DSA December 2012 by Defence and Security Alert

editor-in-chief

“The country comes first – always and every time”.

he Indian Navy came of age in a spectacular way on 04 December 1971. In a very bold and imaginative operation, it attacked the home base of the Pakistani Navy at Karachi, sinking two ships and set its oil farm ablaze. It repeated this feat a few days later and crippled the Pakistani Navy. During the cold war the US Navy used to dream of precisely such an attack on the Soviet naval home base of Murmansk. That remained an aspiration. The Indian Navy actualised the concept in a bold and offensive manner by striking and bottling up the enemy navy in its home base. The attack remains unparalleled in the annals of naval history.

By the 1980s, the Indian Navy had become a full-fledged Blue Water Navy with two Aircraft Carrier Battle Groups and a leased Soviet Nuclear Submarine along with powerful Soviet Kashin class destroyers and Kilo submarines. The economic downturn of 1991 saw the navy decline as old ships / submarines were phased out and new ones did not come in. India needed a period of peace and economic modernisation, before it could start recapitalising its navy again. This took three decades. This process has now commenced in full steam. India is now not buying but building a brand new navy that will be world-class. It will have two (and later three) Aircraft Carrier Battle Groups, three to four Nuclear Submarines and a powerful fleet of surface combatants, AIP and other conventional submarines; in short, a Blue Water Force of great consequence. The problem is the lethargic pace of our Public Sector shipyards. That will have to be accelerated, if necessary, by roping in our dynamic private sector. Why that was not done ab initio is a mystery. Coastal security: In the quest for a Blue Water status, have we forgotten the less glamorous task of coastal security? We were hit by asymmetric attacks on our coastline in 1993. We were hit again in 2008 in an even more spectacular fashion. Yet little seems to have been done by way of coordination amongst various agencies involved and meaningful initiatives to create a Naval Maginot Line on our sea coast. The Coastal Police have proved incapable of maintaining and running the fleet of fast patrol boats. Though less spectacular than the huge men of war, they are badly needed to counter the growing asymmetric threats. Our oil refineries and coastal nuclear installations seem to be in the enemy sights and industrial infrastructure near the coast will have to be protected. Navies and nationalism in the Asia Pacific: Industrialisation and urbanisation usually gives a powerful boost to nationalism. The concomitant commercial competition for resources and markets usually sets the stage for war and conflict. When Japan industrialised before the Second World War, she sought to secure her energy and mineral resources. The highly innovative Imperial Japanese Navy created a lethal fleet based on 10 carrier battle groups (CBGs). With this she challenged the might of the USA in the Pacific. The spectacular strike on the Pearl Harbour crippled the American Battleship Fleet. The UK then had 8 carriers but only one was in the Pacific, off the coast of Asia. The USA rapidly expanded its navy to 18 CBGs and decisively defeated Japan in the Pacific. Post World War II Russia and China were both primarily continental powers. Thus began US hegemony lite over the Asia-Pacific. It enabled the large scale re-industrialisation of Japan and then the industrialisation and urbanisation of South East Asian tiger economies and finally of China. The massive industrialisation and urbanisation of China has now created the second serious challenge to US primacy in the Asia-Pacific. Alarmed, the US has cut costs in Iraq and Afghanistan and is rebalancing towards Asia. China, the challenger, is increasingly becoming more assertive and aggressive. Nationalism and navies are on the rise in Asia. The region is witnessing the greatest ever naval build-up in recent history. Naval flashpoints have emerged in the South and East China Seas. Large scale industrialisation and urbanisation in Europe had led to the two World Wars. Is an industrialised Asia drifting towards an era of war and conflict? India’s naval build-up will have to be speeded up in response to the gathering war clouds. Unfortunately our growing economy has started sputtering and already the air is rife with talk of cuts in our defence budget, when defence spending in the rest of Asia is soaring. The nation can ill afford to rest at the cost of vital national interests. A premature onset of a welfare state a la Europe cannot be allowed to imperil the very existence of our state per se. This issue is dedicated to our Warriors in White. The Naval Chief has outlined his vision and views on various issues that concern the Indian Navy.

Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM (retd) December 2012 Defence AND security alert

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founding editor

publisher's view

More Kasabs ready! Are we?

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Vo l u m e 4 I s s u e 3 D e c e m b e r 2 0 1 2 chairman shyam sunder publisher and ceo pawan agrawal founding editor manvendra singh editor-in-chief maj gen (dr) g d bakshi SM, VSM (retd) director shishir bhushan corporate consultant k j singh art consultant divya gupta central saint martins college of art & design, university of arts, london marketing and sales dhirendra sharma corporate communications tejinder singh creative vivek anand pant administration shveta gupta representative (Jammu and Kashmir) salil sharma correspondent (Europe) dominika cosic production dilshad and dabeer webmaster sundar rawat photographer subhash circulation and distribution mithlesh tiwari e-mail: (first name)@dsalert.org info: info@dsalert.org articles: articles@dsalert.org subscription: subscription@dsalert.org online edition: online@dsalert.org advertisement: advt@dsalert.org editorial and business office 4/19 asaf ali road new delhi-110002 (India) t: +91-011-23243999, 23287999, 9958382999 e: info@dsalert.org www.dsalert.org

disclaimer all rights reserved. reproduction and translation in any language in whole or in part by any means without permission from Defence and Security Alert is prohibited. opinions expressed are those of the individual writers and do not necessarily reflect those of the publisher and / or editors. all disputes are subject to jurisdiction of delhi courts. defence and security alert is printed, published and owned by pawan agrawal and printed at graphic world, 1686, kucha dakhini rai, darya ganj, new delhi-110002 and published at 4/19 asaf ali road, new delhi (india). editor: maj gen (dr) g d bakshi (retd).

o, finally, the sole surviving butcher of the Mumbai terrorist attack was hanged on 21st November 2012. Silently and strictly in keeping with the rules laid down for death by hanging Ajmal Kasab was hanged after dawn. There was no media hype nor the contentious human rights activists and all went well. No newspaper covered it in their daily news till it was announced officially by the government of Maharashtra and the central government. Although it was an occasion of gala celebrations that this attacker was hanged but the restraint and silence has once again proved that each Indian has a heart and an active positive mind which more often than not is constructive. I must congratulate each Indian for proving that Indians are like this, peace-loving and stoic in their demeanour. Each community has shown a high level of tolerance and patience over the past four years of the trial and appeals to the higher judiciary till the mercy petition was rejected by President Pranab Mukherjee which itself is self-explanatory about our love for peace, our absolute faith in the judiciary and above all our commitment to the security of the nation. The month of November will always remind us of the heinous attacks in Mumbai by the Pakistani terrorists. And it will also remind us that how with dignity and restraint the severe punishment was finally given to this terrorist who was responsible for the indiscriminate killing of the innocent citizens of India. November should also be taken as a lesson by our security apparatus and they should not think that their (terrorist groupsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;) mission to disturb and sabotage the Indian security is over. It must also remind us as to how weak was our intelligence network and how poor have been our preparations to counter such attacks. The Mumbai attack should be taken as a blaring wake-up call by all our policy and decision-makers responsible for the security of our coastal belt and all our international borders. Its time to evaluate the security of our entire coastal belt. It is so vast that it is not possible to guard it manually and thus we must procure the best technology and systems to strengthen the coastal security. Terrorists have struck in Mumbai and much the same can happen anywhere because our coasts all around are as vulnerable. We should always remember that these terrorists are thinking way ahead of us and we have to think like them and stay many steps ahead in our prevention and countermeasures to defeat their nefarious designs. The Indian Navy is one of the best naval forces in the world and we have the most courageous and dedicated personnel as well as a strong group of retired personnel who have spent decades in shaping the force. Our Indian Coast Guard has been designed to counter any such attack in future but that is no easy task given the length of our coastline. We need to induct more officers and we need to train them especially to handle such attacks. This is also the time to invite and involve our retired officers in underpinning the maritime security apparatus although the bright young warriors in white are doing very well under the leadership of our new Naval Chief Admiral D K Joshi. It is true that the Mumbai attack could happen because of the negligence in the defence of coastal areas but team DSA can assure the people of India that in the past four years our coastal and maritime security has improved considerably and we are now better prepared for any such attack in the future. Moving away from the sombre memories of November, the Indian Navy will be celebrating Navy Day on 4 December, commemorating one of the most resoundingly successful maritime operations in the several wars with Pakistan â&#x20AC;&#x201C; the attack on Karachi harbour in 1971. Team DSA greets and salutes each Naval Warrior and we all happily join in the celebrations. Jai Hind!

nce man mastered the oceans the dynamics of economic growth changed dramatically. Trade, which is the essential of economic growth, came out of its land based stranglehold and was transformed. Volumes increased greatly, as did the countries and distances covered. The monopoly of the 'Silk Route' was shattered by sailing dhows that crossed unimaginable expanses of oceans. Man globalised as rapidly as the sails that connected ports and people. But the trader and ship captain needed a surety to their security just as they needed it for their commodities and that is where sea power emerged. And it decided the fortunes of empires, just as it reworked the dynamics of power.

Any nation aspiring to greatness has had to fly its flag on vast armadas of combatant vessels. The Roman Empire was an exception, but for its duration as well as the peculiarity of its geography. Anything since then has had a navy to back its growth. That too a navy which packs a punch. Prior to the emergence of the United States Navy it was the Royal Navy that controlled the seas, so to say. And so the sun never set on the British Empire, as they once said. It isn't a question of options, but a necessity that dictates such decision-making in the field of defence planning. While each service has its role, assigned by terrain, the navy is an exception in that it does more than its role of safeguarding the seas.

Because of the peculiarities of Indian history and the even greater peculiarity of Indian historical learning, research and teaching, the focus of military planners has remained the national land boundaries. Events since 1947 have only served to deepen that focus. While not taking away anything from the threats of cross border infiltration from Pakistan, or the nascent Chinese military pressures, there is every reason to prepare in a holistic way. In this largely land focused approach the navy has repeatedly been short-changed. For an oceanic country the size of India, its budgeting and planning for naval development is a shame. When the issue gets highlighted, which is when it reaches crisis point, there is a sudden spurt of funding and commitment, only to be neglected to the back pages once the story is forgotten.

As India integrates with the world economy and the global security order, it has to bring something to the table to be taken seriously. And what the world wants it to deliver is an efficient navy. The makings of a world-class navy are there, but what is lacking is political consistency. Once that shortcoming is addressed there is nothing stopping the Indian Navy from becoming the power that it ought to be. It isn't simply to protect national commercial shipping, or global sea lanes of communications, but also to protect India. Even as a rapidly shrinking Royal Navy cuts its numbers there is one thing that is guaranteed budgetary allocations â&#x20AC;&#x201C; the nuclear submarine programme. They know it is the most secure platform available to a country. India knows it too, but national planners continue to prioritise those that look good for a display on Republic Day parade.

manvendra singh

pawan agrawal

December 2012 Defence AND security alert

contents STATUS OF SEA POWER IN INDIA TODAY

Special Issue December 2012

A R T I C L E S

the Indian navy at sixty-two; a maritime force of substance

Admiral Arun Prakash PVSM, AVSM, Vrc, VSM (retd) An ISO 9001:2008 Certified Magazine

c o n t e n t s

challenging the dragon at sea by 2030

Volume 4 Issue 3 DECEMBER 2012

Vice Admiral Arun Kumar Singh (retd)

sea power and the right to unimpeded entrée

the ‘uncertainty paradigm’ Vice Adm Vijay Shankar PVSM, AVSM, ADC (retd)

India adrift, awash or awake in its maritime wake

Vice Admiral Venkat Bharathan (retd)

matters littoral defence

Rear Admiral (Dr) S Kulshrestha (retd)

amphibious aircraft: a force multiplier for the Indian navy

Cmde Sujeet Samaddar NM (retd)

India’s sea power status going into the future, an appreciation 50 Cmde Ranjit Bhawnani Rai (retd)

a balanced energy mix for India

Amb Ashok Sajjanhar

E X C L U S I V E I N T E R V I E W

sea power: piracy, insurgency and force actions

Chief of Naval Staff 06 Admiral D K Joshi PVSM, AVSM, YSM, NM, VSM, ADC

Maj Gen P K Chakravorty VSM (Retd)

C O L U M N Indian navy and sea power in the 21st century

cyber jihad – osj (open source jihad) Dr Rupali Jeswal

Cdr Sunil Chauhan (retd)

F E A T U R E S China as a global naval power

rising nationalisms and navies in Asia: the road to conflict? Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM (retd)

why Japan needs India as strategic partner? Dr Satoru Nagao

Vassilios Damiras, PhD (ABD)

India’s maritime interests in the changing world Prof Hari Saran

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sea power in India

CNS INTERVIEW

Chief of Naval Staff Admiral D K Joshi admiring the latest issue of DSA

EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW Chief of Naval Staff Admiral D K Joshi PVSM, AVSM, YSM, NM, VSM, ADC honoured DSA by giving an exclusive interview on the eve of the Indian Navy Day. In conversation with Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi, Editor-in-Chief, DSA magazine, CNS expounds his views and shares his vision for the Indian Navy with our readers. Defence and Security Alert: We congratulate you on taking over as the new Chief of the Indian Navy. The navy has pursued a visionary approach for technology-intensive maritime force planning and development. Kindly share your vision and road map for the Indian Navy with our readers. Chief of Naval Staff: At the very outset, I must record my gratitude for the most privileged opportunity given to me and the confidence reposed, by entrusting me with the responsibility and honour of commanding one of the largest navies in the world. The raison d’etre of our existence has been encapsulated in the theme of this year ie "Maritime Power for National Prosperity". Therefore, my aim is to steer our team and resources, in a manner to be able to act as a ‘Net Security Provider’ wherever the country’s sovereign interests may lie in the maritime domain. To fulfill this mandate, I have identified a few focus areas which are a sine qua non:

December 2012 Defence AND security alert

(a) Indian Navy today is at the cusp of transformation wherein it is poised for induction of cutting edge technologies in all the three dimensions viz. air, surface and sub-surface. These will significantly enhance our capabilities to tackle emerging maritime challenges. My focus would be to consolidate, train and continuously re-audit our preparedness with complete professionalism to optimally exploit these capabilities as also to achieve seamless man machine interface. (b) Security encompassing Information, Data and Physical security of our assets, infrastructure as well as Coastal Security. (c) Effective use of contemporary information technology tools and state-of-the-art intra-navy communications, to ensure that there are no delays in decision-making and staff processes are speedy and efficient.

We have to constantly remind ourselves that each one of us has joined this noble profession of arms as a matter of ‘honour’ and therefore adherence to ethical and moral values by each one of us is sacrosanct. Moreover, our disciplined upbringing in the Service, places us on a pedestal in society, wherein each one of us is expected to serve as an examplar. There is only one requirement – professional excellence in all dimensions, in all our endeavours. Nothing more and nothing less December 2012 Defence AND security alert

sea power in India

CNS INTERVIEW

Building a potent and credible navy is an ongoing process, one that gets even more challenging as we strive towards maximum indigenisation. We have been able to meet many of the goals we set for ourselves but there is still more to be accomplished. I am very confident that the navy will continue to grow and maintain its focus on operational excellence.

Indian Navy is continuously monitoring such developments and factors these into our long-term modernisation programmes.

DSA: The Indian Navy has been the most successful service in terms of indigenisation. Today we are building instead of buying a navy. Yet there has been a slippage in our shipbuilding programmes by the Public Sector shipyards. This is causing a slowdown in our shipbuilding and asset acquisition programmes. Do we need to involve the Private Sector in this process? How can we speed up the ship induction process?

DSA: The Chinese have fielded their first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning and also unveiled the J-31 stealth fighters to be possibly fielded on their later aircraft carriers. How do you see this threat and does India need bigger aircraft carriers (of 60,000 tons plus displacement) to cope with the fielding of Chinese aircraft carriers?

CNS: The Indian Navy has made steady progress towards achieving the objective of being a Builder’s Navy. At present 42 warships and submarines, out of a total of 44 on order are in various stages of procurement through indigenous construction. So far mostly DPSU shipyards have been involved in the construction of war ships. However, the needs of an expanding navy with multifaceted roles cannot be met solely with the existing capacities of DPSUs. Hence, the IN has made a conscious decision to tap into the potential of India’s burgeoning private sector shipbuilding companies. As a consequence, orders have been placed with a few of the private shipyards for vessels where the content of weapons and sensors is not very high. However, as these firms gain the requisite expertise, it is likely that they would be able to participate in more complex warship projects that the navy would require in the future. The opening of JVs between the DPSUs and private shipyards is also a step that bodes well for the future of warship building in India. The JVs / MoUs will enable the firms to benefit from each other’s strengths whilst addressing their respective constraints. The shortage of land / infrastructure with some shipyards is an example of the problems which can be overcome by this joint approach. It also needs to be noted that the government is making significant efforts to ensure that the DPSUs upgrade their technological and infrastructural capabilities. Our shipyards are in the process of acquiring the latest techniques in integrated shipbuilding, which will result in significantly shorter build periods and reduced design to production cycles. The Indian Navy is therefore very optimistic that the coming decade would see the overarching goal of a ‘Builders Navy’ consolidating in a highly beneficial way for the nation as well as the service.

Considering the large quantum of Indian trade through the Gulf of Aden (imports valued US$ 50 billion and exports valued US$ 60 billion), we need to continue deployments for anti-piracy in the Gulf of Aden as well as in the Arabian Sea DSA: The meteoric rise of China’s economic and military power is now causing unease in almost all global capitals. Recently China has turned most assertive and aggressive in her maritime disputes in The South and East China Seas. Nations such as Japan, Vietnam, Indonesia and Philippines are seriously perturbed over Chinese actions and intentions and are looking towards India to balance a rising China. What role do you envisage for the Indian Navy in this emerging scenario? Should India more actively assist smaller nations such as Vietnam in building-up their military capabilities? CNS: China’s economic growth has spawned a modernisation drive within the PLA Navy. As is well known, the 21st century is characterised by common maritime threats. Since oceans do not represent national boundaries, such threats need to be identified well in time and countered. In this context, the growth of PLA Navy and its contribution in combating global maritime threats such as piracy in the Gulf of Aden are a natural outcome of China’s overall development. We hope that the rise of the PLA Navy will contribute towards the overall maritime peace and stability. Our country has a rich maritime tradition from which our navy draws great inspiration. Let me assure you that the Indian Navy is a professional force which is engaged in a continuous evaluation of the maritime security environment around us and is adept at meeting any challenge that we may encounter in the present and the future. DSA: The Aircraft Carrier Battle Group emerged as the prime instrument for power projection during the Second World War and still has primacy in sea power terms. Do you see China’s fielding of the Dong Feng-21D aircraft carrier killer missiles as a significant game changer in naval warfare? CNS: The reports of development of an anti-ship ballistic missile (DF-21D aircraft carrier killer missile) are being assessed on a regular basis. Any weapons system that aims to hit moving targets at sea to a range of around 2,000 km by using a ballistic missile would occupy the interest of maritime strategists. A successful ASBM programme poses challenges for all navies and aircraft carrier operating navies in particular. The

December 2012 Defence AND security alert

CNS: An aircraft carrier is able to contribute to fleet operations only after it transcends from being a “platform” to a fleet “capability”. This transformation of an asset into a “capability” is a process that demands investment of time and effort. IN has undergone this process for over five decades now. Acquisition of platforms / capabilities is an outcome of the necessity to safeguard national interests. Navies across the world are enhancing capabilities depending upon the challenges they expect to face. Since the security challenges are only bound to increase in times to come, the IN’s acquisition plan is continuously evolving to meet new challenges. These acquisitions are not directed towards any specific country. DSA: Navies have traditionally been viewed as diplomatic, as well as military tools. Through its multiple and increasingly institutionalised naval exercises with both regional and extra-regional navies and its hosting of multilateral initiatives such as the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, the Indian Navy clearly sees a role as a diplomatic instrument for New Delhi. What kind of diplomatic role do you envision for the Indian Navy in troubled areas such as the IOR and the Western Pacific? CNS: Navies the world over have long been recognised as effective and versatile tools of diplomacy. A modern warship with professional sailors is a potent ambassador for any country. In periods short of war, every capable maritime state uses the inherent characteristics of its naval power to shape the security environment and the perceptions to its advantage within its area of maritime interest. The principal method to do so is ‘Constructive Engagement’ with friendly and like-minded navies. The Indian Navy in conjunction with the Ministry of External Affairs is always willing to assist any friendly maritime neighbour, when requested. Recognising the democratic values of India and the professional capabilities of the Indian Navy, we are today engaged in close professional cooperation with a number of navies across the globe and this is only going to increase in the years ahead.

Recognising the democratic values of India and the professional capabilities of the Indian Navy, we are today engaged in close professional cooperation with a number of navies across the globe and this is only going to increase in the years ahead DSA: What are your comments on the delivery delays and cost overruns in the induction of the Gorshkov aircraft carrier from Russia? When do you expect the Vikramaditya to join the fleet? CNS: There have been some unforeseen delays in induction of Vikramaditya. The ship has undergone extensive sea trials and has spent more than 100 days at sea. During the trials, the ship clocked a distance of almost 12,000 miles and more than 500 sorties (involving four types of aircraft and three types of helicopters) were flown towards proving the ship’s Aviation Facilities Complex (AFC) and its onboard equipment / system. The ship’s main propulsion and auxiliary equipment were tested under seagoing conditions and their performance barring a few equipment, was observed to be good. However defects that have emerged during the course of sea trials would need time for rectification. It is now estimated that the ship would be delivered in the fourth quarter of 2013.

December 2012 Defence AND security alert

sea power in India

CNS INTERVIEW

announcement TM

DSA: Coastal security is a less glamorous task than fielding a Bluewater Navy. Nonetheless it is vitally important. Is the Indian Navy prepared to take on a 26/11 type terror attack, particularly in the wake of recent disclosures that the Lashkar-e-Taiba has reactivated its maritime wing? What are the measures taken for guarding the coastline of India and our industrial infrastructure and refineries near the coast? Are you satisfied with the level of coordination now achieved between the various agencies involved? CNS: Since November 2008, several initiatives have been taken by the government to strengthen security of the coastal areas against the threat of non-state actors from the maritime domain. One of the most significant achievements of the last few years has been the integration of all maritime stakeholders, including the several state and central agencies into the coastal security construct. The capability of this construct to tackle emerging threats is regularly tested through coastal security exercises. The results are encouraging as good coordination, synergy and understanding between all agencies has been developed thereby permitting the optimum utilisation of resources of all the stakeholders. Real time information flow between stakeholders has resulted in prompt response by seagoing agencies to any emerging situation. The coastal and fishing communities have been trained as ‘eyes and ears’ of the security agencies through regular coastal security awareness campaigns. A number of surveillance initiatives such as coastal radar network and Automatic Identification System (AIS) chains have been operationalised. It is intended to continue the efforts towards integrating and exercising all stakeholders along with early conclusion of various technological projects such as transponders on all fishing vessels, biometric identity cards for fishermen etc, to ensure seamless security of our coastline. The tasks are huge and the challenges are many, but all of us involved in the maritime domain are working steadfastly to strengthen coastal security.

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The opening of JVs between the DPSUs and private shipyards is also a step that bodes well for the future of warship building in India. The JVs / MoUs will enable the firms to benefit from each other’s strengths whilst addressing their respective constraints. The shortage of land / infrastructure with some shipyards is an example of the problems which can be overcome by this joint approach DSA: What are the steps that the Indian Navy has taken to ensure the safety of our merchant fleet against piracy in the Gulf of Aden, Somali coast, Omani coast and seas between the African coastline and Maldives? What challenges is the Indian Navy facing with respect to the changing operating profile of piracy? CNS: Piracy has shown a decline in the recent times, primarily due to the robust efforts put in by the world navies and Best Management Practices (BMP), including deployment of armed guards onboard merchant ships. However, it would not be correct to conclude that piracy is on its way out, as it is also related to the internal situation in Somalia. The Indian Navy has deployed ships for anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden since October 2008. Ships have also been deployed for EEZ surveillance and anti-piracy patrols off the island nations of Mauritius, Seychelles and Maldives on the request of their respective governments. Considering the large quantum of Indian trade through the Gulf of Aden (imports valued US$ 50 billion and exports valued US$ 60 billion), we need to continue deployments for anti-piracy in the Gulf of Aden as well as in the Arabian Sea. To operationally de-conflict the anti-piracy efforts of other navies, we share relevant information with the ships deployed in the Gulf of Aden, through the forum of Shared Awareness and De-confliction (SHADE) meeting and Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS). Piracy will need a solution to be found on land through international efforts. Action at sea is aimed at containing the problem till a lasting solution is found on land. DSA: Your message to our countrymen and to the ‘warriors in white’. CNS: I would like to convey to one and all in the Indian Navy that we have to constantly remind ourselves that each one of us has joined this noble profession of arms as a matter of ‘honour’ and therefore adherence to ethical and moral values by each one of us is sacrosanct. Moreover, our disciplined upbringing in the Service, places us on a pedestal in society, wherein each one of us is expected to serve as an examplar. There is only one requirement – professional excellence in all dimensions, in all our endeavours. Nothing more and nothing less.

December 2012 Defence AND security alert

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sea power in India

CHALLENGES FOR INDIAN NAVY

Admiral Arun Prakash PVSM, AVSM, VrC, VSM (retd) The writer retired as the Navy Chief and Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee in end-2006. He writes and speaks on issues of national security and maritime interest and is, currently a member of the National Security Advisory Board.

As two of the world’s largest geographic, demographic and military entities, each in quest of scarce resources to fuel its growing economy and meet the aspirations of its people, China and India are going to make uneasy neighbours. For the two nuclear-armed nations to rise, almost simultaneously, in such close proximity without conflict will require either adroit diplomacy or a miracle; perhaps both

It was in the early hours of 4th December 1971 that an audacious and unorthodox attack by a squadron of small, IN vessels unleashed a barrage of guided missiles on Karachi; sinking two warships, setting alight a fuel storage facility and bottling up the Pakistani fleet in harbour

ndia will, in a few years, be amongst the foremost centres of power in the world, whose economic strength and technological prowess would need to be underpinned by concomitant military power, of which maritime strength will be a critical component. India launched its first nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine (SSBN) in 2009 and at least 2-3 more SSBNs will follow, with longer range missiles. A Russian nuclear-powered attack submarine was delivered in 2012 on a 10-year lease. The IN is expecting the long-awaited, delivery of the refurbished Russian aircraft carrier Gorshkov in 2013, while a second such ship, is being indigenously built in Cochin. On order are seven stealth frigates, six diesel subs, eight P-8I maritime patrol aircraft, 45 MiG-29K fighters and 30 other warships. The level of the nation’s commitment to a maritime build-up can be gauged from the fact that the items outlined above signify an outlay in the region of US$ 25-30 billion over the next decade. Whether the nation can sustain further expansion, in the face of the recent economic downturn or not, this “committed expenditure” by itself will place the IN amongst the top ranks of the most modern and potent maritime forces worldwide. Another aspect that has set the IN apart from the other two Services is its total commitment to indigenisation, which was underpinned by two bold and far-sighted decisions in the late 1960s; to undertake warship construction in the country and to set up a Directorate of Naval Design manned by a Corps of Naval Constructors. Our shipyards have, to-date, delivered nearly a 100 ships ranging from patrol boats and amphibious ships to sophisticated submarines, frigates and destroyers.

he Indian Navy (IN) can count its age in two ways. The historically inclined, trace its ancestry all the way back to September 1612, when the British raised the first organised seagoing service in India, named the Indian Marine to protect their trade against the Portuguese. This service became Her Majesty’s Indian Navy in 1830 and then the Royal Indian Navy (RIN) in 1934; making the IN a little over 400 years old today – older than the oldest Indian Army regiment! The more pedantic, on the other hand, look back merely to 26th January 1950 when the prefix “Royal” was dropped from RIN; which makes the IN, officially, just 62 years old. Navy Day is, however, celebrated every year to commemorate a famous naval victory. It was in the early hours of 4th December 1971 that an audacious and unorthodox attack by a squadron of small, IN vessels unleashed a barrage of guided missiles on Karachi; sinking two warships, setting alight a fuel storage facility and bottling up the Pakistani fleet in harbour. On the other coast, the aircraft-carrier INS Vikrant and her escorts, blockaded East Pakistani ports, attacked airfields and interdicted shipping; thus hastening the Pak surrender.

The IN saw its baptism by fire in the 1971 war, but it was the Great Asian tsunami of December 2004, which saw the Service emerging as a regional force of substance and resolve. Within hours of receiving the first distress messages, IN ships and aircraft were rushing to the aid of, not just our own stricken citizens, but also our Sri Lankan, Maldivian and Indonesian neighbours in dire need. The alacrity with which the IN responded to this humanitarian crisis left an abiding impression of competence and professionalism amongst observers. This was reinforced by the sea-lift operation efficiently mounted by IN task forces to evacuate South Asian refugees from war-torn Lebanon in 2006 and Libya in 2011.

December 2012 Defence AND security alert

The IN has been sustaining anti-piracy patrols off the Horn of Africa for many years now. By their bold and resolute actions, in many encounters, Captains of Indian warships have sent out a clear message to the outlaws not to mess with Indian merchantmen. This has been in the best traditions of our navy and brought encomiums, nationally and internationally. But this has not always been the case. India’s inherited continental mindset and landward orientation persisted for many years after Independence. For this reason the fortunes of the IN tended to fluctuate with the vagaries of the annual defence budget; its precarious existence, earning it the sobriquet of “Cinderella Service”.

A change in maritime perceptions The 1980s, however, saw a noteworthy paradigm shift in policy, wherein Indian maritime power was, for the first time, deployed in neighbouring countries like Sri Lanka and Maldives. This decade was also witness to a long-delayed upswing in the fortunes of the IN; with a second aircraft carrier, a nuclear submarine (on lease from USSR), a squadron of long-range reconnaissance aircraft and new destroyers, submarines and missile corvettes joining in quick succession. With the dawn of economic liberalisation on one hand and India’s acceptance of realpolitik on the other, the last two decades have, especially, brought about a radical change in perceptions. Most significant has been the slow dawning of realisation amongst the politicians as well as diplomats and civil servants, that the navy is a potent instrument of state policy. While the navy had, no doubt, always nurtured a lofty vision of itself as a “blue water” force at some future point of time, this vision was not really shared by the decision-makers. Fortuitously, the coalescing of certain key factors has driven a consensus, across the board that India did indeed need to focus on maritime security. The first of these is the powerful phenomenon of globalisation. International trade, the sine qua non of globalisation, is carried overwhelmingly by sea, as is energy, the lifeblood of industry. Ensuring stability at sea and the safety of shipping lanes has assumed prime importance for our economy and national well-being and has brought maritime forces into sharp focus.

December 2012 Defence AND security alert

sea power in India

CHALLENGES FOR INDIAN NAVY

As a sovereign democracy, India has a clear moral obligation to ensure that not only its 10 million tons of national merchant shipping, its trade and energy lifelines but also a hundred thousand Indian seafarers plying on the high seas under different flags, are accorded protection, wherever possible, from pirates and hijackers. In 1993 explosives landed on India’s west coast, from Pakistan, by boat, were used to trigger serial blasts which created mayhem in Mumbai. Fifteen years later, in November 2008, terrorists travelled from Karachi to Mumbai by sea, to play havoc with the city once more. This has created a sense of intense vulnerability, amongst the public, about India’s 7,000 km coastline and 1,200 odd islands. Next is the adversarial relationship with China. There is recognition in India’s security circles that China’s economic and military rise which underpins an increasingly arrogant attitude could eventually lead to a confrontation. Given the vast trade and energy dependency of both nations on sea lanes, the Indian Ocean could become the arena wherein maritime forces would play a decisive role. The fourth factor, more catalyst than driver, is the availability of funding. Four decades of post-independence fiscal stringency that kept IN plans in deep-freeze, ended when the economy was opened in 1990. Steady GDP growth generated sufficient resources for implementation of many long-delayed plans. The effectiveness of these drivers can be gauged from the government of India’s acquiescence to the navy’s ambitious acquisition programmes. India launched its first nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine (SSBN) in 2009 and at least 2-3 more SSBNs will follow, with longer range missiles. A Russian nuclear-powered attack submarine was delivered in 2012 on a 10-year lease. The IN is expecting the long-awaited, delivery of the refurbished Russian aircraft carrier Gorshkov in 2013, while a second such ship, is being indigenously built in Cochin. On order are; seven stealth frigates, six diesel subs, eight P-8I maritime patrol aircraft, 45 MiG-29K fighters and 30 other warships.

The level of the nation’s commitment to a maritime build-up can be gauged from the fact that the items outlined above signify an outlay in the region of US$ 25-30 billion over the next decade. Whether the nation can sustain further expansion, in the face of the recent economic downturn or not, this “committed expenditure” by itself will place the IN amongst the top ranks of the most modern and potent maritime forces worldwide. However, hardware lists by themselves, tell only half the story and the IN has been at pains to ensure that its force-planning, far more than that of sister services, has had the requisite doctrinal and strategic underpinning.

A strategic underpinning As far back as 1988, NHQ had issued a document titled: “A Military Maritime Strategy 1989-2014” which reflected cold war realities and the insular posture India had adopted in that era. Although overtaken by events within a few years, this document triggered off a process, between 2004 and 2006 which resulted in a series of documents including a Maritime Doctrine, a Maritime Strategy and a Maritime Capabilities Plan which have collectively provided an intellectual underpinning for and placed the navy’s roles, missions, operational posture and acquisition policies into geostrategic perspective. This has created a firm foundation which the Service can build upon in the years to come.

The recent commissioning of the Chinese PLA Navy carrier Liaoning has caused a flutter in maritime circles. However, since this navy is wanting in aviation experience and the ship lacks aircraft it is a few years from operationalisation Another aspect that has set the IN apart from the other two Services is its total commitment to indigenisation, which was underpinned by two bold and far-sighted decisions in the late 1960s; to undertake warship construction in the country and to set up a Directorate of Naval Design manned by a Corps of Naval Constructors. Our shipyards have, to-date, delivered nearly a 100 ships ranging from patrol boats and amphibious ships to sophisticated submarines, frigates and destroyers.

December 2012 Defence AND security alert

It is to be hoped that an indigenous aircraft carrier will be launched from Cochin Shipyard in a few years time, provided the requisite political impetus is given to this project.

a vital role in sustaining India’s economic prosperity. India’s long-term maritime strategy or roadmap, therefore, requires special focus on certain vital factors.

Of a piece with the resolute indigenisation drive is the symbiotic relationship which the IN has assiduously created with the DRDO – an organisation which otherwise attracts much searing but justified criticism. Apart from whole-heartedly participating in the work of DRDO’s two laboratories dedicated to naval projects, the IN has invariably contributed funds as well as manpower and expertise to ventures such as the Advanced Technology Vessel (nuclear submarine) project and the Light Combat Aircraft (Navy) project. In 2005 a Principal Directorate of Indigenisation was established in NHQ to provide badly needed focus to its endeavours for attaining self-reliance.

In 1993 explosives landed on India’s west coast, from Pakistan, by boat, were used to trigger serial blasts which created mayhem in Mumbai. Fifteen years later, in November 2008, terrorists travelled from Karachi to Mumbai by sea, to play havoc with the city once more. This has created a sense of intense vulnerability, amongst the public, about India’s 7,000 km coastline and 1,200 odd islands

Challenges for the IN Looking at our neighbourhood, as far as the Sino-Indian strategic equation is concerned, the maritime dimension is a relatively new factor. The rapid growth of both economies has led to increasing reliance on energy and raw materials, sourced from all over the world and transported by sea. This has focused sharp attention on the criticality, for both economies, of uninterrupted use of the sea lanes for trade and energy transportation. With improving technology, the seabed is seen, increasingly, as a potential cornucopia of energy and mineral wealth; thus creating bones of territorial contention in exclusive economic zones. As two of the world’s largest geographic, demographic and military entities, each in quest of scarce resources to fuel its growing economy and meet the aspirations of its people, China and India are going to make uneasy neighbours. For the two nuclear-armed nations to rise, almost simultaneously, in such close proximity without conflict will require either adroit diplomacy or a miracle; perhaps both. Given the transnational reach and versatility of maritime power, not only is the IN finding greater salience in India’s national security matrix, but has also come to play

The navy’s biggest challenge is going to be the timely replacement of ageing platforms and obsolescent equipment, in order to maintain requisite force-levels. The aim of maintaining a stabilised order of battle of, say, about 150-170 ships and submarines and possibly 250-300 aircraft and helicopters, assumes a certain production rate from shipyards and aircraft factories. Unfortunately the Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs), never known for their productivity, continue to lag in construction schedules while exceeding cost estimates.

distant nations. Therefore, while the Foreign Service forms the front-line of our international interface, the IN can form a very useful second-line, provided the MEA shows vision and imagination. Countries in our immediate neighbourhood, many of them island nations, seek maritime security; sometimes through direct naval presence, but more often through urgent requests for assistance and advice. India’s maritime diplomacy from the 1990s onwards, through exchange of port visits, naval exercises and training and hardware assistance, has contributed significantly to fostering friendship and understanding in the Indian Ocean region. The IN has reached out to extra-regional navies too and maritime exercises with the US, French, British, Russian and Chinese navies have contributed much to warming of bilateral relations.

