DSA December 2013 by Defence and Security Alert

editor-in-chief

DSA is as much yours, as it is ours!

he Indian Ocean as a community has not existed as a definable concept for very long. Yet it has existed in an economic sense and cultural to a point. For millennia there has been an active economic and cultural exchange between peoples living along the rim of the Indian Ocean. Ideas have travelled along the oceanic currents, propelled by the monsoon winds. ‘Asian values’ as a common denominator across the ocean begins its journey from the shores of the Indian Ocean, spreading over generations of interaction. So languages have common words across thousands of oceanic miles. Common cultural traits are found amongst people who don’t live anywhere near each other, but are in fact separated by the vast expanse of water. There is now a serious requirement for raising the idea of an Indian Ocean community to a campaign level issue. Asia is widely regarded as the pole sitter in the years to come. The sheer economic dynamism of the continent is evident to all observers. But it cannot grow to that status in isolation from each other. There has to be a greater sense of cooperation and sharing. The sense of togetherness has not always been evident, as the region remained divided, by history, experiences and interests. The region offered little in terms of hope for the future. Though there have been instances that raised expectations. The December 2004 Asian Tsunami was one such episode that suggested there is a sense of belonging and sharing. The cooperation displayed, instantly and spontaneously, was as impressive as it was touching. It showed that the Asian land mass can rise to the occasion when the need arises. Well the need has arisen and is in fact long overdue. And it suggested that there is a sense of belonging to an Indian Ocean Community. It was a golden moment to grasp and encash. But it is still not too late, for there is a serious demand to belong to a community that is cooperative. The demand is based on cultural, economic and security factors. And that is an immediate challenge. The Indian Ocean offers a ring of opportunity to all those willing to accept the challenges. Its location on the map makes it unique in many senses. Energy sources surround the water mass and its regional and internal politics makes for a combination that is exciting, perplexing and dangerous. The Indian Ocean Community is essentially an Asian venture, deeply embedded in the regional sense of belonging. And the Asian land mass offers the greatest economic opportunities for the future. That the future is Asian is not a loose statement, but based on potential and performance. The combination of the Indian Ocean water mass and its surrounding Asian land mass is the perfect brew for a heady future. But to achieve that glory and status there has to be greater cooperation in some very serious and basic issues. The two biggest challenges facing the Indian Ocean Community are a working structure on trade and a verifiable mechanism on terrorism. Trade and Terror are the two biggest issues confronting Asia, on land and water. Even as the Indian Ocean offers routes of progress, it is also surrounded by ideas that are divisive, destructive and derail dialogue and cooperation. Therefore there is an urgent need to enhance security and economic cooperation. Greater economic cooperation will ensure a togetherness in tackling the menace of terrorism. For if it is not tackled to the fullest there is every chance that economic growth of the region will be affected. Sincere, transparent and regular cooperation on facing the challenges of terrorism will create the environment for enhanced economic growth. The greatest opportunity in security cooperation is offered by regular naval interaction and exchanges. Since global trade and energy movement is largely water borne, navies remain an important factor for the future. Despite economic crises that influence budgeting, investment in naval research and development remains a core pillar of defence planning. So much so that many countries are pooling resources to enhance naval capabilities. This has a direct impact on the development of naval systems and the future suggests there are exciting changes in the offing. A perfect opportunity for the Indian Ocean region to show that it belongs to a Community.

Manvendra Singh December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

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ndian mythology depicts that the forces of Good and Evil once decided to find out who could plumb the depths of oceans and retrieve its unique resources. The Samudra Manthan (Churning of the Ocean) embodies the current yearning among nations to grab control of oceans for their exclusive benefit either through “spheres of influence” or direct control of sea lines of communication. India has been a victim of this rivalry of nations, adamant on colonising and exploitation. Prehistory affirms that India wielded immense influence of the benign kind especially in south-east Asia where the frieze of this Samudra Manthan episode is engraved on one of the many corridors of Angkor Vat temple in Cambodia. The epic “Ramayana” is re-enacted with passionate zest and expertise by non-Hindus in south-east Asian countries of Laos, Vietnam and Indonesia and underscores the inclusive ethos of Indian nationhood.

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Today oil and gas and the facilities and passages to transport energy across oceans have cruelly instigated inter-national rivalry for control of these oceans. Geopolitical equations have changed in the recent years between former colonial powers and their former vassals. New colonialists are emerging who are active participants in the chase for control over the seas and oceans and the wealth and commerce they generate. India too has developed new equations with many countries to strengthen our sea power in due course of time. Induction of the aircraft carrier Vikramaditya is one large step in the direction of making the mainland secure from threats akin to Mumbai 26/11. Although it may take a few years to be fully operational but the addition of another aircraft carrier should be a convincing dissuader to those who have used the seas to attack the Indian mainland. As part of our ancient glorious culture, India has forged strategic alliances with Russia, UK, Japan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia and many other states with the primary intention of ensuring that all of us, collectively and singly, are able to enjoy the benefits of these oceans without unwelcome obstacles. Five years ago India was shattered by the terrorist attack on Mumbai on the 26th of November that sneaked in from the sea killing many innocent people. This edition of DSA focuses on emerging equations in sea power and the status appraisal after five years of the Mumbai attack. We are all aware that it was one of the worst terrorist attacks India has had to endure in the last few years. It is time to review our shortcomings and erase out loopholes that enabled these terrorists to hold our nation to ransom. The most important question that needs to be answered right away is, “Have we learnt our lessons?” or are we still in the thrall of our resilient Sab Chalta Hai philosophy of ‘this too shall pass’ without ensuring that it does not happen again. The National Investigation Agency (NIA) has played a significant role during these five years and I am happy to inform you that we are carrying an exclusive interview with the Director General of NIA in this edition. The 26/11 status appraisal by Mr V Balachandran is an important and interesting article as he was an integral part of the Pradhan Committee that was entrusted with the responsibility to conduct an enquiry on the Mumbai attacks and I am sure his review will highlight exactly where we stand today. This edition also features thought-provoking research-based analyses from distinguished contributors Vice Admiral Arun Kumar Singh, Rear Admiral Sanatan Kulshrestha, Cmde Ranjit B Rai and Cmde AJ Singh. Our contributor from Bangladesh, Ms Sultana Yasmin has tried to focus on the strategic triangle in the Indian Ocean which I am sure will be of great interest for all who are students of naval power and strategic alliances. Dr Pankaj Jha, an expert on India-Indonesia affairs has advocated a return to the relationship they enjoyed when the Non-Aligned Movement was created. You will also read in this issue how “flying boats” can strengthen maritime security and rescue operations in the Indian Ocean region. Another highlight of this issue is an exclusive interview with a friend of India His Excellency Mr Alexander M Kadakin, Ambassador of the Russian Federation to India. On behalf of Team DSA, I congratulate our Sea Warriors on the Navy and Submarine Days that we celebrate in December and wish them greater strength and many laurels in the coming year. Jai Hind!

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

Pawan Agrawal

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Contents

INDIAN OCEAN COMMUNITY EVOLVING SEA POWER EQUATIONS 5 Years After 26/11: Status Appraisal

SPECIAL ISSUE DECEMBER 2013

A R T I C L E S Navy Moves Forward But Needs Balanced Growth And Funds Vice Admiral Arun Kumar Singh (Retd)

Seabed Mineral Wealth And Its Security Rear Admiral Dr S Kulshrestha (Retd)

Operational Art Of Leadership Skills For Law Enforcement Agents Dr Rupali Jeswal

Five Years After 26/11: A Critical Appraisal PM Kamath

Choosing A Future: Bald Power Or Influence? Commodore Ranjit B Rai (Retd)

Underestimated Threat From Sea Colonel US Rathore (Retd)

Submarine Rescue Capability Commodore Anil Jai Singh (Retd)

Unlearned Lessons Dr Harsh K Sinha

INS Vikramaditya: A Highly Questionable Symbol Of Friendship Major General (Dr) Mrinal Suman AVSM, VSM (Retd)

Need To Rebuild Strategic Understanding Dr Pankaj Jha

Flying Boats In Maritime Security And Rescue Cecil Victor

Need To Boost Indian Navy’s Power Projection Capability Radhakrishna Rao

China, Japan And The Island Conflict Saloni Salil

Expanding Regional Cooperation Prof Hari Saran

Strategic Triangle In The Indian Ocean Sultana Yesmin

Status Appraisal 5 Years After 26/11 V Balachandran IPS (Retd)

India’s Emerging Concerns After 26/11 Lt General (Dr) DB Shekatkar PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd)

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F E A T U R E S

EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW 6 His Excellency Mr Alexander M Kadakin Ambassador Of The Russian Federation

EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW Mr Sharad Kumar IPS DG, National Investigation Agency

UK Defence Maritime Trade Mission To India Team DSA

Vikramaditya Is Coming Finally Team DSA

40 77

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strategic partnership

INTERVIEW

INTERVIEW WITH HIS EXCELLENCY

MR ALEXANDER M KADAKIN AMBASSADOR OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION TO INDIA

ndia and Russia have one of the strongest and most enduring Strategic Partnerships. In the words of His Excellency Ambassador Kadakin “Friendly India has always been and will remain among the highest priorities of modern Russia … The development of frank political dialogue goes hand-in-hand with broader and stronger ties in economic, trade, financial, scientific, technical, cultural and other fields. Our military and technical cooperation has no parallel in the world practice.” In an exclusive interview with DSA His Excellency Ambassador Kadakin expounds his views on many important and critical areas of Indo-Russian bilateral cooperation. Defence and Security Alert: A continued convergence of bilateral interests makes it inevitable for both Russia and India to maintain close ties in various realms of

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

national endeavour. Can you please deﬁne the contours of Indo-Russian strategic relationship? Alexander M Kadakin: The modern history of Russian-Indian ties reached its new level on the threshold of the 21st century when in the year 2000 Russia and India became pioneers in establishing a novel format of international relations and the historic Declaration on Strategic Partnership was signed by Prime Minister AB Vajpayee and President V Putin. Since then the revitalised Russian-Indian bilateral cooperation has gone from strength to strength. Today our relations are matured, they are a cornerstone of foreign policies of the two countries and this fact has been emphasised time and again by top leaders from both sides. Russian-Indian cooperation covers many diverse ﬁelds like defence, energy, space, infrastructure, banking, investment, agriculture, education, science and

His Excellency Mr Alexander M Kadakin Ambassador Of The Russian Federation To India December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

strategic partnership

INTERVIEW

Our unique relationship absolutely does not depend on domestic political compulsions or on any kind of marriages of convenience or expediency in the international arena. Here lies its enduring value, both for our mutual benefit and as a factor for global peace and stability. It serves as deep civilisational basis of Russian-Indian special and privileged strategic partnership technology, trade, pharmaceuticals, culture and tourism. There is effective and constructive interaction between our countries in various world bodies and multilateral forums, including the RIC, the BRICS, the G-20, the East Asia Summit and the United Nations. What is important – our unique relationship absolutely does not depend on domestic political compulsions or on any kind of marriages of convenience or expediency in the international arena. Here lies its enduring value, both for our mutual beneﬁt and as a factor for global peace and stability. It serves as deep civilisational basis of Russian-Indian special and privileged strategic partnership. DSA: The Indian Prime Minister has often underlined the signiﬁcant role of Russia in India’s defence modernisation drive. Kindly put this in perspective and share with our readers around the world the nature and scope of Indo-Russian defence collaboration. AM Kadakin: Our positions in the military-technical cooperation with India always were and keep being strong. Russia, no doubt, is the most consistent Indian partner. We have never been driven by political ambitions or considerations. The Indian share in Russian military exports amounts to 30 per cent. The running projects are worth approximately US$ 20 billion. No other country in the world enjoys the same. The Indian Navy is 80 per cent equipped by our technologies and 70 per cent of the Indian Air Force consists of Russian and Soviet production. At present Russia gives to India what we have never offered to anyone else. It is only with a most trusted friend that one can share the best of razor-edge achievements and know-how. DSA: BrahMos Aerospace is a shining example of what India and Russia can do together. Our President while addressing a Russian Parliamentarians’ delegation in February 2013 stated that “India Russia bilateral relations are progressing in diverse areas such as energy, defence, space, trade and economics, science and

At present Russia gives to India what we have never offered to anyone else. It is only with a most trusted friend that one can share the best of razor-edge achievements and know-how

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

technology, culture and people-to-people ties”. But we don’t have many other joint ventures of the level and class of BrahMos. Why? AM Kadakin: As regards military supplies, be sure that me personally and my country in general is against tenders. Our relations have really achieved the level of special and privileged strategic partnership. Therefore Russia does not exactly feel comfortable when attempts to put us on the same shelf with others are made as regards opportunities for future contracts and tenders under the guise of equal chances for all – including several newly-acquired partners or contract-seekers. We stand more for deals made on inter-governmental basis. Tenders are often sly and crafted. You can easily see it in that notorious helicopter deal, about which we read on front pages every morning. That is why we are not exactly in favour of tenders. After all, it was not through tenders that you have received the nuclear submarine or “BrahMos” technologies. In fact, several joint projects are underway: licensed production of Su-30MKI aircraft, T-90C battle tanks, aircraft engines of AL-55I series and the third modiﬁcation of RD-33, modernisation of MiG-29 etc. The joint development of prospective multi-purpose ﬁghter and multi-role transport aircraft has reached the stage of practical implementation and Russia is giving India technological assistance in building ships of different types.

