Battle Staff NCO Review by Patrick Flannery

Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) Warfighter Observations (Year 2002)

Battle Staff NCO Review

Issue No. 09-02 0

Purpose

Table of Contents

In this book you will see many areas that speak about senior NCOs: Pages 2 thru 45 are words of wisdom and excerpts from former General Officers and former Command Sergeants Major. Unlike previous manuals and editions (FM 22100) which in some cases focus exclusively on leadership by uniformed leaders at battalion level and below—this edition addresses leadership between the officer and NCO at all levels and is addressed by former officers and NCOs who on the most part have spent over 30 years in the military. The primary manual to read is FM 22-100, AR 600-10, and FM 71-1001 which refers to NCO in staff positions and during TOC operations. These offer a framework for how to lead and provides points for Army leaders to consider when assessing and developing themselves, their people, and their organizations. This pamphlet “Battle Staff NCO Review” doesn’t presume to tell Army leaders exactly how they should lead every step of the way. They must be themselves and apply this leadership doctrine as appropriate to the situations they face. The main purpose of this book is to help the officer and NCO gain a better understanding and appreciation of the officer and NCO corps. Some of the information provided came from the book “The Officer/NCO Relationship,” dated September 1997, ARMOR magizine issue March-April 2001 “Redefining the Role of the Command Sergeant Major in a Tactical Environment, MPRI Patrick Castin, Battle Command Training Program, Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), and former instructors at USASMA. The last portion of the Battle Staff NCO refers to SGM duties in the MDMP process and CSM/SGM Trends. We hope this edition assist you in training and gives you a better understanding of the NCO corps. 1

Subject

Page

Purpose

NCO Creed

NCO History

NCO Leadership

Battalion CommandersCommand Sergeants Major

The Role of the SGM in the MDMP Process

Battle Staff NCO Training

CSM/SGM Trends

Conops Resource Library Holdings

Conclusion

Non-Commissioned Officer Creed No one is more professional than I. I am a Noncommissioned Officer, a leader of soldiers. As a Non-Commissioned Officer, I realize that I am a member of a time honored corps, which is known as "The Backbone of the Army." I am proud of the Corps of Noncommissioned Officers and will at all times conduct myself so as to bring credit upon the Corps, the Military Service and my country regardless of the situation in which I find myself. I will not use my grade or position to attain pleasure, profit, or personal safety.

Competence is my watch-word. My two basic responsibilities will always be uppermost in my mind-accomplishment of my mission and the welfare of my soldiers. I will strive to remain tactically and technically proficient. I am aware of my role as a Noncommissioned Officer. I will fulfill my responsibilities inherent in that role. All soldiers are entitled to outstanding leadership; I will provide that leadership. I know my soldiers and I will always place their needs above my own. I will communicate consistently with my soldiers and never leave them uninformed. I will be fair and impartial when recommending both rewards and punishment.

Officers of my unit will have maximum time to accomplish their duties; they will not have to accomplish mine. I will earn their respect and confidence as well as that of my soldiers. I will be loyal to those with whom I serve; seniors, peers and subordinates alike. I will exercise initiative by taking appropriate action in the absence of orders. I will not compromise my integrity, nor my moral courage. I will not forget, nor will I allow my comrades to forget that we are professionals, Noncommissioned Officers, leaders!

NCO History Office of the Sergeant Major of the Army By CSM Dan Elder

FOR TODAY’S SOLDIERS, THE POSITION OF SERGEANT MAJOR OF THE ARMY IS AS NATURAL AS A SQUAD LEADER. But just 35 short years ago it was not so. It was on the Fourth of July 1966 that the Chief of Staff of the Army Gen. Harold K. Johnson approved the establishment of the position of Sergeant Major of the Army, and a week later on a reviewing stand near the Pentagon Mall Entrance the first enlisted man, Sergeant Major William O. Wooldridge, was sworn in as the first Sergeant Major of the Army. The sergeant major was a part of the fledgling Continental Army of 1775 and served at the head of the noncommissioned officers of the regiment. In Baron von Steuben’s instructions (the Blue Book) he noted that the sergeant major should be well-acquainted with management, discipline of the regiment and of keeping rosters and forming details. Though their numbers and placement would vary over the years, it took a cost-reduction measure by Congress in June 1920 to eliminate the grade of sergeant major when enlisted members were grouped into seven pay grades (E-1 through E7). Though the position of sergeant major would informally be given to a senior master sergeant (E7), it would not be until the Military Pay Bill of 1958 that created the "super-grades" that the grade of sergeant major was restored. In April 1959, the first NCOs were promoted into the newly created rank. In 1964 and again in 1965, the U.S. Army Pacific Command representative at the annual Personnel Sergeants Major conference recommended establishing a Sergeant Major of the Army position and the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel initiated a study. In 1957 the Marines had established a Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps position, and the enlisted assistant to the Chief of Staff of the Army, Sgt. Maj. George Loikow, had recommended to Johnson that the Army should follow suit. Johnson believed that "If we were going to talk about the noncommissioned officers being the backbone of the Army, there ought to be established a position that this was in fact the case." In May of 1966 Johnson notified the field commanders of the major commands that he intended to appoint a Sergeant Major of the Army and solicited their nominations asking that it be a personal recommendation and should not be considered a contest or retirement-type assignment. Johnson listed seven duties and functions he expected the sergeant major to perform, including service as a personal advisor and assistant to the chief of staff on those matters pertaining to enlisted men. Johnson whittled the 4,700 candidates down to 21 nominees and then selected the only one then serving in Vietnam, the sergeant major of the 1st Infantry Division, William O. Wooldridge. Wooldridge came to Johnson’s attention when he represented his division in an adoption ceremony in Birmingham, Ala., and was highly regarded by military superiors, contemporaries and subordinates — and by the civilians he had come in contact with. A highly-decorated veteran of World War II and Vietnam, Wooldridge had served the majority of his career as an infantryman, with 16 years spent overseas. He was quickly dispatched to the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. 3

Johnson signed General Orders #29 officially establishing the position of Sergeant Major of the Army on July 4, 1966, with a tenure to correspond with the Chief of Staff of the Army’s. Wooldridge soon arrived from Vietnam, still in his fatigue uniform, and reported to Gen. Johnson, who announced he was to swear Wooldridge in as the first Sergeant Major of the Army on the 11th of July. Wooldridge was to lay low until the official announcement and was fitted for a proper dress uniform. At 11a.m. on Monday, the Secretary of the Army, Chief of Staff, and other distinguished guests participated along with the ceremonial troops from the 3rd Infantry (Old Guard) in the official swearing-in ceremony of the first Sergeant Major of the Army. Gen. Johnson administered the oath to Wooldridge on the Pentagon Mall. This unprecedented position in U.S. Army history was given a full-court press. Special position quarters on Fort Myer, Va. were designated and refurbished for the senior enlisted man, along with an office in the Pentagon’s "E Ring," which were to set an example that all Army personnel could aim for, the prestige of the position of the senior enlisted soldier of the Army. Since no special rank insignia had yet been developed, Mrs. Wooldridge and Johnson affixed to the sergeant major’s uniform a specially designed collar insignia. This new badge of the office, improvised by Gen. Johnson’s special projects officer, Col. Jasper J. Wilson, and approved on July 4, 1966, was devised by attaching the shield (minus the eagle) of the Aide to the Chief of Staff to a standard enlisted brass disk. The Sergeant Major of the Army was to wear a pair of these insignia in place of the branch and U.S. insignia normally worn by enlisted men. It would not be until the fall of 1978 that the Army would adopt a distinctive insignia of rank for the office. Special Orders # 142 appointed Wooldridge as the Sergeant Major of the Army with a date of rank of July 11, 1966, directing him to serve as principal enlisted assistant to the Chief of Staff, Army. In his brief instructions, Johnson included on a 3 x 5 card that he presented to Wooldridge that he was to advise the Chief of Staff on "all matters pertaining primarily to enlisted personnel, including … morale, welfare, training, clothing, insignia, equipment, pay and allowances, customs and courtesies of the service, enlistment and reenlistment, discipline and promotion policies." Wooldridge kept the folded card in his wallet, the only written instructions he had during his time in office. In a handwritten note to Wooldridge later Johnson stated "You have shouldered a large burden, and I am most appreciative of the way you have done it." Since that July day 35 years ago, 11other of the most qualified senior noncommissioned officers have held the top position within our Army. Since the establishment of the position of Sergeant Major of the Army, they have been working to refine and bring back professionalism to the NCO Corps, and refining the focus of the Office of the Sergeant Major of the Army. Today’s soldier can clearly identify with the top enlisted soldier serving at the head of the noncommissioned officer support channel and we owe a debt of gratitude to General Johnson and the men who have made it possible … the Sergeants Major of the Army. CSM Elder is a devout student of Army history. He has contributed articles to the NCO Journal for several years. To learn more about the SMAs, read The Sergeants Major of the Army by Mark Gillepsie, Glen Hawkins, Michael Kelly and Preston Pierce. The book is available from the Center of Military History, Pub. 70-63, 1995, 180 pages

NCO Leadership Thoughts of past and future leaders

"He who laughs, lasts." Anonymous NCO Leadership. "On [the] battlefield, the difference between victory and defeat very likely will be the leadership of NCOs." Gen Wickham. "NCOs directly supervise more than 80 percent of the soldiers in the Army." FM 22-600-20, 1986, p. 8. "NCOs focus on those things that touch soldiers most directly." TRADOC Pam 525100-4, 1994, p. 7, paraphrased "[Soldiers] look up to you for inspiration and for examples." Gen Wickham, p. 190. "After all, professionalism is contagious." SFC Gary Ogden, The NCO Journal, Winter 1993, p. 22 "Never sidestep a chance to work with a soldier; if you're busy, set up an appointment for later. If you can't do this, or if you get tired of it, it's time for you to go." CSM John Woodyard, The NCO Journal, Summer 1993, p. 18 "This nation and its families entrust their sons and daughters...to our care. We accept the awesome responsibility of shaping their lives, of teaching them..." "Help them to catch the values of the Army Ethic: loyalty, duty, selfless service, and integrity." Gen Wickham, p. 193 "The effective noncommissioned officer is one who is looked upon by his soldiers with professional respect, because he provides them with sound information on how to do the job, how to handle the equipment, how to perform tactically, how to cope with 'the system,' because he teaches them. Building on that confidence, those soldiers will seek their sergeant's counsel on matters more stressful and more personal. The resulting soldier/sergeant relationships are essential elements in building cohesive units- units that will hang together and perform aggressively and successfully on the...battlefield." Gen Wickham, p. 75 "The whole Army looks to its sergeants." Gen Sullivan, The NCO Journal, Winter 1994, p. 8. "Soldiers go where their sergeants lead them." 1SG Pedro Olivari, quoted by CSM J. D. Pendry, The NCO Journal, Spring 1995, p. 5 "The Army can only be as excellent as its NCO Corps." Gen Wickham, p. 17. "The toughest job is at the unit level- at the company commander's level, the first sergeant's level, the platoon sergeant's level..." Gen Wickham, p. 342 "Noncommissioned officers...are the heart of the infantry." Marshal de Saxe, 1732, Reveries, p. 215 "It is difficult to be a good noncommissioned officer. If it had been easy, they would have given it to the officer corps." SMA William A. Connelly, The Sergeants Major of the Army: On Leadership and the Profession of Arms, p. 21 NCOs Executing. "[NCOs] translate missions from theory into reality." Gen Wickham, p. 75

"If the senior NCOs were attuned to the commander's intent, understood what he really wanted to do, and had a good support channel working, that freed the commander to focus on the battle." lesson learned from Desert Storm, TRADOC Pam 525-100-4, 1994, p. 15 "Effective NCOs enable commanders to command!" TRADOC Pam 525-100-4, 1994, p. 17. "Often it's the NCOs' initiative that determines the outcome of the battle." CSM Jerry Alley, NTC CSM, The NCO Journal, Summer 1991, p. 12 "Develop a good relationship with your Command Sergeant Major....listen to what he or she has to say. He or she probably knows more about the Army than you do. He or she clearly knows more about soldiers than you do. And they clearly know a lot more about how to get things done through the NCO chain than you or I do." Gen Wickham "Although we no longer carry our colors into battle to rally our units, by tradition we entrust the responsibility for their safeguarding, care, and display to you the senior NCOs of the Army. Symbolically, then, by that charge, we have placed in your hands the spirit of the Army through the regiments those colors represent." Gen Wickham. "The choice of non-commissioned officers is an object of the greatest importance: The order and discipline of a regiment depends so much upon their behavior, that too much care cannot be taken in preferring none to that trust but those who by their merit and good conduct are entitled to it." MG Baron von Steuben, quoted by Gen Wickham. "NCOs are responsible for assisting and advising officers in carrying out their duties. They must also stand ready to assume the responsibilities of the officers." FM 22-100, 1983, p. 240. An example: "NCOs filled all staff positions in the 743d MI Bn except for the XO and the S3, and they moved an entire Army intelligence system by their efforts. They met immediate and day-today requirements, created systems to effectively manage these requirements, developed basic battalion programs, and at the same time developed the unit's world-wide and one-of-a-kind mission. They impacted national security and created a momentum that continued beyond their presence in the unit. These NCOs included CSM James Kumpost, SFC Joseph Harvey, SFC Luther Lockhart, SFC Alma Pinckney, SFC Arnold Taylor, SSG Stephen Asher, SSG John Carson, SSG Evelyn Dailey Hillman, SSG Donald Ervin, SSG Landy Flowers, SSG John McNally, SSG Michael Smith, SGT Stefanie January, SGT William Persinger, and SGT Kevin Reed. Though not on the staff, the contributions of 1SG Stephen Bunting, 1SG John Flanagan, 1SG David Spieles, and SGT Robert Truban were also invaluable to the development of the systems." MAJ M. M. Yamamoto NCO and Officer Relationships. "Officers are responsible for helping, supervising, and ensuring that NCOs carry out their responsibilities. They cannot simply say, 'Oh, that's sergeant's business,' as if checking the maintenance of weapons, the quality of food, the correctness of foxholes, or the cleanliness of the barracks is somehow below their commissioned status. Officers should not do NCOs' work for them; however, they must ensure that NCOs have the guidance, resources, and assistance necessary to do their duties." FM 22-100, 1983, p. 240 "There is no such thing as exclusive sergeants' business or exclusive officers' business in the training area- it's all organizational business." LTG John Otjen

OFFICER RESPONSIBILITIES

NCO RESPONSIBILITIES

The officer commands, establishes policy, plans and program The NCO conducts the daily business of the Army within the work of the Army. established orders, directives, and policies. The officer concentrates on collective training which will The NCO concentrates on individual and team training enable the unit to accomplish its mission. which develops the capability to accoomplish the mission.

The officer is primarily involved with unit operations, training, and related activities.

The NCO is primarily involved with training individual soldiers and teams.

The officer concentrates on unit effectiveness and unit readiness.

The NCO concentrates on each subordinate NCO and soldier and on the small teams of the unit- to ensure that each is well trained, highly motivated, ready, and functioning.

The officer pays particular attention to the standards of performance, training, and professional development of NCOs.

The NCO concentrates on standards of performance, training, and professional development of NCOs and enlisted personnel.

The officer creates conditions- makes the time and other resources available- so the NCO can do his job.

The NCO gets the job done."

Battalion Commanders And Command Sergeants Major Words of Wisdom from Senior Officers and NCOs

Battalion Commanders and the CSM There is nobody who wants you to succeed more than your command sergeant major, but you have to let him inside to make that happen.... He is the first individual you ought to see. I have not taken command of any job, to include having been the Chief of Staff, that the first individual I did not spend time with was my command sergeant major. -GEN Carl E. Vuono, address to Precommand Course, Collected Works, 1991, p. 440 Develop a good relationship with your Command Sergeant Major- one of open confidence between the two of you. Share your views; listen to what he has to say. He probably knows more about the Army than you do. He clearly knows more about soldiers than you do. And he clearly knows a lot more about how to get things done through the NCO chain than you or I do. Harness his talent in support of what you're trying to do. The whole NCO Corps in your unit will feel enthusiastic about that relationship and they'll see it as one of strength. -GEN John A. Wickham, remarks to Precommand Course, Collected Works, 1987, p. 335 If we are to have a strong CSM chain, individuals selected for these key positions must be much more than mere figureheads and administrative specialists. They must be vigorous, broadly experienced, and dedicated professionals who are more at home in the field with troops than at a desk in a major headquarters. They should be people who seek opportunities to get out among the troop units and who can see the problems that exist at the grass roots. Their selflessness, personal integrity, and moral courage must be unassailable. -GEN Harold K. Johnson, 1967, in "CSMs- They Must Be Much More Than Figureheads." NCO Journal, Summer 1995, p. 45 If you look in the written specification of what a sergeant major does, there's always [a] statement that comes first. It's a disaster. It says that he or she is responsible for keeping their commander informed on enlisted matters.... In other words, that says that the sergeant major is the ambassador, the minister extraordinary and plenipotentiary or whatever they say in the State Department. He sort of floats around out there and observes what's going on with soldiers and tells the old man about that. Fine, I think he can do that, but that's a very limited view of what a sergeant major is supposed to do. -GEN William E. DePuy, address TRADOC Commander's Conference, Dec 10-11, 1975 The CSM is the most experienced enlisted member of the battalion and to limit his or her duties and responsibilities to routine matters associated with garrison operations does not take full advantage of their background, experience, rank, or position.

[The CSM's function in combat] must be addressed and, as with the garrison role, agreed to and resourced.... The CSM must have, as a minimum, a wheeled vehicle, driver, and radio with a secure net capability. If the CSM is to function effectively as an enlisted extension of the commander, he must be visible and maintain contact with soldiers during all phases of unit activity in garrison, during training, and in tactical environments. -COL Claude W. Abate and LTC Warren P. Giddings, "What Is a Sergeant Major?" USAWC Paper, 1985, pp. 29, 26, 35 Commanders must analyze all areas that need to be checked and decide how each will be checked. No commander should or has time to personally check each area. He or she must decide what needs to be emphasized; what needs to be checked through multiple means; what areas others such as the XO and CSM should check; and what areas the commander will personally check. -COL Donald L. Langridge, Command, Leadership, and Effective Staff Support, 1996, p. 68 [The CSM and I] purposely did not stay close together during [training]. We covered twice as much of what was happening by splitting up. -COL Glenn A. Smith, Battalion Commanders Speak Out, 1977, p. 1-20 A good share of a battalion commander's time is spent counseling. In time, the CSM will learn to know the commander's feelings about any given subject. The CSM may assist the commander by screening those cases in which the soldier doesn't specifically demand to see the battalion commander. The CSM will find that he or she will be able to resolve at least 90% of the problems that would have ended up in the battalion commander's office. -LTC John L. Lorms, "The Role and Duties of CSM." Infantry, Jan-Feb 1974, p. 36 Let [your CSM] do his job and your job will be much easier. -LTC Jerry H. Hogan, "Once You Assume Command, Command!" ARMY, Jan 1979, p. 32 The most important asset of the battalion command sergeant major is the quality of his leadership.... As the senior noncommissioned officer in the battalion the CSM commands a special respect; all noncommissioned officers look to him as their role model.... The CSM must review all plans and schedules prior to publication by the S-3. Because he is very knowledgeable of all of the battalion's commitments, he or she can identify conflicting schedules and can provide comments concerning guidance from higher headquarters; often from a perspective unlike either the battalion S-3 or XO. Their review is necessary for all such documents to preclude generating unnecessary changes to the training schedule and plans.... The battalion command sergeant major is a critical member of the battalion. His or hers influence and presence must be properly and effectively transmitted throughout the battalion. [I thought that] complete integration of the battalion CSM into the battalion would be more beneficial to the soldiers than limiting him to his most proficient areas of expertise. I did not want him to ignore the areas in which he was less experienced.... The CSM...must help improve the image of his or her unit among there contemporaries.... Because the battalion was part of a maneuver brigade, the CSM had to interface with other battalion CSMs in the brigade. Often this interface was an opportunity for the other battalions to form opinions of their sister battalion, and the impression reflected through the CSM could

strongly influence those opinions. Every time the brigade commander directed some action through CSM channels, the CSMs supported competitively and would try to ensure rapid compliance. If the other battalion CSMs recognized the accomplishments of the battalion the credit was due to the CSM's ability to interact with those CSMs. Positive feedback from these CSMs had a positive effect on the troops in the maneuver units and the troops of the battalion.... CSM presence in the motor pool inspires soldiers, and helps generate interest in their work; and keeps soldiers working productively during the scarce time allocated for maintenance.... Units which have their soldiers adhering to the -10 manual checks to perform routine PMCS usually have the best maintenance programs. One method for determining the degree of maintenance discipline in a unit is to walk through the motor pool to observe if soldiers are using the -10 to perform maintenance.... The presence of the battalion commander and CSM in the motor pool during the PMCS encourages the sections to perform work more effectively, and continuous emphasis is needed to maintain this proficiency.... Once the soldier believes that the battalion CSM and battalion commander will be in the motor pool checking PMCS frequently there will be an increased effort to maintain good habits.... The battalion sponsorship program is one of the key programs which affects the battalion. Often its impact extends throughout the entire time the soldier is assigned to the unit. [The CSM should ensure that] the enlisted portion of the program...has horsepower. -LTC James R. Siket, "Duties and Roles of the Battalion Command Sergeant Major." USAWC Paper, 1987, pp. 13-14, 8, 21, 5, 9-10, 11-12, 18, 19 [The commander's charter to the CSM is the] commander's view of how that relationship should be.... Given on the first day and informally updated on a monthly basis, it is the start of an open partnership. Although the words may change with time, and as each new team forms, the basic philosophy of command and the senior enlisted leader's role in that relationship remain the same. Five key points provide the interlacing for the team's flexibility and strength. First, responsibilities must be clearly spelled out in order to establish focus and efficiency. They also serve to provide accountability. Secondly, the commander must understand that his command sergeant major has been successful not being an officer, and that there exists two separate and distinct career patterns. The commander may not want to be an NCO, but neither does the command sergeant major want to be an officer. The third point is an open dialogue. Easy to say, but hard to do. Every workday there must be a huddle of the two leaders. No matter how great one may think the team is going, daily azimuth checks are needed. Fourth point, be honest and talk through the bad- as well as the good- days. In most cases, both commander and command sergeant major are about the same age and time-in-service, and are going through many of the same feelings. Share them in order to form a bond of trust and honesty.

