States. It emphasized that the country was now facing a total enemy in al-‐ Qaeda and state sponsors of terrorism. Because the core values of American freedom were under threat from the enemy’s inverted values of fanaticism, the War on Terror was endorsed on both sides of the political spectrum and became a meta-‐narrative of “common sense.”142 Similarly, Richard A Melanson writes that “Operation Enduring Freedom [code name for the invasion into Afghanistan] enjoyed the overwhelming support of the public, and served as the basis for a new, and seemingly strong, domestic foreign policy consensus.”143 Parmar also speaks here of a liberal-‐conservative consensus.144 A Gallup poll conducted at the end of October 2001 suggested that no less than 8 of 10 Americans supported the invasion into Afghanistan. Surely enough, that poll is not without tendency, concluding that conservatives are more likely than liberals to be hawks (28% vs. 14%), while liberals are more likely than conservatives to be doves (27% vs. 11%). 145

141 Although many have had it suggested to them. For example, see: Richard Seymour, ”Christopher Hitchens: from socialist to neocon,” The Guardian, January 18, 2013, accessed May 15, 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2013/jan/18/christopher-‐ hitchens-‐socialist-‐neocon. 142 Croft, Culture, Crisis and America’s War on Terror, 97-‐121. 143 Richard A. Melanson, American Foreign Policy Since the Vietnam War: The Search for Consensus from Richard Nixon to George W. Bush, 4th ed. (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2005), 326. 144 Parmar, “Foreign policy fusion,” 203. 145 David W. Moore, “Eight of 10 Americans Support Ground War in Afghanistan,” Gallup News Service, November 1, 2001, accessed May 15, 2013,

Still, such differences are not sufficiently telling. We shall thus proceed to look at what the Four Horsemen say about the War on Terror and Islamic terrorism with only very careful assumptions about where their ideas and arguments fit in politically. Again, I do not believe that a European perspective is relevant here. Although a number of European states participated in either the war in Afghanistan or Iraq War, or both, these events have hardly been a topic of much inter-‐European political controversy. European public opinion on military intervention prior to both invasions was overwhelmingly negative: a Gallup International poll conducted in 37 countries in late September 2001 showed that except for the United States, Israel and India, “a majority of people in every country surveyed preferred extradition and trial of suspects to a US attack.”146 For Europe, this included UK (75%), France (67%), Switzerland (87%), Czech Republic (64%), and Lithuania (83%). Numbers were even more striking regarding opposition to the war in Iraq, with no more than 11% of the population in any European country supporting the invasion in 2003.147

10.2 Four Horsemen on the War on Terror A perceived danger of religious terrorism is present among all writers. For example, Dennett points out that with present-‐day technology, “a toxic religious mania could end human civilization over-‐night,”148 and Hitchens says that some “like to fantasize about a final conflict and embellish the vision with mushroom-‐shaped clouds.” 149 Although particular belief systems are not always mentioned in these discussions, the most pressing worry seems to lie with a fresh memory of 9/11 and Islamic terrorism. Hitchens mentions Iran, and says that the only aspect of modernity that has made its way into the country is nuclearization: http://www.gallup.com/poll/5029/eight-‐americans-‐support-‐ground-‐war-‐ afghanistan.aspx. 146 David Miller, “World Opinion Opposes,” Global Policy Forum, November 21, 2001, accessed May 15, 2013, http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/154/26553.html. 147 John Springford, “’Old’ and ‘New’ Europeans United: Public Attitudes Towards the Iraq War and US Foreign Policy,” Centre for European Reform, December 11, 2003, accessed May 15, 2013, http://www.academia.edu/247326/Oldand_NewEuropeans_United_Public_Attitudes_To wards_the_Iraq_War_and_US_Foreign_Policy. 148 Dennett, Breaking the Spell, 72. 149 Hitchens, God Is Not Great, 59.

This puts the confrontation between faith and civilization on a whole new footing. Until relatively recently, those who adopted the clerical path had to pay a heavy price for it. . . . A country like Afghanistan would simply rot. Bad enough as this was, it became worse on September 11, 2001, when from Afghanistan the holy order was given to annex two famous achievements of modernism—the high-‐rise building and the jet aircraft—and use them for immolation and human sacrifice. The succeeding stage, very plainly announced in hysterical sermons, was to be the moment when apocalyptic nihilists coincided with Armageddon weaponry.150

The prospects of combating Islamic extremism is only to a lesser degree discussed in the Four Horsemen books. However, elsewhere, this has been a topic raised by Dawkins, Harris and Hitchens. I have not found anything suggesting that the writers’ views on this issue have changed over time. Hitchens has been consistently clear about a need to fight Islamic extremists with military means. On British television program Question Time in 2007, he responded to an audience question about the implied slow democratic progress in Afghanistan, and whether British troops should stay there “for another 30 years”: We are going to need armed forces that have seen combat against Islamic jihadism. We’re going to be, having to train tough young men and women in how this is done—in rough terrain, against the scum of the earth—because we are going to be needing these skills and those tactics again, and I’m sorry to say, again. It, it is going to go on for a very long time. We don’t want to be living in a disarmed, inexperienced country while that’s going on.151

Although Hitchens seemed to support the invasion into Iraq for a number of reasons— including an expressed solidarity with the socialist Kurds in the area, as well as the sort of personal distaste for Saddam Hussein that he would harbor against other personalities he thought unjustly celebrated or power abusive, such as Mother Theresa and Bill Clinton—the link between the Hussein regime and al-‐Qaeda was one of those reasons. In a debate just prior to the invasion, Hitchens alluded to al-‐Qaeda affiliate Ansar al-‐Islam, and said that he had “a very good suspicion” why it shared with Hussein

150 Hitchens, God Is Not Great, 280. 151 Hitchens, “Christopher Hitchens on Afghanistan (Question Time Part VII),” YouTube video, 9.25, appearance on Question Time televised by BBC on June 21, 2007, posted by “dstpfw,” June 22, 2007, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5d1_721zYBg.

the target of the Kurdish leadership and state.152 He would later maintain the position that al-‐Qaeda was present in Iraq before America invaded.153 What about the Christian rhetoric of the Bush administration—the political fundamentalism—behind much of the War on Terror? In God Is Not Great, Hitchens goes on to strongly attack the rhetoric and actions of Christian Right personalities after 9/11. He comments that they led to “the mutual reinforcement of two forms of . . . mania: the jihadist assault reconjured the bloodstained specter of the Crusaders.”154 However, in an article from November 2004, Hitchens said that the successful warfare against the Taliban, al-‐Qaeda, and “theocratic saboteurs” in Iraq had paved the way for “non-‐ fundamentalist forces.” In the light of that progress, he seemed less bothered about the religious motives that might have played into the decision to invade Iraq: George Bush may subjectively be a Christian, but he—and the US armed forces—have objectively done more for secularism than the whole of the American agnostic community combined and doubled.155

In a Washington Times article in 2004, Harris went on to explain why he thought that the description of a war on terrorism was not suitable for the conflict at hand: It is time we admitted that we are not at war with “terrorism.” We are at war with Islam. This is not to say that we are at war with all Muslims, but we are absolutely at war with the vision of life that is prescribed to all Muslims in the Koran.156

Harris has said to support the War on Terror, but does not appear to view the invasion 152 Hitchens, “How Should We Use Our Power? Iraq and the War on Terror,” YouTube video, 1:40:37, from debate with Mark Danner at Berkeley on January 28, 2003, posted by “calcommunitycontent,” January 27, 2010, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cJzdY2jA0nk, around 20:00. 153 See for example Hitchens, “Morning Joe, Christopher Hitchens on Afghanistan 10/06/08,” YouTube video, 9:13, appearance on Morning Joe televised by MSNBC on June 10, 2008, posted by “Derfglouglou,” October 6, 2008, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-‐f66a2HVy5U. 154 Hitchens, God Is Not Great, 35. 155 Hitchens, “Bush’s Secularist Triumph,” Slate, November 9, 2004, accessed May 15, 2013, http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/fighting_words/2004/11/bushs_sec ularist_triumph.html. 156 Harris, “’Mired in a religious war,’” Washington Times, December 1, 2004, accessed May 14, 2013, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2004/dec/1/20041201-‐ 090801-‐2582r/.

into Iraq as part of it; he states to have no opinion of the Iraq War, other than that it seemed a “dangerous distraction” from the war in Afghanistan. 157 Commenting on the role of domestic religion with regards to U.S. foreign policy after 9/11, Harris has said that while the invasion into Afghanistan “was obviously a necessary thing to do,” Americans were consoling themselves with “our own religious certainties . . . very much in the language of Christian fundamentalism.” 158 Although he has not advocated interventionism to a higher degree than most Americans after 9/11, Harris has been accused of having aggressive intentions with regards to the Muslim world. The reason for this is a passage in The End of Faith, in which he elaborates on hypothetical nuclear warfare with an Islamic enemy: It should be of particular concern to us that the beliefs of Muslims pose a special problem for nuclear deterrence. There is little possibility of our having a cold war with an Islamist regime armed with long-‐range nuclear weapons. A cold war requires that the parties be mutually deterred by the threat of death. Notions of martyrdom and jihad run roughshod over the logic that allowed the United States and the Soviet Union to pass half a century perched, more or less stably, on the brink of Armageddon. What will we do if an Islamist regime, which grows dewy-‐eyed at the mere mention of paradise, ever acquires long-‐range nuclear weaponry? . . . In such a situation, the only thing likely to ensure our survival may be a nuclear first strike of our own. Needless to say, this would be an unthinkable crime—as it would kill tens of millions of innocent civilians in a single day—but it may be the only course of action available to us, given what Islamists believe. 159