Tenders are often sly and crafted. You can easily see it in that notorious helicopter deal, about which we read on front pages every morning. That is why we are not exactly in favour of tenders. After all, it was not through tenders that you have received the nuclear submarine or “BrahMos” technologies We are ready for broadest possible cooperation with Indian partners in joint designing the brands of new civil aircraft, including wide-bodied planes. Both Russia and India do require such planes. There are also vibrant opportunities for cooperating on helicopters. Not only could we jointly use such hardware, as is done by “Integrated Helicopter Service”, but also jointly modernise it, given the requirements of our countries and then promote them in the international market. As regards the Vikramaditya, which you have already received, I would like to stress, as President Putin mentioned, that she is such a beautiful baby that we felt sorry to part with her. It was for the ﬁrst time for the two sides that such a beautiful baby had to be born. The Vikramaditya symbolises the close friendship between India and Russia and gives conﬁdence that it will grow in the coming years. As Russian Defence Minister Mr Shoigu assured the 13th meeting of the India-Russia Inter-Governmental Commission on Military Technical Cooperation, Russian sea-based aviation specialists will train Indian pilots fully for take-offs and landing on the INS Vikramaditya and in all probability it will be held in Goa.

Russian-Indian cooperation in peaceful nuclear energy has been in place for more than twenty years. The Kudankulam nuclear power project is an important embodiment of our strategic partnership. As you know the ﬁrst unit of the KNPP is already synchronised with the national grid, nearly reaching its full capacity and the second one is coming up. Our strategic road map involves erection of 14-16 units in India, 1 GW each. At October bilateral Summit Prime Minister Manmohan Singh conveyed to President Vladimir Putin commitment to fully implement the road map on Russian-Indian civil nuclear cooperation that was signed in 2010 and ofﬁcials of both

countries were directed to resolve all outstanding issues at the earliest. Today we eye various other projects, from modernisation of Soviet-built plants in India to creation of not just competitive industrial entities, but those technologically surpassing foreign analogues. The time has arrived for joint production, implementation of new technologies and introduction of jointly produced goods to the markets of third countries. DSA: President Putin has maintained that India and Russia are not making all efforts necessary to take the relationship to the next level and our bilateral trade in struggling to cross US$ 10 billion mark. What more can be done to revamp and reorient our economic co-operation to give it a new thrust and direction? AM Kadakin: In my opinion there is still excessive shyness to do mutual investments on the part of Indian entrepreneurs and the Russian business community. We

We are ready for broadest possible cooperation with Indian partners in joint designing the brands of new civil aircraft, including wide-bodied planes. Both Russia and India do require such planes. There are also vibrant opportunities for cooperating on helicopters

Multi-billion dollar deals alone should not be the only our common yardstick. We have something that you cannot buy for thousands of billions – that is an extraordinary history of our relationship, friendship and affection between the two nations, warmth and goodwill between our peoples have to give immediate attention to this problem. Trade and economic cooperation between Russia and India is steadily developing. But even if our bilateral trade reaches US$ 20 billion mark by 2015, it will still be “peanuts” for Russia and India. Our trade turnover has much more room for development. We should eliminate such negative aspects as narrow commodity composition of mutual trade, low export ratio in civil machinery, technical products and high-tech items. At the recently held Moscow Summit Russian President Vladimir Putin and Indian Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh resolved to promote investments and facilitate closer cooperation in a number of areas with great potential, such as oil and gas, information technology, telecommunications, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, fertilizers and mining. Indian side expressed its interest to launch the negotiations on a Free Trade Agreement with the Customs Union of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus. But let me make one more remark: Multi-billion dollar deals alone should not be the only our common yardstick. We have something that you cannot buy for thousands of billions – that is an extraordinary history of our relationship, friendship and affection between the two nations, warmth and goodwill between our peoples. That gives us conﬁdence that Russia and India will successfully exploit expanding opportunities and growing convergence of bilateral interests to take our strategic partnership to even greater heights.

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

internal security

DG, NIA INTERVIEW

NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY

he Director General (DG) of National Investigation Agency (NIA) Mr Sharad Kumar is a senior IPS ofﬁcer of 1979-batch Haryana cadre. His previous post was Director General (Prisons) in Haryana. He has been DSP in Gurgaon, Ambala and Rohtak. He remained the Inspector General of Police, Rohtak range for nearly three years and was promoted to the rank of Additional Director General of Police (ADGP) in November, 2007. He was in Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) on deputation from July 1991 to July 1999 as SP and DIG. Under his dyanamic stewardship NIA is scaling new heights of innovative investigation to secure India and Indians. Defence and Security Alert: The National Investigation Agency (NIA) was created in the aftermath of the traumatic 26/11 Mumbai Terror Attack. How has been NIA’s journey these 5 years and what have been its accomplishments as mandated in the NIA Charter? DG, National Investigation Agency: NIA came into existence after the Mumbai attack as NIA Act was unanimously passed by the Parliament. Since terrorism has inter-state ramiﬁcations, with direct challenge to sovereignty and security of the country; the need for a federal organisation to tackle investigation of terrorism related crimes was felt. The NIA Act was created with provisions for investigation of terror related cases, which fall under the category of "schedule offence", with provisions like ‘police power during investigation’, ‘special courts’ for day-to-day trial and so on. In order to contain the problem of terrorism which operates with absolute anonymity and

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

mobility, NIA under the Act has been given sufficient legal mandate. In last five years NIA has established its branch offices in Mumbai, Guwahati, Hyderabad and Kochi other than the head office in New Delhi. DSA: Global jihad, terrorism, insurgency and left wing extremism have all afflicted India for years. What value has been added by NIA in countering these scourges? DG, NIA: At present NIA is handling several cases involving serious matters like bomb blasts, funding of terrorists, killings etc. NIA is investigating cases involving the whole length and breadth of the country against all major terrorist organisations like LeT, IM, CPI (Maoist), BKI, UNLF, PLA and so on. During investigation a number of persons belonging to different terrorist outfits were arrested and produced to face the legal action. The biggest strength of NIA’s investigation is transparency and all possible endeavours for honest investigation. DSA: The silent, almost invisible role of NIA in ushering in peace and harmony in the north-eastern region has been widely appreciated. Please share with our readers the highlights and success stories of your team. DG, NIA: NIA has investigated number of cases in NE involving all important terrorist organisations like UNLF, PLA, KYKL, NSCN (IM) and so on and arrested more than 70 persons. NIA’s efforts resulted in the arrest of some of the top leaders of these terrorist outfits. Moreover, in these cases unlike the past hardly anyone was bailed out. The cases are

being sincerely pursued in the courts for conviction. The investigation of terror cases by NIA has been extremely successful in setting up a new benchmark in exhibiting coordination amongst the different law enforcement agencies in tracking of accused, hitting the financial muscles of the outfits and last but not the least effectively presenting the cases before the court for prosecution. Insurgency had taken a toll on investigation. NIA, I believe has re-imposed the faith in rule of law in tackling of terror crime investigation. DSA: Global terror funding and pumping in of FICN into vast swathes of Indian territory have escalated in the recent past. How are NIA and TFFC Cell dealing with this? DG, NIA: TFFC cell of NIA was formed to specifically look into the important but so far neglected field of Terrorist Financing and Fake Indian Currency Notes. NIA has investigated many cases covering both these aspects. A large amount of terror funds and other terror property have been seized and forfeited as a result of this effort of NIA. Similarly, on the FICN front, NIA has investigated many cases and has also busted an all-India network of Malda based FICN smugglers. The course of International legal instruments has also been taken to procure evidence from other countries in FICN cases being investigated by NIA. Some of the notable cases of Terror Financing and Fake Currency dealt by the NIA have been Malda Network of FICN trafficking, funding to the HM through JKART, funding to the BKI etc. DSA: With the security threats and challenges increasing exponentially as enemies of India become more and more

tech-savvy, how well is NIA equipped to face and surmount the nefarious designs of the anti-national elements? DG, NIA: Technology has become pervasive and is moving rapidly; from a security perspective it is a big challenge to keep pace with it. We have ensured that all our investigators have the fundamental skills to operate in the cyber environment. At the same time we rely on traditional capabilities like cultivating sources necessary to infiltrate into terrorist network, to collect intelligence and topple such networks from inside. We are striving to enhance our capabilities to lawfully intercept all kinds of communications used by terrorists and also ensuring advances in technology do not erode our abilities and skills to combat tech-savvy terrorists. DSA: Training of the personnel and upgradation of skills is an ongoing process in all security forces. What special arrangements has NIA made to train its officers and men to make NIA a world-class investigation and security force? DG, NIA: Regular training, exposure to best practices and introduction to modern methods and technologies in every sphere of the Agency’s activity remains an abiding commitment as far as NIA is concerned. It is for the very same reason that the same finds a place in our mission statement. NIA constantly seeks to upgrade its skill set and transform itself into a world-class Agency by organising regular inhouse induction and in-service training for our staff. Further, we also seek to utilise the finest training facilities across the world, to which we send our officers. Finally, being a niche and cutting edge area of work, we believe that the best training

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

internal security

sea power equations

DG, NIA INTERVIEW

MARITIME COOPERATION

UK DEFENCE MARITIME Mr Sharad Kumar DG, National Investigation Agency (NIA) in conversation with Mr Pawan Agrawal, Publisher and CEO of Defence and Security Alert (DSA) Magazine

cooperation extended Thailand and Malaysia.

countries

Bangladesh,

DSA: NIA and other security forces apprehend many terrorists, smugglers and insurgents etc but very few are ultimately convicted. What steps is NIA taking to analyse the existing laws and suggest suitable amendments so that they have a deterrent effect?

remains out in the field and hence encourage our officers to spend as much time on the ground. DSA: Since terrorism and terror funding are global phenomena and have pan India footprint, what kind of data sharing mechanism has NIA developed with various agencies in India and overseas? DG, NIA: In all cases related with terror funding and FICN, NIA shares data on a regular basis with IB, RA&W, DRI, FCORD, CEIB, NCRB, State Police and CPOs like BSF. NIA organises, Zone-wise Regional Coordination Meetings, on a quarterly basis with an aim to sensitise different sates with various aspects of terror funding and FICN smuggling. These quarterly meetings lay down modalities for prompt information sharing preemptive measures to be adopted for collaboratively fighting the menace of terror funding and FICN smuggling. NIA uses the available international instruments of Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty and Letters Rogatory to seek cooperation from foreign countries. Besides the legal instruments NIA sends its teams to various countries where linkages to terror funding and FICN smuggling into India have emerged. In the recent past such visits by NIA teams have borne fruits as witnessed in the unprecedented

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

DG, NIA: While it is true that our security forces apprehend many terrorists, insurgents etc, it would be incorrect to infer that accused in NIA cases do not end in conviction. In fact, our statistics reveal exactly the opposite. Almost all our accused end up getting conviction. It is true that trial in not too many of our cases have started. This is primarily because we are a young organisation. Though our statute provides for day-to-day trial of cases, not too many Courts have actually undertaken the same. Once this provision is implemented, the perception would change considerably and NIA would be known as a 100 per cent conviction organisation or considerably close to it. Having said that we have also sent recommendations for considerable changes in the anti-terror law, so as to enhance our capabilities. For instance, we have sought powers to undertake undercover operations, like most counter-terror agencies in the world. Legalisation of such operations would enable us to collect a large volume of evidence, critical in anti-terror investigations. DSA: What thoughts on NIA vision and mission you will like to share with the people of India and DSA readers around the world? DG, NIA: NIA is a premier investigating agency for investigating all terrorism related crimes. It envisions setting high standards of professional competency in detection, investigation and prosecution of terror crimes. It seeks to build capacity in terms of scientiﬁc investigation, knowledge bank on various domestic and global terrorist outﬁts and intelligence network to track absconding terrorists. NIA will be relentless in its pursuit of terrorist groups responsible for threatening the integrity and security of the nation.

TRADE MISSION TO INDIA Team DSA

s Media Partner of UK Defence Maritime Trade Mission to India team DSA is delighted to welcome Constructor Rear Admiral Anthony Graham RCNC Director Ships and Head of the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors, all the delegates and representatives of UK Industry to India.

Indo-UK bilateral relations received signiﬁcant boost in 2004 when the relationship was upgraded to “Strategic Partnership”. The British Prime Minister David Cameron has often said that though Britain’s relationship with India “goes deep”, it “should go deeper” and during the India-UK Summit 2013 he expressed the desire for a “stronger, wider, deeper partnership” with India. Defence and Security Alert (DSA) is a premier, world-class monthly magazine covering the entire spectrum of “defence” and “security” issues highlighting the developing scenarios impacting regional and global strategic concerns. Its insightful and thought-provoking content commands serious reading by policy makers and decision-makers at the highest levels in federal and state governments and the corporate world.

Rear Admiral Anthony Graham

DSA is the ﬁrst and the only ISO 9001:2008 certiﬁed defence and security magazine in India and also the only one available on the Indian Air Force (IAF) Intranet. DSA is the ideal platform to showcase and promote your products, services and technologies in the burgeoning Indian market. We have many advertising and branding options in print and online editions of DSA. To know more you may

view our media kits on the following weblinks: http://www.dsalert.co.in/ﬁles/DSA_International_Online_ Media_Kit.pdf http://www.dsalert.co.in/files/DSA_International_Print_ Media_Kit.pdf We wish you all a pleasant and successful visit and look forward to hearing from you and contributing to India and the UK doing more business together.

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

sea power equations

PROTECTING NATIONAL INTERESTS

VICE ADMIRAL ARUN KUMAR SINGH (RETD)

NAVY MOVES

FORWARD

The writer retired as Flag Ofﬁcer Commanding-in-Chief of the Eastern Naval Command, Visakhapatnam. His key appointments included Director General of the Indian Coast Guard (during the Tsunami of 26 December 2004) and Commander-in-Chief of the Tri-Service Andaman and Nicobar Command. He is also a proliﬁc writer on maritime, strategic and nuclear issues.

