The Public Career of James Tallmadge, Part 11

In addition to the great amount of American Revolutionary lore with which the Fishkill and Wiccopee area is steeped, there is social history which supports the democratic philosophy practiced by the Fresh Air Fund. One of these forms a precedent for the complete racial and religious integration observed at the Fund camps.

In the eighteenth century it was customary in the local churches to assign some of the gallery seats for the use of slaves, who were encouraged to attend services. Henry DuBois Bailey, in his Local Tales and Historical Sketches, published in 1874, tells of an incident which happened in the Rombout Presbyterian Church at Brinckerhoffville. One of the early residents, Henry Terbos, on a Sabbath morning brought all of his Negroes in a large lumber wagon to the church and, marching to one of the square pews, opened the door and ordered them to be seated. Then he seated himself among them, to the surprise of the assembled congregation.

The land acquired by Dr. Sharpe in 1933 had been the site of several abandoned farms whose first settlers supplied the village of Fishkill Landing with produce and firewood. Traces of several such farms are still to be seen and the miles of painstakingly built stone walls that crisscross the reservation stand as mute evidence of habitation in an earlier day. Even as late as two years ago the farmhouse where Charles Ross was brought up was still standing, as pictures shown by Mr. Ross to the pilgrims on the September 30, 1961, trip attest.

Several tracts of land were assembled into one tract by John M. Van Houten with the idea of selling it to the City of Beacon for its water supply. Civil engineers had surveyed the property, finding two large areas where dams creating deep artificial lakes could be built. The deal fell through and, after sixteen years of ownership, Dr. Sharpe decided that such a large piece of wild land should be used to bring inspiration, education and fun to children of all races and creeds trapped in the stone caverns of New York City. Since that time an additional and contiguous 2,000 acres have been acquired through the gifts enabling their purchase.

The Fresh Air Fund accepted Dr. Sharpe's grant with a deep sense of responsibility for preserving the natural beauty of the land and for maintaining its strategic importance to the Fishkill watershed over which it towers. Here was an opportunity that comes to few nongovernmental camping organizations interested in creating a new recreational area. Here one could start with virtually pristine forest, field and stream, lay out a long-range plan for land utilization and

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improvement that could be fitted closely to the needs of a natureoriented camping program and to modern conservation practices. Sought early was the advice and counsel of the Dutchess County Soil Conservation District whose interest and aid have been invaluable. The district prepared a detailed plan of land use which, as funds become available, the Fund is carrying through to completion. Progress is reflected in the following excerpts from a recent report of the reservation's Superintendent of Maintenance:

Planting 2,500 feet of wildlife hedge, consisting of multiflora rose, coralberry and tartarian honeysuckle. All of these shrubs provide food and shelter for wildlife. Several hundred willow shrubs have been planted around our lake and along our streams to prevent erosion. Some stream improvement has been accomplished, such as restoring an old dam and the building of several log dams to create pools for fish. The re-seeding of construction areas is moving along at a good pace. Clearing a 10-acre brush field at the entrance of the property and building a 400-foot diversion ditch, as this field is poorly drained.

We have planted this area with 4,000 evergreens, spruce and Douglas fir. We have constructed a small farm pond on this 50-acre plantation for fire control. Acquiring equipment for fish management, such as net, boots and shocking devices. We still need additional equipment to keep the fishing in our lakes and ponds at a high level. Funds are also needed for management and restocking. There is a need on this 3,000-acre tract of land (including Huber Forest) for a network of foot trails to facilitate forest fire control and prevention.

Twelve years ago, when plans for the reservation were in the dreaming stage and when (in the absence of an accurate survey) the Fund was not sure of its exact metes and bounds, it was thought that the complete "development" of the area could be accomplished in ten years. Since then, plans have been expanded and construction costs have risen and the reservation is still but two-thirds completed.

In order to interest people in contributing funds and for future recreational purposes it was felt necessary, as a first order of business, to create a lake and to build enough roads so prospective donors could see where their gifts would be applied. These roads, fourteen miles of them today, for the most part follow the old wood roads traveled many years ago by horse and ox-drawn wagons. A substantial start has been made on the creation of a second lake, much larger than the first. Both lake sites are in the paths of streams that are tributaries of Fishkill Creek and have now become a sylvan playground for children from the old Dutch island of Manhattan.

Currently, there are six camps operating on the reservation—Anita, Bliss, Coler, Hayden, Hidden Valley and Pioneer. A seventh Fund camp, Marks Memorial, also in Dutchess County, is located at the

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intersection of the Taconic Parkway and Route 199. The physical requirements of all of the camps are provided by an Operations Center and a Maintenance Center located on Sharpe Reservation. As the accompanying pictures show, the Fund has brought to the field of camping a freshness of architectural design in its new construction. Not only have the buildings and camping areas been arranged so as to permit a decentralized or "small group" plan of camping, but the aesthetic has been expertly blended with the considerations of function and durability.

The long-range plan for the full development of the reservation includes a "living museum" to serve as a source of information about the natural and historical resources of the surrounding Dutchess County area. Like all the recent construction on the reservation, the museum and its supporting facilities will be designed for year-round use. It is anticipated that such a center could be of great value to the school children of Dutchess and neighboring counties during the fall, winter and spring. If and when this activity becomes a reality it is hoped that old maps, books, papers, pictures and other items of historical significance pertaining to the Sharpe Reservation area will be donated to the museum by residents of the county.

Even beyond the important role of Fishkill and environs in early American history, the land occupied by Sharpe Reservation has a most interesting and indeed unique place in the geological history ot the eastern seaboard. Geologists have given much attention to the area, and professors of geology have utilized it to interest their students in the earthly developments that occurred many thousands of years ago.

Regional planners and population experts flatly predict that a quarter of a century hence the eastern seaboard will be solid city and suburb all the way from Portland, Maine, to Richmond, Virginia. In preserving an oasis of green amidst the urban sprawl caused by our population explosion, the Fresh Air Fund believes it is performing a broad civic role even beyond that of providing recreation and education for city-starved children. The Fund accepts willingly and eagerly the full public responsibilities as custodian of its present acreage and is prepared to exercise the same concern for contiguous land that may 'come to it in the future.

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THE PUBLIC CAREER OF JAMES TALLMADGE4

PART II

CHAPTER FIVE — AUTHOR OF RESTRICTION

It would appear that the Tallmadge Amendment was political rather than moral in substance, but political insight has extended little further into the matter. The question immediately arises, what politician, or political faction, designed this restrictive amendment? The historian's closest link with a possible answer lies in James Tallmadge, the mover of the amendment, for evidence is spotty and only circumstantial.

Many southern contemporaries thought that Federalism was the cause of the political device, reappearing from its lethargy and drawing new hope from this sectional issue. Jefferson wrote, "that it has given resurrection to the Hartford convention men."1

The Missouri question is a mere party trick, The leaders of federalism, defeated in their schemes of obtaining power by rallying partisans to the principle of monarchism, . . . are taking advantage of the virtuous feelings of the people to effect a division of parties by a geographical line; they expect that this will ensure them, on local principles, the majority they could never obtain on principles of federalism. . . .2 Monroe felt that,

The same men, in some instances, who were parties to the project in 1786, for closing the mouth of the Mississippi for 25 years, may be consider'd as the Authors of this. The dismemberment of the Union by the Allegheny Mountains, was then believ'd to be their object. . . .3 Madison wrote that the leaders of restriction were "dividing the Republicans of the North from those of the South, and making the former instrumental in giving to the opponents [Federalists] of both an ascendancy over the whole."4 Thomas Hart Benton, of Missouri, reiterated Madison's feelings, saying that it was a Federal movement which was "balked by the Northern democracy, who saw their own overthrow" and the ascendancy of their political adversaries.5 Naturally, neither Benton nor Madison took cognizance of the northern dissatisfaction within the Republican party as a cause of the controversy. The fact that the strongest support of restriction came from New

*The second of two parts of a dissertation in the department of history submitted by John D. Gindele, April 30, 1954, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts at New York University.

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York and Pennsylvania, predominantly Republican states, would implicate Republicans rather than Federalists. Then too, Tallmadge was not a Federalist and he was opposed to them in his election to Congress. However, there were spots of Federalism still existing, around which a new party could be formed, and "there were features of that agitation which gave it the appearance of a Federalist movement." But when some New England Federalists learned that the South thought the TVlissouri issue was a Federal stratagem, they discontinued their support of restriction in fear of hostility from the South.7

One reason for the South to accuse the Federalists was because Rufus King, a Federalist, championed the cause of restriction. He was dubbed the leader of the whole political scheme. The Richmond Enquirer wrote on February 19, 1820:

. . . We regarded him [King], though a Federalist, as a high and honorable patriot . . . now he stands exposed in the eyes of his countrymen, goaded by an unholy ambition, attempting to clutch the office [presidency] which we trust will forever elude his grasp.8 Even John Quincy Adams, who took an amazingly naive attitude toward the Tallmadge Amendment,9 suspected that King was trying to gain political office through his ardent support of restriction.10 At the same time, Adams could write, ". . . there is not a man in the Union of purer integrity than Rufus King."11

Although he was roundly abused by the South, "there is no evidence that King had any ulterior designs."12 He did not take part in the secessionist movement of the Hartford Convention; he was too much of a patriot. His motives concerning the Missouri question were just as noble. Besides the evil of slavery as an institution, King saw the political injustice of the extension of the three-fifths slavery representation. He fought it as a political menace to the just influence in politics of the free states; the South felt that he admitted his own guilt of political ambition at the price of the Union. Concerning the revival of Federalism in New York, King wrote in 1820, "it is in my view dissolved."13

Reports from the South placed Rufus King and De Witt Clinton as co-conspirators of the Missouri question,14 but King could have disliked no other man more than Clinton. In 1819, there were three candidates up for election to the United States Senate by the New York legislature. Governor Clinton's influence was exerted against the re-election of Rufus King who had the smallest number of votes in his favor. A deadlock resulted in no successful election. When the next Assembly was chosen, the Federalists gained a number of seats

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which the Clintonians lost; to maintain his power, Clinton conciliated the Federalists. Then he recommended King for senator and the Bucktails followed suit, so that King was re-elected.15 Only three votes were registered against King," and they were given by anti-Clintonian assemblymen from New York City." When the election of governor occurred in 1820, King opposed Clinton, toward whom he had a "deep and strong aversion."18 He was indebted to Tompkins for his support "without which Mr. C. and his federal friends would have succeeded in degrading me."19 Thus, it is highly improbable that King and Clinton were working together on the Missouri question. King even refuted a rumor that the Missouri issue was part of " 'a plan devised by & for Mr. De Witt Clinton and intended to advance him to the presidency.' " 20 He said that accusations of this sort, whether against himself or Clinton, had "'no sort of Relation to the subject.' 21 Since Rufus King was not an architect of the Tallmadge Amendment, nor did he believe in the hidden political significance of the issue, he would naturally think that Clinton had no responsibility for it because King certainly did not intend to do Clinton's work. If Clinton, on the other hand, were the architect, it was logical for him not to support King for senator, because King, by the end of the Fifteenth Congress, had not come out in favor of slavery restriction and there was no assurance that he would.