Responding to critics’ accusations of advocating preemptive, genocidal nuclear strikes on Muslims, Harris responded on his blog. He emphasized that he had not suggested a nuclear strike on any Muslim regime (as some, like Pakistan, have nuclear weapons already), but had tried to line out a scenario in which a “hostile regime that is avowedly suicidal acquires long-‐range nuclear weaponry.”160 As provocative as Harris’ statement may be, it is very hard to determine what it can be said to mean in terms of a political viewpoint. After all, the extreme scenario which he describes has not yet occurred (although it carries some resemblance to the Bush administration’s description of the 157 Harris, “Response to Controversy,” blog, last modified April 7, 2013, http://www.samharris.org/site/full_text/response-‐to-‐controversy2. 158 Harris, “Why I Criticize Religion,” YouTube video, 5:46, talk at BigThink on unknown date, posted by “FFreeThinker,” February 11, 2009, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yeblvLoVJCA. 159 Harris, End of Faith, 128-‐129. 160 Harris, “Response to Controversy.”

situation leading up to the invasion into Iraq). Dawkins has said not to oppose the Afghanistan war because it appeared that the Taliban regime was indeed promoting terrorism.161 However, he has been strongly critical of the Iraq War on the grounds that he did not see any ties between Saddam Hussein regime and al-‐Qaeda (or weapons of mass destruction). Writing in The Guardian just two days after the invasion, Dawkins said that Osama bin Laden, in his wildest dreams, could hardly have hoped for this. A mere 18 months after he boosted the US to a peak of worldwide sympathy unprecedented since Pearl Harbor, that international goodwill has been squandered to near zero. Bin Laden must be beside himself with glee. And the infidels are now walking right into the Iraq trap. There was always a risk for Bin Laden that worldwide sympathy for the US might thwart his long-‐term aim of holy war against the Great Satan. He needn't have worried. With the Bush junta at the helm, a camel could have foreseen the outcome.162

As we can see, Dawkins impatience with the Bush administration and what he views as its escalation of religiously motivated conflict is unmistakable. Here, he sets himself apart from the other Horsemen in being the most outspoken about the negative effects of (in part religiously motivated) U.S. foreign policy after 9/11. Like Harris, Dawkins has dismissed the idea of a war on “terror.” 163

10.3 More than just a few extremists? In what way is Islamic extremism a political issue in Europe? We can safely say that jihadist ambitions to convert the world to Islam are not in themselves a political controversy. However, ideas about the threat of an “Islamization” of the continent, or even the entire West, have certainly become a political topic. Cesari says that in Europe, “anti-‐immigrant statements in politics is now commonplace.”164 At the same time, she argues that attempts to point to positive 161 Dawkins, “Richard Dawkins interview on religion, evolution and Iraq,” by Matt Kennard, The Comment Factory, March 19, 2010, accessed May 15, 2013, http://www.thecommentfactory.com/richard-‐dawkins-‐interview-‐on-‐religion-‐ evolution-‐and-‐iraq-‐2777/. 162 Dawkins, “Bin Laden’s victory,” The Guardian, March 22, 2003, accessed May 15, 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/mar/22/iraq.usa. 163 Dawkins, God Delusion, 344. 164 Cesari, ”Securitization,” 14.

attitudes on the political left towards Muslims are among some seen as “courageous truth-‐telling in the face of moral relativists and dangerous Muslims.”165 Especially those with an immigrant background have an opportunity to criticize traditional Islamic practices “in a way few non-‐Islamic intellectuals would dare.”166 How does “courageous truth-‐telling” fit with commonplace anti-‐immigrant remarks? In another passage, Cesari suggests that with the large proportion of Muslims in Europe, “the anti-‐immigrant rhetoric of extreme right-‐wing parties [there] has become markedly anti-‐Muslim.”167 In other words, anti-‐Muslim rhetoric in European politics can only be seen as commonplace if by that we mean that extreme right-‐wing (or far-‐right) parties have become more and more visible on the political arena. The definition of the European extreme-‐right is debated. Zúquete says it is seen to consist of “highly nationalist, anti-‐system, and exclusionary (often racist) parties.”168 In the 2000s, these have increasingly focused on Islam, and are commonly viewed as “Islamophobic.” Zúquete argues that “Islamophobia” is a concept that is ubiquitous in the discourse on Islam today; however, it is a fairly new phenomenon. Roughly, it can be seen to refer to the stigmatization of all Muslims and the view that Islam is “a dangerous and unchanged, monolithic bloc that is the natural subject of well-‐deserved hostility from Westerners.”169 What threat is it that Islam is seen to pose? Zúquete says that the Islamic threat discussed in the party literature of the European extreme-‐right is one of “’colonization’ and terrorism.”170 As for colonization, this refers to the “Islamization” of Europe into “Eurabia” (as part of an Islamic Caliphate), with the subjugation of Christians and Jews under Islamic governance (“Dhimmitude”). Does this mean that the European extreme-‐right is hostile towards Muslims because it views them as extremists? I would say that this is very uncertain. Much of the extreme-‐right rhetoric in Europe seems to focus more on the number, and possibly cultural practices, of arriving Muslims, rather than on what they do or do not believe about jihad. Boiled down to a reasonable definition, I believe that a European far-‐right position must be stated simply as the view that more than just a small minority of Muslims pose some type of threat to Europe or the 165 Cesari, ”Securitization,” 23. 166 Cesari, ”Securitization,” 23. 167 Cesari, ”Securitization,” 13. 168 Zúquete, “European extreme-‐right,” 322. 169 Zúquete, “European extreme-‐right,” 321-‐323. 170 Zúquete, “European extreme-‐right,” 331.

West. Any ideas that do not correspond with this definition, I would view as falling on the rest of the political spectrum, that is, roughly left to center-‐right. Before we move on to look at what the Four Horsemen say about the nature of Islamic extremism, let us examine more precisely why an American political context is not very relevant here. In the American culture war, conservatives are generally seen to oppose multiculturalism. However, opposition to multiculturalism as a (normative) policy can hardly in itself be regarded as synonymous with anti-‐Muslim views. Between the fall of 2010 and spring of 2011, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, British Prime Minister David Cameron and French President Nicholas Sarkozy all declared multiculturalism to “have failed.”171 Moreover, questions of multiculturalism and immigration in the United States are, as we shall see, not primarily about Muslims. In terms of far-‐right political groups, much attention in academia and the media has in recent years been directed at the so-‐called Tea Party movement. The Tea Party (Tea for “Taxed Enough Already”) materialized in 2009 as a social movement with a strong reverence for the U.S. constitution, calling for smaller government.172 Theda Skocpol and Vanessa Williamson suggest that “concern about illegal immigration is widespread in Tea Party circles, and draconian remedies are in vogue. . . . Sealing America’s borders with Mexico and dealing with Latin immigrants are prime challenges for the nation to tackle, as Tea Partiers see it.”173 Here, Muslim immigration is not the (primary) issue. The demographics are of course very different between Europe and the United States. In 2005, between 1% and 10% of West European countries’ populations were Muslims, whereas the American number that same year was between 0,5% and 1,5%.174 Even though the number of Muslim immigrants to the United States is seen to have largely increased since September 11,175 the discrepancy is still striking; a small Swedish town 171 Clarence Page, “The way to do multiculturalism right,” Chicago Tribune, February 20, 2011, accessed May 15, 2013, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-‐02-‐20/news/ct-‐ oped-‐0220-‐page-‐20110218_1_multiculturalism-‐cultural-‐differences-‐immigrants. 172 See Theda Skocpol and Vanessa Williamson, The Tea Party and the Remaking of Republican Conservatism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 19-‐49. 173 Skocpol and Williamson, The Tea Party, 57. 174 See: “Muslims in Europe: Country guide,” BBC, last modified December 23, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4385768.stm; “Islam in the United States,” euro-‐ islam.info, accessed May 15, 2013, http://www.euro-‐islam.info/country-‐ profiles/united-‐states/. 175 Andrea Elliott, “More Muslims Arrive in U.S., After 9/11 Dip,” New York Times, September 10, 2006, accessed May 15, 2013,

of some 80 000 inhabitants situated 18 miles—about 30 km—south of Stockholm, gained reputation in the spring of 2008 for having accepted more refugees from Iraq than had the United States and Canada combined.176 However, Skocpol and Williamson suggest that there are Tea Partiers who have argued for limitations on freedom of religion for Muslim-‐Americans.177 Such discrimination against Muslims as a group appear reminiscent of the agenda of the European extreme-‐ right. But the question is just how widespread such anti-‐Muslim sentiment within the Tea Party really is. Skocpol and Williamson suggest that Tea Partiers have equally negative views about “[non-‐Muslim] immigrants, and young people.”178 The all-‐around hostile attitude to the “Other” seems to suggest that the Tea Party is not very concerned about Muslims in particular; indeed, some have even said to be active within the Tea Party movement.179 Further, there is far from consensus on where the Republican Party and other conservatives end and where the Tea Party begins. In the summer of 2012, American media reported heavily about polls suggesting that somewhere around 30% of Republicans and conservatives believed that Barack Obama was a Muslim.180 This was a perceived characteristic of the American president that was not appreciated; as a matter of fact, it appeared indistinguishable from common Tea Party rhetoric stressing that Obama is secretly a “Muslim socialist.” This puts into question Skocpol and Williamson’s suggestion that the presidency of a black man with Hussein as middle name, was and is scary only for “very conservative Republicans, and others even further to the right.”181 Michael Bérubé commented on the said polls by saying that “we are beginning to cultivate a culture of Islamophobic demagoguery [in America] that may yet match that of http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/10/nyregion/10muslims.html?pagewanted=all&_r =0. 176 Mary Jordan, “Iraqis Refugees Find Sweden’s Doors Closing,” Washington Post, April 10, 2008, accessed May 15, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-‐ dyn/content/article/2008/04/09/AR2008040904319.html. 177 Skocpol and Williamson, Tea Party, 50. 178 Skocpol and Williamson, Tea Party, 200. 179 Davi Barker, “Tea Party Muslims shatter all preconceptions,” examiner.com, August 24, 2011, accessed May 15, 2013, http://www.examiner.com/article/tea-‐party-‐ muslims-‐shatter-‐all-‐preconceptions. 180 Stephanie Condon, “Conservatives more likely to think Obama is Muslim now than in 2008,” CBS News, July 26, 2012, accessed May 15, 2013, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-‐503544_162-‐57480905-‐503544/conservatives-‐more-‐ likely-‐to-‐think-‐obama-‐is-‐muslim-‐now-‐than-‐in-‐2008/. 181 Skocpol and Williamson, Tea Party, 48.

the European far right.”182 [Added emphasis] But neither does such a culture appear to have arrived as of yet, nor is it clear if first steps toward it can be seen as limited only to the Tea Party. I shall therefore focus only on a European perspective here.