BUT NEEDS BALANCED GROWTH AND FUNDS The Indian Navy has always planned to develop a ‘balanced force capability’ comprising

naval aviation, submarines, warships and marine commandos, so that it can protect national interests across huge ocean areas by a capability to deter and if necessary combat all threats. It would be preferable to have four larger SSBNs with 12 to 16 SLBMs (with MIRV) ranges of 6,000 km to deter China from a patrol area in the Bay of Bengal itself.

s the Indian Navy (IN) celebrates Navy Day on 4 December and Submarine Arm Day on 8 December 2013, it will look back at the last year with mixed feelings of pride at some achievements and sorrow at the loss of a conventional submarine. This article deals with the need to plug some of the media reported loopholes in the Indian Navy's capability for carrying out its wide spectrum of tasks across not only the Indian and Paciﬁc Oceans, but given the recent spate of piracy off West Africa, also for possible counter-piracy operations in the Atlantic Ocean. In addition other media reported shortcomings in the capability for conventional and strategic deterrence would also be examined brieﬂy.

Double Naval Budget

At the outset, I need to emphasise, that given the budget allocations needed for the Army to raise an additional mountain strike corps by 2020 and the Air Force's need

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

for MMRCA and an intermediate jet trainer to replace the ageing Kirans, by about 2018, the media reported loopholes in the IN capability would mean additional funding by raising the defence budget from its present 2 per cent to about 3 per cent and doubling the Navy's share of the budget. The IN has always planned to develop a 'balanced force capability' comprising naval aviation, submarines, warships and marine commandos, so that it can protect national interests across huge ocean areas by a capability to deter and if necessary combat all threats, ranging from low end piracy, maritime terror to conventional war ﬁghting to strategic deterrence to cyber war and security for Indian exploitation of space and ocean depths.

Nuclear Powered Submarines

Submarines play a crucial role in peacetime and during war. While SSBNs provide strategic second strike

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

sea power equations

PROTECTING NATIONAL INTERESTS

August 2013 was an eventful month for the Indian Navy. On August 10, the reactor of the much-delayed SSBN (ballistic missile submarine) Arihant (India’s first home-built nuclear-powered submarine launched on July 26, 2008) went critical. Hopefully, by December 2013, this 6,000 tonne SSBN will commence sea trials, followed by induction within a year capability, conventional submarines and SSNs, form the spearhead of any naval operations to deny the use of the sea to enemy naval units, blockade ports and also attack land targets with conventional cruise missiles. In some distant areas like the South and East China Seas, where the Chinese have overwhelming air and sea superiority, only SSNs can be usefully deployed to blockade Chinese ports or in some cases like the Malacca Straits (in co-ordination with own air and surface units and satellites) to deny access to the Indian Ocean to Chinese warships or to deny exit to Chinese merchant ships carrying oil to China from the Middle East. In addition, during peacetime own submarines are used to train Indian Navy anti-submarine units (ships, aircraft, helicopters) to hone their skills in anti-submarine warfare. To meet all these requirements and to cater for some submarines to be under maintenance cum repairs, the Indian Navy needs at least six SSBNs, eight SSNs and 18 conventional submarines.

Mine Warfare

Other areas where loopholes need to be plugged include counter-mine warfare and amphibious warfare. Most of the earlier vintage Russian minesweeper ships have either been de-commissioned while a handful are on their last years of “extended” service. Keeping the harbour entrances free of mines laid by the enemy in wartime or by terrorists in peacetime is crucial as the Indian economy will suffer due to stoppage of vital energy or material imports if a port is closed due to a merchant ship sinking after hitting a mine and other ships will refuse to enter or leave. Also, imported commodity prices will rise as international shipping insurance costs will skyrocket. Hence keeping the entrance and exit channels to ports is as important as protecting our SLOCs (Sea Lanes of Communications). At the time of writing this article, it appears that the case for eight critically needed MCMV (Mine Counter Measures Vessels) from South Korea (two to be imported and six to be built at Goa Shipyard) may be again deferred to the next ﬁnancial year, despite the requirement being critical. In my opinion the IN needs 16 such MCMVs (eight for each coast).

Amphibious Assault

Similarly, the case for indigenous construction of four 20,000 ton amphibious warfare ships known as LPDs (Landing Platform Docks) is pending. Another requirement, indirectly linked to the LPD case, which needs to be highlighted is the need to create a naval amphibious brigade comprising three battalions of Marines with integrated

ﬁre cum logistics support based on the model of the US Marines. This is vital for ensuring the safety and security of our 1,197 islands and also for “out of area contingencies” like humanitarian assistance to foreign countries during natural disasters or for evacuating Indian civilians from war-torn regions as had happened in the past in Libya and Lebanon. The LPD design should include a ski-jump and hangar facilities to permit operations by 4 to 6 STOVL aircraft like the Harrier or the stealthy F-35 STOVL variant.

Indigenous Nuclear Submarine

August 2013 was an eventful month for the Indian Navy. On August 10, the reactor of the much-delayed SSBN (ballistic missile submarine) Arihant (India’s ﬁrst home-built nuclear-powered submarine launched on July 26, 2008) went critical. Hopefully, by December 2013, this 6,000 tonne SSBN will commence sea trials, followed by induction within a year. The media reports indicate that initially the SSBN will carry 12 nuclear tipped K-15 SLBMs (Submarine Launched Ballastic Missiles) with a 700 km range and in a few years the SSBN will embark the larger nuclear tipped K-4 SLBM with a range of 3,500 to 4,000 km. An SSBN has the ﬂexibility of mobility and an Indian Arihant type SSBN operating in the East or South China Seas would put many Chinese counter value targets under threat. But given our geographical location and the additional sailing distance needed by the SSBN to bypass choke points of Malacca-Singapore Straits or Lombok and Sunda Straits, it would be preferable to have four larger SSBNs (over twice the size of the Arihant) with 12 to 16

Unfortunately, the Indian Navy suffered a huge jolt on August 14 due to the explosion on board its frontline Kilo-class submarine INS Sindhurakshak (inducted on December 24, 1997), which resulted in the tragic loss of 18 young submariners and the sinking of the submarine in about five metres of shallow water SLBMs (with MIRV) ranges of 6,000 km to deter China from a patrol area in the Bay of Bengal itself – this would increase time on patrol area and reduce the number of SSBNs needed. SSBNs are important as ﬁnally over 50 per cent of India's second strike capability would need to be sea based to avoid loss due to a surprise ﬁrst strike by a nuclear armed nation. In addition, as mentioned earlier, the mobility provided by a large SSBN with say 12 to 16 SLBMs (with MIRVs and range over 6,000 km) would provide India with a theoretical global strike cum deterrence capability.

Follow-on Aircraft Carriers

Another much delayed project, the first India-built 37,500 ton aircraft carrier Vikrant was launched at Kochi on August 12 and should commence sea trials in 2016, with induction in 2018. Another aircraft carrier (the 44,000 ton, INS Vikramaditya – former Gorshkov) completed sea trials in Russia on 21 September 2013 and has joined the Navy on 16 November 2013. Given that most medium sized Navies (Russia, China and UK) have realised that to be effective at sea, an aircraft carrier needs to be about 65,000 tons to operate 36 fighters and 12 helicopters for SAR (Search and Rescue), AEW (Airborne Early Warning) ASuW (Anti-Surface Warfare) and ASW (Anti-Submarine Warfare), India's third home-built carrier should be at least 65,000 tons. The earlier 40,000 ton dry dock limit of Cochin Shipyard (where the 37,500 ton INS Vikrant was built and is now fitting out), is no longer a constraint as Pipavav Shipyard has a dry dock which can build ships over 100,000 tons and by 2016 will have a second and even larger dry dock ready. On August 29, India’s first dedicated military satellite (GSAT-7) was launched by a European rocket. Since operational by mid-September, this unique maritime satellite will provide the Indian Navy with a dedicated satellite for instant communication and instant situational awareness across the vast expanses of the Indian Ocean by sending data onto TV type screens about all shipping and aircraft (including own, neutral and enemy units) and their movements in simple digital symbols. The Air Force and Army satellites are a few years behind the Navy.

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

sea power equations Deep Sea Rescue Vessels

PROTECTING NATIONAL INTERESTS

Unfortunately, the Indian Navy suffered a huge jolt on August 14 due to the explosion on board its frontline Kilo-class submarine INS Sindhurakshak (inducted on December 24, 1997), which resulted in the tragic loss of 18 young submariners and the sinking of the submarine in about ﬁve metres of shallow water. Had this accident taken place at sea, the loss would have been catastrophic and would have exposed the severe limitations of the Navy’s vintage submarine rescue system. It will take a few months of imported salvage operations to lift the submarine to the surface and then examine it in dry dock to ascertain the probable cause of the explosion.

Somali piracy Offshore oil rigs

Let me here explain the difference between salvage and rescue. Salvage means to lift the sunken submarine (or ship) out of the water and take it to a dry dock for repairs (if possible) or for investigation as to cause of sinking. The word “rescue” means to rescue the surviving crew members of a sunken submarine which is lying on the sea bottom. No Navy has a salvage system capability, including India. A foreign firm (possibly based on a time-consuming global tendering process) will lift the Sindhurakshak once the contract is signed. Perhaps the time has come for the Indian Navy or an Indian public sector company to acquire salvage capability, since a merchant ship or warship sinking in a narrow channel could block a port for months, thus adversely impacting trade and oil imports, or blocking Indian Navy operations in wartime. The Indian Navy, as per media reports, has a single vintage submarine rescue system with a capability of rescuing any surviving crew from a sunken submarine at depths less than 150 metres, whereas the modern requirement is to have a deep submergence rescue vehicle (DSRV) up to 600 metres. In October 2012, in a joint exercise off the west coast, an American DSRV carried out an exercise wherein a few Indian submarine crew members were actually transferred from two Indian submarines that were sitting on the sea bottom to simulate distressed submarines. In an actual emergency, the Indo-American agreement SRFK (Submarine Rescue Flyaway Kit) of a decade back actually provides for an American DSRV to be flown to India for rescue operations. Since such an airlift and subsequent deployment could take an unacceptable five to six days, it’s high time India revived its 33-year-old case (the case for two viable Submarine Rescue systems has been pending with

is expected to double its strength from the present 200 aircraft by 2020, but urgently needs 30 new medium type (12 ton) shipborne ASW helicopters and 12 more LRMP (Long Range Maritime Patrol) aircraft and eight more MRP (Medium Range Patrol) aircraft. There is also a need for more UAVs (both land based and ship based) for cost-effective monitoring of the coastal areas of interest.

INS Vikramaditya

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

Marine commandos

the government for clearance since 1980) for providing two submarine rescue vessels with two DSRVs (one for each coast). In submarine rescue, time is critical and involves location of the distressed submarine, arrival on scene of the submarine rescue vessel, deployment of DSRV and rescue of crew in batches of about 10 to 20, depending on the size and capability of the DSRV. The rescue ship also needs to have medical facilities to treat the rescued crew who may be physically injured or face sickness due to exposure to great pressures or poisonous gases.

Backlog Of Submarines

Another major problem facing the Indian Navy is its ageing conventional submarine ﬂeet. It must be noted that SSBNs (Arihant type) have only a strategic nuclear deterrence (second strike) role, whilst actual warﬁghting is done by SSNs and conventional submarines. Only one Kilo-class, INS Sindhushastra, is 13 years old. The other eight are between 23 to 27 years old and due for replacement, given the 25-year lifespan of submarines. The four German SSK submarines are in a similar state of ageing, being between 19 to 27 years old. The much-delayed (phase 1 of the government approved 30 year submarine building plan, approved in 1999) six Scorpene submarines (Project 75) under

construction at Mazagon Dock in Mumbai will enter service between 2016 and 2022. The case for second and third phases of this indigenous submarine construction plan is still pending. These two phases envisage another 6 larger license produced subs (Phase 2 under Project 75(I), followed by 12 indigenously designed conventional submarines between 2015 and 2030, is likely to get delayed further, as the cases are not on the priority list for unknown reasons. Clearly the time has come to review the original 30 year plan and start a second production line of nine larger conventional submarines under Project 75(I) and an independent SSN production line to build eight SSNs of the INS Chakra type (INS Chakra joined the IN in 2012 on a 10 year lease from Russia). Clearly, the Indian government, despite being in election mode and despite an economy in shambles, needs to take some interim measures to plug the huge gaps in submarine combat capability. One interim option is to induct two new Kilo-class submarines from Russia. Unlike France and Germany which take six years, the Russians build the Kilo subs in 27 months – the Kilo, though an old design, would meet our interim requirements as it is now equipped with modern sensors and missiles. A second option is to induct two Russian SSNs (INS Chakra type) by 2018.