Maritime game changers

Consequently, naval force levels have already dipped below the minimum approved figures. At the same time, our other major source, of hardware, the Russians, have brazenly reneged on costs as well as delivery schedules of ships, in violation of solemn agreements. One of the more serious challenges before the navy’s leadership will be to tackle the Russians and somehow motivate Indian DPSUs to rise to the occasion.

The recent commissioning of the Chinese PLA Navy carrier Liaoning has caused a flutter in maritime circles. However, since this navy is wanting in aviation experience and the ship lacks aircraft it is a few years from operationalisation. In this context, the arrival of the carrier Gorshkov (to be re-named INS Vikramaditya) with its complement of MiG-29K fighters and Kamov-28/31 helicopters, in Indian waters, should send out reassuring signals all round; especially since the IN has a wealth of carrier operating experience behind it and depth of aviation expertise. If all goes as planned, by the end of the decade, a second, indigenous carrier should also join the IN fleet.

The second important factor relates to “foreign co-operation”. In the maritime context this term has wide connotations and covers a whole gamut of activities. While naval exercises establish navy-to-navy rapport and interoperability, joint-patrolling builds confidence, port calls and flag-showing deployments enhance bilateral goodwill and understanding. Navies are fortunate in having foreigncooperation as a serious peacetime operational role to discharge because the oceans truly make neighbours of

The induction of the nuclear-powered attack-submarine (or SSN) INS Chakra has brought about a quantum change in the regional maritime balance of power. While surface warships are versatile instruments for power-projection, they remain vulnerable to detection and attack from all three dimensions. An SSN, on the other hand, once deployed on patrol, disappears from sight for months at a time to undertake surveillance, gather intelligence and, when required, interdict shipping and shore targets with impunity.

The other “game changer” in the IN inventory will be the SSBN INS Arihant due for induction shortly. As the custodian of the 3rd leg of India’s nuclear triad, the IN will bear responsibility for training, maintenance, communications and safety of SSBN operations; although deterrence related command and control functions will be retained by the Strategic Forces Command. The nuclear submarine fleet is, willy-nilly going to make exacting demands on the operational expertise, as well as human and material resources of the IN. While the funding for its acquisition and maintenance may come from elsewhere, the underwater deterrent will certainly enhance the status of the IN and boost its position on the national security totem pole.

Conclusion An economically resurgent India has vast and varied maritime interests, which include offshore hydrocarbons, seabed resources, sea lanes of communication, energy lifelines, a large merchant marine and about 180 ports and harbours dotting its coastline. It is now obvious that the nation’s economic prosperity is inextricably linked with its maritime capability. The IN not only has the onerous role of safeguarding these vital interests, but also the international obligation of ensuring order, peace and tranquillity in the Indian Ocean so that world trade can proceed unhindered. Having crafted a Maritime Strategy and a Doctrine, the long-term plans of the IN are in place. They envisage fielding two carrier groups at any time (tasked either for strike or amphibious operations), along with adequate destroyers and frigates to cater for tasks like air-defence and anti-submarine warfare; all supported by a capable aviation arm and sustained by a logistic fleet. An Indian built submarine force would remain poised to interdict enemy naval forces and shipping. India will, in a few years, be amongst the foremost centres of power in the world, whose economic strength and technological prowess would need to be underpinned by concomitant military power, of which maritime strength will be a critical component.

December 2012 Defence AND security alert

sea power in India

THE GROWTH PATHWAY

G Vice Admiral Arun Kumar Singh (retd) The writer retired as Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Eastern Naval Command, Visakhapatnam. His key appointments included Director General of the Indian Coast Guard (during the Tsunami of 26 December 2004) and Commander-in-Chief of the Tri-Service Andaman and Nicobar Command. He is also a prolific writer on maritime, strategic and nuclear issues.

With the arrival of the tactical nuclear submarine (SSN), INS Chakra, on April 4, 2012, the challenge now is how to quickly build indigenous SSNs for the navy by utilising the massive unused capacity of the private sector Indian shipyards, like Pipavav, which is India’s largest, most modern shipyard and has some of the world’s largest dry docks for submarine building, in a joint venture with a public sector shipyard or yards which have the necessary expertise

Hopefully the decision-makers in South Block take note and take the appropriate steps to make India a true submarine building nation at the earliest and also provide the Indian Navy the wherewithal to protect our national interests at sea

iven the Chinese challenge, India needs to take a series of measures to boost its sea power in the IOR. These include building a 65,000 ton aircraft carrier, six more conventional submarines of the much delayed Project 75(I), setting up more naval air stations in strategically located islands off its west and east coast, satellites for surveillance, communications and real time maritime domain awareness (MDA). The only viable antidote to the Chinese seaborne threat is the SSN. While a second INS Chakra type SSN should be acquired from Russia at the earliest, there is no doubt that the Indian Navy urgently needs 6 to 12 SSNs to meet its challenges in the vast expanses of the IOR and APR, specially if it has to operate in the APR without any foreign base support. A 40,000 ton aircraft carrier can embark about 18 to 20 modern fighter aircraft along with a few AEW (Airborne Early Warning) and ASW (Anti-Submarine Warfare-cum-Anti-Ship ) helicopters. Most medium sized navies (including the Chinese who have a 65,000 ton carrier on sea trials and British, who are building two such ships by 2016 and 2019) have now realised that to be effective, an aircraft carrier needs to embark about 36 fighter aircraft in addition to AEW and ASW helicopters. A most useful and insightful article on the growth path of the Indian Navy.

s the Indian Navy celebrates the Navy Day on 4 December 2012, it would be fully aware of the ominous developments taking place in China, whose economy, military and sea power is growing at a tremendous pace and the nations of Asia Pacific Region are beginning to feel the heat of prolonged Chinese muscle flexing at sea. The Chinese economy is slated to overtake the US economy by 2027. By 2030, China will have blue water navy with a capability to operate for prolonged periods in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Indeed most strategists have linked these two oceans as one strategic mass of water connected by narrow choke points. The Asia Pacific Region (APR) and Indian Ocean Region (IOR) are now being referred to as the Indo-Pacific Region (IPR). Given the Indian Army and Air Force modernisation and force augmentation plans, any border conflict is likely to not only result in a stalemate, but also spill over to the maritime domain, where China's long SLOCs (sea lanes of communications) for its energy imports would be extremely vulnerable to interdiction by the Indian Navy. Thus, Indian sea power (if suitably augmented), provides India

December 2012 Defence AND security alert

with an option to deter any future Chinese aggression on land. India has taken no decision on the media reported offer made by the Vietnamese defence minister in 2011 of providing the Indian Navy a base in Vietnam. In the absence of a forward base the Indian Navy has to plan for different force architecture, should it become necessary to carry the fight to the enemy. The Japanese too, feeling the heat of growing Chinese sea power are keen to have closer ties with the Indian Navy. Aware of Indian naval power, the wily Chinese have offered to have talks between the Indian and Chinese Navies, while the number of border violations across the 4,000 km disputed Indo-Chinese border (Line of Actual Control) have increased to over 400 in 2012, from a figure of 181 in 2011. At the same time China continues to boost up the military capabilities of its two nuclear armed proxies viz. Pakistan and North Korea. Amongst the three services – Army, Navy and the Air Force – only the Indian Navy has a proud record of indigenous shipbuilding over the last 50 years. Unfortunately, its

Challenging the dragon at sea

by 2030

record of indigenous construction of conventional submarines (or SSKs) and strategic Arihant class submarines (or nuclear-powered, ballistic missile-carrying submarine SSBNs) has been comparatively poor. With the arrival of the tactical nuclear submarine (SSN), INS Chakra, on April 4, 2012, the challenge now is how to quickly build indigenous SSNs for the navy by utilising the massive unused capacity of the private-sector Indian shipyards, like Pipavav, which is India’s largest, most modern shipyard and has some of the world’s largest dry docks for submarine building, in a joint venture with a public sector shipyard or yards which have the necessary expertise. Given China’s continued sabre-rattling in the South and East China Seas, it is only a matter of time before India and its navy, are confronted by the dragon at sea. India needs to take a series of measures to boost its sea power in the IOR eg building a 65,000 ton aircraft carrier, six more conventional submarines of the much delayed Project 75(I), setting up more naval air stations in strategically located islands off

its west and east coast, satellites for surveillance, communications and real time maritime domain awareness (MDA). The only viable antidote to the Chinese seaborne threat is the SSN. While a second INS Chakra type SSN should be acquired from Russia at the earliest, there is no doubt that the Indian Navy urgently needs 6 to 12 SSNs to meet its challenges in the vast expanses of the IOR and APR, specially if it has to operate in the APR without any foreign base support. In addition, India would need real time Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) from friendly APR and IOR nations about movement of Chinese warships and merchant ships. India’s quest to acquire medium sized aircraft carriers has been delayed. Media reports mention that the 44,000 ton Russian aircraft carrier ex- Gorshkov (INS Vikramaditya) will now be handed over to the Indian Navy a year later ie in end 2013, due to boiler (asbestos liner) problems. The indigeneous 40,000 ton INS Vikrant, being builtat the Kochi based Cochin Shipyard Ltd has been delayed from 2015 to 2017, due to late receipt of its gearbox and other

problems. A 40,000 ton aircraft carrier can embark about 18 to 20 modern fighter aircraft along with a few AEW (Airborne Early Warning) and ASW (Anti-Submarine Warfare-cum-AntiShip) helicopters. Most medium sized navies (including the Chinese who have a 65,000 ton carrier on sea trials and British, who are building two such ships by 2016 and 2019) have now realised that to be effective, an aircraft carrier needs to embark about 36 fighter aircraft in addition to AEW and ASW helicopters. In the past, dry dock space constraints (the CSL dry dock being the largest a decade ago, can accomodate only a 40,000 ton aircraft carrier for building or repairs). Fortunately, the ultra modern Pipavav Shipyard (located in Pipavav, southern Gujarat) has dry docks capable of building and repairing such large ships. Its time to commence design work on a 65,000 ton aircraft carrier and use this as a standard platform for future designs. India is doing well in building sophisticated warships like desroyers, frigates, mine hunters and is about to commence work on building

December 2012 Defence AND security alert

THE GROWTH PATHWAY

Building SSKs is a complex and time-consuming process, as it requires dedicated specialised manpower and infrastructure for design and construction. In the case of nuclear submarines (SSNs and SSBNs), the complexity and “degree of difficulty” increases manifold, as design of a safe, reliable miniature reactor and expensive silencing techniques are essential. Between an SSBN and an SSN, the latter is even more complex, as the SSN is required to be at least 30 per cent faster, more silent at higher speeds and capable of operating at depths that are far greater than the SSBN or SSKs. The UK took six years to design their latest Astute class SSNs and then another 10 years to make the first (HMS Astute) operational in 2011. A total of seven Astute class submarines are being built, with a new unit being delivered every two years. The lesson here is that India should aim to build at least 6 to 12 SSNs so that the cost-cum-time benefits of series production, after initial design, are realised. The universally accepted norm after over a century of submarine construction is to have stringent quality control at the construction

India’s experiments with constructing conventional submarines, on a single tender basis, at Mazagon Dock Limited (MDL), Mumbai, (initially two German-designed HDW units were built between 1984 and 1994) was, perhaps, necessary at that time given the paucity of shipyards and dry docks in the country. Nonetheless, this experiment showed that the total building time could have been reduced by half (ie four to five years saved in the construction of each submarine), had a joint venture system been followed, as against the German build time of 56 months, MDL took 96 and 108 months respectively. The same experiment was repeated in 2004, with MDL being again nominated for the construction of six French-designed Scorpene submarines and the project is already about four years behind schedule. India’s advanced technology vessel (ATV) project to build a few SSBNs by the Defence Research and Development Organisation was also done on a single tender basis and Larsen & Toubro (L&T) yard was nominated. Once again, perhaps at that time, there were very sound reasons for this single tender project. Though the project originated in the 1970s it was in 1998 that the then defence minister, George Fernandes first publicly mentioned it. The first SSBN (Arihant) was publicly launched on July 26, 2009, in the presence of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. Till early November 2012, the Arihant

December 2012 Defence AND security alert

is yet to start sea trials, while press reports mention two more being built. Given an international norm of “eight years start to finish” project time, the Arihant is definitely a few years behind schedule. But this could be expected in a first of an indigenous SSBN. However, valuable time could have been saved if SSBNs of the Arihant had been made in a joint venture with other shipyards which have valuable dry dock space and adequate infrastructure. I do hope that any additional improved Arihant follow on units, if ever planned, will be built using the joint venture concept, thus harnessing the full shipbuilding capability of India.

The nations of Asia Pacific Region are beginning to feel the heat of prolonged Chinese muscle flexing at sea. The Chinese economy is slated to overtake the US economy by 2027. By 2030, China will have blue water navy with a capability to operate for prolonged periods in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Indeed most strategists have linked these two oceans as one strategic mass of water connected by narrow choke points. The Asia Pacific Region (APR) and Indian Ocean Region (IOR) are now being referred to as the Indo-Pacific Region (IPR)

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Given China’s continued sabre-rattling in the South and East China Seas, it is only a matter of time before India and its navy, are confronted by the dragon at sea. India needs to take a series of measures to boost its sea power in the IOR eg building a 65,000 ton aircraft carrier, six more conventional submarines of the much delayed Project 75(I), setting up more naval air stations in strategically located islands off its west and east coast, satellites for surveillance, communications and real time maritime domain awareness (MDA)

stage, the harbour trials stage and the sea trials stage. In addition, building complex platforms, like the SSNs, in acceptable time frames requires joint ventures between two or more shipbuilding yards (either public or private) if India is to become a great sea power, which can complement the strengths of each other’s infrastructure and manpower, to independently build the various “sections” of the SSN hull, which are welded together to form “blocks” and transfer them to a “master yard” which has suitable dry docks, where these “blocks” are welded together to form a complete submarine, which is then “floated out” of the dry dock, for final “Harbour Acceptance Trials” (HATS), followed by “Sea Acceptance Trials” (SATS).

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20,000 ton amphibious warfare ships. I will now deal with the strategic field of submarine construction since this is an area that India has not done well so far and lags far behind the Chinese, who are rapidly building a large number of submarines and already have about 60 conventional submarines and a few SSNs and SSBNs in service.

308mm in. Bleed

sea power in India

With the arrival of the third-generation Akula class SSN at Visakhapatnam on April 4, 2012, it is but natural to expect India to commence indigenous construction of SSNs on a priority basis. Such a project may involve design and building of a new submarine and a new more powerful and silent miniature reactor by Bhabha Atomic Research Centre. Hence, India would need a few years of design work, followed by joint venture construction of a series of at least 6 to 12 SSNs, to replenish the rapidly ageing conventional submarine fleet, especially given the five-year delay in even issuing Request for Proposals for the second conventional SSK production line under Project 75(I). Hopefully, the decision-makers in South Block take note and take the appropriate steps to make India a true submarine building nation at the earliest and also provide the Indian Navy the wherewithal to protect our national interests at sea.

Boeing is proud of its longstanding partnership with India. A partnership India can depend upon to meet its developing requirements, from surveillance, strike and mobility platforms to C4ISR, unmanned systems and support services. The most advanced systems and technologies providing the greatest value for India. That’s a partnership of endless possibilities.

boeing.co.in

sea power in India

CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES

A Vice Adm Vijay Shankar PVSM, AVSM, ADC (retd) The writer holds an MSc in Defence Studies and is a graduate of the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, USA. He is the former Commander-in-Chief of the Andaman and Nicobar Command, C-in-C of the Strategic Forces Command and Flag Officer Commanding Western Fleet. His Command and operational experience are comprehensive and include Command of INS Viraat the aircraft carrier. He is a member of the adjunct faculty of the National Institute of Advanced Studies and he currently tenants the Admiral Katari Chair of Excellence at the United Services Institute.

In this era the fears and anxieties of nations are driven by four vital traumas. At the head of these four is the perpetuation of the state and its dispensation. In second place is the fear and understanding that impedance to the nation’s ambitions of growth and development may come about due to internal or external stresses or a combination of the two. The third trauma is that the remaining interests that the state considers critical must be recognised and accepted by the international system; this distress places the system on the horns of a dilemma, particularly so when interests overlap at which time there is a real potential for friction and conflict. Lastly, is a conundrum faced by all major powers that is, does military power prevail?

nti-access Denial seeks to contest and deny regional or extra-regional countries the ability to unilaterally project military power to secure their interests either through aggression or through other destabilising activities. The instrument to achieve denial is by convincingly raising the cost of military intervention through the use or threat of use of methods that are asymmetrical in form and disruptive in substance. The strategy’s first impulse is to avoid a hot conflict. The writer examines in detail the Chinese Anti-access Area Denial strategy. He then advocates an Indian Anti-access strategy for the IOR to devise operational and material strategies to deter, threaten (and should the need arise) strike and neutralise Chinese aircraft carriers that may menace our vital interests in the IOEO. To deploy denial forces that effectively blockade the ‘string of pearls’ ports. Platforms of choice would be conventional submarines, maritime strike aircraft both supported by long-range surveillance efforts. This strategy would seek to disrupt and disable operational networks through ASAT and active cyber action and to surveil and seed the straits and narrows with seabed sensors, surface and air scouts and through cooperative arrangements.

he end of the cold war and the paradigm that it represented brought in its wake scholarly works that sought to prognosticate what future international relations and order held. Wide ranging theories were advanced of the emergence of one world in which harmony, democracy and an end to conflict were prophesised and with it an end to a turbulent history of man’s ideological evolution with the grand terminal formulation that western liberal democracy had prevailed.1 Some saw the emergence of a multipolar order and the arrival of China notwithstanding the warts of Tiananmen. Yet others saw in the First Iraq War, the continuing war in the Levant, the admission of former Soviet satellite nations into NATO and the splintering of Yugoslavia, an emerging clash of civilisations marked by violent discord shaped by cultural and civilisational similitude.2 However, these illusions were, within a decade, dispelled and found little use in understanding and coming to grips with the realities of the post cold war world as each of them represented a candour of its own. The paradigm of the day (if there is one) is the tensions of the multipolar; the tyranny of economics; the anarchy of expectations; and a polarisation along religio-cultural lines all compacted in the cauldron of globalisation. So too when thinking of maritime affairs a paradigm only places in perspective the events that we are confronted with, provides a pattern and a context within which a strategy may be devised and force structures put in place to come to terms with an uncertain future. China’s quest to secure efficiently rights of passage on the sea to fuel her thirst for energy, primary produce and commodities has led her to the ‘Northern Passage’3. Today that paradigm is a reality, in 2011 alone more than 18 commercial ships and in 2012 forty ships have made the now ice-free crossing and it is no surprise that Chinese merchantmen are leading the charge. Significantly the route avoids two sensitive ‘choke points’ the Malacca Strait and the Suez Canal. China also theorises that the road to securing these sea lines of communication is through a strategy of ‘Access Denial.’4 The access denial paradigm was founded on China’s security concern in 1. Fukuayama Francis. “The End of History.” The National Interest, 16 (Summer 1989), pp 4, 18. 2. Huntington. Samuel, P. The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order, Penguin Books, India 1997, pp 30-39. 3. Article by writer titled “The Gwadar-Karakoram-Xinjiang Corridor”, published in the September 2012 issue of the DSA. The Northern Passage was a fabled sea route theorised by adventurers, merchants and money chandlers over the last six centuries to link the Pacific with the Atlantic Ocean. The Route lay through the Arctic archipelago the treacherous ice flows that frustrate passage across the Arctic Ocean. To put matters in perspective, as a trade corridor the distance from China to markets in Europe has been cut down to less than 8,000 miles from 14,700 miles. 4. Security analysts have examined China’s efforts to develop weapons systems that can retard or even stop a potential adversary from entering an area of interest. Dubbed “access-denial,” the aim of such a strategy is to use weapons that deter and should the need arise challenge or indeed prevent inimical forces from operating in conflict zones or oceanic areas of interest . The teeth of this strategy is an anti-ship missile. Such a missile, fired from land, sea, underwater or air can cause tremendous damage to an enemy surface vessel. While such technology isn’t new, the effective ranges of such weapons have increased tremendously, along with their accuracy, speed of delivery and precision. Defending against such systems is therefore a major problem for planners.

December 2012 Defence AND security alert

relation to Taiwan. The US deployment of two carrier groups to the region during the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait crisis remains in Chinese memory as an embarrassing infringement of sovereignty. The value and logic of an access denial strategy is obvious in reference to Taiwan. But enabling such a strategy when scope and space are enlarged must clearly tax strategists worldwide and suggest a future marked by bewildering uncertainty.

The fear of nations Some of the symptoms of the anarchic nature of things are a vicious securing of spheres of power and economic influence as exemplified by China in Africa; the competition between autocracy and liberalism; an older religious struggle between radical Islam and secular cultures; and the inability to regulate the chaotic flow of technologies and information. As these struggles are played out the first casualty in the post cold war era is the stillborn hope of a benign and enlightened world order. The endemic instability worldwide is characterised by the number of armed conflicts that erupted between the periods 1989 to 2010 which total 49.5 The nature of these wars, reflected what I term the ‘Uncertainty Paradigm’ for they ranged from wars of liberation and freedom to insurgencies, civil wars, racial-ethnic-religious wars, proxy wars, interventions and wars motivated by the urge to corner economic resources. In all cases it was either the perpetuation of a dispensation, political ambitions, or the fear of economic deprivation that was at work below the surface.

Contemporary challenges in the IOEO are dominated by what direction China’s rise will take, of significance is that the potential for a collision is a reality and the only consideration that could deter it, is the ability of India to attain a strategic posture in the IOEO that serves to stabilise. India’s relationship with the USA provides some openings to establish cooperative security in the region that could counterpoise China In this era the fears and anxieties of nations are driven by four vital traumas. At the head of these four is the perpetuation of the state and its dispensation. In second place is the fear and understanding that impedance to the nation’s ambitions of growth and development may come about due to internal or external stresses or a 5. The World at War http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/index.html.The United Nations defines “major wars” as military conflicts inflicting 1,000 battlefield deaths per year. In 1965, there were 10 major wars underway. The new millennium began with much of the world consumed in armed conflict or cultivating an uncertain peace. As of mid-2005, there were eight major wars underway [down from 15 at the end of 2003], with as many as two dozen “lesser” conflicts ongoing with varrying degrees of intensity.

December 2012 Defence AND security alert

sea power in India

CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES

combination of the two. The third trauma is that the remaining interests that the state considers critical must be recognised and accepted by the international system; this distress places the system on the horns of a dilemma, particularly so when interests overlap at which time there is a real potential for friction and conflict. Lastly, is a conundrum faced by all major powers that is, does military power prevail? It will not fail anybody’s notice that both India and China fall into this very same cast ensnared by the ‘four traumas’, with one very critical difference and that is the cooperative stimulus along with an egalitarian tradition is strong in India’s case, while China has no belief in respecting either. Against this backdrop, when the politics of competitive resource access is put into the same pot as survival and development of state, to which is added the blunt character of military power, we have before us the recipe for friction and conflict. It is against this canvas that the development and structuring of Indian maritime power must be gauged.

Evolution of China’s ‘Access Denial Strategy’ China published its sixth Defence White Paper in January 2008. Its contours were that of a self-confident China recognising its own growing economic and military prowess. The paramountcy of containment of the various social fissures that development had precipitated was top of their agenda. Their appreciation of the security situation underscored the belief that the risk of worldwide all-out war was relatively low in the foreseeable future, yet, the absence of such risk did not automatically imply a conviction that stability and peace pervades international relations. The paper critically points out that struggles for cornering strategic resources, dominating geographically vital areas and tenanting strategic locations have, in fact, intensified. Power as a natural currency of politics remains the preferred instrument. Under these circumstances the portents for friction are ever present and would therefore demand preparedness, modernisation and strategic orientation of a nature that would serve to neutralise the fall out of such friction.6

Expansion of the ASEAN and the creation of the ASEAN Regional Forum are suggestive of aspirations to counterbalance the looming presence of China in their grouping One of the clauses that is central to the White Paper is that “the influence of military-security factors on international relations is mounting.” China highlights the fact that they are in the process of implementing a military strategy of ‘active defence’, in which, material as well as doctrinal tenets would combine offensive operations with defensive manoeuvres. This would demand that the Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) develop advanced assault capabilities. Of significance is the enhancement of mobility and strike capabilities in all three dimensions. Doctrines to back such capabilities involving sea-air-land integrated operations would be central to military strategy. Long-range assault, regional reach and the development of ‘Access Denial’ and control strategies are at the core of Chinese military thought.7 To China, two events of the 1990s have had a seminal impact on the shaping of their military strategy. The first of these is the Gulf War of 1991. China took home not lessons or answers but, a reason for strategic pre-emption. In the words of General Liu Jingsong “allowing a modern military opponent unfettered access to land, sea and air territories in which to build-up and employ forces, as well as regional bases and logistic hubs to sustain them, was a recipe for defeat." He pointed out that the very assembly and positioning of coalition forces constitute the “first salvo” and justified action to counter or even deter actual war.8 The second event was the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995-1996, which to the Chinese was a humiliating experience of their sovereignty being violated when the US deployed two carrier groups in the Strait with impunity. These events were the primary cause to formulate and enable their ‘Access Denial’ strategy. The development of ‘Access Denial’ capabilities has shown impressive growth over the last decade and a half, not just in terms of material progress but also in terms of doctrinal foundations and operational precepts. China’s three modernisations, along with their investments in cyber warfare, anti-air, anti-ship weaponry and anti-carrier hardware in addition to the thrust on nuclear submarine, both strategic and nuclear powered attack submarines, a carrier group centred on the Liaoning (ex Varyag) aircraft carrier with its suite of J-15s all make for a force that is increasingly lethal in effectiveness and enhanced in reach. Operating from infrastructure that they have cultivated from Sittwe and Aan in Myanmar to Hambantotta in Sri Lanka, Maroa in the Maldives and Gwadar in Pakistan (collectively the so called ‘string of pearls’) would give teeth to the long-range access denial.

‘string of pearls.’ Also one regiment of ASAT missiles along with cyber warfare teams to manipulate, black out, control and wage information warfare that will seek to paralyse operations in the or Indian Ocean Eastern Ocean. In t h e absence of a security oriented cooperative impulse, the problem with such sweeping strategies is its blindness to recognise that, we are in fact dealing with a sea space that, in Mahan’s words, is the busiest of all the “vast commons.” The reluctance for collaboration makes the potential for friction high. During President Hu Jintao’s review of the South China Fleet at Shanya in April 2008, he declared that the central problem arising from China’s security goals was how to maintain the robust level of resource access and to put in place control features needed to sustain and nurture national development. To this end, the importance of protecting and securing maritime interests present a major challenge. He specifically focused on the PLAN’s rapid reaction capability in its territorial seas, sea control capabilities in blue waters and power projection in waters of interest. In relation to extra regional naval forces, the PLAN’s strategy would centre on an effective denial capability. To achieve these objectives, the development and implementation of Access Denial Strategy and the ‘Assassin’s Mace’9 were key. The rapid expansion of the nuclear submarine fleet is all a part of this venture. The new dispensation which is due to take over the reigns of office in March 2013 under chairman Xi Jinping has promised continuity with power being central to their policies.10

Oceans and economic power The realisation that maritime power is at the heart of making effective use of the world’s oceans as an inexhaustible source of energy, raw materials, food and most critically as a medium for the movement of trade, materials, petroleum products and indeed of personnel; so also do the oceans provide the portents for discord. This has driven China from a closed centrally planned system to a more market oriented security sensitive nation. Today it is the world’s largest exporter, its economy at US$ 9.8 trillion is only second to the USA and with energy consumption of 8.2 million bbl / day she is the third largest consumer in the world. When we look at the growth pattern of India since liberalisation, we note a similar trend with respect to consumption patterns, energy demands, exports and trade. Indeed with one third of this growth being powered by trade to the East (in 2012 trade with ASEAN nations was pegged at US$ 80 billion), the requirement to secure these interests become all the more vital. Already, the 2011 figures make China our largest trading partner (US$ 70 billion). Security of this trend will be a key to development of India. At the same instant, in the race to garner limited resources for the development of two very large economies the scope for friction looms large.

Specific operational deployments may include one carrier group operating in the Eastern Ocean; a Jin class Ballistic Missile Nuclear Submarine (SSBN) on deterrent patrol; two Nuclear powered attack Submarines (SSN) on SLOC patrol with cooperating surface groups and maritime patrol aircraft; long-range maritime strike aircraft operating from Aan or Gwadar; one amphibious brigade standby with transports on hand at one of the

The reasons many countries view China with trepidation today are similar on the surface to their reaction to the rise of Japan in the 1970s and 80s and yet rooted in very different forces. China, too, uses a competing economic model, albeit with a difference (the very phrase used is an oxymoron) – “state capitalism” – that challenges established economic ideology. In many ways, China also behaves in a mercantilist fashion. It keeps its currency controlled so its exports can out-compete those from other countries and it corners natural resources by methods that are reminiscent of colonial dealings. But the real alarm is that China openly seeks to influence and eventually dominate international political and security institutions without bringing about a change within her own biological morphology.

6. Ma Cheng-Kun, PLA News Analysis, “Significance of 2008 China’s National Defence White Paper” no. 15, pp. 49-60. 7. Ibid 8. Lewis John Wilson and Litai Xue, “The Quest for a Modern Air Force” in Imagined Enemies China Prepares for Uncertain War, Stanford University Press 2006, p 237. General Liu Jingsong, a member of the 15th CPC Central Committee, he was also the PLA Commander of the Shenyang and Lanzhou military regions and to him amongst others is attributed the opening of Equatorial Guinea 1995.

9. Ma Cheng-Kun, PLA News Analysis “China’s security strategy” number 8 April 2008, Pgs 146-150. The assassin’s mace programme is a part of China’s asymmetric war fighting strategy to develop capabilities designed to give a technologically inferior military advantages to overwhelm a technologically superior adversary. Their ASAT programme, strategic hacking teams and cyber warfare, submarine programmes are all a sub-set of the assassin’s mace 10. BBC E-news. www.bbc.co.uk 15 November 2012.

December 2012 Defence AND security alert

sea power in India

CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES China and her case for lebensraum China’s claims on the South China Sea as a territorial sea (see Map 1); her handling of dissent within, in Tibet and Tiananmen; her proliferatory carousing with rogue states such as North Korea and Pakistan are cases, amongst others, that do not inspire confidence in change occurring within without turbulence. We also note with some foreboding, the emergence of China from out of its, largely, defensive maritime perimeters as defined by the first and second island chain strategies into the Indian Ocean region. To this end, it has through diplomacy and economic inducements established bases in Sittwe, Hambantota, Gwadar and Marao in the Maldives.

The geographic and strategic significance of these posts were apparent in the past and are equally vital today, whether for purposes of control, regulating, providing havens or assuring security to energy lines. Sittwe and Gwadar also provide the front end for piping energy into China. These long-term strategic investments by China maybe seen as the coming of the ‘Third Island Chain’. Map 1: China’s claims of territorial sea along with the UNCLOS approved EEZs of the littoral states. Shaded circles indicate the disputed islands. Source: www.bbc.co.uk

The reasons many countries view China with trepidation today are similar on the surface to their reaction to the rise of Japan in the 1970s and 80s and yet rooted in very different forces In articulating its strategic objectives it has unambiguously identified three canons, the first of which is internal and external stability to its own gauge; the second is to sustain the current levels of economic growth and lastly to achieve regional pre-eminence. Gone is the ‘power bashfulness’ that marked the Deng era, in its place is a cockiness that is discernible by the contemporary conviction that “the-world-needs-China-more-than-China-the-world”. Lt Gen Qi Jianguo, the Asst Chief of General Staff’s comment on the building of an aircraft carrier is revealing, he stated “It would have been better for us if we had acted sooner in understanding the ocean and mapping out our blue water capability earlier. We are now facing heavy pressure in the oceans whether the South China Sea, the East China Sea or the Taiwan Straits.”11At the heart of the matter lie three vulnerabilities:12 Vulnerability of the economic powerhouses located along the east coast and the SLOCs that feed it. Vulnerability of Taiwan. Vulnerability of the sea spaces, dramatically demonstrated by the crisis of 1995-1996. Seen in this frame of reference General Liu Jingsong’s words carry new meaning, for if the first salvo is the build-up; then it is not from the precincts of pre-emption that a strike emerges but as a reactive and a defensive strategy. This rationale gives form to the ‘Access Denial Strategy’ and when projected in consonance with the Third Island Chain, one notes the enlarged space of conflict.

A theory of maritime warfare and terms for structuring the fleet A fourfold classification of maritime forces has dominated naval thought since the Second World War. The grouping is largely functional and task oriented. The differentiation comprises of aircraft carriers, strike units, escorts and scouts, denial forces and auxiliaries (the last include logistic and other support ships such as mine layers, sweepers, tenders etc). In addition contemporary thought has given strategic nuclear forces a restraining role to define and demarcate the limits within which conventional forces operate. Clearly, the makeup of fleets must logically be a material articulation of the strategic concepts and ideas that prevail. The principal demand of the theory of naval war is to attain a strategic position that would permit control of oceanic spaces. 11. BBC E-news 08 June 2011. Lt Gen Qi Jianguo speaking to the Hong Kong Commercial Daily. 12. Lampton, David M The Three Faces of Chinese Power. Might, Money and Minds. Berkeley, University of California Press 2008, p 16, 40-41 and 50.

December 2012 Defence AND security alert

Against this frame of reference the fundamental obligation is therefore to provide the means to seize and exercise that control. It therefore comes as no surprise that China develops forces necessary to realise an ‘access denial’ strategy. Pursuing this line of argument, the rational formulation that remains consistent with our theory of naval warfare is that upon the escorts and scouts depends our ability to exercise control over sea area; while on the aircraft carrier group assisted by strike and denial forces depends the security of control. Control and Security of Control is the relationship that operationally links all maritime forces. The argument against seeking a decisive engagement is driven by the fact that the antagonist may hardly be expected to be so accommodating as to expose his main forces. As Corbett so eloquently put it “the more closely he induces us to concentrate in the face of his fleet, the more he frees the sea for the circulation of his own trade and the more he exposes ours to cruiser raids.”13 Indeed, there is no correct solution to this dilemma of how best in time, space and most economically, can sea control be established as this would often be dictated by the relative strength, constitution of the fleet, intentions and the geographic character of the theatre of operations. Maritime warfare is governed by the ability to control maritime space and put it to use that furthers the national effort. If we were to look at the two defining characteristics of the international systems as mentioned earlier, it is apparent that instability and the concept of sovereignty play a disproportionate role in the roots of conflict and yet there are a host of other factors that influence relations between nations. War today, is not just a continuation of politics but politics and military strategy as Kissinger suggested, merge at every point.