Finally, there is only one commander. He must not abdicate his authority or responsibilities. He must cooperate and delegate. The commander needs to respect the command sergeant major, for he or she is- like the commander- only one soldier deep. Neither must be placed in a position of failure or isolation.... Both the commander and the command sergeant major need to understand each other and how they will function together as a team. [The CDRâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s charter to the CSM] begins that process. But more important is what lies beyond the letter. A command will have unlimited potential if the commander and command sergeant major team takes the point and leads the unit to new levels of readiness. -LTC Herbert F. Harback, "The Command Sergeant Major." Engineer, Oct 1990, pp. 40, 42 The sergeant major's personal relationship to the commander depends entirely on the commander's personality. The old man may consider the sergeant major as his reliable enlisted friend and trustworthy confidant, or he may just use him as an effective tool to get things done fast and right. Either way, it doesn't really matter, as long as the sergeant major gets the message and is doing the very best job he can do. -CSM Bob L. Williams, "The Sergeant Major." Infantry, Sep-Oct 1969, p. 18 A good command relationship [is] built on honest communication...and being able to disagree without disrespect. -CSM Sandra Robinson, in "Walking and Talking the Talk." NCO Journal, Winter 1993, p. 12 When you assume command of your first battalion you will establish your first commander/command sergeant major (CSM) relationship. No matter how many command sergeants major you have worked with in the past, this is the first one that is your CSM. It will be a learning experience that all other former battalion commanders have gone through, and based on their comments concerning their command sergeants major, they really knew how to properly utilize a CSM only after they had changed command and reflected on their experience. Although thousands of words can be written about the commander/CSM relationship, its foundation is frankness, integrity, and absolute trust between both parties. If these basics do not exist between you and your CSM due to his or her failure- get another CSM. Treat your CSM as a professional. Should you have the misfortune of having one of the very few command sergeants major who cannot or does not perform in a professional manner, be sure to give the position the respect it demands, even though you are forced to relieve him. The way you handle this situation will be common knowledge within your command. If you do not separate him from the prestige of the position, you will create the probability of his becoming a "Lame Duck." The first individual you should talk to after taking command is your CSM. You should meet with him in your office, shortly after your assumption of command reception. This meeting should be private and uninterrupted. Seek his opinions about key officer and enlisted personnel by name and position, problems within the battalion, things the battalion does well, and the relationship between your battalion and higher headquarters. His or her comments will be an accurate base for you to use as you seek the same information from others to evaluate the state of your battalion. His or her comments will be the most accurate you will hear since it is there duty to tell you the unvarnished truth. His or her career depends on fulfilling this duty with openness and

complete candor. Others have the same duty, but it is questionable if their careers depend on such. During the initial meeting with your CSM, have him or her tell you what their specific duties have been. Do not become concerned if the list is not too long. It is important for your CSM to be free to: --Have time to initiate plans and implement actions and ideas to improve the battalion. --Visit the companies daily, especially training sites. --Check specific trouble spots that you have identified and desire his or her opinion or action. --"Put out the fires" that are best handled through sergeant major channels. Talking with your CSM and other principals in your battalion provides information for you to evaluate your battalion from within. Once you have done this, visit the brigade command sergeant major. He or she is an excellent source of information concerning your battalion's strengths and weaknesses in comparison to the other battalions in the brigade. He or she can also provide you with an evaluation of your CSM and his performance in relation to other command sergeants major in the brigade. This visit will open the channel of communication between you and the brigade CSM and provide a sound basis for later interaction. You should communicate randomly with the brigade command sergeant major, but be selective. Do not undercut your own CSM. Define the CSM's position both verbally and by your actions. Some actions and policies that will enhance the CO/CSM relationship follow. Advise your CSM in private that there is no one between you in the chain of command. This is a basic point, but must be stated early to provide a clear understanding for both of you. Advise your staff officers, also privately, that the CSM's position is that of a special enlisted advisor to you, with direct access and accountability to you. Allow your CSM free access to you at all times. He or she will have information that you should know now and will exercise the proper judgment before interrupting whatever else you are doing to advise you. There is nothing like knowing a hot call is forthcoming from the brigade commander and being prepared with answers when he calls. If your CSM has a good relationship with the brigade CSM, this type of action will be routine. Explain to your CSM that once you have made a decision, after considering his and all other recommendations, you expect him to support your decision. This, again, is basic, but it "clears the air" when restated. Give your CSM's opinion the consideration it merits. When a company commander proposes an action and the CSM is in opposition, listen to both sides in private without making the officer/enlisted distinction. Remember that while the company commander is advocating what he believes is right for his company, the CSM is advocating what he believes is right for the battalion. The company commander is responsible for anything his or her unit does or does not do; therefore, consideration must be given to his command prerogative. However, the experience factor of your CSM must receive equal consideration. What is right and/or what is best should be the only criteria for your decision, not who presented which course of action. Require your company commanders and staff officers to voice their complaints about your CSM to you only! If they desire to work out any problems with your CSM, that may be a choice of theirs. To insure differences are handled professionally, only the battalion commander is qualified to make a decision in this type of situation.

Require your CSM to meet privately with all new company commanders. This works best if done at least 2 days before they take command. However, circumstances may not always make this feasible. This will accomplish two things. It will make your CSM more effective, and company commanders will have a better understanding of their relationship to the CSM. Some of the things about which the CSM can offer advice to the new company commander are: --The company commander/first sergeant relationship. --The CSM/1SG relationship. --The CSM/company commander relationship. --The battalion commander/company commander relationship vs the company commander/battalion staff relationship (green tab relationships). --Insights pertaining to your methods as battalion commander. --Utilization of the CSM, through the company 1SG to "keep the fires out." --Availability of the CSM to the company commander. --Insight into the senior NCO and personnel in his company. --The strengths and weaknesses in his unit as viewed by the CSM. Require your staff to coordinate with your CSM on matters within his realm of experience, (e.g. plans for ceremonies and change of commands). The CSM has been involved in drill and ceremonies all his life. Listen receptively when your CSM brings officer problems or failures to your attention. He or she will or may have already tried to tactfully solve it and failed. When they bring it to your attention in private, he or she will have met there responsibility, (e.g. an officer with an unauthorized mustache that is affecting the standards of appearance of the enlisted soldiers). He will not presume to recommend disposition. That is your responsibility. He or she will, however, provide sound advice, if solicited, pertaining to the development of young officers. Make your CSM responsible for assigning incoming noncommissioned officers to the companies. He is impartial and concerned with the needs of your command. His objectivity and professionalism will guarantee that noncommissioned officer assignments will be based on the unit need, rather than personal desires. Require your CSM to review and concur or nonconcur on all recommended judicial and nonjudicial actions taken at battalion level. He oe she will guarantee that you have all the information prior to your decision. Require your CSM to concur or nonconcur on all awards for enlisted personnel. He or she will give you the insight that you need to recognize the deserving and weed out the undeserving. Require your CSM to make frequent inspections. One billet a day and one inspection of troops in formation a month is a recommended minimum requirement. His presence will provide valuable feedback and will activate the noncommissioned officer chain of command. Require your CSM to inspect or check training daily. Require your CSM to participate totally in your battalion's reenlistment program. As your senior enlisted advisor, he or she is concerned directly with career development. To be effective in this role he or she must involve themselves in every aspect of reenlistment. Require your CSM to work closely with your race relations/equal opportunity NCO. Together they can solve most problems before they escalate, and they can insure that you have all the available information before you must take action in this area.

Consider briefing your CSM privately and immediately upon your return from a commander's call at brigade. He will then be able to get going or gain information for you on subjects you desire, prior to your commander's call. Require your CSM to keep the brigade CSM advised. Good communications between them will put out fires that otherwise might escalate to brigade commander involvement. You may get the brigade CSM on your side, or he may offer advice to your CSM, either of which may ease the pain when it becomes of interest to the brigade commander. This is, of course, a selective process. Continually seek feedback through your CSM from the noncommissioned officers of your unit. With his sources of information he will keep you abreast of developments that will enable you to measure your battalion in relation to others in the brigade. Your command sergeant major will also have vital information obtained through his relationship with the brigade CSM and through command sergeants major call at brigade. Have your CSM brief you after each CSM call. This gives valuable insight into your command. Just as there are many things you must do in establishing your commander/CSM relationship, there are some things you should not do. Don't routinely include your CSM in officer social functions. There are certain ones (e.g. dining ins, New Year's receptions, a unit Christmas ball, etc.) that are traditional and proper for him to attend. Remember, your CSM is the senior enlisted member of the command, and his credibility with the enlisted soldiers of your battalion lies in maintaining that identity. He knows and is proud of his enlisted status. Treat the position with the respect it demands but not in the "officer vein." Don't allow intrabattalion reassignment of noncommissioned officers without the recommendation of your CSM. He or she will know, or be able to find out, the real reason for a proposed reassignment. You should have this information before making your decision. Don't let your CSM become desk bound! Part of the duties of a CSM as stated in AR 611-201 is to take corrective action in the name of the commander- a clear indicator that he is a doer not just an advisor. Insure that all your officers know your CSM is able to go anywhere, talk to anybody, and see everything in your battalion. Don't use your CSM as an adjutant trainer, but require the adjutant to seek your CSM's advice on enlisted matters. The CSM is duty bound to advise and assist staff officers in their various areas. This is a two-way street on mutual respect and accomplishment of responsibilities of all concerned. It is not enough that you and the CSM understand your relationship. Your staff and most particularly your subordinate commanders must also understand it. While he is first and foremost your CSM, he or she is also their battalion CSM. Encourage them to use there advice and counsel. A healthy open relationship between your CSM and your key officers will make them more effective. The ultimate payoff will be stronger companies and, correspondingly, a more combat ready battalion. -CSM John W. Gillis, "The Command Sergeant Major." Armor, MarApr 1979, pp. 30-32 The CSM's Role in Combat When someone once asked me how I plan to use my sergeant major in combat, my answer boiled down to this: The same as I use him in peacetime- to show the way.... I expect the sergeant major to be at or near the point of decision at critical times and provide me, as the commander, with an

unbiased assessment. Every commander needs to know the morale and fighting spirit of his soldiers. No one close to the commander is better able to report on that than the sergeant major.... The sergeant major must also assess the tactical situation. Once again, this is where his experience is a key factor. He or she must look at reality through the filter of that experience and provide the commander with an opinion. The weight of that opinion will depend on the commander's relationship with the sergeant major, but it is always an opinion that must be considered.... At the crucial time, they must provide the shot of confidence, discipline, and backbone that makes bone-weary soldiers- and overtaxed units- get up and go. This is where the sergeant major assumes a larger-than-life role that influences the individual soldier and inspires him to do things he thought were beyond him. This influential role, however, is not something that simply occurs magically when that first bullet is fired. It is a perception that grows during those daily visits in peacetime, on the firing range, in the barracks, in private counseling sessions, and in the professionalism of his every word and action. There is no substitute for the influence he or she exerts, which in itself is as much of a combat multiplier as a minefield or a good intelligence network. -LTG Robert L. Wetzel, "The Sergeant Major's Role- Leadership 'to Show the Way.'" ARMY, May 1986, pp. 72, 71 [During Operation Desert Storm] many battalion commanders commented that their command sergeants major seemed to be everywhere, talking with soldiers, smoothing problems in the logistics and maintenance efforts, and assisting the commander with control of the unit. TRADOC Pam 525-100-2, Leadership and Command on the Battlefield: Battalion and Company, 1993, p. 28 The CSM at the National Training Center Here is a checklist for the CSM's attention before or on arrival [at the NTC]. It applies to the garrison, not the field: organizational setup in the dustbowl area (tent city); duty uniform standards; baggage unloading and identification (a system!); movies at night; daily police and port-o-let maintenance; authorized vehicle routes/off limits areas; pass system for PX, shoppette; MP traffic control and cantonment support; daily key NCO meetings (when/where?); established times for first call, chow, formations; guard force; controlled access to Ft. Irwin; interface with post CSM, PX manager, barber, gym operator, NCO club manager, morale support director and range control, among others; stand-down celebration (USO show, free cokes?)... CSMs uses their influence with other NCOs on proper dress, conduct, and discipline. He or she absorbs themselves in the training and maintenance effort. They inspects and reinspects. He oe she double-checks the combat load the soldier will pack and carry to NTC. They eyeballs soldiers in their deployment uniforms, making sure that standards are met. The CSM talks to soldiers at every opportunity. He or she gauges their progress through the train-up, with emphasis on individual training. The CSM needs to front-load himself and arrive at the NTC with the first group of soldiers. Their first sergeants or senior platoon sergeants from each unit are with him. They assist them with the

many chores ready to jump up and bite. He or she needs chiefs, indians, and decision-making authority.... Once the task force moves to the field, the CSM needs to be mobile and visit every unit he can. A radio-equipped jeep with driver is a necessity. The CSM may consider available helicopter support. The distances he travels are vast and time consuming in a jeep. The CSM must watch: NCO duties and responsibilities- no let down!; accountability of soldiers; Class I delivery to all soldiers (to include water and ice); personal appearance and hygiene; vehicle maintenance; morale and esprit; injuries and hospitalized soldiers; police of command post areas; safety. The CSM should attend after-action reviews to find out how the units are doing. Then he should talk to his first sergeants about corrective action for deficient areas. He needs to be where the action is; that may not necessarily be the battlefield. His sixth sense should tell him where to focus his efforts: to start a fire or put one out. Once the FTX is over, he needs to concentrate full bore on clearing the range areas within his responsibility. This is no easy job. It needs planning and full supervision. The CSM leaves on the last plane- after vehicle and property turn-in, after the majority of soldiers has departed and the task force has been green-lighted. Front-load the first sergeants. But the CSM stays until everything he is remotely in charge of has been thoroughly covered, discharged, and disposed of. -CSM Donald C. Cubbison, "Getting Ready for NTC: Tips for the CSM." Army Trainer, Winter 1983, pp. 23, 22 Of all the questions generated by leaders coming to the National Training Center, one is recurring: "How are CSMs to be used at the NTC?" According to CSM [Robert Windham, NTC Operations Center CSM], battalion and brigade CSMs coming to the NTC often are not used at a level consistent with their battlefield knowledge, experience, or capability. "Consequently, their units don't achieve maximum effectiveness during task force and brigade level operations," Windham observed. In his discussions with CSMs, Windham learned that commanders often don't review with CSMs their duties as outlined in the regulations.... "On two separate occasions, the duties of a battalion and brigade CSM were clearly defined to optimize the NCO leadership throughout the command. This had significant impact on the overall success of those units during the rotation."... Battle Field Cirulation by the CSM Battlefield circulation by the TF commander, S3, XO, and CSM is critical to the success of nested rehearsals. The TF commander attends the ME rehearsal and the S3/XO/CSM attend the supporting efforts' rehearsals (focus on maneuver units). This process is passive. Attendees of subordinate rehearsals are not participants. The TF commander/S3/XO/CSM listen to ensure that the company scheme of maneuver fits within the TF and BCT framework and contributes to the success of the main effort. This process allows the TF CDR/S3/XO to identify areas, which were not synchronized well during wargaming, to crosstalk with the TOC for direct coordination of issues, and provides the battlestaff a window of opportunity to correct shortcomings/issues, prior to the TF combined arms rehearsal. Nested rehearsals help ensure that tasks and purposes are linked from platoon (two levels down/target of TF commanders intent) through task force level. They also allow the commander to see if subordinate units understand the TF fire plan (direct and indirect) to include triggers, engagement criteria and engagement priorities (see Engagement

Area Rehearsals in FM 71-1). The chart below (Figure 13) illustrates what a graphic portrayal of the TF concept could look like. Techniques For The CSM While In The Defense Defense, Defense, Defense. Two areas of concern are fighting positions and force protection. Your CSM and First Sergeants must take ownership of the perimeter. Building fighting positions is an individual skill. Fighting positions require hard work and are often not built to standard. Soldiers need a position for survivability. Your CSM can ensure that the standard is met and continuously improved. Identify shortfalls early and avoid defeat later. Remember, construction of fighting positions to standard should be practiced at home station at squad and team levels. Who is checking? In protecting the force, use mounted and dismounted patrols. Develop a tracking matrix to fix responsibility to confirm or deny enemy activity in and around your area. Adjust the Brigade Support Area (BSA)'s perimeter and site layout as necessary during occupation and continue to improve your defensive posture to ensure proper dispersion. These techniques for the battalion CSM while the battalion is preparing for the defense were compiled from 30 rotations worth of JRTC experience. They have been proven to be very effective time after time. Battalions experience problems with asset and time management in the defense. The staff is frequently unable to quickly recommend to the commander where to kill the enemy. An early decision means that the staff has ample time to integrate and synchronize engineer, CSS, and force protection assets. The battalion CSM's early participation in key staff processes makes it happen. The CSM must attend staff mission analysis briefs to gain insight into the commander's guidance and attain sufficient situational awareness to influence actions before the warning order is issued. CSM attendance at the defense COA decision brief to the Commander is likewise mandatory. This enables the Senior NCO in the battalion to get the message to the troops while the staff prepares the battalion order. Armed with the firm knowledge of the staff's progress/products, the CSM is able to combine his experience with the following techniques and ideas to expedite defense preparations. They illustrate the CSM's role in shoring up shortcomings in the defense. The CSM's role requires him to move around the battlefield as much as possible; as the commander's right hand, he must know how the plan comes together before he leaves the TOC. Thus, he can effectively operate as a scout while conducting battlefield circulation. The CSM should: Facilitate feedback to the commander from within the battalion's defensive sector. Check the companies to ensure compliance with battalion SOPs. Correct existing problems. Refer difficult situations to the battalion commander. The following techniques and tips, listed by BOS for battalion and company, should help prepare the battalion's defense. Battalion Obstacles 1. Check for an engineer matrix. Does it include a timeline? Is it posted inside the TOC Is it updated?

2. SGM as CINC Dozer: Advantages: Ensures the equipment is used efficiently. Adjusts the blade timeline to prevent wasted blade hours. Ensures the positions meet standards Provides the Battalion Commander "eyes-on" feedback regarding survivability status and defensive preparations. Disadvantages: Responsible for the heavy equipment such as bulldozers, bucket loaders Responsible for emplacing obstacles and vehicle survivability. Often pulls the CSM forward of the defensive positions and away from troops. CSM is "placed on a leash." Unable to respond to high priority missions Leaves the equipment unsupervised. Solution. Assign an equipment supervisor from the engineer equipment platoon as CINC Dozer. Allows the CSM freedom of movement CSM oversees the efforts of CINC Dozer CSM available to assist CINC Dozer as required to accomplish the mission. Fire support 1. Get a solid understanding of the engineer's and the FSO's plan. Check the locations of the targets Remember, if the target is directly on the obstacle, when you call in the fire, you blow the obstacle up. 2. Check with the battalion scouts and Delta Company. Find out what the fire support plan is Confirm it with the FSO. Is it covered in rehearsals? Combat Service Support (CSS) 1. Check the S-4's plan Key to the development of the defense. Plan must be solid. Make sure it identifies who gets what, when, where, and how. 2. Make sure the battalion does not try to deliver class IV/V before line companies show up. The enemy will destroy it, set up ambushes, or follow the companies to their defense. 3. Ask the scouts if they know how, when, where, and who will resupply them. Command And Control (C2) 1. Make sure the battalion staff finalizes the plan quickly. It avoids putting a time crunch on the engineers and line companies. 2. The CSM should read the S-3, S-2s and FSO logs as often as possible. Make sure that clear reports are being sent to the TOC. A double check to ensure acceptable standards of information management. 3. Look at a contact report or a sighting of the enemy and follow it. Is it clear and understandable?

Read the S-2's log. Check to see if the FSO has a copy. 4. Check with slice elements. Ask unit members if they know the plan and who's going where and when. Force Protection 1. Send out experienced personnel to LP/OPs, not two privates. 2. Conduct counter-reconnaissance at night. Don't get caught sleeping. Ensure constant communication with QRF (Positive Control from the TOC). 3. Ensure everyone on security uses ALL NODs. Make sure all weapons have proper reticles in the PVS-4s. 4. Develop a sound rest plan. Do not stop working. Do all the pounding during the day Spread wire at night if needed. 5. Indicate early warning devices on a sector sketch to show everyone where they are located. 6. Indicate the latrine location and enforce its use. This action prevents personnel from leaving the perimeter and getting shot coming back in. Obstacles One of the most difficult problems to overcome is the tendency of line companies to wait for the Small Emplacement Excavator (SEE) instead of digging in. If the company isn't sure exactly where it will defend, leaders can take the following precautions. 1. Send out reconnaissance to look for crossing sites. 2. Check on how the Class IV/V will get to your location. Make sure it goes to the location you specify. If it is not broken down into platoon packages, start doing it when it shows up. If it is in platoon packages, deliver it to each platoon's location. 3. Find out the location of nearest engineer dump. Pick up unused wire and mines to supplement your company's assets (see CSS below). 4. Use all the mines you can. Place them to your entire front not just near and around obstacles. If there is no good killing zone for AT weapons, surface-lay mines to set up trigger points. 5. Support engineers with infantry when emplacing obstacles. Include this in the operations order. 6. Have the engineers train your men on the use and employment of the MOPMS. 7. Surround your defensive positions (360) degrees with tangle-foot wire. Prevents the enemy from outflanking the wire. Sustains defensive advantage by blocking an assault from the rear. Direct Fire 1. Know how the FSO's fire plan covers each company you visit. Check with the company FO to make sure he knows it. 2. Walk the line with the First Sergeant. Check the following: See if the obstacles can be bypassed.