From the nature of the political background and the support of the Tallmadge Amendment, it is certain that the New York politicians were the designers of the device. Both Tallmadge and Taylor, leaders of restriction in the House, were from New York. Their prominence in the issue is revealed by Missouri's hatred for them expressed in a toast given them at a celebration in 1819. " 'Messrs. Tallmadge and Taylor—Politically insane, may the next Congress appoint them a dark room, a straight waistcoat and a thin water gruel diet., ”22 Since the Federalists are ruled out, there remain only two political factions in New York State which could be responsible for the Tallmadge Amendment, the Clintonians and the anti-Clintonians, or Bucktails.

The Bucktails represented the orthodox Republican party in New York State. Daniel Tompkins, then vice-president to James Monroe, was one of their leading men. According to James Emott of Poughkeepsie, Tompkins "thought the office of President of right belonged to him in the election" of 1816 but, despite his disappointment, "his views of the throne are not given up altho' they are necessarily postponed."23 In 1820, Adams wrote that there was no opposition party

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to Monroe's re-election, but Tompkins was in the market for the presidency.24 In the years immediately following the War of 1812, the national administration had sustained the Tammanyites (Bucktails) in their war upon Clinton, with Governor Tompkins secretly encouraging this course of procedure. But now that Tompkins "had become the strongest Republican in the State, he found the same policy exerted against himself."25 What easier way could the Virginia Dynasty find to dispose of Tompkins' political potentialities and yet preserve his support than by making him vice-president, but never president? It might appear that Tompkins was dissatisfied with Virginia control but he quietly acquiesced in its wishes. Because he did anticipate the presidency through the support of the whole Republican party, he never could risk defiance toward Virginia.

Besides endangering the political control of Virginia, the Tallmadge Amendment was designed so as to make precarious the position of any northern Republicans who were faithful followers of the Virginia Dynasty. Martin Van Buren, the leader of the Bucktail party, took no positive stand on the Missouri question. Having supported King for senator, Van Buren said that slavery restriction concealed no plot so far as King was concerned but that he, Van Buren, and his friends would give it a true direction.26 Just what Van Buren had in mind is not quite clear but he probably intended to prevent the Missouri question from creating a sectional split within the Republican party. Van Buren voted in the New York Senate to restrict slavery and joined in calling a meeting against slavery extension but was absent and refused to have his name placed on the anti-slavery resolutions which were drawn up at the meeting and sent to Washington.27 Thus, Van Buren was playing both ends of the fiddle, keeping in tune with popular sentiment in New York while not getting off-key with Virginia.

The New York Republican party was also innocent of any political plot, having followed the lead of Van Buren and Tompkins in its subserviency to Virginia. William Plumer wrote after the Missouri Compromise had been passed: "It since appears that the Bucktails or Tomkinites, were in general lukewarm on this subject, 8z., many of them opposed to the restriction."28 Seward perceived at the time of Missouri's admission, "the subserviency to southern influence and dictation which prevailed in the democratic party in the state of New York."29 In 1 82 0, King wrote: "There will be no opposition to Mr. Monroe that I have heard of; none is expected even from New York, whose Legislature in all probability will be anti-Clintonian."3° The

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Republicans continued their southern leanings in the New York Constitutional Convention of 1821, where Seward observed that "the Clintonian minority were more liberal [concerning Negro suffrage] than the [Bucktail] majority of which I was a supporter."31 He had a suspicion "that the Republican party in the State, and its leaders, adopted the restraint upon negro suffrage from a motive of sympathy with slavery, or favor toward it, as that institution then existed in all the more Southern Atlantic States of the Union."32 In 1824, the New York Democrats [Republicans] wanted an alliance with Virginia." They even supported the national presidential caucus and the South's William H. Crawford for president, both actions being in complete agreement with the Virginia Republicans. There is little doubt that the Bucktails were not the architects of the Tallmadge Amendment.

By deduction, the Clintonians were responsible for the Tallmadge Amendment. This conclusion, however, is not arrived at by a process of elimination. There is more than possibility and probability in this judgment. First, one must examine the political background of the draftsmen of restriction, the New York delegation in the House of Representatives. Of the twenty-seven representatives from New York in the Fifteenth Congress, four never voted in favor of restriction, two more were in favor of only part one of the Tallmadge Amendment, and the remaining twenty-one were for the amendment." Of the twenty-one, those from the West were generally strong supporters of De Witt Clinton because of his advocacy of a western canal. Ellicott and Spencer were Clintonians,35 and Hasbrouck and Townsend were both lieutenant colonels in the New York militia in 1808,36 when the Clintonians had such complete control. John W. Taylor, also, held a militia appointment in 1808.37 He had seconded the Tallmadge Amendment and reproposed it in the Sixteenth Congress. Most important of all, James Tallmadge was a Clintonian.38 He was a family relation of Clinton, had received his military appointments through Clinton's influence, and had been elected to Congress as a Clintonian and by Clintonians. Even if all of New York's delegation were not Clintonians, some of the few Federalist members had allied themselves with Clinton.39

Adams wrote that "a majority of the New York delegation in [the Sixteenth] Congress are partisans of Clinton . . ."4° But, when Taylor was up for election as speaker of the House in November 1820, he told Adams that he was opposed by members of the New York delegation because they believed he was a Clintonian.41 He had previously been supported by all the Republicans in his election to

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Congress,42 so the Bucktails now must have thought that his stand on slavery restriction was ground for thinking him to be a Clintonian. Taylor was finally elected on the twenty-second ballot by a vote of 76 to 75,43 but only after he had specifically told the opposing members of the New York delegation that he was not a Clintonian. It appears from this that there were at least about six anti-Clintonians in Congress voing in favor of slavery restriction. This was not unusual, in that the political motives of restriction were hidden as much as possible, and New York congressmen risked their immediate political future by opposing restriction. The election of Speaker Taylor did not entail a moral question; it brought prestige to New York. But even so, J. A. King wrote that Taylor's election was a source of regret. "If Van Buren had been in Sanford's place, this would not have taken place."44

The elections of 1821 placed Van Buren's party in firm control of New York. This was carried over in Congress, for Taylor was defeated by the anti-Clintonians in his bid for re-election as speaker of the House.45 In his election to this Seventeenth Congress, Taylor had been nominated by the Clintonians.46 Again, in 1827, the Van Bill en Democrats were largely responsible for Taylor's defeat as speaker and, in 1832, they thwarted his re-election to Congress.47

In November, 1820, just after John Taylor had been elected speaker, he had a conversation with Adams, of which Adams recorded:

He spoke to me this evening of Clinton very lightly, and said that the Southern people had ascribed to Clinton the origin of the

Missouri question without a shadow of foundation; that so far from it, Clinton had in the first instance entirely discouraged, and never gave any countenance to it until he discovered its great popularity in the State.48 Taylor was forced to deny any connection with Clinton in order to obtain the election of speaker and this conversation with Adams was only supporting his denial. Since Taylor was one of the leaders in the fight for slavery restriction, he would naturally deny Clinton's authorship of the issue because, if Clinton were the author, Taylor would be implicated as a Clintonian and this is what he was trying to avoid.

Clinton, actually, had a long record in favor of Negro emancipation and, if he were reticent on the Missouri question, it could only be that he did not want to reveal himself as the author. In 1798, he became a state senator and shone particularly in the debate on the gradual abolition of slavery within the state.49 His own colored employees were free and drew wages for their work. "An Act to Prevent the Inhuman Treatment of Slaves" and "An Act to Prevent

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the Farther Introduction of Slaves" were both from his pen.5° Their arguments suggest Clinton's authorship of the Tallmadge Amendment, which also allowed for gradual abolition and prohibition of slavery.

Clinton's political career is a record of nearly continuous pursuit of the presidency and defiance of the Virginia Dynasty. When Jefferson retired from the presidency, and the claims of Vice-President George Cinton were overlooked, there were not a few members of the Republican party who even then desired De Witt Clinton to be the candidate for president.51- New York was represented by only one delegate in this congressional caucus of 1808. Although Madison was nominated, De Witt Clinton managed to secure six of New York's electoral votes for his uncle. Even then Virginia was jealous of the growing power of New York, "and particularly of the rising talents and influence of De Witt Clinton

There were only twelve members from New York and all of New England at the caucus of Congress in 1812, which nominated Madison for a second term." In defiance of this nomination, the Republicans of New York nominated De Witt Clinton. The slogaa of the Clinton men was "No Virginia Control" and their plan denounced "King Caucus" and opposed regencies and perpetuation in office.54 Van Buren, then working for Clinton, effected a combination with the Federalists. Clinton took a middle-of-the-road position on the War of 1812, in an effort to gain this Federalist support without losing his Republican following. Clinton tried to secure the support of Gouverneur Morris, Jay and King, but the latter two would not patronize him.55 The dissatisfied Republicans, who objected to the caucus, hoped Clinton might break the caucus system and the Virginia Dynasty at the same time.5° Clinton's attempted coup d'etat nearly reached the mark. He won the electoral votes of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware and five of Maryland's for a total of eighty-nine. Madison took six from Maryland, and all the votes of the western and other southern states, plus those of Pennsylvania and Vermont for a majority of 128.57 Running with Clinton, for the vice-presidency, was Jared Ingersoll of Pennsylvania. Had this political alignment been successful in winning the twenty-five electoral votes of Pennsylvania, De Witt Clinton would have been the fifth president of the United States. By failing, he became an outcast of the Republican administration at -Washington, and was now subjected to the charge of Federalism. Besides this, it created an anti-Clintonian faction.58

This faction ousted Clinton from the mayoralty of New York

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in 1815. Despite this setback, he made another bid for the Republican presidential nomination, losing to Monroe in the caucus of 1816, by a vote of 65 to 54.59 After Clinton was elected governor in 1817, opposition in New York City continued unabated and "was speedily reenforced by the whole weight of the executive influence of the general government."" Clinton was far from being on amiable terms with President Monroe and an open breach nearly occurred. Through the number and value of the federal custom-house appointments in New York City, the general government possessed great political influence. This corps, banded with the anti-Clintonians and Federalists, presented a sizeable opposition to Clinton in that area. The opposition became so strong that in his opening speech to the legislature in 1819, after being re-elected by a slim majority of 2,000 votes, Clinton referred to thc situation by saying he had "proved, in more than one instance, that votes were given under the influence of fear of loss of office."6' From the foregoing account, Clinto'n appears to have been the most dissatisfied and the most antagonized of any Republican toward the Virginia Dynasty. He had fought Virginia in the three previous presidential elections. Slavery restriction would be his fourth attempt to thwart the entrenched South. If anyone had cause to draw the plans of slavery restriction, it was Clinton.

It was on February 13, 1819, that James Tallmadge proposed his memorable amendment, signaling the end of the "Era of Good Feeling." Just over one month before this unexpected proposal caught the nation unaware, Governor De Witt Clinton addressed the opening session of the New York legislature. His words were:

At no period within my recollection has the public mind been in a state of greater tranquility, more exempt from the impulses of ambition and the agitations of faction, and more accessible to the influence of reason and patriotism.

He continued, speaking of great future inland waterways and navigation improvements which would connect far regions. Then he turned his thoughts toward free elective government, asserting that liberty and union are inseparably connected.