Anti-access denial and contemporary challenges In the development of a strategy the first imperative for India is to bring about coherence between security dynamics, strategic space and growth. It begins by defining the geographical contours within which the strategy to ‘deny maritime access’ to China’s military power or other inimical extra-regional powers (should such an eventuality arise) will operate. The broad parameters in this definition must factor in the areas from where the mechanics of trade originate, the energy lines run, the sea lines of communication pass, the narrows contained therein which China would endeavour to secure and the geographic location of potential allies. In this context the sea space between the 30 degree East Meridian and the 130 degree East Meridian extending to the Antarctic continent provides the theatre within which the ‘Anti-access Denial’ strategy will function. We may call it the Indian Ocean and Eastern Ocean region (IOEO). This hydrospace, bound by land masses on all sides except the 130 East Meridian, has some unique features. Its weather is dominated by the monsoons and tropical systems; the hydrology of this Ocean makes it difficult for underwater surveillance operations between the 30 degrees north south parallels. Widespread clouding impairs domain transparency. Small ship operations, other than in the littoral seas, are particularly inhibited during the 6 month monsoon period. Density of traffic through the narrow passages and straits makes surveillance without identification incoherent. This Oceanic body is dominated by ten important choke points. From west to east these may be identified as follows: The Cape of Good Hope: It is a way point across which transoceanic shipping traffic plies to and from the Atlantic Ocean and the Indian Ocean. Four million containers transit the Cape annually. The Strait of Babel Mandeb: It is a strategically important strait that separates the Arabian Peninsula from Eastern Africa and links the Mediterranean Sea. Through this strait passes 3.3 million barrels of oil / day. The Strait of Hormuz: It is a key energy corridor shipping 40 per cent of seaborne oil traded globally. Through these narrows 16.5-17mbl / day of oil ply. Dondra Head: It provides the passage which connects the sea lines of communication from the 9 degree channel to East Asia provides a deep water route for a third of global traffic. 13. Corbett. Some Principles of Maritime Strategy p. 115.

December 2012 Defence AND security alert

sea power in India

CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES

Six Degree Channel: It is the primary route that feeds into the Strait of Malacca. Between 200 and 220 ships transit this Channel everyday of which more than 15 per cent are oil tankers, 10 per cent of which are bound for China. The Malacca Strait: At the heart of the Eastern Ocean lie the Malacca Strait which links the Indian Ocean with the Pacific Ocean. It offers the most cost efficient SLOC, connecting the energy and mineral rich African continent and the oil rich regions of the Persian Gulf and the Middle East with the Eastern Ocean. The Sunda Strait: The Sunda Strait is a deep water channel that can accommodate very large crude carriers and container carriers it is not easy to navigate due to strong tidal flow and the presence of obstacles. An alternate route to the Malacca Strait. Lombok Strait: The Lombok Strait is an alternate passage to the Malacca and Sunda Straits. While it provides stealth, the strong cross-currents inhibit passage of commercial traffic; it also involves a diversion of close to 1,500 nautical miles. It’s virtue lies in the discretion it provides for the transit of nuclear powered submarines. Makassar Strait: The Makassar Strait is a natural route for ships transiting the Sunda or the Lombok to and from ports in the Celebes Sea, Sulu Sea and the South China Sea. The Luzon Strait: It provides the Pacific passage into the South China Sea. In essence this ocean space of interest with its ten choke points / passages provides the strategic context within which Indian maritime strategy must operate and the Sea Lines of Communication that power the region’s growth. In order to seek strategic, economic, political and security leverage in today’s international arena, an oceanic vision is the first essential and the idea must be backed by the development of a strategic military posture that characterises our resolve to fulfil the quest. Inspiration may take the form of a policy declaration in relation to the geographic region such as the ‘Look East Policy’, the ‘India Africa Forum Summit’ declaration or the Antarctic Treaty. Policy provides form for purposes of force planning to develop a strategic posture. Littorals may well develop denial capabilities with their focus on individual interests in these waters, but their effectiveness can only be assured through cooperative engagements with like-minded nations whose combined presence in the region would serve individual as well as collective interest. Within such a cooperative group it is reasonable to assume that individual friction would be subsumed to the larger denial objectives. Expansion of the ASEAN and the creation of the ASEAN Regional Forum are suggestive of aspirations to counterbalance the looming presence of China in their grouping. USA’s presence will dominate activities in the region in the immediate and mid-term future. Flash points such as territorial claims both in the maritime and continental domain will remain a source of friction that would necessarily demand military capabilities and a strategic orientation that serves to assure restraint. The eventuality of a US drawback from the region, remains a contingency that will leave a vacuum which has the potential for friction between China on the one side and India and Japan on the other.

The US deployment of two carrier groups to the region during the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait crisis remains in Chinese memory as an embarrassing infringement of sovereignty. The value and logic of an access denial strategy is obvious in reference to Taiwan On the trade front the picture is somewhat strategically paradoxical. India and China along with ASEAN14 are set to become the world’s largest economic bloc. The grouping is expected to account for about 27 per cent of Global GDP and will very quickly overtake the EU and USA economies. The buoyancy of the Indo-ASEAN relationship is backed by surging trade figures which in 2007 was US$ 15.06 billion and is slated to hit US$ 80 billion in the current year. With such burgeoning stakes in the region, the reason to establish strong and stable security ties now becomes a core issue. Notwithstanding the above, contemporary challenges in the region are dominated by three currents. While there are several regional and sub-regional issues whose influence on the region cannot be denied it is these three that will have the greatest impact on the success or otherwise of our policy. The challenge of a rising China: Towards the end of 2003 and early 2004 senior leaders of the Communist Party of China studied the rise of great powers in history noting the destructive inventory of conflicts that proved to be the engines of supremacy from the 15th century onwards. This brought them to the central theme 14. Since the declaration of India’s Look East Policy, the ASEAN-India relationship has grown from the limited sectoral partnership in 1992 to a full dialogue venture in 1995 and subsequently to a summit level collaboration in the first ASEAN-India summit held in 2002. This reflects a newfound mutuality between the two entities. The current membership of the original ASEAN grouping plus 6 is symptomatic of the shifting centre of gravity of geopolitics to the East and from a security angle, the inclusion of India, USA, Russia, Japan and South Korea in addition to China provides the context for security checks and balances in the Eastern Ocean.

December 2012 Defence AND security alert

of their examination: Could China dominate without recourse to arms? Unfortunately, in its relationship with India it has shown no propensity to establish cooperative stabilising arrangements nor has it taken any measures to resolve long-standing boundary disputes. Its collusion with reprobate states further pushes Sino-Indian relations downhill, the nuclear tie-up both in the weapon and civilian field with Pakistan along with possible doctrinal links and in March 2010, the failure to issue a condemnation when North Korea sank a South Korean warship does not suggest a pacific approach to relations. Its disputes with Japan and its forceful reassertion of claims to sovereignty over virtually the entire South China Sea are very serious ulcers in current relationships in the Eastern Ocean. As, no doubt, the history lesson would have told Chinese leadership that the relationship that determines regional conflict or otherwise is the stability of relationship between powers that have the greatest impact on the region. The hyper power: The overwhelming ascendancy of the single hyper power and its penchant to resort to military force seen against the backdrop of the intricate economic relations that the US and China currently enjoy poses an ironic dilemma. Is the American posture in the Pacific and Indian Oceans intrinsically antagonistic and would it break out into a hot conflict given the strategic links that USA enjoys with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and the other littorals of this region? The present would seem to suggest that the war of words is just a few turns away from a conflictual situation. The impact of instability in this region will be to adversely affect India’s economic and developmental aspirations in addition to the hazards of being drawn into an unintended clash. The mixed blessings of globalisation, rise of nationalism: Impact of globalisation and the inability of the state to reconcile with the stresses that it places on the very concept of sovereignty make historical sores take centrestage. Nationalism and ideology which was the underlying force that sparked off the major wars of the 20th century has today become the source of China’s confidence, to an extent, when the words of Chairman Deng who started the reforms in the early 80’s and advocated a strategy marked by restraint, patience, poise and guile15 now has a hollow ring about it. According to Yuan Peng of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations “many Chinese scholars suggest that the Government give up the illusion of US partnership and face squarely the profound and inevitable strategic competition.” 16 It is also apparent that the surge of nationalism that sweeps China has led it to formulate an affordable military strategy of asymmetric weapons (the ‘Access Denial’ and ‘Assassin’s Mace’ strategies are part of such a concept). These unorthodox strategies have set into motion three areas of rapid modernisation in the military establishment; firstly the most active land based ballistic and cruise missile programme in the world, secondly an enlarged nuclear attack and nuclear ballistic missile submarine fleet and lastly concentration on what China calls “informatisation,” an active and passive method of waging information warfare.

Concept of anti-access denial It would now be appropriate to define and derive objectives of the concept of Anti-access Denial as applicable to the larger Indian Maritime Military Strategy. Anti-access Denial seeks to contest and deny regional or extra-regional countries the ability to unilaterally project military power to secure their interests either through aggression or through other destabilising activities. The instrument to achieve denial is by convincingly raising the cost of military intervention through the use or threat of use of methods that are asymmetrical in form and disruptive in substance. The strategy’s first impulse is to avoid a hot conflict. To ‘contest and deny’ would first suggest a clear understanding of where the centre of gravity of power projection forces lie. In China’s case it is the triumvirate of the Aircraft Carrier; security of the narrows and of the ‘string of pearls’ that would be needed to assure sustenance of forces (on which is founded the integrity of the Third Island Chain); and safety of hulls that convey resources and energy vital to fuel growth. Use of aggressive means is clear enough, but prying open faults that could destabilise and therefore distract the main exertions, are not at all patent. In India’s case both internal as well as external stresses obtain that could be leveraged in order to subvert and undermine the primary thrust to contest and deny the ability to project power. China not only has the will and capability to exploit these opportunities but also has a willing ally in Pakistan. ‘To raise the cost of military intervention’ is a matter that resides in the mind of political leadership, yet there will always be a threshold, the verge of which is marked by diminishing benefits of intervention or power projection. It will be noted that it was a similar calculus (albeit in reverse) that must have come to play in the 1995 Taiwan Strait crisis that inhibited and forced China to reconcile to humiliation in the face of a possible debilitating confrontation. Also the logic of weakening out-of-region motivation sets in, diluting the efforts of the intervener. Lastly the threat of ‘use of force’ must not only be credible but also the ‘value exchange’ in terms of losses must weigh against the power projecting force. 15. The 24 Character Strategy is attributed to Deng Xiaoping in the early 90’s as quoted in the Pentagon’s annual China report dated 17th August 2010 “Coolly observe, calmly deal with things, hold your position, hide your capabilities, bide your time, never try to take the lead, accomplish things where possible”. 16. As quoted in The Economist of December 4-10, 2010 Special report p 9.

December 2012 Defence AND security alert

sea power in India

CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES

The objectives of India’s ‘Anti-access Denial’ Strategy may therefore be summarised as follows: To devise operational and material strategies to deter, threaten (and should the need arise) strike and neutralise Chinese aircraft carriers that may menace our vital interests in the IOEO. To deploy denial forces that effectively blockade the ‘string of pearls’ ports. Platforms of choice would be conventional submarines, maritime strike aircraft supported by long-range surveillance efforts. To disrupt and disable operational networks through ASAT and active cyber action. To surveil and seed the straits with seabed sensors, surface and air scouts. To devise material and operational strategies that serve to disable energy and resources traffic through non-lethal methods and to ensure that own escorts keep open our rights of passage on the sea. To raise the cost of military intervention will suggest a strategic posture that by disposition, demonstration, marking and resolve declare our orientation, will and intent that the cost of intervention will far outweigh its benefits. Leaving aside, for the moment, material aspects of generating capabilities, the most critical issue is one of timing, that is, what would be the enabling circumstances that would trigger India’s Anti-access Denial Strategy. While the short answer may be “when national interests are threatened” this does not in any way assist the planner in resolving the quandary. Two factors must, however, dominate. The first is that initial moves must be so calibrated that the intervener is made aware that a threshold is being approached and that the next rung in the escalatory ladder is a ‘hot’ exchange. This may take the form of ‘marking’ or through hotline communications. The second is by initiating demonstrative action which may serve to disrupt and disable operational networks or even measures instituted in some other theatre. A maritime Anti-access Denial Strategy unlike a continental standpoint, abhors Lakshman Rekhas for there are no readily definable geographic ‘red lines’, what is of greater import is context, circumstances and events, which brings us back to the original dilemma of characterising the conditions that would bring the strategy into play. We have noted China’s security narrative and the challenge that a rising China poses. Both advocate the centrality and compelling force of an aggressive drive to corner resources. Under this order of things, we may define our ‘red lines’ as follows: Any large-scale military attempt to change the status quo in our territorial configuration. Large-scale military build-up either at Hambantota, Gwadar or at Sittwe. Aggressive deployments that disrupt our own energy and resource traffic or dislocate networks. Any attempt to provide large-scale military support, covert or otherwise, to promote an internal war against the Indian state. In execution, our Anti-access Denial Strategy will be implemented in three distinct phases. The First will involve selective Anti-access Denial deployment, surveillance and marking in the IOEO; the second will entail demonstration through cyber action and possible ASAT intervention; the third and last is hot action including sea control, blockades and SLOC severance. Phases I, II and III will be preceded by and concurrent with bilateral and multilateral diplomacy to stabilise and defuse the situation. Any one of the phases may be brought into play singly or sequentially as a part of an escalatory ladder. We have in an earlier section identified maritime forces required in order to enable this strategy in addition to missions that these forces may be tasked with.

Force planning and structures In evolving a vision for maritime military forces, their planning and developing a strategic posture, of essence, is the understanding of the three dominant currents that influence and change the Eastern and Indian Oceans within which policy would have to operate. In the broadest of terms our vision would be ‘to create and deploy such forces which would establish and contribute to stability within these waters’. When dealing with the problem of means, a balance is necessary between objectives that are identified with available resources. Force planning must be driven by three overarching considerations. First, understanding of what the articulated national policy is; second, what challenges may arise in the short and long-term to this policy and the nature of conflicts which overlapping interests may cause; lastly, an estimate of potential loss or harm that may occur to our national interests if forces were not developed to address the first two. Infrastructure and logistic planning to deploy in the IOEO must factor not just the expanse of this region but

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also the ability to reach and sustain operations between 3,000 – 4,000 nautical miles from Indian ports / bases. Ideally the potential for development of infrastructure for such long-range operations towards the east lies in the Andaman and Nicobar islands which offers the necessary springboard into the Eastern Ocean and for the South Indian Ocean; forward operating bases in like-minded East African littorals cultivated through the IAFS. Such focused development endows us with the Mahanian logic of being able to provide the very “unity of objectives directed upon the sea.” A major infrastructural centre in the Andaman Sea must be accompanied by establishing base support facility arrangements in Indonesia, Vietnam and Japan. To the west, the Indian Ocean littorals such as South Africa, Malagasy, Tanzania, Mauritius and Seychelles will have to be cultivated. Such infrastructural backup would serve the policy admirably. The types of military maritime missions that the navy may be tasked within the IOEO may encompass war fighting, strategic deterrence, coercive maritime deployments, cooperative missions, diplomatic missions, policing and benign role. Forces that would be required at all times to fulfil these missions would comprise of: 1 x deployed carrier group. 3 x LPDs – with a brigade lift capability. 1 x squadron Su-30s with air to air refuelling facilities. 1 x squadron long-range maritime patrol aircraft. Squadron of long-range surveillance UAVs. 1 x amphibious division standby at the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. 1 x SSBN on deterrent patrol under Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) control. Nuclear submarine force and conventional submarines for anti-access denial tasks. Appropriate forces for surveilling, seeding and monitoring of straits. Appropriate ‘marking group’ to shadow hostile nuclear forces, ASAT batteries and cyber warfare teams. Forward submarine operating base and enhancement of air stations. Appropriate in theatre logistic support facilities.

Conclusion The ultimate reality of the international system is the place that power, in all its dimensions, enjoys in the scheme of assuring stability in relations between nations. Uncertainty in international relations queers the pitch, in view of the expanded space of possibles. The strategy of Anti-access Denial is a defensive power tool which is available to a nation provided it nurtures and develops capabilities that serve to ‘contest and deny’ adversarial power projection. For the strategy to have impact not only must in-theatre force balance be tilted towards the rebuffer through asymmetricity, but also, the first salvo must be his. China has unambiguously articulated three canons that make its strategic objectives; stability, growth and regional pre-eminence. In the absence of a security oriented cooperative impulse, the problem with such sweeping strategies specifically the coming ‘Third Island Chain’ superimposed on a long-range power projection and access denial is its blindness to recognise that, we are in fact dealing with a sea space that is the busiest of all the “vast commons”. The reluctance for collaboration makes the potential for friction high. Contemporary challenges in the IOEO are dominated by what direction China’s rise will take, of significance is that the potential for a collision is a reality and the only consideration that could deter it, is the ability of India to attain a strategic posture in the IOEO that serves to stabilise. India’s relationship with the USA provides some openings to establish cooperative security in the region that could counterpoise China. Phased implementation of the Anti-access Denial Strategy, from deployment through demonstration prior to a hot exchange is intrinsic to the scheme and essential to its mechanics if the interests of deterrence are to be served. The question of when or under what conditions the plan is to be brought to bear is a dodgy call for if Phase III is arrived at; it may well signify a point of no return. The article has suggested four ‘red lines’ which when breached may enable our Anti-access Denial Strategy; it is the second of these which will challenge decision-makers to the extreme, for if a military build-up at Hambantota, Gwadar or Sittwe is threatening, then at what stage of the mobilisation should the strategy be called into play? The obvious answer is “at an early stage” at which time we must find the will and resolve to translate rapidly from Phase I to Phase II. A focused plan in support of our Anti-access Denial Strategy must be placed on the anvil and purposefully hammered out, if we are to come to grips with the ‘Uncertainty Paradigm.’

December 2012 Defence AND security alert

sea power in India

OCEAN blind

“Only on the Oceans Lie India’s Hopes”

Vice Admiral Venkat Bharathan (retd) The writer is former Vice Chief of Naval Staff. He also served as Indian Naval Attache in Washington DC, USA.

“Only on the oceans lie India’s hopes” is neither a cliché nor, a marketing statement. It is a reality staring in our face. A reality we cannot see because of our “Ocean Blindness”. It is a continental mindset genome from our centuries old cultured DNA of being afraid of crossing the seven seas. This fear translates itself into a sin in our scriptures. Well that is yet another story.

he illustrative pictures below, clearly show-off the three sided island features as well as the sacred Himalayan mountain chain. This geographical advantage and the fact that 95 per cent of our trade is by the sea make us a predominantly seafaring nation.

Strange as it may seem, Nations are mostly a reflection of its people. A case in point is the ‘Indian and Chinese." The former an eclectic, freely speaking individual locally absorbed, with a martially inhibited DNA. The latter insular with a capacity to withstand and inflict pain and a sense of their identity

Comparisons invariably tend to be odious. Should India get hidebound by Chinese Maritime thrusts, the growing blue water PLA Navy. Should it react by a quantum increase in its military maritime expenditure or respond through a consensus of a coherent Military build-up, a balanced budget, a maritime consortium of benign littorals, including USA, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, Philippines, Australia, Russia. The Indian Ocean is too critical and important for World Trade Order and economic sustenance of the entire Asiatic belt. There is need by the Global comity to realise the peace and development dividend of making The Indian Ocean a robust East West Maritime bridge

How we ought to look at India and how we actually look This maritime view which did flourish till the early 13th century in the coastal parts of India did not survive the advent of European onslaught. After six decades of independence, despite our complete dependency on the seas our continental look continues to make us Ocean Blind. This in turn has caused us to accept an opaque maritime mindset. Today, sitting astride an ocean named after it, our ancient land should bemoan that INDIA is really and truly at sea! The World has changed and so too has India. The only constant is its intrinsic need of the Ocean to sustain, stabilise and reach out to the World. History is a good teacher and a curtain call for introspection is the bugle alert. How we manage the Indian Ocean for commerce and its security? How we preserve this geographical gift for posterity will decide our destiny. Our imperative maritime matrices have to be preceded by how we holistically view the Indian Ocean with a sense of ownership.

Imagining, imaging, infusing maritime India Maritime India has to be eclectic in approach, attitude. Commerce is the critical tipping point. Its security has to be ensured across the spectrum of trade, infrastructure, organisation, effective efficiency through military protection. Imagining, Imaging, Infusing Maritime India is the catalytic need to sustain and accelerate the present growth rate of India.

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Indian dependency, on the seas, is complete and critical. There is urgent need, to vastly improve across the span of trade, commerce, development, ocean exploration, fisheries, security and maritime access. Present maritime arrangements, existing regulations and compartmentalised activities of the various stakeholders and maritime players result in endemic inefficiencies, considerable fiscal shortfalls, significant security gaps, disjointed crises coordination and sub-optimal decision-making. This century old prescient prophetic statement is reality today. The Indian Ocean is one of the busiest in the World daily traversed by tankers and cargo ships. This keeps the World ticking. The powerful Navies of the World are permanent, proactive tenants of the Indian Ocean. Many foreign powers trade, negotiate, woo, coerce, control and coordinate with every littoral on their own terms. It is a fact that Indian Ocean littorals not only do not know each other well but remain distant strangers! Legacies of historic, cultural, commercial, hegemonic differences still persist. European powers, China and Russia seem to be very much in the minds and thoughts of these Nations. Lasting geopolitical changes have reshaped sovereignty and governance in most Indian Ocean littorals. India is astride of the Indian Ocean. It has geography, centrality and reach in the waters round it. It has gained international recognition as a secular democracy. In the last decade the Indian maritime spread has been significant. The Indian Ocean is a maritime common that is the focus of great interest by several countries, USA, China among a host of others are our maritime neighbours in presence and influence. Our response apart from being diplomatic has to be physical in the maritime arena. The Indian Navy does enjoy considerable reach with long sea legs. The coast guard and the merchant marine are continuously expanding. These all augur well. What is needed is only focused optimisation through dynamic coordination. India cannot afford to abdicate its rightful maritime suzerainty. The question that now begs asking is whether the Indian Navy can fulfill its role in India’s imperative maritime military matrices? If not, can a completely maritime dependent India afford to discount this. Our Domination by European powers was through the sea with lasting colonial scars. Should we allow History to repeat itself? The start point is Maritime Governance that brings together all stakeholders in peace. Only then can we look at the imperative military matrices.

Maritime military habits The Nature of War at sea would; Range from classic maritime four dimensional warfare to low intensity maritime operations as stated earlier. Preparation for both in all dimensions of surface, sub-surface, air and cyberspace would have to become an ongoing maritime military habit. Have to be correlated with our National interests rationalised with threats. Require resource planning, allocation and perspectives on development and directed growth. Depend on technology and the industrial base of the country.

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sea power in India

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“Sea Power continues to be central in the comity of Nations. Perpetuation of commerce over the seas has become the overarching mission. Sea power is synonymous with National power. A sense of the sea, palpable, critical awareness of its catalytic connectivity potential is the quintessence of this process. It has to be an integral aggregate of a country’s overall economic, technological, industrial, capability and strengths. This has to be woven into its vision of itself for the present and future. Its people have to participate first and last, be passionate and committed, with a sense of ownership, leadership and pride.” – Bharathan

Indian Ocean a common lake This Ocean being everyone’s lake is the reality today. The Indian Ocean is a floating home to about 35 to 40 warships from different nations, under Task Force 150, not to speak about the Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Sri Lankan Navies. At any given time there are at least 10 to 15 submarines transiting underwater. Nearly 2,000 merchant ships ranging from supertankers, gas carriers, cargo ships, container vessels, traverse these waterways everyday. Fishing fleets, dhows, trawlers, exploratory vessels, big oil rigs also cross the sea lanes. In peacetime alone the Arabian Sea, the Bay of Bengal, the important straits from east to west are all subject to threats of: Mutual interference among submarines. Environmental degradation due to discharge of dirty sullage oil by empty oil tankers in violation of UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on Laws of the Seas) agreed upon rules of behaviour. Major oil pollution disasters due to collisions between tankers. Tsunamis and cyclones. Low intensity threats of piracy, smuggling and hijacking. Strangulation of traffic, in choke points, due to any of the above. Disruption of vital trade in case of a conflict between the contending countries like India and Pakistan. Chinese maritime expansion into the Indian Ocean would further spawn tensions.

South China Sea – Indian Ocean – Persian Gulf – The East African Coast – The Uncommon Common Oceans are waterways connecting the Globe. These have vital survival, commercial and security implications for humanity. The swathe from the South China Sea to the East Coast of Africa is critical to all the littorals. In many ways due to the existing tensions between various littorals, this entire maritime continuum has evolved into an “UNCOMMON COMMON”. There is absence of any unifying coordination. The region lacks any organised response mechanism and incapable of even measurable reactions to any major contingency, let alone a coordinated response. There are emerging bilateral arrangements which are short of managing emergent large scale situations like tsunamis or major tanker collisions. UNCLOS is a viable coordinating medium. USA and India have set up cooperative engagements with many littorals. The annual naval exercises and other regular maritime conferences held in the region all have potential to bring about needed unifying changes in approach, attitude and agreements. China and India despite existing differences are jointly reviewing maritime cooperation initiatives. USA, India, Japan, Australia, South Korea and Vietnam have common cause to engage China collectively and bilaterally. ASEAN nations would welcome these initiatives. This Uncommon Common is critical for human survival and hence needs an arrangement that goes beyond customary perspectives of “National Interests and Threats.” The Regional leadership needs to be aware that even in the present conditions, the Oceans are fragile and the maritime environment needs nurturing for Global sustenance. “Realities of contention, divergence of interests, conundrum of bilateral agreements, historical animosity and limits of diplomacy militate against a cohesive coherent Global Maritime Vision. Narrowed World view by the leadership needs to change from the short-term and short-lived to the long and large-term sustenance and security

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of Humanity. Diplomacy, Military manoeuvres, Commerce, Science and Industry need to take the lead in spreading this awareness. Economic wellness and well-being of people have to evolve within parameters of Human Security”. A positive incremental beginning would obtain in the non-military spectrum and perhaps motivate the international system to resolve military and security tensions. The NON-MILITARY COOPERATION arena is one that is very much needed and doable. Non-military Maritime Cooperation Initiatives are: Setting up Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) systems to have a round-the-clock three dimensional overview of the maritime picture in the region. Monitoring seaborne traffic, effective response: to search and rescue, natural disasters, environmental pollution, tanker collisions, ocean research projects, would be optimally enabled if the coastal countries cooperate in creation of a viable MDA organisation. USA, China, India, Japan, Australia and advanced countries could take the initiative under the aegis of UNCLOS. Piracy-Terrorism-Contraband control. These low intensity but costly aspects present major challenges to Nations, Navies, merchant shipping and hence international commerce. Tackling this requires organisation, effort through coordinated planning in cooperation among all countries of the region. This initiative will also help in better understanding even by contending nations. Proliferation-Container-Port Security Initiatives – PSI/CSI/ISPS. Maritime terrorism and its rabid spread has resulted in counter initiatives to protect container traffic, preserve port security and prevent proliferation of nuclear and conventional ordnance. An overview of the present status of these shows significant shortfalls in awareness, preparedness, readiness. Concerted efforts in cooperation between all players is again the answer. Regional Search and Rescue Organisation. Search and rescue in busy waterways is an ever present requirement. The availability of an institutionalised, international organisation to coordinate and monitor SAR would increase safety of sea through standardised processes. Environmental Protection. The oceans of the world present major environmental challenges and consequent dangers. Rise in sea temperatures, changing patterns of ocean currents, pollution of the seas by coastal countries is on the rise. Resultantly marine life is being adversely affected along with danger of unhealthy mutation. This is compounded by discharge of dirty oil from shipping as well as over fishing by many states. Absence of regulatory enforcement and effective monitoring mechanisms in the Indian Ocean, South China Sea, the east coast of Africa and the Gulf region is a major weakness of the region. There is urgent priority need for all coastal states to regard maritime environmental protection as a strategic cooperation imperative. Disaster Management Coordination. Natural disasters are the order of the day. Coastal states rich and poor need constant support and coordinated effort for salvage, rescue and restoration. Preventive, pre-emptive response mechanisms, through planned command coordination centres, prepositioned assets and systemic infrastructure are priority International maritime requirements. Navies of nations are best suited for spearheading cooperative engagements. The Look East Policy of India, US maritime initiatives, the 5th fleet, Task Force, in cooperation with many nations could all be gelled into developing plans, systems, processes to make the non-military maritime cooperation imperatives a progressive reality.

Sino maritime moves The International Institute For Strategic Studies Assessment on China’s Naval Strategy makes interesting reading. “The PLA (N) current maritime strategy has three main elements: Military exercises designed for training purposes as well as to act as a deterrent; Longer-range power projection experiments; Military diplomacy in the form of port calls and bilateral cooperation. It is a maritime strategy which seeks to secure China’s access to energy resources and to give it more diplomatic leverage in territorial disputes with its neighbours. It has been able to draw on a military-industrial base and research and development capabilities that have gained maturity through two decades of reform and military modernisation. Of late, Chinese naval and coastal defence exercises have been unusually intense and numerous. Moving away from the heavily scripted affairs of the past, the emphasis has been on ‘real-life’ combat situations. Focusing on littoral defence, rapid mobilisation, command-and-control flexibility and longer-range projection, the exercises have

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been highly significant for the development of the PLAN (PLA Navy) and also demonstrate that it has achieved its greatest-ever level of operational flexibility in the simultaneous deployment of underwater, surface and air assets, with the confidence to sail over longer distances as it seeks to reinforce Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea. General Chen Bingde, a Central Military Commission member and Chief of the General Staff Department, called upon the PLAN to ‘pay close attention to regional situations and be militarily prepared’. Amid tensions in the South China Sea, this long-range combined-arms exercise sent a clear message of deterrence to China’s neighbours. It displayed China’s abilities and willingness to project its naval power to the South China Sea in a flexible and comprehensive manner.

The collapse of the Soviet Union mainly due to its uncontrolled military expenditure and cost prohibitive geopolitics is an object lesson for India and China too. The question hence is "should India be Sino-deferential, Sino-conscious, Sino-agnostic in a constantly changing Ocean neighbourhood? More importantly is there a Global recognition on the reality that this essential strategic waterway is in fact an uncommon maritime common without any coordinating mechanisms for management of the Indian Ocean PLAN is now focusing beyond merely achieving the capabilities required for a military resolution of the Taiwan issue. In an effort to demonstrate to the world, China’s ability to deploy a multi-layered and multi-armed defensive ring around its territorial waters, the PLAN has conducted long-range missile tests off the coast of Nanjing military region featuring PHL03 multiple-launch rocket systems. These have a range of some 150 km and can fire precision-guided munitions. The Naval Aviation branch of the PLAN, the PLA Navy Air Force, has provided extensive support towards these efforts. Since December 2008 it has deployed naval vessels to the multinational anti-piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden. Each four-month rotation usually consists of two destroyers or frigates and one replenishment ship. The PLA terms these ‘military operations other than war’ and sees them as an opportunity to train officers and test equipment. China has established arrangements for resupply ports. Chinese warships visit Djibouti, Salalah in Oman and Aden in Yemen. China’s task force has also begun to participate in meetings at which navies exchange operational information. The PLAN flotillas have participated in joint exercises and officer exchanges and have been keen to gain experience of anti-piracy tactics from other navies. The PLAN has expressed an interest in taking on more of a collaborative role in the anti-piracy effort, which would be a significant step of its overall approach of acquiring long sea legs. The PLAN’s largest vessel the Kunlun Shan, a 17,000-tonne Type 071 Yuzhao-class landing platform dock (LPD), was dispatched to the Gulf of Aden, carrying a platoon-level force of PLAN marines – the elite of the Chinese Navy. With Z-8 medium helicopters, a new landing craft and two new speedboats, the Kunlun Shan was able to test the navy’s expeditionary capabilities – vital for a vessel that would play a crucial role in any military action against Taiwan. In August helicopters and marines deployed from the Kunlun Shan repelled three groups of pirate skiffs. Kunlun Shan PLA LPD

The 10,000-tonne Peace Ark, China’s largest hospital ship has also been sent to conduct medical exercises with countries in the Gulf of Aden and along its route. Its “Soft power” sinews are symbolised well, through this deployment wherein its medical crew would provide assistance in Bangladesh, Seychelles, Djibouti, Kenya and wherever needed. PLA Navy from the coast to blue waters Over the last three decades China has grown long sea legs as is evident from the above. Learning from perhaps the British, the Americans on the value of sea power, it has built and still building a reckonable military maritime force that is capable of denying access and raising the threshold of intervention not only in the military sense but also in the context of economic impacts.

Aircraft carriers are the next logical progression in the wake of the PLA Navy.

Aircraft carrier genesis It would be interesting to note that till Liaoning appeared on the horizon, China was the lone permanent UN Security Council member which did not have an aircraft carrier. It also represents expanded Chinese national

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interests created by deeper integration into the global economy. In the past decade, China’s trade dependence doubled from 40 per cent in 2000 to 73 per cent during the 2006-2008, with more than 80 per cent of that trade carried by ships. The acquisition of a carrier would enable the PLA to implement Hu Jintao’s 2004 “New Historic Missions” and respond to demands to undertake a range of non-traditional security operations. Mastering the challenges of operating, defending and maintaining a carrier, as well as a possible accompanying carrier task force, will take at least a decade. The PLA Navy has gone through this evolution through a patient process. The LPD as well as the hospital ship are part of this expansion programme.

Peace Ark hospital ship

Liaoning

Aircraft carrier build plans China plans to build, 3 or 4 carriers based on its experience with Liaoning. A strategic context of the likely pros for China on its carrier deployment is important. Carriers enable power projection capability. The obvious advantages are: Carriers offer a scalable set of capabilities that can handle a range of high-end to low-end contingencies. These would be classic naval operations, asymmetric security missions and humanitarian tasks. It would give its maritime forces long sea legs through long-range deployments. It would globally enhance China’s image as an eminent power. Proactive regional influence. The Chinese presence in the South China Sea highlighted earlier would be a force multiplier with the induction of the aircraft carrier. The carrier group would provide visible Chinese naval presence in the South China Sea, Southeast Asia, along key sea lanes in the Indian Ocean. Improve China’s overall national strategic ability to counter presence of the US and other navies not only in its waters but also in the Indian Ocean as well the East African coastline.

Optimal Indian response China’s Maritime moves, its engagement and influence with Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Pakistan for maritime access and infrastructure is bound to impact the Indian Ocean dynamics. India since independence has pronounced the Indian Ocean to be a zone of peace and cooperation. It’s Maritime “East and West Look” is based on increased cooperation in the region to promote the concept of an Indian Ocean Common. It has moved to increase maritime engagement with Mauritius, Maldives, Seychelles and Madagascar and the rim states of South Africa, Tanzania and Mozambique to make strategic imprints in the region. The support includes Hydrographic surveys, regular port visits, transfer of offshore naval vessels, imparting training and refit facilities. Indian Navy had set up Mauritius Coast Guard in 1970s. Further, since the 1990s, India has embarked on a

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‘Look East Policy’, engaging East Asia, particularly ASEAN. The Indian Navy has regular cooperative engagements with Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia. Military Personnel from many of these countries are trained by India. There are also annual / biannual / programmed Navy to Navy exercises by India with USA, UK, France, Russia, Japan and China.

Indian military maritime growth and initiatives The Indian Navy in the last two decades has also evolved as a capable blue water entity. A three dimensional maritime force centered on two carrier battle groups being envisoned would be able to respond to any untoward Chinese Maritime action in the Indian Ocean region. There are however certain caveats that need to be fulfilled for India to evolve as a reckonable maritime power. These are: Self-reliance in becoming a builder’s military. This requires smart and realistic absorption of eclectic technologies that are readily available from USA, France, Russia and Israel. Creation of synergy among the various seagoing stakeholders through insitutionalised Maritime Governance Authority. Coordination between navy, coast guard, customs, mercantile shipping / port authorities.

Needed military maritime regional posture Strategic prudence on Security is best adopted in all circumstances. The present temperature of regional tensions and a growing aggressive Chinese maritime pose is a matter of concern. The PLA Navy and Beijing’s Maritime Strategy cause discomfiture. Its island claims in South China, build-up of a carrier based 3 dimensional fleet, denial of maritime access doctrine, independent thrusts in the Gulf and East Africa and seeking base support facilities in Indian Ocean evoke various uncomfortable reactions. Overarching US-CHINA trade relationships and the American debt and deficit status cast doubts on an optimal response by the latter in any confrontation. A focused coordinated response by countries with common democratic connections and concern about China’s growing stridency is needed to impose International restraint as well as impose some check and balance in regional geopolitical equations. American leadership is the prime mover. The region recognises, respects and needs the umbrella of American security. A Chinese denouement is neither desirable nor benign at present. However an international combine needs to contain and tame the red dragon. It has to be a repeat of the Allied effort against the Axis powers but without any military confrontation. USA and India have to lead the wake in this quest of a “Maritime Common” and keep the Oceans intact for the survival of Human race. It has to be predicated upon a two-pronged non-military cooperation and a non-combative military containment strategy. Japan, South Korea, NATO powers, Australia, ASEAN and Russia would readily welcome this initiative. Even the Chinese would have room to negotiate, review their maritime and security posture. It is as simple as that even amidst all its complexities.