10.4 Four Horsemen on the nature of Islamic extremism In an article for Slate in 2007, Hitchens was not keen on making a distinction between a more moderate and an extreme version of Islam, stating that “Islamic belief, however simply or modestly it may be stated, is an extreme position to begin with.”183 He has continuously emphasized a problematic aspect of Islam being that it views itself as the final, perfect revelation, something which he has likened with a totalitarian claim.184 While Christianity and Judaism have historically resorted to torture and censorship against those who have questioned similar truth claims, he says that those are a reality within Islam still today, as are preaches about the need to extend Islam’s dominions. 185 Hitchens determination to fight Islamic militants appears to have been grounded in a firm understanding that the motives behind jihadists’ actions are wholly based on imperialist ambitions for world domination. Shortly after September 11, 2001, he wrote in The Nation about the “Wahhabi-‐indoctrinated sectarians of Al Qaeda” that the grievance and animosity predate even the Balfour Declaration, let alone the occupation of the West Bank. They predate the creation of Iraq as a state. The gates of Vienna would have had to fall to the Ottoman jihad before any balm could begin to be applied to these psychic wounds.186

Consequently, Hitchens refused to consider circumstances such as the Israel-‐Palestine conflict to play into terrorists’ motives, calling them “half-‐balked apologies for terrorism.”187 182 Michael Bérubé, “Michael Bérubé Responds: The Left at Bay,” Politics and Culture 3-‐4 (2010), accessed May 15, 2013, http://www.politicsandculture.org/2010/12/30/the-‐ left-‐at-‐bay/. 183 Hitchens, “God-‐Fearing People,” Slate, July 30, 2007, accessed May 15, 2013, http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/fighting_words/2007/07/godfearing _people.html. 184 See for example Dawkins et al., Discussion, Part 2, around 22:00. 185 Hitchens, God Is Not Great, 123-‐126. 186 Hitchens, “Of Sin, the Left and Islamic Fascism,” The Nation, October 8, 2001, accessed May 15, 2013, http://www.thenation.com/article/sin-‐left-‐islamic-‐fascism#. 187 See: Hitchens, “Why Ask Why?,” Slate, October 3, 2005, accessed, May 15, 2013, http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/fighting_words/2005/10/why_ask_ why.html; http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DRtLUgM1OTA.

Dawkins has said to view Islam as “one of the great evils in the world.”188 Similarly to Hitchens, he points to what he views as the problematic claim that every word of the Koran is literally true. He argues that this has led to a lesser tradition of questioning in the Muslim world—even compared to Christianity in earlier times. Dawkins also shares Hitchens’ view that terrorists have religious reasons for their actions, and concludes that therefore, the problem is not extremism but religious belief itself.189 Dennett speaks very generally about religious extremism. However, touching upon the topic of terrorism in Breaking the Spell, one could initially get the impression that he views the underlying factors as different from those of his Horsemen colleagues: In every place where terrorism has blossomed, those it has attracted are almost all young men who have learned enough about the world to see that their futures look otherwise bleak or uninspiring.190

Dennett worries that the “draconian one-‐child-‐per-‐family measures” in China, and the resulting imbalance between men and women there, could produce such frustrated young men and that “we have a few years to figure out benign channels into which their hormone-‐soaked energies can be directed.”191 However, in a TED talk in 2002, Dennett stressed the importance of ideas. Adopting the concept of memes—that is, replicating ideas—developed by Dawkins in the 1970s, Dennett drew a parallel between what he called toxic ideas and parasites. Explaining how parasitic worms “hijack” brains in ants, leading the ants to expose themselves to cows and sheep with a higher chance for the worm of getting into the cow’s or sheep’s stomach and guarantee its own survival, Dennett drew a parallel to Islam: Well, it’s ideas and not worms that hijack our brains. Now, am I saying that a sizeable minority of the world’s population has had their brain hijacked by parasitic ideas? Oh, it’s worse than that. Most people have.192

188 Dawkins, “Richard Dawkins ‘Islam Is One Of The Great Evils In The World,’” YouTube video, 3:01, interview televised on Dutch station on unknown date, posted by “AtheistStream,” January 6, 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yyNv8kvd2H8. 189 Dawkins, God Delusion, 341-‐348. 190 Dennett, Breaking the Spell, 333. 191 Dennett, Breaking the Spell, 333. 192 Dennett, “Dan Dennett: Dangerous memes,” TED video, 15:31, filmed February 2002, posted July 2007, http://www.ted.com/talks/dan_dennett_on_dangerous_memes.html.

However, the statement should not be understood as a suggestion that most Muslims had had their brains hijacked; instead, Dennett went on to count through a number of infectious ideas people might die for: Islam, Catholicism, but also communism, freedom and justice. Among the Four Horsemen, Harris stands out as being the most critical of Islam: While I do not mean to single out the doctrine of Islam for special abuse, there is no question that, at this point in history, it represents a unique danger to all of us, Muslim and non-‐Muslim alike. . . . In thinking about Islam, and the risk it now poses to the West, we should imagine what it would take to live peacefully with the Christians of the fourteenth century—Christians who were still eager to prosecute people for crimes like host desecration or witchcraft.193

Harris is overtly clear about his view on the nature of Islamic extremism. He says that to be an Islamic extremist simply means to be extreme in one’s devotion; by its very nature, Islam is a religion that aims to dominate the world, with martyrdom and jihad being central to its doctrine. He argues that as long as someone sincerely believes in the Koran, that person “will pose a problem for us,” and further that “most Muslims appear to be ‘fundamentalists’ in the Western sense of the word.”194 Consequently, Harris has said that Islamic terrorists speak the truth when they point to the theological grievances behind their actions.195 Regarding the potential of jihadist ideas to lead to plans of turning Europe into “Eurabia,” Harris suggested in a conversation arranged by the Science Network in 2008 that there are people who really think in those terms. And they’re, they’re not necessarily just the people in the center of the bull’s eye of Islamic infatuation. . . . Just the kind of people, people who would never blow themselves up, but who think it’s a good thing that some people will.196

In a blog post with the heading “In Defense of Profiling” from April 2012, he argued that American airport security operated ineffectively by tedious checks of all passengers. Because he viewed it as likely that terrorists would be Muslims, Harris suggested that 193 Harris, End of Faith, 28. 194 Harris, End of Faith, 28-‐29; 110-‐111. 195 Harris, End of Faith, 29, ”Islamic humiliation – Sam Harris @ The Science Network,” YouTube video, 9:21, from conversation at the Science Network on October 3, 2008, posted by ”FFreeThinker,” December 31, 2008, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MuuKItF_xJo. 196 Harris, “Islamic humiliation.”

there should be a special profiling of “anyone who looks like he or she could conceivably be Muslim.” He said that this would include him, also.197 Later responding to fierce criticism by readers of his blog, he said that the article has been called “racist,” “dreadful,” “sickening,” “appalling,” “frighteningly ignorant,” etc. by (former) fans who profess to have loved everything I’ve written until this moment. I find this reaction difficult to understand. Of course, anyone who imagines that there is no link between Islam and suicidal terrorism might object to what I’ve written here, but I say far more offensive things about Islam in The End of Faith and in many of my essays and lectures.198

Harris has stressed that moderate Muslims—“wherever they are”—ought to be empowered so that they can win a war of ideas against their extremist coreligionists.199 In the next chapter, on religion in the public sphere, we will see that Harris has a very clear understanding of where his statements fit in politically in the West today.

10.5 Conclusion: Four Horsemen on Islamic extremism To the extent that the Four Horsemen talk about the need to fight Islamic terrorism, they are fairly unanimous in what they suggest. Dawkins, Hitchens and Harris were all in favor, or at least not opposed to, the war in Afghanistan. Hitchens also supported the invasion into Iraq, although the perceived connection between Hussein and al-‐Qaeda was only one reason why he did so. Again, back in 2001, support for the War on Terror was overwhelming on both sides of the American political spectrum. I therefore believe that it makes little sense to categorize any support for it politically. If one broadens the context to include the entire West (and leaves aside for the moment political spectrums), one might say that the support for the War on Terror was very much the “American” position. Dawkins, Harris and Hitchens have argued that it is questionable whether Islamic extremists are really very extreme. What is one to make of this? The idea that terrorism and other attempts to win over the world are not in themselves extreme positions 197 Harris, “In Defense of Profiling,” blog, April 28, 2012, http://www.samharris.org/blog/item/in-‐defense-‐of-‐profiling. 198 Harris, “In Defense of Profiling.” 199 Harris, “Sam Harris on the Reality of Islam,” Truthdig, February 7, 2006, accessed May 21, 2013, http://www.truthdig.com/report/item/20060207_reality_islam/.

within Islam, seems to suggest a view of that belief system as inherently dangerous or immoral. But what does this imply about how one sees people who subscribe to Islam? This is not entirely clear, but appears to be that those who sincerely believe in its doctrine are (what is generally described elsewhere as) extremists. Is this synonymous with a view that more than just a small minority of Muslims pose some type of threat to society? That would depend on how many Muslims one thinks actually do take the ideas of the Koran seriously. Here, only Harris’ statement that most Muslims appear to be fundamentalists can be said to fit the far-‐right position. However, taken together, I argue that the writer’s ideas and arguments on the nature of Islamic extremism can be said to lean towards that same position.