A dismemberment of the republic into separate confederacies would necessarily produce the jealous circumspection and hostile preparations of bordering states . . . . A dissolution of the Union may therefore be considered the natural death of our free government. And to avert this awful calamity all local prejudices and geographical distinctions should be discarded—the people should be habituated to frequent intercourse and beneficial 'intercommunication, and the whole republic ought to be bound together, by the golden ties of commerce and the adamantine chains of interest.

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In attending to the general interest of the community, let us not overlook the concerns of two unfortunate races of men, who will be forever insulated from the great body of the people by uncomfortable circumstances, and who ought to receive our protection and benevolence. I refer to the Indian and African population. After discussing Indian affairs at some length, Clinton cited the "black codes" which prohibited the separation of relatives of slaves, the conveying of them in a state of slavery by exportation and the precluding of the increase of population by importation. Then he added, "it may be proper to fortify the existing provisions, on account of the artful evasions which are practised to procure the exportation of servants."62

Granted that the Union was in a state of "tranquility," but why then did Clinton talk of "dismemberment," "confederacies," "dissolution of the union" and "the natural death of our free government?" He did not stop there but assumed that this awful calamity was due to come and to be averted. Then he alluded to the Negroes "who ought to receive our protection and benevolence." The Negroes in New York had already received such action in legislation but Clinton referred to the "African population," which certainly was not confined within the borders of New York State. Again he did not stop short but said that further laws are necessary to terminate the violations of the black codes. This speech, delivered one month before an amendment was proposed in Congress, which set bounds to slavery and which precipitated a crisis that nearly led to secession, is too coincidental to be other than proof that De Witt Clinton had foreknowledge of the Tallmadge Amendment. Perhaps he treated these subjects in his speech to prove his patriotism and humanitarianism in the struggle to come but by doing so he only revealed his own share in it.

In 1 8 1 1, Clinton was one of a committee of men appointed by the New York legislature to solicit financial aid from the United States government for the construction of a cross-state canal. Subsidy was refused because of sectional jealousy; the doctrine that it was not in the delegated powers of Congress to grant such aid had not yet been formulated.63 Furthermore, the government possessed ample funds, because war preparation had been neglected." However, New York carried on with her project, mainly by the instigation of the tireless efforts of De Witt Clinton. It must have occurred to him that, since the Mississippi River was the best outlet for western produce, the Northwest was economically bound to the South, and therefore, politically bound also. If a waterway could be constructed to connect the Great Lakes with the Hudson River, and thence to the

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Atlantic Ocean, the economic ties of the Northwest would be shifted from the South to New York and the East. A political alliance would follow. Clinton could not have been blind to such reasoning and it is probable that this was one consideration which prompted him in his efforts to build the Erie Canal. Construction had begun by the time the Missouri question arose but it would have been a greater advantage to the North to have had the canal completed by that date. The question having split the free from the slave states, an economic basis would probably have secured the votes of the Northwest to the North instead of losing them to the South. In Clinton's speech to the legislature on January 16, 1819, the only other topic which drew mention was that of "great future inland waterways." "The people should be habituated to frequent intercourse and beneficial intercommunication, and the whole republic ought to be bound together, by the golden ties of commerce and the adamantine chains of interest."

When the Missouri controversy engulfed the thoughts of the nation, De Witt Clinton was not restraining himself to see if it would prove to be a popular cause. He was the first in New York to propose a resolution in favor of slavery restriction. His attitude can best be observed in his own speech to the legislature in January, 1820.

. . . Nor [could] I conceal on this occasion the deep anxiety which

I feel on a subject now under the consideration of the general government; and which is unfortunately calculated to produce geographical distinctions . . . Morally and politically speaking, slavery is an evil of the first magnitude; & Whatever may be the consequences, it is our duty to prohibit its progress in all cases where such prohibition is allowed by the constitution.65

James Tallmadge undoubtedly knew who was the original planner of slavery restriction but he never named the person in writing. If he had, he would only have implicated himself in a political plot. Some further insight into the matter is provided, however, by a letter which Tallmadge wrote in 1825. Discussing the politics of New York, he stated:

At Washington they seem to consider this state as divided into sections & that the hostile section can be conciliated by favours. This reasoning, tho impure in principle, might be correct in practice as to ordinary Divisions in other states, where the divisions are either local, or personal— & all looking to Washington as the common head. But not so here. In this state there is a candidate for the Presidency. —a Pretender to the throne. The divisions in this state are neither local nor personal, as Wstn state. The divisions here are—one party—The old Republican Party, disposed to support the Genl. administation—another party—the old Hartford Convention men & the body guard of an individual united as one band in support of the Pretender to the Throne—every act therefore of favour to this party, can not condiliate or gain friends to the Genl administration. It strengthens the force & party of the Pretender— & dismays &

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weakens the friends of the Present administration. That Clinton has entered for the Presidency no one can doubt. He intends to supplant

Mr. Adams at the end of his present term.66 When Tallmadge wrote this letter he was lieutenant governor, serving under Clinton, who was governor. Even though their association was close, Tallmadge was greatly antagonistic toward Clinton at that time. This, however, does not detract from the value of Tallmadge's appraisal of him.

Tallmadge was not the only one to accuse "the Pretender" of insatiable ambition. Clinton's most sympathetic biographer and personal friend, Dr. David Hosack, wrote that his friends had never denied he was ambitious. But his political foes spared no abuse in denouncing him. As early as 1808, Clinton "was said to be the greatest political intriguer in the United States."67 Adams wrote that Clinton was a man of great talents but used "the charlatanery of popular inticement" and "everything that smacks of combination and votemaking."68 At the height of the Missouri controversy, an editorial in the Richmond Enquirer slandered Clinton.

We say this firmly and frankly, though we are not ignorant of the pretensions of those who would fill the chair [the presidency].

Of De Witt Clinton we have never concealed our opinion. Ambitious, intriguing, grasping in his designs, careless of his means—such is one of those who aspire to 'lord it over Venice.'69 According to all accounts, Clinton was always in contention for the presidency. In 1818, the three main contenders were Clinton, Crawford and Clay,7° and the latter two were both hurt by the Missouri question. Even though Clinton was not one of the final four presidential candidates in the election of 1824, he was in the running in the early years; Bucktail dominance of New York after 1821 quelled his hopes. Clay accused Clinton of joining Jackson and Crawford in assailing him over his support of Adams in the House of Representatives in the presidential election of 1824.71 Dr. Hosack verified the central idea of these accusations when he wrote that Clinton, after his re-election as governor in 1826, "had gained such a complete victory over the party feelings of former times, that next to the two leading candidates for the Presidency, his prospect of eventually attaining to that elevated station, had become greater than that of any other citizen of the United States."72 However, Clinton's career was suddenly, brought to a halt by his unexpected death in February, 1828.

There is an interesting entry in President Adams' diary of September 9, 1826, which reads as follows:

I received a letter from De Witt Clinton, Governor of New

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York, with enclosures, complaining of an advertisement in the National Intelligencer for the sale of a colored man, whom they claim as a freeman and a citizen of New York.73 Adams then handed the papers to his secretary of state, Henry Clay, to have him act on the dispute according to law. Here was a freeman supposedly held as a slave after entering a slave state. Reverse the conditions, (i.e., a slave being declared free after being in a free state) , and it will be seen how similar the situation was to the Dred Scott affair. Was Clinton trying to create another slavery issue?

Looking back at James Tallmadge, one finds that he refused a renomination to Congress.74 For one who was to prove to be so ambitious within a few years, this action seems strange. Undoubtedly, he was more interested in the governorship of New York, or even a judgeship. This action leads one to think that Tallmadge did not originally desire to attend Congress. As it happened, he was elected as a "pinch hitter." This could mean that the Clintonians desired him to go, and to propose slavery restriction. After returning from Washington, he would naturally expect some reward through political spoils.

In the spring of 1819, two state senatorial seats from the southern district of New York had to be filled by election. In February, the Democratic county convention was held to nominate candidates for this coming election. The Clintonians and anti-Clintonians had no common points and so each made their own nominations. The Clintonians had delegates from twelve towns and nominated James Tallmadge.75 There were three tickets in all: the Federalists nominated Morris and Schuyler, the Clintonians chose Tallmadge and Van Cortlandt and the anti-Clintonians selected Livingston and Townsend.76

More than a month before the election, on March 16, 1819, the Clintonians in the state legislature tried to elect Tallmadge as a Regent of the University of the State of New York, but Stephen Van Rensselaer was made the choice from the four candidates.77

The election for state senators began April 27. The Federalists won in Dutchess County as was expected but Dutchess had been attached to the southern district since 1815, with New York City and and the Long Island counties, so the Federalist and Clintonian vote was overwhelmed by the Bucktail electorate.78 The anti-Clintonian victors amassed more votes than the other two tickets combined. Tallmadge led his colleagues in the total vote for the southern district and in every town in Dutchess County. He also received more

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total votes than the Federalist Morris; in Dutchess he was beaten only by the Federalists.79 With Tallmadge's failure to win this election, the Clintonians still had not rewarded him for his brilliant defense of slavery restriction in Congress. Since Clinton had been elected governor in 1817, Van Buren, although antagonistic toward the Clinton administration, was not removed from the office of the state attorney general. However, in 1819, the situation became unbearable, and yet Clinton hesitated to dismiss Van Buren, mainly to avert the hostility of James Tallmadge and John C. Spencer, two ardent Clintonians, who both sought the office.8° Spencer was an influential politician who had assisted Clinton to raise his political stature after his low turn in 1815 and 1816. To consider Tallmadge, who had been nothing more than a small town lawyer and politician before his term in Congress, as deserving an equal share of the political spoils as compared to Spencer, is significant. It is an indication that James Tallmadge had performed an important mission for De Witt Clinton. "Tallmadge had recently returned from Congress full of honours because of his brilliant part in the great debate on the Missouri Compromise," and he expected to receive the appointment as attorney genera1.81 A new Assembly was chosen in May and the Federalists gained seats which the Clintonians lost. For Clinton to maintain his control over the Bucktails he had to appease the Federalists. Thus, in July 1819, the claims of both Spencer and Tallmadge were overlooked, while Thomas J. Oakley, a Federalist, was appointed attorney genera1.82 Despite the political conciliation on the part of Clinton, Oakley said he was in a peculiar position, being appointed by a Clintonian council to "one of the most important, influential and, at that time, lucrative offices."83 At the same time, a Federalist was appointed district attorney of Dutchess County, while George Bloom, the former law partner of Tallmadge, was removed.84

Earlier, in April 1819, before his defeat in the senatorial election, Tallmadge wrote to John W. Taylor that he, Tallmadge, was "'suspected & squinted at by Clinton.' "85 The meaning of this is revealed in another letter from Tallmadge to Taylor, which he wrote some time after his failure to secure the attorney generalship. " 'I have not doubted, but little was to be expected by you or me from either state of Genl Government—The one hates us—the other is jealous of us—so we go.' " 86 All the South was determined to put down the aorthern leaders of the Missouri controversy, in their intense hatred Df restrictionists. Clinton grew jealous of the prestige attaching to its

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proponent. Clinton's jealousy is understandable; Tallmadge had won the credit of his plot, yet here he was, demanding more rewards from the hand whose pen had wrought his fame.