Make sure mines are emplaced in such a manner that if enemy bypasses the obstacles, the mines will hinder his progress. Make sure mines are placed in front of the wire so you can cover them with direct fire. 3. Are the obstacles covered by direct and indirect fire? Do not place M60s out on the flank by themselves covering obstacles. Reposition the M60 and put a SAW next to it to create interlocking and mutually supporting fires. NOTE: If obstacles are not covered, the enemy can easily breach them without firing a shot. 4. Check all positions for location, overhead cover and proper emplacement of crew-served weapons. Get down behind one or two of the M60s and sight in the weapon. Ask questions about the weapon to ensure the gunner's proficiency. 5. Check the final protective wire. Is it too close? Is beyond hand grenade throwing range? 6. Look at the range cards for dead space and who will cover it. 7. Look at sector sketches to further the outlook on gaps between squads, platoons, and companies. Can they be closed in time, and how will they be covered? 8. Take a good hard look at the CASEVAC plans. Confirm how, when and where it will be done. Consider locating advance trauma life support (ATLS) in the company area. 9. While moving around the battlefield, always be looking for unused pickets, concertina wire, overhead cover, field expedient means for overhead cover and mines. 10. Encourage cross-talk between companies. What your company doesn't need, another might need in the worst way. Fire Support 1. Meet with the line company FOs. Find out if there is a dry rehearsal set up for each platoons TRPs. Task the platoons to time it for a trigger point. Rehearse with 81s and company mortars. 2. At some time in the defense, you may have to call indirect fire in on your own position. Plan for it and establish the determining point. 3. Make sure that all squad leaders understand if the platoon leader goes down, get his radio. Keep in contact with the company commander. Make sure all squad leaders know the platoon's and company's TRPs in case they have to call for indirect fires. Combat Service Support (CSS) Most of the CSS TTPs covered for battalion also apply at company level, except stockpile extra mines and concertina wire so you can reseed. Command And Control (C2) 1. Make sure each company commander has a timeline chart. Check the battalion commander's timeline with each company commander's timeline. Make sure they track.

2. Are priorities of work/troop-leading procedures being properly conducted? 3. Ask soldiers what their commander's plan is. Does it agree with the battalion overall plan? What does the company have as contingency plans? Have they been rehearsed? 4. Check for alternate and supplementary positions inside your final protective wire. 5. Try to fight the battle with your squad leaders. Get them together; go over the fight as you see it. Rehearse, or, at a minimum, discuss your plan. 6. Encourage commanders to listen to their NCOs. Too many don't, especially regarding crewserved weapons. 7. Situational awareness: The Battle Captain should keep track of the battle. Update the line companies. Cross-talk with your sister battalion. Do they have intel you don't have yet on the battle? Battlefield Circulation And The CSM How the CSM can move around the battlefield--courses of action: Have his/her own vehicle. The CSM This is the position title designating the senior NCO of the command at battalion and higher level. He or she carries out policies and standards on the performance, training, appearance, and conduct of enlisted personnel. The CSM gives advice and initiates recommendations to the commander and staff in matters pertaining to enlisted personnel. A unit, installation, or higher headquarters CSM directs the activities of that NCO support channel. This channel functions orally through the CSM's or first sergeant's call and normally does not involve written instruction. The CSM administers the unit Noncommissioned Officer Development Program (NCODP), normally through written directives and utilizing the NCO support channel. As the senior NCO of the command, the CSM is the training professional within the unit, overseeing and driving the entire training program. The CSM and commander jointly coordinate and develop the unit's mission essential task list (METL) and individual training tasks to create a team approach to battle-focused training. The CSM and NCO leaders then select the specific individual tasks which support each collective task to be trained during this same period. CSMs utilize command information channels to inform, express concerns on enlisted issues and build esprit. They also represent the commander at military and civilian functions to maintain good community relations. The Sergeant Major is generally the key enlisted member of staff elements at levels higher than battalion. The sergeant major's experience and ability are equal to that of the command sergeant major, but the sphere of influence regarding leadership is generally limited to those directly under his or her charge. Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States 1794 Instructions for the Sergeant Major The sergeant major, being at the head of the non-commissioned officers, must pay the greatest attention to their conduct and behavior, never conniving at the least irregularity committed by them or the soldiers, from both of whom he must exact the most implicit obedience. He should be well acquainted with the interior management and discipline of the regiment, and the manner of keeping rosters and forming details. He must always attend the parade, be very expert in counting off the battalion, and in every other business of the adjutant, to whom he is an assistant.

One commander used [excerpts of the CDR/CSM counseling] to create a memorandum to his staff and subordinate commanders. The memo defined the CSM's duties, responsibilities, and authority with definitive guidance on how to go about them. In his guidance, the commander highlighted several points pivotal during training as well as in combat. Consequently, staff and subordinate commanders aggressively sought advice and assistance from the CSM throughout their rotation. -CSM Jerry T. Alley, NTC CSM, "The NTC Challenge." NCO Journal, Summer 1991, p. 14 The CSM's Role in Advising the Commander The command sergeant major's counsel is expected to be calm, settled, and unequivocally accurate, but with an energy and enthusiasm that never wanes, even in the worst of times. -Army National Guard Noncommissioned Officer Handbook, 1989, p. A-17 One of [the CSM's] most effective ways for advising me was to schedule items on my calendar. If he found a weak area in the battalion that needed my attention, he advised me, through my calendar, on when and where to visit that unit or section. Invariably, he was correct in focusing me into that area. -COL Glenn A. Smith, Battalion Commanders Speak Out, 1977, p. 1-20 [Our battalion CSM] knows- by name, job, background, and problems- 90 percent of the soldiers in the battalion. The other 10 percent just got here. That gives me the capability to go to somebody I trust and say, "How are we doing?" Not only will I get a command perspective, but I will get a view of what's going on at the private's level. There is no other way to get that! -LTC Donald H. Volta, in "Command Sergeant Major: A New Breed of 'Old' Soldier." Soldiers, Mar 1981, p. 31 The Battalion Commander's Handbook, 1991: Your relationship with the CSM is vital. It must be based on mutual trust and respect.... Get their views on everything new you plan to do. Solicit his expectations, and perceptions of unit strengths and weaknesses. Make sure everyone knows you trust him or her, so they will operate from a position of strength.... Ensure the company commanders include the CSM in the problemsolving process. He or she is a doer as well as an advisor. Make them the principal resource for the leader development of your NCOs. Operate as a team, but encourage him or her to go their own way.... He or she ensures NCO business is accomplished.... In the field, ensure they have a vehicle and commo. He or she shares with you the responsibility for ensuring soldiers know the mission, perform to standard, and that the chain of command is responsive to soldiers... Charge them with quality control of garrison billets and facility maintenance.... Have them review all EERs and award recommendations for NCOs. Give the CSM the lead in personnel actions, individual training, ITEP, NCOPD, enlisted assignments, First Sergeant training.... Require him or her to inspect individual and small unit training.... Let the CSM run training without officers for specific events. (e.g. CTT, EIB, EFMB).... Involve the CSM in UCMJ decisions. Ensure his presence at UCMJ actions.... Have him bring good soldiers to you for informal discussions.

The CSM has access to inside information of which the battalion commander may be unaware, and vice versa. The information must be exchanged between these two personnel on a daily basis.... The CSM and commander must be "active" not "reactive" to situations which come about. Keeping each other informed will help the active side of this equation. -LTC James R. Siket, "Duties and Roles of the Battalion Command Sergeant Major." USAWC Paper, 1987, p. 15 Normally a battalion commander will consult with his or her battalion command sergeant major before putting orders into the chain of command. This does not mean that the CSM is in the chain of command, but it does say that the CSM must know what instructions are being issued in order for them to effectively supervise the NCO support channel. -FM 22-600-20, The Army Noncommissioned Officer Guide, 1980, p. 18, signed by GEN Edward C. Meyer Don't leave your CSM out of officer assignments. He has valuable information on officer personalities and unique subordinate unit needs. -LTC Louis V. Hightower, Battalion Commanders Speak Out, 1977, p. 2-5 CSMs must be the devil's advocate on policy. What effect will this directive have? Is it dumb? Harmful? Some of us interpret this advocate business as being negative. In fact, it can be negative and it has appalling effects when policies are challenged in the wrong place at the wrong time. Discretion, tact, and questioning go together. -CSM Walter W. Krueger, in CSM: That First Challenge, no date, p. 58 The Battalion Commander, the CSM, and the Staff Incumbent battalion commanders must take the time to formally educate their subordinates on the duties, functions, and responsibilities of the CSM. This could be a topic for discussion at an Officer Professional Development class. The company grade officers should be encouraged to seek the CSM's advice and counsel, and all junior officers should look at him as their battalion CSM. Commanders must insure that the XO and S-3 work in close coordination and cooperation with the CSM and pay particular attention to his or duties and responsibilities as outlined by the commander, to their methods, and their accomplishments. Since the commander has the mission to train the XO and S-3 for a future O5 command assignment, the effective use of the CSM should be one of his teaching points. A logical starting point may be the job description block on the CSM's EER. -COL Claude W. Abate and LTC Warren P. Giddings, "What Is a Sergeant Major?" USAWC Paper, 1985, p. 28 The command sergeant major can be a forceful personality in the battalion who can easily discourage a lieutenant or captain from seeking his advice. The battery commanders, in some cases, must be strongly encouraged by the battalion commander to seek guidance from the command sergeant major; and the CSM must be responsive to their needs when such help is requested. -LTC James R. Siket, "Duties and Roles of the Battalion Command Sergeant Major." USAWC Paper, 1987, p. 14 A good staff officer who uses [the SGM] will find he has a friend at court.... He or she knows the route your paperwork must follow and he or she knows someone at each stopping place who can

help with expert advice.... In all his or her dealings with the staff, the sergeant major is trying to make them look good to the commander. -SGM Robert B. Begg, "Sergeant Major." ARMY, Jan 1966, pp. 38, 39 Anything [the SGM] can do to help [the staff] helps the commander and the command at the same time. -CSM Bob L. Williams, "The Sergeant Major." Infantry, Sep-Oct 1969, p. 18 The demands of leadership are the same for staff NCOs. Too many combat arms NCOs treat staff jobs as temporary positions to be tolerated until they can get reassigned to a line unit. Yet staff roles are important. Seasoned noncommissioned officers who have seen operations go wrong when a staff's planning and logistics are tested in "the real world" have a special insight that may be missed by other team members who haven't had the same experience. In addition, each member contributes specific skills and knowledge to the team. NCOs can play a vital role in making training realistic and in helping to develop plans for future exercises. If staffs fail to restock ammo, for example, or fail to take the time needed for vehicle maintenance, their commanders must fight with less ammunition and fewer vehicles.... Experienced noncommissioned officers must make it known that they are...an important part of the plans and policy process. At the same time, the staff NCO cannot afford to be discouraged if advice is not accepted. Often, soldiers will go into a shell because what they considered important input to a plan was not accepted by the staff. They may become reluctant to provide information. This must not occur. It's up to the staff NCO to provide knowledge acquired through years of experience in the field and keep submitting that knowledge and experience into the planning stages. -CSM James C. McKinney, CSM Lyle C. Daniels, and MSG Michael Lawson, "CMTC: Training for Combat." NCO Journal, Summer 1991, p. 8 Experience, especially staff experience, is vital to the CSM. A soldier whose highest level of experience has been that of the first sergeant- no matter how good a first sergeant he may have been- is going to require a period of adjustment when he or she finds himself the commander's chief enlisted representative on the battalion staff. During the interim, while the new battalion CSM learns to shake the adversary role he or she played as a hard-charging first sergeant and learns how to work with the staff, soldiers suffer. -SMA Glen E. Morrell, in "News Call." ARMY, May 1984, p. 75 XO/Commanders/CSM must know and trust each other. They must speak publicly with the same voice. -The Battalion Commander's Handbook, 1991, p. 19 Just as the commander forms one relationship with the XO and another with the CSM, so the XO and the CSM must work closely together. -COL Charles D. Beck, Command, Leadership, and Effective Staff Support, 1996, p. 47 The XO and CSM must be of "One Mind" with the commander. -COL Neil L. Putz, Command, Leadership, and Effective Staff Support, 1996, p. 49

When the battalion commander and the CSM are TDY, as acting commander, when anything out of the ordinary happens, the first person you look for is the acting CSM. -Battalion XO, A Treasury of NCO Quotations, 1997, no page number (See also Battalion and Company Commander, CSM, and 1SG Responsibilities for Training Platoon Leaders; Company Commanders and the CSM) Integrating the new CSM Orientation of the new CSM is a primary factor in developing the role he or she will play in the unit. It is not sufficient to simply assign them a sponsor, as the regulation requires. In some situations...assigning his predecessor as the sponsor may not be the best solution. Guidance with regard to exactly what the sponsor should do cannot be reduced to a checklist. In fact, giving the CSM the same information as an incoming battalion CO is probably an accurate idea of how well he or she should be briefed. The new CSM must be treated as the senior noncommissioned officer of the unit from the first moment of contact with your unit, and not in a half-hearted manner. Upon his arrival, there should be a ceremony to recognize both him or her and the retiring CSM. The new CSM will learn a great deal about the battalion's attitude toward a CSM by participating in such a ceremony. The degree of complexity of the ceremony would, of course, be variable, depending upon the situation. Recognition, though, is the key. Following the ceremony, the new CSM should receive briefings from the noncommissioned officers he will be working with in the future. These briefings will tell the CSM about all aspects of the unit, how the battalion commander operates, and what was expected and received from the previous CSM. The initial discussion between the battalion commander and the new CSM is perhaps the most critical of the orientation activities. To provide specific guidance on how to conduct this meeting or what to say is indeed futile, except to say that the meeting should be conceptual in nature. Because the CSM is new and the battalion CO has been in command for some time, it is perhaps best if the commander initiates the discussion by describing his perceptions of the battalion. The CO must emphasize at least one point- the value of the CSM's leadership, ideas, and experience regarding the battalion. The CO must let the CSM know, at least in concept, how he wants the CSM to operate and what authority the CSM has within the battalion. The CSM should leave the office with a good conceptual understanding of his role within the battalion. -LTC John L. Lorms, "The Role and Duties of CSM." Infantry, Jan-Feb 1974, pp. 35-36 One day in the 3rd ID, I visited an arms room in Aschaffenburg, Germany. I asked the young armorer if he knew CSM Ligon [CSM James Ligon, the division CSM]. His eyes opened wide and he said, "Sir, everyone knows CSM Ligon!" CSM Ligon had inspected every weapon in the division in his first 30 days in the job, along with the NCOs in the respective chain of command. We had no weapons problems from that point forward. The best way to describe him is to say, "he was everywhere all the time." -LTG Robert L. Wetzel, letter 29 Aug 1997 CSM Southern Hewitt...reported into the 2d Battalion, 42d Field Artillery as the new battalion CSM. [During our first meeting he asked me what the battalion was doing the next day,

Saturday.] "CSM, it so happens we're running the Crailsheim International Marathon tomorrow morning; but, don't worry about that. Get your family settled and report for duty Monday morning"... The next morning the new CSM met us at the start line.... We ran side by side for the entire 26-plus miles.... I hadn't intended to run the whole distance. My plan was to come up lame at the first beer tent and call it a day. The CSM called my bluff and we went the whole distance together. In later years he told me that he hadn't intended to run the whole distance either. His plan was to wait until I dropped out and follow suit just as "a courtesy." -COL Fredrick Van Horn, "Lasting First Impressions." NCO Journal, Winter 1994, p. 18 What the CSM needs to know from the battalion commander: · Commander's intent · How the commander plans to use him · Command philosophy · The commander's expectations of a CSM · Commander's likes and dislikes · How the commander defines the CSM's job in the unit · Command focus · Guidance on social functions What the battalion commander needs to know from the CSM: · Training status of unit · Changes in NCO educational training programs and opportunities · Welfare, morale, and satisfaction of enlisted members within battalion · Administration recommendations regarding assignments, discipline, training, awards and decorations, and uniform regulation relevant to enlisted soldiers of the command · Input on equal opportunity policies established within the unit · Potential combat technical and tactical deficiencies in the unit and suggestions for improvement Battalion Commanders and NCOs [Battalion commanders:] Ask yourself a question, "Did I do everything humanly possible to develop the officers and NCOs in my battalion?" -GEN Carl E. Vuono, Collected Works, 1991, p. 436 [Often during WWII, GEN Creighton Abrams, as a battalion commander,] would include leaders down through buck sergeant...in the nighttime meetings. -Lewis Sorley, Thunderbolt: General Creighton Abrams and the Army of His Times, p. 56 Support your NCOs, they are the primary leaders of soldiers.... Use NCO task forces to solve problems. Give them the problem, a time limit, walk out, and return later for a briefing on their solution.... Let the 1SGs know you support them and need their input.... Share hardships with your soldiers. The worse the weather, the more they need you.... The influence of supply sergeants, armorers, mail clerks, administrative personnel, and cooks, on the morale and welfare

of the troops is tremendous and they need to share the glory. -The Battalion Commander's Handbook, 1991, pp. 23, 70, 21, 33, 71 There is no better procedure for a new commander than to consult with his key NCOs before making changes in policies and standing operating procedures. They are an invaluable source of knowledge. -BG Hillman Dickinson, "From a Ground Commander to the Aviator." U.S. Army Aviation Digest, Oct 1974, p. 6 It reflects well on a battalion when NCOs give briefings. -COL Jerry F. Pickar, A Treasury of NCO Quotations, 1997, no page number The resources needed to support NCOs are as important as those needed for officers. The battalion commander needs to be aware of these requirements and make those resources available. For example, one of the companies of the 743d MI Bn consisted of detachments world-wide, and company-level commanders and higher would go TDY to visit these detachments. But the first sergeant also needs to visit his soldiers, and the commander must make sure TDY funds are allocated for that purpose. Commanders who make an effort to be sensitive to NCO requirements will have a stronger unit. -COL Donald L. Langridge, A Treasury of NCO Quotations, 1997, no page number The platoon sergeant is the key leader in creating a highly professional and combat-effective force. As I prepared to assume command of a light infantry battalion, I published my concept of the tasks, conditions, and standards for all the battalion's key leaders. Much of this effort focused on the platoon sergeant, because he, along with the platoon leader, must understand and execute the battalion commander's intent two levels down. Additionally, he must always be prepared to assume the responsibilities of his platoon leader. Some may argue that a battalion commander should concentrate on junior officer development and leave noncommissioned officer development to the battalion's command sergeant major and company first sergeants. Experience has taught me, however, that a uniform set of standards for key leaders is vital to combat readiness. Addressing the platoon sergeants on my first day of command, I outlined exactly what I would expect of them during our time together in the battalion. At the same time, I asked them to tell me what they, as the battalion's senior noncommissioned officers, expected from me as the incoming commander. -LTC Cole C. Kingseed, "The Platoon Sergeant." Infantry, Jul-Aug 1993, p. 8 Battalion Commanders Speak Out, 1977: Have frequent NCO calls to get their suggestions, discuss plans, policies, and other pertinent topics. -LTC Stanley G. Bonta, p. 5-7 Well-meaning officers and NCOs in the unit will interpret your orders in terms of their own capabilities, limitations, and experience. You must therefore try to strike a balance between overly specific orders (which take away all initiative on the part of subordinates) and overly general mission-type orders which could result in the failure of the battalion to achieve its objective. I found that fairly general mission-type orders with a good feedback system worked best for me. -COL Fred E. Elam, p. 7-3