11. Speaking critically about religion in the public sphere An explosive part of the New Atheism is the argument that part of the responsibility for

the current role of religion in society relates to the way religious belief is treated in the public sphere. This chapter will not look into politics, but rather into the social aspects of criticizing religion in the West. Because this might be one of the most central messages the New Atheists provide, and likely one contributing factor to the hype of the movement, it will be difficult to provide a lengthier background discussion. Harris says at the beginning of The End of Faith that we will see that the greatest problem confronting civilization is not merely religious extremism: rather, it is the larger set of cultural and intellectual accommodations we have made to faith itself.200

The Four Horsemen show impatience with what they seem to regard as a sort of bulwark against speaking critically about religion in the public sphere. However, what it is that is seen to prevent more forthcoming discussion appears to differ depending on the belief system discussed. Firstly, there is irritation with what is perceived as the social taboo of generally challenging someone’s religious beliefs, regardless of the belief system. (Harris said at a conference that he was receiving angry e-‐mails even from people worshipping Poseidon.201) Secondly, the writers describe a specific problem of criticizing Islam. The concern here is with what is viewed as an inability or unwillingness in Western society to recognize problems which the writers attribute to Islam. We will now first have a look at what the Four Horsemen say about the alleged problems of criticizing religion and religious belief more generally.

200 Harris, End of Faith, 45. 201 Harris, “Sam Harris shows prayer studies for the joke they are,” YouTube video, 5:22, from Beyond Belief symposium in La Jolla, CA on November 5-‐7, 2006, posted by “TheInformedAtheist,” April 14, 2013, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N9sgbw7gdjY.

11.1 Taboo to criticize religious belief? Rozell and Hamilton suggest that there is a “general cultural taboo of talking negatively about religion, or merely just being perceived as in any way negative toward religion.”202 However, they go on to say that the United States has seen occasional “frank and honest” on the topic. One is left guessing whether their first statement about the general cultural taboo thus refers solely to the United States. Interestingly, the authors claim that one reason that a more open discussion is no longer occurring is because of “the anti-‐ religiousness by Dawkins, Hitchens and Harris” that has taken it “off-‐track.” Whereas these New Atheists have directed attention to the role of religion in society, they are seen to have disregarded the fact that religion is an “integral part of humanity.”203

11.2. Four Horsemen on criticizing religious belief Are the Four Horsemen only concerned with religion in the American public sphere? Early on in their discussion, we are introduced to a different view. DENNETT: And too, there’s no polite way to say to somebody… HARRIS: … “You wasted your life.” DENNETT: “Do you realize you wasted your life? Do you realize you just devoted all your efforts and all your goods to the glorification of something which is just a myth?” Or, “ have you ever considered,” even if you say, “have you even considered the possibility that you wasted your life on this?” There’s no, there’s no inoffensive way of saying that, but we do have to say it, because they should jolly well consider it. Same as we do about our own lives!204 [Added emphasis]

If criticizing someone’s belief can be seen as a way of questioning that person’s whole way of living (as Dennett seems to suggest), it is difficult to see how a cultural norm— which urges people not to do so—could be conceived of as uniquely American. This is not to say that it may not be even more socially inappropriate to criticize religion in strongly religious societies, such as the United States. Harris argued in the same Four Horsemen discussion that one reason why criticism of religion is perceived as sensitive is because spiritual experiences are only dignified within religion. Hence, critical examination of religion is likely to be perceived by 202 Rozell and Hamilton, Fundamentalism, Politics and the Law, 3. 203 Rozell and Hamilton, Fundamentalism, Politics and the Law, 3. 204 Dawkins et al., Discussion, Part 1, around 3:40.

religious believers as infringing on “the most important moments in peoples’ lives.”205 Dennett replied on the topic that it was unfortunate that religious people did not value their numinous experiences without viewing them as religious.206 On the same note, Hitchens said that if he “could change one thing,” it would be to enable people to separate “the numinous from the supernatural.”207 In Breaking the Spell, Dennett describes in greater detail the sensitivity of asking too many questions about a god: People of all faiths have been taught that any such questioning [of the nature of God] is somehow insulting or demeaning to their faith, and must be an attempt to ridicule their views. What a fine protective screen this virus provides—permitting it to shed the antibodies of skepticism effortlessly!208

But are offended religious believers sufficient in creating a social taboo of criticizing religion? Dennett talks about his self-‐invented concept belief in belief in God. It refers to widely held beliefs among non-‐religious people that religious faith should be encouraged due to its inherent nobility or benign benefits.209 Harris echoes Dennett’s assertion that there is a widespread conception in society about the benefits of religious belief. But if there are two myths that “seem to have granted us perfect immunity to outbreaks of reasonableness in our public discourse,” he says that the other is that many of us also believe that the terrible things that are sometimes done in the name of religion are the products not of faith per se but of our baser natures—forces like greed, hatred and fear—for which religious beliefs are themselves the best remedy.210

Harris suggests that these ideas extend to “our fellow secularists and our fellow atheists,” which would fit well with the notion of a general taboo.211 205 Dawkins et al., Discussion, Part 1, around 8:40. 206 Dawkins et al., Discussion, Part 1, around 12:10. 207 Dawkins et al., Discussion, Part 1, around 11:00. 208 Dennett, Breaking the Spell, 207. 209 Dennett, Breaking the Spell, 200-‐245, especially 221. 210 Harris, End of Faith, 15. 211 Dawkins et al., Discussion, Part 1, around 1:15.

Dennett has described how non-‐believers have been the most critical of his criticism of religion.212 He says that an honest confrontation with religious belief is also discouraged within academia. But here, other forces are at work. Speaking of an “academic smoke screen” that looks to disqualify the natural sciences from studying religion on the grounds that such an effort is not meaningful, Dennett blames “postmodernists”: In fact, one of the few serious differences between the natural sciences and the humanities is that all too many thinkers in the humanities have decided that the postmodernists are right: it’s all just stories, and all truth is relative. . . . They couldn’t claim to prove that there is no such thing as an objective truth, of course, for that would be to contradict themselves blatantly, and they have at least that much respect for logic.213

Dawkins has also involved postmodernism in his criticism of religion. In a speech in 2012 at the Freedom From Religion National Convention, he pointed to examples of postmodern studies which he saw as obscuring scientific understanding.214 However, that discussion does not relate to the sensitivity of dealing with religion in the public sphere. 11.2.1. “Moderates” vs. extremists? We have already seen the writers question popular conceptions about degrees of devotion among Muslims. More general ideas about the relationship between moderately religious people and those who could rather be described as fundamentalists or extremists are a central part of their discussion on religion in the public sphere. According to Dennett, moderately religious people work as a sort of shield from criticism against fundamentalists or extremists. He views this as problematic since religious moderates in all religions fail to temper those with more radical beliefs.215 To

212 Dawkins et al., Discussion, Part 1, around 8:10. 213 Dennett, Breaking the Spell, 262. 214 Dawkins, “Richard Dawkins addresses FFRF 2012 National Convention,” YouTube video, 1:06:54, from speech at FFRF 2012 National Convention on October 12-‐13, 2012, posted by “FFRForg”, February 4, 2013, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dJTQiChzTNI, around 38:00. 215 Dennett, Breaking the Spell, 297-‐298.

the contrary, he says that these moderates are being used by fanatics in their own ranks to discourage any criticism of religion from occurring in society.216 Hitchens appears to have tried to make the point that moderately religious actors constitute a further problem, namely that of a more outright enabler of extremist violence by making excuses for it. Regarding the Danish cartoon crisis in 2006, Hitchens said: His Holiness the Pope condemned what? The cartoons. The [United States] State Department condemned the cartoons. Not the violence, not the campaign of intimidation. His, the archbishop of Canterbury, condemned the cartoons. Every church I know of condemned the blasphemy of the cartoons. . . . In other words, ladies and gentleman: The barbarians are not at the gate. They are not at the gate. They are well inside. And who held open the door for them? The other religious did!217

Hitchens elaboration is somewhat confusing. It is not clear in what way the apologetic function of non-‐extremists (the Pope might not necessarily count as moderately religious) would differ from that of other non-‐religious actors. After all, the United States State Department is not a religious actor. In the previous chapter, we saw Hitchens say that “Islamic belief” had an inherently extreme character. In the Four Horsemen discussion, he pointed to similar tendencies within Christianity. Speaking of senior figures within the Church of England who he said had “recently” proposed that floods in New Yorkshire resulted from homosexuality, Hitchens concluded that the “supposed . . . mild, and reflective, and thoughtful . . . Church” was making “fanatical pronouncements.” 218 In Hitchens’ view, then, it seems questionable whether a term like “religious moderate” carries much weight. Dawkins says in the preface to his paperback edition of The God Delusion that to the vast majority of believers around the world, religion all too closely resembles what you hear from the likes of Robertson, Falwell or Haggard, Osama bin Laden or the Ayatollah Khomeini.219

However, he still cares to distinguish between moderates and extremists: 216 Dennett, Breaking the Spell, 300. 217 Hitchens, “Hitchens ’07: Danish Muhammad Cartoons,” YouTube video, 7:09, from conversation with Tim Rutten in Los Angeles on June 4, 2007, posted by “MrMindFeed,” April 16, 2012, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LZZ96SArpuc. 218 Dawkins et al., Discussion, Part 1, around 26:30. 219 Dawkins, God Delusion, 15.