Closure India is in a position of strength to chart its present and future destiny centered on its steady Maritime Wake. Favourable, diplomatic, geopolitical and economic equity, growing maritime awareness in international cooperation and recognition of India’s salutary benign role need to be properly internalised and then externalised in Strategy, Policy and Process. There has to be a consensus on removing the cataract of Ocean blindness, concentration on balanced maritime military robustness and a concept of unified operations involving all seagoing stakeholders including the air force and the army. Finally and importantly let us learn to be Sino-conscious and not Sino-deferential to focus on our own imperatives. “Only on the Oceans Lie India’s Hopes.”

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sea power in India

PARADIGM shift

Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM (retd) The writer is a combat veteran of many skirmishes on the Line of Control and counter-terrorist operations in Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab. He subsequently commanded the reputed Romeo Force during intensive counter-terrorist operations in the Rajouri-Poonch districts. He has served two tenures at the DGMO. He is a prolific writer on matters military and non-military and has published 24 books and over 100 papers in many prestigious research journals. He is Editor-in-Chief of Defence and Security Alert (DSA) magazine.

With its meteoric rates of growth, its huge geographic and demographic size and massive military modernisation, China now has the capacity and will to assert regional leadership. It is the unprecedented rise in the power of the Chinese Navy that is making it a serious new challenge to US power in the Asia-Pacific. The Chinese have carefully studied the basis of US power projection capabilities in the Asia-Pacific. It is now based upon the 11 Aircraft Carrier Battle Groups of the US Navy. These had forced China to back down over Taiwan in 1995-96. China has now deployed Asymmetric Warfare capabilities in the form of Surveillance and Global Positioning Satellites and the DF-21D Aircraft Carrier Killer missiles. Like the Japanese fielding of 10 Carrier Battle Groups in World War II, will the new Chinese capabilities prove to be a significant Game Changer in Naval Warfare? It has undoubtedly shaken and worried the Americans

he industrialisation and urbanisation of Asia has led to the inevitable growth and intensification of nationalism in these economically significant states. Nationalism may be on the decline in Europe, it is clearly on the upsurge in Asia. In tandem with dramatic economic growth and the rise of nationalism, is the unprecedented military and naval build-up now ongoing in Asia. Industrialisation and urbanisation had led to a similar upsurge of nationalism in Europe and resulted in two highly destructive World Wars. Is Asia replicating the European pattern of industrialisation that leads to a great hunger for energy, mineral and food resources? This hunger for resources leads to insecurities over access to energy and other critical inputs. Michael Wesley observes however that those Asian countries most closely allied with the US, lack the military heft to seriously help counter the Chinese challenge. Those partners with the greatest military heft, ie, India, Vietnam and Indonesia are least likely to align closely with the US Alliance System. Wesley highlights the fact that growing frictions between China and its smaller neighbours in the South China Sea and the East China Sea, pose dangers of entrapment for the US in the Western Pacific. The US embrace of status quo has emboldened the Philippines and Vietnam in strongly opposing Chinaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s claims â&#x20AC;&#x201C; both militarily and diplomatically. The principle of freedom of the high seas is at stake and competing nationalisms in Asia are setting the stage for future conflicts. Corruption and dramatic discord generated by economic inequities within the Asian nations enhance the need for external digressions. All this is leading to an unprecedented military and naval build-up in Asia. The chances of the outbreak of localised conflicts are increasingly getting higher.

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he last decade of the 20th century saw the onset of an inexorable power shift from Europe and the West in general to the vast land mass of Asia and the Asia Pacific rim. It merits recounting that in the 16th century, India and China between them, were generating 25 per cent of the world's GDP. These were the great and magnificent empires of the agricultural era of world history. The onset of the industrial revolution in Europe, led to the steep decline of the agricultural empires in Asia. India was colonised and China spent a century of humiliation at the hands of foreign powers. By the middle of the 20th century however, both India and China had re-emerged as major states and the Euro-centric orientation of world history was once again undergoing a significant shift of paradigm. The Asia Pacific region is now the economic powerhouse of the world. The worldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s second, third and fourth largest economies are now located in Asia and there are a whole range of second tier players on the rise. Thus besides, China, Japan and India, the states of Indonesia, Vietnam, Philippines and South Korea are also becoming significant regional players of consequence. Almost all the states of Asia are today engaged in an unprecedented military arms build-up. China is on the rise and the world is rife with speculation on whether the rising power will clash with the status quo power of America.

Japan, South Korea, Philippines and Australia have tightened their alliances with the US even as they have simultaneously deepened their economic integration with China. Countries like India, Vietnam, Indonesia and Singapore that are not US allies have also tightened their security ties to Washington even as they have maximised their trade and investment with China. However, as the Asian rivalry deepens and competitive nationalism rises the region is headed for ever increasing levels of violence uncertainty The industrialisation and urbanisation of Asia has led to the inevitable growth and intensification of nationalism in these economically

RISING NATIONALISMS AND NAVIES IN ASIA:

THE ROAD TO CONFLICT?

significant states. Nationalism may be on the decline in Europe, it is clearly on the upsurge in Asia. In tandem with dramatic economic growth and the rise of nationalism, is the unprecedented military and naval build-up now ongoing in Asia. Industrialisation and urbanisation had led to a similar upsurge of nationalism in Europe and resulted in two highly destructive World Wars. Is Asia replicating the European pattern of industrialisation that leads to a great hunger for energy, mineral and food resources? This hunger for resources leads to insecurities over access to energy and other critical inputs, the security of supplies and protection of sea routes. This competition for resources and markets had spiralled out of control and led to the two World Wars with their epicentre in Europe.

Conflict characteristics of multipolar world orders Bipolar world orders, by their very nature, tend to be stable. The cold war that followed the World War II was an era of relative stability. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, resulted overnight in a unipolar world order, where the conventional RMA permitted the USA and its allies to mount efficient military invasions of many countries that ranged from Iraq, Kosovo, Bosnia, Somalia to Afghanistan.

Prolonged occupation that needed boots on the ground however was a visible weakness; and soon forced the USA to retreat from its spoiling attacks. The world is now seeing the emergence of a whole host of regional powers to include China, India, Brazil and Russia. It must be remembered that multipolar world orders were in position before both the First and Second World Wars. The multipolar world orders were characterised by quick alignments and realignments and an inherent tendency towards instability and conflict. The emergence of a multipolar world order is once again exhibiting the tendency towards balancing and bandwagoning; the increase in the stridency of nationalism and an increasing propensity towards localised conflicts.

Changes in Asia: The rise of instability American hegemony in the Pacific stemmed from its decisive victory over Japan in World War II. The Japanese Navy, with its ten Carrier Battle Groups had dealt decisive initial blows in the Pacific at the outset of the war. It had destroyed the American battleship fleet at Pearl Harbour. The US industrial might came into play and

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by the end of the war the US had fielded 18 Carrier Battle Groups to decisively beat Japan. The nuclear bombardment of Hiroshima and Nagasaki led to Japan’s surrender and hence complete US hegemony over the Pacific. Russia and China were primarily land powers. The Chinese military was technologically weak. It was primarily a foot infantry army incapable of projecting power far from China’s borders. Formidable on land it was weak at sea and incapable even of defeating Taiwan. The USA later allied itself with China to balance the formidable land power of the USSR. Even though it lost the Vietnam War, it was able to impose its hegemony lite on the Asia-Pacific region.

Pakistan’s Gwadar Port may well become a keystone in any future Chinese strategy to bypass the Malacca Straits choke point for its energy supplies. China has also invested hugely in Nepal, Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Bangladesh than has India in the subcontinent. Similarly China is trying to woo Laos, Cambodia and other smaller nations in Vietnam’s periphery. This cross dynamic of balancing alignments will add to the complexity of Asia’s security space In an insightful article ‘Asia’s New Age of Instability’ Michael Wesley highlights how the Asia-Pacific was so far the fastest growing economic powerhouse of the world and relatively a very stable and peaceful region. He attributed this to America’s benign Hegemony Lite that ensured that the region focused on unprecedented economic development and put aside all conflicts. American success in pacifying this region stemmed from four factors. These were: Inability of any Asian state to aspire for regional leadership: The region’s largest states then were too poor and internally focused to make serious bids for predominance while the richest and most cohesive were too small. Economic development trumped other priorities: The US crafted a hegemony lite alliance structure that maintained the region’s non-competitive dynamic. No political or strategic dispute could threaten the stability essential to development. ASEAN created a regional ethic that stability was vital to development and vice versa. This stimulated regional growth and reduced conflict. The US let Asian states institute distinctive political and economic models: It allowed them to focus on economic development to nurture and mobilise domestic wealth and expertise free of any external competition and minimise the impact of economic retardants. USA also kept its large domestic market open to Asian exports in the face of mounting deficits. US Alliance system permitted the Asian Tigers to minimise their security expenditures while channeling all resources into their economic development. The fact that they were all having a demographic youth bulge helped them to prosper economically. Close alignment amongst Asian states, security partnerships and their trading and investment patterns: All the non-communist countries of Asia became part of a Pacific Rim trading cycle that brought together American consumers, North Asian manufacturing, South East Asian labour and Australian minerals and energy.

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All these four factors, says Wesley, that led to the extraordinary peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region have now been seriously disrupted. The new disruptive factors are: ■■ The unprecedented rise of China: With its meteoric rates of growth, its huge geographic and demographic size and massive military modernisation, China now has the capacity and will to assert regional leadership. It is the unprecedented rise in the power of the Chinese Navy that is making it a serious new challenge to US power in the Asia-Pacific. The Chinese have carefully studied the basis of US power projection capabilities in the Asia-Pacific. It is now based upon the 11 Aircraft Carrier Battle Groups of the US Navy. These had forced China to back down over Taiwan in 1995-96. China has now deployed Asymmetric Warfare capabilities in the form of Surveillance and Global Positioning Satellites and the DF-21D Aircraft Carrier Killer missiles. Like the Japanese fielding of 10 Carrier Battle Groups in World War II, will the new Chinese capabilities prove to be a significant Game Changer in Naval Warfare? It has undoubtedly shaken and worried the Americans. ■■ Meanwhile the Chinese have strengthened their surface and submarine fleets and are now graduating towards the use of Aircraft Carriers themselves. Not only are they adopting an anti-access strategy based on missiles, they have started acquiring the tools of power projection. The unveiling of two Stealth Fighters (J-20 and J-31) in just two years is a significant pointer. The J-31 is equivalent to the US F-35 Lightning and is likely to be based on Chinese aircraft carriers. China is emerging from a land power into a major challenger in the Pacific. ■■ The rise of second tier powers: Not only has China accelerated the growth of its Comprehensive National Power, Japan is already the world’s third largest economic power (albeit stagnating and graying in demographic profile). India is fast emerging as the world’s fourth largest economy and a significant regional military power, which will in time deploy three aircraft carriers and three to four nuclear submarines, besides a powerful surface combatant and undersea fleet of diesel and AIP submarines. Russia is on the road to recovery and reassertion. These are strong and powerful rivals with competing territorial claims and historically uneasy in relationships with China. Asia itself will therefore be a multipolar entity with an inherent dynamic that could lead to conflict. Besides these major powers, there is a series of other regional challengers to China like Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines, who have significant disputes over islands and sea boundaries in the South China Sea. The East China Sea itself is increasingly coming to limelight because of the rising friction between China and Japan. With the rise of strident nationalism in all the Asian states the chances of the breakout of conflict are on the rise. The Chinese in fact are preparing their forces for Limited / Local Wars under Conditions of Informatisation and have gained dominance over all regional competitors. The second tier powers – India, Japan, Indonesia, Vietnam and Philippines do not want to cede regional leadership to China. However they do not (as yet) want

to balance explicitly against China’s growing might. They prefer to reach out to each other and to the US through a network of less formal collaborations, investments in vital infrastructure, FDIs, collaborative naval exercises and joint ventures in energy and technology.

It makes simple common sense for India therefore, to balance the rising power of an increasingly assertive China. Non-alignment 2.0, in the face of the nation’s primary security threat is a logical absurdity. India needs to reach out urgently to Japan, Vietnam, South Korea, Philippines and Indonesia. It also needs to coordinate its policies and responses with these, the USA and Australia. Any Indian grand strategy must define the global end states it seeks to engender. Does a Bipolar situation with USA and China as the primary poles – suit India? Or would India prefer a multipolar world order where pure national interests dictate the nature of networking and partnerships? These may well be fluid and dynamic – depending upon the issues involved and the determination of where national interest lies Balancing in Asia: It makes simple common sense for India therefore, to balance the rising power of an increasingly assertive China. Non-alignment 2.0, in the face of the nation’s primary security threat is a logical absurdity. India needs to reach out urgently to Japan, Vietnam, South Korea, Philippines and Indonesia. It also needs to coordinate its policies and responses with these, the USA and Australia. Any Indian grand strategy must define the global end states it seeks to engender. Does a Bipolar situation with USA and China as the primary poles – suit India? Or would India prefer a multipolar world order where pure national interests dictate the nature of networking and partnerships? These may well be fluid and dynamic – depending upon the issues involved and the determination of where national interest lies. Tertiary balancing: Even as the main powers in Asia seek to balance China’s growing power, a second tier of balancing has invariably been triggered by this process. A tertiary level and sift balancing has emerged in Asia as neighbours of the second tier powers reach out to China for reassurance. Thus China’s trade with India’s neighbours is four times the value of India’s trade with them. Pakistan, in fact, has shown desperation to use Chinese power to balance India. China has given unprecedented levels of military support to Pakistan. Pakistan’s Gwadar Port may well become a keystone in any future Chinese strategy to bypass the Malacca Straits choke point for its energy supplies. China has also invested hugely in Nepal, Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Bangladesh than has India in the subcontinent. Similarly China is trying to woo Laos, Cambodia and other smaller nations in Vietnam’s periphery. This cross-dynamic of balancing alignments will add to the complexity of Asia’s security space. Resource flow dynamics: Industrialisation and urbanisation has made Asia’s major dynamic economies dependent upon imports of energy, minerals and food. This dependence will only increase with time. The Asian elites’ commitment to mutual understanding and stability is now eroding and giving way to an unstable mix of vulnerability

and entitlement. A great deal of vulnerability has been generated in Asian capitals over the sea corridors and choke points and the capacity of strategic rivals to disrupt or threaten these in times of conflict. Nationalist expectations: Wesley writes that the sudden emergence of big Asian economies has generated nationalist expectations that they should be treated with greatest respect by other countries. A mix of greater vulnerability and growing confidence has played out in accentuating a series of confrontations in the East China Sea, the Sea of Japan and the Sino-Indian border region. Paradigm shift in trading patterns: A major paradigm shift in trade and investment patterns has occurred in Asia. China has reclaimed its national position as the economic hinterland of the pacific economies. This has disrupted the earlier alignment between security preferences and trading and investment patterns in Asia. China has now emerged at the centre of the region’s tightly integrated Asian system of distributed manufacture. Industrialised economies in East and South East Asia increasingly have become exporters of components and parts to China, the final point of any exports of finished products. Thus component exports increased from just 50 per cent of South East Asian exports in 1992 to 75 per cent of its exports in 2007. The main destination of all these exports was China. China’s component imports correspondingly grew from 16 per cent in 1992 to over 46 per cent in 2007. Many of the regional countries that are closely bound with China’s economy are either allies of the US, rivals of China or both. Japan, South Korea, Philippines and Australia have tightened their alliances with the US even as they have simultaneously deepened their economic integration with China. Countries like India, Vietnam, Indonesia and Singapore that are not US allies have also tightened their security ties to Washington even as they have maximised their trade and investment with China. However, as the Asian rivalry deepens and competitive nationalism rises the region is headed for ever increasing levels of violence uncertainty. Michael Wesley observes however that those most closely allied with the US, lack the military heft to seriously help counter the Chinese challenge. Those partners with the greatest military heft, ie India, Vietnam and Indonesia are least likely to align closely with the US Alliance System. Wesley highlights the fact that growing frictions between China and its smaller neighbours in the South China Sea and the East China Sea, pose dangers of entrapment for the US in the Western Pacific. The US embrace of status quo has emboldened the Philippines and Vietnam in strongly opposing China’s claims – both militarily and diplomatically. The principle of freedom of the high seas is at stake and competing nationalisms in Asia are setting the stage for future conflicts. Corruption and dramatic discord generated by economic inequities within the Asian nations enhance the need for external digressions. All this is leading to an unprecedented military and naval build-up in Asia. The chances of the outbreak of localised conflicts are increasingly getting higher.

December 2012 Defence AND security alert

sea power in India

PLUGGING THE GAPS

T Rear Admiral (Dr) S Kulshrestha (retd) The writer joined Indian Navy in the year 1975 and was awarded Silver Medal at the Naval Academy, the Telescope and the Sword of Honour for being adjudged the best Naval Officer during initial training. He did his specialisation in Quality Assurance of Naval Armament and adorned various key appointments at Naval Command Headquarters, DRDO establishments, Ordnance Factories and finally rose to become the Director General of Naval Armament Inspection (DGNAI) at the Integrated Headquarters of Ministry of Defence (Navy). He is an alumnus of the prestigious National Defence College (NDC). He has been writing in defence journals on issues related to Armament technology and indigenisation. India has a formidable naval force with both blue water and littoral capabilities; it also has a credible coast guard which would work in unison with the Indian Navy in times of war. Further India has put in place a powerful template for marine domain awareness, intelligence and protection of the coast, after the terrorist attack of 26 November 2008. Some of the measures include; setting up of Multi Agency Centres (MAC) for intelligence inputs and reports; registration of fishing vessels by states; placing in orbit Indian Regional Navigation Seven Satellite System and satellite GSAT-7; setting up of a coast wide radar chain; raising Marine Police force, Marine Commandos Rapid Reaction Force and a Sagar Prahari Bal (SPB); setting up layered patrolling; putting in place The National Command Control Communication and Intelligence network (NC3IN) etc

he littorals are teeming with fishing boats, miscellaneous craft, neutral international shipping, friendly craft as well as the adversary’s vessels. Despite having information superiority in the oceans, a blue water force is restrained in littorals due to overwhelming number of contacts presented in the littorals, leading to dilemma in identification, detection and targeting. The time available to a commander to take engagement decisions is a fraction of that which is available in a traditional blue water mission. This shrinking of time coupled with congested space puts tremendous pressure on the commander and may lead to undesired outcomes. A very interesting article on the highly neglected aspect of littoral warfare and what India needs to do to plug gaps in this realm.

littoral zone can be defined as a zone that is contiguous to land in a large water body like the sea, river or a lake. In coastal areas it defines the zone between the high water mark and the beginning of the permanently submerged area. The Land Ocean Interaction in the Coastal Zone1, science plan defines a coastal zone as:

interests. It is clear however that the littorals harbour major economic and security concerns for countries. The purpose of this article is to highlight the possible gaps in littoral defence of India and suggest measures to shore up coastal defences. The end of cold war has changed the focus of blue water fleets from battles ‘on’ the high seas to battles ‘from’ the sea. Thus bringing the littorals into sharp focus as they form the interface between the coast and the depths greater than about 60 m on an average.

“the coastal zone as extending from the coastal plains to the outer edge of the continental shelves, approximately matching the region that has been alternately flooded and exposed during the sea-level fluctuations of the late Quaternary period”.

The naval mine is a relatively cheap, easy to employ, highly effective weapon that affords weaker navies the ability to oppose larger, more technologically advanced adversaries. The mere existence of mines poses enough psychological threat to practically stop maritime operations and thus deny access to a desired area at sea Further the coastal domain is defined as 200 m above to 200 m below the sea level. This domain covers an area where about 25 per cent of the global productivity occurs, 60 per cent of the global population resides and 11 of the 14 mega cities in the world are located. Indian coastline extends over 7,500 km and has about 250 mn people staying within 50 km of the coast2. Ninety per cent of India`s international trade by volume and seventy-seven per cent by value are carried by sea. It is seen that coastal domain, coastal zone and the littoral zones have overlapping connotations and no internationally accepted definition is as yet available. The definitions have been interpreted by coastal countries in a way that is beneficial to their national

Source: http://www.lawisgreek.com/ coastal-regulations-in-india The US Navy (Naval Warfare-Naval Doctrine Publication 1, 2010) interprets littorals in naval operations as that portion of the world’s land masses adjacent to the oceans within direct control of and vulnerable to the striking power of sea-based forces. A zone that comprises two segments of the operational environment: Seaward: The area from the open ocean to the shore, which must be controlled to support operations ashore. Landward: The area inland from the shore that can be supported and defended directly from the sea.

1. LOICZ is an international research project involving scientists from across the globe who have been investigating changes in the biology, chemistry and physics of the coastal zone since 1993. 2. http://envfor.nic.in/divisions/ic/wssd/doc2/ch11.pdf

December 2012 Defence AND security alert

MATTERS LITTORAL DEFENCE

States which cannot invest in major warships have resorted to fielding small, even primitive submarines to protect their coasts; these submarines have up to one tenth of the weight and length of the conventional submarines and can thus operate with impunity in littorals. Two submarine types, namely the Sang-O class and the Yono class submarines of North Korea, warrant special mention The littoral focus has very interesting characteristics and connotations for blue water naval fleets planned for standoff operations on open seas. Three of the fundamental parameters which have adverse effect on war fighting in littorals are discussed below. Environment: The littoral natural environment is subject to wide variations both in the atmospheric and the oceanographic domain. The sensor, modelling and simulation technologies have not matured

enough to provide reliable predictions for real time operations. Neither is an archival data base available for all the littorals where blue water navies may be required to operate. Unfortunately, the same is applicable to India’s harbours, estuaries and islands. The symbiotic relationship between ocean conditions and the atmospheric conditions is only being recognised in the recent years. This has a direct bearing on naval air operations (landing, take off, flight endurances etc) surface operations (station keeping, safety, weapon firings, etc), the underwater operations (anti-submarine and mine clearing etc) and the amphibious and special operations. Currently the complex dynamics of underwater, beach and shore conditions generating the resultant environment is not clearly understood, leading to levels of uncertainty which threaten the success of missions in the littorals. Thus it can be seen that littoral environment has impacted all the missions of the navy, be it sea and air dominance or deterrence and power projection. Further there are gaps in knowledge due to insufficient information and understanding of environmental phenomenon. Space: The littorals are regions with restricted depths, which prevent blue water naval combatants with greater draught to operate. It also

restricts severely the manoeuvring of ships in formation. Thus the blue water navy has to redefine its conduct of operations from the wide expanse of the oceans to constricted and / or partially choked contortions available in littorals. With larger combatants and logistic units unable to approach the littorals comfortably the mission logistics is hampered considerably as logistic requirements cannot be satisfactorily met in terms of arms, ammunition and other maritime support to ground operations. Time: The littorals are teeming with fishing boats, miscellaneous craft, neutral international shipping, friendly craft as well as the adversary’s vessels. Despite having information superiority in the oceans, a blue water force is restrained in littorals due to overwhelming number of contacts presented in the littorals, leading to dilemma in identification, detection and targeting. The time available to a commander to take engagement decisions is a fraction of that which is available in a traditional blue water mission. This shrinking of time coupled with congested space puts tremendous pressure on the commander and may lead to undesired outcomes. Another aspect is the variable duration of presence required in the littorals as the land operations progress; this also brings in an uncertainty as to sustainability

December 2012 Defence AND security alert

sea power in India

PLUGGING THE GAPS

of operations at large distances from the home port. The US Navy has accordingly advocated ‘sea basing’ for conduct of Sea-Land operations.

Small diesel submarines capable of operating in shallow waters with advanced technology propulsion systems that reduce their acoustic signatures pose a dangerous risk to ships. The submarines are capable of firing torpedoes and missiles which can sink or cripple major combatants. The detection of these prowlers in littorals is very difficult due to vagaries of acoustic propagation underwater In the above discussion it has been brought out that littorals present, a deficit in environmental knowledge / information, constriction of manoeuvring space and shrinking of time for decision-making as major issues for blue water navies. At this juncture a perspective into the threats that could be posed by an adversary is necessary. The threats include: Miniature / midget / small diesel submarines: Small diesel submarines capable of operating in shallow waters with advanced technology propulsion systems that reduce their acoustic signatures pose a dangerous risk to ships. The submarines are capable of firing torpedoes and missiles which can sink or cripple major combatants. The detection of these prowlers in littorals is very difficult due to vagaries of acoustic propagation underwater. States which cannot invest in major warships have resorted to fielding small, even primitive submarines to protect their coasts; these submarines have up to one tenth of the weight and length of the conventional submarines and can thus operate with impunity in littorals. Two submarine types, namely the Sang-O class and the Yono class submarines of North Korea, warrant special mention. The Yono class miniature diesel submarine displaces 130 tons, is 20-22 m long, has a range of 500 nm and carries two heavyweight torpedoes. It is suspected that the South Korean Naval ship Cheonan

was sunk on March 26, 2010 by a CHT-02D torpedo fired from a Yono class submarine. Some of these submarines have been purchased by Iran. The bigger Sang-O class diesel submarine displaces 370 tons, is 34 m in length, has a range of 1,500 nm, carries two heavyweight torpedoes and can also lay mines. Naval mines: The naval mine is a relatively cheap, easy to employ, highly effective weapon that affords weaker navies the ability to oppose larger, more technologically advanced adversaries. The mere existence of mines poses enough psychological threat to practically stop maritime operations and thus deny access to a desired area at sea. Thus, a mine doesn’t have to actually explode to achieve its mission of access denial. North Koreans were able to deter and delay arrival of US Marines sufficiently to escape safely, by mining Wonsan Harbour in October 1950 with about 3,000 mines. “I’d cancelled the Navy’s amphibious assault on Faylakah Island. Plans called for it to precede the ground war by two days, but the helicopter carrier USS Tripoli and the Aegis guided missile cruiser USS Princeton had struck mines, US and British minesweepers had been unable to clear the area and as a result the Navy hadn’t made it into position to launch the attack in time.” – Gen Schwarzkopf, Desert Storm Mine technology has kept a step ahead of the ships designs for low acoustic and magnetic signatures and many countries are engaged in development and production of naval mines. Non-metallic casings, anechoic coatings, modern electronics and finally reasonable costs have made mines a choice weapon for poor and rich nations alike. It is estimated that about 20 countries export mines while about 30 produce them. Boat swarms: Swarms of boats armed with ammunition and explosives, operating deceptively amidst the large shipping and fishing vessels that populate the littorals constitute a grave threat for the combatants as they are very difficult to identify, engage and neutralise. These can be deployed in a kamikaze type of attack or simply navigated

December 2012 Defence AND security alert

towards the warships and abandoned at short range to ram the hull. The emergence of UAVs and USVs has only complicated the threat further.

The US Navy (Naval Warfare-Naval Doctrine Publication 1, 2010) interprets littorals in naval operations as that portion of the world’s land masses adjacent to the oceans within direct control of and vulnerable to the striking power of sea-based forces Coastal missile batteries: With the crashing cost and very high precision of anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM), many countries have deployed them from coastal batteries. The ASCMs can be launched from fixed or mobile launchers and are very effective in crippling warships. Thus it can be seen that to deny access to a blue water navy, a littoral country has to intelligently prepare its defences by coordinating its submarines, armed boats mines and missile batteries. The expeditionary force would be sufficiently deterred to either postpone its foray or give it up altogether. “Lose Invincible and the operation is severely jeopardised, lose Hermes and the operation is over. One unlucky torpedo, bomb, or missile hit could do it.” – Admiral Falkland War

Sandy

Woodward,

Defending India’s coastal areas: India has a formidable naval force with both blue water and littoral capabilities; it also has a credible coast guard which would work in unison with the Indian Navy in times of war. Further India has put in place a powerful template for marine domain awareness, intelligence and protection of the coast, after the terrorist attack of 26 November 2008. Some of the measures include; setting up of Multi Agency Centres (MAC) for intelligence inputs and reports; registration of fishing vessels by states; placing in orbit Indian Regional Navigation Seven Satellite System and satellite GSAT-7; setting up of a coast wide radar chain; raising Marine Police Force, Marine Commandos Rapid Reaction Force

and a Sagar Prahari Bal (SPB); setting up layered patrolling; putting in place The National Command Control Communication and Intelligence network (NC3IN) etc.

Prominent gaps in littoral defence Thus the layered defence of Indian coast consists of Indian Navy, the coast guard, the marine commando and SPB and the marine police. All these are info-linked for maximum advance knowledge and in a way form a networked coalition. However there apparently is a gap as far as setting up the coastal defences per se is concerned. The Indian coast protection lacks the delay, denial, disruption and demoralising (D4) capability which is an essential in modern littoral warfare. This capability should be acquired by leveraging the perceived threats presented in the littorals by the submarine, mines, small craft and ASCM. The coastal defence plan should be an asymmetric approach to littoral defence with defining littorals as a zone that comprises two segments of the defence environment: Seaward: The area from the shore to the open ocean, which must be

defended to thwart expeditionary forces at sea.

■■ Firing mines.

Landward: From the shore to the area inland that can be supported and defended directly from the shore.

■■ Procurement and laying of cable controlled minefields, other minefields across various depths zones.

The existing gap in Indian defences can be obviated with very potent coastal defence elements by including: Comprehensive assessment of threats from expeditionary forces to ports / harbours. Procurement of midget / miniature submarines with torpedoes and mine laying capability along with arrays of underwater sensors for environment, intrusion information, navigation and communication. Procurement of UAVs / USVs with intelligent software for remote operations as swarms. Procurement of unmanned underwater sensor and weapon carriers capable of: ■■ Transmitting integrated underwater picture to fixed or mobile stations.

torpedoes

and

laying

■■ Coastal extended reach ASCM batteries. ■■ Coastal gun batteries with ability to carry out precision attack on surface ships at ranges greater than 50 km. ■■ All systems networked for an iron clad protection of the Indian coast. ■■ Development of weapons specific for use in littorals and systems for collection of oceanographic information. A robust Indian coastal defence plan and its implementation is an essential element of economic well-being of India as it would ensure security of sea trade, shipping, fishing, marine resources and offshore assets as well as security of the EEZ.

December 2012 Defence AND security alert

sea power in India

MULTITASKING

Cmde Sujeet Samaddar NM (retd) The writer retired as the Principal Director Naval Plans. He served NOVA Integrated Systems – A TATA Enterprise as Vice President (Operations) until October 2011. He is presently Director and CEO, ShinMaywa Industries India Limited.

Of particular relevance to the Indian Navy and in fact all navies that operate long-range maritime patrol aircraft (LRMR) or AWACS aircraft or shore based maritime interdiction aircraft, is in the choice of the most suitable amphibious aircraft that can conduct a near all-weather high speed rescue operation for the entire crew of a ditched aircraft. The aircraft is more easily replaceable than its highly trained aircrew. Similarly, the rescue of a crew of distressed ship or submarine is faster and surer with amphibious aircraft than using ships or even helicopters. Combat missions may also be undertaken by suitable amphibious aircraft. Rapid and precision induction and de-induction of troops along undefended coastlines for covert / diplomatic or force projection operations is one example

o d e r n amphibious aircraft make possible a range of options not achievable by any one platform. It’s unique multi-modal design permits airborne, seaborne and land operations in a single platform and thus is a highly effective force multiplier for a regional navy. Unlike helicopters and aircraft, amphibious aircraft can land at the location and enforce both the will and the law of the country and thus are a platform of choice for benign and constabulary missions of navies. Unlike ships, amphibious aircraft can reach the location far faster than ships can preventing destruction or dumping of contraband. These aircraft can now therefore be tasked for multifarious naval missions such as mainland to distant island and inter-island support without need of a runway, monitoring, servicing and protection of offshore assets, surveillance, reconnaissance, intelligence gathering and on-spot investigation in the EEZ and on High Seas and Oceanic Search and Rescue (SAR) and casualty hilst evacuation (CASEVAC) from an IL-38 and aircraft) ships and oilrigs. a Norwegian joining the

A Force Multiplier for the Indian Navy

P-3 Orion circled overhead airdropping rescue gear, forty two submariners of a nuclear-powered submarine perished in the Norwegian Sea on April 7, 1989. The rescue aircraft, circling overhead, powerlessly watched freezing submariners perish literally before their eyes since the rescue ships had not reached the location. Just one capable amphibious aircraft would have averted the tragedy. Most importantly, the human tragedy of the loss of the highly trained and specialised submariners far exceeded the cost of the submarine. This is a lesson of history that India can learn from the experience of the Russians.

Similarly, incidents of civilian disasters at sea are equally numerous. 1,502 people perished when the Titanic sank on April 15, 1912. More recently in December 2010, an asylum seeker boat sank killing 48 people off the Christmas Islands; 200 lives were lost in December 2011, when a ship sank off Java in rough seas; in June 2012, despite adequate warning and with four Indonesian and Australian warships, four merchant ships and five Australian government aircraft (but no amphibious

Amphibious Aircraft:

December 2012 Defence AND security alert

search in only 2 m swells, 90 people were still missing; and, in the Comoros Islands more than 30 people have died recently following boat capsizes at sea. In the immediate neighbourhood, as recently as November 7, 2012 more than 100 lives were lost when a boat capsized off Bangladesh’s Teknaf coast. Just one capable amphibious aircraft would have averted all these tragedies. In India, M V Wisdom and M V Patit ran aground near Mumbai within a few months of each other having pierced the coastal surveillance envelope undetected. Both ships were suspected to have been drifting after their crew abandoned the vessels. Such derelicts are not only hazardous upon beaching but also are a menace at sea. Helicopters and ships were unequal to the task. The M V Rak, sailing from Indonesia to Dahej in Gujarat with 60,000 tonnes of coal, sank barely 20 nautical miles off the Mumbai coast after developing two holes in its hull. Advanced technology amphibious aircraft operating even in rough sea conditions, ferrying sophisticated damage control equipment and a specialist and

experienced naval teams rapidly and directly to the stricken ship would have averted these disasters easily. Beginning its debut on March 28, 1911 when the Hydravion took-off from water at Martinique, amphibious aircraft by end of World War I had completed transcontinental flights and in some instances even been refuelled by ships and submarines at sea. Post 1918, the amphibious aircraft made their appearance. After World War II, these amphibious aircraft lost their charm though limited civil and commercial applications continued. Modern technological advances have now made it possible for amphibious aircraft to conduct a variety of naval missions ranging from benign, constabulary and even military operations. Under Article 98 of the United

Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) “Every coastal State shall promote the establishment, operation and maintenance of an adequate and effective search and rescue service regarding safety on and over the sea and, where circumstances so require, by way of mutual regional arrangements cooperate with neighbouring States for this purpose.” Amphibious aircraft fit this purpose completely. As regards Piracy, one of the more pressing international problems facing the seafaring community today, as per the United Nations Convention on Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) military aircraft are “entitled to seize (Article 107)”, enjoy “right of visit (Article 110)” and the “right of hot pursuit (Article 111)”. Amphibious aircraft can thus be very useful in conducting anti-piracy missions

and efficient, effective and economic constabulary operations for safe and secure seas. Once the deterrence value of amphibious aircraft is clearly established by conducting a few successful operations that bring culprits to book seas will become far more safe and secure in the future and at lesser operating cost. Thus, even under UNCLOS amphibious aircraft owned or operated by the state are an efficient, effective and economic option for safe and secure seas.

Low stalling speed would enable better observation of the target area to search for casualties swept away in cyclones or tsunamis. Payloads would vary with the mission but should be sufficient to carry one platoon of rescue personnel together with disaster relief material Amphibious aircraft combine the

December 2012 Defence AND security alert

sea power in India

MULTITASKING

capabilities of rapid surveillance and prompt response, whether for relief or arrest, in a single platform. Such a capability is not available on any other platform. The modern amphibious aircraft is thus a veritable force multiplier since they fulfill a multitude of missions in a single platform. Unlike helicopters and aircraft, amphibious aircraft can land at the location and enforce both the will and the law of the country and thus are a platform of choice for benign and constabulary missions of navies. Unlike ships, amphibious aircraft can reach the location far faster than ships can preventing destruction or dumping of contraband. These aircraft can now therefore be tasked for multifarious naval missions such as: Mainland to distant island and inter-island support without need of a runway. Monitoring, servicing protection of offshore assets.

and

Surveillance, reconnaissance, intelligence gathering and on-spot investigation in the EEZ and on High Seas. Oceanic search and rescue (SAR) and casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) from ships and oil rigs. Long-range naval logistic and maintenance support through ferrying of specialised dockyard personnel and spares to a fleet during deployment. Long-range visit, board, search and seizure (VBSS) operations. Controlling derelicts. Humanitarian assistance disaster relief operations.

and

Countering small arms, shoulder launched weapons and drugs trafficking. Countering migration.

illegal

human

Prevention of poaching and illegal fishing. Prevention of toxic cargo dumping at sea.