Long Range Reconnaissance

A mention needs to be made of Naval aviation which

The IN, needs a large number of cheap blue water capable ships for long range counter-piracy cum counter-maritime terror operations and for protection of offshore oil rigs, while it also needs small 20 ton type patrol boats for harbour security to prevent another 26/11 terror attack. The latter are being inducted and will reach about a 100 such boats shortly, while the cheap blue water capability would need additional long range indian built, 2,500 ton Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs) of which a total of about 27 units would be needed. These helicopter capable units are comparatively cheap (you can buy or build 10 for the cost of a 4,000 ton stealth frigate). Another aspect of coastal security (in addition to the 50 km detection range of coastal radar chain which is being set up by the Indian Coast Guard), is the need for the IN to have long range radars of the HF or High Frequency (Sky wave and Ground wave) which would provide detection ranges of ships between 50 km to 4,000 km at sea. The Chinese, Australians and Russians have this HF radar system and its time India too inducted a similar capability. Phase 2 of the naval base at Karwar, when completed by 2022 should provide the IN with a badly needed ultra-modern dedicated naval base. Similarly, the government needs to urgently approve phase 2 of the Naval Academy at Ezhimala (Kerala) to almost double the existing capacity of accomodating 700 naval cadets. To conclude, the IN can be proud of its indigenisation efforts (46 out of the 47 ships and submarines presently on order are being built in Indian yards), but much more needs to be done, specially in the ﬁeld of indigenous submarine construction. Also the government needs to double the naval budget to make India a true sea power, which is a prerequisite for a nation aspiring to be a global economic power.

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

sea power equations

MARINE RESOURCES

SEABED MINERAL WEALTH

AND ITS SECURITY

Coming to the deterrence capability in the EEZ, it has to be a non-military option during peacetime, which brings the discussion to deployment of Non-lethal Weapons (NLW) and the need to develop them for the EEZ environment. Conflicts in the EEZ are definitely going to be unconventional and it would be difficult to distinguish the adversary from the neutrals or friendly vessels. This may lead to conflicts where use of lethal weapons may not be permissible 210 sq km on the west coast (off Aleppy-Quilon, Trivandrum-Kanyakumari and Ratnagiri) and 923 sq km on the east coast (off Andhra and Orissa coast). Relict Marine Sand: Survey of various blocks off Kollam, Ponnani, Beypore, Chavakkad etc have conﬁrmed the presence of relict sand in an area of 13,750 sq km. Lime Mud Deposits: These have been found at a depth of 180-1,200 m off Gujarat coast and at depth of 100-200 m off Andhra coast. These have also been found in the continental margin of Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Andhra and Gujarat coasts. Phosphatic Sediments: These have been found at depths of 200-1,000 m off Gujarat coast and at a depth of 100-200 m SE of Chennai. These contain 15-20 per cent P2O5.

Within its EEZ, a coastal state has sovereign rights for exploring, exploiting, conserving and managing natural living and non-living resources of the waters superjacent to the seabed and its subsoil. Two essential components of effective EEZ security management comprise surveillance and deterrence. For such an extensive requirement a cooperative, synergetic and system of systems approach between various agencies involved would be paramount.

he Indian Ocean Region’s states are very rich in mineral resources; they contain about 80 per cent of the world’s diamond, 40 per cent of gold and 60 per cent of uranium deposits. These estimates may well be dwarfed by the exploration and discoveries in the mineral rich seabed of their extensive EEZs. India’s EEZ comprises of about 2.172 million km along and around its coastline of about 7,500 km. Further, India is likely to gain 1.5 million sq km of EEZ as it has placed survey details pertaining to the extent of its continental shelf before the International Seabed Authority (ISBA). The continental shelf area of India is approximately 3,80,000 sq km and the shelf area of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands is about 30,000 sq km. This implies that more than 75 per cent of the EEZ lies beyond the depth of 200 meters. On the western coast of Maharashtra, the shelf extends to about 180 nautical miles, whereas on the eastern coast it is much narrower. Major issues relating to maritime security in the Indian Ocean range from security of the energy arteries, to piracy, drug and human trafﬁcking, illegal ﬁshing, gunrunning, environmental issues and terrorism. However, the aim of this article is to lay emphasis on the seabed

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

mineral resources, which have been less talked about in the media and to bring out gaps in the comprehensive security of the Indian EEZ.

Mapping The EEZ

Indian agencies had carried out reconnaissance mapping of the equivalent of 85.7 per cent of offshore area within the territorial waters (TW) and about 98 per cent of the seabed within the EEZ by March 2011. The collection of offshore data is carried out by many agencies such as the Geological Survey of India (GSI), Indian Navy, ONGC, National Institute of Oceanography (NIO) and departments of Ministry of Earth Sciences. The collection of data is carried out by the agencies for scientiﬁc, economic and strategic purposes. The main task of GSI is seabed mapping and exploration of non-living resources in the EEZ and in international waters. GSI has till date surveyed 18,48,318 sq km out of 18,64,900 sq km in the EEZ beyond the territorial waters. It has surveyed 19,76,798 sq km (EEZ +TW) out of a total of 20,14,900 sq km (EEZ +TW).

Marine Mineral Wealth

Placer Deposits: These are accumulation of valuable minerals formed by gravity during sedimentary processes, the survey has found two promising zones namely,

Phosphorite Nodules: The concentration of P2O5 in nodules is between 15.6–18.6 per cent and is 9.8 per cent in phosphate rich lime mud. Oolites and Phosphate (greater than 5 per cent) in lime deposits have been found off Vengurla. The nodules along with lime mud have been found at depths of 300-550 m off Gujarat coast. Phosphorite in nodules has been found off Nagapattinam at depths of 45-412 m. Manganese Nodules: Ferro manganese encrustations have been located off Batti Malva in the Andaman Sea. Micro-manganese nodules have been found west of Lakshadweep at depths of 2,800-4,300 m. The polymetallic nodules and polymetallic massive sulphides (PMS) are of great interest to nations. The PMS are found in localised sites along hot springs in underwater volcanic ranges and contain copper, gold, silver, iron and zinc. The polymetallic nodules, covering vast areas are found at 4–5 km of depth and contain cobalt, nickel, manganese and iron.

Undersea Mining Rights

India had received rights to explore these nodules in 1987. It has established two mine sites after exploring an area of about 4 million sq miles. China too has been active in this region and its company China Ocean Mineral Resources Research and Development Association (COMRA) has been allowed by the International Seabed Authority to undertake PMS exploration in an area of 10,000 sq km in South-west Indian Ocean. Within its EEZ, a coastal state has sovereign rights for exploring, exploiting, conserving and managing natural living and non-living resources of the waters superjacent to the seabed and its subsoil. Further, it can exploit and explore production of energy from water, winds and currents. The EEZ remains an open zone with freedom of innocent passage for all. The EEZ legal regime is different from that governing

territorial waters and high seas and contains certain characteristics of both.

Differences On EEZ

However, in a recent judgment regarding the Enrica Lexie (Italian marines) case, the Supreme Court of India has declared the region between the contiguous zone and the 200 nautical miles into the sea as ‘High Seas’. The Supreme Court has said that Article 97 of the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is not applicable as shooting was a criminal action and not a navigation accident. China has been maintaining its right to regulate foreign military activities in its EEZ, as it feels that it has the right to prevent any activity that threatens its economic interests or security. It also asserts that its domestic laws have jurisdiction in its EEZ. The Chinese law requires foreign entities to obtain prior approval to carry out resource exploitation, ﬁshing and marine research. As far as military activities are concerned, it holds them as prejudicial to ‘peaceful purposes’ provision of the Laws of the Seas Convention. This interpretation has led to a number of minor standoffs between it and the United States of America. India is also one of the countries, which mandate prior permission before any maintenance or repairs are carried out to the submarine cables running on the ﬂoor of its EEZ.

REAR ADMIRAL DR S KULSHRESTHA (RETD)

The writer is a Gold Medalist in MSc (Solid State Physics). He was awarded Sword of Honour and has specialised in Quality Assurance of Naval Armaments. He superannuated in the post of Director General of Naval Armament Inspection. As DGNAI, he was directly responsible for timely availability of reliable and safe naval armament to the Indian Navy. He has two MPhil degrees pertaining to nanotechnology and associated issues and has a Doctorate from ‘School of International Studies’ at the Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU). He is also an alumnus of the prestigious National Defence College (NDC), NHCC, DSSC and a Senior Fellow at New Westminster College, Canada. He is an ardent exponent of indigenisation. He has been writing in defence journals on issues related to Armament technology and indigenisation.

With respect to military activities by foreign militaries in the EEZ, India along with Bangladesh, Brazil, Cape Verde, Malaysia, Pakistan and Uruguay require obtaining of prior permission. North Korea has prohibited any such activity within 50 nm of its territory and Iran has completely prohibited the same.

As far as oceanographic surveying is considered, again some countries require prior permission, in fact, China registered protests against the activities of USNS Bowditch and India against HMS Scott and USNS Bowditch, which were gathering military data by undertaking oceanographic survey. Coupling the above with increased proliferation of submarines in the region, the instances of clandestine underwater and ASW surveys would only increase. There are bound to be incidents involving intruder submarines in future and states would therefore be monitoring activities in their EEZs diligently.

EEZ Security Components

Two essential components of effective EEZ security

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

sea power equations

MARINE RESOURCES

Enrica Lexie

management comprise of surveillance and deterrence. Some of the drawbacks of EEZ surveillance systems in use today include; inability of patrol boats to carry out surveillance, since their missions are area denial, SAR or interdiction; UAVs have much better sensor packages but need a large infrastructure for 24/7 surveillance; HF radars are affordable but need very large areas for installation; Microwave radars suffer from limited horizon; and patrol aircraft incur huge costs. Since radars have difficulty in automatically identifying unknown and devious small vessels and the electro-optic systems are heavily weather dependent, there is requirement for add-on sensors to carry out effective monitoring of EEZ. In fact, a complete EEZ surveillance system should be able to cater to all the facets of EEZ activity be it terrorism, drug and human trafficking, piracy, smuggling, coastal security, search and rescue, sea traffic control, pollution control, illegal fishing, illegal arms supply and exploitation of natural resources of solar, air, wave, minerals, oil and gas. For such an extensive requirement a cooperative, synergetic and system of systems approach between various agencies involved would be paramount.

Surveillance Platforms

The surveillance platforms would include the following:  Unmanned undersea vehicles, sonar arrays, patrol submarines and other underwater sensors.  Remotely operated vehicles, unmanned surface vehicles, offshore platforms, sensors for activity monitoring and patrol boats.  Vessel trafﬁc management system (VTMS), communication networks, control centres, pollution monitoring centres, surface and navigation radars and electro-optic systems.  Unmanned aerial vehicles, patrol aircraft, helicopters, aerostats and sensors.  Observation and communication satellites.

Surface Non-lethal Weapons

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

benefits to the EEZ protection force in the global commons. NLW would enable options for de-escalation of conflicts, avoid irretrievable consequences of using lethal options and result in deterring activity without loss of lives and damage to material. NLWs have to be cost-effective and easy to operate, as different varieties in varying numbers would be required. However to ensure a calibrated approach, across the spectrum of conflict, there is also a need for NLWs to be doctrinally integrated with the regular naval forces to enable them to tackle a developing situation in the EEZ. Various NLWs have been developed for use on the surface against vehicles and personnel and are being used, even military combat vehicles like tanks are being outfitted with Anti-Denial Systems, which project electromagnetic radiation to incapacitate personnel. Non-lethal firearm ammunition is based on transfer of energy and is not designed to kill. Wax bullets, beanbag rounds, plastic bullets and rubber bullets come under this category. Hand grenades which stun, release irritant chemicals or rubber shrapnel are also in use. Directed energy weapons are used not only in anti-missile defence but also in disabling drones, electronic devices and cars. The directed energy weapons utilise various energy forms like electromagnetic radiation, acoustic waves or particle beams (micro projectile weapons).

Undersea NLWs?

Whereas there are various options for use of NLWs on the surface, not much has been reported as far as underwater NLWs are concerned. It may be desirable therefore to task the development agencies in the civilian domain to develop them since NLWs may not strictly come under the purview of the DRDO. NLW’s designs based on acoustic pulses, ultrasonics, water shots and very low explosive content weapons can be thought of. In case of India, an ambitious plan for coastal security and maritime domain awareness has been put in place, however it appears that it needs to be further strengthened and stitched together so that the EEZ security functions as a comprehensive entity with synergies across the various agencies involved. In conclusion, it has been brought out that India’s EEZ has the potential to deliver a rich haul of precious minerals once relevant technologies are harnessed. However, it is also true that, in addition to existing threats of disruption of energy supplies, piracy and acts of terrorism, other nations are keen to poach in to the ﬁsheries and seabed wealth. The security of the EEZ is therefore a matter of India’s national interest and need exists for boosting the EEZ’s monitoring, augmenting its security arrangements and developing cost-effective comprehensive surveillance and non-lethal weapon systems to tackle situations developing in the EEZ which may not warrant military intervention.

sea power equations

MARITIME DOCTRINES

CHOOSING A FUTURE

BALD POWER OR INFLUENCE?

In the absence of announced strategy directions to the Indian Armed Forces, the statements like the ones above by the Prime Minister are taken as strategy for planning purposes by the Service Chiefs. The Indian Navy on its own volition issued a Maritime Military Strategy (2007) Document and a revised Indian Maritime...Document (2009) to ensure the Navy has capabilities to act from the Gulf to the Malacca Straits. India has been dubbed a ‘reluctant super power’ but yet harbours ambitions to have a say

The success of a nation in the 21st century will be dependant on its economic, foreign and military policy and the nation’s technology adaptation policy and depends on the strategic outlook of its leaders and society as a whole. The Chinese have imbibed these pointers. China’s rise has witnessed strides in its economic and military might and the Chinese have adapted technology and infrastructure as accomplishments of comprehensive national power (CNP), which India has to note in any strategy calculus.

Portuguese Doctrine

“India’s growing international stature gives it strategic relevance in the area ranging from the Persian Gulf to the Straits of Malacca … India has exploited the ﬂuidities of the emerging world order to forge new links through a combination of diplomatic repositioning, economic resurgence and military ﬁrmness”. Dr Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister, Circa 2006.

in international affairs and the UN Security Council beﬁtting its size for which a cogent articulated strategy, or white papers and ingredients of power are needed to be put in place.