As long as we accept the principle that religious faith must be respected simply because it is religious faith, it is hard to withhold respect from the faith of Osama bin Laden and the suicide bombers. The alternative, one so transparent that it should need no urging, is to abandon the principle of automatic respect for religious faith. This is one reason why I do everything in my power to warn people against faith itself, not just against so-‐called ‘extremist’ faith. The teachings of ‘moderate’ religion, though not extremist in themselves, are an open invitation to extremism.220

Could moderate religion not, in reverse, lead over to secularism? Responding to an allegation that his strident tone might benefit those (fundamentalists) proposing Intelligent Design, Dawkins says that the proper conflict is not one of religious moderation and religious extremism, but rather one of rationalism and superstition.221 In other words, it seems that Dawkins acknowledges that there are people who can be described as moderately religious, but he does not appear to view them as either significant in numbers or strategically important in dealing with extremists. Harris says that religious extremism is not very rare by means of its occurrence, and further that there is a blurry line between moderate and extreme religion. As the only Horseman, he suggests that another problem with religious moderation is the legitimacy given to organized religion, thereby hindering the discovery of “real” spiritual and ethical truths.222

220 Dawkins, God Delusion, 345-‐346. 221 Dawkins, God Delusion, 92. 222 Harris, Letter, 103-‐107.

11.3 Taboo to criticize Islam? In “Western Hostility toward Muslims: A History of the Present,”223 Tomaž Mastnak presents a historiography of Western intellectuals’ attitudes towards Islam from the point of the First Crusade via Martin Luther, Voltaire and up until today. He concludes that “Islamophobia” is the “the dominant Western tradition.”224 While Mastnak argues that commitment to tolerance is a central part of the West’s self-‐image, hatred towards Muslims is “commonplace” in Europe and North America. Here, Islam is not unusually described as a threat to democracy or even civilization.225 Mastnak’s outlook on the West as inherently hostile to Islam and Muslims is— regardless of its accuracy—hardly helpful in understanding why speaking critically of Islam in the West could be considered taboo. Is it possible to contrast Mastnak’s view to any other? French philosopher Pascal Bruckner does not see Europe as being very hostile to Islam. In his book The Tyranny of Guilt: An Essay on Western Masochism, he argues that “Islamophobia” is a term coined by fundamentalists in the 1970s, supposed to mirror xenophobia and “a clever invention because it amounts to making Islam a subject that one cannot touch without being accused of racism.”226 Bruckner says that the expression has taken root in Western society because Westerners suffer from a guilt complex over past imperialist evil-‐doings, and are now applying a condescending relativism to Muslims. He even suggests that despite their sympathies for the victims of 9/11, “many Europeans . . . were telling themselves that the Americans deserved what they got.”227 In an article called “Enlightenment fundamentalism or racism of the anti-‐racists?,”228 Bruckner defends ex-‐Muslim Ayaan Hirsi Ali from criticism for her stand-‐taking against Islam. Somali-‐born and former Dutch politician Hirsi Ali is a central figure in criticism of Islam today. A year after Hitchens death due to cancer in 2011, she went on to take his 223 Tomaž Mastnak, “Western Hostility toward Muslims: A History of the Present,” in Islamophobia/Islamophilia: Beyond the Politics of Enemy and Friend, ed. Andrew Shryock (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010). 224 Mastnak, “Western Hostility,” 42. 225 Mastnak, “Western Hostility,” 29. 226 Pascal Bruckner, The Tyranny of Guilt: Western Masochism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 48. 227 Bruckner, Western Masochism, 14. 228 Bruckner, ”Enlightenment fundamentalism or racism of the anti-‐racists?,” signandsight.com, January 24, 2007, accessed May 14, 2013, http://www.signandsight.com/features/1146.html.

place in a discussion with Dawkins, Dennett and Harris at the Global Atheist Convention in Australia.229 Bruckner’s description of Islam and the West—again, whether legitimate or not— would render the Four Horsemen’s view of the sensitive nature of criticizing Islam intelligible. His suggestion that criticism of Islam may be viewed as racist also seems to make sense in the light of what we saw in the chapter on Islamic extremism.

11.4 Four Horsemen on criticizing Islam At the said atheist convention in Australia, Dawkins, Dennett, Harris and Hirsi Ali began a discussion talking especially about Islam. Reflecting on allegations from Christians that the New Atheists focus more on Christianity than on Islam when criticizing religion, Dawkins said that I think we need to discuss that, because it’s true that, uhm, the threat of having your head cut off, uhm, is somewhat of a deterrant.230

However, the Four Horsemen’s issue with what one may or may not say in the West about Islam has more to do with secular Westerners than Muslim extremists. Perhaps because he is the most critical among the Four Horsemen when it comes to Islam, Harris has been very vocal about what he views as liberals’ failure of understanding the threat it poses. In an article called “Islam and the Future of Liberalism,” he suggests that this does not bode well either for the future of liberalism or civilization.231 Appearing on “The Last Word with Lawrence O’Donnell” on MSNBC, he expressed concern about his perception that only “our own [American] religious demagogues” were “speaking candidly” about Islam, and that they were doing so for the wrong reasons. 232 In a second edition of an Internet Q&A session called “Ask Sam Harris 229 See: Dawkins, Dennett, Harris and Ayaan Hirsi Ali, ”Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, Sam Harris [and] Ayaan Hirsi Ali,” YouTube video, 1:02:28, from Global Atheist Convention in Melbourne on April 15, 2012, posted by ”Juan Varni,” November 9, 2012, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qtBsZZ7veaI. 230 Dawkins, Dennett, Harris and Ali, ”Dawkins, Dennett, Harris Ayaan [and] Hirsi Ali,” around 10:10. 231 Harris, “The End of Liberalism?,” blog, September 18, 2006, http://www.samharris.org/site/full_text/the-‐end-‐of-‐liberalism/. 232 Harris, “Sam Harris on Islam the Religion of Peace,” YouTube video, 6:04, appearance on The Last Word with Lawrence O’Donnell televised by MSNBC on November 16, 2010,

Anything,” Harris responded to a question on how to handle an increasingly sensitive nature of criticizing Islam after the Utøya massacre in Norway in 2011: This is a real concern for me. There was already such a politically correct impediment— especially in Europe, but everywhere—in the way of speaking honestly about specific doctrines within Islam and they way in which they are actually held by Muslims in various communities. . . . We can’t lie about the nature of Islam. Given the fact that very few people on the left realize this, or want to talk about this publicly, you find yourself echoing the words of reactionaries and worse, and it’s a huge problem discursively.

For Harris, a solution to the problem was to make it clear at every moment that you’re talking about ideas, you’re talking about Islam, you’re not talking about people, and the color of people’s skin, certainly, and you’re not talking about specific cultures. You’re talking about ideas and their consequences.233

The statement is interesting in that Harris here shows himself to be having a view of the political climate in the West surrounding the topic of Islam that is very reminiscent of how it was described earlier, in chapter 10. However, we saw that on at least one occasion—when discussing airport security—he did not live up to his own instruction to speak of ideas and not people. Harris wrote in a blog post after the attacks in Norway that he hoped that the mass murder would dampen the enthusiasm for racist nationalism in Europe, but feared that instead, there would be greater emphasis in society on the dangers of “Islamophobia.”234 The other Horsemen show similar concerns about Western attitudes towards Islam. Regarding different standards being applied in the West to the own and to the Muslim society, Dennett said at the Atheist convention that

posted by ”Sundried Atheist,” November 19, 2010, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8E1u9lQeAsY. 233 Harris, “Ask Sam Harris Anything #2,” YouTube video, 1:00:54, private Q&A session from August 2011, posted by ”mahalodotcom,” August 11, 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7qX_d4TDmz0, around 36:30. 234 Harris, ”Christian Terrorism and Islamophobia,” blog, July 24, 2011, accessed May 21, 2013, http://www.samharris.org/blog/item/christian-‐terrorism-‐and-‐islamophobia.

I think that the humanities and social sciences have a lot to answer for in their infatuation, which now seems to be waning with postmodernism and a sort of hypermulticulturalism—which I think is one of the most reactionary forces on the planet.235

A reoccurring subject is what the writers view as timid reactions in the West to Islamic threats of violence. Dawkins commented on the fatwa issued by Ayatollah Khomeini against Salman Rushdie following the publication of the British novelist’s The Satanic Verses in 1988: At the time of the fatwa against Salman Rushdie some of the most disgraceful episodes were Western liberals who almost sided with the Ayatollah, as though somehow they were expiating their collective guilt for what white people have been doing throughout history.236

Here, Dawkins echoes Bruckner’s suggestion that Western guilt played into these liberal’s behavior. As we have seen already, Hitchens, who personally knew Rushdie, was highly critical of

the response in the West to the 2006 Danish cartoon crisis.237 In God Is Not Great, he blames fear and “the morally lazy practice of relativism” (here also echoing Bruckner) for what he deemed the West’s cowardly reaction towards it.238 In a debate with Islamic scholar and preacher Tariq Ramadan in October 2012, Hitchens let show impatience with reactions to Islamic terror attacks stressing that they had nothing to do with Islam. He pointed out that since there was no authority within the religion, it was impossible to tell what could or could not be viewed as the “real” Islam. 239

235 “Dawkins, Dennett, Harris and Ali,” around 8:30. 236 “Dawkins, Dennett, Harris and Ali,” around 5:30. 237 See also Hitchens, “Assassins of the Mind,” Vanity Fair, February 2009, accessed May 14, 2013, http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2009/02/hitchens200902. 238 Hitchens, God Is Not Great, 281. 239 Hitchens, “Christopher Hitchens vs Tariq Ramadan – Is Islam a Religion of Peace (2010),” YouTube video, 1:39:19, from debate with Tariq Ramadan in New York on October 5, 2010, posted by “LeCaNANDian,” August 18, 2012, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=24J3Y0mtWZU, around 15:10.