Anti-piracy missions. Firefighting – some amphibious aircraft can carry 15 tonnes of water in 20 seconds. Support for deep sea mining activities, offshore cable laying and hydrocarbon prospecting.

Not all amphibious aircraft are suited for military missions. For mission effectiveness the main parameters of performance evaluation would be rough sea operations, range, payload, STOL capabilities, shallow water operations and beaching ability. Of these, rough sea operations are paramount for India. According to a study only about 60 per cent of all waves are below 1.2 m in height, but 96 per cent of all waves likely to be encountered are below 3 m in height. Amphibious aircraft must therefore, by design, have full operational capability to undertake maritime missions in wave heights of 3 m as a norm In a world increasingly challenged by natural disasters such as floods, tsunamis and cyclones amphibious aircraft can provide rapid relief to a devastated population. Requiring neither runway nor other airfield facilities modern amphibious aircraft can safely land within a few meters from the coast and relief material and teams can be ferried ashore through integral boats requiring no logistic support from the shore. Amphibious aircraft can also be used as airborne firefighters carrying several tons of sea water to douse fires ashore or on oil rigs. Amphibious aircraft can also support remote communities in distant islands or remote land frontiers which are in proximity of deep lakes and rivers with logistics and medical support. Of particular relevance to the Indian Navy and in fact all navies that operate long-range maritime patrol aircraft (LRMR) or AWACS aircraft or shore based maritime interdiction aircraft, is in the choice of the most suitable amphibious aircraft that can conduct a near all-weather high speed rescue operation for the entire crew of a ditched aircraft. The aircraft is more easily replaceable than its highly trained aircrew. Similarly, the

December 2012 Defence AND security alert

rescue of a crew of distressed ship or submarine is faster and surer with amphibious aircraft than using ships or even helicopters. Combat missions may also be undertaken by suitable amphibious aircraft. Rapid and precision induction and de-induction of troops along undefended coastlines for covert / diplomatic or force projection operations is one example. However not all amphibious aircraft are suited for military missions. For mission effectiveness the main parameters of performance evaluation would be rough sea operations, range, payload, STOL capabilities, shallow water operations and beaching ability. Of these, rough sea operations are paramount for India. According to a study only about 60 per cent of all waves are below 1.2 m in height, but 96 per cent of all waves likely to be encountered are below 3 m in height. Amphibious aircraft must therefore, by design, have full operational capability to undertake maritime missions in wave heights of 3 m as a norm so as to be available for missions all year except for a few days. The range must be adequate to conduct missions into the Malacca Straits on the eastern seaboard and the Gulf of Aden on the western seaboard. For disaster relief operations the amphibian must have a capacity for onboard first aid, a sick bay for at least ten patients and commensurate rescue gear. STOL features and shallow water operations must permit landing in busy waterways, possible riverine / high altitude lake operations as well as in open oceans. Low stalling speed would enable better observation of the target area to search for casualties swept away in cyclones or tsunamis. Payloads would vary with the mission but should be sufficient to carry one platoon of rescue personnel together with disaster relief material. In addition, amphibious aircraft should also be able to land in the rivers and lakes of distant parts of the country and in short runways to support the local population. Worldwide, Beriev, Bombardier and ShinMaywa are the lead manufacturers of amphibious aircraft. The table on the next page summarises the features of the options. For India, aspiring to regional

Features

ShinMaywa US-2

Bombardier CL-415

Beriev Be-200

Engines

Turboprop×4

Turboprop×2

Turbofan×2

Dimensions LXBXH(m)

33.3x33.2x9.8

19.8x28.6x9

32.1x32.8x8.9

Max take-off weight

47.7 ton

19.9 ton

37.2 ton

Max range

4,500 km

2,300 km

3,600 km

Cruise altitude

9,000 m

2,400 m

7,900 m

Normal cruise speed 480 km/h

280 km/h

610 km/h

Max cruise speed

560 km/h

380 km/h

700 km/h

Stalling speed

107 km/h

150 km/h*

155 km/h*

Take off from water

280 m

808 m

1,000 m

Landing to water

330 m

665 m

1,300 m

Operational wave height

3 m (Sea State 5) > 96% operability

1.2 m (Sea State 2) Upto 66% operability

power status, its navy must not only be able to address the immediate security needs of the country and defeat the enemies of the state but must also be able to contribute in benign and constabulary operations in its area of interest and influence for the regional good. From a maritime perspective this power status contributes to burden sharing towards protection of global public goods and the oceanic commons to achieve firstly, freedom of navigation and safety at sea; secondly, promote regional stability through an open and participative security

architecture; thirdly, proactively alleviate suffering during disasters in the littorals of friendly nations; and finally a constabulary capacity to maintain order at sea for the common good of the region. Development of such capabilities and induction of the appropriate enabling systems signal a firm regional commitment towards maintaining regional stability and maritime security and safety but is also an affirmation of delivering on the natural responsibilities that come with great power status. Whilst

ships, submarines and aircraft are all qualified in some way or the other for fulfilling the above missions each of these platforms are also limited by some capability gap or the other. Modern amphibious aircraft make possible a range of options not achievable by any one platform. It’s unique multi-modal design permits airborne, seaborne and land operations in a single platform and thus is a highly effective force multiplier for a regional navy.

December 2012 Defence AND security alert

sea power in India

ACQUISITIONS PRECEDENCE

“The future of India lies at sea, but Indians’ mindset is steeped landwards. This presents Indian Leaders a Challenge of Choices and Allocations Going into The Future.”

T Cmde Ranjit Bhawnani Rai (retd) The writer is a former Director Naval Intelligence and Director Naval Operations. Presently he is Vice President of Indian Maritime Foundation, New Delhi.

Sea power has become four dimensional and can assert political pressure when needed, like China’s moves in the South China Seas. United Nation Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) were enacted in 1982 and nations are employing the voids to further national interests. The seas will be critical repositories of resources with increasing wealth and populations especially in the East. French chief Admiral Bernard Rogel has termed this, ‘Maritimisation in the 21st century’

Preparations to become a ‘builder’s navy’ began in late 60s when Mazagon Dock Ltd (MDL) began licensed construction of Vickers Armstrong and Yarrow Leander frigates. The first Leander INS Nilgiri in 1972 was a dream ship with all systems including the Sea-Cat AA exceeding specifications and gave confidence to constructors

he Greeks defined a “thalassocratic” state as a nation with maritime ambitions in the military and commercial spheres. Extending this, today ‘Sea Power’ encompasses the attributes of geography, population and a government mandated to maintain a strong navy, a sizeable commercial fleet and ports with hinterland connectivity. India with a large population is blessed with an advantageous maritime geography and juts into the strategic Indian Ocean like a springboard. In recent times the government has been supportive of India’s small professional navy with 53,000 officers and men and 128 ships and 150 aircraft which guards 7,300 km of coastline and 2.1 sq km of EEZ and many islands, but it has to grow. Indian Coast Guard has the responsibility to look after coastal security and 4.1 sq km of sea space as its Search and Rescue (SAR) area. Sea power supports the nation’s foreign and economic policy that enables ‘benign dominance of the region’ and ‘sea control’ in war, with assets to blockade and transport its army to distant shores, termed ‘amphibious capability’.

The rise of Spain through sea power in the 16th century under the Hapsburgs and Phillip II enabled Spain to colonise South America and the Philippines. From 1600 to 1750 the French colonised states and still possess riparian assets worldwide, including Reunion in the Indian Ocean. From 1812 the British spread their empire on which the sun never set and India was subjugated from the seas to become Britain’s ‘Jewel in the Crown’. In the last century America rose as a nuclear and economic super power, led by powerful aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines which enabled it by the late 1980s to humble Soviet sea power in the cold war. Today the facet of colonisation has got modified to carve spheres of influence and investment and sea power will count.

GOING INTO THE FUTURE, AN APPRECIATION

heodore Roosevelt said, “A good Navy is not a provocation to war. It is the surest guaranty of peace.’’ Serving in the nation’s navy also means serving the rise of India. An excellent appraisal of the growth of India’s Navy and the need to speed up our acquisitions, especially of the Submarine arm. With the rising challenge of a powerful PLAN we cannot afford to dither and delay our naval build-up.

Strategist Mahan defined sea power as an extension of the foreign policy of a nation and the Naval War College (NWC) at Rhode Island is dedicated to Mahan’s teachings and strategy. Seven naval chiefs out of the last nine including present CNS Admiral D K Joshi are NWC graduates, who have contributed much to Indian Navy, its planning, its doctrines and its employment in war and peace. In the 1971 war the Indian Navy rose to the occasion after it was banned from taking part in the 1965 war by a Cabinet decision and in the Kargil half war the navy’s ‘sea manoeuvre’ to blockade Pakistan, helped end the incursion.

Sea power and India – post independence Pandit Nehru from the quarter deck of INS Delhi soon after independence prophetically mused, “We cannot afford to be weak at sea. History has shown that whoever controls the Indian Ocean has, in the first instance, India’s seaborne trade at her mercy and, in the second, India’s very independence itself.” But India’s Hindu rate of growth could not support a large navy and the Indian mindset looked northwards for security. The offensives by Pakistan forced India to spend on its land and air forces. The roles of sea power, which includes war fighting, constabulary to police sea lines of communications (SLOCs) and piracy and assistance to civil demands, have not changed and air power and the underwater prowess of submarines have joined applications from space, as force multipliers and for deterrence in this nuclear age. Sea power has become four dimensional and can assert political pressure when needed, like China’s moves in the South China Seas. United Nation Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) were enacted in 1982 and nations are employing the voids to further national interests. The seas will be critical repositories of resources with increasing wealth and populations especially in the East. French chief Admiral Bernard Rogel has termed this, ‘Maritimisation in the 21st century’. Less appreciated is that India has employed its sea power successfully in peace. In Op Vijay to wrest Goa from the Portuguese in 1961, the navy captured Diu and Anjadip Island and forced the frigate Alfonso de Albuquerque to ground and surrender. In 1983 in Op Lal Dora, the mere threat of amphibious operation in Mauritius by Mrs Indira Gandhi ensured Anerood Jugnauth did not forfeit his premiership to Paul Beringer. In June 1987, the Indian Navy secretly intervened with the INS Vindhyagiri, in the Seychelles Port of Victoria to head off an attempted coup against President Rene by Defence Minister Berlois (Operation Flowers Are Blooming). Prior to Op Pawan the Indian Navy responded to a request from Sri Lanka to deploy off Colombo when the JVP activists in concert with Tamil ‘Eelam’ seeking rebels tried to de-stabilise the Jayewardene government. The navy and coast guard later crossed the international sea border

INDIA’S SEA POWER STATUS

December 2012 Defence AND security alert

to provide succour to the beleaguered Tamils. In November 1988, following a request by the Maldivian President, India flew a battalion of paratroops to the Maldives, to avert a coup by Tamil mercenaries (Operation Cactus) and INS Godavari contributed by nabbing the rebels. Scorpene submarines commenced construction in 2006 at MDL with Exocet SM-39 missiles for which cost has escalated to US$ 5.3 billion. The first boat will join only in 2015 and six more 75I second line submarines are yet to be ordered. On 4th April, 2012 the 8,500 ton Nerpa, a 971 ‘Shchuka B’ class Nuclear SSN Akula submarine INS Chakra with Club missiles joined from Russia on lease. India’s first 80 MW 6,500 ton nuclear submarine INS Arihant to be fitted with 700 km nuclear tipped K-15 vertical launched missiles constructed at the SBC is completing harbour acceptance trials and nuclear safety checks

December 2012 Defence AND security alert

sea power in India

ACQUISITIONS PRECEDENCE

The rise from a buyer’s navy to a builder’s navy The Indian Navy since Independence witnessed a period when the private sector was not allowed into shipbuilding. UK and Soviet Union supplied the front line ships and weapons. Preparations to become a ‘builder’s navy’ began in late 60s when Mazagon Dock Ltd (MDL) began licensed construction of Vickers Armstrong and Yarrow Leander frigates. The first Leander INS Nilgiri in 1972 was a dream ship with all systems including the Sea-Cat AA exceeding specifications and gave confidence to constructors, ‘that we can do it’, a less applauded landmark. The basic 3,200 ton Nilgiri hull was expanded and weaponised with a mix of Soviet and Western weapons by naval constructors and the Weapons Engineering Electronics Systems Establishment (WEESE) to build three powerful 4,500 ton Project 16 Godavaris with P-20 missiles and two Sea King helicopters at MDL. Three 16A similar Brahmaputra class were constructed at Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers Ltd (GRSE) with Uran and Barak missiles between 1980-98. These platforms were expanded into three 6,800 ton Delhi class Type 15 destroyers at MDL. India’s maritime stature rose and in the 80s, there was an induction of five powerful Kashins of the Rajput class with Kamov-28s ASW helicopters. The Kashins are being retro-fitted with BrahMos missiles and simultaneously a long line of OPVs, missile boats and acquisition of INS Viraat (Hermes) to replace INS Vikrant with Sea Harriers and new Sea King 42B/C was noticed by the world. The IN’s status rose. Three excellent stealth platforms (Shivalik, Satpura and Sahyadri) heavier than the Krivacks with GE LM -2500 gas turbines and diesels in combined diesel and gas combination (CODOG) are now operational. The Leander experience is being replicated, with even heavier 7 Type 17A frigates based on the Type 17 design and will be built at MDL (4) and Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers at Kolkata (3) with vertical launched BrahMos missiles. Fincantieri of Italy which has supplied two new tankers INS Deepak and Shakti and is assisting Cochin Shipyard Ltd for the 37,500 ton aircraft carrier and DCNS of France will assist with modular construction Today the powerful Delhi class has matured into the more formidable 7,100 ton 15A Kolkata class destroyers with 299 km supersonic Vertical Launch (VLS) BrahMos missiles and M/F Star Elta Israeli electronically scanned radars and long-range Barak AA systems with AMD EL/M 2238 Radar and RBU-6000 and powerful Russian gas turbines. The first INS Kolkata to be followed by two more Bombay and Mysore is due to commission from MDL early 2013. The Goa Shipyard Ltd (GSL) specialises in OPVs and has delivered 16 OPVs to the coast guard and is set to deliver four naval armed OPVs to the navy and mine hunters. Pipavav Defence and Offshore Engineering has an order for 5 NOPVs. The Krivack type 17 story: In late 90s the IN which had experience of ordering and supervising the three 3,600 ton Krivack class frigates from Russia (lead ship INS Talwar F-40) equipped with Club missiles, Fregat radars and Shtil AA system, designed the Type 17 Shivalik class jointly with Russia, for construction at MDL. Three excellent stealth platforms (Shivalik, Satpura and Sahyadri) heavier than the Krivacks with GE LM-2500 gas turbines and diesels in combined diesel and gas combination (CODOG) are now operational. The Leander experience is being replicated, with even heavier 7 Type 17A frigates based on the Type 17 design and will be built at MDL (4) and Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers at Kolkata (3) with vertical launched BrahMos missiles. Fincantieri of Italy which has supplied two new tankers INS Deepak and Shakti and is assisting Cochin Shipyard Ltd for the 37,500 ton aircraft carrier and DCNS of France will assist with modular construction. For maritime reconnaissance from above IN’s first of 8 Boeing P-8I maritime reconnaissance (MR) platforms with Harpoons and Mk 58 torpedoes and APY-10 and APS-137 (stern) radars will join the aging IL-38s and TU-142s and short range Dorniers Do-228. India’s GSAT-7 Geo-stationary satellite dedicated for the Indian Navy is awaiting launch and all front line warships have been fitted with the Israeli supplied Orbit Technologies terminals for Ku/C band net-centric exchange of data. India’s first synthetic aperture radar fitted satellite RISAT-1 is already operational for all weather intelligence and mapping with cameras.

3 Type 17 Shivaliks at Mazagon Dock Ltd (MDL) Mumbai with Club Missiles built with BEL Sonars (INS Shivalik, INS Satpura, INS Sahyadri delivered from April 2011). 7 Type 17A Stealth Frigates in the pipeline under ‘Buy Design and Make Modular in India’. 4 planned at Mazagon Dock Ltd (MDL) Mumbai and 3 at Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers Ltd (GRSE) Kolkata. 3 Type 15A Destroyers improved Delhi design at MDL. Fitted with M Star Radar, BrahMos, Long-range Baraks, AMDR and two New Multi Role ASW Helicopters on each platform. JV between Pipavav Offshore and Engineering Services Ltd and MDL being progressed. Type 15B to follow. 6 Scorpene Submarines by DCNS Navantia combine at MDL from 2013 with Exocet MM 39 and New Torpedoes. Last two to be fitted with Air Independent Propulsion.(AIP). Selection in and RFP in progress. 2 Plus 2 Nuclear submarines. SSN INS Chakra with Club missiles and CET torpedoes joined the Fleet at Ship Building Centre (SBC) Visakhapatnam and INS Arihant built at SBC likely to proceed for sea trials in end 2012 and be fitted with K-15 Nuclear capable 700 km underwater launched missiles. 2 more larger Arihants S-4 and S-5 reported under construction at SBC. 6 Submarines of Project 75 (I) Second Line, to be ordered. RFPs to be issued in 2012. Defence Acquistion Council (DAC) approved 2 to be imported, three to be constructed at MDL and one at Hindustan Shipyard Ltd (HSL). JV on Submarines between MDL and Larsen & Toubro Ltd (L&T) being progressed.

The major addition being looked forward to in 2013 is the 43,000 ton aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya (Ex Gorshkov), from SEVMASH yard in Severodnisk, with 12 powerful multi-role short takeoff and arrestor landing (STOBAR) MiG-29K fighters and 4 Ka-31 AEW helicopters. The ship after 100 days at sea and 41 successful landings by Russian MiG-29Ks developed boiler brick and insulation problems in final speed trials. The commissioning stands delayed. The list of ships under acquisition is appended.

4 Naval Indian Navy design OPVS at Goa Shipyard Ltd (GSL) for delivery from 2013.

The acquisition programme of the Indian Navy and the coast guard US$ 22 billion plus refits

2 Tankers at Italy’s Fincantieri. Both INS Deepak and Shakti delivered.

Repairs and upgrades in dockyards worth US$ 1 billion 2 Aircraft carriers - INS Vikramaditya (Ex Gorshkov) developed boiler problems while of final trials in White Sea with delivery now in 2013 and Air Defence Ship (ADS INS Vikrant) progressing at Cochin Shipyard Ltd (CSL) with revised delayed delivery of 2017. A 65,000 ton Aircraft Carrier is on drawing board.

2 Krivacks at Yantar Yard in Kalinngrad Russia with VLS BrahMos Missiles and Shtil AA with delivery from 2012 onwards (INS Teg and INS Tarash delivered, INS Trikand early 2013).

December 2012 Defence AND security alert

4 Type 28 ASW Kamorta class Corvettes as per NHQ Design from 2013 onwards at GRSE. 2 Indian Design Merchant Ship Configuration Training Ships ordered at ABG Shipyard delivery 2013-14.

6 Catamaran 500 ton Australian design survey Ships at Alock Ashdown Shipyard Ltd Bhavnagar. INS Makkar undergoing sea trials off Mumbai. 4 LPD at HSL Mistral variety approved by DAC (Two to be built at HSL and two by the Private Sector). 8 MCMV from Kangnan Korea (2 to be built in Korea and 6 at GSL).

December 2012 Defence AND security alert

sea power in India

ACQUISITIONS PRECEDENCE

2 Submarine Support Ships – Order yet to be placed. 2 Submersible DSRVs – Order yet to be placed. 8 Plus 4 P-8I Boeing MR aircraft from 2013 onwards. 16 Multirole Helicopters between Eurocopter NH-90 and Sirkosky MH-60R to be ordered. 8 MRMR Aircraft to be ordered. 56 Utility Helicopters RFP issued. 17 BAE Hawks ordered. Part of the air force acquisition. 45 MiG-29Ks (6 deivered to INS Hansa Goa for assembly and trials. 3 Krivacks under negotiation. 3 Coast Guard Oil Pollution Vessels 3,000 ton Rolls Royce design from ABG Shipyard (Two delivered 3 CGS Samudra Prahari and CGS Sagar Samudra Paheredar Prahari). 7 Coast Guard OPVs to be ordered by Coast Guard. Replies for RFPs received. 6 Coast Guard OPVs nominated to be ordered at GSL. 145 Interceptor Boats for Coast Guard by L&T, GSL. HSL and other Yards. 80 FIVs ordered on Solas Marine Sri Lanka which has supplied Admiral’s barges and craft. Tampa Yachts USA and France supplying boats.

IN’s submarine story of woes Submarines are a vital asset of a “thalassocratic” state and Indian Navy constructed two West German HDW Type IKL 1500 Shishumar class submarines at MDL in the 1980s but the line was halted due to a scandal and the expertise was lost due no fault of the navy. There was an addition of ten Kilo class submarines some with Club missiles between 1986 and 2000 to the Foxtrot class. In 1990 the submarine strength reached 20 which included a Charlie class nuclear boat INS Chakra on lease. Submarines are now aging and the submarine strength is fast dwindling to less than a woeful 12. After wasted years in indigenous construction, six Scorpene submarines commenced construction in 2006 at MDL with Exocet SM-39 missiles which cost has escalated to US$ 5.3 billion. The first boat will join only in 2015 and six more 75I second line submarines are yet to be ordered. On 4th April, 2012 the 8,500 ton Nerpa, a 971 ‘Shchuka B’ class Nuclear SSN Akula submarine INS Chakra with Club missiles joined from Russia on lease. India’s first 80 MW 6,500 ton nuclear submarine INS Arihant to be fitted with 700 km nuclear tipped K-15 vertical launched missiles constructed at the SBC is completing harbour acceptance trials and nuclear safety checks and due to proceed for sea trials in the near future.

Conclusion The world economy has slowed and so has India’s, while China has built-up reserves. The world is therefore witnessing the swift rise of China’s ‘thalassocratic’ PLA (Navy) in the East with increasing nuclear and conventional maritime power including aircraft carrier Liaoning (ExVaryag) for wider operations and for strategic outreach China assists Pakistan. On 19th July, 2011 the International Seabed Authority cleared China’s request for mining licenses to explore up to 10,000 sq km for poly-metallic sulphides over the next 15 years in Southwestern Indian Ridge by the state-run China Ocean Mineral Resources Research Development Association. Indian Navy faces challenges and it looks forward to rise to the occasion as it celebrates Navy Day on 4th December but its status will depend on India’s economy and thoughtful planning. It would be appropriate to quote US President Theodore Roosevelt, who wrote USA’s naval strategy in 1900s, “A good Navy is not a provocation to war. It is the surest guaranty of peace.’’ Serving in the nation’s navy also means serving the rise of India and every man and woman in white can echo President J F Kennedy’s words, “If any one asks what you did for America (India). Just say I served the United States Navy (Indian Navy)”. It sums up all, as China and India in their rise both aspire for large navies in this century.

December 2012 Defence AND security alert

homeland security

DIY TERRORISM!

Cyber Jihad – OSJ (open source jihad)

The visceral nature of emotions amplified by mainstream mass media.

he great changes of our time, the emotional tectonic shifts have provided new causes for anger, past dreams to be fulfilled and new tools of attack. Emotion’s role enables past experiences to be determined with appraisal of history, which further enables current circumstances to be quickly referred to and deduced – this is the case with all beings also in politics and in terrorism. Information technology has given this process speed and larger, diverse area of dissemination. Terrorists must have publicity in some form if they are to gain attention, inspire fear and respect and to convert and recruit. One may not agree with their act but this does not preclude the sympathisers to trigger a favourable understanding of their cause. They believe they are “helping” the disillusioned and the pathless through means of cyber jihad, in understanding that the cause is just and in this path acts of terror when committed are justified. Example: The rhetorical skills (oratory through videos or written) in forums, blogs, or online magazines exudes pride, focus, devotion to the cause, strong-directed belief of success, anger, anxiety, shock, fear and panic. “Civilisations have feelings, too.” According to French policy theorist Dominique Moisi, his intriguing book explores how cultures of fear, humiliation and hope are reshaping global politics. Example from Inspire, issue 9. (Info. Note: In the documents retrieved from Abbottabad titled: “Letters from Abbottabad: Bin Laden Sidelined”:

December 2012 Defence AND security alert

The columnist is an Intelligence and Terrorism Analyst, Clinical Psychologist and Clinical Hypnotherapist based in SouthEast Asia. She has also received training in specialised areas including counter-terrorism, intelligence and tactical operations. She specialises in cognitive learning processes and neural pathway response and how these factors apply to specialised trainings. She is an expert in the field of non-verbal micro and macro expression for deception and detection and also using non-verbal assets for psychological self-assessment in conjunction with Emotional Intelligence to enhance the human mind, personality, image and spirit. She is a member of ICPA (International Corrections and Prisons Association), IACSP (International Association for Counter-Terrorism and Security Professionals), APA (American Psychological Association), APP (Association of Professional Psychologists), FPRI (Foreign Policy Research Institute) and UK Certified Hypnotherapist and General Hypnotherapy Register.

Dr Rupali Jeswal

The American public might be surprised to learn that Bin Ladin was unimpressed by the recent trend of American populist jihad. For example, he did not hold the American jihadi citizen Anwar al-`Awlaqi (killed by a drone strike in Yemen in 2011) in great esteem; Bin Ladin was not even inspired by Inspire, AQAP’s English-language magazine designed to appeal to Muslim Americans to launch random attacks in the United States. He warned of its “dangerous consequences,” presumably due to its tasteless content and no doubt to the poor planning of the operations it promotes.) Image below is taken from Inspire: Like modern terrorist organisations, the Assassins (Following the death of the Fâtimid caliphate al Mustansir in 1094, members of a faction in Persia that supported a deposed claimant to the caliphate, Nizâr, believed they now represented Fâtimid interests. These Nizârî Ismâî’lîs ended up separating themselves from mainstream Islam and creating their own state in parts of present-day Syria, Iraq and Iran. In order to establish and maintain regional control, the Nizârî Ismâî’lîs used political murders and spies to subjugate or influence rival caliphates and the dominant Saljûqs.) {Excerpt from the book: The Secret Order of Assassins The Struggle of the Early Nizârî Ismâî’lîs Against the Islamic World Marshall G S Hodgson} succeeded in reshaping and redirecting the rage of the discontented into an ideology and an organisation. Furthermore, the Assassins cultivated their terrifying reputation by slaying their victims in public. Its modern equivalent is ‘media hype’. Instant connectivity, communication and learning is enabling the terrorist to become decentralised, evolving into varied melding of groups, cells, individuals who are not dependent on any structured on-ground training camps or a base to learn, plan and carry out operations of terror. Dissemination of disinformation is not new, however use of technology has given it

December 2012 Defence AND security alert

homeland security

DIY TERRORISM!

speed and it is a weapon of mass destruction in its own right. Internet is a purposeful medium for strategic communication, the online jihadist media campaign has been growing and opening new fronts, back in 2005 in a letter to al-Zarqawi, Ayman al-Zawahari declared: “We are in a battle and more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media. We are in a media battle for the hearts and minds of our umma”. The Internet provides many different ways of anonymously meeting with ‘like minded’ individuals in a (comparatively) safe way. Furthermore, a successful cyberterrorism event could require no more prerequisite than knowledge – easily obtained through the Internet. A mujahid suitcase can be easily prepared through online learning training tools in the form of manuals on explosives, weapons know-how, targeting guidance, constructing UAV’s and more. The various jihadi forums contain sections titled Muntada al-’udda wal-i’dad (“[Military] Equipment and Preparation Forum”), devoted to discussions of a wide range of weapons and tactics. This includes discussions of electronic warfare, such as ways of combating drones, spy aircraft and satellite surveillance and ways of disrupting power systems etc. In addition to these topics, members have addressed electromagnetic pulse (EMP) technology as a means of causing severe damage to the enemy. A would be jihadi can learn all about propaganda, fund-raising and how to convert more minds. Websites such as the Taliban (alemarahweb and ABalkhi), the Somali Al-Qaeda-affiliated group Al-Shabaab Al-Mujahideen (HSMPress), Hamas (hamasinfo) and its military wing Al-Qassam Brigades (AlqassamBrigade), Hizbullah and its media arm Al-Manar TV (almanarnews) and other groups have created an epidemic. Example: A course in explosives, manufacturing of primary charges. In an article titled: Using Twitter, YouTube, Facebook and Other Internet Tools, Pakistani Terrorist Group Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Incites Violence against Shi’ite Muslims and Engenders Antisemitism http://www.memri.org/report/ en/0/0/0/0/0/0/6208.htm by Tufail Ahmad, conveys – The Lashkar-e-Jhangvi’s media campaign is steered by the Jhangvi Media Movement (JMM), which has a dedicated website jmmpak. org, creating numerous links to its webcasts, websites, videos and print magazines. The JMM also has multiple active accounts on Twitter, YouTube and Facebook, the US-based social networking sites used by it to advance its ideological propaganda. Ahlesunnatforum.com – built on the lines of jihadist Internet forums associated with Al Qaeda – is a major Internet forum operated by the LeJ/SSP. The JMM website lists a number of websites associated with it, some being jmmpak.net, kr-hyc.tk, jmmpak.tk, youtube.com/jmmpak, katibewahi.com, realitymedia.ws and Islamic-forum-net. A search of these websites in early March 2012 indicated that most of these sites are active. The jmmpak.org also propagates a number of websites and print magazines.

December 2012 Defence AND security alert

Manufacturing of primary charges Page I 49 4. HEXAMINE PEROXIDE [C6H12O6N2](14) Properties 1) It is in the form of white crystals, semi flour like form and has a smell like fish. 2) The density is 1.57 g/cm3. 3) It does not dissolve in anything at normal temperature and does not evaporate. 4) Speed of blast is 6150 m/s. 5) Temperature at which it blasts is 200˚c. 6) When boiled in water for 24 hours it decomposes and cannot be recovered. 7) Less than Hexamine Peroxide burns with a drop of Sulphuric Acid. If it is in small quantity it will not blast but not burn. 8) Doesn’t react with most of metals. 9) In moisture state it may not explode. 10) Sunlight doesn’t affect the strength. 11) For making Hydrogen Peroxide never use more than 30% H2O2 and do not use Nitric Acid as a catalyst, it may explode. Uses: 1) Used in normal and electric detonators. 2) It is also used in impact detonators and is safer to use because of its sensitivity, its neither very sensitive nor too less. 3) You can make blasting fuel, like cortex, this can be made by making a mixture of this Hexamine peroxide with Engine oil or Glycerin, such that the ratio is 1 part Engine oil and 3 parts Hexamine peroxide (Hexamine peroxide with Engine oil is better). Preparation Of Hexamine Peroxide [C6H12O6N2] 1) Take 3.5 grams Hexamine[15] and put it into breaker 1 containing 11.2 grams Hydrogen peroxide (20-30% concentration). 2) Add 5.25 grams of concentrated Citric Acid [C6H8O7] or Acetic acid [CH3COOH] to beaker 1. 3) Mix well for 30 minutes, temperature should be between 30-42˚c, then cover and leave it in a bowl of cold water till it becomes semi flour like (don’t leave unattended). 14

Note: Our sheikh recommends that the best

activating explosive for guerilla warfare for Mujahidin is Hexamine peroxide and Acetone Peroxide because they are easily available and easily prepared and strong.

Online forums and chat rooms are buzzing with “call for participation” this not only demonstrates the continuing effort by Jihadist propagandists to use mainstream social media platforms to communicate with potential followers (Al-Shabaab for example, started using Twitter in December 2011, http://www.adl.org/main_Terrorism/ twitter-shabaab-somalia-terror.htm), but also how Jihadist media entities continue to rely on the skills and efforts of individual followers to help craft their message. In April 2012 image of the New York skyline with the message “Al Qaeda Coming Soon Again in New York” attracted widespread media attention and prompted enhanced law enforcement vigilance. The image, apparently created by an individual member of a jihadist forum, demonstrated the propaganda value that can be created by individuals using commercially available software. French Sociologist, Émile Durkheim (1858–1917) has argued in his book “Division of Labour in Society”, that traditional primitive societies, based around a clan, family or a tribe unite members through common consciousness and religion plays an important role in unifying its members. This also reflects the work of the Islamic scholar, Ibn Khaldun, (1332-1395 C.E), on Asbyiah (group feelings) Ibn Khaldun expects the sense of solidarity to be based originally and normally on kinship. A sense of solidarity can be powerfully supported by religion and conversely no religion can make an impact unless its members have a strong sense of solidarity. If we keep the above mentioned theories in mind then the modern era of today and intermingling of cultures and ideas through media and Internet may give rise to cultural insecurities in various societies leading to mental and emotional unrest. Terrorist Cells and Radicalised cells are not operated by psychopaths, they are individuals who have a vision, a strategy and a goal, they have command on their oratorical and writing skills and knowledge in various fields, they, like every human being have a belief system and a set of emotional values. This comes about through the systemic process, as illustrated in the diagram below, of emotional meaning, emotional support and self-expansion (this process is in all positives and all negatives). Organisms respond to environmental cues according to their

emotional / motivational significance. Terrorism is phenomenon that precedes m o d e r n mass media, historically, spread of terror was through oral communication, example the Assassin sect of Shiite Islam during the middle ages, spread terror by word of mouth in the mosques and marketplaces, their connections to mainstream Islam were marginal, they had respect for the Qur’an and a philosophical explanation of the universe. An interesting research in 2007 by Prof Christian Seidl states that – they proposed a warm, personal, emotional faith and to their followers and supporters they offered a well-organised and powerful opposition movement. Two obvious requirements for the success of their operations were an organisation capable to launch the attack and survive the counter-blow and an ideology strong enough to inspire and sustain the attackers. This ideology was provided by the Ismaili religion with its promise of divine and human fulfilment, martyrdom that inspired astonishing devotion. Even though the Assassins operated in ancient times, they are relevant today, primarily as forerunners of modern terrorists in aspects of motivation, organisation, targeting and goals. Furthermore, the fact that they are remembered hundreds of years later, demonstrates the deep psychological impact they caused. In current times, similar form of oral communication are taking place, one of the recent examples at Masjid al-Azahar, South Jakarta, can be read on this link http://prisonerofjoy.blogspot.com/2012/11/ ustadz-abu-jibriel-jihad-of-syria.html

homeland security

DIY TERRORISM!

Media and public attention makes terrorism widespread and successful, even provoked governments adopting repressive measures strengthens the success of terrorism. Terrorism has symbolic power and deep psychological effects, especially when information technology is used, it is terrifying because of it’s potential, as we saw in the case of Assam recently, destructive cyber militancy led to manipulation, corruption of information and images to release misinformation and insert confusion, chaos and disruption of the daily flow of life, this has a psychological impact of a deeper kind. Disruptive Cyber militancy activities also includes activities such as web defacement, according to the Indian government’s information technology ministry, more than 270 government websites were hacked in the first half of 2012. Twenty-first century technology, spreading rapidly throughout the developing world, is increasingly colliding with ancient tribal animosities, with explosive results. We are far from full comprehension of the kind of foreign policy, national security and civil liberty questions that this new force will raise. Cyber militancy activities used by the terrorist organisations benefit them in converting, radicalising, recruiting, financing, target and operation planning and of course communicating.

Al Qeada operative and administrator of an online jihadi chat forum – Al-Hesbah, posting propaganda material and poetry on the forums. In “Knights under the Prophet’s Banner”, al-Zawahiri suggests that “the jihad movement must dedicate one of its wings to work with the masses”. In concluding, al-Zawahiri offers advice to the future generation of the jihadist movement: “We must get our message across to the masses of the nation and break the media siege imposed on the jihad movement”. - Ayman al-Zawahiri, “ (“Knights under the Prophet’s Banner”).