“Our foreign policy is not deﬁned merely by our interests, but also by (our) values”. Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh speaking to 120 Heads Of Missions on 6th November, in New Delhi, Circa 2013.

The success of a nation in the 21st century will be dependant on its economic, foreign and military policy and the nation’s technology adaptation policy (a recent addition which includes infrastructure) and depends on the strategic outlook of its leaders and society as a whole. The Chinese have imbibed these pointers. China’s rise has witnessed strides in its economic and military might and the Chinese have adapted technology and infrastructure as accomplishments of comprehensive national power (CNP), which India has to note in any strategy calculus. Sir Julian Corbett defined maritime strategy as the principles which govern war, in which the sea is the substantial power and naval strategy is that part of it which determines the movements of the fleet and what part the fleet must play, in consonance with actions of the land and air forces.

Maritime Power is India’s Imperative. Choices lie between the Alphonso de Albuquerque’s Portuguese route of inﬂuence. – Ranjit B Rai

Mahanian

This article debates India’s futuristic maritime strategy options Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh’s two seminal statements above.

O 24

the

way

light

n 4th December India annually celebrates Navy Day, commemorating the ‘Missile Killers’ daring attacks on Karachi in the 1971 victorious war. This year the Navy is gearing up to induct the 44,500 ton MiG-29K aircraft carrier Vikramaditya from Russia and seven additional P8I Boeing 737 Maritime Reconnaissance (MR) aircraft from USA. The state-of-theart P8Is bristling with electronics and internet mobility, which is the future, can scour the Indian oceanic skies and Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs) 24x7 and ﬁre latest AGM-84 Harpoons and Mk-54 anti-submarine torpedoes and direct ﬁghters at will. The balance of power in the region is set to change.

BrahMos missile ﬁring platforms and two spanking new Fincantieri supplied 27,550 ton tankers INS Deepak and Shakti, which can transport 15,000 tons of fuel for ships and aircraft and 500 tons of dry cargo, including ammunition and provisions with workshop facilities and ability to operate heavy helicopters, the Indian Navy is blossoming to becoming a true ‘Bluewater Navy’. The men in blue deserve congratulations. This is the icing on the cake, but dearth of submarines is plaguing the Indian Navy and the accidental loss of the Kilo INS Sindhurakshak in overcrowded Mumbai naval dockyard and the health and cost of fortyseven platforms mostly in Defence PSUs on order for induction and their usage deserves introspection, in strategic terms.

With the 8,500 ton nuclear Akula INS Chakra being available to patrol the seas undetected and a long grey line of

India And China In The East

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

great power status (Tai Gua Gum). China suffered only 100 years of foreign domination as the period of Opium Addiction and Local Wars which they call the Hundred Years of Shame (Baitu Guru 1840-1940) and foreswear, never to let that repeat. The opium went from India. Chinese worship their ancestors and their philosophers’ strategic writings inﬂuence COMMODORE Chinese strategy. Confucius RANJIT B RAI (RETD) (551-479 BC) gave them a sense The writer is author of of obedience and culture, A Nation and Its Navy at Sun Tzu (512 BC) enunciated War and served as Director The Art of War in thirteen chapters Naval Operations and and Lao Tzu spread Taoism a Intelligence in the mixture of principles and religion. Indian Navy and nine years Chinese are glorifying the voyages with USA’s largest project carrier shipping company. of Admiral Zheng He (1371-1433) who visited Calicut around 1430 to enthuse maritime fervour among the public. Maritime power is their goal.

In the East, India and China are the two rising powers.

As India’s neighbour China is also India’s competitor with ambitions of a

Historically, India is different. India was ruled by a foreign Muslim lineage from the 11th century till the Portuguese arrived in the 15th century driven by Portugal’s sea power strategy of sending ships and emissaries in numbers world over for discoveries and fortunes. Military power and inﬂuence was made to follow, as Indian rulers experienced. Explorer Vasco da Gama landed at Calicut in 1498 as a trader, but soon, the Portuguese ships carrying soldiers followed and

This is how Afonso de Albuquerque explained to his forces why the Portuguese wanted to capture Malacca: “The King of Portugal has often commanded me to go to the Straits, because … this was the best place to intercept the trade which the Moslems … carry on in these parts. So it was to do Our Lord’s service that we were brought here; by taking Malacca, we would close the Straits so that never again would the Moslems be able to bring their spices by this route … I am very sure that, if this Malacca trade is taken out of their hands, Cairo and Mecca will be completely lost.” – From the Commentaries of the Great Afonso de Albuquerque consolidated their power on the Konkan coast and captured Goa from the Sultan of Bijapur with intrigues, by requisitioning the services of Timoji a privateer in the service of the Hindu Vijayanagar Empire. Capt Francisco D’ Almeida's ship sailed into Bombay in December 1508 from Cannanore and later took Diu. This was Portuguesemaritime strategy crafted by Prince Henry the Navigator and successfully prosecuted by Alphonso de Albuquerque, Governor of Goa in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

sea power equations

MARITIME DOCTRINES

The late Samuel Huntington wrote. “If the service (Armed Forces) does not possess a well defined strategic concept, the public and political leaders will be confused as to the role of the service (Armed Force), uncertain as to the necessity of its existence and apathetic or hostile to the claims made by the service upon the resources of society”. This one statement explains the raison d’etre of this article and why India has lost every war it has fought or has been in stalemate except the 1971 Aphonso de Albuquerque’s strategies are highlighted in Robert Kaplan’s book Monsoon. It was Albuquerque’s strategic vision coupled with military skills that established the Portuguese empire in the Indian Ocean. After conquering Goa and setting up their capital there, the Portuguese established bases in Malacca in 1511 (See Box), Hormuz and Socotra in 1515, Colombo in 1518 and Java in 1521. Some Portuguese even went to Japan. The unique strategy of establishing naval bases for inﬂuence as part of expanding maritime power and monitoring the choke points in Indian Ocean was propounded by maritime theorists. This needs to be considered by India, as the economical Portuguese strategy continues to hold currency as opposed to Mahan’s strategy of ‘power play’ that India has adopted and is discussed later. Indian maritime thinkers need to take leaves from the Portuguese and Spanish navies as options to emulate. Interestingly the Pope mediated and divided the world into two for them to explore and colonise. Portugal was given the East and Spain the West.

Whitehall’s Long Shadow

The British consolidated their hold on India from the 17th century when the Portuguese gifted the seven islands of Bombay to the Crown as dowry, when Catherine of Braganza married King Charles in 1661. India’s strategic policies, including cotton export to UK and denial of the industrial revolution got crafted from Whitehall and the East India Trading Companies in the United Kingdom with British national interests in view. In the early 1900s a few Indian ofﬁcers of the Imperial Civil Service (ICS), had a say in charting strategies for India but their loyalties

remained on the British side. India’s tall leaders were busy selﬂessly struggling for freedom. On achieving Independence on 15th August, 1947, British Service chiefs were in command of the military. India’s leaders were devoid of any experience of exercising strategic decisions and were unsure of how to steer India with economic choices of capitalism, communism and socialism before them. The principles of non-violence (Ahimsa) and Turn The Other Cheek enunciated by Mahatma Gandhi struck chords of sympathy and still do in India’s strategic and military policies. The quality of hard-nosed strategic tradition was glaringly absent.

military spheres. This is where infrastructure comes into play and is part of a holistic maritime strategy. In the 21st century India’s Navy will be critical for India’s rise, its foreign policy initiatives and security both in peace and war. India’s interests lie in the Indian Ocean, in the Middle East and beyond in the South China Sea with investments. The government has been supportive of India’s small professional Navy with a large order book of 47 ships and 20 more approved by the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) but has been negligent of beeﬁng up infrastructure, or thinking along the Portuguese lines. The Mahanian way of a large Navy alone is not the way a poverty ridden nation can thrive.

India’s foreign and military policy became a ﬁefdom of Pandit Nehru who was shaken by Pakistani attacks in Kashmir soon after Independence and by the Chinese leadership who dealt a blow in 1962. Though Nehru realised the import of sea power made famous by his quote on INS Delhi in 1950, that India had lost its Independence from the seas, India’s economy could not sustain a large Navy and was even barred from taking part in the 1965 Indo-Pak War. The Navy proved its mettle in the 1971 War and then in the 1999 Kargil War by preparing a naval manoeuvre to blockade Pakistan and came out ahead of the US Navy in the 2004 tsunami. Since then the government has appreciated ‘Sea Power’ and its attributes and supported India’s large induction programmes but left strategies to the Navy Admirals, many US trained and six out of last Naval Chiefs including the current Chief Admiral DK Joshi are graduates of the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island.

The Greeks deﬁned a “thalassocratic” state as a nation with maritime ambitions in the commercial and

As a geostrategist, Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840–1914) rose to be an Admiral in the US Navy as ‘the most important American strategist of the nineteenth century’. His theory The Inﬂuence of Sea Power Upon History (1890) led to a US and European naval arms race. His concept of sea power was adopted for America in the 20th century when an isolated USA had no land based threats, which India has and when USA was riding a wave of economic ascendancy. Indian thinkers are not taking that into account as India faces land threats and has limited economic resources. Mahan’s ideas were based on the Navy being an extension of foreign policy to control sea routes. Mahan’s ideas still permeate the US Navy Doctrine which the Indian Navy has adopted in a large measure for its acquisition programme which deserves credit but there has been no say from foreign policy makers on the strategy. USA is now attempting a Pivot in the East with leaves from the Portuguese strategies and looking to India to join. The Naval War College (NWC) at Rhode Island is full of busts of Mahan and his teachings and strategy of power with huge aircraft carriers are drummed into all students as the ultimate in maritime strategy. Though Alfred Mahan deﬁned sea power as an extension of the foreign policy of a nation, the Portuguese model needs emulation for its execution. India’s Look East policy of extending trade and signing accords and appointing

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

naval officers in friendly nations like Singapore for co-operation, training and gaining influence needs replicating as an economical path elsewhere. The Navy and Coast Guard have young officers in the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), the multi-nation Infusion Centre for maritime intelligence and the Singapore Armed Forces Training Institute (SAFTI) in Singapore and have conducted 16 unbroken SIMBEX exercises and has Operational Turnaround (OTR) facilities sans diplomatic clearances in Singapore. A step has been taken to appoint a naval officer to rich Qatar which is seeking maritime co-operation from where India imports over US$ 15 billion of gas annually. The recent visit of INS Tabar and Aditya in September to Doha were well received.

Confusion Over Role

Mahan and Maritime Strategy

Throughout history, sea power has been a determinant in the rise and fall of powers, as Robert Kaplan explains in his book Monsoon and depicts how sea power helped the British to dominate the Indian subcontinent and Malaya. The Dutch colonised Indonesia and America took Philippines in the 18th-19th century, after USA had defeated its only land threat the Spanish Nicaragua attack. Abroad only a handful of soldiers were needed.

The Indian Navy (IN) and Coast Guard (INCG) have become versatile three dimensional flexible instruments of national power, which can be used independently or in consonance with other services to achieve the country’s security objectives and protect India’s national interests

Writing in the May 1954 issue of the US Naval Proceedings the late Samuel Huntington wrote. “If the service (Armed Forces) does not possess a well defined strategic concept, the public and political leaders will be confused as to the role of the service (Armed Force), uncertain as to the necessity of its existence and apathetic or hostile to the claims made by the service upon the resources of society”. This one statement explains the raison d’etre of this article and why India has lost every war it has fought or has been in stalemate except the 1971, which was victory in only the East, assisted by the Mukti Bahini in no small measure. In the 1987 foray into Sri Lanka code named Operation Pawan India went in with no defined aim or strategy and lost 1,400 army souls achieving little. In 1998 India went nuclear which did not help as the Kargil half-war took another toll. India needs to hone its Mahanian maritime strategy with Prince Henry’s of Portuguese diplomacy and connections of influence and attend to the infrastructure needs of a compact professional and powerful bluewater Navy. The Indian Navy (IN) and Coast Guard (INCG) have become versatile three dimensional flexible instruments of national power, which can be used independently or in consonance with other services to achieve the country’s security objectives and protect India’s national interests. The roles of the Navy are well divided into military, constabulary, diplomatic and humanitarian in the Navy’s Maritime Military Strategy and Doctrine and its Doctrine for Information Warfare. The overall strategy needs a makeover. Shano Varuna the Navy’s motto invokes Lord Varuna to bless the Navy in its endeavours.

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

sea power equations

SAFETY AND SECURITY PARAMOUNT

Deep Submergence Rescue Vehicle (DSRV)

submarines of Russian origin in the Indian Navy suffered a major explosion while alongside her berth in Mumbai. The vivid videos of this accident were on our television screens as the nation woke to this terrible tragedy a day before the nation’s Independence Day celebrations. While the exact cause for the explosion is yet to be established, the magnitude of the explosion and the resulting ﬁre suggest that this too could have been related to the armament on board.

Hazardous Occupation

Submarines are inherently dangerous platforms with a potent presence of highly volatile solid, liquid and gaseous substances on board in sealed metallic containers. Even though adequate redundancies are built into the system to ensure safety and prevent an explosive cocktail from causing a conﬂagration, accidents can happen. Add to this the hazard of the operating medium many fathoms below the surface of the sea, the possibility, though remote, of material failure, equipment malfunction and human error (despite the highly trained crews on board) and the adage that “submarines are safe until you forget they can be dangerous” aptly describes submarining.