11.5 Conclusion: Four Horsemen on speaking critically about religion in the public sphere The Four Horsemen point to three main reasons why they view religion as protected from criticism in the public sphere: a widespread conception of such criticism as impolite; a common perception of religious belief as inherently noble or beneficial; and a tendency to view the “ills” sometimes ascribed to religion as not stemming from religion, but from other factors. Even other atheists and secularists are seen to wrongly reinforce the resulting social taboo of speaking critically about religion. Dennett also pointed to postmodern tendencies within academia as hindering more forthright confrontation with religion when it came to studying the subject. Moderately religious people are, to the extent that they are recognized as a separate category of religious believers, seen to hinder criticism directed against extremists by taking offense at such criticism. They are not seen as helpful in tempering their co-‐ believers, as in some cases, they even act exculpatory of religious violence. Islam is seen as a particularly problematic topic. The Four Horsemen point to widespread timidity in society in speaking critically about Islam, and are strongly condemning of what are seen as Westerners’ (and in particular “Western liberals’”) reactions to Islamic threats of violence. While the more general concerns about criticizing religion are clearly a social matter, we can see that the topic of Islam in the West constantly pulls into a political direction. Where do the Four Horsemen’s ideas about the need for a more critical discussion in the public sphere on religious belief fit into a wider social context? Stephen Bullivant has argued that in the religious United States, non-‐belief is not very popular; in much more secularized England, the topic barely enjoys any interest at all.240 So who could possibly share the writers’ views on this topic? As we saw Amarasingam point out in the beginning of this essay, what may in part be new about the New Atheism is the social revival of atheism which it helped create. Indeed, Richard Cimino and Christopher Smith have argued that the New Atheists have helped an empowerment of American freethinkers: “The tension between debunking religious belief and pressing for equal treatment in a religious and pluralistic society runs through much of the discourse of 240 Stephen Bullivant, ”The New Atheism and Sociology: Why Here? Why Now? What Next?,” in Amarasingam, Religion and the New Atheism, 112-‐114.

American freethinkers.”241 The New Atheist ideas on this topic can thus be seen as coinciding with those of fringe movements in American (and perhaps to a lesser degree, European) society, calling for more outspoken criticism of religion in the public sphere.

241 Richard Cimino and Christopher Smith, ”The New Atheism and the Empowerment of American Freethinkers,” in Amarasingam, Religion and the New Atheism, 154.

12. Context and conclusions Having examined the topics of the hypothesis, we have now arrived at the final chapter. We have seen that the Four Horsemen’s ideas and arguments match an American liberal position in the domestic struggles in the United States involving the Christian Right; what can be described as an “American” position on Islamic terrorism and the War on Terror; and have leaned towards or partly matched a European far-‐right position in their views on Islamic extremism (or Islam). Finally, they have criticized what they see as the privileged status of religion in the public sphere in the West, taking the standpoint sometimes shared by freethinkers and secular humanist groups. To what extent do the ideas and arguments brought forth by Dawkins, Dennett, Harris and Hitchens appear coherent? Is it possible to talk of one New Atheism? The writers certainly differ in their perspectives. Farthest apart are perhaps Dennett and Harris. While Dennett is firmly steeped in academic tradition and has a rather general take on religion, Harris has a particular focus on Islam and is more worried about its role in the world. Had it been the purpose of this essay to make sense of only these two Americans’ views, that would have been a difficult task. But together, I find that the four writers are sufficiently coherent in their ideas and arguments so that one may indeed speak of “one” New Atheism. Some of what has been discussed I find it hard to contextualize further than what I have done already. As we saw in the chapter on Islamic extremism, three of the Horsemen’s support of the War on Terror coincided with an American political consensus on this foreign policy issue. Further, their ideas about a social taboo of criticizing religion in the West can be seen to be shared by freethinkers or secular humanist organizations. What I will turn to focus on now is how one may understand the combination of liberal ideas expressed on the cultural issues in the American culture war, with those leaning towards a European far-‐right position on the topic of Islamic extremism. American comedian Bill Maher is a notable liberal and critic of religion. Christopher Hitchens, Richard Dawkins and Sam Harris have appeared on multiple occasions on his talk show “Real Time with Bill Maher” on the HBO network. But discussing the relationship between the West and Islam on September 21, 2012, Maher turned to guest Salman Rushdie:

There is something I would like to name… and that is “9/11 liberals.” ‘Cause remember the 9/11 conservatives? . . . These were people who, like, were changed by 9/11, but they became conservatives; they wanted war . . . 9/11 liberals are different. That’s like, you, me, [Christopher] Hitchens was one, Ayaan Hirsi Ali, who else is on this…? Sam Harris! These are people, we are, we are liberals and we’re with liberals on almost every issue. But not the Muslim issue.

Maher went on to put the finger on what characterizes his idea of the 9/11 liberal. Responding more specifically to the criticism against a controversial Newsweek cover of furious Muslim protesters, and an article in the same magazine by Hirsi Ali, Maher said: You know, the problem is that liberals see this picture and they go “This is not all Muslims!” And that is very true. Most Muslims don’t go in the street like this. The point [Hirsi Ali] was making, and that I’ve tried to make [is], “Yeah, but most Muslims—at least half of them, I think, around the world—think it is OK to kill somebody if they insult the Prophet. “And that is a big problem! That is a clash of civilizations!242

As fitting a “9/11 liberal” position may be the most neutral description of how one could label the writers’ ideas and arguments. However, I will go on to present two opposing, less neutral interpretations. The first is presented to us by an author who stresses that the Four Horsemen’s views on Islam and Muslims are central to what is essentially a racist worldview. Here, the writers’ liberal ideas in the American culture war are irrelevant. The other alternative suggests that the liberal ideas on cultural issues are symptomatic of a liberal or “liberal-‐left” mindset that is also behind their criticism of Islam. We shall turn first to the interpretation of the New Atheists as new, scientific racists.

242 William Maher, “Salman Rushdie on Bill Maher discussing ‘9/11 liberals,’” YouTube video, 7:46, from Real Time with Bill Maher televised by HBO on September 21, 2012, posted by “The Sasss1,” September 22, 2012, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E1lZnXUe0qY.

12.1 Scientific racists? In the spring of 2013, Murtaza Hussain wrote an article on Al Jazeera called “Scientific racism, militarism, and the new atheists.”243 Going back to the 1700s and some scientists’ racist practices of describing those of other skin color as intellectually or morally inferior to white Westerners, Hussain suggests that “the crudest racism has often been cloaked in the guise of disinterested scientific inquiry.”244 He argues that the New Atheists—writing here of Dawkins, Harris and Hitchens—are at the forefront of a modern scientific racism. Hussain refers to twitter messages by Dawkins about “Islamic barbarism,” Hitchens “outright bloodlust towards Muslims,” but most of all to Harris, and several of the neuroscientist’s statements mentioned earlier in this essay. He says that even though Islam is not a race, and criticism of it therefore not in itself racist, the collective targeting of Muslims who generally are not white is still a form of racism. If one sets up a premise that racism means prejudice or stigmatization of groups of certain skin color(s), and considers the New Atheists’ view that Islam is immoral, what would stand in the way of a racist label indeed only seems to be the question of how many (non-‐white) Muslims one believes to sincerely subscribe to Islam—that is, to what extent one does target Muslims as a group. If the New Atheists’ ideas on Islam and Muslims are racist, where does this place them in a sociopolitical context? Socially, they would be confined to some of the most condemned and socially inappropriate in the West today. This would also correspond with the social taboo of criticizing Islam that both Bruckner and the writers themselves have pointed to. In terms of politics, the writers’ views would be allowed to be even a little “less” than racist, and still be seen as ending up on the far-‐right end on the European political spectrum. As we have seen Zúquete suggest, the far-‐right parties are often—that is, not always—racist. Further, and except for Vlaams Belang and perhaps some other parties, the European extreme-‐right may largely promote fairly liberal ideas on cultural issues, which are not at odds with the Four Horsemen’s standpoint in the American culture war. We shall now turn to the alternative interpretation. 243 Murtaza Hussain, “Scientific racism, militarism, and the new atheists,” Aljazeera, last modified April 2, 2013, accessed May 21, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/04/20134210413618256.html. 244 Hussain, ”Scientific racism.”

12.2 Anti-‐“Manichean” left? In Alan Sokal’s Beyond the Hoax, the author finally takes a stand with the New Atheists. In an interview with Sokal in The Philosopher’s Magazine Online, interviewee Julian Baggini commented: When thinking about why Sokal gets involved with these debates [on religion in society], it’s important to remember his political motivations. Sokal is a man of the left . . . Underlying his work outside of physics is a strong conviction that it is a disaster for the left to abandon a commitment to reason.245 [Added emphasis]

I believe there are two key words in this passage worthy of consideration for an alternative understanding to the far-‐right labeling of (one part of) the Four Horsemen’s ideas and arguments. These are the political left, and reason. To focus first separately on the latter, and recalling Bradley and Tate’s suggestion that the New Atheists writings were in part a reaction against what they saw as “postmodern mumbo-‐jumbo,” it is well worth pointing out that Sokal is a notorious critic of postmodernism. In 1996, he caused a great stir with the so-‐called Sokal affair after submitting a hoax article consisting of nonsensical “postmodern clichés” to the academic journal Social Text, which unknowingly went on to publish it. On the philosophical movement of postmodernism, the Encyclopedia Britannica states in a first, short summary: Postmodernism . . . in Western philosophy, a late 20th century movement characterized by broad skepticism, subjectivism, or relativism; a general suspicion of reason; and an acute sensitivity to the role of ideology in asserting and maintaining political and economic power.246 [Added emphasis]

If we accept this very short definition of the postmodern philosophical movement as satisfyingly correct, we can in the light of the findings of this study so far conclude that— with the exception for skepticism—the Four Horsemen’s views on religion and science are not likely to resonate well with the characteristics of postmodernism. We have seen that Dennett and Dawkins, who both have been academics for several decades, have

245 Julian Baggini, “My philosophy: Alan Sokal,” The Philosophers’ Magainze, November 4, 2009, accessed May 15, 2013, http://philosophypress.co.uk/?m=200911. 246 Encyclopaedia Britannia, Online, s.v. ”postmodernism.”