Al-Suwaidan’s January 17 tweet was not his first statement in support of cyber jihad, as documented by MEMRI. In a June 4, 2011 interview on Al-Quds TV, Al-Suwaidan called for armed resistance and electronic jihad against Israel. June 14, 2012 - http://www. memri.org/report/en/print6453. htm

”

Internet has become an important tactical operational tool for the terrorist organisations (building online strength in numbers), with trajectory beyond bombs, missiles and guns.

Also see http://www.youtube. com/watch?v=QjCsSRo4eoE &feature=player_embedded – Tareq Suwaidan Encourages the Ummah to work for the establishment of the Khilafah [English subtitles]. On September 14, 2006 a free online video game was released: “The night of the capture of Bush” subtitled “Quest for Bush”, this was advertised as a game for young mujahideen. Apparently this game was a modified version of the commercial game “Quest for Saddam”, produced by Petrilla Entertainment in 2003.

Below is an example which conveys how significant is the tool called Internet – Information Technology for cyber jihad. The Momentous Secret that is No Longer Secret!!! To close, the final secret I am spreading, which has been known to the wise of the world, follows this question: How was the legend of America destroyed in the media? Indeed was its nose rubbed in the dirt; in light and darkness? The cleansed hands of the lions of the Jihadist media, the keyboard heroes, the guards of the monitors, the pioneers of the forums. May you be blessed, O strangers of the net, masters of the Islamic tide; blessings to you who revived the most beautiful days of my life. Blessings to you who destroyed the stock market prices, crushed in the countries of infidelity with the bells and whistles ringing. Blessed are you who have exhausted the slaves of the Cross. For you I pray in private on the wings of wonder and longing. I do not hide from you that we praise be to Allah found your good influence in the Land of Jihad. Continue repaying Allah with your excellent publications, moving speeches, grand analysis and enjoyable articles. Continue your blessed media invasion and develop methods to confront the enemy and penetrate his websites so that he has no peace of mind. Brother of the Mujahideen Abu Kandahar al‑Zarqawi 12 Rabi al-Awwal 1431 02 March 2010 Abu Kandahar al-Zarqawi” a Jordanian was an

December 2012 Defence AND security alert

Al Qaeda has explicitly called for acts of cyber jihad along with acts of “lone” terrorism since the death of Osama bin Laden.

“Quest for Bush” after its release in September was downloaded a few thousand times on the Internet by mid-October. The general popularity of this game among children makes this production a decoy for the recruitment of young supporters.”

May 22, 2012. In a chilling video, an Al Qaeda operative calls for “electronic jihad” against the United States and compares vulnerabilities in vital American computer networks to the flaws in aviation security before the 9/11 attack. The Al Qaeda video calls upon the “covert mujahidin” to launch cyber attacks against the US networks of both government and critical infrastructure, including the electric grid.

http://www.washingtonpost. com/wp-dyn/content/ article/2006/10/08/ AR2006100800931.html

Excerpts of few articles and links:

Al-Suwaidan Tweets In Support Of Cyber Jihad.

“A growing community of German speaking Islamists has developed on the Internet. Aiming to find new recruits, they glorify jihad and call for attacks on Germany. A new study warns that such online propaganda might foster a new generation of terrorists. “http://www.spiegel.de/ international/germany/germanjihadists-target-youth-on-theinternet-study-finds-a-864797.html

Following the January 2012 Saudi cyber-attack on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange (TASE) and El-Al Airlines and series of hacking attacks that accessed the credit card information of thousands of Israelis, Al-Suwaidan used his Twitter account to provide religious justification for these attacks. On January 17, 2012, Al-Suwaidan tweeted: “I see the need in uniting the efforts of the hackers within the electronic jihad project against the Zionist enemy and it is an effective and important jihad and its reward is great – Allah willing.” Al-Suwaidan: “I Strongly Encourage Young People To Undertake Electronic Jihad ... I View This As Better Than 20 Jihad Operations.”

Virtual Terrorism: Al Qaeda Video Calls for ‘Electronic Jihad’ http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/ cyber-terrorism-al-qaeda-video-calls-electronic-jihad/story?id=16407875#.UKdSq6krxSU

“Denis Cuspert was a bit player, but as a propagandist for jihad he is a star in some circles. He has gained considerable prominence since 2010, when he transformed

December 2012 Defence AND security alert

homeland security

DIY TERRORISM!

himself from a Berlin hip hop artist named Deso Dogg into the Islamist Abu Malik.”

•After 9/11, OBL (ed. Ausaf newspaper)

“Young Muslim men in Germany are systematically trying to recruit their peers for jihad using sophisticated rhetoric and psychology and by targeting vulnerable youths who are searching for direction in life. Two men who have quit the scene tell their story to SPIEGEL, providing a rare look into a dangerous underground.” The full story can be read here: http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/howgerman-islamists-recruit-young-men-for-jihad-a-851393. html

“… Hundreds of Muslim scientists were with him and who would use their knowledge in chemistry, biology and (sic) ranging from computers to electronics against the infidels.”

Daveed Gartenstein-Ross article on 29th October 2012 – Gunpowder and Lead http://www.defenddemocracy.com/media-hit/ shabaabs-godane-releases-eid-message/ “Shabaab leader Ahmad Abdi Godane (aka Mokhtar Abu Zubayr) released an audio statement commemorating Eid al-Adha that was posted on the pro-Shabaab Calamada website.” Excerpt from the statement – “ ... The second example of the ongoing changes in the world is the success achieved by the Muslim ummah. The first one is the fall of infidel-allied regimes in the Arab world and the spread of jihad activities in Egypt, India, Syria, Mali and Nigeria.” For terror groups, the Internet has become a useful tool to recruit would-be jihadists. By Elisabeth Oktofani for Khabar Southeast Asia in Jakarta October 31, 2012 http://khabarsoutheastasia.com/en_GB/articles/apwi/ articles/features/2012/10/31/feature-02 “There are also some individuals who manage several websites at one time,” as stated by Noor Huda Ismail, executive director of the International Institute for Peace Building, Indonesia. “They usually use social media and / or free blog hosting such as Facebook or Blogpot to post information or ideas about jihad.” One of the most popular topics on such sites, he said, is how to make a bomb from regular kitchen items. “They can easily find out how to make bombs cheaply. They can purchase the ingredients such as match powder and also sugar without being noticed,” he said. “That was actually what happened in Umar Bin Khattab boarding school in Bima, West Nusa Tenggara. They assembled a bomb with knowledge gained from the Internet.” In the age of modern terrorism bombmakers have had luxury of access to high powered military explosives such as TNT, C-4 and Semtex, technologies shaped charges, platter charges and explosively formed penetrators have also made these explosives powerful. Microelectronics has also, greatly altered the craft of bombmaking. A device can be set on timers to be activated weeks after it is placed aided by sensors which can detect motion, light, changes in altitude in order to detonate the device. Digital mulitmeter is preferred over analogue. Command detonated devices using car batteries, cell phones, radio signals are widely employed (information of this sort is readily available, discussed upon, online, in jihadi forums).

December 2012 Defence AND security alert

allegedly

told

Hadmid

Mir

Information technology has become a delivering agent for, concoction of recipes of mayhem. A brief on bioterrorism with focus on India, shared with me by my friend and colleague Dr Miri Halperin Wernli, she is a senior Pharma Executive working in Basel Switzerland. “This topic has great relevance to India because India faces both domestic and international terrorism and has specific vulnerabilities due to the following 3 factors: 1. Material needed for bio- and chemical-terrorism could be easily found in India: India has made significant progress in biotechnology over the last few years and this has increased the “easy availability” of material and knowledge to undertake acts of bio-terror. Numerous pharmaceutical production facilities, bio-containment laboratories are working with lethal pathogens – and controls are weak. Also, there is a large biomedical research community, which could be recruited or employed by terrorists. And there is plethora of indigenous highly pathogenic and virulent agents naturally occurring in India. 2. Also, Indian industries produce enormous amounts of dual-use chemicals and these chemicals are easily available and cheap: the production of chemicals is in bulk for the domestic consumption and for defence forces. And the access to such chemicals is hardly regulated and no verifiable records are kept.

From the past:

•Muslim Hackers Club

http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/features/virtualterrorists/story-e6frg6z6-1111114072291?from=public_rss

–Active in 1998-99

Virtual Terrorist, 2007

–Goal: “a non-state capability in information warfare, err, research.”

http://digital-intifada.blogspot.com/2012/03/digitalintifada-exclusive-interview_05.html

–Provided training to local chapters on hacking and network admin

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cpIRllogW_s http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6746756/#. UKnWQKkrwlI

•Three Pakistani hacker groups: GForce Pakistan stated in 2001: In a few days US government websites will be taken down, so will be the Indian websites ... (image below).

Prominent groups identified by MEMRI

–212 defacements

Hackboy

–Last recorded 10/27/01

Ansal Al-Jihad Lil-Jihad Al-Electroni

–Said they weren’t “cyber terrorists”

Munazamat Fursan Al-Jihad Al-Electroni

–Said “all we ask for is PEACE for everyone”

Majmu’at Al-Jihad Al-Electroni Majma’ Al-Hakar Al-Muslim Inhiyar Al-Dolar (maintain own websites for recruiting volunteers for and coordinating attacks) E Alshech, Cyberspace as a Combat Zone: The Phenomenon of Electronic Jihad, MEMRI, No. 329, Feb. 27, 2007

3. Hazardous materials could easily be taken in or out of the country, given the strong web of air connections Delhi shares with the rest of the world and the vulnerabilities that might be exploited at the airport. Delhi airport alone sees planes depart daily to numerous European, Asian, Middle Eastern and African destinations, as well as non-stop flights to Chicago and Newark.

•Al Qaeda Alliance Online

In all our work we have outlined a series of new and different challenges that could implicate pharma and healthcare in bio- and chemical-terrorism. And India is particularly vulnerable.”

•Q8Army

And information bridge the gap of security.

technology know-how and

can poor

The virtual online strength gives – numbers (virtual population), shared vision, speed to information, gathers imaginative tech-savvy minds, indoctrinated justification through religious ideology, reinforcing the feeling of oppression, marginalisation, selectively perceived pain and sufferings being used as a drive – resulting in increased online chatter and follow-up with hands-on acts of terrorism.

•OBL Crew •Abu Syf3r •Hilf Al-Muhajirin

•Cyber Jihad •Hackers for Palestine •Arab Electronic Jihad Team –Sought to bring down all US websites •Arabian-Fighterz Team –About 3,000 defacements –http://www.zone-h.org/en/defacements/mirror/ id=3672421/

Agreement to stand united under the banner of the Muhajirun Brigades in order to promote cyber warfare and allegiance to leadership –Goal to wage media jihad and attack websites harmful to Islam and Muslims •Initiative launched January 3, 2007 on Islamic websites •Mujahideen operating on Internet http://bsimmons.wordpress.com/2007/02/26/ cyberspace-as-a-combat-zone-the-phenomenon-ofelectronic-jihad/ • Hacking tools developed by jihadists and acquired from other hackers

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homeland security

sea power in India

DIY TERRORISM!

•Terrorist training centres

Training manuals and videos

–al-Qaeda safe house in Pakistan reportedly used for training in computer hacking and cyber warfare, and cyber reconnaissance of infrastructure and SCADA systems [Magnus Ranstorp, “al Qaeda in Cyberspace,” in Terrorism in the Information Age, 2004]

Explosives of all types, Surface-to-air missiles, Flying planes (18 videos on flying 747’s)

•Documents on how to hack •Numerous web forum •First announced late 2003 with “college” on electronic jihad •Announced again in October 2005 on al-Farouq web forum •Forum offers library of hacking tools and instructions for cyber attacks Fouad Hussein (Fouad Hussein is a Jordanian journalist and author of the 2005 Arabic language book Al-Zarqawi: The Second Generation of Al Qaeda.) http://www.theage.com.au/news/war-on-terror/alqaeda-chiefsreveal-world-domination-design/2005/08/23/1124562861654. html

Electronic Jihad Magazines Sawt al-Jihad (Voice of Jihad) - October 2003 – (with lapses) (By AQAP) Sada al-Jihad (Echo of the Jihad) - January 2006 (By Global Islamic Media Front) For example, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s English language magazine Inspire regularly encourages readers to contribute articles, quotes and images. It has also provided contact information for readers “interested in contributing to this magazine with any skills – exmple: writing, research, editing or advice” and suggested that individuals use the same encryption programme referenced by GIMF “in order to avoid detection from the intelligence services [sic].” (image ablow)

al-Zarqawi–al-Qaeda’s Second Generation, 2005, in Arabic describes 7 phases of al-Qaeda’s long-term war based on interviews of top lieutenants ... Phase 4, 2010-2013, includes cyberterrorism against US economy

CRITICAL RESOURCE

A Balanced Energy Mix for India A

concise and clear-headed analysis of a balanced energy Mix for India. Coal, oil and gas account for major part of India's energy mix while wind, solar power and geothermal together account for a mere 0.3 per cent, hydro energy for 0.7 per cent and nuclear for around 3 per cent. The other major source of energy in India is bio-mass and agricultural waste which is principally employed in rural areas and accounts for around 24 per cent of energy generation. Prices of solar photovoltaic cells have fallen dramatically in the international market on account of state subsidies provided by Chinese government to support large scale production and to promote cheap exports to Europe and USA. This has made solar energy more competitive and affordable than was the case earlier. India imports more than 75 per cent of its oil needs. This is likely to go up further in the coming years. The country is dependent to the tune of 70 per cent on coal for generating electricity. The quality of domestic coal is inferior on account of excessive ash content and low calorific value. We import coal from Australia and Indonesia. Therefore there is no other way but to have a balanced mix of energy production. Nuclear energy and shale gas will have to be small but important components of that energy mix for the foreseeable future.

More through cyber means: •Recruitment –MTV-quality rap video inspiring viewers to take up jihad against the west. •Recordings of terrorist acts –Bombings, hostages, beheadings, etc.

–Leaders

Mohamed Osman Mohamud, accused of attempting to detonate a vehicle which he believed was laden with explosives at an Oregon Christmas Tree lighting ceremony in 2010, is an example of someone who responded to such solicitations.

–Suicide bombers

Al-Muhahid al-Taqni (The Technical Mujahid) - October 2006

•Weapons training

Mu’askar al-Battar (Al Battar Camp) - January - November 2004

•Recorded statements by

–Videos and manuals on mixing explosives, making dirty bombs, using Stinger missiles, etc •Al-Battar Training Camp

Al Khansa - August 2004 only

6th issue discussed cell organisation and command structure

(For female mujahidin)

•The Technical Mujahid- al-Qa’ida

(Military training manual)

December 2012 Defence AND security alert

Conclusion: The list from the past is exhaustive. Another year has passed and what have we learned?

rotests and counter-protests, charges and counter-charges have vitiated the environment over the last many months since the central government decided to load U-235 fuel and operationalise the Kudankulam Nuclear Plant in Tamil Nadu. Anti-nuke protesters contend that both the central and Tamil Nadu governments have sold the safety and security of common people to corporate and foreign interests. They charge that authorities are riding

Amb Ashok Sajjanhar The writer a Postgraduate in Physics from Delhi University and a career diplomat, has served as Ambassador of India to Kazakhstan, Sweden and Latvia. He has also held several significant positions in Indian Embassies in Moscow, Teheran, Geneva, Dhaka, Bangkok, Washington and Brussels. He negotiated for India in the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. He has been an active participant in many International Seminars organised by UNCTAD and WTO. For the foreseeable future hence there is no way out for India but to rationalise and optimise its fossil fuel generation and consumption and invest in more efficient systems, buildings, residential complexes, industrial establishments etc to get maximum benefit from its energy resources. We also need to ensure that our sources of foreign oil and gas continue to provide unimpeded energy to us in the coming years. India has done well to stand firm on its principled stand with respect to import of oil from Iran. Iran accounts for 12 per cent of our energy needs at a cost of around US$ 12 billion per annum. It is commendable that we did not get steamrolled into following the US diktat of cutting all business and investment links with Iran

It would not be prudent to take a final view on doing away completely with nuclear energy at this stage under social and political duress which by its very nature is emotional and volatile and not very well informed

December 2012 Defence AND security alert

sea power in India

CRITICAL RESOURCE

roughshod over genuine concerns of the people on safety of nuclear plants to appease the US, Russian and French governments and private business houses. In their view it has been proven beyond any reasonable doubt after the Fukushima tragedy in Japan in March last year that nuclear energy is unsafe and should be phased out with immediate effect. In fact many countries including Germany, France and Austria which have hitherto been strong proponents of nuclear energy have decided to gradually but conclusively phase out nuclear energy and invest more on progressively harnessing renewable forms of energy. It needs of course to be emphasised that most of such decisions have been taken on political considerations in view of forthcoming or just concluded elections. Another possible reason is that prices of solar photovoltaic cells have fallen dramatically in the international market on account of state subsidies provided by Chinese government to support large scale production and to promote cheap exports to Europe and USA. This has made solar energy more competitive and affordable than was the case earlier.

Even more than solar energy, it is wind energy, bio-energy and small hydro plants which can contribute to meeting our energy needs. It is proven that our wind energy potential is about 20 or 30 times larger than the 1,00,000 MW that was projected earlier. Also,that the cost of producing wind-energy is cheaper than energy produced from imported coal. Similar is the case with bio-energy as this can use agricultural and forestry waste, wooden shavings, bio-matter, residue etc to generate energy It is argued that India also needs to follow the path of renewables in preference to fossil fuels and nuclear energy. There is considerable merit in this argument. It is well recognised that on account of its expanding population and robust economic growth India cannot continue for long with its reliance on fossil fuels for generating energy. These are dirty sources of energy and cause immense damage to the environment. India

imports more than 75 per cent of its oil needs. This is likely to go up further in the coming years. The country is dependent to the tune of 70 per cent on coal for generating electricity. The quality of domestic coal is inferior on account of excessive ash content and low calorific value. We import coal from Australia and Indonesia and NTPC has been scouring foreign coal deposits for acquisition to serve as captive sources for feeding power plants in India. This exercise is proving to be increasingly difficult and fraught with uncertainty. The increasing cost of fossil fuels including oil, gas, coal etc in the international market makes continuation of business as usual increasingly unviable and prohibitively expensive. It is clear that renewables are the long-term answer to India’s crying need for significantly enhanced supplies of sustainable energy. We have been making slow but steady progress towards this objective by increasing the share of renewables in our overall energy mix. It is however a formidable challenge. There is no way that renewables will be able to meet our burgeoning energy demands in the short or medium term. The picture becomes clear when we notice that coal, oil and gas account for major part of India’s energy mix while wind, solar power and geothermal together account for a mere 0.3 per cent, hydro energy for 0.7 per cent and nuclear for around 3 per cent. The other major source of energy in India is bio-mass and agricultural waste which is principally employed in rural areas and accounts for around 24 per cent of energy generation. For the foreseeable future hence there is no way out for India but to rationalise and optimise its fossil fuel generation and consumption and invest in more efficient systems, buildings, residential complexes, industrial establishments etc to get maximum benefit from its energy resources. We also need to ensure that our sources of foreign oil and gas continue to provide unimpeded energy to us in the coming years. India has done well to stand firm on its principled stand with respect to import of oil from Iran. Iran accounts for

December 2012 Defence AND security alert

12 per cent of our energy needs at a cost of around US$ 12 billion per annum. It is commendable that we did not get steamrolled into following the US diktat of cutting all business and investment links with Iran because of its alleged pursuit of nuclear weapon ambitions. In the same vein we need to continue our negotiations with increased seriousness and focus with Iran and Pakistan on laying a gas pipeline for meeting our growing energy needs.

Renewables will also provide a further fillip to increasing rural demand which has been at the forefront in propelling the India growth story Another avenue that needs to be actively explored is the natural gas option which has so far not been accorded the attention that it deserves. Natural gas, occurring naturally for millennia and harnessed as an energy source for two centuries, has appeared an unlikely answer. However, in the past 15 years, quantum advances in extraction technology in the Oil and Gas industry have brought the prospects of plentiful natural gas from unconventional sources to the forefront. Among these, perhaps the most significant is the development of hydraulic fracturing (or fracking as it is commonly known) as well as horizontal drilling techniques in the US which have allowed firms around the globe to finally tap into deep geological repositories of shale gas (natural gas trapped in subterranean shale formations) that were previously either inaccessible or economically unviable to extract. Meanwhile, significant discoveries of gas reservoirs in offshore shale formations in the Krishna-Godavari basin off India’s east coast have been made in the past decade, beginning with Reliance Industries’ discovery of 14 trillion cubic feet (tcf) in the KG-D6 block in 2002. These have prompted investments of over Rs. 40,000 crore (US$ 7.5 billion) in the construction of supporting infrastructure including receiving terminals and pipelines, as well as gas-based power plants, to harness this resource for the nation’s billion-plus inhabitants. Estimates made by the US Energy

Information Administration in 2010 have pegged India’s recoverable shale-gas resources to around 63 tcf.

Significant discoveries of gas reservoirs in offshore shale formations in the Krishna-Godavari basin off India’s east coast have been made in the past decade, beginning with Reliance Industries’ discovery of 14 trillion cubic feet (tcf) in the KG-D6 block in 2002. These have prompted investments of over Rs 40,000 crore (US$ 7.5 billion) in the construction of supporting infrastructure including receiving terminals and pipelines, as well as gas-based power plants, to harness this resource These could bolster India’s energy security and raise the profile of gas in our energy mix in the coming years. In future, gas is set to increasingly become a staple ‘’bridge fuel’’ for developed and developing economies the world over and India is unlikely to be an exception. In spite of weak domestic production, India’s appetite for gas is set to only grow further. Reasons are not far to seek. Increasing uncompetitiveness of coal, advent of new technologies for prospecting and retrieving shale gas, growing industrial applications of natural gas and significantly lower environmental impact will ensure increasing use of gas in comparison to other fossil fuels as a ‘’bridge fuel’’ as we move into the era of renewables. Speaking of renewables, even more than solar energy, it is wind energy, bio-energy and small hydro plants which can contribute to meeting our energy needs. It is proven that our wind energy potential is about 20 or 30 times larger than the 1,00,000 MW that was projected earlier. Also, that the cost of producing wind-energy is cheaper than energy produced from imported coal. Similar is the case with bio-energy as this can use agricultural and forestry waste, wooden shavings, bio-matter, residue etc to generate energy. The other significant advantage of renewables over both fossil fuels as well as nuclear energy is that these units can be installed in a decentralised fashion in far away

hamlets and villages in mountainous areas and isolated places. Such energy generation and supply will hence not entail losses on account of transmission and distribution and will be able to meet the needs of the most disadvantaged and impoverished sections of the population living in those areas. They will hence fulfill the vital need of making our growth inclusive in addition to contributing to energy security and sustainability.

Estimates made by the US Energy Information Administration in 2010 have pegged India’s recoverable shale-gas resources to around 63 tcf Renewables will also provide a further fillip to increasing rural demand which has been at the forefront in propelling the India growth story. There are of course huge challenges including high initial costs, high cost of power, large area of land required for installing solar and wind energy plants etc. For instance, installing solar cells would require an investment of around US$ 120 billion to replace a nuclear power plant costing US$ 3.25 billion, an increase of more than 35 times. Solar cells required would occupy an area of 150 sq km, a huge area by any yardstick particularly in a country where land acquisition has become one of the biggest bottlenecks to timely implementation of projects.

Going forward therefore there is no other way but to have a balanced mix of energy production. Nuclear energy and shale gas will have to be small but important components of that energy mix for the foreseeable future. There are huge differences between Fukushima and the measures taken by the Indian government in ensuring safety of our nuclear plants. These have been extensively recounted by scientists and professionals in public discourse. Today nuclear energy generation of around 5,000 MW accounts for around 4 per cent of our total energy production. Even with 20,000 MW by 2020 and 62,000 MW by 2032, assuming that these targets are realised, its contribution to total energy production will be barely 6-7 per cent. Under these circumstances it would not be prudent to take a final view on doing away completely with nuclear energy at this stage under social and political duress which by its very nature is emotional and volatile and not very well informed. The government in about 15-20 years time should take an informed and fully thought-through decision in full and transparent consultation with the public, scientific community and civil society. This is the only way to go forward.

December 2012 Defence AND security alert

sea power in India

CONTROLLING THE SEAS

A Maj Gen P K Chakravorty VSM (retd) The writer is an alumnus of National Defence Academy who was comissioned into the Regiment of Artillery on 31 March 1972. A Silver Gunner who has undergone the Long Gunnery Staff Course, Staff College and is a graduate of the National Defence College. He has commanded a Medium Regiment and a Composite Artillery Brigade. He was Major General Artillery of an operational Command, Commandant of Selection Centre South in Bangalore and Additional Director General Artillery at Army Headquarters. He has also served as the Defence Attache to Vietnam and is a prolific writer on strategic subjects. The pirates in Somalia have been accused of forming an alliance with Islamic insurgents. Jane’s Terrorism and Security Monitor has reported that certain insurgent groups have been using pirates to smuggle weapons and supplies in return for providing bases. The fundamentalist group Al Shahab has provided operating funds and specialist weapons in return for a share of the ransoms being paid to the captors. As many as 2,500 young Somalis have been trained by the Al Shahab

The pirates have linkages with the Al Qaida based in Yemen. It is reported that Al Qaida has reportedly provided the pirate groups with assistance in procurement of mother ships and arms for successful conduct of operations

n indepth analysis of the phenomena of Somali Piracy that goes into why the Somalis have taken to piracy. Overall the multinational naval operations have resulted in reduction of piracy. There has been no hijack of ship since 19 June 2012 and no boarding attempted since 26 June 2012. Despite t h i s a s m a n y a s 191 crew members and about 14 merchant vessels are still held by Somalian pirates. This is a temporary pause and it is still profitable to be a pirate in Somalia than an ordinary citizen. Despite large number of warships, pirates have extended their area to 1,100 nautical miles from the shore. The moment the naval ships thin out the process would resume. The solution has three components – on land to check genuine Somali grievances based on illegal poaching and dumping of toxic waste in their waters; at sea via multinational anti-piracy naval operations and lastly protective measures by the merchant ships.

Control of the seas means security. Control of the seas means peace. Control of the seas can mean victory. The United States must control the sea if it is to protect our security.

– John F Kennedy

ea power is the source of a nation’s capability to defend its coastline and its trade of commodities as also offshore assets. Seaborne piracy against civilian ships remains an important aspect with estimated losses of US$ 15 billion annually. Piracy has existed for as long as people and commodities have traversed the oceans. The ancient Greeks, Romans and Chinese all complained of it and all created naval forces to fight pirates. The word “piracy” comes from the Latin pirata, “sea robber” and before that from the Greek peirates “brigand” or “one who attacks.” As modern nation states emerged from feudalism, privateering for both profit and war supplemented piracy at the margins of national sovereignty. Recently, an ocean enclosure movement under the aegis of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 has granted states access to maritime resources far beyond their territorial limits. This in turn has given states more responsibility for providing safe passage through their waters. Who owns the sea? Who has rights of navigation through its waters? Who is responsible for protecting ships at sea? For most of human history, the high seas were seen as vast, dangerous, uncharted regions filled with demons and dragons. Throughout much of human history, therefore, it was assumed that the seas could not be owned, occupied or governed. Fighting pirates at sea, although desirable, was beyond the jurisdiction and ability of most “states” whether feudal or national. Historically, a state’s sovereignty stopped at the shoreline. The world’s oceans remained open-access, “common pool” resources. As commercial trade expanded, coastal communities overtime evolved maritime practices to earn money from passing merchantmen. These practices ranged from the piloting and provisioning of ships, to extortion, to outright pirating. In these early years, piracy was not just an enterprise of criminals but a widespread practice of some seafaring communities, including the Bugis and Riau in the Malay world, Iban raiding and pirating communities on the west coast of Borneo, the Iranun around Jolo and the Sulu Sea and others in Vietnamese and Chinese coastal areas.

Various types of piracy Piracy is a difficult issue and is mainly due to various underlying socio-political issues affecting a specific area. Piracy is classified either by region or the kind of acts pertaining to piracy. In the geographic category there are Asian, South American, West African and Somalian types of piracy. The piracy practised by Somalians is entirely different from other geographic regions as it has a commercial corporatised approach which involves hijacking merchant cargo vessels, ocean liners, yachts for collection of ransom from the shipping companies. It is indeed creditable

December 2012 Defence AND security alert

SEA POWER PIRACY, INSURGENCY AND FORCE ACTIONS

that the pirates have been generally treating their hostages with minimal violence. However, there are chances of this being flouted and this certainly is a cause for concern. The other type of piracy includes marine robberies by petty criminals, cargo hijacking with selling of cargo, vessel hijacking with seeking of ransom, hijacking vessels for terrorist missions, barratry and maritime fraud. Out of these marine robberies colloquially known as marine mugging is most prevalent.

mostly confined to the cargo carried by the ships than the crew. These acts interfere with the trading interests of Benin, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of Congo. It is pertinent to note that trade of Benin’s important port the Port of Contou, was reported to have dropped by 70 per cent during the current year. The estimated losses due to piracy in the Gulf of Guinea due to stolen goods, security and insurance have been estimated to be US$ 2 billion.

The pirate skiffs approach the vessel and intimidate the crew by firing AK-47s or rocket propelled grenades, thereby forcing it to slow down or stop. The ship is steered to a Somali harbour for a ransom demand. The phase of negotiations is often long and painful for the hostages. The average ransoms are heavy and go up to US$ 4 million in case of Somalian pirates. The ransom if heavy is normally delivered by air and the release of hostages takes a long time, sometime after two months. The booty is normally divided with 30 per cent going to the piracy bosses, 50 per cent to the executors and 20 per cent to the guards and other creditors

Somalian piracy

Out of all the regions piracy is currently most prevalent in West Africa in the Gulf of Guinea and Somalia. In as much as the Gulf of Guinea is concerned piracy is

Somalian piracy has caused consternation for the entire shipping passing close to the country and compelled navies to think of innovative ideas to deal with them. The primary reason for the increase of Somalian piracy is that the country is realistically a failed state. The country has been ignored globally and governance is absent since the fall of the Siad Barre regime more than two decades ago. The country has been facing severe civil disturbances. The ailing Transitional Federal Government leader Abdullah Yusuf Ahmed established the state of Puntland. The new state has 1,600 km coastline which has plenty of resources including large quantities of marine resources and fish. However, after the collapse of the Somali central government in 1991, the coastal portion was left unguarded against foreign poachers. The poaching by

December 2012 Defence AND security alert

sea power in India

CONTROLLING THE SEAS

undesirable elements was one of the primary reasons that led to increase in piracy. Fishing is the main source of livelihood of the coastal population of Somalia and Puntland. Due to inability of the government to prevent stealing of fish by foreign trawlers, the area lost US$ 300 million worth of tuna, shrimp and lobsters. The local fishermen were deprived of their catch and this led to frustration amongst the fishermen in the region. The illegal fishing was done by trawlers from Spain, South Korea and Egypt.

They include the US Fifth Fleet coordinated Coalition Task Force 151, the Operation Atlanta European Union Naval Force and the Operation Ocean Shield by NATO Apart from this, the region was abused by the dumping of radioactive toxic waste near the Somalian coast by foreign countries. It was stated that the Italian mafia was involved in this nefarious operation. These allegations which were made remained unproven for almost a decade. In 2004 Northern Somalia was struck by a tsunami and barrels of toxic waste were scattered over Somaliaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s beaches. This was mainly done by European countries who found it inexpensive to dispose radioactive waste at US$ 2.50 a ton in Somalian waters against legal disposal at US$ 1,000 a ton. Experts from United Nations Environment Programme have found that the waste contained uranium radioactive materials as also, lead, cadmium, mercury, industrial waste and hospital waste. The Somalian pirate emerged as a result of these circumstances. Similar facts would emerge in the Gulf of Guinea and other areas affected by piracy. Initially the Somalian fishermen tried to dissuade the trawlers and dumpers. They even tried levying taxes on them but they were not able to establish firm control. It is important to note that a civil war was on and many trawlers and duper owners were bribing the Somalia government ministers to obtain licenses to dump their toxic waste. Gradually the fishermen transformed themselves as pirates as they found the task more lucrative. A pirate earns US$ 20,000 to US$ 30,000 per year, an unimaginable amount for Somalis whose per capita income works out to US$ 600 per year. Broadly there are three categories of pirates; first of all the battle hardened clan based militia, second youth looking for quick money to finance plans and the third fishermen who are forcibly recruited for their navigational skills. It is extremely fascinating to note that despite the criminal nature of their activity, Somalis accept piracy as a legitimate service due to the illegal fishing and dumping of waste.

Adoption of corporatised policy methodologies The focus of Somalian piracy is to extort money from the shipping companies by hijacking their ships. The method of operating is to avoid violence as much as possible and to treat the crews well. Their execution of tasks is similar to that of a private company. Their ship targeting entails detailed research and prospective ships are analysed prior to undertaking operations. About US$ 6,000 is invested by financiers prior to undertaking operations. This is utilised

December 2012 Defence AND security alert

for logistics as well as sophisticated weaponry primarily Small Arms and RPGs, bribes to officials and intelligence authorities. The pirates used small skiffs with heavy Out Board Motors to carry out attacks on the merchant vessels. The pilots have a mother ship which is normally a captured fishing boat in which their logistics needs are based. In a classical pirate operation, these mother ships wait for their prey hundreds of miles from the coast and ambush the targeted ship. The actual process of capturing a ship does not take much time and can be as short as 15 minutes. The pirate skiffs approach the vessel and intimidate the crew by firing AK-47s or rocket propelled grenades, thereby forcing it to slow down or stop. The ship is steered to a Somali harbour for a ransom demand. The phase of negotiations is often long and painful for the hostages. The average ransoms are heavy and go up to US$ 4 million in case of Somalian pirates. The ransom if heavy is normally delivered by air and the release of hostages takes a long time, sometime after two months. The booty is normally divided with 30 per cent going to the piracy bosses, 50 per cent to the executors and 20 per cent to the guards and other creditors.

Piracy and maritime terrorism The pirates in Somalia have been accused of forming an alliance with Islamic insurgents. Janeâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Terrorism and Security Monitor has reported that certain insurgent groups have been using pirates to smuggle weapons and supplies in return for providing bases. The fundamentalist group Al Shahab has provided operating funds and specialist weapons in return for a share of the ransoms being paid to the captors. As many as 2,500 young Somalis have been trained by the Al Shahab. Further there are unconfirmed reports of a strong maritime force comprising of those experienced in piracy has been organised by the Al Shahab along the lines of Sea Tigers operated by the LTTE. This group is said to have a stronghold in South Central Somalia. In addition to the Al Shahab group, the pirates have linkages with the Al Qaida based in Yemen. It is reported that Al Qaida has reportedly provided the pirate groups with assistance in procurement of mother ships and arms for successful conduct of operations. It appears that the linkages are symbiotic as the aims of terrorism and piracy do not converge. While terrorism is politically motivated action of a group to convey through fear a message or warning to the larger community, piracy is merely an act of violence on the seas undertaken for personal monetary gain.

Force actions The International Maritime Organisation lobbied with the UN Security Council who adopted Resolution 1816 on 02 June 2008 which authorised naval vessels of other countries to enter Somali territorial waters for an initial period of six months to repress acts of piracy. However, there was a rider which stated that entry into Somali waters was to be carried out with the prior consent of the Somali Transitional Federal Government. It was obvious that the resolution was ineffective and needed to be strengthened. Accordingly the UN Security

Council adopted Resolution 1851 in January 2009 through which a contact group was set up on piracy off the coast of Somalia. The current membership is over 50 countries.

Their ship targeting entails detailed research and prospective ships are analysed prior to undertaking operations. About US$ 6,000 is invested by financiers prior to undertaking operations. This is utilised for logistics as well as sophisticated weaponry primarily Small Arms and RPGs, bribes to officials and intelligence authorities The resolution opened the area for military operations which has proved effective but the root causes remain. Currently the Horn of Africa has ships of numerous nations which are undertaking operations to prevent piracy. Currently all G-20 countries are represented. They include the US Fifth Fleet coordinated Coalition Task Force 151, the Operation Atlanta European Union Naval Force and the Operation Ocean Shield by NATO. The Gulf Council Countries are also assisting in coordinating operations. Further most of the ships are carrying armed guards and concertina coils to prevent boarding. Overall the operations have resulted in reduction of piracy. There has been no hijack of ship since 19 June 2012 and no boarding attempted since 26 June 2012. Despite this as many as 191 crew members and about 14 merchant vessels are still held by Somalian pirates.