[During my individual inbriefs with new NCOs I told them] that I wanted to hear bad news as fast or faster than good news. -LTC Louis V. Hightower, p. 2-13 Within all companies, selected personnel are tabbed with the additional duties of career counselor, drug and alcohol specialists, etc. I hosted periodic lunches or other meetings with these individual groups to hear what problems they were having. This simple act added credibility to their jobs and provided me with useful information. I found out that many of these young soldiers had...fine ideas that resulted in many improvements in the battalion. -LTC Louis V. Hightower, pp. 2-13, 2-14 The battalion will rise or fall based on the caliber of leadership we find at the NCO leader levels. -LTC Herbert F. Harback, "The Command Sergeant Major." Engineer, Oct 1990, p. 41 Once a month have your key NCOs brief the commanders and staff in their areas of responsibility. -LTC Jerry H. Hogan, "Once You Assume Command, Command!" ARMY, Jan 1979, p. 32 Periodically visit [the Brigade CSM] to discuss his views and ask his opinion. He can be of considerable assistance to your CSM regarding senior NCO problems. He will have valuable insight into your boss's thinking. -The Battalion Commander's Handbook, 1991, pp. 41-42 For [NCOs] to be effective, the commander must make it known that his NCOs share in the command of that unit. -CSM William J. H. Peters, "From the TRADOC CSM." Army Trainer, Spring 1985, p. 24 Battalion Commanders' and CSMs' Spouses [Battalion commanders' spouses not only have help available from] outside agencies, but I would say...draw from the command sergeant major.... You will want the kind of advice and guidance and assistance he can give- it is invaluable. -GEN Carl E. Vuono, Collected Works, 1991, p. 444 The concept of the family support program is tremendous. Unfortunately, in my experience, some of the programs weren't successful. Unit family members of soldiers of all ranks must be involved- must willingly participate- for the program to succeed. And the commander must be involved, take full responsibility for the program because it's his program. It's a great help to the commander if his spouse takes that program and runs with it and other spouses of unit leaders are involved. But he must stay in touch, and they must go into it with open minds, open hearts, and open ears, or they'll turn off the family members of the more junior soldiers and the program will fail. All unit family members must be valued for their contributions to the group. Again, it boils down to open communications and the true spirit of taking care of our own. -CSM James C. McKinney, "Advice to NCOs Today- Be Patient and Professional." Field Artillery, Oct 1993, p. 8 [In assisting spouse's groups, the job of the Bn Cdrâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s spouse] is to encourage, support, suggest, and above all, be available when needed.... The wife of the command sergeant major...can be

invaluable in suggesting how to assist young wives in the unit. -USACGSC RB 22-2, The Commander's "Link", 1983, pp. 32, 31 Leaders' Wives Speak Out, 1985: [Recommendations from battalion commanders' spouses]: Treat the wives with respect and caring. They expect you to have answers for them or be willing to help them find the answers. The senior NCO wives are a very important factor in this family. If you don't have their support, it is very hard to reach the young enlisted man's family. Remember the senior NCO wives for the most part are your age. They are a great resource for information and help. -Maureen B. Kievenaar, p. 51 Establish a solid partnership with the XO's wife and the Sergeant Major's wife. Ask for their ideas, and share your plans with them before you make general announcements. Even if they choose not to help, you should keep them informed. -Linda O. Anderson, p. 10 [The friendship of the CSM's spouse] was imperative to me. -Mary Anne Shlenker, p. 26 Thoughts from Above Battalion Level In reflecting, I would talk to the other Army leaders, my vice chiefs (the first [GEN Dennis] Reimer, then [GEN] Binnie Peay, and finally [GEN] John Tilelli), and especially Sergeant Major of the Army Richard Kidd, the Army's senior enlisted soldier. -GEN Gordon R. Sullivan, Hope Is Not a Method, 1996, p. 229 Every afternoon, I walked a fixed route, at the same time, through the streets of my three battalions, deliberately letting myself be ambushed.... It did not take long for the soldier with a gripe, the noncom with a problem, to figure out where he could waylay the brigade commander for a private minute or two. Good NCOs and junior officers understood what I was doing. I was not breaking the chain of command. They knew that I would never agree to anything in these curbside sessions that would undermine their authority. If anything, my outdoor office hours gave them a chance to blow off steam. -GEN Colin L. Powell, My American Journey, 1995, p. 216 I didn't know [SMA Glen Morrell] before I selected him. But I've listened to him and I pay attention to what he has to say. You need to do the same with your command sergeants major. GEN John A. Wickham, Collected Works, 1987, p. 335 You will report directly to me and there will be no one between your desk and mine. When you need to see me, you will use the private entrance to my office. The only other person who uses that entrance is the Secretary of the Army. -GEN Harold K. Johnson to the Army's first SMA, William Wooldridge, 1966, in "SMAâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Role Evolves, Grows." NCO Journal, Summer 1995, p. 44 The Sergeant Major of the Army's job is to support and keep the Chief of Staff informed about the enlisted concerns in the Army, and let him know how soldiers are training and living at the canteen-cup level. -SMA Julius W. Gates, The Sergeants Major of the Army, 1995, p. 154

My responsibility [as a MACOM CSM] is the same as that of the battalion sergeant major. The only difference is that I operate at a higher organizational level. -CSM James B. Craft, "The Cutting Edge." Army Trainer, Fall 1985, p. 37

The Role of the SGM in the MDMP Process Written by SGM (R) Patrick Castin BCTP/MPRI

SGM Role in MDMP NCOâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s and officers have specific roles in the MDMP process. As stated before there is no manual that really defines what the SGM/NCOs do in TOC operations, however FM 71-100-1 does state that the Noncommissioned officer assigned to the command post will be an integral part of all command post operations. The Command Sergeant Major and Operations Sergeant Major are the senior NCOs in the organization. His or her duties span a wide spectrum of NCO activities, including the command post. He or she will actively participate in the selection and retention of qualified NCOs for CP operations. Unlike the officers, NCOs will be routinely focused on specific aspects of their duties or work areas. Some specific responsibilities of the command post are: - The effective collection, processing, and dissemination of information within his or her cell throughout the command post and external to the command post. - The preparation and updating of staff estimates and the preparation, review, and issuance of orders and plans. - The coordination, synchronization, and integration of internal CP and separate cell activities, battle tracking areas such as maintenance of map boards, status charts, shift changeover procedures, information management, journals, journal files, and the health and welfare of soldiers. - Participation in the command post site selection, reconnaissance, movement and force protection of the command post.

He or she will vigorously enforce the use of available formal CP training courses by ensuring allocations are available and proper personnel attend. He participates the development and implementations of individual enlisted training and collective enlisted soldiers tasks based on the unit METL and battle focus. The CSM monitors CP operations and NCO participation to ensure all are properly accomplishing their specific duties. The CSM will be able to actively and accurately advise and counsel NCOs as to their command post responsibilities. Through training and practical experience, the NCO will be able to assume the duties of an officer in the event of the officerâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s temporary or extended absence from the command post. Command post NCOs are required to develop and train young soldiers and new NCOs in the individual and collective tasks associated with command post operations. The NCOIC of each cell will maintain a folder depicting the duties and responsibilities of specified tasks for each soldier assigned to that cell. NCOs assigned for duties within the command post are the cornerstone of operations stability and continuity. Commands must use NCOs in a manner that frees officers from routine CP duties. Officers must see the battlefield from a board rather than a narrow perspective. .

SGM and NCOs Role in the MDMP Process The following information shows the NCOs responsibilities in the MDMP process. Purpose: To familiarize NCOs with the steps in the Military Decision Making Process. To identify how and where NCOs can support the Military Decision Making Process. Advantages of MDMP: It analyzes and compares multiple friendly and enemy COAs in an attempt to identify the most effective friendly COA. It produces the greatest integration, coordination, and synchronization for an operation and minimizes the risk of overlooking a critical event. It produces a detailed OPORD/OPLAN. Disadvantages: It can be a time-consuming process. (If you are untrained and unpracticed).

Receipt of Mission (Step one) Prepare for Planning: SGM: Once the SGM receives the new order the SGM should ensure the battle NCO announce TOC Drill # 1, he or she should try to get two copies of OPORD from higher. Log/Inventory order and overlays/annexes and ensure all copies of overlays are being made to the map board drop. Make 1 complete copy of OPORD (Label copy #1). Make 1 Copy of all overlays (Label copy #1). Distribute OPORD and annexes (Copy #1) Distribute OPORD and annexes (Copy #1). Ensure base order goes to Battle CPT and Annexes to responsible staff section/XO. Battle Captain: Hasty scan (METT-T) of 1st copy of ORDER. Inform Cdr, S3, CTCP, and FTCP of new order. All orders should be distributed to commander, S-2, S-3, FSO, ENG, and XO, ensure one copy is posted in the orders book. The best way to get information out in the TOC is to call. SGM: “ATTENTION IN THE TOC – TOC HUDDLE - We have a new WARNO/ OPORD / FRAGO. Battle Captain: Provide TOC a general new order situation update, to include the "big picture" SGM/Plans NCO: Assist plans officer in the distribution and collection of the mission analysis products that the battle staff is tasked with producing. Begin gathering the tools for COA development, wargaming and begin forming the terrain model team.

Cdr’s initial Guidance If needed, how to abbreviate MDMP Initial time allocation Staff options vs Cdr directives (time) Intent for reconnaissance Intent for early movement

SGM: Should assist and ensure that the battle captain when he or she starts writing warning order #1 ensure that he or has all available information need to complete warning order #1 The SGM should ensure the battle NCO and slice NCO are providing all necessary information and equipment needed to complete the warning order. The SGM should read the warning order before it goes to the XO and ensures at a minimum it has higher mission, type of operation, location and time of operation. The SGM should supervise and spot check to ensure the S-2 is conducting IPB, determining areas of interest, AA analysis and doctrinal templating. XO: Determine planning time available (1/3 time of now until mission execution). SGM: SGM decision point 1. Security in/around the TOC, does he or she increase the number of personnel on security and update force protection for each node? Battle Captain/Planner: Begin writing WARNO1. XO: QC / Send Warning Order (WARNO1). Staff: Update staff estimates. WARNO1 (Minimum) Higher mission Type of Operation Location of Operation Time of Operation

S-2: Initiate IPB process (Area of interest, AA analysis, Doctrinal Template) SGM/BSNCO: Prepare for mission analysis, Post Blank Mission Analysis Charts, Confirm receipt of WARNO1 by subordinate/attached units Things to consider (SGM): ¾ Prepare TOC for planning process ¾ Prepare and distribute warning orders ¾ Log receipt of all warning orders, OPORDs, and FRAGOS ¾ Use your TACSOP ¾ Gather appropriate maps of AO ¾ Gather appropriate FMs ¾ Configure plans tent for Mission Analysis Products out: WARNO 1 (Btl Cpt), Preliminary IPB (S2), Notify plans cell to assemble (Btl Cpt) Time Schedule (XO), Doctrinal Temp posted (S2), Initial RFIs submitted (Ops NCO) Review of AO (S2), Current FF Status (All Staff)

Mission Analysis Products in: Higher WARNO # 2 or Higher OPORD. SGM: Should ensure that the battle NCO/RTO finish making copies of OPORD, the SGM should review the plan. S-2 officer/NCO: Should read and reviews BDE template for NAIs/TAIs. All slice elements review the plan. The SGM ensures the battle NCO post new Task Organization. The commander will then conduct Initial recon and identify Initial Cdr's intent. The S-2 should identify and Call in Recon element/commander for planning and then conduct Initial Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. Battle Sketch (Blow-up). Commander: Cdr conducts own hasty msn anal. Fire Support Officer/NCO: Review top down fire plan. XO: Plan use of time, conducts S2/S3 Hasty Huddle determines/verifies the following: ¾ S3 provides Area of Operation (overlay) ¾ S2/S3 identify area of interest (overlay) ¾ S2 determines En MPCOA ¾ S3 determines En MDCOA SGM/BNCO: Post Higher Missions and Commanders’ Intent, updates all as of times. S-4/NCO: Determine initial need for CL IV, mines and trans or assist in determining current combat stance of subordinate units. IPB/Msn Anal team: S3/Btl Cpt BOS, CSS Rep, CSM/SGM, ADA. Initial CCIR (PIR /FFIR / EEFI) IPB Analysis Team: (CHEMO, ENG, FSO/NCO) SGM/BNCO: Battle Sketch (Blow-up) S-2: (IPB) assembles IPB team, briefs, then prepares: Enemy SITEMP (Refine info from S3/XO huddle), Weather analysis - temp/hum, precip, winds, clouds, visib, illum, Terrain analysis - OAKOC results in MCOO (include roads), Focus is on effects to BLUFOR/OPFOR, Enemy BOS analysis—FA & direct fire range fans, ADA coverage & air AA, enemy obstacles, COB ¾ Area of Interest and AA analysis ¾ Terrain Analysis (Effects) ¾ Threat Evaluation ¾ Threat Integration Plans officer/NCO: Assembles mission analysis team, briefs then prepares: ¾ List Specified and Implied Tasks (circle Mission Essential Tasks) ¾ List assets available ¾ List Limitations and Constraints ¾ ID facts and assumptions ¾ ID Risk/force protection ¾ Develop Restated Mission SGM/BNCO: Collects, reads and maintains an RFI report matrix, ensures BOS elements received updated RFI with answers from higher. Prep sand table/terrain model DON’T FORGET Mission vs Purpose Our strengths Enemy vulnerabilities

Mission Analysis ContStaff: Rehearse Mission Analysis Briefing to XO and conduct Mission Analysis Brief Commander: Cdr approves restated mission and Issue Cdr's guidance XO: Update timeline Battle Cpt: Begin writing WARNO2 METT-T 1. MISSION Purpose to be achieved Main effort / supporting effort Essential tasks to subordinates Sketch and concept 2. ENEMY MPCOA / MDCOA

WARNO 2 (Minimum) Weaknesses Restated Mission Cdr's intent 3. TERRAIN Obstacles Area of Operation Key terrain (ID Decisive Point) CCIR Observations & fields of fire Risk Cover & Concealment Recon effort Avenues of Approach Security measures Weather 4. TIME 5. TROOPS AVAILABLE Assigned assets

Deception Mob/CM Guidance Priorities Time plan Rehearsal guidance Cdr's guidance

Cdr's Recon: Staff factors What must/can the Cdr see? What can be delegated to others? Give Cdr a suggested route/recon Frago? Recon areas of major decisions: (EA/ME, Key Obstacles/Terrain, CntrRcn) What to do with the info from this recon?

Additional duties the SGM must make happen or delegate: ¾ Copy graphics ¾ Prepare and update status charts ¾ Prepare terrain sketches ¾ Update and post unit reports ¾ Conduct mission analysis as a member of your staff section ¾ Serve as a recorder during process ¾ Post Mission Analysis Briefing chart (agenda) ¾ Make copies of Cdr’s intent of guidance ¾ Ensure the briefing area is set up with all the required equipment (i.e. computers, charts, maps and ect.) ¾ Brief commander and staff

Mission Analysis ContAdditional duties the SGM must make happen or delegate during mission analysis: ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾

Butcher block Marker pens1:50,000 Map of AO Acetate cover Unit symbols Recorder (S) Briefing agenda Overlays (Ops Graphics, Enemy Sitemp, Obstacles)

Products out: MCOO (S2), Obj Area sketch (S2), Updated Time Schedule (XO), Time Analysis (S2/S3), Initial R & S Matrix (S2), Staff Updates (Staff), Mission Analysis Briefing to Cdr (Staff), RFI Update (Ops NCO/SGM), Mvmt FRAGO (S3 NCO) EN SIT TEMP (S2), Restated Mission (S3), Initial Cdr's guidance and recon plan developed.

Course of Action development (COA) Commander: Decide on single or multiple COA technique Decisive point Defense – Where to kill him Offense – Weak pt on obj

Cdr/XO/S3/ SGM/CSM: COA(s) concept developed by Cdr/XO/S3 Huddle XO: Brief COA concept Route clearing plan

Things to weigh

Deliberate clearing Hasty Clearing Type mission? Type mission?

Narrow area of Resp Minimize tasks Task org assets Priority effort Attrit eny prior to ME

S3/S2/FSO/: COA Refinement process: ¾ Determine enemy decisive point and time ¾ Task & purpose focused on the Decisive point, link purpose to TF mission, determine essential tasks, ¾ Determine task and purpose of Supporting Efforts, task organize, weight the main effort and determine the endstate: enemy / friendly Timeline Off – LD to Reorg/consol Def – EN recon to main body in EA

Course of Action development (COA) ContS3/SGM/S2/FSO/: Implement control measures (purpose of Phase Lines etc.) CONTROL MEASURES (min) Offensive Both Defensive Ass areas Sectors Engagement Areas LD/LC BSA Battle position OBJ Phase lines SPF position Attack position Timeline Off – LD to Reorg/consol Def – EN recon to main body in EA

¾ Timeline of opn to include weather/lt data ¾ Determine obstacle needed / intent ¾ COA sketch and statement, list critical events / points and mark NAI which focus on feasible /acceptable/ suitable NAIs Off – EN positions Def – EN COAs

¾ List assumptions made ¾ Scheme of maneuver Initial mvmt order Type – admin Determine route Need TCP’s? Scout? Quartering party Tactical support March units SP/RP FRAGO Overlay w/strip map

S3: Brief staff on result of COA brief, relay commander’s guidance BOS reps: Continue to update estimates/calculating Consider all enemy Div/Bde recon Dismounted forces CRP Supporting/disrupting attk Main attack Guerrilla/SOF Air: fixed / rotary / AASLT

All: Begin gathering tools for the wargamingr

Course of Action development (COA) ContObstacle design Desired effect (Turn, fix, block, disrupt) Size of enemy How long effects last Our actions when he: is affected he breaches? he bypasses? Obstacle control measures Marking Tied into terrain Reserve Be prepared msns Planning priorities Task for success Reaction Time Position

SGM/RTO/OPS NCO/Plans NCO: Develop sand table/terrain board. Additional duties the SGM must make happen or delegate during Course of Action Development: ¾ Prepare charts and products for COA development ¾ Assist in the development of COAs. ¾ Sketch COAs. ¾ Support briefing requirements. ¾ Assist with preparation of COA statements where necessary. ¾ Post COA briefing chart (if required). ¾ Record Cdr’s guidance or adjustments to specific COAs. SGM responsibilities in developing a Course of Action sketch. (Task/delegate) ¾ Graphically portrays the scheme of maneuver. ¾ At a minimum, the sketch should include the array of generic forces (enemy and friendly) and control measures. ¾ Can be on any media – what it portrays is more important than its form. ¾ Stands alone. ¾ Sketches for multiple COAs in the same operation. Should be identical (terrain, enemy sitemp, obstacles). ¾ Enforce OPSEC standards-both computer and analog. ¾ Identifies a collection point for OPSEC and force the rules.

Course of Action development (COA) ContSGM responsibilities in developing a Course of Action sketch. COA sketch must include: ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾

Phase lines Ground and/or air axes of advance Areas of operation Assembly areas Strongpoints Battle positions Engagement areas Objectives FEBA or LD/LC Major obstacles Fire support coordination measures Main effort designated in the offense Enemy situation Depict Terrain Array the Enemy and Avenues of Approach Apply Higher Hqs Graphics Show Scheme of Maneuver

SGM responsibilities in developing a Scheme of Maneuver sketch: Use symbols from FM 101-5-1, App C ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾

Paint a picture for the commander and staff Create a separate sketch for actions on the objective if necessary Identify the decisive point Work through the battlefield framework Write down task and purpose for each sub-element

Products out: MCOO (S2), Obj Area sketch (S2), Updated Time Schedule (XO), Time Analysis (S2/S3), Initial R & S Matrix (S2), Staff Updates (Staff), Mission Analysis Briefing to Cdr (Staff) RFI Update (Ops NCO), Mvmt FRAGO (S3 NCO), EN SIT TEMP (S2), Restated Mission (S3) and Initial Cdr's guidance

Course of Action Analysis SGM/BNCO: Prepare for the Wargame / Gather the tools: ¾ Blown-up sketch/map for planning w/ basic control measures. ¾ Determine which EN and which BLUFOR COA to use. ¾ Post Wargame worksheets (not synch matrix). ¾ Post Task organization. SGM/BNCO /S2/BOS: Array all forces (post BLUEFOR and enemy pieces (SITEMP). XO/SGM: Assemble the staff - define the purpose of the Wargame: XO Facilitates process Player participation Honest mediator Keeps it moving No premature conclusions

¾ Hasty or Deliberate ¾ Box or Belt method ¾ Box or Belt method ¾ Allocate time to each event. XO/Staff: Conduct battle using. Action / Reaction / Counteraction OBJ Blow-up Sketch w/photos Detailed locations Obst/wire (2 or 3)/mines ADA / FA / MTR ranges LOS LP/Ops

Plans officer/S2/S-2 NCO: Post time/distance graphics. Assumptions - verify validity (may ID need for CCIR). List known critical points and decision points in order. List significant factors (4-8). S2/ Thoughts S2 honest enemy – unbiased Enemy: who, what, where, when, why What enemy expects of us Our MPCOA / MDCOA to the enemy Our vulnerabilities Enemy vulnerabilities Enemy Decisive Points Enemy R&S: their NAIs, TAIs, assets Enemy IF plan and HVT on us Enemy obstacle plan purpose Deception plan What do we want the en to believe? Can we convince him? Use dummy positions?