more explicitly reacted against postmodernism. But only Dennett has raised it within the discussion on religion in the public sphere. Harris and Hitchens seem less preoccupied with postmodernism and more with the worldview of one American linguist and philosopher, namely Noam Chomsky. This is especially interesting since Chomsky, who has been an influential figure on the American left, has repeatedly criticized what he considers to be the unintelligible language of postmodern science. As it happens, both he and Dawkins have a quote on the back cover of a book written by Sokal and Jean Bricmont entitled Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodernists Abuse of Science.247 Here, the disagreement could not possibly be understood as being over postmodernism in academia. In The End of Faith, under the heading “Leftist Unreason and the Strange Case of Noam Chomsky,” Harris sharply criticizes Chomsky’s utterances after September 11. Responding to the linguist’s suggestion that the U.S. bombing of the Al-‐Saifa pharmaceutical plant in Sudan in 1998 was a more deplorable action than the 9/11 attacks, Harris said that whereas the United States had “much to atone for,” the difference between his and Chomsky’s home country and al-‐Qaeda were the intentions. While the bombing of the Al-‐Saifa plant was undertaken in a belief that it was an al-‐ Qaeda chemical weapons site, bin Laden’s plans were about killing as many civilians as possible.248 Quoting a defender of Chomsky’s stressing a United States habit of positioning itself as a “well-‐intentioned giant,” Harris commented: But we are, in many respects, just such a “well-‐intentioned giant.”249

In the introduction to a compilation of articles and letters entitled Christopher Hitchens and his Critics — Terror, Iraq and the Left, editors Cottee and Cushman comment that the harshest of Hitchens’ later battles (since 2001) had been those with what they call “the Western Left—the very political family from which he himself descended.”250 In an interview in November 2010, Hitchens further commented on his initial reaction to the attacks on September 11, 2001, explaining that the event was also the starting point of a 247 Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont, Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals’ Abuse of Science (New York: Picador, 1998). 248 Harris, End of Faith, 139-‐142. 249 Harris, End of Faith, 142. 250 Simon Cottee and Thomas Cushman, Christopher Hitchens and His Critics: Terror, Iraq and the Left (New York, New York University Press, 2008), 3.

divide between him and former political allies: ‘OK, now, if you don’t recognize this is a crisis, when would you recognize one?’ And then very soon succeeded by the realization—I had by then been working for the Nation magazine as a columnist, for the flagship journal of the American Left, for upwards of two decades—immediately realizing that I wasn’t going to like what quite a lot of my comrades were going to say. And I remember thinking of Noam Chomsky, Michael Moore, Howard Zinn and a few others. They would find a way of explaining this away. . . . I wasn’t prepared to tolerate that.251 [Added emphasis]

Hitchens, who had several written exchanges with Chomsky in the first decade of the 21st century, summarized concisely in an interview in 2005 his view about what set him and Chomsky apart: He [Chomsky] did not finally think that the United States of America was a good idea. He thought it had been, sort of, all genocide since Columbus, basically. I mean, that’s not simplifying his opinion by very much.252

Harris’ and Hitchens’ disagreement with Chomsky appears to come down to differing sentiments about the role and responsibility of the United States in world politics. Surely, this must be considered a very different concern from Dennett’s and Dawkins’, regarding contemporary trends in academia? British journalist and author Nick Cohen suggests that it is not: Noam Chomsky in his political writings and the cultural theorising of Michel Foucault and the postmodernists anticipated the 21st century left ideology. . . . All they have is a criticism of the existing order. In this mental universe, no movement that challenges the existing order can be unambiguously condemned.253

Who is it that represents this “left” ideology in the 21st century? Cohen argues that with 251 Hitchens, “Christopher Hitchens on Cancer and Atheism, Lateline ABC – Part 3 of 4 – November 2010,” YouTube video, 15:07, interview by Tony Jones televised by ABC in November 2010, posted by ”mccainisthroughX,” February 14, 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dq_kMsrVynU. 252 Hitchens, “Hitchens: Marx, New Left (Leftists), Chomsky’s sympathies to Theocratic Nihilists,” YouTube video, 4:13, from speech in Arlington, Virginia on June 17, 2005, posted by “AustralianNeoCon2,” February 11, 2013, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kfh_6_SDe8g. 253 Nick Cohen, ”Foreword: The New Left and the Old Far Right,” in Marsden and Savigny, Media, Religion and Conflict.

the decline of socialism, the leftist agenda has come to fit perfectly with an at best moderately politically engaged liberal mainstream. This is further reflected in the title of his book expanding on the topic: What’s Left? How Liberals Lost Their Way.254 Cohen says that the new leftists or liberals despise the United States, feel guilt over past Western imperialism, and do not see themselves as worthy of criticizing intolerance in other places of the world. For Cohen, this intolerance is made up of what he views as fascist Islamic movements. Consequently, “it has become racist to oppose sexists, homophobes and fascists from other cultures.”255 In 2006, Jewish-‐German publicist Henryk M. Broder released a book arguing very much in the style of Bruckner and Cohen, accusing Europeans of appeasing what he calls Islamic fascism.256 Together with publicists Michael Miersch and Dirk Maxeiner, Broder runs a much-‐debated weblog called “Achse des Guten” (“Axis of Good”). Highly critical of what they see as a European appeasement tactic to aggressive Islamism, the writers accuse the European left for Anti-‐Semitism masqueraded as anti-‐Zionism. In an interview, Miersch describes a reaction to September 11 almost identical to that of Hitchens’: After September 11 . . . there was a divide among friends. Suddenly you were very alone, if you didn’t join in with choir of ‘The Yanks are to blame themselves.’ And so those who were against the rampant contempt towards America drew closer together.257 [Added emphasis]

Who is the left here? In an article called “Ist die Linke noch links?”258 (“Is the Left still left?”), Maxeiner and Miersch deliberately choose to use the term “the left” undifferentiated. This wider perspective corresponds with that of both Bruckner and Cohen. Moreover, Maxeiner and Miersch argue that this new leftist mainstream has 254 Cohen, What’s Left? How Liberals Lost Their Way (London: Fourth Estate, 2007). 255 Cohen, ”Foreword,” xxiii. 256 Henryk M. Broder, Hurra wir kapitulieren!: Von der Lust am Einknicken (München: Pantheon, 2007). 257 Michael Miersch, ”’Die Linke hat uns verlassen’ – Interview mit Michael Miersch,” by Fabian Heinzel, Freiewelt.net, October 5, 2009, accessed May 15, 2013, http://www.freiewelt.net/nachricht-‐2134/%22die-‐linke-‐hat-‐uns-‐verlassen%22-‐-‐-‐ interview-‐mit-‐michael-‐miersch.html: ”Nach dem 11. September ging bei ihm, wie bei Maxeiner, mir und vielen anderen ein Riss durch den Freundeskreis. Plötzlich war man sehr allein, wenn man nicht in den „Die Amis sind selbst schuld“-‐Chor einstimmte… Und so rückten die, denen die grassierende Amerikaverachtung zuwider war, enger zusammen.” 258 Dirk Maxeiner und Michael Miersch, Ist die Linke noch links?: Der Abschied von Freiheit, Gleichheit und Brüderlichkeit (Berlin: Comdok, 2005).

betrayed the old left’s ideals: it has inverted the values of equality, internationalism and anti-‐fascism, rejected the Enlightenment and progress. Cohen echoes this almost to the word: “’Internationalism’, ‘solidarity’, and ‘fraternity’ now feel like dead words from a lost age.”259 We may compare this finally also to an American writer. Academic Michael Bérubé speaks of what he calls the “Manichean left,” with Chomsky at the forefront, in his book The Left at War.260 He describes the Manichean left as emphasizing arguments of corporate media producing a “false consciousness.” This, Bérubé says, has had devastating effects on the America’s foreign policy: At just the time when the United States needed a vigorous and widespread popular dissent from the depredation of the Bush-‐Cheney regime, the Manichean left stepped forward with a form of critique which holds that the United States is responsible for the emergence of al-‐Qaeda. . . . I believe that Manichean left has lost sight of what should be the central emphases of the left: the advocacy of equality and freedom, the yin and yang of democratic theory and practice.261

Are the Four Horsemen ideas and arguments to be classified as liberal-‐left in an older, anti-‐Manichean left style? It would certainly be ironic if a political epithet for these a-‐ theists should be another negation of something they oppose.

12.3 Where to go from here I have tried in this essay to understand how a movement’s ideas and arguments about contemporary society can be said to fit into a sociopolitical context. To succeed in doing so, it has been necessary both to find and understand ideas and arguments as presented in the sources, but also to arrive at an interpretation of a wider socio-‐political context in which they have been expressed. This has been a significant, but I believe sufficiently manageable task. I have looked to answer what the New Atheists’ primary concerns are both with religion, as well as attitudes in the West towards religion. As to the first task, we saw in the literature review in the beginning of this thesis that this has been suggested to be 259 Cohen, “Foreword,” xx. 260 Michael Bérubé, The Left at War (New York: New York University Press, 2009), accessed May 21, 2013, ebrary (ID: 10347233). 261 Bérubé, Left at War, 11.

Islamic extremism, or possibly even just Islam. This turned out be very much a correct assertion. But since Dawkins, Dennett, Harris and Hitchens seem to have little hope in tempering extremists, and only limited hope at reaching out to more moderately religious Muslims (who are seen as largely absent in the discussion on the extremists in their religion), their impatience is perhaps directed even more towards a Western society that is seen to act to timidly around what is viewed as a significant conflict with Islam. Because views in academia and elsewhere on the contemporary society appear to be far from unanimous—sometimes they appear even to be diametrically opposed—I have found it reasonable to consider different interpretations of the writers’ standpoints. Consequently, how one may view the New Atheists’ ideas and arguments as discussed here will differ depending on the interpretation adopted. Whether one decides to consider the writers as essentially prolonging a racist tradition, or to think of them as reacting towards leftist or liberal ideals seen to be declining in the West, is something I have left for the reader to decide. One thing that I believe that this thesis has shown is the difficulty, perhaps impossibility, of speaking about beliefs and ideas without eventually involving those who subscribe to them. It is only one aspect of the New Atheism that has been dealt with here, but I believe it to be the most interesting one. Plenty of questions remain. What impact has the New Atheism had on Western society? Is it still relevant almost ten years after the release of the movement’s first book, or has the hype cooled? Has it attracted readership because of what it had to say about the social implications of questioning others’ metaphysical beliefs, or was the public’s interest sparked by ever more tense ties between the West and the Muslim world? For the sake of a good outcome, these questions deserve all the attention they can get.