Way ahead Shrewd observers are of the view that this is a temporary pause and it is still profitable to be a pirate in Somalia than an ordinary citizen. Further despite large number of warships pirates have extended their area to

1,100 nautical miles from the shore. The moment the naval ships thin out the process would resume. Accordingly there needs to be a multi-pronged approach to resolve the problem. The first thrust should be towards solutions on land. Immediate action must be taken to stop illegal fishing and dumping of toxic waste on the coast of Somalia. Steps should be taken to establish a strong Somalian government which lays emphasis on education of its citizens. Finally strengthen legal support system and anti-piracy laws. The second thrust must cover the seas. The warships patrolling the area and providing escorts must effectively coordinate their activities. Further there must be common rules of engagement by all warships. The third thrust must come from shipping companies which must adopt security measures. Passive methods like adopting high speeds and evasive manoeuvring is essential. Further ship-wide alarm systems, surveillance devices, electric concertina fencing and armoured plated hatches and doors are low grade security devices; expensive equipment like long-range acoustic device is relatively expensive and high-tech. Armed marshals are being provided which though expensive are extremely useful.

Conclusion Sea piracy has been controlled by the navies with intensive patrolling as also provision of safe corridors for movement of ships. This has enabled temporary pause in piracy. Permanent cure would take place only when thrusts are undertaken at land, sea and by shipping companies.

December 2012 Defence AND security alert

sea power in India

PROMISING ALLIANCE

Dr Satoru Nagao The writer is a Research Fellow, Ocean Policy Research Foundation, Japan. He is an expert on strategic affairs and has written a PhD thesis about India’s military strategy, the first of its kind in Japan. India has the potential to become a security provider in Southeast Asia. For example, India has the desired geographical potentiality. Historically, empires in subcontinent have not been able to project their land power far beyond South Asia because South Asia is surrounded by mountains. But as a naval power, the influential area of the Chola Empire could extend to Southeast Asia. The history of the Cholas has indicated that “Sea is open for India”. This implies that India has the potential to become a security provider for Southeast Asia

hy does Japan need India – asks the writer? Because India is likely to be a strong naval power. India will possess enough naval power to be projected as a significant naval power in the future. For example, the number of surface combatants whose full load displacement is more than 3,000 t has been increasing rapidly in the Indian Navy. The number was only 14 in 1990 which rose to 21 in 2012 and will reach 27 in 2013. Secondly, India’s strong naval power is expected to fill the power vacuum that a declining US is creating. Thirdly, India is trustworthy. India has exercised restraint in use of military power as a strategy in the past, most countries can trust India. A most cogent and dispassionate Japanese analysis of the strong need for a strategic partnership between India and Japan.

owadays, cooperation in military relations between Japan and India is becoming more and more plausible. Japan and India have already started a 2 + 2 dialogue (at secretary level) and an annual exercise called (JIMEX). It was the first time in 2012 that Japan participated in the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS). It is important to bear in mind that Japan has not entered into such kind of a deep security relationship with any other countries except US and Australia. This makes the military ties between Japan and India a very important exceptional case. But why does Japan need India? What kind of interest does Japan have in a tie-up with India? In my opinion, there are three reasons to account for this inclination.

India is likely to be a strong naval power Firstly, India will possess enough naval power to be projected as a strong naval power in the future. For example, the number of surface combatants whose full load displacement is more than 3,000 t has been increasing rapidly in the Indian Navy. The number was only 14 in 1990 which rose to 21 in 2012 and will reach 27 in 2013. Generally, a big ship can operate in a wider area than smaller ones. As a “Blue Water Navy”, the capability of Indian Navy is improving rapidly. Figure 1: The number of surface combatants *The load displacement is more than 3,000 t in the Indian Navy

There are two reasons as to why India is perceived as a trustworthy partner by Japan, US, Australia and ASEAN. When we try to understand military strategy of other countries, we collect information by not only reading official documents but also by exchanging opinions between experts in and out of governments. Freedom of expression in India proves that experts can voice their complaints against government institutions freely. Thus, people can trust these experts in India

Why Japan needs India as Strategic Partner?

the Atlantic to about a 60-40 split between those oceans”1, the number of deployed warships in the Pacific will be nearly the same in 2020 because the total number of warships are declining. This information implies that US power has been declining for the last 23 years and in theory, declining power leads to a power vacuum.

Firstly, India is likely to be strong a naval power. Secondly, India is expected to fill the vacuum made by declining US power. Thirdly, India is trustworthy. Thus, in Asia, Japan needs India to stabilise the region On the other hand, China has been modernising their navy for the last 23 years. The Japanese White Paper of Defence points out that the nominal size of China’s announced national defence budget has more than doubled in size over the past five years and has grown approximately 30-fold over the past 24 years.2 Further, the focus of China’s military modernisation is navy and air force. As a result, Chinese Navy has been increasing their capability as “blue water navy”. This can be illustrated thus. In 1990, China possessed 55 surface combatants, 16 of those 55 are big warships which are more than 3,000 t of load displacement. By 2012, the total number of surface combatants has grown from 55 to 78 and 37 of those 78 are big ships. Generally, a big ship can operate in a wider area than a small ship. As a “Blue Water Navy”, the capability of Chinese Navy has been improving considerably. China also possess an aircraft carrier in 2012. Their submarine forces have modernised with the number of nuclear submarines that has increased from 5 to 10. As a result, theoretically it can be concurred that China’s assertiveness in the West Pacific and in the Indian Ocean reflects this power shift in Asia. US needs an ally or a friendly country to fill the power vacuum as against China. For example, Mr Richard L Armitage, former US deputy secretary of state, pointed out that US needs ‘strong Japan’ when he published the report “US-Japan Alliance” co-authored by him and Prof Joseph S Nye of the Harvard University.3 As a “Natural Ally”4 or a “Linchpin”5, US needs a strong India too. Japan and India are candidates to fill the power vacuum in Asia. Hence, US would want to support the coalition of Japan and India.

Japan needs India to fill the power vacuum Secondly, India’s strong naval power is expected to fill the power vacuum that declining US is making. After the cold war, US lost the reason to maintain large number of warships in their navy. In 1990, US Navy possessed 15 aircraft carriers, 258 surface combatants and 127 submarines which included 126 nuclear submarines. However by 2012, US Navy consisted only of 11 aircraft carriers, 110 surface combatants and 72 nuclear submarines. And by next year, US will decrease one aircraft carrier and nine surface combatants though they will add one nuclear submarine. Despite what the US Secretary of Defence Leon Panetta said at the annual Shangri-La Dialogue, “By 2020, the navy will reposture its forces from today’s roughly 50-50 per cent split between the Pacific and

December 2012 Defence AND security alert

Especially in India’s case, India has the potential to become a security provider in Southeast Asia. For example, India has the desired geographical potentiality. Historically, empires in subcontinent have not been able to project their land power far beyond South Asia because South Asia is surrounded by mountains. But as a naval power, the influential area of the Chola Empire could extend to Southeast Asia. The history of the Cholas has indicated that “Sea is open for India”. This implies that India has the potential to become a security provider for Southeast Asia. 1. “Leon Panetta: US to deploy 60% of navy fleet to Pacific” (BBC, 2 June 2012). Web source: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-18305750 2. Japan Ministry of Defence, Defence of Japan 2012, Part 1 Chapter1 Session 3. Web source: http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2012/07_Part1_Chapter1_Sec3.pdf “Video: The Armitage-Nye Report: US-Japan Alliance: Anchoring Stability in Asia”, Center for Strategic and International Studies (2012). 3. Web source: http://csis.org/multimedia/videothe-armitage-nye-report-us-japan-alliance-anchoring-stability-asia 4. “India a natural ally of US: Pentagon” (The Times of India, 23rd November 2010). Web source: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-a-natural-ally-of-US-Pentagon/articleshow/6974025.cms 5. Rajat Pandit and Sachin Parashar, “US, China woo India for control over Asia-Pacific” (The Times of India, 7th June 2012). Web source: http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-06-07/india/32100282_1_asia-pacific-defence-cooperation-defence-secretary

December 2012 Defence AND security alert

sea power in India

PROMISING ALLIANCE

India is trustworthy Thirdly, India is trustworthy. There are two reasons as to why India is perceived as a trustworthy partner by Japan, US, Australia and ASEAN. When we try to understand military strategy of other countries, we collect information by not only reading official documents but also by exchanging opinions between experts in and out of governments. Freedom of expression in India proves that experts can voice their complaints against government institutions freely. Thus, people can trust these experts in India. Because India has exercised restraint to use military power as a strategy in the past, most countries can trust India. Below is given a list of India’s military operations. This list proves that most of India’s operations are reactive and Indian Army has not crossed border since 1972 except for peacekeeping or peace building operations. India’s restraint to use force is a consistent strategy. Hence, for most countries, India’s perception is that of a trustworthy country. Table 1: The list of India’s military operation 6 Junagadh (1947) India-Pak (1947-48) Hyderabad (1948) Northeast (1956-now) Goa (1961) India-China (1962) Kutch (1965) India-Pak (1965) Nathu La and Chola (1967) Maoist (1967-now) India-Pak (1971) Siachen (1984) Falcon & Checkerboard (1986-87) Punjab (1984-92) Brasstack (1987) Sri Lanka (1987-90) Maldives (1988) Kashmir (1989-now) 1990Crisis (1990) Kargil (1999) Parakram (2001-02) UNPKO

Active or Reactive Active Reactive Active Reactive Active Reactive Reactive Reactive Reactive Reactive Active Active Reactive Reactive Active Active Reactive Reactive Reactive Reactive Reactive Reactive

Type of Operation Limited war Limited war Limited war Counterinsurgency Limited war Limited war Limited war Limited war Limited war Counterinsurgency Limited war Limited war Coercive diplomacy Counterinsurgency Coercive diplomacy Peace building Peace building Counterinsurgency Coercive diplomacy Limited war Coercive diplomacy Peacekeeping

Area of Operation Outside Outside Outside Inside Outside Inside Inside Outside Inside Inside Outside Inside Inside Inside Inside Outside Outside Inside Inside Inside Inside Outside

India is an important partner for Japan Finally, deducing from the arguments presented above, it can be concluded why Japan needs India as strategic partner. Firstly, India is likely to be a strong naval power. Secondly, India is expected to fill the vacuum made by declining US power. Thirdly, India is trustworthy. Thus, in Asia, Japan needs India to stabilise the region. However, there is still one question. Does India have the required will? Japan is waiting for India to show up as a great power in the world. 6. Satoru Nagao, “The Emerging India is Not a Threat, Why?: An Assessment from Japan” Asia Pacific Journal of Social Science, Vol. III, July-December 2012, pp. 99-109. In this list, I have divided India’s military operations into three categories. Firstly, ‘Active’ or ‘Reactive’, referring to who sent combat troops first. Secondly, there are five types of operations, 1. ‘Limited war’ (The probabilities of total wars may have reduced after World War II. Thus, most wars are limited wars), 2. ‘Coercive diplomacy’ (Coercive diplomacy is one kind of diplomatic persuasion by using military intimidation and coercive diplomacy is not war or deterrence. In a war, one country compels its opponent by using military operation. In coercive diplomacy, it attempts to persuade the opponent. “Whereas deterrence represents an effort to dissuade an opponent from undertaking an action that has not yet been initiated, coercive diplomacy attempts to reverse actions which have already been undertaken by adversary”), 3. ‘Peace building’ (Peace building is forceful operation for peacekeeping), 4. ‘Peacekeeping’ (Peacekeeping is military operation based by agreement of all warring parties); and 5. “Counterinsurgency” (domestic operation to maintain law and order). Thirdly, ‘Area of operation’, which refers to ‘Inside’ or ‘Outside’ of India when India started the operation. Web source: http://isapsindia.org/APJSS/6.5.%20Satoru%20Nagao.pdf (accessed on 31 August 2012).

December 2012 Defence AND security alert

Northrop Grumman’s E-2D Advanced Hawkeye

Well-Positioned to Support India’s Present and Future Defence Requirements

Cmde Gyanendra Sharma (retd), Country Head, India

uilt on a legacy of providing uncompromising airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) capability, Northrop Grumman’s E-2D Advanced Hawkeye was designed to provide the enhanced capabilities required to meet emerging threats and improved mission effectiveness from both shore bases as well as from the decks of today’s modern aircraft carriers.

Features include completely redesigned aircraft systems, the state-of-the-art AN/APY-9 radar and a new glass cockpit. All E-2D’s are newly manufactured aircraft based on a proven airframe, capable of both long-range shore operations and carrier-based operations. Exclusive to the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye, the APY-9 radar provides a transformational leap in radar technology, allowing the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye to “see” greater numbers of smaller targets at a greater range than currently fielded radar systems. The APY-9 was specifically designed for Cruise Missile Defence and integration into the US Navy’s Naval Integrated Fire Control – Counter Air Architecture. This state-of-the-art radar provides the most technologically advanced command and control capability in the world, with the ability to collect data and supply information to naval and joint forces well ahead of engagement. With its distinctive rotodome design, the E-2 Hawkeye provides critically important, continuous 360-degree scanning allowing the operator to focus on select areas of interest, vastly improving situational awareness. The new rotodome allows for three modes of operation including an electronically scanned mode. As new threats have emerged over the past fifty years, the E-2 has undergone several configuration upgrades to provide the enhanced situational awareness and improved mission effectiveness required for today’s missions as well as those of tomorrow. The E-2D is a uniquely integrated system for the defence of any nation and highly interoperable with coalition partners. With its network-centric capability, the E-2D will help nations with maritime, surveillance, homeland security and associated crises as well as combat operations. Initial Operational Test and Evaluation was conducted by the US Navy during 2012 and the programme is on track for Initial Operational Capability with the US Navy fleet in 2015. The E-2D programme meets, or exceeds, all technical and programme requirements and flight testing has produced excellent results with the E-2D systems, including radar long-range detection. As of October 2012, Northrop Grumman has delivered nine E-2D Advanced Hawkeyes to the US Navy, which has plans to procure a total of 75 aircraft. In 2010, Northrop Grumman responded to a formal Indian Navy Request for Information for four, carrier-based airborne early warning and control aircraft. As the only AEW platform designed specifically to meet the demanding environment of carrier operations, the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye is ideally suited for the Indian Navy’s requirements. Northrop Grumman is proud of the successful relationships it has built and continues to build around the world. In early 2012, the US government announced a sharper US foreign policy focus on the Asia-Pacific region. This shift provides the opportunity to strengthen strategic, collaborative relationships with United States' allies around the globe. The company’s strong relationship with India goes back many decades and is built on a legacy of trust and performance. Its range of industry-leading capabilities, products and services are available to international markets and currently with customers in 25 nations. Northrop Grumman is committed to the country and people of India and is fully prepared to meet the current and future requirements of the Indian armed forces by providing India with advanced technology and capabilities while demonstrating the value of performance.

sea power in India

MARITIME STRATEGY

oday, India's national interests are congruent with its maritime interests, which are expanding exponentially. India can become T a major power by building on a coherent national maritime-centric

Cdr Sunil Chauhan (retd) The writer is a Defence, Aerospace and Homeland Security professional and an independent researcher focusing on international security issues, maritime strategy, military affairs and force structuring, defence procurement and policies, climate change and disaster risk management. He was commissioned in the Indian Navy in 1985. He is a Fellow of the International Congress on Disaster Management (FICDM) and a Certified Master Trainer of Trainers from Emergency Management Institute (EMI), Emmetsburg, US. He is also a resource for Indian Institutes and Agencies for training on security issues, conducting table top exercises and risk assessment. The Indian Navy, arguably the most outward looking and strategic-minded of the three services, has been aggressively charting out multidimensional roles and missions for the navy, of which warfighting is just one aspect. This is manifest in the Indian Maritime Doctrine 2009, which lays out four roles for the Indian Navy – military, diplomatic, constabulary and benign

The fundamentals of its maritime strategy identify Indian Navy’s aspiration to create a large, well-balanced ocean fleet and a serious building and acquisition programme put in place since late nineties has reshaped the Indian Navy. India already possesses one of the largest navies in the world and once the current programme for naval development up to 2025 has been implemented, India will be one of the most powerful navies in the world

strategy and a sea power capability backed by foreign and security policy initiatives. Nearly 35 per cent of world trade moves along the Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs) in the Indian Ocean. The region is flanked on all sides by several conflict zones and is prone to increasing maritime terrorism, piracy and sectarian influences. Though energy deficient, the country is located close to sources of oil and natural gas. Almost 90 per cent of India’s oil requirements are imported by sea. By 2025 Indian Navy would have created a powerful modern ocean fleet, with a core of three aircraft carriers, over seventy corvettes, frigates and destroyers, over twenty submarines, including four nuclear-powered ballistic missile capable submarines, up to six general purpose nuclear submarines and about fifteen conventional submarines. This force structuring will enable India to implement its maritime military strategy and be a significant player in the Indian Ocean.The Indian Navy has reached out far beyond its own littoral to enable more expansive maritime domain awareness, develop basing opportunities and fortify naval operational and diplomatic ties. The Indian Navy has been fostering close naval ties with Mozambique, Mauritius and the Seychelles, having donated patrol vessels to both of the latter countries. For expansion of maritime domain awareness, the Indian Navy has also established a radio and radar monitoring station on Madagascar.

hat sea power is a requirement for India to be a great power is indisputable. Located at base of continental Asia and at the heart of the Indian Ocean, India provides a vantage point in relation to West, Central, Continental and South East Asia. Its location gives it a stake in security and stability of the region. Nearly 35 per cent of world trade moves along the Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs) in the Indian Ocean. The region is flanked on all sides by several conflict zones and is prone to increasing maritime terrorism, piracy and sectarian influences. Though energy deficient, the country is located close to sources of oil and natural gas. Almost 90 per cent of India’s oil requirements are imported by sea. India’s island territories and vast coastline bestow a large Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) which is the repository of a host of important raw materials including gas and oil. The security of India’s EEZ is closely linked to the security of the larger Indian Ocean Region (IOR). India is obliged to act in its own national interests and the interests of regional stability to ensure security in this region. History itself evidences for India that neglect of sea power can lead to subjugation and cession of sovereignty. With growing Indian dependence on imported crude oil and raw materials and as the demand for consumer goods increases, India’s

December 2012 Defence AND security alert

strategic maritime objectives are being founded on ensuring the security of SLOCs from the Persian Gulf, Europe and East Asia. The security of these vital shipping lanes is also vital for the country’s exports – most notably the increasing quantities of refined distillates, fuels and petro-chemicals being exported throughout the IOR and beyond from refineries such as at Jamnagar. Unlike other two temperate oceans ie, Atlantic and Pacific, IOR is land mass defined, the littoral is conflict ridden with states of great disparities and there is emergence of many new states in the last few decades. Post cold war there has been a quantum increase in oil import dependencies of Asia Pacific states and increase in global trade volumes through IOR. There is a discernible shift in the centre of economic growth from the continental heartland to our coastal rim land. Along with this has been the emergence of an arc of instability (from Mid East through Central Asia to Indonesia) as a major hot spot to world stability in the years ahead. This large semi-circle covers almost half the globe and contained within it are most of the security challenges in the coming years as well as vital natural resources and tremendous economic opportunities. This critical area also exhibits a significant littoral character that makes it a natural area for engagement by maritime-based forces.

INDIAN NAVY AND SEA POWER

IN THE 21st CENTURY

If we combine these factors and examine their impact on India, one overriding concern seems apparent: the significance of a coherent national maritime-centric strategy and sea power capability to ensure continuation of rise of India as an economic power and a major world player.

Multidimentional role The Indian Navy, arguably the most outward looking and strategic-minded of the three services, has been aggressively charting out multidimensional roles and missions for the navy, of which warfighting is just one aspect. This is manifest in the Indian Maritime Doctrine 2009, which lays out four roles for the Indian Navy – military, diplomatic, constabulary and benign. These four roles echo to a certain degree those already identified more than a decade ago in the Indian Navy’s first Strategic Defence Review, which were then defined as the following: sea-based deterrence, economic and energy security, forward presence and naval diplomacy. Embracing the greater role of peacetime objectives,

international cooperation and collective and international security efforts in the new Indian strategy, the Indian Maritime Doctrine has broken shackles from its colonial tradition and evolved more into a post-Mahan concept and a modernist one. Successive visionary Chiefs of Naval Staff have been instrumental in driving the long-term vision of navy and have been building-up the navy progressively and incrementally into blue water navy and a force projection navy.

No nation has the resources required to provide safety and security throughout the entire maritime domain. Increasingly, governments, non-governmental organisations, international organisations and the private sector will form partnerships of common interest to counter these emerging threats The fundamentals of its maritime strategy identify Indian Navy’s aspiration to create a large, well-balanced ocean fleet and a serious building and acquisition programme put in place since late nineties has reshaped the

Indian Navy. India already possesses one of the largest navies in the world and once the current programme for naval development up to 2025 has been implemented, India will be one of the most powerful navies in the world. A nation aspiring to have a controlling effect in the IOR for maritime security operations and power projection needs substantial assets. Currently, the only navy capable of meeting these requirements is the US Navy. Nevertheless, India’s naval expansion programme, both quantitatively and qualitatively, is being undertaken with this purpose in mind. If the induction and acquisition plans are implemented successfully, by 2025 Indian Navy would have created a powerful modern ocean fleet, with a core of three aircraft carriers, over seventy corvettes, frigates and destroyers, over twenty submarines, including four nuclear-powered ballistic missile capable submarines, up to six general purpose nuclear submarines and about fifteen conventional submarines. This force structuring will enable India to implement its maritime military strategy and be a significant player in the Indian Ocean.

December 2012 Defence AND security alert

sea power in India

MARITIME STRATEGY

As India’s navy has evolved, it has demonstrated its ambition to project influence and power across the IOR and beyond. It has participated significantly in humanitarian relief operations in tsunami 2004, evacuation of Indian diaspora as also, Sri Lankan and Nepali expatriate nationals from Lebanon during its war with Israel in 2006. The navy has also been involved in counter-piracy operations with substantial deployments to the International Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC), established in 2009 in the Gulf of Aden and the Somalia Basin, along with the Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151) one of three task forces operated by Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) under the US. Operation ‘Island Watch’ was launched on December 2010 in the western seaboard and the islands of Lakshadweep to deter and disrupt Somali Pirate Action Group shunting off the Lakshadweep archipelago and achieved many successes with over 41 pirates captured and 45 hostages released.

Expansive domain The Indian Navy has reached out far beyond its own littoral to enable more expansive maritime domain awareness, develop basing opportunities and fortify naval operational and diplomatic ties. The Indian Navy has been fostering close naval ties with Mozambique, Mauritius and the Seychelles, having donated patrol vessels to both of the latter countries. For expansion of maritime domain awareness, the Indian Navy has also established a radio and radar monitoring station on Madagascar and has long maintained monitoring capabilities in the Nicobar Islands overlooking shipping routes leading to and from Malacca. As part of confidence building measures Indian naval overseas deployments and presence span the IOR from the Gulf of Aden to the Straits of Malacca and besides the major navies Indian Navy regularly exercises with regional navies like UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Oman, Iran, South Africa, Brazil, Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mayanmar, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Philippines, South Korea, Japan, Vietnam, Singapore, New Zealand et al being a part of either joint exercises or port calls.

The Indian Navy has steadily been augmenting its bases and infrastructure, in and around the Indian Ocean. From a tri-command service, the navy has added another command with the setting up of the Far Eastern Naval Command (FENC) off Port Blair which when fully developed, will have a chain of small anchor stations and three main bases in the Andaman islands. Construction and commissioning of the deep water port at Gangavaram in 2008, 50 km south of Visakhapatnam, to house India’s two new aircraft carriers, assessments with Vietnam on naval berthing rights for Indian Ships at Cam Ranh deep water bay, the activation of a monitoring station with some anchoring facilities on the northern tip of Madagascar in July 2007, the on-going discussion on developing maritime infrastructure for the Indian Navy on the Mauritian islands of Agalega, the recent setting up of a naval air station INS Baaz at Campbell Bay and INS Dweeprakshak at Kavaratti in Lakshawadeep as strategic outposts are signs of Indian Navy’s infrastructural reach and expansion. But the grand vision of navy to be a credible sea power is not without its impediments and challenges. While there has been a boost in the naval share of the military budget in 2012-2013, (from 15 to 19 per cent) it is still inadequate for an aspiring sea power navy of a nation sitting astride the IOR. With a ‘continental mindset’ legacy to national security and ‘sea-blindness’ forces the Indian Navy to negotiate elephantine bureaucracy and an unhurried political leadership. The red tape dogging Indian Navy’s aspirations to become a credible sea power is as apparent in the naval plans as in any other part of its defence industry. This has to change. The Indian naval fleet expansion necessitates the acceleration of efforts to overhaul an ageing fleet and to strike the right balance between indigenous and foreign procurement. The indigenous naval defence production is marred by slowness and inefficiency. For major ship construction programmes, the lead times reach up to fifteen years from the original request to order completion and delivery. Such

December 2012 Defence AND security alert

extended timelines are unacceptable and the process needs to shorten. To achieve this though there must be more cooperation between the public and private sectors and, specifically in the drawing up of joint ventures between public and private shipyards. Direct foreign purchases and acquisitions always get bogged down by drawn-out negotiations, such as Russia’s Gorshkov aircraft carrier. Another crippling deficiency in the overall shipbuilding scenario is enduring reliance on imported obsolescent weapon systems and command, control, intelligence and surveillance suites. A navy can never be strong and relevant when it depends on imports of critical equipment and weapons. The Indian Navy has also to contend with the changing security paradigms in the world especially Asia. The world is becoming an increasingly level playing field. Globalisation is ensuring economic concerns to take precedence over security issues. The environment in the Indian Ocean has changed from geostrategic to geo-economics and from conflict to commerce, as also from continental to a rim land outlook, which merits major world players as US, Japan, EU and India to take steps to safeguard the trade and commerce across the oceans.

IOR game plan A vast range of extra-regional and regional naval forces and various multilateral task groups operate in the IOR. Ten states, Australia, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Malaysia, Pakistan, Singapore and Thailand, within the IOR have large standing naval forces. These navies boast a fleet of surface combatants and high numbers of coastal patrol vessels and also have submarines. All of these countries have discernible strategic interests in the IOR, some common and others more specific to their geographical location. The country with the biggest and most permanent presence of course has been the US and will be in the future. The continual and substantial US naval presence in the region has been necessitated for several key reasons, safety and security of vital crude exports from the region, undertaking maritime security operations, which include counter-terrorist, counter-trafficking and counter-piracy missions, aside from military operations during the

wars in the Persian Gulf, monitoring Iranian military deployments and deterring Iranian aggression.

its strategic posture and maritime military deployment priorities as the IOR’s strategic setting evolve.

There is a discernible shift in the centre of economic growth from the continental heartland to our coastal rim land. Along with this has been the emergence of an arc of instability (from Mid East through Central Asia to Indonesia)

The maritime militarisation or maritimisation of the Indian Ocean will continue over the next two decades through to 2030 as carrier groups from US, UK, France and support ships from other nations continuously operate in the IOR. The IOR will become an increasingly important and complex maritime space from a geostrategic perspective in several key respects, characterised by continued naval involvement from long established actors and the steadily increasing naval task-group and expeditionary-force presence from rising Asian powers. Besides the continued strategic relevance of well-known and long-acknowledged choke points, vital terminals and ports and primary sea lines of communication, certain maritime areas and littorals will emerge and develop into important strategic players in the coming years.

With such a large presence of naval forces, maritime security concerns in the IOR could be more potently addressed using the coalition-building-and-deployment formula. A cooperative approach of using naval forces which are international in composition and spirit to tackle the various maritime security challenges in vital parts of the Indian Ocean is no longer a necessity but obligatory and imperative. Accordingly Indian naval maritime operations in the IOR in the medium to long-term needs to be aligned to and with the presence of the robust and sustained naval presence of the larger extra-regional navies and the large regional powers and to develop cooperative engagement capability.

Assertive dragon The China factor in the IOR cannot be ignored and will be a crucial determinant in Indian Navy's force structuring and strategic posturing for sea power status. The rise of Chinese naval power and its foreseeable deployment in the Indian Ocean will be one of the most defining aspects of IOR dynamics in the 21st century. The ‘string of pearls’ theory as coined by a US defence report describes the infrastructural projects undertaken by China in countries around India, in Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Myanmar to be offensive. As China’s energy importing requirements and widespread commercial investments in the IOR expand, so too will its deployment of naval and expeditionary forces to monitor and protect those interests. This will be made possible by the future trajectory of Chinese Navy over the next 10-15 years which is clearly a Mahanian approach with substantial increases in its blue water and power-projection capabilities, which is likely to centre on organic airpower and long-range logistical support capabilities. In response, the Indian Navy must continually adapt

These conditions combine to create an uncertain future and cause us to think anew about how Indian Navy must view sea power. With Indian Ocean’s role as a conduit of vital resources growing, India’s role as a regional power to exert its influence in this arena is growing. But no nation has the resources required to provide safety and security throughout the entire maritime domain. Increasingly, governments, non-governmental organisations, international organisations and the private sector will form partnerships of common interest to counter these emerging threats. A conceptual shift in the making from dominance and denial to cooperative and collective maritime security management has manifest in the maritime community. Today sea power is not only about ships, submarines, bases and sailors, or sea based assumptions. There is more to sea power than sea control and sea denial. The notion, ‘who controls the sea controls everything’, was true when control of raw materials gave prosperity and wealth. Technology, entrepreneurial skills and access to money and information works today. These cannot be intercepted by ships and aircraft. Reducing insecurity

at sea, rather than denying and dominating underline the framework for a cooperative maritime security management. Maritime security has many intangible peacetime dimensions and there is a need to preserve ‘good order’ amongst regional navies. Stability in IOR is now a shared strategic priority and aside of US, UK, France involvement there would be involvement from Iran to Japan. With maritime security paradigms moving beyond individual states to increasing interdependence on security and empowerment of transnational actors, new Indian naval initiatives in IOR are needed. India is viewed as a stabilising factor with acceptance of Indian defence potential, including nuclear reality. Of course critical to the concept of sea power is the maintenance of a powerful fleet – ships, aircraft, marine forces and shore-based fleet activities, capable of selectively controlling the seas, projecting power ashore and protecting friendly forces and territories from attack. But to play a major part in the region Indian Navy will need to have a built-in cooperative engagement capability. It would not be possible for Indian Navy to look at sea power in compartmental terms. While focusing on the concept of sea power as ‘nation state’ India would need to align to ‘cooperative sea power’ in the framework of maritime cooperation and interlocking regional security mechanisms. India needs to settle maritime boundaries, end conflicts with neighbours and build trade and other economic interdependencies and look for new sub-regional alliances and confidence building measures. Today, India’s national interests are congruent with its maritime interests, which are expanding exponentially. India can become a major power by building on a coherent national maritime-centric strategy and a sea power capability backed by foreign and security policy initiatives. National power-economic viability, political stability with social order, military capability remains the key to India becoming a super power and today sea power is no longer a subset but an adjunct to national power. Without a sea power capability national power will remain a chimera.

December 2012 Defence AND security alert

sea power in India

HEGEMONIC ASPIRATIONS?

C Vassilios Damiras, PhD (ABD) The writer is a US counter-terrorism and defence expert. He has extensively studied and worked on various US National Security issues, Middle East and Balkan politics and history. He has graduated from the US Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, USA. Also, he has graduated from the Federal Bureau of Investigation-FBI Citizens Academy Chicago, Illinois, USA. He is CEO of Geostrategic Forecasting Cooperation and Chief Business Negotiator of Rescue Trek. The US government has three alternatives to face China’s new naval projection. The first strategic alternative for the Obama administration is to continue its current security approach to the region in essence to sustain a strong military presence. The second strategic alternative promoted by neo-isolationists in both political parties would be to significantly reduce American commitment and to introduce an extremely narrower definition on America’s geopolitical role in the Asia-Pacific region. Such a strategy will have the American government to rely on its allies to defend stability and America’s national interests in the region. The third strategic alternative would be to establish a forward-leaning strategy that would protect the US forces and US commitment in the region

hina throughout history has been perceived as a great hegemonic regional power. Lately, Chinese politico-military leadership has embarked upon building and sustaining a strong naval power and presence in the Asia-Pacific proper and across the globe. Chinese naval forces have deployed operationally far beyond its close maritime security periphery to protect Chinese and other merchant vessels from pirates in the Gulf of Aden. Thus, the current Chinese policy is determined to create and establish a prosperous nation via a strong and highly sophisticated military initiative. This new policy contains four vital modernisations such as defence, agriculture, industry and science and technology. Chinese leadership has declared in clear terms that the security of Chinese seaborne imports and exports are extremely crucial to the Chinese nation’s prosperity and socio-economic survival in a competitive global market. Specifically, security of the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) in the vicinity of the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Aden is extremely important to major Chinese geoeconomic interests. China imports sixteen per cent of its overall energy (including one-third of its oil supplies), as well as a variety of strategic resources significant to operate its manufacturing industry from the African continent. The various Somali pirate attacks on numerous Chinese ships consolidated Chinese concerns that its maritime interests face serious challenges. On December 28, 2008, China deployed a flotilla from the South Sea Fleet to protect its geostrategic and geoeconomic interests in the region. Moreover, China is the European Union’s (EU’s) second largest commercial and trading partner, the EU is China’s largest and much of the commercial goods pass daily the Red Sea and through the Indian Ocean via large container ships. Forty per cent are Chinese vessels that utilise the various navigation lines of the Indian Ocean. Furthermore, some of China’s 2,000 distant water fishing ships use the waters of the Horn of Africa practically on a daily basis. Chinese naval leadership, in order to protect the various and complex Chinese naval interests, has classified its naval operations into near seas, middle seas and far seas / oceans. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has realised that the new naval policy will create the image of a strong China ready to protect its maritime interests. Also, Communist Party officials argue constantly that Chinese Navy needs to obtain aircraft carriers for the purpose to carry the new defence policy. In 2000, China bought the

December 2012 Defence AND security alert

ince 1990s, the Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) Navy has increasingly transformed from a large fleet of low-capability, single-mission naval platforms, to a much leaner force equipped with a more modern, multi-mission platforms. Compare to the fleet a decade ago, a variety of PLA Navy combatants and vessels are equipped with highly advanced air defence systems and very sophisticated Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles -ASCMS, with ranges in excess to 297 miles. These brand new highly sophisticated systems and modernised military platforms give a great capacity to urge an anti-surface warfare (ASuW) and also allow them to execute complex military operations far beyond the range of land-based air defences. former Soviet carrier Kiev from Ukraine. However, it became a tourist attraction at the Tianjin Binhai Aircraft Carrier Theme Park. In 2004, China obtained an unlicensed copy of Su-33 carrier aircraft from Ukraine. On August 10, 2011, Beijing presented the first aircraft carrier. Thus, the Chinese Navy has the capability to reach long-range targets.

The rapid warming of the diplomatic relations between India and the United States over the past decade is proving to be a serious and significant, yet very challenging, new relationship Chinese military leadership supports this new revolutionary naval projection of power,

China as a Global Naval Power

because it perceives that China is facing long-term, complex and diverse security challenges and serious menaces. Obviously, issues of current Chinese security concerns and evolving security challenges in the region, traditional security threats and non-traditional security challenges regarding Asia-Pacific region and domestic security issues regarding civil and political unrest and the Muslim minority and global security menaces and challenges are extensively interactive and interwoven. On specific terms, Beijing closely monitors the Taiwanese independence movement, the East Turkistan independent movement

and the Tibetan independence movement. Chinese decision-makers fear that the United States, Russia, or India can support these sectarian movements in order to undermine China’s national interests in the region.