SUBMARINE RESCUE CAPABILITY Submarine rescue and escape is not only about having suitable equipment. It is more about having the ability to deploy this equipment optimally in the shortest possible time because it is time that is of essence in getting to a disabled submarine and rescuing the crew in conditions that could be extremely difficult due to weather.

n 12 August 2000, a Russian Oscar Class-II nuclear powered attack submarine (SSN), the Kursk sank in the Barents Sea with all hands on board. The submarine was in the midst of routine exercises with the Russian surface ﬂeet. The subsequent investigation revealed that the sinking was caused by an explosion due to leakage of hydrogen peroxide from one of the torpedoes. This was the worst submarine accident in recent times and the power of the media ensured that the inherent dangers in submarining were brought to our living rooms for the ﬁrst time.

Thirteen years later and almost to the day (night of 13/14 August 2013), INS Sindhurakshak, one of the ten Kilo class

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

Kursk was not the first submarine accident and will definitely not be the last. On 07 April 1989, a Russian Mike Class submarine, the Komsomolets had sunk due to a fire which initially broke out in the aft compartment. Ironically, the submarine was able to surface and the maximum loss of life was due to sailors jumping overboard and suffering hypothermia as help did not arrive in time. The emphasis on material and operational safety and the professionalism of submarine crews notwithstanding, the hazards of the operating medium in the depths of the oceans and the possibility of material failure, human error, collision etc can never be eliminated despite the redundancies incorporated into the submarine design to prevent such an occurrence. Submarine accidents have served to highlight the importance of establishing a robust and responsive search, rescue and escape capability to minimise the loss of life on board. The loss of the USS Thresher on 10 April 1963 with its entire crew of 128 was one such incident. Although Thresher sank to a depth far greater than its ‘crushing’ depth and rescue of personnel would not have been possible, the inadequacy of a suitable rescue system and organisation even upto a rescuable depth was recognised and led to the development of the Deep Submergence Rescue Vehicle (DSRV). The current US DSRV system is air transportable and can even be transported on the casing of a submarine. Since then many different types of deep sea rescue vehicles have been designed and are in operation with many submarine operating navies specific to their requirements.

Timely Intervention

Submarine rescue and escape is not only about having suitable equipment. It is more about having the ability to deploy this equipment optimally in the shortest possible time because it is time that is of essence in getting to a disabled submarine and rescuing the crew in conditions that could be extremely difﬁcult due to weather, the area, the nature of the accident and the physiological and

physical condition of the crew to exit the submarine. Successful submarine operations are centred around remaining undetected at sea. Therefore a submarine has to maintain total radio and sonar silence to avoid its position getting compromised. During routine peacetime exercises a submarine indicates that it is safe by transmitting a short coded message within a pre-determined interval of time. If this signal becomes overdue, a series of actions are initiated. If these too fail to elicit a response from the submarine, a SUBSUNK procedure is initiated. Promulgation of SUBSUNK sets off a chain of well documented procedures including all vessels in the vicinity heading towards the submarine’s last known position known as the ‘datum’. Submarines are ﬁtted with an emergency indicator buoy which can be detached by the sunken submarine. It ﬂoats up to the surface while remaining connected to the submarine by a cable which can be used to establish communication with the disabled submarine and assists in locating the sunken submarine.

COMMODORE ANIL JAI SINGH (RETD)

The writer commissioned in January 1981, joined the submarine arm in March 1982 and in three decades since, had ﬁve aﬂoat commands (including four submarine commands) and a wide array of appointments ashore. He was also the Indian Naval Adviser in London and part of the perspective planning and force development process in HQ IDS. He took premature retirement in 2011 and is Vice President of the Indian Maritime Foundation. He takes keen interest in matters maritime and has written and spoken on the subject in India and abroad.

Submarine search and rescue is not restricted by nationalities or political considerations. It is a humanitarian act at sea as is the case with any accident at sea. The fallout of the Kursk incident led to the establishing of the ‘International Submarine Escape and Rescue Liaison Ofﬁce’ (ISMERLO). ISMERLO is based at Norfolk, Virginia USA and provides the international liaison and coordination for a rescue effort. A working group called the ‘Submarine Escape and Rescue Working Group (SMERWG) is part of ISMERLO which addresses the technical aspects through information sharing amongst submarine operating nations. Lessons learnt from exercises, interaction and discussion by experts in the ﬁeld are incorporated in evolving procedures towards strengthening the global submarine search, escape and rescue capability. The sinking of the Kursk highlighted the challenges in effecting successful escape and rescue and was an eye-opener for the global submarine community. Despite the availability of an escape and rescue capability with the Russian Navy and the presence of major surface combatants in the vicinity, a successful operation could not be executed because of bad weather and the limitations of the system. The help offered by other nations was unacceptable to an obdurate political leadership due to misplaced nationalistic fervour. By the time they realised that the task was beyond them and agreed to the help being offered by others, it was too late.

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

sea power equations

SAFETY AND SECURITY PARAMOUNT

LR5 submarine rescue vehicle

The tragedy was that there were 23 crew members alive in the ninth compartment who finally must have lost hope and succumbed to a watery grave. The recovery of the diary of one of the officers tells a poignant tale of a poorly executed rescue operation by a navy which prides itself on its submarine capability. Submarines of all countries have been involved in minor incidents which did not result in disastrous consequences due to sheer good fortune. In 2009, a French and a British SSBN brushed each other while they dived in a very rare occurrence but the very thought of what could have happened had the collision between two nuclear behemoths been more severe is too alarming to just contemplate. There has been a large increase in the number of submarines operating in the world’s oceans. It is heartening to note that submarine rescue and escape has also got its due attention. Recent additions to the traditional nations like the USA, UK, France, Sweden etc are China, South Korea and Singapore, all of whom have gone in for systems built in the UK and bespoke to their specific requirements. The British LR5 which was at the scene during the Kursk incident and thereafter rescued the crew of seven from the Priz (a Russian DSRV which got entangled in a hydrophone array and sank to a depth of about 190 feet), has been replaced by the NATO Submarine rescue System (NSRS), a combined UK, France and Norway initiative. The LR5 is now with the Royal Australian Navy as they had problems with the Remora DSRV in their inventory.

Indian Paralysis

The Indian Navy prides itself on being one of the premier submarine operating navies in the world. It is only

The proposal for a dedicated rescue system for the Indian Navy has been under discussion for almost three decades. After the Kursk incident there was a flurry of activity with numerous presentations but soon it was back to business as usual. After the Sindhurakshak incident, once again there is much talk of expeditious procurement

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

one of four navies with a ballistic missile submarine (the indigenously built Arihant which is expected to sail for sea trials soon), a nuclear attack submarine (INS Chakra, an Akula–II class SSN on lease from Russia and perhaps lease of another one under a similar arrangement) and 14 conventional submarines (with six more under construction and a further six under active consideration of the government). The country is also aspiring to build a series of SSBNs and SSNs. The IN is also one of the largest submarine operating navies in the world. It is therefore indeed surprising that the naval planners have not thought it necessary to develop a contemporary submarine rescue capability in the 46 years since the ﬁrst Indian naval submarine was commissioned on 08 December 1967. The recent incident on INS Sindhurakshak has highlighted the imperative need for one. Although this accident happened in harbour where an escape system would have been of little use, it could well have happened at sea with greater loss of life and more catastrophic consequences. The absence of an escape system would have further compounded the magnitude of the tragedy.

Unreliable Arrangement With US

It is understood that the Indian Navy has an arrangement with the US ﬂyaway DSRV facility located in San Diego, USA and is assured of the availability at the scene within 72 hours. In an ideal world this may well be possible but if not exercised frequently not only amongst the two navies but with all agencies on board, it is unlikely that these timelines would be achievable. To ensure that the equipment reaches the disabled submarine in the quickest possible time, whether on the east or west coasts, would require a streamlined procedure, a clear understanding of the logistic challenge by all agencies and close civil-military liaison. While the naval end of the procedure – sailing of ships, establishing suitable communication etc would move without a hitch as it is exercised often, it is the preparedness of the civil administration, their appreciation of the urgency and their efﬁciency which needs to be addressed. The SRV itself weighs over 30 tons and with its associated equipment would need specialised trailers to transport it from the

airport to the seaport of embarkation. Both Mumbai and Chennai, the only two airports in coastal India where this equipment can land are more than 30 km away from the port and the route passes through high population and traffic density areas. Suitable routes would therefore have to be identified to ensure unimpeded movement of the convoy carrying the equipment and the police would have to ensure traffic management for which they would need to be sensitised to the immediacy of the movement. A suitable mother ship would have to be ready in the port to embark the equipment irrespective of time of day and thereafter sail without delay to the datum. The navy is well aware of the magnitude of the challenge and would have factored this into their contingency plan for submarine escape and rescue. As brought out earlier, in submarine rescue time is of the essence. The presence of all the equipment would be of no avail if it is unable to reach in time to effect a meaningful rescue and escape for the trapped submariner. The conduct of a rescue exercise with the US System in 2012 had led to a successful mating of a DSRV with an Indian submarine thus validating the capability. However this would need to be exercised on a regular basis with the entire procedure being followed. Once the necessary confidence level is achieved, an un-alerted exercise should be conducted to validate the efficacy of the operation.

Indian DSRV

The proposal for a dedicated rescue system for the Indian Navy has been under discussion for almost three decades. After the Kursk incident there was a ﬂurry of activity with numerous presentations but soon it was back to business as usual. Throughout the last decade the issue has been on the cards with its priority waxing and waning but nothing meaningful has emerged. After the Sindhurakshak incident, once again there is much talk of expeditious procurement. It remains to be seen if those ensconced in their air-conditioned ivory towers in New Delhi, safe as they are from ever meeting a watery grave because of the sheer indifference of their own ilk, have the intention to walk the talk this time. There are basically two types of systems in use all over the world. These are either tethered where the rescue vessel remains connected to the mother ship by an umbilical cord and can be controlled from the mother ship or untethered where the vessel is lowered into the water and thereafter propels and manoeuvres independently to mate with the submarine. Both systems have their advantages and disadvantages and it is for the navy to decide which is more suited to our operating environment. Selection of a suitable system is not such an arduous task that three decades of procrastination can be blamed on this dilemma. The navy is contemplating the procurement of two systems, one each for the west and east coasts which is

The need to exhibit the intent that safety of life is paramount calls for the immediate procurement and operationalisation of a robust submarine escape and rescue capability and would be a fitting tribute to the 18 lives that were lost on that fateful night of 13/14 August 3013 that their sacrifice was not in vain the basic minimum required to ensure that the system is available for deployment at short notice while also ensuring the operational availability of at least one at all times. There are various models of ownership and operation being followed by different navies; these include a Government-owned, Government-operated (GOGO), Government-owned, Company-operated (GOCO) and Company-owned, Company-Operated (COCO). The Indian Navy must adopt a model best suited to ensure the expeditious procurement and operationalising of this vital capability and not be bound by the traditional thinking of complete ownership which would bring with it a whole new set of maintenance, operational and logistic challenges besides the ﬁscal commitment. SRVs cannot be bought off the shelf and are designed and built bespoke to a navy’s speciﬁc requirements. This takes time and even after a contract for procurement is signed, the actual availability would still be some distance away.

Moral Obligation

Any navy operating submarines would consider it a moral obligation to ensure that there is adequate capability to attempt a meaningful rescue effort in the event of an accident which is a distinct possibility operating as it does in an unforgiving and hostile environment. The unblemished safety record of the Indian Navy’s submarine arm, attributable to the professionalism of the crew and the strict adherence to the Standard Operating Procedures should not lull the navy into a false sense of complacency as the events on night of 13/14 August 2013 so clearly demonstrated. Had this incident happened at sea, the lackadaisical approach towards addressing this important lacuna would have cost the navy and country dear not to mention the loss of life that would have ensued. As the Indian Navy moves towards true bluewater capability in the underwater domain with the induction of SSBNs, SSNs and enhanced SSK capability, the eve of Navy Day (04 December) which commemorates the navy’s finest hour and the 46th anniversary of the submarine arm (08 December) may be appropriate to merit serious introspection on the lack of a vital capability and unreliable dependence on external largesse (the US had suspended its discussions with the IN after sanctions were imposed by them post Pokhran in 1998). The need to exhibit the intent that safety of life is paramount calls for the immediate procurement and operationalisation of a robust submarine escape and rescue capability and would be a fitting tribute to the 18 lives that were lost on that fateful night of 13/14 August 3013 that their sacrifice was not in vain.

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

sea power equations

UNFRIENDLY STRATAGEM

INS VIKRAMADITYA A HIGHLY QUESTIONABLE SYMBOL OF FRIENDSHIP

Three high level committees constituted to monitor the project, a Warship Overseeing Team (WOT) of 45 members was located at the shipyard for the entire duration of R&R work. One wonders as to what functions WOT performed. India came to know of the delay only when Russia presented the revised cost and delivery dates in October / November 2007.

After nearly a decade of negotiations, the deal was ﬁnally signed on 20 January 2004 and the effective date of the contract was established as 24 February 2004. Refurbishment cost of the carrier was negotiated at US$ 947 million. The refurbished carrier was contracted to be delivered to India within a period of 52 months, ie by August 2008. Repair and re-equipping (R&R) work was to be carried out at the government owned Sevmash shipyard in the Russian city of Severodvinsk. The work started with due diligence. However, it was soon realised by the shipyard that the scope of work had been grossly underestimated. Large portions of steel hull, entire length of cable, motors, turbines, boilers and other facilities had to be completely replaced or re-fabricated. For example, 1,750 compartments out of a total of 2,500 had to be re-fabricated / re-conﬁgured. In November 2007, Russia shocked India by raising a demand of US$ 2.9 billion for the ship (three times the contracted cost) and sought deferment of delivery by additional 52 weeks. India was understandably dismayed but found itself in a tight corner with no leeway whatsoever. After months of bitter negotiations, both sides agreed to a revised price tag of US$ 2.35 billion on 10 March 2009. New delivery date was shifted to end-2012. Sea trials began in Russia’s White Sea in June 2012. However, they had to be called off prematurely in September 2012 due to multiple boiler failure – seven out of eight steam boilers of the propulsion machinery became out of order. Consequently, the delivery deadline had to be extended by another year.