Course of Action Analysis ContSIGO How to best communicate Locations Radio / signals / markings Wire vs radio

XO: Select Wargame method Box, Belt, Ave in depth, Combine SGM: ID recorder and recording technique and IDs a graphics updater / visual aid changer XO/Staff: Conduct Wargame ¾ Fight battle by chronologically selected critical events ¾ S2/S3 fight the battle and move the units ¾ SGM delegates someone to update graphics/control measures as changes happen ¾ XO/S-3/S-4/CSM, cover contingency plans - CATK, CasEvac, Resupply, C2 ¾ SGM, Correlation of forces and means and relative cbt power ¾ S1/CSM, casualty, treatment, evacuation assets, CCPs/AXPs, routes ¾ S4/NCO, critical WPN/SYS losses, ammo, fuel use, Trains reqd/loc, MSR routes, timing WARNO 3 Cdr’s COA Concept of Opn Task Organization Company Tasks Draft of Graphics

Location vs time effect Who controls? Cntr measures

ADA officer Priority protection Location Tgt lines ENG Location time task asset Rqmt breach, mine, Cl. IV

SGM responsibilities in COA. Task/delegate an NCO to collect and prepare tools/charts/products ¾ Prepare unit icons for movement on the map ¾ Blank sheet of acetate on the map ¾ Post the assumptions ¾ Post the COA sketch and statement ¾ Post the evaluation criteria ¾ Prepare the sync matrix w/appropriate task organization

Course of Action Analysis ContSGM responsibilities in COA Cont-. Task/delegate an NCO to collect and prepare tools/charts/products ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾

Serve as a war-game recorder Conduct war-game session Post war-game briefing chart (if required) Monitor time and keep the staff on track

Products out: COA confirmation briefing charts (Staff), Update RFI (SGM/Ops NCO) Wargame worksheet (S3) and WARNO 3 (Btl Cpt)

Course of Action Comparison/ Synchronization XO: ¾ Prioritize key events for synchronization ¾ Follow synch matrix ¾ XO announces event ¾ Staff estimates ¾ Use action/reaction/counter action ¾ S-2 gives enemy actions ¾ S-3 gives BLUEFOR actions ¾ Each BOS rep identifies their actions ¾ Staff calculates time for each event ¾ Staff identifies control measures required ¾ Identify decision points ¾ Assess risk ¾ Compare COAs ¾ Recommendation (COA) ¾ Complete staff estimates SGM/BNCO: ¾ Assemble the briefing products ¾ Post appropriate decision matrix format for use during comparison ¾ Post decision briefing chart ¾ Make recommendations ¾ Record/post commander’s guidance ¾ Support briefing requirements ¾ Inspect the terrain model CHEMO: Records all information Products out: Synch/timing Matrix (CHEMO), Opns overlay (S3), Decision Support Matrix (S3) Execution Timeline (S3), Update RFI (Ops NCO), Decision Support Template (S3) OPORD/Task Org Changes (Btl Cpt) and produce WARNO #3. 42

Course of Action Approval Commander 他他他他

Select COA Assess Risk Specify Type of Order Further guidance on contingency plans/rehearsals

Orders Production S2/S3/S4/:

Base OPORD

Battle CPT:

ANNEX A, Task Org ANNEX B, Intelligence, IPB MCOO Enemy SITMP, Enemy AA R&S plan ANNEX C OPS overlay ANNEX C Execution timelines ANNEX D Air support FA support Fire support overlay Fire support matrix FS target worksheet

OPORD ANNEXES:

S-2:

S-3: CHEMO: FSO:

Order is: Authoritative Simple Balanced Concise Clear

Complete Positive Timely Flexible Coordinated

Orders Production ContEngineer:

ANNEX F ENG overlay ENG matrix Obstacle plan Obstacle exec matrix ADA: ANNEX G ADA overlay S-4/S-1/CSM: ANNEX I CSS overlay CSS matrix Traffic plan Road movement table S-3 Air/LNO: ANNEX O Air routes overlay S-5: ANNEX U CMO operations SGM/BNCO: Ensures complete order, QC reproducibility Battle Cpt: QC order content, inventory control SGM/BNCO: Reproduces order RTO/OPS NCO: Make final adjustments on sand table/terrain board SGM/BNCO: Prep order brief All: Rehearse OPORD brief XO Introduction S2 Bde IPB picture / threat S3 Bde mission, concept, Task Org S2 IPB in TF zone (ID hard vs soft data) (R&S plan, terrain, light/weather, templates) Cdr S3 FSO ENG ADA S4/CSM

5 5 5 10

Intent TF scheme of maneuver FS (how helps concept, assets) CINC Engineer ADA status, locations, priority of support CSS concept, CASEVAC, Class I, III, V, LRPs, emergency re-supply S3 DST, Coordinating Instructions Cdr Final comments Cdr Backbriefs

5 15 5 5 5 10

Total:

5 5

Products out: OPORD (Ops NCO/S3) see distribution log for OPORD recipients OPORD ANNEXES (S3, Staff), Prep OPORD brief (Staff) Update RFI (Ops NCO)

Battle Staff NCO Training (Part II) More Techniques, Observations and Comments on Training for Success By Patrick Castin

Since you are truly a professional NCO of the highest caliber, you undoubtedly want to do the best job you can, so now it's time for you, the operations sergeant, to ask a few questions and assess your section. You already know your NCOs have become subject matter experts in the myriad of duties required while operating in garrison such as training NCO, school NCO, filling out status reports and hundreds of other duties. But are the NCOs and soldiers in your section trained to perform their most critical function, their assigned duties within the TOC, when your unit deploys to combat? Does your unit have a current tactical operations center standard operating procedure (TOCSOP)? Do officers and battle staff NCOs post and update the map boards? Do the battle staff NCOs and radio operators know what the commander's critical information requirements (CCIR) are? Do they even know the meaning of the acronym? Do the battle staff NCOs understand the tactical decision-making process (MDMP)? These are all questions to ask when assessing your section. Here are a few other things you are responsible for as the OPS SGM. When considering what training your section needs in order to improve TOC operations or the operations of daily garrison activities, some of these have been mention in the past BCTP NCO Review issue 07-02. First, read all the after-action reports and take-home packages prepared on your TOC during the past two years. This includes any trips your unit has made to the National Training Center at Ft. Irwin, CA, Joint Readiness Training Center at Ft. Polk, LA, or any recent participation in WARFIGHTER command post exercises. These products provide great insight to potential training weaknesses. SOPâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s. Next, pull out a copy of the TOCSOP. Does it cover the duties and responsibilities of battle staff NCOs? Most TOCSOPs do a great job of describing duties of key officers, but don't go into enough detail listing the duties and responsibilities of the operations sergeant/sergeant major, assistant operations sergeants or shift NCOs, as well as radio operators. A newly-assigned battle staff NCO or radio operator should be able to pick up the TOCSOP, read it and understand what his or her responsibilities are within that TOC. This will help lessen the time required to train that person to perform assigned duties. Counsel your NCOs based off of the duties and responsibilities listed in the SOP. Assign roles and responsibilities to each person in the TOC. Effective command quickly erodes when the workers in the TOC, from battalion commander to RTO, do not know their jobs, do not execute their jobs, or poach on someone else's job. Highspeed TOCs make sure they do the following: Identify one person in charge to receive reports and direct the battalion. Units that violate unity of command discover that their soldiers take direction from a variety of sources including the battle captain, XO, SPO and battalion commander. As the OPS SGM make efficient use of all personnel, neither machines nor standing operating procedures can replace motivated soldiers. Dedicated and motivated soldiers find ways of making the most difficult machines and incomprehensible SOPs work. On the other hand, the best of machines and clearest SOPs will not produce if the soldiers do not care and the leaders cannot motivate them. Make sure the S2, S3, Chemical Officer/NCO and SPO talk to each other.

Staffs that do not share information either duplicate work or suffer vulnerabilities in their plan due to the missing information. Effective TOCs share information, especially the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and how it affects the base defense and CSS missions. The chemical officer or NCO must exchange information to conduct chemical IPB and add this data to the S3 base defense estimate. As the operations sergeant major you may want to think about validating and making changes if necessary before and during each CPX, FTX and any CTC rotations. Ensure you read and understand the TOCSOP/TACSOP. Ensure all soldiers read and understand each area of the SOP.

TOC FUNCTION / DUTY POSITION XO BATTLE CPT RECEIVE INFORMATION X X - Monitor situation - Receive messages/reports - Maintain journal X - Update/post unit locations - Update status boards/charts DISTRIBUTE INFORMATION - Submit reports - Publish orders X - Pass messages/reports within TOC ANALYZE INFORMATION X X - Review in/out going reports/orders X X - Conduct predictive analysis X X - Identify CCIR X X - Conduct TDMP - Serve as recorders - Develop terrain sketches - Prepare charts and overlays X X MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS TO CDR INTEGRATE/SYNCH RESOURCES X X Reference: CALL Newsletter 95-7, MAY 95, Tactical Operations Center

STAFF NCO

RTO/CLERK

X X X X X

X X X

X X X X X

X X X

Journals and Journal Files. One of the most useful ways of recording information into a useable format in a TOC is the DA Form 1594 Staff Journal. Unfortunately it is also one of the most poorly done tasks we find when we observe unit NCOs in the field. AR 220-15 provides you step-by-step instructions on filling out the DA 1594. AR 340-18-12 is also a reference for the DA 1594. The most common errors we find with staff journal maintenance are: Headings are not filled out correctly and properly. Be specific when filling out “Organization or Installation.” If more than one journal is being maintained in your TOC, note that yours is the S3 section, 123 Armor Brigade, not just the 123 Armor Brigade. When filling out the “Location” block, put where you are! If your home base is Camp Swampy, but you are not operating at Camp Swampy, don’t list your location as Camp Swampy, list where you are! “Period covered” is the area of the heading that is most often done incorrectly. The period should include the entire period of the journal, not just that particular page of the journal. For example, your journal runs from 0001 hours to 2400 hours on 4 DEC 95. The page you are working on only holds journal entries from 0001 hours to 1300 hours. The period covered still must show 0001 to 2400 on 4 DEC 95, as should every other page for that day.

Speaking of 0001 to 2400 hours, journals run for 24 hours on a calendar day basis. Journals don’t run for 12-hour shifts, or from 0700 hours on day to 0700 hours the next day. The ACTIONS TAKEN block is filled out incorrectly, “Logged” is not an action taken. Use that block to tell the reader what you did with the information that you just entered in the “Incidents, messages, orders, etc.” block. Did you post the information on the map? ...Inform the staff? ...Notify higher headquarters? If you did any or all of those things, say so. If you did nothing, write nothing in the “Actions Taken” block. Using a legend to record actions taken is very useful and time saving. Refer to the Extract from FM 101-5. Page B-3 in FM 101-5 provides an example of a journal page using symbols and a legend to record actions taken. Entries are not legible or don’t contain enough information to be of use to the reader. Be specific with information entries. The entry “Received FRAGO 5” doesn’t identify which headquarters issued the FRAGO, or what it was about. Don’t identify personnel by call signs; it may be hard to figure out whom you’re talking about if a SOI or CEOI is not handy, especially if we’re looking at your journal days, weeks or months later. Journals are more than a record of radio messages. Staff NCOs MUST be proactive in finding out, and recording all significant information that affects the unit. Journal files are not created, or are not maintained properly. A journal file is nothing more than all the hard copy documents that support journal entries. When your clerk takes a radio message on a form, he/she then logs the info in the journal. That form is a supporting document to the journal. Place the JOURNAL NUMBER on the message form in a standard location, top right for example. The journal should reflect the highlights; the

message form contains the details. If I want to see the details, I go to the journal, find the journal number, then find the message form with the same number! At the end of the day, all supporting documents to the journal are stacked (in numerical order) with the DA 1594 pages and filed. That becomes your journal file for that calendar day. •Remember, any hard copy information that supports journal entries must become part of the journal file. That includes faxes, orders, FRAGOs, overlays, as well as message forms. Graphics and Overlays. If officers within the TOC are posting and updating map boards, they will not have sufficient time to do their own job of integrating resources and synchronizing the fight. This can lead to tired and inefficient officers, resulting in an ineffective staff. Battle staff NCOs must be thoroughly knowledgeable on how to depict operational graphics and symbols in accordance with FM 101-5-1. Some frequently overlooked items include map overlays that do not have the proper classification clearly labeled on the top and bottom and no registration marks to aid in lining up the overlay to the map. Marginal information should also be included on the overlay. If your commander requires you to use colors and symbols that are not IAW FM 101-5-1, they must be explained in the overlay's legend. One of the most important TOC functions is the posting and updating of maps and overlays. TOC maps provide commanders and staffs the best possible snapshot of the battlefield. Listed below are some of the doctrinal guidance the Army provides us to accomplish this task below. FM 101-5-1 (page 8-7) states that, as a minimum, situation maps and overlays should show: • Symbols as required to portray the friendly and enemy situation. • Boundaries and front line trace applicable to the current operations. • Other control measures as applicable to the staff section (example: a logistic situation map should reflect main supply routes, ambulance exchange points, battalion/task force trains, battalion aid stations and traffic control points). • CPs of adjacent units and of the next higher and lower levels of command. • Locations of units and/or installations of significance to the staff section (example: a logistics situation map should reflect division and brigade support areas). • Civilian installations, airfields, and rail networks as appropriate. Additionally, FM 71-123 (page 1-44, 1-45) states: • Friendly and enemy units should be displayed on clear acetate placed on the operations overlay. Units normally keep track of subordinate units two levels down. • Posted friendly information should include all subordinate units, CPs, trains, higher headquarters CPs, and flank unit locations. • Enemy forces should be displayed in red. Include time, location, direction of movement and composition in red. • Unknown information on enemy unit symbols should be displayed as a question mark (?). There are several techniques used to mark unit locations. The most common is clear plastic paper or the blue, red and white “post it” tabs. These can be effective for tracking frequent

movement of units. Unit symbols and designation can be written on these tabs. I would avoid the stickpins, most stickpins are unreadable and can’t be identified from a distance. Graphic/Overlays Common Pit Falls (The “TOP TEN”) most common errors when working with maps, graphics and overlays are: 1. Operation graphics are not changed with the next mission. 2. All required overlays are not present. 3. Not enough map coverage to show the entire area of operation and the area of interest. 4. Marginal data on overlays not present or not complete (see FM 21-26). 5. Security classification not marked (all overlays, even unclassified one are marked with the appropriate security classification, centered on the top and bottom of the overlay). 6. Boundaries not marked or labeled. 7. Unit symbols not correctly depicted. Remember, if you pre-fabricate unit symbols you must leave room for all required information that goes on the symbol (see FM 101-51). 8. Friendly subordinate units not tracked two levels down. 9. Friendly flank units not tracked. 10. Enemy units not tracked. 11. Specialty units such as ground surveillance radar (GSR) and scouts not tracked.

EXAMPLE TOC BATTLE DRILL TITLE: UPDATE OVERLAY (FRIENDLY SITUATION) SECTION: OPERATIONS PURPOSE: RECEIVE SIGNIFICANT UNIT LOCATION CHANGE; TRACK UNITS ON OPERATION OVERLAY. ¾

SHIFT NCO RECEIVES BATTALION COMMANDER’S SITUATION REPORT OR SPOT REPORT FROM SUBORDINATE ELEMENT.

SHIFT NCO CONFIRMS LOCATION OF UNIT, ENSURES NEW GRID LOCATION IS NOT SENSELESS. CHECK EXECUTION CHECKLIST OF CURRENT OPERATION ORDER TO VERIFY LOCATION IS IAW THE EXECUTION CHECKLIST.

SHIFT NCO RECEIVES EVENT CODE WORDS FROM ANNEXs (REF: TAB ____), AND UPDATE UNIT LOCATION AS PER EVENT FROM ANNEX DD.

NOTIFIES BATTLE CAPTAIN OF UNIT’S NEW LOCATION.

SHIFT NCO POST NEW LOCATION ON OPERATION OVERLAY. (TAB ____)

BATTLE CAPTAIN CONDUCTS TOC BATTLE DRILL #___ (UPDATE BRIEF).

UPON CONCLUSION OF TOC BATTLE DRILL # __ (UPDATE BRIEF) THE SHIFT NCO COLLECTS SLICE ELEMENTS UNIT LOCATION CHANGES.

SHIFT NCO POST SLICE ELEMENTS NEW LOCATIONS. (REF: TAB ___)

Shift Change and Briefs. Does your TOCSOP cover the actions taken during a shift change? Are the battle staff NCOs involved in the shift change brief or is it exclusively the officers' domain? Whether there is involvement of battle staff NCOs at the shift change brief or not, there still must be one-on-one exchange between the battle staff NCOs going off shift and those coming on shift, to include the radio operators. A good technique is to prepare, on a pocketsize card, a generic shift change briefing format for all battle staff NCOs and radio operators to carry in their breast pocket. When it is time for a shift change they each pull out the card and go down the list and follow the format. This

EXAMPLE

TOC BATTLE DRILL # ___ TITLE: SHIFT CHANGE SECTION: OPERATIONS PURPOSE: RELIEF OUT GOING SHIFT OFFICER; BRIEF ON COMING SHIFT OFFICER AND ASSUME CONTROL OF CURRENT OPERATIONS. LINE

ACTION

1 OUT GOING SHIFT OFFICER ANNOUNCES TO TOC PERSONNEL OF UPCOMING SHIFT CHANGE. 2. OUT GOING SHIFT OFFICER UPDATES CURRENT OPERATION OVERLAY AND CHARTS. (TAB ____ , ____). 3. SHIFT OFFICER REVIEWS LOG AND DETERMINES LAST COMMUNICATION CHECK WITH SUBORDINATE UNITS AND HIGHER HQS. VERIFIES COMMUNICATIONS. 4. SHIFT NCO CHECKS TOC SECURITY, BATTERIES IN REMOTES, GENERATOR STATUS (TAB ____), TOC LIGHT DISCIPLINE AND VERIFY SLUGGER ON ALL RADIOS. 5. BRIEFS ON COMING SHIFT OFFICER. ANNOUNCES: ATTENTION IN THE TOC, CONDUCT BATTLE CAPTAIN SHIFT CHANGE, (TOC BATTLE DRILL #___). 6. OUT GOING SHIFT OFFICER CONDUCTS SHIFT CHANGE BRIEFING (TAB U). ON COMING SHIFT OFFICER ASSUMES CONTROL OF OPERATIONS. BRIEFS TOC PERSONNEL ON ANY PECULIARITY OF UP COMING MISSIONS. 7. ON COMING SHIFT OFFICER REVIEWS LOG 24 HOURS BACK. RECEIVES LOG FROM SHIFT NCO.

EXAMPLE SHIFT CHANGE FORMAT: a. Current Operations (1) Mission (Battle CPT) (2) Commander’s Intent (Battle CPT) (3) Brief Concept (Battle CPT) (4) Task Organization (Battle CPT) (5) Enemy Situation (S2 Rep) (6) Current Status (Battle CPT) a). Unit Locations and current actions (Map) b). Personnel (Status Board) c). Logistics (Status Board) d). Combat Power (Status Board) e). Weapons Systems (Status Board) f). MOPP Status (Status Board) g). ADA Status (Status Board) (7) Status of Fire Support (FSO) a). Current Fire Mission b). Current Attack Air Missions c). Battle Damage Assessment During Shift (8) Attachments Reports (BOS Reps) (9) Current Command Status (Battle CPT) a). Location of :___ b). Location of :___ c). Location of:___ b. Future Operations (Battle CPT) (1) Orders/Plans to be produced (2) Orders due to Higher (3) Contingency Missions c. Questions Period d. Shift Report (All Personnel Participate) a). Significant Events and Status (Logged/Disseminated) b). Reports Last Sent c). Actions required by next shift d). Reports due early next shift e). Review Staff Journal

Balance Shift Maintain a good balance with personnel. This should be the strong with the weak. Don’t put all your strong TOC personnel all on one shift.

Daily Briefings: Normally, Situation/Decision Briefings will be conducted each day IAW the table below: Each briefing is designed to accomplish two objectives: First, to provide the BDE CDR with pertinent information; second, to secure command guidance and/or decisions on projected BDE operations.

0600

BDE COMMANDERS UPDATE

0630 0730

BDE COMMANDERS CONFERENCE CALL

0900

SHIFT CHANGE BRIEF

1200

BDE TARGETING MEETING

1800

BDE COMMANDERS UPDATE

1830

BDE COMMANDERS CONFERENCE CALL

1900 2100

SHIFT CHANGE BRIEF

The CP is most vulnerable to a breakdown of information flow when there is a changeover of personnel. The outgoing shift must brief the incoming shift in detail to ensure that all critical information is passed. Ensures that a thorough briefing has taken place and the incoming personnel have a complete picture of what occurred during the last shift. Above is an example of the minimum standards to which each person should brief.

CONCEPT OF SUPPORT BRIEF EXAMPLE

INTRODUCTION TASK ORGANIZATION - USE SLIDE •

GO OVER FSB ORGANIC UNITS

•

ATTACHMENTS ⇒

1 MA TEAM - ESTAB MA COLLECTION POINT IN BSA

⇒

1 AEROMEDICAL EVAC FORWARD SUPT TEAM (3 UH-1Vs) FROM ____ MEDCO

⇒

1 GROUND AMB PLT (10 HMMWVs) FROM ____ MEDCO

* GO TO CSS OVERLAY I WILL FOCUS ON THE CSS LOCATIONS AND THE CONCEPT OF SUPPORT AS THE CONCEPT OF THE OPERATION HAS PREVIOUSLY BEEN BRIEFED. • •

•

THE 1 MSB IS LOCATED IN THE DSA THE ___ FSB PROVIDES DIRECT SUPPORT IN ZONE TO THE 1 BDE AND ESTABLISHES THE BSA IN AA SPAIN. THE FSB ESTABLISHES A FLE TO SUPPORT THE DEFENSE FROM ________. ON ORDER THE FLE WILL RETURN TO THE NEW BSA LOCATION AT _______ TO ASSIST IN SUPPORTING THE BRIGADE FOR THE DEFENSE AND FOLLOW ON MISSIONS. THE BDE WILL UTILIZE SUPPLY ROUTES SILVER (SOUTH) AND BLUE (NORTH). THE BDE WILL UTILIZE 3 AXPs (Point them out) DIVISION MEDIUM LIFT HELICOPTERS WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR CLASS V, BULK CLASS III AND BACKHAUL OF IMMEDIATE CARE PATIENTS. NOT HOST NATION SUPPORT AVAILABLE FORWARD OF BDE REAR BOUNDARY.

•

SHOW CSS MATRIX*

• • • •

BEFORE THE BEFORE PERIOD BEGINS WITH UNIT MOVEMENT TO AAS AND ENDS WITH THE 1 BDE CROSSING THE LD. PRIMARY LOGISTICS FOCUS IS IMPROVING UNIT COMBAT POWER. • • • • •

PRIORITY OF SUPPORT AND REPLACEMENTS IS TO TF ___, TF ___, AND TF ___. MA COLLECTION POINT ESTAB IN BSA AND COLLOCATES WITH THE ATP. UNITS WILL REPLENISH ABLs PRIOR TO DEPARTING AAs. CLASS IV/V FSPs HAVE BEEN DETERMINED FOR PREPARATION OF DEFENSE. UNIT REQUESTS FOR THIS MATERIAL MUST BE SUBMITTED TO FSB PRIOR TO DEPARTING Aas. FUEL .. ALL COMBAT VEHICLES WILL BE REFUELED AT THE CORPS ROM PRIOR TO MOVEMENT INTO THEIR AAs. REFUEL ALL OTHER VEHICLES AND REPLENISH UBLS BEFORE DEPARTURE FROM THE AA. DURING

PERIOD BEGINS WITH THE 1 BDE CROSSING THE LD AND ENDS WITH THE BRIGADE DEFENDING FROM PL OHIO TO PL TEXAS. PRIMARY LOGISTICS FOCUS IS SUPPORT OF UNITS IN COMBAT AND ECHELON OF CSS ASSETS FORWARD. • • • • • •

PRIORITY OF SUPPORT AND REPLACEMENTS REMAINS UNCHANGED. EVACUATE CASUALTIES TO BSA UNTIL AXPs ARE OPERATIONAL. AMMO RESUPPLY FROM COMBAT TRAINS AND FIELD TRAINS. ARTILLERY RESUPPLY FROM ATP. CLASS IV AND V THROUGHPUT TO FORWARD SUPPLY POINTS. FUEL RESUPPLY FROM COMBAT TRAINS. O/O LOGPACS FROM BSA. PRIORITIES FOR MAINT IS UNCHANGED. UMCPs ESTABLISHED O/O. PRIORITY FOR MOVEMENT FORWARD IS CLASS III, V AND IV BARRIER MATERIAL. PRIORITY OF MOVEMENT REARWARD IS MEDICAL THEN MAINTENANCE.