A forward-leaning or forward-looking US strategy for the Asian continent would have two major pillars: American willingness to engage in long-term diplomatic competition with China in peacetime and to persuade Chinese leaders that it cannot start and win a quick regional war

The new and very powerful naval posture from China has created a new era in regional relations regarding the United States, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and India. The Bush and Obama administrations strengthened defence ties in the area. Sino-American diplomatic relations entered a new era of ambiguity. China has ongoing disputes with Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam and Malaysia over maritime territorial interest in the East and South China Sea. These various and sustaining conflicts create the conditions for permanent

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HEGEMONIC ASPIRATIONS?

instability in the region. Taiwan is the most sensitive issue. The Chinese Communist leaders want to incorporate the island of Taiwan into China. Taiwanese political leadership refuses such an approach. Thus, the Taiwan Relations Act (1979) demands the US government supply both military material and services of a defensive posture to Taiwanese government and sustains American military capability to assist the Taiwanese military to thwart a Chinese invasion.

The new and very powerful naval posture from China has created a new era in regional relations regarding the United States, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and India The US government has three alternatives to face China’s new naval projection. The first strategic alternative for the Obama administration is to continue its current security approach to the region in essence to sustain a strong military presence. The second strategic alternative promoted by neo-isolationists in both political parties would be to significantly reduce American commitment and to introduce an extremely narrower definition on America’s geopolitical role in the Asia-Pacific region. Such a strategy will have the American government to rely on its allies to defend stability and the American national interests in the region. The third strategic alternative would be to establish a forward-leaning strategy that would protect the US forces and US commitment in the region. A forward-leaning or forward-looking US strategy for the Asian continent would have two major pillars: American willingness to engage in long-term diplomatic competition with China in peacetime and to persuade Chinese leaders that it cannot start and win a quick regional war. In order to achieve that, the Obama administration needs to adopt three major geostrategic approaches. First, US military structure in the Asia-Pacific region should reduce its overdependence on the support of aircraft carriers and design and develop networks of modern and capable surface ships.

Thus, the US Defence Department (DOD) supports the development of the new highly sophisticated destroyer. In addition, the US administration needs to sustain a great amount of highly modernised and sophisticated submarines. The Bush administration had started to build the new generation of submarines and President Barack Obama continues the same naval programme. Second, the US government needs to sustain a strong military presence in the Western Pacific to protect its allies and to deter a potential Chinese aggression. Third, the American administration needs to adopt and execute considerable investments to counter China’s new deployment of highly precision-guided conventional missiles, such as its anti-ship ballistic missiles. The Obama administration indicates that it wants to stop China’s hegemonic presence in the region. Nonetheless, President Obama has sent mixed signals to China and their American allies and friends in the region about how determined the United States really is to stop Chinese expansion. On March 31, 2011, China’s Defence White Paper for 2010 clearly indicated four strategic goals as: safeguard national sovereignty, security and interests of national development; maintaining social harmony and stability; accelerating the modernisation of national defence and the armed forces; and maintaining world peace and stability. Nonetheless, the United States and the regional countries do not trust that China is for global peace and world stability. Especially India is extremely suspicious. The Indian government fears that in the near future it will face Chinese aggression again. The two countries have border disputes since 1962. These regional disputes allowed China to seize territory from India. Indian leadership has serious concerns regarding Chinese naval emergence in the region at large and also particularly in the Indian

December 2012 Defence AND security alert

Ocean. Furthermore, Beijing supports Pakistan against India. In 2006, China and India signed a “Memorandum of Understanding on Exchanges and Cooperation in the Field of Defence.” Nonetheless, both countries still distrust each other. Hence, in the twentyfirst century India’s defence establishment is undergoing a serious and dramatic transformation as it modernises its defence capabilities. India systematically seeks a “strategic partnership” with the United States of America. The diplomatic courtship s t a r t e d under President Bill C l i n t o n continued under Pre s i d e n t George W Bush and was furthered under President Obama with his latest trip to India. The rapid warming of the diplomatic relations between India and the United States over the past decade is proving to be a serious and significant, yet very challenging, new relationship. The new opportunity for tens of billions of US dollars in defence related sales will open up new business avenues for both countries and establish strong bilateral relations. Both nation states can collaborate to stop a Chinese aggression in the region. It is evident that the Chinese Communist leadership wants to build a prosperous nation state with a strong and modernised military. With the advent of the new century the globe is facing serious and tremendous alterations, adjustments and challenges. Peace, prosperity and development still dominate the political, diplomatic and economic arenas. Nonetheless, there are various factors of political and economic uncertainty in the Asia-Pacific region. The dramatic geopolitical, geostrategic and geoeconomic vacillations in the world market influence extensively on regional economic development and evolution. Ethnic, political and religious discords and various conflicting demands and claims over territorial and maritime rights dominate the regional stability in the region. China wants to capitalise on these issues and enhance its hegemonic influence in the region and beyond Asia-Pacific proper.

FINCANTIERI in the NAVAL BUSINESS FIELD

orld leader in the construction of cruise ships, Fincantieri is also a major player in other sectors, ranging from cruise ferries to megayachts and naval vessels. With record 7,000 vessels built in over two hundred years since the company was founded, the company is heir to the great tradition of Italian shipbuilding.

Fincantieri Group comprises two design centres, (Trieste, Genoa), eight shipyards in Italy and three yards in the USA (in the region of the Great Lakes). Fincantieri is also present in the UAE with Etihad Ship Building, a Joint Venture with Melara Middle East and Al Fattan Ship Industries. Fincantieri has also a number of subsidiaries, including: Fincantieri Marine Group, Isotta Fraschini Motori, Orizzonte Sistemi Navali, Cetena-Centro per gli Studi di Tecnica Navale, Seastema. In the military field, Fincantieri is a reference operator worldwide offering a wide range of ship types including surface vessels, submarines and special ships. In Italy the company is the reference partner of the Italian Navy, the Coastguards and other public bodies for the design, the construction and logistic support of the surface fleet, main auxiliary vessels and submarines, while many foreign Navies (India, Iraq, Turkey, UAE, USA, Brazil) have expressed interest in the proven designs and new concept projects introduced by Fincantieri.

FINCANTIERI FOR INDIA Fincantieri is closely following the fleet renewal and expansion programme of the Indian Navy, which will involve the national shipyards and give rise to important opportunities also for foreign industries in the sector. In order to follow its activities in India and further strengthen its commercial relations, Fincantieri has opened a permanent office in New Delhi. The building of the aircraft carrier Cavour, equipped with the most powerful non-nuclear propulsion plant in the world, allowed Fincantieri to sign two contracts, in 2004, with Cochin Shipyard, which had been commissioned by the Indian Navy to build the Air Defence Ship (ADS); the contracts regard the design and integration of the engine in the new vessel and the detailed engineering of a number of services complementary to propulsion.The agreement also comprised, in parallel, technology transfer during the design phase, through the presence of a group of officers of the Indian Navy and of technical personnel from Cochin Shipyard at the facilities of Fincantieri’s Naval Vessels Business Unit. The teams, each for an average of approximately two months, operated side by side with Fincantieri designers, coming into contact with the reality of the integrated Shipyards of Riva Trigosoand Muggiano. Equally frequent during this period was the presence of Fincantieri staff in India, both at the Directorate of Naval Design of the Indian Navy in New Delhi and at Cochin Shipyard, to facilitate the process of discussion and approval of the documentation of a programme which proceeds in a reciprocally cooperative manner of shared responsibility. This phase was particularly fruitful both for the development of the design and for the start-up and management of technology transfer. In December 2007 Fincantieri delivered the Sagar Nidhi (“Pearl of the Oceans”), an oceanographic vessel ordered for the National Institute of Ocean Technology (NIOT), Chennai, the first ship realised by the company for the Indian market. The 5,000-ton ship, delivered to the satisfaction of the client, is 104 metres long and 18 metres wide. The vessel constitutes a cutting edge reference point for the study of the marine environment as it is possible to work in all theatres of operation, including tropical and polar environments. The ship has been built to the highest national and international standards regarding the environment and safety on board, in order to be awarded the maximum class provided under the regulations of the naval registers of India – IRS and Norway – Det Norske Veritas. To this regard one important issue was the containment of vibrations and noise levels and here Fincantieri has been able to implement innovative solutions by drawing on the experience gained in the construction of submarines. Moreover Fincantieri gained an order to build two fleet tankers for the Indian Navy. Both the vessels, which are built at the shipyards in Liguria, are 175 metres long, 25 wide and 19 high and have a displacement at full load of 27,500 tonnes. The first fleet tanker, Deepak, was introduced in Mumbai in January 2011 and the second vessel, Shakti, was delivered in autumn 2011. Equipped with double hatches, the vessels are able to service four ships each at the same time. In addition, Fincantieri has set up a technical support unit in India, thereby guaranteeing the Indian Navy of the maximum availability and efficiency of the new Fleet Tankers.

sea power in India

ASCENT AND DOMINATION

n this century, India has achieved many milestones to Ibecome a major maritime power

Prof Hari Saran The writer is Professor, Department of Defence and Strategic Studies, DDU Gorakhpur University, Gorakhpur, India.

India has a long coastline of about 7516.6 km along with 2.02 million sq km of exclusive economic zone (nearly two third part of the total land area which is set to increase to 2.54 million sq km in near future) and islands territories (1,197 in number and about 8,249 sq km In area) hundreds of miles away from the mainland. New dimensions of challenges in guarding the coastal frontiers and islands have emerged in this century. Sea borders are more porous than land borders. After 26th November 2008, Mumbai terrorist attack, various measures were taken to strengthen the coastal security. India decided to increase its space reconnaissance and surveillance capability especially to monitor the illegal infiltration of men and materials through the long coastal line and islands

To counter the internal security challenges, the inherent weakness of coastal security should be removed as early as possible. Navy should have its own satellite for ocean monitoring and communication

India’s Maritime Interests in the Changing World

in IOR. India is destined to be a potential maritime power by 2025-30. India is well aware of the growing Chinese influence and American presence in the IOR. India is the most stable, powerful and responsible country in IOR. IOR is very crucial for India’s national security. India needs a secure and peaceful IOR. All exits and entries in the Indian Ocean pass through very restricted water passages / choke points of IOR. Gulf of Hormuz, Gulf of Aden, Mozambique Channel, Straits of Malacca and Singapore, Lombok and Sunda Straits are in need for protection. About 40 per cent of global seaborne trade is accounted for by the Straits of Malacca. Oil is the main source of energy and every day 15.5 million barrels of oil or 40 per cent of the entire global oil pass through the Straits of Hormuz and 11 million barrels of oil pass through the Malacca and Singapore Straits. India’s 89 per cent oil imports are coming by sea routes. IOR intra-regional trade amounts to 24 per cent of the global trade and it is increasing. The value of intra-regional trade stands at about US$ 777 billion, with a huge potential for significant growth in future. Ninety per cent of India’s international trade by volume and seventyseven per cent by value are carried by sea. India’s imports and exports have reached US$ 600 billion up to 2012 already and slated to touch US$ 2 trillion by 2020. Combining exports and imports, India’s trade is more than 50 per cent of GDP. Realising the importance of the maritime sector, the government of India has initiated ’National Maritime Development Programme’ (NMDP) in 2006.

“Promotion and protection of maritime interests will be a major driving force for India’s future progress.”

ndia has a maritime tradition since Vedic period. There are sufficient historical evidences to prove that India was one of the oldest maritime powers in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). India is the most stable, powerful and responsible country in IOR. IOR is very crucial for India’s national security. India needs a secure and peaceful IOR. India cannot ignore IOR for its maritime interests. It has now become pertinent for India to protect and enhance these maritime interests for the purpose of generating massive employment opportunities and capital. Today, without utilising and developing this maritime sector, India cannot achieve the desired economic growth in the world. Realising the importance of this sector, the government of India has initiated ’National Maritime Development Programme’ (NMDP) in 2006. The programme argues that without harnessing the potential of this sector, it will be a very difficult task to maintain the desired pace of economic development in the next decades. The time has come to chart a new path in this changing world. India has all the primary ingredients to be a major maritime power by 2025-30. Government should have a bold ‘Maritime Vision’ clearly spelling out its maritime interests and goals for the next two decades.

December 2012 Defence AND security alert

India’s future development should be maritime centric and the following maritime interest areas need immediate attention of the government, policy makers and maritime experts: 1. Territory protection: It implies security of coastal area, exclusive economic zone and islands. India has a long coastline of about 7516.6 km along with 2.02 million sq km of exclusive economic zone (nearly two third part

of the total land area which is set to increase to 2.54 million sq km in near future) and islands territories (1,197 in number and about 8,249 sq km in area) hundreds of miles away from the mainland. New dimensions of challenges in guarding the coastal frontiers and islands have emerged in this century. Sea borders are more porous than land borders. After 26th November 2008, Mumbai terrorist attack, various measures were taken to strengthen the coastal security. India decided to increase

its space reconnaissance and surveillance capability especially to monitor the illegal infiltration of men and materials through the long coastal line and islands. Indian government immediately decided to improve its land and sea border monitoring capability. On April 20, 2009, India successfully launched its first all-weather Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) built radar imaging satellite (300 kg) RISAT-2, that enables it to closely

December 2012 Defence AND security alert

sea power in India

ASCENT AND DOMINATION

monitor its restive and porous land and sea borders. It was equipped with high resolution Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR). The satellite can see through clouds and identify objects on the ground very precisely (Jane’s Defence Weekly, April 29, 2009). On April 26, 2012, India successfully launched its first indigenously built, RISAT-1 (1,858 kg) in space. It is useful in monitoring our coastal line and land borders also. Now, Indian forces will get precise information about underwater submarines, aircraft and movement of nuclear weapons from one place to another. Thus India has two radar platforms to monitor IOR.

The hydrographic survey of Indonesia, Oman, Mauritius, Maldives and Seychelles had been carried out by Indian Navy during the past decade. In April 2003, the active assistance of the IN was requested by Mauritius 2,500 nautical miles away to tow their Coast Guard vessel Vigilante to Mumbai for repair at the naval dockyard Indian navy is also deploying naval spy drones (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles) along the coast to detect terror as well as conventional threats emanating from sea in real time. Kerala, Gujarat and Tamil Nadu have such naval UAV squadrons (The Times of India, Varanasi, April 11, 2012). It is commonly agreed upon fact that internal security challenges could be managed effectively by controlling infiltration of men and material from neighbouring countries and other potent sources via sea and land borders. Coastal security is very necessary for National Security of a state. After 9/11, US Administration adopted various measures related to coastal security. The Container Security Initiative 2003 and Proliferation Security Initiative 2004 were initiated for the US homeland security so that terrorists cannot target America again. 2. Boundary definition: India has maritime boundary with four South Asian countries – Pakistan, Maldives, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh and three South East Asian countries – Myanmar, Thailand and Indonesia. It has signed twelve maritime

boundary agreements with five of its neighbours, nine of them bilateral and three trilateral. Bilateral agreements have been concluded with Indonesia (1974 and 1977), Maldives (1976), Myanmar (1987), Sri Lanka (1974 and 1976) and Thailand (1978 and 1993). The trilateral agreements are concluded with Sri Lanka and Maldives (1976), Indonesia and Thailand (1978) and Myanmar and Thailand (1993). Presently, India has maritime boundary disputes and demarcation issues with Pakistan (Sir Creek) and Bangladesh (New Moore). India is committed to resolve maritime disputes with these two neighbouring countries through bilateral dialogues in an atmosphere free from terror, threat and violence. Several rounds of bilateral talks have taken place in past decades, but to no avail. The poor fishermen of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh are the worst sufferers. 3. Sea lines of communications (SLOCs) choke point protection: In this era of globalisation, the entire SLOCs of IOR remain crucial for India’s trade, energy and national security interests. Globalisation here means free flow of men and material around the globe from one place to another mostly via sea. It deserves special mention that all exits and entries in the Indian Ocean pass through very restricted water passages known as choke points of IOR. Gulf of Hormuz, Gulf of Aden, Mozambique Channel, Straits of Malacca and Singapore, Lombok and Sunda Straits are in need for protection. About 40 per cent of global seaborne trade is accounted for by the Straits of Malacca. Oil is the main source of energy and every day 15.5 million barrels of oil or 40 per cent of the entire global oil pass through the Straits of Hormuz and 11 million barrels of oil pass through the Malacca and Singapore Straits. India’s 89 per cent oil imports are coming by sea routes (Probal Ghosh’s, Strategic Environment in Indian Ocean and Security of SLOCs Against Piracy’, Journal of Indian Ocean Studies, Vol. 19, No. 3, December 2011, p. 359). IOR intra-regional trade amounts to 24 per cent of the global trade and it is increasing. (Strategic Digest,

December 2012 Defence AND security alert

December 2011, p. 1224) The value of intra-regional trade stands at about US$ 777 billion, with a huge potential for significant growth in future. Ninety per cent of India’s international trade by volume and seventyseven per cent by value are carried by sea. India’s imports and exports have reached US$ 600 billion up to 2012 already and slated to touch US$ 2 trillion by 2020. Combining exports and imports, India’s trade is more than 50 per cent of GDP (Ram Upendra Das, ’the other half of Budget 2012’, The Economic Times, Lucknow, 7 April, 2012). India’s bilateral trade with ASEAN countries has crossed US$ 40 billion in 2009 and is expected to reach US$ 100 billion by 2015. On the other hand its trade with Gulf countries was US$ 100 billion in 2010 and increasing day by day. Almost all of this trade moves by sea through the maritime trade routes and narrow straits mentioned above. Any adverse effect on the safe movement of this trade will have a bad impact on India’s economic growth.

c32/279581.html). Accordingly, SLOCs have now become the lifeline not for India but for all the major economies of the globe. Safe movement of the cargo ships and oil tankers are vital for India’s future development and security.

India wants a minimum but credible nuclear deterrence. The bare necessity to have this capability is to develop nuclear powered submarines and missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads. Nuclear submarines are considered the most reliable and secure platforms for nuclear missiles

The Indian Navy has been part of the UN missions in the coast of Somalia and has provided security to the African Union summit held in Mozambique. From December 1992 to October 1993, a naval task force comprising a corvette, an amphibious ship and a replenishment tanker were deployed with other multinational warships for providing logistics support to land forces and patrolling surveillance off the Somali coast. The Indian Navy is very much a ‘Blue water’ force and has indeed been so for many years

About 40 per cent of India’s trade out of total trade is with IOR countries. India’s energy needs are exploding every year. In 2011-12, India’s crude oil import bill was US$ 150 billion. India is presently importing 7.5 million tonnes of LNG from Qatar (Shuchi Srivastava, ’Efforts on for Shipping Gas from Mumbai’, The Economic Times, Lucknow, 27 April, 2012). It is also importing gas from Russia. The Russian company Gazprom is ready to increase gas supply to India within the framework of the Eastern gas programme. Gazprom has exported to India 6,50,000 tonnes of natural gas since 2009 (Strategic Digest, December 2011, p. 1282 and also at – “RF ready to increase deliveries of natural gas to India – Gazprom CEO” ITAR TASS, November 23, 2011, http://www.itar-tass:com/en/

Piracy in the Gulf of Aden, Somalian coast, Omani coast and seas between the African coastline and Maldives has grown steadily during the past decade. For the safe passage of trade and commerce, India has been actively engaged in anti-piracy operations. The Indian Navy (IN) started anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden in October 2008. A total of 27 IN warships have been deployed in the Gulf of Aden since then. Nearly 1,900 ships including over 1,600 foreign flagged vessels from different countries, have been escorted by IN warships in the Gulf of Aden since October 2008. About 39 piracy attempts have been thwarted and no ship under Indian escort has thus far been hijacked by pirates.

India argued that international norms of ‘freedom of Navigation’ should be maintained at any cost. India believes that all countries must also abide by the United Nations Convention on Law of Sea (UNCLOS). In the spirit of that convention, in 2002, on the special request of the US, Indian warships provided security to US high value ships in Malacca region for almost two years. 4. Seafood procurement: Now, India is the sixth largest producer of fish in the world. Fisheries and

marine resources occupy important space in the economies and livelihood of the IOR countries. India’s seafood procurement has increased manifold since independence and is a major source of foreign exchange earning. About 10-15 per cent of population living in the coastal areas is engaged in fishing as their only means of livelihood. India is far less than the estimated sustainable yield in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), in which 90-95 per cent of living resources are found. The Indian EEZ is extremely rich in fish stock. About 3.9 million tonnes of fish is available in the Indian EEZ of which 0.25 million tonnes are tuna alone. According to the provisions of Maritime Zone of India Act 1981, the foreign fishing vessels could operate in Indian Maritime Zone, but not in the Territorial Waters. In India, much of the catch comes from coastal waters less than 100 meters deep since most fishing activities are by traditional means. Employment of mechanised means for deep sea fishing is negligible, considering that merely 160 deep sea vessels are registered, many of which are not operational (Gurpreet S Khurana, ’Maritime Forces in Pursuit of national Security’ Shipra Pub., New Delhi, p. 14) and their presence has been noticed in the Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea. India’s marine products export was 8,607.94 crore in 2008-09. Sea fishing

is now increasingly dependent on satellite fish location technology, linked with advanced catching system. The largest market for Indian products is European Union. With the country’s largest coastline of 1,600 km and a large continental shelf, Gujarat, the largest exporter of fish both in quality and value. Effective surveillance and patrolling of EEZ is necessary to control illegal poaching of fish. Taiwanese, Sri Lankan, Philippino and Thai fishing vessels are frequently poaching fish from Indian EEZ.

Piracy in the Gulf of Aden, Somalian coast, Omani coast and seas between the African coastline and Maldives has grown steadily during the past decade. For the safe passage of trade and commerce, India has been actively engaged in anti-piracy operations. The Indian Navy (IN) started anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden in October 2008. A total of 27 IN warships have been deployed in the Gulf of Aden since then. Nearly 1,900 ships including over 1,600 foreign flagged vessels from different countries, have been escorted by IN warship in the Gulf of Aden since October 2008. About 39 piracy attempts have been thwarted and no ship under Indian escort has thus far been hijacked by pirates

December 2012 Defence AND security alert

sea power in India

ASCENT AND DOMINATION

For the management and sustainable harvesting of fish stocks and combating illegal fishing in IOR, ’IOR-ARC Fisheries Support Unit’ set up under the aegis of the Sultanate of Oman. It could function as a nodal institution to respond to the interests and requirements of member states.

IOR intra-regional trade amounts to 24 per cent of the global trade and it is increasing. The value of intra-regional trade stands at about US$ 777 billion, with a huge potential for significant growth in future. Ninety per cent of India’s international trade by volume and seventyseven per cent by value are carried by sea. India’s imports and exports have reached US$ 600 billion up to 2012 already and slated to touch US$ 2 trillion by 2020. Combining exports and imports, India’s trade is more than 50 per cent of GDP Seafood procurement can enhance our food security in general and economic prosperity of the coastal population in particular. For example, a kilogram of tuna fish is sold at Rs 60 in the Vizag market and for US$ 5 in international markets in Japan and United States. Fish traders have exported tuna worth Rs 129 crore from Visakhapatnam during 2007. Marine Products Export Development Authority (MPEDA) has done a very good work in this field. 5. Marine resource excavation: It implies the mining of seabed resources like alginates, calcium, gypsum, oil and gas along with deep sea mining. Nations and private companies are claiming, mapping and preparing to mine large tracts of the ocean floor that are rich in precious metals. India has also developed sufficiently advanced interests in Oceanographic research and technological power to explore the deep seabed minerals. It has a mineral rich EEZ of about 2.02 million sq km. The important mineral commodities such as Petroleum, Hydrocarbons, Calcium Carbonate, Gas, Elmenite (a mixture of Iron and Titanium oxide) Tin, Monazite, Zircon, Chromites etc are present in our EEZ area. Central government is the owner of minerals lying under the ocean within territorial waters or the EEZ of India. The

Geographical Survey of India has completed seabed mapping of 19 lakh sq km EEZ area or 98 per cent of the total EEZ up to December 2011. In 1987, India became the first developing country to be given by the UN, the status of a ‘Pioneer Investor’, which provided it an area of 1,50,000 sq km in the central Indian Ocean area for deep seabed mining, which have yet to be fully exploited. This site is over 1,000 nautical miles away from the southern tip of the Indian mainland. Since 1981, India maintains an active programme in the Antarctica region. The first research station in Antarctica was ‘Dakshin Gangotri’. It was commissioned in 1983 and was replaced in 1992 by a permanent station ’Maitri’. India’s most modern Antarctica station ‘Bharati’ has started working in January 2012. Marine engineering and technology are also very useful in the following underwater applications: for underwater pipeline telecommunication cable lying,

and

for selecting suitable area for waste disposal and dumping, for site selection to construct offshore platforms and terminals. 6. Offshore infra-installations: India is now self-sufficient in making offshore infrastructure and oil platforms. India’s offshore platforms on both coasts are spread across 50,000 sq km in water area. The worth of these platforms is more than 2,00,000 crore. Bombay High and Krishna-Godavari basin have become a vital asset of the country. Oil from the Bombay High fields is transported to western coast by over a thousand kilometers of submarine pipeline. These are very vulnerable assets and need to be safeguarded at any cost. India’s energy consumption is growing rapidly. In April 2011, 16 companies were granted exploration licenses for 62 blocks – 26 in Bay of Bengal and 36 in Arabian Sea. The process of commencement of offshore exploration has begun. In June 2011, the Controller General of Indian Bureau of Mines notified mineral

December 2012 Defence AND security alert

bearing blocks available for the grant of exploration license in the offshore waters of Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea. Exploration is also currently being undertaken in the northern half of the Gulf of Khambat, where it is estimated that very large gas reserves exist. The bulk of crude imports from the Persian Gulf are handled in the Gulf of Kachh because of its proximity. The Gulf of Kachh is the nearest water frontage to the refineries and consumption centres located in the northern area. It is also very near to Pakistan. With three major refineries, four crude oil terminals and six SBMs, the Gulf of Kachh and its adjoining areas are of national strategic importance and extremely important commercially.

Indian Navy is also deploying naval spy drones (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles) along the coast to detect terror as well as conventional threats emanating from sea in real time. Kerala, Gujarat and Tamil Nadu have such naval UAV squadrons 7. Investment protection: It is related to the protection of nationals and investments abroad. For future energy security, ONGC Videsh Ltd (OVL) has made huge investments in energy rich areas such as Russia (Sakhalin l and ll), Sudan, Columbia, Brazil, Syria, Vietnam, Myanmar, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Libya, Nigeria, Cuba and Venezuela during the past years. OVL has been in Vietnam for quite some time in offshore oil and natural gas exploration and both sides are in the process of further expanding cooperation in other fields also. ONGC’s wholly owned subsidiary OVL is the biggest Indian energy multinational, managing 30 properties worth US$ 15 billion in 15 countries (ONGC annual report 2011-12, Chairman’s Message). Videocon International and public sector Bharat Petroleum Corp Ltd jointly hold 10 per cent each in six blocks in the deep water Rovuma Basin, off the Mozambique coast of Africa. The basin may hold 30 trillion cubic feet of gas, which can be liquefied and transported to India and other countries of the world. Gas production from Rovuma Basin will start in the next 5-6 years. Indians are scattered in almost all the littoral

states of the Indian Ocean. Over six million Indians are working in the IOR countries. Out of which more than five millions are in the Gulf countries alone. They have remitted about US$ 30 billion to their families in 2010. This cannot be underestimated in the national interest (Maritime Affairs, Vol. 5, no. 2, winter 2009, p. 18). India has climbed to the top of the charts as the top source country for skilled permanent immigrants to Australia. As of June 2010, there were 3,40,000 India born people living in Australia, which equals to 5.7 per cent Australia overseas born population.

On April 26, 2012, India successfully launched its first indigenously built, RISAT 1 (1,858 kg) in space. It is useful in monitoring our coastline and land borders also. Now, Indian forces will get precise information about underwater submarines, aircraft and movement of nuclear weapons from one place to another. Thus India has two radar platforms to monitor IOR Indian government and Indian Navy are committed to support and protect the life of Indian nationals abroad. INS Jalashwa and INS Mysore set sail on 26th February 2011 to evacuate Indians stranded in Libya. In July 2006, the Indian Navy had similarly evacuated over 2,500 Indians and some foreign nationals from Lebanon. INS Jalashwa has been especially equipped to undertake such humanitarian missions (http;// indiannavy.nic.in PR26Feb.2011pdf.). 8. Vessel repair and construction: It has been a major sector of employment and income. Unfortunately, India’s share in global shipbuilding sector is only one per cent. India has seven shipyards (4 big and 3 medium) under the control of central government, two ship yards controlled by state government, 35 private shipyards and 18 dry docks for major ship construction and repair needs. Now, India has become self-sufficient in this field. In December 2009, the central government has transferred the Hindustan Shipyard Ltd from Ministry of Shipping to the Ministry of Defence. Now, Ministry of Defence has four dedicated shipyards for submarine and other shipbuilding

activities. Government has taken a bold decision to encourage private shipyards to enter the specialised field of warship construction and awarded contracts for survey ships, naval offshore patrol vessels and cadet training ships for the Indian Navy. The construction of indigenous aircraft carrier is in progress at Cochin Shipyard Ltd. There are only six countries in the world, which build such ships (http:// indiadefenceonline.com). To enhance self-reliance in warship production capability, Defence Minister A K Antony had laid the foundation stone of the National Institute for Research and Development in Defence Shipbuilding (NIRDESH) on January 2, 2011 in Calicut. It is an autonomous body under the aegis of Department of Defence Production and registered under the Registration of Societies Act 1860. Ship construction is a booming and labour intensive industry. India could assist IOR countries in ship repair work. 9. Assisting UN peacekeeping operations: The 167 countries of the world are connected by sea. By this medium one can reach to any country of the globe. The Indian Navy has been part of the UN missions in the coast of Somalia and has provided security to the African Union summit held in Mozambique. From December 1992 to October 1993, a naval task force comprising a corvette, an amphibious ship and a replenishment tanker were deployed with other multinational warships for providing logistics support to land forces and patrolling surveillance off the Somali coast. Former naval chief Admiral Nirmal Verma has aptly said that, ”The Indian Navy operates a variety of ships, submarines and aircraft all capable of deploying military power at large distances from our own country. The Indian Navy is very much a ‘Blue water’ force and has indeed been so for many years”. 10. Participation in disaster relief operation: As a major maritime state of the IOR, India’s commitment to regional common interests is very high. The Indian armed forces launched their biggest ever peacetime relief operation ‘Operation Sea Waves’, to provide help and relief to the people in the Tsunami 2004 effected areas

in the Bay of Bengal and other adjoining region. Given the nature of the disaster, it was the navy which played the major role in all the operations. The reactive response time of the Indian Navy surprised the most powerful US Navy also. Overall 32 ships, 30 aircraft and helicopters and over 5,500 personnel were mobilised by the IN for search, rescue and relief operations. Indian naval personnel provided assistance in locating survivors, evacuated people, carried out hydrographic surveys to reopen ports and harbours, restoration of drinking water facilities and power generation etc.

India is the most stable, powerful and responsible country in IOR. IOR is very crucial for India’s national security. India needs a secure and peaceful IOR. India cannot ignore IOR for its maritime interests. It has now become pertinent for India to protect and enhance these maritime interests for the purpose of generating massive employment opportunities and capital. Without utilising and developing this maritime sector, India cannot achieve the desired economic growth in the world. Realising the importance of this sector, the government of India has initiated ’National Maritime Development Programme’ (NMDP) in 2006 The Indian Navy also provided help and succour to the Yogyakarta earthquake stricken victims of Indonesia in 2006. It has also provided humanitarian help and relief to the Myanmar in 2008, when it was hit by the devastating cyclone Nargis. At this time two Indian warships INS Rana and INS Kirpan sailed for Yangon along with relief materials. All these assistance operations have clearly demonstrated India’s maritime diplomacy policy, power and reach. 11. Travel destination: Marine tourism has now become the most important area of recreation throughout the world. Tourism has become a major revenue generation sector during this age of globalisation. It is a smokeless industry. One of the most common uses of the sea and sea coast all over the world is recreation. India has a great potential in this

December 2012 Defence AND security alert

sea power in India

ASCENT AND DOMINATION

sector. Andaman and Nicobar Islands and Lakshadweep are growing as popular destinations for foreign and Indian tourists. But marine tourism on a large scale is yet to come up on these islands. The other regional countries like Singapore, Thailand, Maldives and Mauritius have now become the popular destinations for marine tourists. The pace of marine tourism development in India is not very impressive. Marine tourism potential and promotion can be an attractive vehicle for future socio-economic development of India. Recently, government of India has rightly taken the decision to develop marine tourism in Lakshadweep coral islands on the Maldivian pattern. 12. Sea life protection: The IOR is also vulnerable to high levels of pollution caused by ocean dumping, waste disposal and oil spills as 60,000 to 65,000 ships transit through it every year. These wastes have posed a threat to marine ecology on which million of livelihoods depend. The main cause of sea pollution is oil spills. In India, sea pollution control is the responsibility of Coast Guard. It has played a very crucial role in controlling oil spills in the sea around the country. It has also played an important role during Mumbai High fire incident in July 2005. In April 1996, India ratified the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctica Treaty. Antarctica region is not only important for environment but it is a treasure house of potential mineral resources including petroleum and gas. For sea pollution control, the Coast Guard had formulated a ‘National Oil-Spill Disaster Contingency Plan (NDS-DCP) in 1996. 13. M aintenance of nuclear deterrence: India as a nuclear weapon state has declared the policy of ‘No First Use’. India wants a minimum but credible nuclear deterrence. The bare necessity to have this capability is to develop nuclear powered submarines and missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads. Nuclear submarines are considered the most reliable and secure platforms for nuclear missiles due to their geographical and technical attributes. It can

stay underwater for long duration without any logistical support. Due to their credibility and endurance nuclear submarines have become the core element of credible nuclear deterrence. Only five countries in the world have nuclear submarine force for their nuclear arsenal. America and Russia have the largest number of nuclear submarines in the world. India has built its own nuclear submarine named Arihant in 2009. It is under extensive sea trials and likely to be commissioned in Indian Navy by 2013. It will be armed with a submarine launched cruise missile Sagarika, which is also under trials. Keeping in view the strategic need and to bridge the gap India has leased a Nerpa class nuclear submarine from Russia in January 2012 for 15 years. India is the only country of the IOR, to have an operational knowledge of nuclear submarine (1988-91). 14. Naval diplomacy for cooperation: Naval diplomacy is very necessary to promote regional cooperation and security. India’s economic, strategic and security interests and concerns are closely intertwined with those of its near and far neighbours. Indian Navy has abandoned its age old policy of isolation and increased its naval diplomacy efforts during the post cold war era, with the help of naval exercises, goodwill visits, naval assistance, disaster relief operations, material and training assistance. All these have now become the main tools of CBMs with IOR countries. India’s prime area of interest is the entire IOR. It cannot leave this region for the sake of others. The hydrographic survey of Indonesia, Oman, Mauritius, Maldives and Seychelles had been carried out by Indian Navy during the past decade (http://indiannavy,nic.in/PRel 040311 Hydroind.pdf.). In April 2003, the active assistance of the IN was requested by Mauritius 2,500 nautical miles away to tow their Coast Guard vessel Vigilante to Mumbai for repair at the naval dockyard (http://www.globalsecurityorg/ military/world/india/navy-intro. htm). Indian Navy has deployed one Dornier to Seychelles under a government to government MOU (24 February 2011). It is stationed at Victoria and will be operated for

December 2012 Defence AND security alert

EEZ surveillance and anti-piracy patrols. Through active naval diplomacy during the post cold war era, India has successfully increased its presence and influence in the IOR. Regional countries have a great faith in India’s policy and capability. In this century, India has achieved many milestones to become a major maritime power in IOR. India is destined to be a potential maritime power by 2025-30. India is well aware of the growing Chinese influence and American presence in the IOR. To achieve this dream, based on the above review of India’s maritime interests, it seems desirable to offer following suggestions: 1. A revised flexible and proactive maritime doctrine. 2. Deep sea fishing activities should be encouraged through various initiatives and infrastructural development as we find in Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore. 3. Promotion and development of marine tourism is very important to generate employment and capital. 4. Sharing of information effective disaster management.

for

5. It is necessary to increase ‘Soft Power’ initiatives to help the regional poor population without any political and military objectives. 6. To counter the internal security challenges, the inherent weakness of coastal security should be removed as early as possible. 7. Navy should have its own satellite for ocean monitoring and communication. 8. Sri Lanka has signed new maritime agreements with Maldives to enable Sri Lankan fishermen to travel to the Arabian Sea via the Maldivian maritime territory. India should also take initiatives to sign such agreement with its maritime neighbours. I hope that the proper protection and promotion of these maritime interests will definitely strengthen our national security.

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