Tallmadge's expectancy must have been very great, because his failure to receive the attorney generalship caused him to join Clinton's enemies,87 In 1821, he was one of five on the Dutchess County Bucktail ticket for the constitutional convention of that year.88 But Tallmadge had completely broken with Clinton in 1820. In March 1820, Tallmadge's father, who had been a Clintonian, attended a Bucktail meeting as one of their party." Two items concerning anonymous letters appeared in the Poughkeepsie Journal on March 8, 1820, eight months after Tallmadge had been disappointed as an office-seeker.

The first item was an unsigned letter to the editor about an anonymous column printed in the last Dutchess Observer, which defamed Clinton. The anonymous writer had said:

. . . When the gratification of any selfish propensity is the motive of public measures, the application of the means is a waste of treasure, and the accomplishment of the pretended is forever delayed and finally frustrated . . . Science and the arts are the objects of his encouragement, not he the object of their support . . . . Even his own base hirelings, will trust him no further than they know themselves to be necessary to his views, and thus becomes himself subservient to the designs of his parasite slaves.90

The other article discussed a pamphlet addressed "to the Federal Republican Electors of the State of New York" and signed "a federalist of '98." The editor wrote that they suspected the pamphlet not only to be anonymous, but to have been circulated clandestinely. It was an "insidious" attempt to get the Federalists to join the Bucktails in opposing Clinton. The author of the pamphlet said the Federal party ceased to exist. Monroe had adopted Federal ideas and Daniel D. Tompkins was vice-president and, therefore, a Federalist too. He went on to search for Federal support not only on the merits of Tompkins, but also on the demerits of Clinton.

. . . And what do you suppose, federalists of Dutchess, are the mighty crimes of Mr. Clinton, which the federalist of '98, calculates will so rouse your indignation and resentment, as to force you into the bucktail ranks . . . . They are summed up in a single short sentence —Mr. Clinton has appointed federalists to office, and therefore federalists are bound to oppose him.91

The editor of the Poughkeepsie Journal thought a disappointed Federalist office-seeker wrote the pamphlet, because it was distributed by men who had forever been hostile to the Federalists. But those men would logically have been Bucktails, with whom Tallmadge was now friendly. The author, if a Federalist, would not have been

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disappointed that Clinton had appointed Federalists to office. The author was more likely a disappointed Clintonian office-seeker. Considering Tallmadge's political affiliations at this time, it seems probable that he was the author of both these anonymous articles. He was changing his political alliance and would not want his name attached to such writings. Furthermore, Tallmadge could faithfully call himself a "federalist of '98," because his brother had received an appointment in that year from a Federalist Council of Appointment, thus linking the family with that party. Tallmadge was appointed by the Federalists to the post in 1800 when his brother moved away.

If one examines these two writings in the thought that Clinton was the designer of the Tallmadge Amendment, that he disappointed Tallmadge of political reward for his service to Congress and that Tallmadge was so incensed by this traitorous action as to join the Bucktails in bitter hatred of Clinton, the shoe fits the foot.

In the light of all this circumstantial evidence, it seems quite probable that De Witt Clinton was the author of the Tallmadge Amendment—a political maneuver inaugurating an era of recurring strife in American politics which only a civil war was able to settle.

NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE

'Jefferson to Henry Dearborn, Aug. 17, 1821, Ford, Writings of Thomas Jefferson, X, 191-2. 2Jefferson to Charles Pinckney, Sept. 30, 1820, Ibid., X, 162. 3Monroe to Jefferson, Feb. 7, 1820, Hamilton, Writings of James Monroe, VI, 114. 4Madison to Monroe, Feb. 10, 1820, Hunt, Writings of James Madison, IX, 22. 5Benton, Thirty Years' View, I, 10. 6Hockett, "Rufus King and the Missouri Compromise," p. 212. 7/bid., p. 220. 8Congressional Globe, 30 Cong., 2 Sess., Appendix, p. 66. 9Adams, Memoirs, IV, 528. Entry of Feb. 20, 1820: "When the amendment was first presented, its importance and consequences were certainly foreseen by no one, not even by those who brought it forward." lo/bid., V, 38. 11/bid., V, 13. 12Hockett, "Rufus King and the Missouri Compromise," p. 218. 13Rufus King to J. A. King, March 18, 1820, King, Life of Rufus King, VI. 317. 14John Tyler to Dr. Curtis, Feb. 5, 1820, Lyon G. Tyler, ed., The Letters and Times of the Tylers (Richmond, 1884), I, 316. 15Adams, Memoirs, IV, 517. 16Poughkeepsie Journal, Jan. 12, 1820. 17/bid., May 12, 1812. New York City returned eleven anti-Clintonian men to the Assembly, and no others. 18Rufus King to J. A. King, March 18, 1820, King, Life of Rufus King, VI, 317-9. 19/ bid., VI. 317.

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20Rufus King to J. A. King, Feb. 20, 1820, as quoted in a letter to the author from George Dangerfield, Sept. 10, 1951. 21-Idem. 22Floyd Calvin Shoemaker, Missouri's Struggle for Statehood 1804-1821 (Jefferson City, Missouri, 1916), P. 94. 23James Emott to Rufus King, Dec. 28, 1816, King, Life of Rufus King, VI, 41. 24Adams, Memoirs, V, 58. 25McGuire, Democratic Party, I, 70. 26Edward M. Shepard, Martin Van Buren (Boston, 1888), p. 62. 27/ bid., pp. 62-3. 28William Plumer, Jr. to his father, April 7, 1820, Brown, Missouri Compromises, p. 16. 29Baker, Life of William H. Seward, p. 30. 30Rufus King to J. Mason, May 4, 1820, King, Life of Rufus King, VI,

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31Wrilliam H. Seward, An Autobiography ,from 1801 to 1834 (New York, 1 3891e ), I, 50. dm.21 33Hammond, History of Political Parties, II, 127. 34Annals of Congress, 15 Cong., 2 Sess., pp. 1214-5. 35Bobbe, De Witt Clinton, p. 230. 36Hastings and Noble, Mil. Min. of N. Y., II, 985.

37/ bid., II, 950. 385'ee Chapter Two. 39j. A. King to Rufus King, Jan. 8, 1818, King, Life of Rufus King, VI, 102. " . . . I regret to say that there are some of the federal gentlemen and influential ones too, who are deeply pledged to support the waning fortunes of Mr. Clinton." 40Adams, Memoirs, V, 58. 41/ bid., V, 203. 42/bid., V, 438.

43/bid., V, 202. 44j. A. King to Rufus King, Nov. 20, 1820, King, Life of Rufus King, VI, 356. Sanford was a Clintonian senator from New York. 451Vlialone, Dictionary of American Biography, XVIII, 336; William Plumer, Jr. to his father, Dec. 3, 1821, Brown, Missouri Compromises, p.65. 46Adams, Memoirs, V, 438. 47Ma1one, Dictionary of American Biography, XVIII, 336. 48Adams, Memoirs, V, 203. 49Bobbe, De Witt Clinton, p. 72. 50/bid., p. 274. 51-James Renwick, Life of De Witt Clinton (New York, 1859), p. 191. 52/bid., p. 192. 53J0hn Bigelow, "De Witt Clinton as a Politician," Harper's New Monthly Magazine, L (March, 1875), 565. 54Minor, Story of the Democratic Party, p. 78. 55James A. Hamilton, Reminiscenses of James A. Hamilton; or Men and Events, at Home and Abroad, During Three Quarters of a Century (New York, 1869), pp. 43-4. 56Bigelow, "De Witt Clinton as a Politician," p. 565. 57Lord and Lord, Historical Atlas, p. 223. 58Bigelow, "De Witt Clinton as a Politician," p. 565. 59Minor, Story of the Democratic Party, p. 86. 60Renwick, Life of De Witt Clinton, p. 232. 61/bid., p. 239. 62Poughkeepsie Journal, Jan 13, 1819. 63Renwick, Life of De Witt Clinton, p. 192.

64Idem. 65poughkeepsie Journal, Jan. 12, 1820.

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66James Tallmadge, Poughkeepsie, to Thurlow Weed, Rochester, Sept. 3, 1825, Tallmadge Papers. 67Adams, Memoirs, I, 512. 681bid., IV, 360. 69Congressional Globe, 30 Cong., 2 Sess., Appendix, p. 66. 70Adams, Memoirs, IV, 62. 71C1ay to Francis Brooke, Feb. 4, 1825, Calvin Colten, ed., Works of Henry Clay (New York, 1897), IV, 113. 72David Hosack, Memoirs of De Witt Clinton (New York, 1829), p. 69. 73Adams, Memoirs, VII, 148. 74Malone, Dictionary of American Biography, XVIII, 285. 76Poughkeepsie Journal, Feb. 24-, 1819. 76Ibid., May 12, 1819. 77/bid., March 24, 1819. 78P1att, Eagle's History, p. 97. 79Poughkeepsie Journal, May 12, 1819; Ibid., June 23, 1819. 80Alexander, Political History of New York, I, 274. 81/dem. 82Poughkeepsie Journal, July 14, 1819. 83J. A. King to Charles King, Jan. 6, 1820, King, Life of Rufus King, VI, 242-3. 84Poughkeepsie Journal, July 14, 1819. 86James Tallmadge to John W. Taylor, April 4-, 1819, John W. Taylor Manuscripts, New-York Historical Society, as quoted to the author in a letter from George Dangerfield, Sept. 10, 1951. To "squint" meant to glance at a person with dislike or disapproval, or by means of some covert allusion, hint or suggestion. 86Tallmadge to Taylor, Jan. 11, 1820, Taylor Manuscripts, Ibid. 87Alexander, Political History of New York, I, 274. 88Poughkeepsie Journal, June 13, 1821. 89/bid., March 8, 1820.

90Idem. 91Idem.

CHAPTER SIX — STATE POLITICIAN

Upon his return from Congress, James Tallmadge shunned further national politics in expectation of a promising political career with the Clintonian faction in New York. However, he was defeated in the state Senate elections of 1819 and received no political appointment from Clinton. When overlooked for the attorney generalship in July 1819, he bolted from the Clintonians and joined forces with the Bucktails. In the spring of 1820, all Bucktail candidates in Dutchess County won election to the state Assembly, a most unusual outcome.' In 1821, Tallmadge successfully ran on a Dutchess Bucktail ticket for delegates to the New York State Constitutional Convention. All five Bucktails were elected from Dutchess County, with Tallmadge amassing the largest individual vote.2

The convention had a decided Bucktail majority and met from late August until early November 1821. The purpose was to alter the undemocratic framework of the existing constitution. There were four main points of revision: the Council of Appointment, the Council

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of Revision, suffrage and the judiciary system. First, a committee, of which Tallmadge was a member, was formed to consider the manner of taking up the business of the convention. This group proposed that ten standing committees be appointed to study and recommend revisions of certain aspects of the constitution. The chairmen of all ten committees were members of Van Buren's Bucktail faction, including Tallmadge, who was chairman of the committee on the Council of Revision.

The Council of Revision was composed of the governor, chancellor and at least two of the supreme court justices. This body had the power of veto over legislation and could only be overruled by a legislative majority of two-thirds or more. Thus the judiciary assumed a quasi-legislative and executive function, as a sort of third branch of the legislature. Since the judges were not elected by the voters, this was an abridgment of direct representative government, which was a subject of growing concern in American political thought.