Sammanfattning på svenska I denna masteruppsats har jag haft som syfte att placera idéer och argument framförda av nyateisterna Richard Dawkins, Daniel C. Dennett, Sam Harris och Christopher Hitchens (The Four Horsemen) i ett samtida sociopolitiskt sammanhang. Fokus har legat vid författarnas åsikter om religionens roll i samhället under 2000-‐talet. Jag har försökt att ta reda på vilka aspekter nyateisterna anser utgöra de största orosmomenten både vad gäller religiös närvaro, men även när det kommer till det västerländska samhällets inställning till religion. Min utgångspunkt har varit att deras idéer och argument rörande dessa ämnen är nära förknippade med vissa sociala eller politiska frågor i väst idag. Källorna har dels utgjorts av författarnas böcker förknippade med nyateismen. Dessa är Dawkins The God Delusion; Dennetts Breaking the Spell; Harris The End of Faith och Letter to a Christian Nation; samt Hitchens God Is Not Great. Därtill har jag använt mig av artiklar, bloggar och audiovisuellt material tillgängligt på internet. För att närma mig en förståelse av det sociopolitiska klimatet i Europa och USA har jag främst försökt etablera vad jag har valt att kalla för politiska referenspunkter att jämföra författarnas åsikter med. Här har så kallade centrala texter (som förespråkar en viss ideologi eller politisk ståndpunkt) och sekundärlitteratur varit nyckelbegrepp. Genom tidigare forskning och egen förståelse ställde jag en hypotes om att nyateisternas huvudsakliga oro riktade sig mot den amerikanska kristna högern, islamistisk extremism, och ett socialt tabu mot att yttra sig kritiskt om religion i det offentliga samtalet i väst. Denna hypotes visade sig stämma. Presentationen av forskningsresultaten inleddes med att redogöra för författarnas syn på den kristna högern i USA. Denna sociala rörelse har under 2000-‐talet haft starka åsikter både om amerikansk utrikes-‐och inrikespolitik. Av nyateisterna beskrivs den som problematisk mest på grund av engagemanget i inrikespolitiken, nämligen på den konservativa sidan av det populariserade konceptet om ett amerikanskt kulturkrig mellan konservativa och liberaler. Jag såg närmare på fem ”kulturkrigskonflikter” som författarna diskuterar. Dessa rör striden om huruvida evolutionen eller skapelseberättelsen bör läras ut i amerikanska (och viss mån brittiska) skolor, samt abort, dödshjälp, stamcellsforskning och synen på moral. Som väntat förespråkade alla författare utlärandet av evolutionsteorin. I den mån de uttalade sig om abort, dödshjälp eller stamcellsforskning förespråkade de legalisering. I det amerikanska kulturkrigets alternativ mellan att stå för en antingen absolut moralsyn eller moralrelativism tog de

inte parti. Enligt de politiska referenspunkter som jag på förhand etablerat kunde författarna sammanfattningsvis anses ta den liberala sidan i det amerikanska kulturkriget. Fenomenet islamistisk extremism bjöd in till två skilda politiska konflikter. I USA bedömde jag denna vara stöd för eller motstånd till kriget mot terrorismen, medan europeisk politisk debatt istället rör ett hot (eller icke-‐hot) från islamistisk extremism (alternativt islam). I kriget mot terrorn visade det sig omöjligt att etablera politiska referenspunkter, eftersom sekundärlitteraturen pekade på en politisk konsensuskultur i USA inför invasionen av Afghanistan efter 9/11. Dawkins, Harris och Hitchens tog upp ämnet och uttalade alla sitt stöd för detta krig. Hitchens förordade även invasionen i Irak, där Dawkins motsatte sig och Harris förhöll sig neutral. Jag lyckades inte komma över några uttalanden av Dennett på detta område. Rörande hotet från islamistisk extremism framstod polariseringen i europeisk politik vara väldigt tydlig mellan den s.k. extremhögern och det övriga politiska etablissemanget. Dock framstod det inte som självklart vad som kännetecknade den europeiska extremhögerns idéer om karaktären av ett hot från islam eller muslimer. Jag definierade därför en högerextrem position som synonym med en uppfattning om att ”fler än en liten minoritet av muslimer utgör någon typ av hot” mot västvärlden. Åtminstone Dawkins, Harris och Hitchens var återigen eniga, den här gången om att det var mycket tveksamt huruvida islamistiska extremister verkligen kunde beskrivas vara ”extrema.” Islam framhölls som ett till sin natur farlig eller omoraliskt trossystem, och utövares faktiska idéer om jihad ansågs ligga bakom terroristhandlingar. Här anslöt sig till synes även Dennett, genom sin betoning på vikten av ”giftiga” idéer. Däremot var det överlag oklart vad författarna ansåg om antalet muslimer som faktiskt trodde på koranen. Endast Harris framhöll tydligt att det verkade som att majoriteten av muslimer var motsvarande fundamentalister. Sammantaget ansåg jag att författarnas åsikter lutade åt en högerextrem position. Religionen i det offentliga samtalet beskrevs av samtliga författare som ett stort problem. De pekade på ett tabu mot att uttala sig kritiskt om religion och religiös tro (kanske i synnerhet i USA) som en följd av att detta kan uppfattas om okänsligt, men även på grund av vanliga uppfattningar om religion som berikande och god till sin natur. Här kan deras åsikter anses sammanfalla med de hos vissa fritänkare och humanister.

Islam utsågs göra ett specifikt känsligt ämne, där västerlänningar (och i synnerhet västerländska ”liberaler”) anklagades för att hellre ursäkta islamistiskt våld än att yttra sig kritiska. På denna punkt fanns det en tydlig politisk dimension. Slutligen bedömde jag att nyateisternas mest tongivande politiska ståndpunkter var de (liberala) i det amerikanska kulturkriget och de (lutandes åt högerextrema) rörande hotet från islamistisk extremism eller islam. Jag föreslog två skilda tolkningar av hur de sammantaget kan förstås i ett vidare sammanhang. Det första perspektivet betonade synen på islam och argumenterade för att författarna i grunden står för en rasistisk världssyn. Denna tolkning skulle kunna ses som ett förslag på att nyateisternas idéer och argument trots allt hör hemma hos den europeiska extremhögern. Det andra perspektivet framhöll att författarnas åsikter återfinns hos ett antal intellektuella med vänsterbakgrund (där ”vänster” måste förstås i vidaste möjliga bemärkelse) i Europa och USA. Dessa skribenter framhöll att Europa och västvärlden lider av ett skuldkomplex över ett imperialistisk förflutet, något de anser ha bidragit till att de egna liberala värderingarna endast appliceras på den egna kulturen. Jag tror framtida forskning om nyateismens sociala och politiska betydelse bör ta hänsyn till det politiska klimat som sedan 9/11 är till stor del outforskat och en väldigt känslig fråga. En mer nyanserad förståelse av samtiden kan enbart vara av godo.

13. Bibliography Four Horsemen sources Dawkins, Richard. The God Delusion. New ed. London: Black Swan, 2007. ——— . “Richard Dawkins ‘Islam Is One Of The Great Evils In The World.’” YouTube video, 3:01. Interview televised on Dutch station on unknown date. Posted by “AtheistStream,” January 6, 2011. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yyNv8kvd2H8. ——— . “Bin Laden’s victory.” The Guardian, March 22, 2003. Accessed May 15, 2013. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/mar/22/iraq.usa. ——— . “Richard Dawkins on absolute morality.” YouTube video, 2:33. From appearance on Q&A televised by Austrialia’s ABC TV on March 8, 2010. Posted by “Skepgnostic,” May 2, 2010. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VgHoyTvyh4o. ——— . “Richard Dawkins interview on religion, evolution and Iraq.” By Matt Kennard. The Comment Factory, March 19, 2010. Accessed May 15, 2013. http://www.thecommentfactory.com/richard-‐dawkins-‐interview-‐on-‐religion-‐ evolution-‐and-‐iraq-‐2777/. ——— . “Richard Dawkins addresses FFRF 2012 National Convention.” YouTube video, 1:06:54. From speech at FFRF 2012 National Convention on October 12-‐13, 2012. Posted by “FFRForg”, February 4, 2013. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dJTQiChzTNI. Dawkins, Richard, Daniel C. Dennett, Christopher Hitchens and Sam Harris. Discussions with Richard Dawkins, Episode One: The Four Horsemen. Filmed September 30, 2007. Sherman Oaks, CA: Upper Branch Productions, 2008. DVD, 120 min. Also available at: ”The Four Horsemen: Dawkins, Dennett, Harris, Hitchens.” YouTube videos, 58:05 and 59:10. Posted by ”SpaceVulcan,” October 2, 2011. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xSYvsnbuFbg (Part 1); http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IDyA5duTNhM (Part 2). Dawkins, Richard, Daniel C. Dennett, Sam Harris and Ayaan Hirsi Ali. ”Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, Sam Harris [and] Ayaan Hirsi Ali.” YouTube video, 1:02:28. From Global Atheist Convention in Melbourne, April 15, 2012. Posted by ”Juan Varni,” November 9, 2012. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qtBsZZ7veaI. Dennett, Daniel C. Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon. New ed. London: Penguin Books, 2007. ——— . “Two Views on Morality: Educator Mynga Futrell and Philosopher Daniel Dennett.” YouTube video, 5:14. Interview on unknown date. Posted by “thebrightsnet,” August 8, 2012. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_BW2oq0AEk8. ——— . “Dan Dennett: Dangerous memes.” TED video, 15:31. Filmed February 2002. Posted July 2007. http://www.ted.com/talks/dan_dennett_on_dangerous_memes.html. Harris, Sam. The End of Faith: Religion, Terror, and the Future of Reason. New ed. London: Free Press, 2006. ——— . Letter to a Christian Nation. Reprint ed. New York: Vintage Books, 2008.

——— . Sam Harris’ blog. http://www.samharris.org/blog/.

——— . “Why I Criticize Religion.” YouTube video, 5:46. Talk at BigThink on unknown

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