CONCEPT OF SUPPORT BRIEF CONT AFTER PERIOD BEGINS WITH BRIGADE DEFENDING FROM PL OHIO TO PL TEXAS. PRIMARY FOCUS OF LOGISTICS EFFORT IS RECONSTITUTION OF UNITS AND CONTINUED ECHELONMENT OF CSS ASSETS FORWARD. • • • • •

ON ORDER, PRIORITY TO REORGANIZE IS TF ___, TF ___, AND TF ___. MANEUVER UNITS WILL BE PREPARED TO REORGANIZE INTERNALLY AND RECEIVE CLASS VII ISSUES. RESUPPLY ACCOMPLISHED BY LOGPACS. EVAC MA TO BSA. UNITS EVAC EPWs TO BSA. MAINTENANCE AND EVACUATION PRIORITIES ARE HOWITZERS, M1, M113, AND FIST-VS. FSB WILL BE PREPARED TO DISPLACE FORWARD ON ORDER . CONCLUSION

♦

LOGSTAT DUE PRIOR TO LD AND CONCLUSION OF OPERATION.

♦

PERSTAT ARE DUE AS PER BDE SOP.

♦

COMBAT STRENGTH IS 100%

♦

ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS?

♦

I WILL BE FOLLOWED BY THE S3.

Information Management. As the operations sergeant major one of the biggest problems you will have in the TOC is maintaining good situational awareness, Its nice to hear that your unit can shoot, move and communicate. Any unit can say this, but the problem now is fratricide, It is not uncommon and I hate to say it this way but during most Warfighters to include other CTC rotations, units loose soldiers because the TOCs in some cases never posted the engineer mine field overlay, units loose contact of their subordinate unit locations (left/right units). NCOs have another area where battle staff NCOs have significant impact is information management and Battle Tracking, you as the operations sergeant major you must make the NCO accountable and the first line of receiving information, this doesn’t mean blame them for mistakes for missing controlled items. If you do not have an effective means for displaying information and distributing information, your TOC will likely become bogged down and cease to function effectively during fast-paced operations. Most TOCSOPs cover in detail the types of charts and status boards that will be displayed in the TOC according to your commander's preference. Where the shortcoming is observed is in the area of maintaining and updating the information, especially during fast-paced operations. Your TOCSOP should specify who is responsible for maintaining these charts and at what frequency they are to be updated. Additionally, these visual display techniques should each have a date-time group clearly posted, to ensure your commander gets the most current information available. It also allows you, the operations sergeant, to spotcheck to ensure everyone is doing a good job.

Example

Incoming Information

RTO Journal Clerk OPS NCO

NBC

BOS/Battle CPT

Journal File

Map NCO

Intel S-2

FSE

Information Management (Message Forms). Another area that is effective in the much larger TOCs (DMAIN/REARs) is the dissemination of message forms. If the unit has a section within the TOCSOP reference messages and the distribution system there shouldnâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t be a problem because the unit has a system emplaced. What we have seen in some cases is NCOs/officers disseminating information by message form and not receiving the message form back or the slice element not complying with the information or the message form is lost. A recommendation for good control is to have the BOS chief / NCO sign for the message form. This may be good depending on the level and urgency of the message and if the unit just has a problem replying back in a timely manner. A spreadsheet is a good system for NCOs to track all information coming and going out of their specific cell. This can also be completed on the DA Form 1594, or whichever system the units has emplaced. If you want to do this digitized and everyone is on the same-shared drive you can simply type out the message and have it hyperlinked into the spreadsheet (See spreadsheet below). Once the message is received the slice element receiving the message can open the hyperlink read and reply to the message. This message can then be completed on a standard message form and hyperlinked back to the RECIVED INFO block

MESSAGE/MATERIAL DISTRIBUTION LOG:

NO#

TYPE OF MESSAGE

DTG

UNIT/SEC SENT BY

MESSAGE SENT TO

RANK

INFORMATION RECEIVED NAME REMARKS/ REVIEVED INFO

Information Management ContBattle tracking can be described as collecting, processing and disseminating information, in all its various forms. More specifically, collecting from the many sources that provide information to the Rear CP/SPT BN TOC, processing it into a useable format for the commander and staff, and not only disseminating it, but also getting it to the right people at the right time. There are several different techniques to accomplish battle tracking in the Rear CP/SPT BN TOC. The technique you use may depend on the assets available in both the Support Battalion and the Brigade S1/S4 sections. When the Rear CP/SPT BN TOC is collocated and under the roof, unity of effort for functions that are normally performed in both areas are greatly enhanced. This also improves communication. Key Personnel and their responsibilities in battle tracking Battle Captain - The focal point of all critical information entering the TOC/CP and dissemination of the information once it has been analyzed. Determines what information goes to a specific section within the TOC/CP and what critical information must be passed to the Senior Officer on shift. Insures all map graphics are current. S2/3 - Conducts continuous IPB for the brigade rear area. Monitors and tracks the brigade tactical plan and the enemy situation. Coordinates the defense of the BSA. Develops and implements the rear area R&S plan. Plans and coordinates the movement of the BSA. Determines TOC shift schedules. Responsible for communications. Makes recommendations to the Commander. * May perform all duties specified under SPO/SOO. OPS NCO - Analyzes incoming messages and recommends distribution of the message to the battle captain. Directs Jr NCOs and soldiers on where to send information and how to maintain and post updates to the operations map.

SPO/SOO - Coordinates and provides technical supervision for the Support Battalionâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s CSS mission to include DS supply, DS maintenance, health service support, and coordination of transportation and field services. Plans and monitors support operations and makes necessary adjustments to ensure support requirements are met. Tracks available assets through the SB companies and the brigade S4 and other supported units. Keeps the DISCOM support operations branch abreast of the logistics and medical situation in the brigade area and request backup support when requirements exceed capabilities. BMMO - Advises the battalion commander and staff on management of supply and maintenance operations. Establishes coordination channels with the MMC of the next higher command for support, emergency requirements, and technical assistance. Maintains current status on all supply commodities and maintenance within the support battalion and tracks all resupply from higher echelon logistics organizations. SPT BN XO - Supervises the Support Battalion staff and coordinates assigned missions with subordinate unit commanders. Supervises Command Post operations. Understands both the support operations and the non-CSS functions of the battalion. BDE S4 - Operates the Brigade Rear CP. Coordinates with support battalion, Task Forces and attachments. Forecasts future CSS requirements. Coordinates maintenance, transportation, supplies, services and administrative moves. BDE S4 NCOIC - Analyzes incoming messages. Insures all information from subordinate units is complete and accurate and recommends distribution of the message to the battle captain or BDE S4. Directs Jr NCOs and soldiers on where to send information and how to maintain and post updates to the operations map. BDE S1 - Monitors unit strength and reports casualties. Determines replacement requirements. Coordinates HSS. Evaluates disposition of displaced civilians and EPWs. Assists in the operations of the Brigade Rear CP. BDE S1 NCOIC - Analyzes incoming messages. Insures all information from subordinate units is complete, accurate and logged in a journal. Directs Jr NCOs and soldiers on how to maintains updated personnel status charts for the brigade. RTOs - Monitors his/her designated radio net or telephone and records information on a standard message form. RTO passes a copy to the operations NCO and retains a copy for the journal file. RTO then enters information into the journal and places the standard message form in the journal file.

CTCP planning and coordinating checklist Task

POC

Current overlays posted - OPS, CSS, ENG, AC2 Current graphics passed to Support Platoon Leader Mission, intent, and TASKO reviewed / posted PIR and DST reviewed / posted MOPP posture reviewed / posted THREATCON and ADA status reviewed / posted CTCP sector sketches current / posted Commo status checked (FM, DNVT, MSRT, wire) Risk assessment reviewed / approved

Maintenance status posted Supply status posted Combat power / personnel current / posted Support link-ups complete (ambulances, AXP, MST) Significant events list reviewed / posted MASCAL / PDS assets assembled / inspected Enemy order of battle reviewed / posted Enemy COA reviewed Current weather & effects reviewed / posted

Status

As of time

Information Management (Liaison Officer/NCO) Liaison is the contact maintained among separate military organizations to insure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action. Liaison is maintained to ensure cooperation and understanding between commanders and staffs of headquarters or units working together and to ensure tactical unity and mutual support by adjacent units. Liaison can be achieved through personal contact between commanders and staffs, through the exchange of liaison personnel, through agreement on mutual support between adjacent units, or through a combination of these means. Units should ensure there is a location within the TOC for ALL liaisonâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s, in other words, keep them consolidated in one location, when information is needed your not looking through the TOC or through vehicles outside for the Liaison. The Liaison should be someone with experience not a brand new lieutenant that just completed OBC and hasnâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t been trained by his or her commander/platoon sergeant yet. Ensure the LNO has a Driver, vehicle, and proper radio communications and know how to read and use a map/GPS. Liaison should, when possible, be reciprocal between higher, lower, and adjacent units. Liaison must be reciprocal when US forces are operating with, or adjacent to, forces of different nationalities. When liaison is not reciprocal, it is established from left to right, lower to higher, and supporting to supported. Specifically designated liaison personnel are the official representatives of their commander. They normally carry out their responsibilities under the supervision of the brigade executive officer or his representative. The Liaison officer or NCO represents the commander at the headquarters of another unit for the purpose of effecting coordination and promoting cooperation between the two units. (1) Prior to departure the liaison officer will(a) Become familiar with the situation of his own unit and, to the extent possible, that of the unit which he is being sent. (b) Clearly understand his mission. (c) Ensure that arrangements for communication (signal and transportation) are adequate. (d) Obtain credentials in writing unless obviously unnecessary. (2) Upon arrival at headquarters to which sent, the liaison officer will: (a) Report promptly to the commander, stating his mission and exhibiting his directive or credentials, if in writing. (b) Offer his assistance to the commander, if appropriate. (c) Arrange for the transmission of messages he may be required to send. (d) Arrange to obtain information required by his mission.

(e) Become familiar with the situation of the unit to which he was sent. (3) During his liaison tour, the liaison officer will: (a) Further harmonious cooperation between his own headquarters and the one to which he is sent. (b) Accomplish his mission without interfering with the operations of the headquarters to which he is sent. (c) Keep informed of the situation of his own unit and makes that information available to the commander and staff of the unit to which he is sent. (Such action is of special importance to liaison officers of attached or supporting units). (d) Keep an appropriate record of his reports. (DA Form 1594). (e) Report on those matters within the scope of his mission. (f) Inform the visited unit commander of the content of reports dispatched to the liaison officer's headquarters. (g) Report promptly to his own headquarters if he is unable to accomplish the liaison mission. (h) Report his departure to the visited unit commander on the completion of his mission. (4) On return to his own headquarters the liaison officer will: (a) Report on his mission. (b) Transmit promptly any requests of the visited commander. 2. Specific LNO Guidelines: Being an LNO is a key essential mission. It is your responsibility to pass accurate information in a timely manner. You are the only critical link between higher or adjacent units with the 2d Brigade. You are the Brigade's image. Be professional and know your responsibilities. a. Working Relations: (1) You are the personal representative of the 3d Brigade Commander. You will normally work for the Brigade S3 and receive your missions and special instructions from him. (2) When sent to Liaison with a higher HQ, you will normally report to the Chief of Staff.

(a) He may give you special guidance and personal desires. (b) Seek out the G3 and introduce yourself. Ask to see his G3 plans officer and G3 operations officer. These two personnel run the future and current operations. (c) Visit each of the divisionâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s primary staff and let them know who you are. Deliver/Pick up any required information (i.e. INTSUM/OPSUM, FRAGOs, Messages, Commanders SITREPs, Overlays, etc). (3) When sent to Liaison with an adjacent unit you will normally report to that unit's commander. (a) He will give you special instructions and requirements he has for you. (b) Seek out the unit's S3 and CP operations officer. Offer your assistance. (4) Introduce yourself to other LNOs - share information when appropriate. b. Special Instructions: (1) Always visit the Chief of Staff or Commander and the operations/plans officer. Ask them what they desire. Be prompt, professional and knowledgeable. (2) Always know the mission, concept of operation and commanders intent of 3d Brigade and 40th ID. (3) The following is a list of information you should receive from the supported unit. (a) Know the situation in as much detail as possible; who, what, when, where, why, and how for current, and if possible, future operations. (b) Know the concept of your unit's and the supported unit's plans to include: 1 Who is the main effort; who is the supporting effort? 2 What is the "deep battle" plan (maneuver, fires, EW etc.)? 3 Who is the reserve and what is its mission? 4 What is the fire support plan (ground, air, naval)? 5 What are the left and right flank situations (at least from OPNS & INTEL

view)?

6 Know the critical intelligence requirements (EEI/PIR). (4) If 2d Brigade receives or provides forces you should know the following:

(a) Capabilities/Limitations/Current Strength status. (b) Name of the Commander. (c) What support packages (CSS) will come with, or will be needed by the unit. (d) What is the frequency/Call signs/ Challenge and Password of the unit. (e) What are the unit's current location and the desired location to meet for liaison? Execute a sleep plan. How many times have you seen the XO, S-3 and OPS SGM staying up an extended amount of hours and maybe getting only a couple hours of sleep in 2 days? This, in some cases is a mistake seen over and over. Sleep deprivation not only inhibits one's ability to perform, it also limits the ability to assess one's own performance. Sleep-deprives leaders work at a snail's pace although they perceive that they are performing fairly normally. Thinking functions degrade first. Yet it is the leaders, upon whom the battalion depends to make decisions that are the least likely to get adequate rest. To adequately perform their functions, leaders must enforce a plan to get sufficient rest, especially on themselves. Seniors must train and trust their subordinates to perform in their place.

2400 2300 2200 2100 2000 1900 1800 1700 1600 1500 1400 1300 1200 1100 1000 0900 0800 0700 0600 0500 0400 0300 0200 0100 2400

Overlapping Shift Change Seems difficult, but itâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s the best way to maintain good situational awareness and continuity.

RTO

BSNCO

XO/S-3

SGM OPS NCO

First Shift

Second shift

TOC Shift Wheel 0001 TOC NCOIC

Shift NCO #1

1800

0600

RTO #1 RTO #2

Shift NCO #2

1200

TOC OIC

NCOES/Battle Staff Course. As the OPS SGM one of your duties is educating your staff NCOs. One of the primary concerns we have is ensuring our soldiers get to the proper NCOES course. As an OPS SGM we must also ensure our MTOE positions are filled with the right MOS/grade and identifiers. The battle staff NCO is becoming bread that is non-existent. Each BCTP rotation we see less and less 2S battle staff NCOs in position. One of the primary problems is OPTEMPO and other school assignments. The Army is stretched pretty thin due to the problems throughout the world, but with the leadership at hand we do a very good job of maintaining. If you have a staff sergeant on your staff that is not battle staff qualified and you are missing 6 battle staff qualified NCOs, talk to your CSM and get the soldier to the course. If your not sure of the qualifications, talk to your schools NCO, he or she can get you in the right direction or call the BSNCOC for future information.

Phase I - Fort Bliss (All Students) Point Of Contact:

Phase 1 NCOIC

Mailing Address:

Email:

BSNCOC-PH1@bliss.army.mil

Commandant, USASMA

Commercial:

(915) 568-9211

ATTN: ATSS-BBB (Phase I)

DSN:

978-9211

Bldg 11291, Biggs Field

FAX:

8145

Fort Bliss, TX 79918-8002

Phase II - Fort Bliss Point Of Contact: BSNCOC Resident Sr. Instructor

Mailing Address:

Email:

BSNCOC-PH1@bliss.army.mil

Commandant, USASMA

Commercial:

(915) 568-9194

ATTN: ATSS-BBB

DSN:

978-9194

Bldg 11291, Biggs Field

FAX:

8145

Fort Bliss, TX 79918-8002

Phase II - Fort McCoy Point Of Contact:

Assistant Commandant

Mailing Address:

Email:

classcoord@emh2.mccoy.army.mil

USA NCO Academy

Commercial:

(800) 982-3585 Ext. 5486

1446 South 11th Avenue

DSN:

280-5486

Fort McCoy, WI 54656-5127

FAX:

(608) 388-5423

Web Site:

http://www.mccoy.army.mil/ncoa/

Phase II - VTT Locations Point Of Contact:

BSNCOC VTT Sr. Instructor

Mailing Address:

Email:

BSC-VTT@bliss.army.mil

Commandant, USASMA

Commercial:

(915) 568-8666

ATTN: ATSS-BBB (VTT)

DSN:

978-8666

Bldg 11291, Biggs Field

FAX (DSN):

979-6353

Fort Bliss, TX 79918-8002

FAX (Commercial):

(915) 569-6353

Information Management (Map Boards) During the last year I have observed over 20 different units from battalion level to Army level and what I see is less and less analog map boards, this is mainly because the Army is going digitized, I donâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t think I had to tell you that. One of the fallbacks I see is with units that are still analog and utilizing map boards is situational understanding. Some common problems we see is that not all map boards within the TOCs are standardized. In other words, map boards are not the same drop, not the map scales, are different sizes or to big for the TOC configuration, situational awareness and understanding is not the same throughout the TOC with other slice elements. Many times the unit/slice element has to many charts attached to the map board and it becomes difficult to see and manage your graphics. Listed below are some useful techniques in maintaining a map board. 65

¾ Save all incoming information to your hard drive then to a CD. ¾ Standardize all map boards, including slice elements. ¾ Standardize all charts, including slice elements. ¾ Although you may be digital, continue to update your map board unless the commander says NO! ¾ Use of your TOPO team. These highly trained soldiers can provide a Varity of different photo images. An excellent tool for river crossings. ¾ Calibrate your map boards if needed. In other words if your TOC has no situational understanding you may want to have an NCO do a map check every hour with each slice element ¾ If you’re a non-digital TOC don’t use one map within the battalion TOC. It’s impossible to see graphics and control measures. ¾ Let the battle captain and battle NCO do all the updating of charts and moving of icons. ¾ Develop map boards and charts so when the commander looks at this information he or she can basically get an update by visualization.

24” Mission

48”

24” Current

CCIR

30”

NFOR

ORD FRAGO

PL Z INC (LO A)

INTE RNAT IONAL BOUNDARY (IB ) PL Z INC (LOA)

PIR

PL T IN V OBJ KNUCKLE PL STEE L

IS AX

Intent

PL T IN

9AR

9IN

14 TF

15 TF

IS AX SFO R I st Coastal Provi sional IN(L )

FO RD

# 2

PL B RASS # 4

TAC

3/40(M) TAA

PL B RASS

V C-1-2

PL ALUMINUM

Actions/ Events

N 9I 15 R 9A 14

FFIR

Alpha 1

SA BE ED SE L R 3

N U TS A D

Cdr’s

V ED H OCR SW

PL BRO NZE FPOL LD/ LC

PERS Status

PL BRONZ E FPOL LD/L C

HE ARST

A X IS

PL GO LD

PL COPPER

SIG

2/40(M)

PL GO LD

OB J WOLF

PL SILVER

EEFI

Report Matrix

PL COPPER

OBJ EAGL E

3/40(M) SFO R 1s t Coastal Provi sional IN(L)

INSUM

PL SILVER

T AF SH

PL STEEL

Task Org

SOI Call Signs

TAA

LOG Status

Bravo Sens Items

TOC SNAP SHOT OF MAIN FRONT S3 OPNS

PHASE I TIME Enemy Action

NFOR NFOR

PL ZINC (LOA)

PL TIN V OBJ KNUCKLE

AX IS SH

PL ZINC (LOA)

PRIORITY- Mobility

NBC

MOPP 0

BRT Forward / Per ANNEX L

PL STEEL

PL SILVER

FWD CL IV (BSA-BP)

MCP co-locate near MCP/TF149

PL COPPER

TAC FWD socal for FPOL

2/40(M)

14 9A

HEARST

EDSE L 2

N 2

14 9A

SFOR Ist Coastal Provisional IN(L)

3/40(M)

U TS

TAC

9 IN

Y EV

9A R TAA

PL BRASS

1:50,000

V PL ALUMINUM

C-1-2

TAA

1:250,000

Map Board Accessories. Below are the accessories that need to be used with each map board.