On September 3, Tallmadge reported that his committee recommended the abolition of the third article of the constitution which provided for the Council of Revision and that the same veto power then vested in the council be given to the governor alone.3 The following day Tallmadge explained that his committee was unanimous in its opinion, reasoning that the legislative and judicial departments should be kept separate, but that there still should be a veto. After speeches had accused the committee's motives as involving censure of the judges, Tallmadge rose to the defense of his group and stated that all its members wanted to do was to separate the judiciary from politics and keep the veto as a defensive and precautionary measure over the legislature. Continuing, Tallmadge argued that government is a libel on man, but necessary because man is weak and corrupt. All provisions of government should be based on the fundamental principle that it should restrain the vicious and profligate. There is safety in government by majority rule, but as expressed by representatives of the people and not by democracy in its collective capacity. The fate of ancient republics should warn us against the danger of all democracies. Their liberties were lost because they had no check on the people.4 With the Council of Revision went the Council of Appointment. In its place, the power of appointment was transferred to the executive and the Senate. This proposal was opposed only by Tallmadge, who thought the legislature should have nothing to do with the patronage of the government.5 Throughout the entire discussion of the judiciary, Tallmadge, along with the Van Buren Democrats, stood for moderate

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measures and opposed the abrogation of the old supreme court in favor of establishing a new one.6 The convention removed all property qualifications as conditions of suffrage for white men but, for the first time, required Negroes to possess a freehold of the value of two hundred and fifty dollars as a condition of voting. The Clintonian minority was more liberal on this issue than the majority.7 The governor's term was altered from three to two years and the office of lieutenant governor took on increased prestige and responsibility.

The Constitutional Convention of 1821 definitely placed James Tallmadge in Van Buren's camp. Tallmadge had been elected with Bucktails, had been appointed to an important chairmanship by Bucktails; he sided with Bucktails and claimed to be a Bucktail.s Rufus King relates that there was no cordiality between factions and "3uspicion and jealousies are more extensive than we could have anticipated."9 We can be sure the presence of James Tallmadge intensified this atmosphere.

It was evident in 1821 that the Bucktails controlled state politics; so Clinton declined a renomination for governor to avoid the risk of defeat. This left the Clintonians without a running candidate and the party temporarily disintegrated." Yates, a member of the Van Buren Democrats, was elected governor.

In 1823, there were not more than a dozen friends of Clinton in the legislature. During this session, the Democrats, while in caucus to fill appointive offices, encountered only one serious controversy—that of comptroller. They were divided in their support between William L. Marcy and General James Tallmadge. Governor Yates and his friends in the legislature backed IVIarcy, while the friends of Colonel Young, headed by John Cramer of the Senate, were in favor of Tallmadge. Van Buren, who was in Washington, avoided the struggle among his friends but favored Marcy. Marcy won the appointment by a large majority of the caucus.il Once again Tallmadge became a disappointed office-seeker.

Ever since Monroe had been elected to his second term as president in 1820, the politicos had been forming alliances in anticipation of the presidential election of 1824. Virginia had ended her dynasty and no longer possessed a favorite son, leaving the race wide open. Perhaps the most undecided state in the Union as to its choice was New York. De Witt Clinton had ambitions but, without the control of his own state, he could not be a contender. The leading candidates were John Quincy Adams, William Crawford of Georgia,

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Henry Clay, John C. Calhoun and Andrew Jackson. Presidential preferences knew no party lines in New York except that Van Buren's "Albany Regency" was expected to adhere to the nomination of the congressional caucus in a desire to keep the national Republican party together.12 The Republicans feared that the election of anyone but Crawford would lead to an amalgamation of parties.13 Their nomination was anticipated to be Crawford, but there was a large group in New York opposed to such a nomination. In New York State the legislature still enjoyed the prerogative of choosing presidential electors and; with the Bucktails in a majority, it seemed certain that Van Buren would have his way. This caused the anti-Crawford men to desire that the choice of presidential electors be taken from the legislature and given to the people. This developed into a great democratic crusade which was immediately popular with the voters. Other states had adopted the change; so it seemed a natural right of the people to choose their own presidential electors.

To give strength to the issue, the anti-Crawford men formed the People's party, of which Henry Wheaton of New York City and General Tallmadge became the most prominent leaders.14 The New York Patriot, a newspaper edited by Wheaton and devoted to a change in the electoral law, gained so much popularity during the state Assembly campaign of 1823 that Democratic candidates feared opposing a change in the law and many had to pledge open support of it.15 The Cherry Valley Gazette of November 1823, recorded that seventyfive per cent of the elected Assembly members had done so.16 Pledges of presidential preference of the candidates were not often requested, because it was hoped that the state electoral law would be repealed.17 The People's party nominated candidates in opposition to the Democratic candidates, with Tallmadge and Wheaton winning election to the Assembly by large majorities.18

Again Tallmadge became opposed to his former allies after failing to receive an appointive office. Outwardly, the sequence of events paralleled those which caused him to turn against Clinton, but there is no reason to believe that he expected to be appointed by the Democrats as state comptroller. It is likely that Tallmadge joined the Bucktails because there was no other party in opposition to Clinton, but his reason for leaving the Bucktails was probably not hatred. It may have had several motives behind it: a sincere desire for democratic political reform; a realization that there was little political future in the ranks of the Bucktails for a late-corner; a wish to have a northern president in John Q. Adams; and a desire to break the

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Virginian hamstringing of New York's political influence which Van Buren's strict party discipline perpetuated.

When this forty-ninth session of the legislature met, one of the first orders of business was to elect the speaker of the Assembly. The People's party, which had become a conglomeration of former Federalists, Clintonians and some Bucktails, met in caucus with the Democrats to nominate a speaker." Wheaton was urged to run, but this session of the Assembly conflicted with his Supreme Court duties. The People's party supported Tallmadge but, in a letter to Daniel Webster on November 30, 1823, Wheaton wrote:

I doubt whether Tallmadge can be got in. Should that be the case I shall perhaps be compelled to run . . . De Witt is playing the fool—but he can do nothing in this state. There are exactly 12

Clintonians in the House—and not more than three who have stood by him in all his turnings and windings.20 But Tallmadge was defeated by a large majority,21 and Wheaton persisted in not running for speaker.

In the Assembly, Wheaton then proposed a motion to give the choice of presidential electors to the people but Democrat Flagg offered a resolution, opposed by Wheaton and Tallmadge, to refer the motion to a committee of nine.22 Flagg became chairman of this committee, whose members were all pro-Crawford men, except Wheaton and two others. Tallmadge was not a member. Flagg had previously been in favor of a popular election of electors until he was "instructed."23 In committee he was able to curb Wheaton's motion by amending it so that presidental electors be chosen by a majority of the voters with no provision for re-election if a majority were not obtained.24 With at least four contenders for the presidency, a majority vote for any one candidate was nearly impossible and, therefore, New York's vote would be invalidated. The Democrats then wanted the legislature to have the choice of electors if the voters were unable to elect by majority vote, but this would have accomplished little change in the law and was defeated.

On January 11, 1824, Marcy wrote to Van Buren in Washing-

ton:

If it were not for the embarrassing question of the electoral law we should be in the best possible condition here . . . . I believe all Republicans have serious apprehensions as to the consequences, if the mode is changed, but they think there is a demand for it by the great body of the people and that a refusal to yield to this demand jeopardizes their popularity and exposes the party to an overthrow.25 Closely connected with this internal state issue, was a growing

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national sentiment against the congressional caucus practice of nominating presidential candidates. The Tennessee Resolutions which proposed such a caucus in 1824 prompted James Tallmadge to speak out in the New York Assembly against the method. He contended that caucuses curtailed the elective liberty of the people and allowed United States government officers undue influence. There are men not in elective government who direct the government. "They are the office holders who now live on executive favour—and fatten on the profits of their craft." These men dictate caucus policy and this defeats the Constitution. After a few examples from history, Tallmadge argued that all power belongs to and proceeds from the people, and all government officers should be held accountable to the people. He denied the right of the legislature to appoint presidential electors. The right belongs to the people.26

On January 30, in his fight to liberalize the electoral law in New York, Tallmadge spoke against the bill proposed by the committee of nine. Instead, he supported a substitute bill proposed by Waterman which also had the majority feature but which provided for election by plurality if a majority vote failed. Tallmadge disliked the majority-vote practice, and thought it was ripe for intrigue.27 However, the committee bill passed in the Assembly with Flagg's amendment by a vote of 110 to 5.

The Senate referred the electoral bill to a select committee which submitted a report, February 24, stating that the legislature should remain as the mode of choosing electors and that the state should wait for an amendment to the federal Constitution. New York must not split, and thereby lose her vote, by district choice or general ticket." By a vote of 17 to 14, the Senate postponed action on the bill until November, when it would be too late to alter the method in the coming national election. Only a minority of the senators had been elected in 1823, so as a body the Senate could oppose this bill with a clear conscience." Nevertheless, this vote weakened Van Buren's party with the people.

The year 1824 was no lean one for politics for, besides the electoral issue and national election, New York had to elect a new governor. The People's party favored the nomination of Colonel Young, but the Democrats forsook their own Governor Yates and stole the People's candidate by nominating Young themselves. The People's party favored Adams and Clay for President, and this move by the Democrats was designed to weaken that faction by reducing

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their chance of winning control of the state.3° Four days later, on April 7, stunned by the Bucktail maneuver, the People's party held a legislative caucus denouncing the Democratic nomination and proposing a nominating convention at Utica on September 21.

On April 12, the Democrats introduced a resolution in the Senate to remove De Witt Clinton from the office of Canal Commissioner. Clinton had performed the duties of his office devotedly and there had never been any complaints regarding his competence. This resolution was therefore quickly recognized as a political trick. The Clintonians and the People's party were working in concert to promote the presidential interests of Adams and Clay; but many of the People's men w2re much more akin to the Democrats in their political thinking and affiliations than to the Clintonians. Thus, men such as Tallmadge and Wheaton were faced with a dilemma, either side of which would prove disastrous. By voting for the resolution they would offend the Clintonians with whom they were acting on the presidential question. By voting against Clinton's ouster they would be denounced by the Regency and identified with the Clintonians."-

Wheaton saw just the latter horn of the dilemma:

This was a contrivance of the faction to fix on us the imputation of partiality to him [Clinton]. They believe we should vote against it. But they were much mortified to find that the most conspicuous members on our side of the House voted for the Resolution. The gun missed fire, as many of their own mien voted for it.32 Tallmadge was treading a tight rope, for his position was even more ticklish. His predicament is best described by Thurlow Weed who wrote:

I hastened back to the Assembly to inform our friends what was coming, and to prepare them for resisting it. General Tallmadge, our leader, was first appealed to. After Colonel Young's defection, it was conceded all around that General Tallmadge must be our candidate for governor. I knew how bitterly General Tallmadge hated Mr. Clinton, but in a few hurried and emphatic sentences implored him not to be caught in the trap thus baited for him. I urged him to state frankly, in a brief speech, how entirely he was estranged personally and politically from Mr. Clinton, but to denounce his removal during the successful progress of a system of improvement which he had inaugurated, . . . as an act of vandalism to which he could not consent to be a party. I concluded by assuring him solemnly that if he voted for that resolution he could not receive the nomination for governor.33 When the resolution was read in the Assembly, Tallmadge remained silent and voted in the affirmative. Clinton was ousted by a vote of 64 to 34, with only three Democratic dissenting votes.34 The legislature adjourned at noon and several members who voted for the resolution were hissed by the people as they came out of the capitol. Tall-

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madge became aware of his great error, for his hotel was filled with citizens who rebuked him loudly as he passed to his apartment." Weed continued his description:

At three o'clock General Tallmadge sent for me. I found him nervously excited, pacing rapidly backwards and forwards in his parlor, 'the victim of a remorse that comes too late.' He perceived both the depth and the darkness of the political pit into which he had fallen. He said that he left me with the intention of first denouncing

Mr. Clinton as his personal and political foe, and then, in language as indignant as he could command, denouncing the resolution and its authors, but that Messrs. Wheaton and Pierson, who occupied seats on either side of him, claimed that they were all embarked in a common cause, and that it was their duty to stand by each other, and that, thus pressed and thus yielding, he had committed the greatest blunder of his political life.36 It was truly an unfortunate decision. "Had it not been for that vote, he would undoubtedly have been the next governor of the state of New-York, with the consent and support of the Clintonian party."37

The legislature returned to its constituents for the summer with two extremely unpopular acts committed: the tabling of the electoral bill and the removal of Clinton.