Vikramaditya expansive flight deck at night

banner displayed prominently at the handing over ceremony of INS Vikramaditya (earlier called Admiral Gorshkov) in the Russian city of Severodvinsk on 16 November 2013 read – “Vikramaditya: Symbol of India-Russia Friendship”. Most knowledgeable observers must have marvelled at the acerbic sense of humour implied in the declaration and struggled to hide their sardonic expression.

Russia Offers “Gift”

Vikramaditya is certainly not an ideal symbol of friendship. Friends stand by their sovereign promises. Friends fulﬁl their contractual obligations, even if they had erred in their initial judgment. Friends do not take undue advantage of each other’s vulnerabilities. In fact, Vikramaditya is a story of Russia reneging on its contracted commitments and supine capitulation of the Indian government.

Originally laid as Baku in 1978, Admiral Gorshkov was launched in 1982 and commissioned in 1987. The ship had been dogged by misfortunes since its conception. To start with, major software bugs in the new command and control system delayed its completion. Thereafter, a boiler room explosion caused considerable damage in 1994.

A short background will be in order here. India’s sole aircraft carrier INS Viraat was due to retire in 2007 and the indigenous aircraft carrier was scheduled to be completed not before 2012. India was therefore on the lookout for an aircraft carrier to ﬁll the gap.

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

Russia offered the 44,500 ton Admiral Gorshkov, a decommissioned hybrid carrier / cruiser lying in hibernation since 1995. It was to be a free gift from ‘one friend to another’. However, India was required to pay for its refurbishment. As an integral part of the package deal, India was to purchase 12 single-seat MiG-29K ‘Fulcrum-D’ and 4 dual-seat MiG-29KUB aircraft, 6 Kamov Ka-31 ‘Helix’ helicopters and other equipment.

Three different delegations of the Indian Navy had visited Russia to inspect the decommissioned ship in 1995, 1998 and 1999 respectively. They indicated that the material condition of the ship was deteriorating rapidly and the state of machinery / systems on board had worsened to an extent that most required replacement / reﬁt rather than repairs.

It was no wonder that Defence Minister Antony heaved a sigh of relief on ﬁnally receiving delivery of INS Vikramaditya on 16 November. He was candid in admitting that the deal had nearly failed. The Naval Chief termed it as a result of exceptional perseverance.

The Russian Stratagem

The Russians deserve credit for managing the whole process in a highly ingenious and well thought-through manner. Enormity of their stratagem can best be illustrated by recalling major developments in a chronological order: a) After the break-up of the erstwhile Soviet Union, Russia found accident-ridden Admiral Gorshkov to be too expensive to be maintained. A decision was taken to do away with it in 1994-95. With no resources available for mothballing it scientiﬁcally, it remained uncared and derelict. As breaking-up of a ship is a costly proposition, Admiral Gorshkov’s fate remained undecided. b) It was at this opportune time that Russia became aware of India’s search for an aircraft carrier to bridge the expected gap during the period 2008-13. With a view to make the package irresistible, it cleverly sugar-coated the offer by making a free gift of the ship and charging only for R&R, thereby generating much needed work for its shipbuilding industry which was in deep recession. Notwithstanding the fact that the deal was linked to India’s procurement of MiG-29 aircraft, India found the

offer to be too good to be declined. c) Russia skillfully tailor-made its offer to suit India’s requirements. As a brand new aircraft carrier would have costed around US$ 2.0 to 2.5 billion in early-2000, Russia agreed to charge only US$ 947 million for complete R&R package, considerably less than the prevailing cost of a new carrier. Moreover, Russia promised to deliver it by August 2008, thereby meeting India’s requirements ideally. No wonder then that India accepted the offer enthusiastically. d) Although Sevmash shipyard had neither built / repaired ships of this size nor possessed any work experience on aircraft carriers, R&R work was assigned to it. It was a subjective decision as Sevmash had little work at hand and needed orders urgently to avert bankruptcy. As pointed out by the Controller and Auditor General of India (CAG) in its Report 18 of 2008-09, the shipyard’s total revenue was US$ 81 million in 2004 when it was loaded with the Indian contract worth US$ 875 million. Worse, Sevmash enjoys poor reputation. It is notorious for reneging on contractual commitments. Norwegian ﬁrm Odfjell was forced to cancel a US$ 544 million contract to build up to 12 tankers, allegedly for serious delays and demands for price increase.

MAJOR GENERAL (DR) MRINAL SUMAN AVSM, VSM (RETD) The writer heads Defence Technical Assessment and Advisory Service (DTAAS) of Confederation of Indian Industry (CII). He did MSc in Defence Studies and Doctorate in Public Administration. He commanded an Engineer Regiment in the most hostile battleﬁeld in the world ie, the Siachen Glacier. He was awarded a gold medal for being 'the most outstanding engineer of the year'. He was the ﬁrst Technical Manager [Land Systems] when the newly created Acquisition Wing was established in the Ministry of Defence in 2001. He has been closely associated with the evolution and promulgation of the new defence procurement mechanism.

It was soon realised by the shipyard that the scope of work had been grossly underestimated. Large portions of steel hull, entire length of cable, motors, turbines, boilers and other facilities had to be completely replaced or re-fabricated. For example, 1,750 compartments out of a total of 2,500 had to be re-fabricated / re-configured e) Russia is claiming that it underestimated the total scope of work initially. It is hard to believe that Russia did not know the full scope of the work involved. For example, to claim that most of cable was expected to be usable in a ship with rotting hull segments is sheer baloney. Russia knew right from the beginning that both the cost and the time-schedule were totally unrealistic propositions. f) Once India had swallowed the bait, signed the deal and released part payments, Russia decided to spring a surprise. R&R work on the ship commenced on 09 April 2004. Even if Russia had underestimated the work initially, it would have realised the actual scope of work by the year end. However, it cleverly chose to remain silent till November 2007. Just 10 months before the scheduled delivery date, it raised claims for additional

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

sea power equations

UNFRIENDLY STRATAGEM

cost and extension of delivery date. As always happens, a breach of contractual commitments always vitiates relations between friends.

to estimate the quantum of cost of Vikramaditya that Russia has defrayed by hiking the outlay for aircraft and other equipment.

Russia is claiming that the ship will have a service life of 30-40 years instead of 20 years as estimated earlier. Indeed it is a laughable premise. It is a common saying that a chain is as strong as its weakest link. Similarly, service life of Vikramaditya will not be determined by 234 new hull sections but by the state of 30-year old hull sections installed in 1978

It is being claimed that since 1,750 of 2,500 compartments have been completely re-fabricated and a total of 234 new hull sections (using 2,500 tonnes of steel) installed to achieve the desired shape, almost two third of the ship has been renovated. Russia is claiming that the ship will have a service life of 30-40 years instead of 20 years as estimated earlier. Indeed it is a laughable premise.

g) Absurdity of demand for additional price can be gauged from the fact that the cost of sea trials was increased from the contracted US$ 27 million to US$ 522.57 million, an escalation of close to twenty times. It is not understood as to what new unanticipated factors had crept in to justify such an astronomical increase. h) Russia had intentionally waited till end-2007 to be in a position of advantage. As India had become complacent after signing contract with Russia, it had not explored any alternate option to acquire an aircraft carrier in the required time-frame. With the scheduled retirement date of INS Viraat drawing uncomfortably near, it became anxious to acquire INS Vikramaditya. Thus the timing was perfect for Russia to deliver the unexpected blow and exploit India’s desperation. It even threatened to cancel the contract. i) While demanding that the deal be re-priced at an outrageous figure of US$ 2.9 billion, Russia shrewdly announced that it was willing to compensate India for the increased cost of Gorshkov if it got more military orders. It was an unfair pressure, that too by a much proclaimed friend. India was finally coerced to shell out US$ 2.35 billion for the carrier ship. Concurrently, in a linked deal, India had to place order for additional 29 aircraft MiG-29K for close to US$ 1.2 billion. It is difficult

Kamov Ka-31 ‘Helix’ helicopter

It is a common saying that a chain is as strong as its weakest link. Similarly, service life of Vikramaditya will not be determined by 234 new hull sections but by the state of 30-year old hull sections installed in 1978. It must also be remembered that the ship was lying unmaintained in a state of total neglect for 10 long years from 1994 to 2004.

Indian Ineptness

Whereas Russia handled the complete contract in a highly skilful manner, the same cannot be said for India. If India let Russia take it for a ride, the fault lies with the inept Indian procurement regime. Despite repeated assertions that single vendor procurements should be avoided, India banked on Gorshkov alone. It failed to explore possibilities of ordering a brand new carrier or seeking a surplus carrier from a Western country. Resultantly, it rendered itself vulnerable. May be India got taken in by repeated declarations of lasting friendship and the free gift. The ship had been laid at Chernomorsky shipyard in Nikolayev (now in Ukraine), with equipment being supplied by various member countries of the erstwhile Soviet Union. Due to the collapse of the Soviet Union, no design details and documents were available. One wonders as to how large scale design changes that are required to reconﬁgure a cruiser into

a full-fledged aircraft carrier were realistically worked out. As is their wont, Russians were highly uncommunicative. India left major designing to Russia. Although Indian Navy has a highly competent ship designing bureau, India chose to sign the deal without full knowledge / analysis of the design changes to be incorporated. As pointed out by the CAG, the contract was drafted in a highly amateurish and slipshod manner. For example, responsibility for paying insurance premium was not specified and Russia got an opportunity to demand US$ 35.80 million for it. There was no provision to levy liquidity damages for delay at stages. For that matter, stage payments were not even linked to demonstrated physical outputs that take forward the achievement of the contractual objective. Most shocking is the fact that the contract did not include the final blueprint and design of the ship being paid for. Everything was left fluid. It was expected that the needed details would get evolved during the progress of work.

Self Delusion

In May 2007, the then Naval Chief claimed that the ship would be delivered by late 2008 or early 2009. He went on to declare that the Indian monitoring team located at the shipyard had conﬁrmed that the work was going on as per the schedule. Apparently, he was unaware of the fact that less than 35 per cent of the work had been done by then. By August 2007, within a period of 4 months of the Naval Chief’s progress-on-schedule assertion, the work came to a complete halt at Sevmash. Russia wanted India to agree to revised cost and release additional payments. In addition to three high level committees constituted to monitor the project, a Warship Overseeing Team (WOT) of 45 members was located at the shipyard for the entire duration of R&R work. One wonders as to what functions WOT performed. India came to know of the delay only when Russia presented the revised cost and delivery dates in October / November 2007.

Hopefully, INS Vikramaditya will perform and not become an embarrassment. It suffers from a number of major limitations. Whereas aircraft carriers of similar tonnage carry up to 40 fighter aircraft, Vikramaditya can carry only 16 fighters and 10 helicopters. Further, it will have to depend on its helicopters for airborne early warning functions with highly limited coverage and endurance Is the Worst Over?

The present euphoria of INS Vikramaditya becoming a game changer is premature. Hopefully, INS Vikramaditya will perform and not become an embarrassment. It suffers from a number of major limitations. Whereas aircraft carriers of similar tonnage carry up to 40 fighter aircraft, Vikramaditya can carry only 16 fighters and 10 helicopters. Further, it will have to depend on its helicopters for airborne early warning functions with highly limited coverage and endurance. As it lacks catapult launch capability, AWACS aircraft like E-2D Hawkeye cannot operate from its deck. Most worrisomely, Vikramaditya does not possess the required air defence capability at present. It is expected to be fully battle-worthy only in 2017, a good 13 years after signing the deal. As per the reports appearing in the press, Russia is blaming India for exploiting the situation when the Russian shipbuilding company was in a bad shape and facing closure – for that reason, it was ready to sign any kind of contract. It is a weird viewpoint. Instead of being grateful to India for saving Sevmash from imminent bankruptcy, Russia is alleging that India drove an unfair deal! CAG has lamented that cooperation from the Ministry of Defence (MoD) in taking forward the audit effort was less forthcoming than usual. MoD’s reluctance is understandable. It was a deal that should have never taken place. India erred at every stage and finally capitulated. In CAG’s words – “The objective of induction of Vikramaditya as an aircraft carrier in time to bridge the gap in Indian Navy capabilities has been defeated. The decision to go in for R&R of a second-hand ship has become questionable as a new aircraft carrier would have cost much less and would have had twice the life span”. India should also be prepared for huge service and spares bills from Russia, whose past track record inspires little confidence. As the Russians never share critical design details / drawings, India will need continuous Russian help to maintain the ship during its entire service life. Russia will certainly exploit such an immense leverage to extract unwarranted favours, both in terms of exorbitant financial gains and additional defence orders. Hopefully, India has learnt due lessons from the deal and is much wiser now. It should never forget the basic dictum that ‘there are no free lunches’. Friendship means little in the world of international arms trade. Even inter-government agreements between two sovereign nations carry little sanctity. Commercial interests rule supreme.