NFOR

PL Z INC (LO A)

INTE RNAT IONAL BOUNDARY (IB ) PL Z INC (LOA)

FSCL

PL T IN V OB J KNUCKLE

PL T IN

PL STEE L

IS AX

PL SILVER

T AF SH

PL STEE L

PL COPPER 2/40(M) OB J EAGL E

3/40(M) SFO R 1s t Coastal Provi sional IN(L )

14 TF 9AR

IN 15 9 TF

PL SILVER

A X IS

IS AX

PL COPPER

# 4

# 2

# 3

TAC

R 9A 14

N 9I 15

SFO R I st Coastal Provi sional IN(L )

PL B RASS

N U TS A D

FO SA RD BE ED SE R L #

V D E H OCR SW

PL B RO NZ E FPOL L D/ LC

PL BRONZ E FPOL LD/L C

HE ARST

PL GO LD

WIND

PL GO LD

OB J WOL F

CFL As of Date

3/40(M) TAA

PL B RASS

V C-1-2

PL ALUMINUM

Legend

TAA

Appendix 3 (Operation Overlay) to Annex C Operations to 3/40(M) ORDER __________ Map Series: __________________________ DATED AS OF: ______________________ OPORD/FRAG/WARNO# IN EFFECT: DIV ORDER # _______________________ DIV FRAGO # _______________________ DIV WARNO # ______________________ BDE ORDER # ______________________ BDE FRAGO # ______________________ BDE WARNO # _____________________ PREPARED BY: _____________________

TAA

V PL ALUMINUM

SFOR Ist Coastal 3/40(M) Provisional IN(L)

1:50,000

TAC

PL BRASS

9 IN

PL BRASS #

C-1-2

D O R HE VY

U TS

BEFORD R

# 2

BEFORD R

E DS

PL BRASS

IS PL BRONZE FPOL LD/LC

SA # 4

AX #1

PL BRONZE FPOL LD/LC

PL COPPER

9 IN TAA

PL COPPER

PL BRONZE FPOL LD/LC

TAA

OBJ WOLF

PL SILVER

HEARST

V PL ALUMINUM

PL GOLD

N 15 9I

PL GOLD

2/40(M)

PL GOLD

TAA

PL BRONZE FPOL LD/LC

OBJ WOLF

PL SILVER

PL BRASS

3/40(M) SFOR 1st Coastal Provisional IN(L)

PL COPPER

OBJ EAGLE

3/40(M) SFOR 1st Coastal Provisional IN(L)

TAC

PL STEEL

RCP vic BSA FQ9660

5 9 IN TF 1 R 4 9A TF 1

D O R HEVY

U TS

PL SILVER

BEFORD R

PRIORITY -1-149, 1-159, 1-143, other FWD CL III, V

CL V cache in place ( FA subsiquent POS) PRIORITY -How Bat, Tank, BFVs, Trucks

EDSE L

PL BRASS

# 2

PL STEEL

PRIORITY -1-159, 1-143, 1-149, other

PL TIN V OBJ KNUCKLE

N 15 9I R 14 9A

PL TIN

PL BRONZE FPOL LD/LC

SFOR Ist Coastal 3/40(M) Provisional IN(L)

C-1-2

INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY (IB)

PRIORITY 1-149AR

PL STEEL

PL ZINC (LOA)

Yellow/Tight

IEW Engineer

C man arm S fix fuel S move sustain

AF #1

PL340 FSB TIN R&S plan - 3/40MP MSR

SURV- at BSA; General; Recon

HEARST

PL BRONZE FPOL LD/LC

NFOR

NONE

SEAD / Target OP's / Limited Use

2/40(M)

PL GOLD

Occupy ATK POS's

CFL - PL ZINC

PL COPPER

PL GOLD

OBJ WOLF

PL COPPER

BRT PL COPPER - PL TIN

Depends on SITREP

OBJ EAGLE

3/40(M)

Fire Support

OBJ KNUCKLE

PL TIN

PL SILVER

PL STEEL

PL SILVER

S-2

TF1-184 SEIZE OBJ KNUCKLE BDE Recon on selected NAIs (LOA PL STEEL)

PRIORITY- FA / C2 / BSA assets

V PL STEEL

AT ability/ Heavy FA

M Deep A N Security E U Close V E Reserve R Rear Air Defense

INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY (IB)

PL ZINC (LOA)

SFOR 1st Coastal Provisional IN(L)

MRB (-) defend, limited Recon/Obstacles to Front

Decision Points

PL ZINC (LOA)

INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY (IB)

PL TIN

DIV Recon in Zone

PL ZINC 2(LOA) MRCs forward, T72 Co(-) back

TAA

There is no single doctrinal source that covers in detail tactics, techniques and procedures for TOC operations, but the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) at Ft. Leavenworth, KS, has published an excellent newsletter titled Tactical Operations Center (TOC), Number 95-7, dated May 95. This particular issue covers many of the problems experienced by TOCs at the combined training centers (CTC). Some of the areas covered in the newsletter include TOC functions, duties and responsibilities of TOC personnel, TOC layout and information management. It also includes a simple generic, command post exercise (CPX) you can conduct in your unit and ideas on easy-to-implement home-station training for your TOC personnel. This particular issue should be on the mandatory reading list of all operations sergeants. It can be ordered from CALL Customer Service at Ft. Leavenworth by calling DSN 552-2255 or commercial (913) 684-2255. The E-mail address is call@ leav-emh.army.mil. If you enjoy "surfing the â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Net" you might want to browse the CALL homepage at http://call.army.mil/call.htm or browse their web page at http://call.army.mil/call/homepage/newsltrs/95-7/toctoc.html and read online the entire contents of Newsletter 95-7, Tactical Operations Center (TOC). One final point: The training tips discussed in this article apply equally whether you're in a combat, combat support or combat service support unit from battalion level all the way up to corps level, or a member of the fire support element, air defense section, or the engineer section within a larger unit's TOC. The important thing to remember is to train at every possible opportunity. The battle staff NCOs and soldiers within your section can contribute immensely to the success of your unit's mission, but you must train them so they can competently and confidently carry out their duties within the TOC.

CSM / SGM Combat Training Center Trends

The following trends are directed mainly at the squad and company level. For this issue, each of the Topics listed below are listed as CSM/SGM. As senior NCOs we are the competent and confident leaders, we must build cohesiveness within our organization, which leads to high morale, good discipline, and well-trained soldiers. We may not be able to fix everything or train every soldier to standard but what is more important is that we achieve and establish standards on a limited number of tasks during a training event and find time to retrain those tasks rather than attempt many tasks and fail to achieve the standards of all. Soldiers will remember the enforced standards when training is effective, organized and well thought out. Topic: Troop Leading and Discipline: LOGPAC Operations SOPs OBSERVATION (Mech): Unit SOPs on logistics package (LOGPAC) operations are seldom followed or enforced. Discussion: 1. LOGPAC turnaround times, as set by unit SOPs are rarely met. Most task forces (TFs) meet their turnaround standard 25% of the time. 2. The excessive time consumed on unit LOGPACs affects the entire TF logistical arena, including mission preparation, draw times from the forward support battalion (FSB), and preparation for the next scheduled LOGPAC. 3. The support platoon suffers in many areas, with the biggest area being its rest plan. 4. Mission essential tasks for the platoon, such as pre-combat checks/pre-combat inspections (PCCs/PCIs), inspection of vehicle load plans, equipment maintenance, personal maintenance, rehearsals, and the orders process at platoon level are inadequately conducted or not conducted at all. 5. The support platoon leader or HHC 1SG often closes the logistics release point (LRP) before all assets return. 6. Many drivers are not aware of the current mission when they depart the LRP and simply follow the truck in front of them. This is a cause of accidents. Recommendation: 1. Most TF and field train SOPs adequately cover all aspects of the LOGPAC, but the SOPs need to be followed by each element within the TF. 2. The TF chain of command, beginning with the TF XO and CSM, must adhere to, enforce, and be actively involved to ensure this important mission requirement is accomplished in a timely manner. 3. Company teams and specialty platoons/sections can aid in LOGPAC turnaround time by: a. Treating the event as a critical task in preparation for the upcoming mission. b. Conducting battle drill training and mission rehearsals when the LOGPAC is on site

Classes of Supply ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾

Class I... Subsistence Class II.... General Supplies, to include clothing, tentage, tools, and administrative supplies. Class III.... Petroleum, fuels, and lubricants. Class IV.... Construction and barrier materials. Class V.... Ammunition. Class VI.... Personal demand items. Class VII ... Major end items (vehicles, radars, etc.) Class VIII.... Medical material. Class IX.... Repair parts and components. Class X.... Non-military program material.

LOGPAC BRIEFING CHECKLIST 1. Situation ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ 2. 3.

Mission statement ("where" = convoy route) Execution ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾

Time line for LOGPAC Staging plan for vehicles (SP from field trains and return LRP site) Speed/distance between vehicles Battle drills (action on control, break in contact, air attack) Marking system for vehicles identification, day or night Actions/linkup at LRP site Contingency plan for return LOGPAC/no shows

Service Support ¾ ¾

Terrain conditions along route, hazardous areas Type, disposition, composition of enemy elements that may be encountered Location of known or suspected enemy mine fields/obstacles Locations of CO/TMs, TOC, combat trains, UMCP, attached units

Vehicle breakdown procedures Combat life savers located in LOGPAC

Command and Signal ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾

Communications plan for LOGPAC Key leaders' locations Uniform Risk assessment/reduction

Unit LRP

ocations

CCP/AXP Locations

LRP Times am

NCO

ENL

TAC CP TOC CTCP CBT Trains CO/TM CO/TM CO/TM CO/TM Slice Slice

Topic: (CSM/SGM trend) Engineer unit recording of minefields Issue: Minefield records, DA Form 1355, are incomplete and are not forwarded to higher headquarters as required or the unit receives the overlays and the unit fails to post and update commanders. Discussion: The result is increased risk of fratricide incidents. Also TOC sometimes fail to post new overlays. Recommendation: Increase use of DA Forms 1355 at Home Station training, to include NCOPD and OPD classes on contents, preparation and submittal requirements. Ensure units that update graphics and overlays within the TOCâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s. Implement a notification process of received information. A Phone call, a returned e-mail of notification, a call by FM.

Topic: (CSM trend) Reaction to indirect friendly fires Issue: Maneuver units seldom react appropriately to fire support rounds coming in. Discussion: Soldiers often stand and watch rounds coming in. They do not put masks on or take appropriate protective measures. The result is increased risk of fratricide. Recommendation: Units must develop SOP and train for reaction to incoming friendly fires on the battlefield.

Topic: (CSM/SGM trend) Use of M256 kits and M9 chemical paper Issue: Units do not use the M256 kit or M9 chemical paper correctly. Discussion: Failure to use all available detection techniques can cause false readings, unnecessary casualties and the spread of contamination. Recommendation: 1. M256 kits detect only vapor, M9 papers detect liquid contamination. 2. Routinely incorporate NBC training into every possible Home Station training event. 3. Proper wearing of gloves must be stressed. 4. "Green tape" cannot be a substitute for M9 chemical paper

Topic: (CSM trend) Preparation of vehicle and individual fighting positions Issue: Preparation of vehicle and individual fighting positions is substandard. Discussion: Maneuver unit leaders tend to place responsibility for proper preparation of their fighting positions on the engineers. Dismounts exhibit weakness in basic battlefield survivability/site preparation skills. Recommendation: 1. Leaders are responsible for proper preparation of vehicle and individual fighting positions, not the engineer units. 2. Units must be trained and proficient in site preparation and survivability skills. This should be done at Home Station.

Topic: (CSM/SGM trend) Use of M8A1 chemical alarms Issue: Too many units do not deploy their M8A1s IAW their tactical standard operating procedures (TACSOP) or FM 3-4. Discussion: Alarms are often placed inside the unit's perimeter and not IAW correct procedure. Units are afraid that the alarms may be damaged by vehicles running over them. Units are afraid someone might steal the alarm if placed outside the perimeter. The medical company, which has one of three authorized M8A1 alarms, often does not place the alarm IAW the latest down-wind message. When in place, - Power source is not hooked up - No wire is run to the alarm No warning of the presence of nerve agents or determination of the type agent that is present in the area. Recommendation: Refer to chapter 3 of FM 3-3. Train soldiers to properly employ the M8A1 IAW TM 3-6665-12-12. Develop standard operating procedures for marking M8A1s to prevent loss of an alarm.

Topic: (CSM/SGM trend) Collection points for NBC casualties Issue: Maneuver units consistently evacuate their contaminated killed in action (KIA) casualties to clean collection points. Discussion: instead of the designated collection point for contaminated casualties. The result of this is that the designated clean collection point becomes contaminated. Recommendation: Ensure unit leaders are briefed on the designated collection point for NBC casualties. This should be briefed at the CSS rehearsal.

Topic: (CSM/SGM trend incorporated) Maintenance procedures and reporting Issue: Generally, operator maintenance procedures are substandard. Discussion: Some of the common problems are: DA Forms 2404: - lack signatures - have incomplete administrative data - are often illegible - are not forwarded IAW standard procedure Identified faults have no recorded corrective action. Units do not use appropriate diagnostic procedures/equipment. Parts often not routed or delivered until end of campaign. Recommendation: Units should better train maintenance reporting procedures and operator/unit level troubleshooting procedures.

TASK: CONDUCT VEHICLE/EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE (71-6-1344.17-00KB) (DA PAM 738-750) CONDITION: HHC trains have deployed and are performing maintenance on organic, attached, and OPCON vehicles/equipment. Some iterations of this task should be performed in MOPP4. TASK STANDARD: Equipment operators perform operator level of maintenance in accordance with equipment technical manual (TM). Maintenance requirements and problems are identified using the appropriate vehicle TM. Maintenance forms are updated in accordance with the appropriate vehicle TM and DA Pam 738-750 (current maintenance update). Nonmission-capable vehicles/equipment are reported immediately.

TASK STEPS and PERFORMANCE MEASURES

* 1. HHC XO and immediate supervisors supervise the conduct of scheduled maintenance and? Supervise for correct checks and inspection of equipment. . Determine level of maintenance required. Ensure corrective actions are conducted as directed by the TM. . Ensure maintenance forms are completed in accordance with DA Pam 738-750. Report changes in material readiness status to maintenance personnel. 2. HHC XO coordinates maintenance support for? Attached/OPCON units to the brigade main CP, TAC CP, rear CP, remote sites. Special maintenance requirements (such as communications and computers). . 3. Maintenance personnel repair unit equipment. Inspect equipment. Determine level of maintenance required. Assign equipment to appropriate maintenance area. . Ensure tools, personnel, and repair parts are available. Perform corrective actions. Complete maintenance forms. . Report changes in material readiness status to the commander or designated representative (site O OIC). 4. HHC commander and staff check status of repair parts requests. Check status of repair parts on order. . Check status of unserviceable items turned in for repair or replacement. . 5. HHC maintenance teams turn in equipment for repair or replacement. Inspect equipment. . Correct all unit-level deficiencies. Prepare maintenance request form. . Prepare equipment for acceptance by support maintenance. 6. Staff section NCOIC manage unit maintenance. Monitor equipment status. . Monitor preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS). Monitor Army oil analysis program. . Monitor maintenance quality control program. Monitor safety program. No NOTE text provided.

NO GO

Topic: (CSM/SGM trend) Boresighting of weapon systems Issue: Maneuver units often fail to boresight their weapon systems before moving to a tactical position. Discussion: The result of this is firepower is worthless; entire company team destroyed by OPFOR in 11 minutes. Recommendation: Success against OPFOR depends on correct boresight. Confirm boresight daily.

Topic: (CSM/SGM trend) Range cards and sector sketches Issue: Too many units are not preparing weapon system range cards and sector sketches to standard, if at all. Discussion: The result of this is that units without range cards and sector sketches, the unit loses fire discipline, integration and effectiveness. Recommendation: Platoon and section sergeants must ensure range cards and sector sketches are completed to standard IAW the applicable FM for the weapon system.

Topic: (CSM trend) Call for fire Issue: Leaders often do not know how to call for fire. Discussion: They do not know who to call. They do not know what radio net or frequency to use. They do not know how to describe the target or its location. Recommendation: NCOs must be informed about how to call for fire. Develop SOP at Home Station and practice call for fire drills during Home Station training. Include leaders in the decision-making process to familiarize them with the fire support plan.

CALL-FOR-FIRE FORMAT The following is the format for a call for fire. a. Observer Identification. b. Warning Order. (1) Adjust fire. (2) Fire for effect. (3) Suppression. (4) Immediate suppression/smoke. c. Location of Target. (1) Grid coordinates--direction. (2) Shift from a known point--direction, lateral shift, range shift, vertical Shift. (3) Polar coordinates--direction, distance, vertical shift from the OP.

d. Description of Target.

e. Method of Engagement. (1) Type of adjustment--area, precision (registration, destruction), danger close. (2) Ammunition and fuse. (3) Distribution. Standard sheaf.

Parallel sheaf.

Open sheaf.

Traversing fire.

Special sheaf.

Converged sheaf.

e. Method of Engagement Cont- Range spread, lateral spread, or range lateral spread (illumination only).

f. Method of Fire and Control. (1) Method of fire. (2) Method of control. At my command. Time on target. Continuous illumination. Coordinated illumination. When ready.

Topic: (Brigade CSM trend) Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC) Issue: Typical TF died of wounds (DOW) rate is seldom below 50%. By the end of a typical 14day rotation, a TF kills itself off through improper CASEVAC three to four times. Discussion: In some cases wounded soldiers are not seen by Bn/TF medical assets in a timely manner. Tfs typically do not fix responsibility on one individual in the staff to effectively plan for CASEVAC. At times the S4 and CSM try to fix broken CASEVAC systems to no avail. The responsibility lies with the S1 and operations officer for planning, and unit 1SGs and the medical platoon for execution. The S1 must do a casualty estimate, including where the casualties will occur and in what numbers. The medical officer should then link medical assets available with the units projected to suffer casualties. Usually, the medical assets available fall short of the requirements to adequately treat projected casualties. Two aid stations in a Bn/TF are almost always inadequate to support a TF's combat missions. Experience shows that 15 to 20 casualties in one hour overwhelms the treatment capabilities of an aid station, which doctrinally constitutes a MASCAL situation. Recommendation: CASEVAC planning is primarily a brigade issue, because that is where the assets exist to adequately treat the casualties a TF is likely to sustain. The Bn/TF staff must, through the estimate process, articulate the necessity to push brigade medical assets forward.

CO/TM 1SG reports casualty over A/L to BAS coords MEDEVAC; collects DA 1155/1156.

1SG submits RED 1 and RED 2 to BN S1 IAW TACSOP.

DA 1380 accompanies casualty.

CTCP

KIA/DOW

BAS BN S1 transmits RED 1/2/3 to BDE S1 IAW TACSOP; submits hard-copy of 1156/1155 and 1380 to BDE.

AXP KIA/DOW Casualty tracked to C/Med.

BDE S1 forwards 1 cy of DA 1155/56; submits Red Reports IAW TACSOP; requisitions replacement as required.

KIA/DOW C

340 FSB Casualty DFRâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;d upon evac to CSH/ MASH

X X

CSH/MASH

PSC 296

BDE Mortuary Affairs

SPO

340 SPO transmits 340 FSB patient SITREP to include KIA/ DOW from mortuary affairs.

Mortuary Affairs NCOIC fwds 1380/1156/1155 to 340 SPO for reporting casualty status to BDE S1

Topic: Planning Logistical Release Points (LRPs) Discussion: This situation: A battalion task force S4 was conducting course-of-action development for the logistical support of a defense in sector. He was analyzing the terrain behind the planned battle positions along the main supply routes to identify locations for LRPs. He knew that the supplies would be moved during periods of limited visibility, on large wheeled vehicles, most likely during inclement weather, and by operators entering the fifth consecutive day of the battle. Problem: The S4 was a young captain and newly assigned. He did not have much experience planning LRPs or in moving the quantities of supplies needed to sustain a heavy task force conducting defensive operations. Identify the Hazard: The S4 was considering the enemy situation when searching for the LRP locations. He was looking for covered and concealed locations close enough to the battle positions to ensure resupply, but not be interfered with by hostile fires and without causing unreasonable burdens on the supported elements. The battalion CSM was circulating among the members of the battle staff as it was working separately to develop COAs. He paused at the S4's workstation and discussed the proposed LRP locations with him. The CSM studied the graphics on the S4's map and asked him to examine the contour intervals around the proposed LRPs. He also asked the S4 to consider the following while he looked at the proposed positions: - How steep was the terrain? Very steep. - What was the condition of the unimproved roads in the area of operations? Heavily rutted and slick from the inclement weather. - When would the LRPs be in use? At night and based on the weather forecasts, visibility would be further limited by fog and rain. - What was the current condition of the drivers? Newly assigned drivers to the battalion who had been moving supplies almost continuously for five days. - What type of vehicle would be used to move the supplies? Five-ton cargos and HETs that were heavily loaded. Identify Control Options and Make Decisions: The S4 concluded that the hazards associated with his proposed LRPs created unacceptable risk. The environment, combined with the inexperience of the drivers, increased the possibility of accidents during resupply operations. The S4 then determined that by substituting different LRPs for his initial proposals and implementing some additional controls, he could control the hazards without jeopardizing the mission. Since the battle staff was still developing COAs, he could implement the controls by embedding them in each proposed COA. He selected proposed LRPs on relatively level ground with a good road network or sufficient turnaround space for large vehicles. The drivers would be rotated through an enforced sleep plan. Vehicle commanders would be thoroughly briefed on the nature of the identified hazards and the need for reduced speed, gradual turns, and ground guides to the front and rear whenever vehicles were being positioned. Implement Control Options: Each logistical COA addressed the identified hazards and integrated the control measures. The commander's selection of a COA did not create any additional risk for logistical support. The properly positioned LRPs were posted to the logistical support graphics and instructions for safe movement in and around the LRPs were included in the logistics annex.

Supervise: Discipline and enforcement of the instructions contained in the OPORD were provided by the entire chain of command. The key was disseminating the controls to the lowest levels of the task force. Adherence to the plan ensured safe operation of the LRPs. Recommendation: Implementation of the risk management process during the tactical decision making process takes little time, saves losses of time and materiel, and ensures that manpower is available so that combat power can be concentrated at the proper place on the battlefield. Many hazard controls are SOP items. But the chain of command must enforce these items, and soldiers must have the self-discipline to adhere to them when not being supervised.