James Tallmadge returned to Poughkeepsie and what must have been a summer of grief. On June 17, his older remaining son, James Edward, died at the age of four years and five months. Less than a month later, his last son, Sutherland, born in the spring of the previous year, died, the fourth son to be lost, leaving the Tallmadges but one daughter.38

The summer of 1824 was not without its politics. Governor Yates had been promised by caucus advocates that he would be rewarded with the renomination for governor if he did not call for the choice of electors by the people.39 But he was discarded by the Regency in favor of Colonel Young, and so, free from his agreement or in revengeful anger, Yates called for a special session of the legislature on August 2, to enact an electoral law which would place the right of choice in the people. Jenkins claims that Yates entertained the idea that should he openly favor the electoral bill, he might obtain the nomination of the People's party."

When the session opened, Flagg offered the following resolutions:

Resolved, That since the last adjournment of the Legislature, nothing has transpired within the letter or spirit of the constitution, requiring an extraordinary session at this time; and therefore the proclamation of the governor convening the same is not warranted by the constitution.

Resolved, That iinasmuch as the transaction of legislative business, in obedience to a proclamation thus illegally issued, . . .

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would sanction a precedent of dangerous tendency; it is due to the members of the Legislature, . . . that they should forthwith adjourn.41 Tallmadge naturally opposed both these resolves, but they passed with strong votes. However, a third move, for immediate adjournment, was postponed. The now famous "seventeen senators" voted that an electoral law ought to be enacted after the Assembly passed it, but the expediency of such action at this session was voted down by the same senators 42

General Tallmadge made several addresses, one of which, on August 4, lasted nearly four hours. With sonorous voice and dramatic elocution he plied the Assembly with patriotism and emotion. Tallmadge was fighting to prevent throwing away the representative government for which "our fathers" fought the Revolution. "The public will not misunderstand our votes on this occasion; and according to those votes, we are to be classed hereafter."43 In refuting Flagg, Tallmadge said extraordinary occasions were to be determined solely by the executive. In explaining his vote for an electoral law, Tallmadge said:

Those who know me, know the compensation can be no object to me . . . . I disclaim being influenced by party considerations.

I am not to this hour, the partizan of either of the presidential candidates, now in the field.44 If Tallmadge were not a partisan of John Adams, he was certainly an interested friend, for on August 9, Adams stated:

I received a letter from James Tallmadge, at Albany, where the New York Legislature, after a session of five days, were to adjourn on the 6th, leaving parties as much undecided as ever, and a victory claimed on both sides.45 Despite the General's efforts, no electoral law was enacted, although one was recommended, and the session ended August 6 with nothing accomplished except the increasing of public resentment.

The proposed Utica Convention was now only a month and a half away. It had been conceived at a meeting, at which Tallmadge, Wheaton, Weed and others were present, for the purpose of nominating candidates for governor and lieutenant governor, by those opposed to Crawford for president and in favor of an electoral law.46 Thus, the nominating convention was inaugurated in New York. Until Clinton's removal as canal commissioner, General Tallmadge had been conceded to be the People's party's leading candidate for governor, but Clinton's removal caused popular sentiment to endorse him, so that by September he had greater backing than Tallmadge. Thurlow Weed felt that this development might be fatal to the People's party

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and therefore also to the electoral prospects of Adams, since the People's men were bitterly hostile to Clinton.47 Weed toured the state to assess public opinion and unite the anti-Van Buren forces for Tallmadge. Weed found public sentiment disappointing for Tallmadge and suggested to the Clintonians in New York City that Tallmadge be run for lieutenant governor with Clinton; but they would not support a man who had voted for Clinton's removal. Tallmadge was "the prince of rascals."48 Nor was the idea appealing to Tallmadge. The General peremptorily refused such an opportunity tendered him by a delegation on its way to Utica.49 Thurlow Weed was successful the next day in what the delegation had failed to achieve. Tallmadge listened attentively to Weed, who endeavored to show him that, with his consent to run with Clinton, they could carry the state; that the presidential electoral vote of New York could be given to Adams; and that in making the sacrifice, "even a broader field for usefulness than that of being governor of New York would be opened to him."5° Weed left for Utica with a letter from Tallmadge "authorizing his friends at Utica, if in their judgment the success of our cause required it, to consent to the use of his name as a candidate for lieutenantgovernor."51

There were one hundred and twenty-two delegates at the convention; of these about thirty were People's men. Since Clinton had a majority of support which was opposed to Tallmadge, the People's men proposed for nomination John W. Taylor, late speaker of the United States House of Representatives. Taylor, however, declined. Hammond felt that if the People's party had been able to offer a candidate with talents equal to those of Tallmadge, a majority of Clintonians would have supported such a man.52 On the first ballot for nomination of governor, Clinton received 69 votes, Tallmadge 21 and Henry Huntington 21. There were also ten other votes scattered among three candidates. On the second ballot, Clinton polled 76. Tallmadge 31 and Huntington 13, to give the nomination to Clinton. The People's men then deemed it fit to run Tallmadge for I;eutenant governor. He won the nomination on the first ballot by 89 votes, with only 10 against him.53 In contempt for Clinton's nomination, most of the People's party delegates seceded in a body to form another meeting, but, since they had denounced the legislative nomination and supported the Utica Convention as a representative body, they could do nothing but endorse Tallmadge's nomination. The only effect of this rump convention was to banish any suspicion of a secret understanding between the Clintonians and the People's party.54

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The gubernatorial election fell on November 1 and swept Clinton and Tallmadge into office with commanding majorities. Clinton obtained a majority of more than 16,000 votes over Colonel Young, while Tallmadge received strong support from both the People's party and the Democrats, and amassed a 32,000 majority over his opponent, General Root. The election also gave Clinton control of the Assembly by a three to one ratio and brought in six Clintonian senators.55

However, the Democratic-controlled legislature of 1824 was still in office and had the right of choosing presidential electors. Several days of balloting for electors proved ineffectual. Neither the Adams, Crawford nor Clay tickets could gain a majority, and only two tickets could be selected. The only chance of success for any faction was a joint ticket with another faction. Clay needed at least seven New York electoral votes to be a candidate for the House of Representatives' election. Thurlow Weed, General Tallmadge, Wheaton, and three other Adams men met secretly several times with the leading Clay supporters, whereby a union ticket was designed to gain Clay supporters, in return for which seven Adams electors would deliver their votes to Clay in the electoral college.56 With this support, the New York Adams men could expect a majority of only two votes and this majority depended upon political pressure applied by Weed Tallmadge and Wheaton to several recalcitrant Adams men.

Previously, Weed had accidentally discovered that a Crawford member of the Assembly had been able to induce an Adams member to support Crawford and also convert two other Adams men. Just prior to the balloting, Tallmadge, Weed and Wheaton called on the first deserter and told him that they knew of his scheme. Wheaton required him and the other two to give their support to Adams on the electoral ballot and have Tallmadge's and Wheaton's initials endorsed. Only in that way could Wheaton be assured of those three votes.57 Tallmadge then said:

As friends of Mr. Adams, knowing what we now know, we have a high responsibility resting upon us. We should lose the electoral ticket if these three votes, or even two of them, should be cast in favor of the Crawford ticket. In addition to what Mr. Wheaton requires, it is proper for me to say that we shall carefully examine the ballots as they are being canvassed, and that if the three, with our initials indorsed, appear in the box, all that has passed here shall be regarded as confidential; but if these ballots do not appear,

I shall, as certainly as my life is spared, rise in my place, proclaim the facts within our knowledge, and demand a committee of investigation.58

The three initialed ballots appeared and the first ballot on the union ticket elected thirty-two Adams and Clay electors. The second

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ballot chose four Crawford electors. So the Adams men were victorious without the benefit of an electoral law.

When the electoral college met in December, there was a shift in the New York vote which gave Adams 26, Crawford 5, Clay 4, and Jackson 1. Even though the Adams men yielded only four of the promised seven Clay votes, Weed maintained that they acted in good faith because Clay had to have Louisiana's vote, which he lost, to be brought into the House of Representatives, therefore, the New York Adams men were freed from their bargain." Weed admitted, however, that those seven votes could not have been delivered. This electoral college vote gave Jackson 99, Adams 84, Crawford 41, and Clay 37. While the Adams men needed Clay supporters to win New York, they could not later surrender the agreed number of votes to Clay because Crawford would then have been eliminated from the race and would have thrown his support to Jackson, thus defeating Adams. The contest was thrown into the House of Representatives where Clay was dropped from the running. Clay threw his support to Adams who was elected president on the first ballot without any material support from the Jackson or Crawford elements.

By this magnificent chicanery, the People's party had virtually made Adams president. In return for this service it expected to reap the spoils of victory and Tallmadge, being the virtual leader of the party, expected the most. Adams felt it essential to get New York ehind his administration and he also felt a debt of gratitude. Thus, Governor Clinton was offered the ministry to England. Either Adams wanted to reward the most powerful man in New York, or remove !Jim from the state to allow the People's party to assume control with Tallmadge as governor. If either of these reasons was not his motive, Adams was misinformed as to the nature of his New York support— thinking that the party which swung New York's electoral vote to him was the same party that made Clinton governor. Clinton viewed this offer skeptically and declined, for "'various other considerations' " than serving the people who elected him governor in 1824.6° Clinton's refusal widened the breach between him and Tallmadge who chafed t the idea of occupying a subordinate and powerless position. Tallmadge asked Thurlow Weed to go to Washington to ask for the English post for him, and the Lieutenant Governor's friends in the legislature united in a letter to Adams asking for Tallmadge's appointment to England; all to no avail, for Rufus King was given the appointment.61

After the legislature adjourned in 1825, Tallmadge again met

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Weed and said that his situation had become so irksome that he was determined to get out of it. He asked Weed to renew his application to the president for a mission, on the grounds of political services rendered and the political future of Adams' administration.62 The debt which Adams owed New York support had not been recognized in any political sense. Adams' patronage policy was mystifying to Tallmadge :

Mr. Adams is pursuing a steady course. But will he succeed to keep old friends — buy up old enemies? He began by an attempt on Clinton, who snuffed at him because the price was too low. Next he selected King . . . . Next comes Conklin for District Judge — . . . now a mere page to Clinton, in his tour to Ohio— & no where able to influence a second vote . . . . As yet I will presume all is correct.

Altho' I confess I do not perceive the wisdom of such a course.

It reminds me what was so often and so warmly urged on me during our Elector Strife—when Judge Spencer and other of Clinton's agents urged me to give up Adams—that his friends could not rely on him—

He would sacrafice them to buy up his opponents—I then said it was a slander—They said they would prove it true . . . . How can Adams' friends oppose Clinton after such decissive acts as Adams has given to him? & no one act to his [Adams'] own friends? They can not oppose him [Clinton] for Adams. They may for some other man . . . . His old friends can not retain the power to give him the votes of this state & make him President a second time, as they have the first if he pursues the course he has begun.63

Although Weed was confident of success in his errand for Tallmadge, he met disappointment. The President felt he could not give the mission to France or Russia to a state which already had received zhe mission to England and only a first-class mission was acceptable to Tallmadge. The Lieutenant Governor was disappointed and annoyed but did not for a moment consider accepting a second-class inission. However, Adams gratified his New York friends with the mission to Sweden which was obtained for Henry Wheaton.64

Through personal contact and association at this time, Weed observed Tallmadge to be inordinately ambitious and easily exasperated t ut with many redeeming qualities:

His anger could be appeased; he was hopeful and confiding; and as a politician was efficient, zealous, and popular. He would soon recover from a disappointment, however severe, and, fining his mind upon some other position, would go to work with renewed energy.66

In 1827, when he was no longer lieutenant governor, Tallmadge still was warmly concerned over his treatment by Adams:

Those who supported him [Adams] braved every thing, were successful, have been abandoned by Adams St have been cast off as dishonoured . . . . Had he been faithful, the Republican party would this Day have been his supporters . . . . It will be very hard to reunite an active ardent party for him in this State, Sc without

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this State, he is lost . . . . The President is a Bookman, locked up in his closet— & Every member of his administration are hostile to him — & Seem to have plotted his destruction—in causing him to permit the destruction of his friends . . . . I have been & shall continue to be, silent, & . . . neither ask—or murmur—as to myself I have a profound indifference to the course Mr. Adams takes hereafter. If the choice band of '24 will be faithful to themselves & to each other— the time is not far off when they must be felt, at least in this state. I will promise them to be ready in the camp or in the field— & sustain any part allotted to me . . . . But we must be firm & patient & redeem ourselves.66 In December of the same year, Adams was informed by Taylor, who had a conversation with Tallmadge upon the subject of appointments in New York State, that the General had for the present abandoned the pursuit of politics and returned to his practice at the bar.67 But only a few weeks later Tallmadge wrote to Representative Van Rensselaer, a member of the People's party of 1824:

We are curious to see in what shape he [Adams] may yet indicate his obligations & gratitude. In tokens heretofore given to those who opposed him in 1821 have opperated like a charm to [secure] majorities against him. Perhaps this is what he deserved.

But we shall look patiently for results.68 A month later, in January 1828, Van Rensselaer and Dickinson, having heard that Adams was inclining to nominate Tallmadge as district attorney at New York, made representations to the President against him because they felt the appointment would produce an ill effect since Tallmadge had lost the confidence of all parties. Adams wrote "that however irresolute or wavering his general political character may have been, he had not been so to me, as on two important and critical occasions he had been a decisive and most efficient friend to me."69 Despite his feelings of obligation, Adams did not appoint Tallmadge to this post. Tallmadge remained hopeful to the end, but was always disappointed.

The complaint lodged against Tallmadge by Van Rensselaer and Dickinson was not unjustified. As soon as Tallmadge was elected lieutenant governor, he went to work to prevent any of the People's party from forming a political alliance with Governor Clinton or his friends.70 It is Hammond's opinion that Tallmadge formed the project of leading off a party, of which he was to be the head, to be composed partly of Clintonians and partly of Democrats, leaving Clinton and Van Buren as castoffs. This is the only rational explanation Hammond could give for the conduct of the Lieutenant Governor. Tallmadge was indignant at not having been made governor himself and was on very poor terms with Clinton from past experiences. His thirty-two thousand majority, twice that of Clinton's, deluded him in judging

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his own strength. The faults and errors of Clinton dominated his conversations and he seemed suddenly to be alarmed and horrified by the fear of the ghost of Federalism.71 The mutual friends of the Governor and the Lieutenant Governor made frequent and ardent appeals to the latter, assuring him of their continued friendship and support and warning him of the inevitable ruin which would be the consequence to both parties if there should be war between him and Clinton.72 The office of lieutenant governor had taken on greater dignity and responsibility as a result of the revisions in the Constitution of 1821, but neither this greater responsibility nor the appeals of friends had any restraining effect on Tallmadge. His own feelings and actions made his position extremely uncomfortable. Hammond, a contemporary political observer, wrote of him:

General Tallmadge, though beyond all question a man of talents, appears to me, nearly through his whole life, to have been politically eccentric and wrongheaded. One of his errors undoubtedly was, that he had imbibed an opinion that political success depended more on tact, and what is called management, than on the measures which the politician advocated, or on personal merit.73

When Rufus King was given the mission to England, the New York legislature had to elect someone to fill out his term in the United States Senate. The Assembly voted on three occasions, representing the leading factions: Spencer, a Clintonian, received 56 votes; Tallmadge 13 votes; and Tracy, a Democrat, 4 votes.74 In the Senate, the Tallmadge and Van Buren factions united in opposing Ambrose Spencer by nominating a number of candidates and, thereby, distributing the votes so no candidate could win a majority. After Spencer was voted down, Tallmadge was nominated but that resolution was laid on the table by a vote of 19 to 12.75 Tracy was also rejected. Tallmadge wrote to Weed:

It is essential some active, decissive man be sent to Washington, who can be of use, to approach & act in concert with Mr. Adams . . . . Some persons believe the Clintonians will wish to unite on the Lieut. Gov. for Senator & insist on his excepting the place & that if he will take the place, it will be conferred with unanimity.

His 'intentions are not known. The papers will soon speak about the place. You will think & act as editor.76 But Clintonian support never materialized for Tallmadge. The People's party hoped to have him appointed by a joint resolution in case of a stalemate. This passed the Senate but the Assembly refused to concur on the grounds that that mode of appointment was foreign to the laws of the state.77 The stalemate was not resolved in Tallmadge's favor and he failed to get out of this incongruous political position.

The Erie Canal was officially opened in October of 1825 with

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a voyage from Buffalo to New York by Clinton, Tallmadge and other public figures. For Tallmadge, the "whole tour on the Canal was very pleasant," but not without its political implications. He wanted to know from Thurlow Weed what effects the canal celebration had in the West in relation to Clinton. Tallmadge observed that, "It appeared to be public rather than individual. I am pleased that I went the whole voyage. My friends think it was a good measure & useful to me."78

Throughout his term as lieutenant governor, Tallmadge unsuccessfully sought a way out of his close political association with Clinton either by patronage favor or elective office. Political ambition was not strong enough to force him to run for re-election on a ticket with Clinton. "There are many reasons which induced me & my friends to think it best I should not run with Clinton. I was entirely satisfied the west should have had a candidate for Lieut. Gov."79 In 1826, Clinton ran against Judge Rochester and was re-elected by a slim majority of four thousand votes, but lacked majorities in both the Senate and Assembly.

In 1827, Tallmadge was out of public office and returned to his law practice in Poughkeepsie but he still looked to President Adams for an appointment. However, Tallmadge's activities were not confined to the practice of law. During the legislative session of 1825, an application for charter of the Dutchess County Bank at Poughkeepsie was approved and Tallmadge was chosen as a director. He was also one of fourteen who incorporated the Poughkeepsie Steamboat Company in March 1827, but plans for this business venture were never completed.8° This came three years after the United States Supreme Court handed down its decision in the Gibbons-versus-Ogden case against the old Fulton and Livingston monopoly of steamboat navigation in New York state waters.

During these years, a fifth son, Charles, was born to the Tallmadges ; and in 1827, the General lost both his mother and brotherin-law through death.

By 1828, Tallmadge was chairman of the Bar of Dutchess County but left his home that year to live in New York City during the winters, until his death in 1853. The office of lieutenant governor was his last public office and, except when he served as a delegate to the New York Constitutional Convention of 1846, in which he was 'conspicuously inconspicuous, Tallmadge participated little in politics during the remainder of his life.

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NOTES TO CHAPTER SIX

'Poughkeepsie Journal, May 3, 1820. 2/bid., June 27, 1821. 3Nathaniel H. Carter and William L. Stone, reporters, Reports of the Proceedings and Debates of the Convention of 1821, Assembled for the Purpose of Amending the Constitution of the State of New-York (Albany, 1821), pp. 42-3. pp. 64-6. 511ammond, History of Political Parties, II, 73. 6/ bid., II, 63-4. 7Seward, Autobiography, I, 50. 8Hammond, History of Political Parties, II, 170. 9Rufus King to C. King, Oct. 15, 1821, King, Life of Rufus King, VI, 416. 10mcGuire, Democratic Party, I, 87. iillammond, History of Political Parties, II, 115. 12C. H. Rammelkamp, "The Campaign of 1824 in New York," American Historical Association Report for 1904, p. 180. 13Hammond, History of Political Parties, II, 128. 14Alexander, Political History of New York, I, 324. 1 16 5,11amm ond, History of Political Parties, II, 131. deni. 17Rammelkamp, "Campaign of 1824," p. 181. 18Hammond, History of Political Parties, II, 132. 19Baker, Wheaton, p. 48; Fox, Decline of Aristocracy, p. 292. 20Baker, Wheaton, p. 48. 21llammond, History of Political Parties, II, 140. 22/bid., II, 142. 23Fox, Decline of Aristocracy, p. 283. 24Baker, Wheaton, p. 50. 25Rammelkamp, "Campaign of 1824," p. 185. 26Speech of James Tallniadge, Esq. on the subject of Caucus, to Nominate a President and Vice-President, as Brought up on the Tennessee Resolutions, in the House of Assembly, 26th January, 1824 (Albany, 1824), pp. 3-11. 27speech of James Tallmadge, Esq. on the Bill to Provide for the Choice, by the People, of the Electors of President and rice-President, in the House of Assembly, 30th January, 1824 (Albany, 1824), pp. 5-10. 28Report of the Select Committee of the Senate, on the Electoral Law (Albany), [no year given]. 29Hammond, History of Political Parties, II, 150. 30Harriet A. Weed, ed., Autobiography of Thurlow Weed (Boston, 1883), p. 108. (In Life of Thurlow Weed Including his Autobiography and a Memoir, edited by Harriet A. Weed and Thurlow Weed Barnes). 31Weed, Autobiography, pp. 110-1. 32H. Wheaton to R. King, April 12, 1824, King, Life of Rufus King, VI, 564. 33Weed, Autobiography, p. 109. 34Hammond, History of Political Parties, II, 159. 35Weed, Autobiography, p. 113. 36/bid., pp. 113-4. 37Hammond, History of Political Parties, II, 163. 38Helen Wilkinson Reynolds, ed., Notices of Marriages and Deaths About 4,000 in Number Published in Newspapers Printed at Poughkeepsie, New York 1778-1825, Collections of the Dutchess County Historical Society, Vol. IV (Poughkeepsie, New York, 1930), p. 102. 39J. A. King to Rufus King, Jan. 9, 1824, King, Life of Rufus King,

VI,

545 496 j ohn S. Jenkins, The Life of Silas Wright (Auburn, New York, 1847), p. 37.