TTP: LRP MEETING ATTENDEES An example role call would involve the following key CSS leadership ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾

TF XO CSM S4 (OIC) 1SGs UMCP REP MORTARS REP MEDICAL PLT REP SCOUT PLT REP ADA REP TOC REP Unit Ministry REP REP from all ATTACHMENTS TTP: AGENDA LRP meetings must have an agenda. The key is that the

Agenda must meet the desired End state. ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾

Accountability of all unit representatives (roll call). Update of the current situation by the S-4 representative. Update of friendly. Locations of C2 nodes. Locations of companies. Timeline. MSRs/LRPs. Enemy. Obstacles. Rear area threat. Air threat. CASEVAC

TTP: AGENDA Cont¾ Collection of Logistic/Maintenance data. ¾ Hard copy of supply request forms. ¾ 5988Es. ¾ Discussion of unit issues. ¾ Special unit requirements. ¾ Previously unfilled request. ¾ Task Organizations. ¾ Changes/Time effective. ¾ Detachments. ¾ Verification of incoming convoy line-up. ¾ If necessary/time permitting, a CSS Rehearsal for Future operations.

Planning Map for LOGPAC Brief

SHORAD 1SG MEETS LOGPAC AT LRP

SENSOR SENSOR TEAM CHIEF SHORAD CBT TEAM

COORDINATES W/SHORAD WPN PLT LDR PLT LDRSHORAD PLT LDR MEETS LOGPAC AT LRP

FSB

TEAM

LRP

TF FLD TRAINS

SENSOR

M SR

FLD TRAINS

UMCP

SHORADPSGs MEETS LOGPAC AT LRP

TF FLD TRAINS SENSOR TEAM CHIEF COORDINATES W/ SHORAD WPN PSG

Terrain board

Conops Resource Library Holdings As of 1 August 2002

DoD Publications: Battle Command Training Program. Simulations Smart Book. Fort Leavenworth, 2001. Department of the Army. Field Manual 3-0, Operations. Washington, 2001. Department of the Army. Field Manual 3-90, Tactics. Washington, 2001. Department of the Army. Field Manual 5-0 (DRAFT), Army Planning and Orders Production. (Initial Draft, August 2001). Department of the Army. Field Manual 6-0 (DRAFT), Command and Control. (Developmental Draft, March 2001). Department of the Army. Field Manual 7-0 (DRAFT), Training. (Pre-decisional Draft, n.d.). Department of the Army. Field Manual 25-100, Training the Force. Washington, 2001. Department of the Army. Field Manual 25-101, Battle Focused Training. Washington, 2001. Department of the Army. Field Manual 1-112, Attack Helicopter Operations. Washington, 1997. Department of the Army. Field Manual 100-10-2, Contracting Support on the Battlefield. Washington, 1999. Department of the Army. Field Manual 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations. Washington, 1997. Department of the Army. Pamphlet 715-16, Contractor Deployment Guide. Washington, 1998. Department of the Army. â&#x20AC;&#x153;United States Army White Paper:

Concepts for the Objective Force.” Washington, n.d. Futures Development & Integration Center (FDIC). Battle Command for Army Forces in 2010 and Beyond: Operational and Organizational Concept (DRAFT). Fort Leavenworth: Combined Arms Center, 2002. Hajjar, Sami G. “U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects.” Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, March 2002. Joint Forces Staff College. JFCS Pub 1, The Joint Staff Officer’s Guide. Norfolk, 2001. Lynch, Rick. Commanding a Digital Brigade Combat Team. CALL Newsletter, Special Edition no. 01-21 (December 2001). TRADOC Regulation 350-50-3. “Battle Command Training Program.”

Other Publications: Biddle, Stephen. “Technology in Modern Warfare: An Empirical Test.” Presented at the 2001 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, CA. Findlay, Michael. “SOCFJCOM: Integrating SOF into Joint Task Forces.” Fort Leavenworth: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2001. “Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949” (Geneva Convention III). Grau, Lester W., and Hernan Maria Vazquez. “Ground Combat in the Clouds: Mountain Warfare at Fighter-Bomber Altitude.” An unpublished manuscript. Foreign Military Studies Office, Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS. House of Commons Library. “11 September 2001: the response.” Research Paper 01/72. London: International Affairs & Defence Section, House of Commons Library, 3 October 2001. Khalizad, Zalmay and Ian O. Lesser. Sources of Conflict in the 21st Century: Regional Futures and U.S. Strategy. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1998. McCarthy, Kevin F. World Population Shifts: Boom or Doom? .

McClanahan, Ted, et al. Human and Organizational Behavior Modeling (HOBM) Technology Assessment. Alexandria, VA: Modeling and Simulation Information Analysis Center, 2001. Murawiec, Laurent, and David Adamson, eds. Demography and Security, RAND Conference Proceedings. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000. Starr, S. Frederick. “Altitude Sickness.” The National Interest, no. 65 (November 2001). [Socio-Military aspects of conflict in mountainous regions. Focus includes Central Asia. Applicability to northern Iraq.] United States Department of State. Foreign Entry Requirements, 2000. Washington: Department of State, 2001. Wass de Czege, Huba. “Conceptual Foundations of a Transformed U.S. Army.” Unpublished manuscript, 2002.

URBAN OPERATIONS Avidor, Gideon. “The Battle of Jenin: April 2002.” Urban Operations Journal (May 2002). Department of the Army. Field Manual 3-06 (DRAG), Urban Operations. Washington, 2002. Department of the Army. Field Manual 3-06.1, Aviation Urban Operations. Washington, 2001. Department of the Army. Field Manual 3-06.11, Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain. Washington, 2002. Department of the Army. Field Manual 3-07 (DRAG), Stability and Support Operations. Washington, 2002. Glenn, Russell W. Marching Under Darkening Skies: The American Military and the Impending Urban Operations Threat. Santa Monica: RAND, 1998. _______. The City’s Many Faces: Proceedings of the ArroyoMCWL-J8 UWG Urban Operations Conference. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000. Grau, Lester W., and Jacob W. Kipp. “Urban Combat: Confronting the Specter.” Military Review (July-August 1999), 9-17.

Hahn, Rober F. II, and Bonnie Jezior. “Urban Warfare and the Urban Warfighter of 2025.” Parameters (Summer 1999), 74-86. McDermott, Patricia L., et al. Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT): Decision Making in Action. Fairborn, OH: Klein Associates for U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 2001. Peters, Ralph. “Our Soldiers, Their Cities.” Parameters (Spring 1996), 43-50. _______. “The Human Terrain of Urban Operations.” Parameters (Spring 2000), 4-12. Schwartz, Norton A., and Robert B. Stephan. “Don’t’ Go Downtown without Us: The Role of Aerospace Power in Joint Urban Operations.” Aerospace Power Journal (Spring 2000), 3-11. Thomas, Timothy L. “The Battle of Grozny: Deadly Classroom for Urban Combat.” Parameters (Summer 1999), 87-102. Urban Operations Journal. “Urban Lessons Learned: Operation Peace for Galilee.” Urban Operations Journal, n.d.

TERRORISM Alexander, Yonah. Middle East Terrorism: Selected Group Profiles. Washington: The Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, 1994. Aras, Djanguir. Militant—2000: World Handbook on Non government Militarized Structures. Baku, Azerbaijan: Center for Low-Intensity Conflict Studies, 2000. [Impressively detailed accounting of terrorist and other extremist groups worldwide]. Arquilla, John, and David Ronfeldt. Networks and Netwars. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001. Bergan, Peter L. Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden. New York: Free Press, 2001. (long-term loan) Byman, Daniel L., and Jerrold D. Green. Political Violence and Stability in the States of the Northern Persian Gulf. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999.

Byman, Daniel L., et.al. Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001. Elliott, Michael. “Al-Qaida Now.” Time (June 3, 2002). Hirschkorn, Phil, et.al. “Blowback.” Jane’s Intelligence Review, Special Report (August 1, 2001). Jenkins, Brian Michael. “Terrorism: Current and Long Term Threats,” Statement Before the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, November 15, 2001. Juergensmeyer, Mark. Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001. Mattox, Keith E. “Strategic Asymmetry: Can America Win the War on Terrorism?” Unpublished USAWC Research Paper. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2002. O’Neill, Bard E. Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare. Herndon, VA: Brassey’s, 1990. (longterm loan) Perl, Raphael F. “Terrorism, the Future, and U.S. Foreign Policy.” CRS Issue Brief for Congress. Washington: The Library of Congress Congressional Research Service, November 2, 2001. al Qaeda. Terrorist Handbook. Entered as evidence in trial of Africa embassy bombings. Government Exhibit 1677-T, Southern District Court, New York City Attorney General’s Office, nd. Reeder, William S., Jr., comp. The Terrorist Threat. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Battle Command Training Program, 2002. Sprinzak, Ehud. “Rational Fanatics,” Foreign Policy (September/October 2000), 66-73. United States Department of State. Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000. Washington: Office of the Secretary of State, April 2001. Wright, Robin. Sacred Rage: The Wrath of Militant Islam. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001. (long-term loan)

COUNTERING TERRORISM Fighting Terrorism, Military Review 82, no. 1 (January-February 2001). Contains a series of articles on countering terrorism. Hoffman, Bruce. “Rethinking Terrorism in Light of a War on Terrorism,” Statement Before the Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Securty, House Permanent Select Committee on Intellitgence, U.S. House of Representatives, September 26, 2001. Lesser, Ian O., et.al. Countering the New Terrorism. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1999. Martin, John R. Defeating Terrorism: Strategic Issue Analyses. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2002. Peters, Ralph. “Strategies for Victory Against Terrorists.” Interview by Fast Company in e-mail, 8 February 2002. Rosenau, William. Special Operations Forces and Elusive Enemy Ground Targets: Lessons from Vietnam and the Persian Gulf War. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001. Szayna, Thomas S., ed. Identifying Potential Ethnic Conflict. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000. Thomson, James A., et.al. “Full Alert: An Arsenal of Ideas for the War Against Terrorism.” RAND Review (Fall 2001).

ISLAM Ahmed, Akbar S., and David M. Hart. Islam in Tribal Societies: From the Atlas to the Indus. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984. Glass, Charles W. “The Historical Origins of the Sunni and Shi’a Sects in Islam and the Impact of the Shi’a Separation on the Politics of the Upper Gulf.” M.A. thesis, University of Kansas, 1980. Kelsay, John. Islam and War: A Study in Comparative Ethics. Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1993.

Williams, Robert Jeffrey. “A Socio-Historical Analysis of Warfare (Jihad and Qital) in Primitive Islam.” Ph.D. diss. Florida State University, 1994.

AFRICA Finley, Hugh, et al. Lonely Planet Guidebook, Africa (Africa on a Shoestring). Ninth Edition. Melbourne: Lonely Planet, 2001.

Algeria: Hunter, Clarence T., Jr. “The Islamic Fundamentalist Movement in Algeria. Executive Research Project A20. Washington: The Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1993.

Libya: Somalia: Menkhaus, Ken. “Somalia: Next Up in the War on Terrorism?” CSIS Africa Notes, no. 6 (January 2002). Norwegian Refugee Council. Profile of Internal Displacement: Somalia. Geneva, Switzerland: Global IDP Project, 2001. “Somalia.” In Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, North Africa. Couldson, Surry [UK]: Jane’s Information Group, 2001. Somalia Country Handbook (FOUO). Quantico: Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, 2001.

CENTRAL AND SOUTH ASIA Baran, Zeyno. “The Caucasus: Ten Years After Independence.” The Washington Quarterly 25, no. 1 (Winter 2002), 221-234. Edwards, Mike. “Central Asia Unveiled,” National Geographic 201, no.2 (February 2002), 108-125. Fairbanks, Charles, et al. Strategic Assessment of Central Eurasia. Washington: The Atlantic Council of the United States/Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, 91

2001. Grau, Lester W. “The Cossack Brotherhood Reborn: A Political/Military Force in a Realm of Chaos.” Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement 2, no. 3 (Winter 1993). Howard, Shawn. “The Afghan Connection: Islamic Extremism in Central Asia,” National Security Studies Quarterly 6, issue 3 (Summer 2000), 25-54. Mayhew, Bradley, Richard Plunkett, and Simon Richmond. Lonely Planet Guidebook, Central Asia. Second Edition. Melbourne: Lonely Planet, 2000.

Afghanistan: Army Quarterly [UK]. Various articles concerning early British operations in the region. Azoy, G. Whitney. Buzkashi: Game of Power in Afghanistan. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982. Biddle, Stephen. “Why Did the Taliban Collapse? Implications for Army and Defense Policy.” Paper copies of a U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute briefing presented on June 6, 2002. Davis, Jimmie. “How the Afghan Militia Fights.” Unpublished BCTP paper (November 2001). Girardet, Edward. “Eyewitness Afghanistan,” National Geographic 200, no. 6 (December 2001), 130-137. (long-term loan) Grau, Lester W., trans. & ed. The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan. Washington: National Defense University Press, 1996. Hopkirk, Peter. The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia. New York: Kodansha International, 1992. Huang, Reyko. “Peacekeeping in Afghanistan: Local Requests vs. International Response.” CDI Terrorism Project. Washington: Center for Defense Information, February 28, 2002. Jalali, Ali Ahmad and Lester W. Grau. The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War.

Quantico, VA: U.S. Marine Corps Studies and Analysis Division, Combat Development Command, n.d. Jawad, Nassim. Afghanistan: A Nation of Minorities. London: Minority Rights Group International, 1992. Lonely Planet. Destination Afghanistan (Worldguide Series). Melbourne: Lonely Planet, 2002. Molesworth, G.N. Afghanistan 1919: An Account of Operations in the Third Afghan War. New York: Asia Publishing House, 1962. Pike, John, comp. “Afghanistan Military Guide.” GlobalSecurity.org, June 13, 2002 (http://globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan/). Poladi, Hassan. The Hazaras. Stockton, CA: Mughal Publishing, 1989. Rashid, Ahmed. Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil & Fundamentalism in Central Asia. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000. Reeder, William S., Jr. AFGHANISTAN: An Abbreviated Country Study. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Battle Command Training Program, 2002. Roy, Oliver. Afghanistan: From Holy War to Civil War. Princeton, NJ: Darwin Press, 1995. _______. The Lessons of the Soviet/Afghan War. Adelphi Papers 259. London: Brassey’s, 1991. Shah, Sirdar Ikbal Ali. Afghanistan of the Afghans. London: Octagon Press, 1982. Shahrani, M. Nazif Mohib. The Kirghiz and Wakhi of Afghanistan. Seattle: University of Washington, 1979. Maps. -

“Afghanistan and Pakistan.” National Geographic, 2001. (long-term loan)

Georgia: Georgia Country Handbook (FOUO). Quantico: Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, 2000. Norwegian Refugee Council. Profile of Internal Displacement: 93

Georgia. Geneva, Switzerland: Global IDP Project, 2001. “Pankisi Crisis.” Civil Georgia Online Magazine at http://www.civil.ge/pankisi.shtml. Copied 28 February 2002. Robertson, Lawrence, et al. Georgia Conflict Assessment. Washington: U.S. Agency for International Development, 2002.

Kashmir: Chalk, Peter. “Pakistan’s Role in the Kashmir Insurgency.” Jane’s Intelligence Review, September 1, 2001.

MIDDLE EAST Humphreys, Andrew, et al. Lonely Planet Guidebook, Middle East. Third Edition. Melbourne: Lonely Planet, 2000. “Knowledge of Arab Customs.” U.S. Central Command, n.d. Rubin, Barry and Thomas A. Keaney, eds. Armed Forces in the Middle East: Politics and Strategy. London: Frank Cass, 2002.

Iran: Byman, Daniel L., et al. Iran’s Security Policy in the PostRevolutionary Era. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001.

Iraq: Clawson, Patrick. “Why Saddam Hussein is Ripe for a Fall,” Washington Post (January 1, 2002). Cordesman, Anthony H. “If We Fight Iraq: Iraq and The Conventional Military Balance in the Gulf.” Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 28, 2001. _______. “If We Fight Iraq: The Lessons of the Fighting in Afghanistan.” Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 7, 2001. _______. “Iraq’s Military Capabilities: Fighting A Wounded, 94

But Dangerous, Poisonous Snake.” Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 3, 2001. Department of State. “Iraq,” Country Background Notes. Washington: U.S. State Department, 2001. _______. “Iraq,” Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. Washington, 2000. _______. “Iraq,” International Religious Freedom Report. Washington, 2001. Ferna, Robert A. Shaykh and Effendi: Changing Patterns of Authority Among the El Shabana of Southern Iraq. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970. Eisler, Peter. “U.S. Officials Question Link Between 9/11 and Iraq,” USA Today (January 3, 2002). “Iraq,” CIA World Factbook. Washington: Central Intelligence Agency, 2001. “Iraq.” In Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, The Gulf States. Couldson, Surry [UK]: Jane’s Information Group, 2001. Iraq Country Handbook (FOUO). Quantico: Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, 1998. Norwegian Refugee Council. Profile of Internal Displacement: Iraq. Geneva, Switzerland: Global IDP Project, 2001. Reeder, William S., Jr. “Iraq: An Abbreviated Country Study.” An unpublished monograph. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Battle Command Training Program, 2002. Robson, Barbara. Iraqi Kurds, Their History and Culture. Washington: Center for Applied Linguistics, 1996. _______. The Iraqis, Their History and Culture. Washington: Center for Applied Linguistics, 1995. Tripp, Charles. A History of Iraq. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000. (long-term loan) U.S. Committee for Refugees. “Country Report: Iraq.” Washington: U.S. Committee for Refugees, 2002.

Lebanon: Jaber, Hala. Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance. New York: Columbia University Press, 1997. Jenkins, Siona and Ann Jousiffe. Lonely Planet Guidebook, Lebanon. Melbourne: Lonely Planet, 2001. Norwegian Refugee Council. Profile of Internal Displacement: Lebanon. Geneva, Switzerland: Global IDP Project, 2001

Syria: Yemen: Hämäläinen, Pertti, Lonely Planet Guidebook, Yemen. Fourth Edition. Melbourne: Lonely Planet, 1999. Schneider, Howard. “For Yemen, A Risk and an Opportunity,” Washington Post (January 2, 2002). “Yemen.” In Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, The Gulf States. Couldson, Surry [UK]: Jane’s Information Group, 2001.

EAST ASIA North Korea: SOUTHEAST ASIA Burma: Cambodia: Indonesia: Malaysia: Philippines: 96

LATIN AMERICA Colombia: “Drugs and Insurgents in Colombia.” Rand Research Brief. Santa Monica: RAND, 2001. Rabasa, Angel and Peter Chalk. Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and Its Implications for Regional Stability. Santa Monica: RAND, 2001.

Paraguay: United Nations Security Council, Republic of Paraguay CounterTerrorism Report, S/2001/1293. New York: United Nations, 2001.

AFTER ACTION REPORTS/LESSONS LEARNED Abbot, Chris. “Brigade Perceptions: BCTP Warfighters (WFX) and Seminars.” BCTP, 1995. Center for Army Lessons Learned. Operation Enduring Freedom: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. CALL Handbook No. 02-8, 2002. Cobb, Jeff, and Bob Fielding. BCTP Initial Observation Report, Task Force Hawk. Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Battle Command Training Program, n.d. CTP and Army Simulations in Support to TASK FORCE HAWK. C.A.L.L., 2001. COALITION TASK FORCE KUWAIT: EXERCISE DESERT THUNDER. LOGICON REPORT. DRAFT PLAN KUWAIT, O5/06/98 Eckert, Greg, Joe Green, and Gary Patterson. “Lessons Learned, 49th Armored Division Stabilization Force 7 Training.” III Corps. IA DRANG Valley Operation, 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, 14-16 November 1965 (Copy of the original report). Third U.S. Army. “Setting the Stage: Operation DESERT THUNDER.” C.A.L.L., 2000. TTP FROM TF HAWK, Operation ALLIED FORCE. C.A.L.L., 2001. 97

UNIT WARGAMING EXERCISE 91-17: BCTP SUPPORT TO DESERT SHIELD.

MAPS: Afghanistan: Land in Crisis. National Geographic, 2001. (long-term loan) National Geographic. Atlas of the World. Seventh Edition. Washington: National Geographic Society, 1999. City Maps -

Central Baghdad (UT map) Baghdad and Vicinity (CIA map)

Thematic Maps -

Distribution of Religious Groups in Lebanon Ethnolinguistic Groups in Afghanistan Ethnolinguistic Groups in the Caucasus Region Ethnolinguistic Groups of Iran Kurdish Inhabited Areas Political Map of Africa Somali Ethnic Groups

Middle East Map. Department of State, 2001. VIDEOS: “The Unfinished War with Iraq.” CNN, 6 Jan 02. “BCTP CONOPS Coordination Meeting.” Fort Leavenworth, KS: BCTP, 12 March 2002.

FOCUSED BCTP STUDIES: Reeder, William S., Jr. AFGHANISTAN: An Abbreviated Country Study. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Battle Command Training Program, 2002. 1

Reeder, William S., Jr. IRAQ: An Abbreviated Country Study. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Battle Command Training Program, 2002. Reeder, William S., Jr., comp. The Terrorist Threat. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Battle Command Training Program, 2002.

Conclusion I hope you found this information of use and that you will incorporate some of the TTPs. Most of all the information provided within this pamphlet is provided by BCTP BOS chiefs, NCO observer controllers, Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) and MPRI. The information provided are not necessarily trends, they are observations taken from Warfighters or one of the other 3 CTCs within the present year 2002. The observations are to provide a forum for open exchange of ideas on tactical operations at the battalion through corps level and to ensure units are conducting military operations in accordance with doctrine and to illustrate better techniques and procedures. Please share this information with other soldiers, NCOs and officers. This document is primarily provided to the Sergeant Majors Academy, Fort Bliss Battle Staff Course and the Fort McCoy Battle Staff Course.

SGM (Ret) Patrick Castin BCTP Operations Sergeant Major Mentor/Observer Controller MPRI Contractor Author, Editor, and Designer

The contents of this pamphlet does not necessarily reflect the official US Army position and does not change or supersede any information in other official US Army publications. If you have questions pertaining to this document, please contact Patrick Castin at e-mail address castinp@leavenworth.army.mil