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41/bid., p. 38. 42/bid., p. 39. 43Tallmadge's Speech on the Electoral Law, Aug. 4, 1824, p. 6. 44/bid., p. 18. 45Adams, Memoirs, VI, 407. 4 47 6,W ee e d , Autobiography, p. 117.

dm. 48Clinton to Post, April 21, 1824, Bigelow, "De Witt Clinton as a Politician," p. 569. 49Weed, Autobiography, p. 119. 50/bid., p. 120. 51Idem. 52Hammond, History of Political Parties, II, 171. 53Albany Daily Advertiser, Sept. 24, 1824. 54Hammond, History of Political Parties, II, 173-4. 55Weed, Autobiography, p. 121. 56/bid., p. 123. 57/bid., pp. 124-6. 58/bid., p. 126. 59/bid., p. 128. 60Bigelow, "De Witt Clinton as a Politician," p. 556. 61Weed, Autobiography, p. 178. 62./dem. 63Tallmadge to Weed, Sept. 3, 1825, Tallmadge Papers. 64Weed, Autobiography, pp. 181, 183. 65/bid., p. 183. 66james Talmadge, Poughkeepsie, to Thurlow Weed, Rochester, Feb. 5, 1827, Tallmadge Papers. 67Adams, Memoirs, VII, 370. 68James Tallmadge, Poughkeepsie, to Hon. S. Van Rensaler, Washington, Dec. 26, 1827, Tallmadge Papers. 60Adams, Memoirs, VII, 411-2. 70Hammond, History of Political Parties, II, 184. 71/bid., II, 185. 72/bid., II, 184. 73Idem. 74Weed, Autobiography, p. 167. 75Jabez Delano Hammond, Political History of the State of New York (Syracuse, 1852), III, 61. 76James Tallmadge, Poughkeepsie, to Thurlow Weed, Rochester, Nov. 24, 1825, Tallmadge Papers.. 77Jenkins, Life of Wright, p. 46. 78Tallmadge to Weed, Nov. 24, 1825, Tallmadge Papers. 79Tallmadge to Weed, Feb. 5, 1827, Tallmadge Papers. 80platt, Eagle's History, p. 117.

CHAPTER SEVEN — EDUCATOR AND ECONOMIST

When James Tallmadge left politics, he did not become less active in public life. In New York City, he became one of a group of men who urged the establishment of a university in the city.' In October 1830, this council of "literary and scientific gentlemen" held a convention in respect to founding such a university. The University of the City of New York, later to be changed in name to New York University, was formed a month later as a stock company. Shareholders elected the council which had complete authority over the university.

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The council sent a memorial to the state legislature prepared by Tallmadge and two other persons requesting incorporation. This petition the legislature granted on April 21, 1831.2

Albert Gallatin resigned as president of the council in 1831, so Morgan Lewis became president and Tallmadge was elected vicepresident. Tallmadge and Chancellor Mathews were appointed as a board of visitors to lectures and classes. During the first year of instruction, Mathews interfered with the curriculum and discipline. This caused dissatisfaction among the faculty and some of the members resigned. The faculty wanted Mathews' dismissal and submitted written complaints to support their charges. Tallmadge was a staunch supporter of Mathews and was able to control the situation in his favor, even though a minority of the council was against Mathews. According to the faculty, Tallmadge replied to their charges that the 'professors should be treated with severity and made to feel their own insignificance.' "3

After this incident had passed the university directed activities toward obtaining endowment and constructing buildings. Tallmadge and Mathews were most active in these capacities and Tallmadge became president of the council in 1834. While in London the following year, he obtained a gift from the British government for the library. In 1837, a new building was dedicated by Tallmadge, to the purposes of science, literature and religion. The university, however, had gone $140,000 in debt. This prompted a new controversy which fell about the heads of the council. Because of difficult economic conditions in the crash of 1837, Mathews' failure to collect the pledged endowment and his spending for the new building, the faculty unanimously wanted him removed as chancellor.4 To attest to the financial plight of the university, Mathews was in Albany in February 1838, lobbying at the state legislature for a $10,000 grant for the university.' The grievance came to a climax in August of the same year when Tallmadge defended Mathews in the council from faculty attack but the council took financial control out of the chancellor's hands.

The faculty grievances were also directed at Tallmadge and other council friends of Mathews. Tallmadge refused to present the grievances to the council even when requested by that body, because he would then be an "accuser."6 Tallmadge felt that the professors had lobbied with some of the council:7 Mathews and Tallmadge requested the resignation of two council members so that their faction would have a majority.8 Then the council removed seven professors from the university, leaving only one. Tallmadge wrote that professors

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could not accuse their principals.° Financial retrenchment was given as the cause for the dismissals, but the faculty claimed they were made to stifle any investigation which their grievances might have caused.1° Although the members of the faculty lost their jobs, they were indirectly successful in forcing Mathews' dismissal for, after the controversy, Tallmadge favored Mathews' immediate resignation; it came about in February 1839.

Tallmadge was president of the council until he resigned in May 1846, because of allegedly dishonest annual reports made by Chancellor Frelinghuysen.11 Tallmadge had been largely responsible for the selection of Frelinghuysen as chancellor, whose salary was increased under the General's direction. But, in 1846, Tallmadge objected to the chancellor's extravagant salary while the annual deficit had increased and classical education was lowered.12 Author Theodore Jones thinks it strange that Tallmadge made this stand after defending charges of Mathews' extravagance. Jones feels that personal antagonisms, due in part to national politics, was the cause of the feud. Both men were Whig party leaders in New York State and Frelinghuysen was the Whig candidate for vice-president in 1844 on a ticket with Henry Clay. Jones considers a more plausible reason for Tallmadge's resignation to be the charge by one of the faculty that Tallmadge wanted to be chancellor of the university as well as president of the council, but that Frelinghuysen checked his ambitions in that direction.18 The fact that Tallmadge was awarded the LL.D. degree in 1838, by the University of the City of New York while he was president of its council, would appear to support the thesis of his ambitiousness.14

Tallmadge's charge that classical teaching was lowered was disingenuous of a man who considered Latin and Greek of no essential value and who was a partisan devotee of utilitarian education. Frelinghuysen believed the purpose of education was to train the intrinsic powers of the mind and he disdained the economic advantages from learning.15 Tallmadge, on the other hand, exhalted science which "should be taught with reference to productive industry, and especially in agriculture and mechanics."16 He viewed America as a middleclass society without high and low classes. A university, he said, "must be adapted to foster the middle class of society."17 It should provide business and professional training which promote practical learning and creation. In relation to foreign nations, Tallmadge said, "our people, even now, hold a rank incomparably pre-eminent in general intelligence and productive industry. It is the natural result from the difference of their and our institutions."18 The common

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school, he said, was "the wisest and the noblest institution ever devised by man for the public vvelfare."19 Tallmadge's criteria for education were economic in nature, and had little appreciation for the development of the individual.

Another interest of utilitarian nature, which chronologically paralleled his interest in education, was Tallmadge's connection with The American Institute. Tallmadge was one of the founders of this organization which was incorporated by the New York legislature. It was dedicated to the advancement of American productivity and creativeness in agriculture, manufacturing and commerce. Tallmadge served as president of The American Institute from 1831 until his death in 1853, except for two years when he declined re-election. He was also one of two vice-presidents, in 1831, of a convention held in New York which called itself the "Friends of Domestic Industry," but which John Adams called a tariff convention.20

Every October, The American Institute held a fair, at which individuals displayed agricultural produce and inventions which would facilitate production or save labor, in competition for prizes among which was the Tallmadge Gold Medal. At the close of each yearly event an address was given, usually by the president, reviewing problems and advances in agriculture, manufacturing and commerce.

General Tallmadge often sopke on these occasions in glowing terms of American progress. But he also had many complaints and gave much advice. He said that agriculture creates commerce and manufacturing, therefore all legislation which benefits agriculture also benefits commerce and manufacturing. "Hence protection to commerce and manufactures should ever be considered a measure in support of agriculture."21 But he later reversed the order of dependency of these factors and said, "Agriculture cannot prosper, without the first prosperity of commerce and manufactures."22 He viewed agriculture and manufacturing as reciprocal types of industry, each needing the other, and both beneficial to commerce. Manufacturing areas use more agricultural products and increase the labor demand rather than reduce it. Tallmadge felt that both these forms of industry should be provided with a home market and an adequate market for surplus productions. This, he said, is the duty of government, and that government is at fault which does not obtain or create a market for its citizens.23 He did not have parity prices or government contracts in mind, but rather reciprocal trade and protective tariffs. Free trade, Tallmadge said, cannot exist. He was not for a high tariff, he argued, but rather

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complete protection. Buy nothing that you can raise or make, he said.24 Tallmadge went so far as to propose that all payments to foreign countries be made with home agricultural products. He was speaking in 1843 and 1844, during the low point of a protracted depression following the crash of 1837.

The Compromise Tariff of 1833 provided for a gradual reduction of all duties above twenty per cent and this trend was not altered until 1942, when a Whig measure returned the tariff to the level of 1832. In 1841, Tallmadge argued that American commerce was crippled by unwise legislation but in the same speech blamed England for this inequality with Europe.25 He complained of high British import duties - on goods in American ships and free British import duty on American goods in British bottoms. This, he said, was detrimental to American commerce and the cause of American unemployment and currency derangement.26 Tallmadge misrepresented and exaggerated the effects of British shipping and presented known incorrect facts of commerce to support his charges.27 England was his scapegoat and a high tariff was his cure.

With a higher tariff passed in 1842, but the depression at its low point in 1843, England was still the cause of American economic ills in the mind of Tallmadge. Now he referred to history in citing England's economic policy. England refused exportation of cotton machinery to Russia but after Tallmadge had been to Russia in the late 1830's, aiding that country in obtaining American machinery for the manufacture of cotton, England lifted her ban and competed in the trade with Russia.28 Tallmadge said that England taught free trade to others while offering protection to her own subjects.

There was some validity in Tallmadge's charges, to be sure, but he was immersed in the spirit of nationalism. He considered foreign investment in United States' industry as virtually an infringement upon American rights. He painted American progress of agricultural pi oductivity in brilliant hues, and with good cause, for he could cite the steel plow, the reaper, mowing, threshing and haying machines, as well as seed drills and cultivators, all of which came into wide use in this period. But his views on trade and tariff were largely Whig in politics and northern in sectionalism, though couched in the phraseology of nationalism.

James Tallmadge outlived, by nearly twenty years, his wife, Laura, who died at New York City, February 22, 1834. He passed away in his seventy-sixth year on September 29, 1853, in the

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