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

sea power equations

GROWING AFFINITY Guards Of The Ocean

In the more contemporary discourse, India and Indonesia have been seen as guards of the Indian Ocean. More importantly, the two countries have been engaged in, Indian Ocean Rim-Association for Regional Cooperation (which is now rechristened as Indian Ocean Rim Association), G-20 processes and also informal mechanisms like East Asia Summit. In terms of geopolitical understanding, it is increasingly acknowledged within India that Indonesia is important for India’s strategic interests and also for building conﬁdence at a time when India is planning to expand its Joint Command in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. It is the geographical land mass which is seen as cradle to Malacca Straits, a very critical Sea Line of Communications (SLOC).

Tolerant Ethos

NEED TO REBUILD

STRATEGIC UNDERSTANDING The evolution of India’s Look East policy (LEP) in early 1990s and the advent of democracy in Indonesia melted the three decades freeze in relations. In terms of geopolitical understanding, it is increasingly acknowledged within India that Indonesia is important for India’s strategic interests and also for building confidence at a time when India is planning to expand its Joint Command in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

ndia and Indonesia have witnessed identical past in terms of multi-religious tolerant society and similar traditional and cultural traits. Importantly, the ancient civilisation links between the two nations were promoted through traders, religious scholars and cultural exchanges which became common points of reference. This created a bilateral bridge between the two countries separated by vast Indian Ocean. Even in historical past, Bali Yatra, religious and cultural artefacts and Hindu and Buddhist temples in Parambanan and Borobodur in Indonesia highlight the inﬂuence of Indic civilisation.

Conﬂuence Of Commerce

For Indian traders, Indonesia was the rendezvous junction with southeast Asian trading communities. Subsequently, with the industrial revolution in Europe and evolution of factories, the trade and commerce activities were dominated by European nations. After independence from the colonial occupation, India and Indonesia shaped the world politics through the Non-Aligned Movement

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

in which the two countries were the founding members. The personal equation between Jawaharlal Nehru and President Sukarno created trust and understanding between the two nations. However, the contrasting position of the two leaders about the formation of communist China created unbridgeable chasm. Subsequently, India’s support to Malaysia during the period of Konfrontasi with Indonesia led to prolonged estrangement and chill in ties. Subsequently, the power bloc inclinations have estranged the two neighbours. The evolution of India’s Look East policy (LEP) in early 1990s and the advent of democracy in Indonesia melted the three decades freeze in relations. A need was expressed that India should recreate and rebuild the understanding which was existent at the time of Jawaharlal Nehru. Nehru advocated cooperative security architecture, regional understanding and sharing of global commons which is seen as a prerequisite for promoting regional peace and security.

Indonesia also gains significance because of being the home to the largest Muslim population (about 220 million) in the world. Indonesia comprises of more than 17,000 islands, tolerant religious ethos and multiethnic society. While India is espousing a greater understanding with the ASEAN nations through the establishment of an ASEAN Ambassador in Jakarta, Indonesia gains significance for India’s approach towards this region which is vital for its trade and services industry. Moreover, its benign image and its role in regional security have been well documented. Therefore, it must engage countries like Indonesia, so as to have comprehensive understanding on regional security as well as multilateral forums like East Asian Summit (EAS). Among the diverse reasons for cooperation, maritime security and counter-terrorism figures prominently in the bilateral cooperation list of the two countries. With Indonesia being strategically placed in Indo-Pacific construct, a reference to which was made in Australian Defence White Paper in 2013, India needs to engage this vital nation. For reasons like energy security, anti-piracy and humanitarian and disaster relief the Indian Ocean region and Indo-Pacific construct has assumed tremendous strategic importance. Political and military developments might hinder the flow of crude oil, exploitation of offshore mineral exploration and merchandise trade could adversely impact the world’s major economies. The importance of choke points has also been amplified as strategic tools. The tactical importance of Malacca Straits was magnified even prior to India’s independence. KM Panikkar in his book India and Indian Ocean: An Essay on Influence of Sea Power on Indian History had stated, “The Gulf of Malacca is like the mouth of a crocodile, the peninsula of Malaya being the upper and the jutting end of Sumatra being the lower jaw. The entry to the Gulf can be controlled by the Nicobars and the narrow end is dominated by the island of Singapore”.

Key Strategic Partner

Subsequently, the then Indian foreign minister Jaswant Singh remarked in 2003 that India’s strategic interests lie from Persian Gulf to Straits of Malacca and beyond. This formed the ediﬁce of India’s defence and strategic engagement with its eastern seaboard. It also helped in articulating India’s Maritime Doctrine of 2004. The second edition of India’s Maritime Doctrine, released

in August 2009, speciﬁed the role of Indian Navy in protecting Indian Ocean. It also highlighted the strategic interest of India from Malacca Straits to Straits of Hormuz. Interestingly, Sunda and Lombok Straits (Indonesian sea lanes) were cited as vital sea lanes of communication, thereby making Indonesia as a country indispensable for maritime security. Lately, India has proclaimed its intention to emerge as the net security provider in the Indian Ocean region. Given these ambitious objectives, Indonesia stands out as the key strategic partner.

DR PANKAJ JHA

The writer is Research Fellow at Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA), New Delhi.

KM Panikkar had advocated controlling the maritime periphery for securing India’s national interests. India’s activism in protecting its maritime commercial interests was seen when India deployed its latest frigates for the protection of its maritime cargo as well as thwarting any pirate attack in Gulf of Aden. With India having received second aircraft carrier Vikramaditya (better known as Admiral Gorshkov), nuclear submarine Arihant attaining criticality, India’s indigenous carrier Vikrant programme progressing at a faster pace, advanced stealth frigates programme and formation of three different versions of BrahMos shows that Indian armed forces are keen for larger geostrategic role. Lately India has projected its naval capabilities in protecting its national interests and on its western stretch it is trying to build affable relations with its littoral neighbours.

Controlling Piracy

The Malacca Straits Security Initiative helped in curtailing piracy which declined from a triple digit ﬁgures to a mere couple of incidents shows that the threat has subsided in the Malacca Straits. India harping on the role in the Malacca Straits Initiative and escorting US ships in Malacca Straits in the past has now subscribed to the fact that its presence might trigger other powers to participate in the security initiative. India had deputed a naval ofﬁcer in Singapore for liaison and coordinating movement of high value cargo with the littoral countries of Southeast Asia. From strategic point of view, engaging Indonesia is important for developing Andaman as the Joint Command centre and for promoting maritime security. It is essential to strengthen joint command to take care of bilateral ties with littoral countries of the region. India has been conducting weekly coordinated patrols along the Eight degree channel with Indonesia. India should organise more frequent joint patrols with Indonesian Navy and make it a more regular feature. Humanitarian aid and disaster relief are the areas of cooperation and this was accepted when the multination exercises were conducted near the Indonesian waters this year. The visit by Indian Prime Minister to Indonesia in October 2013 highlighted the need for better coordination and strategic understanding. With Indonesia, India had signed the Strategic Partnership Agreement in 2005 but

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

sea power equations

GROWING AFFINITY

The two countries should work out possibilities for cooperation in defence research and technology even at a small scale. Intent was shown from the two sides during the Indian Prime Minister’s visit. The two countries can also work on the joint shipbuilding programme, especially when there is an MoU already in place for this purpose. India could sell radars, communication equipment and non-lethal military equipment to Indonesia

the lack of initiative and ofﬁcial inertia from both sides has put the strategic understanding on the back burner. It was only when Indonesia cajoled Indian foreign ministry to create better strategic and defence understanding and India also recognising Indonesia’s growing stature in southeast Asia that the bilateral ties have gained some momentum. There is need for naval exercises, sharing of intelligence and information and cooperation in anti-piracy and humanitarian missions.

Proactive Role

Further, India must enhance its presence in Andaman and Nicobar Islands. India must deploy two corvettes and one tanker at Andamans for patrols as well as coordinating rescue efforts. India could look for possibility for deploying coast guard ships along the mouth of Malacca Straits for coordinating anti-piracy operations as well as interdiction of harmful cargo. Lately, reports have suggested that there is again a spurt in piracy incidents near the Straits of Malacca. India could undertake naval liaison visits to Sunda, Lombok and Makassar Straits. INS Sudarshini expedition commemorating two decades of Look East policy has provided the necessary impetus to this objective. The two countries should work out possibilities for cooperation in defence research and technology even at a small scale. Intent was shown from the two sides during the Indian Prime Minister’s visit. The two countries can also work on the joint shipbuilding programme, especially when there is an MoU already in place for this purpose. India could sell radars, communication equipment and non-lethal military equipment to Indonesia. Cooperation related to network centric warfare and joint hydrographic surveys should be initiated so as to plot the maritime terrain. Technical cooperation in maintenance and joint production of defence equipment should be done with mutual consent. Given the necessary impetus already achieved after the visit of the Indian Prime Minister, Indonesia should work towards building mutually beneﬁcial ties.

Aceh Al Qaeda

One more important issue which has been gaining traction in the bilateral context is counter-terrorism. With maritime borders of the two nations being very close to each other (nearly 80 nautical miles), the counter-terrorism cooperation has been embedded in the bilateral ties. More importantly, there are increasing references to the maritime terrorism in Southeast Asia. Indonesian experience in containing terrorism and eliminating Jemaah Islamiyah leaders like Noordin Top, Azhari Bin Husin, Dulmatin to name a few, India can draw lessons from Indonesian example. India and Indonesia have been signatories to the Counter Terrorism Convention held in Cebu in Philippines in 2007 and the common agenda for both nations is to help in counter-terrorism initiatives through sharing of intelligence and coordinated action to apprehend any such individuals and organisations having malaﬁde intentions. Developments in Aceh with reports of formation of Al Qaeda of Aceh and increasing religious radicalisation in the recent past had perturbed India’s security agencies. These developments closer to its maritime boundary in Andaman and Nicobar Islands, have caused concerns with regard to security of India’s cargo and trade.

Pakistan Connection

Another concern is the visit of many of the southeast Asian students in Pakistani madrasas having radical leanings. The Ahle Hadith Madarsas which were run by Hafeez Saeed (prime suspect in Mumbai blasts of 26/11) has seen the arrest and deportation of Indonesian religious radicals in the past. Even the arrest of Umar Patek (early in 2012) who had visited Abbottabad to meet Al Qaeda operative (primarily Osama bin Laden, just few months prior to his death) showcases how Pakistan conveniently ignored the existence of Osama bin Laden. The coordination between the radical elements of south Asia and southeast Asia would be one area which would have serious implications for the security of both nations because of the porous borders and the lack of integrated intelligence network between the south and southeast Asian nations; it would be very difficult to apprehend the terrorist elements. Therefore, there is urgent need for intelligence and information sharing in this context. Indonesia, with its increasing international clout and better economic growth is likely to gain importance in regional and global politics. India with its increasing strategic footprints needs to engage Indonesia, not only to safeguard its sphere of influence but also to calibrate its maritime expansion plans. In the past plans for building the Andaman Command were met with fierce diplomatic resistance from many southeast Asian nations. The modernisation of navy and the increasing responsibility towards safeguarding Indian EEZ means that India will have to build greater trust and understanding with its maritime neighbours. Indonesia being the largest democracy in southeast Asia and also a close strategic partner, India needs to build cooperative structures in maritime security, anti-piracy and counter-terrorism cooperation.

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Driving Self Reliance for

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www.drdo.gov.in

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

Issued by Directorate of Public Interface

sea power equations

INDO-JAPANESE COOPERATION

CECIL VICTOR

IN MARITIME SECURITY

AND RESCUE

Though the factum of the efficacy of the flying boat has become established within the Indian defence establishment (and is seen as a binding force with Japan within the diplomatic community) there is need to establish the parameters within which India will deploy such platforms.The threats to be dealt with – piracy, gun-running, contraband smuggling, jihadi operations, conventional naval surface warfare and anti-submarine operations, protection of energy, commerce convoys – are concentrated within the latitudes that constitute the Arabian Sea / Indian Ocean ambiance

fter an analysis published in the October 2010 issue of Defence and Security Alert highlighting the inadequacy of current and future surface skimmers to deal with the threat posed to Indian national interests all along the Indian Ocean rim, the Government of India woke to the potentiality of flying boats as marine quick reaction teams. The Indian Navy has been using ships as large as the INS Delhi against pirates operating among the sea lanes of communications debauching from the Suez Canal through the Gulf of Aden. It was appropriately described as “swatting flies with a sledgehammer”. The analysis suggested the use of flying boats as marine flying squads capable of interventions in hours instead of days with the greater possibility of catching up with pirates using Gemini craft and boats with outboard motors than can be done with even the fastest of the waterjet propulsion fast attack craft currently being produced in bulk in Indian shipyards. Air delivery of succour is non-existant.

Happy With The Idea

South Block, the epicentre of Indian defence and external

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

affairs policy, became enamoured of the idea because it fitted quite nicely into its “Look East” formulation. The Japanese who use flying boats as a matter of course were also quick to respond to Indian Navy queries and began pushing its latest variant, the US-2, through demonstration flights and presentations for the Indian Navy. That was why when Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh visited Japan and signed a Strategic Partnership agreement in May 2013 the idea of the two countries cooperating in creating a flying boat to suit Indian conditions was mooted. A Joint Working Group was set up to explore the modalities for such cooperation. India is very impressed with the concept of joint ventures and joint development of systems after the resounding success of the India-Soviet creation, the supersonic cruise missile BrahMos. This weapon has been scouped up by all the three defence Services – a rare heartwarming phenomenon of commonality of equipment within the normal culture of each Service creating its own qualitative staff requirements for platforms that generically lend themselves to use by multiple agencies, like aircraft and helicopters.

The writer has covered all wars with Pakistan as War Correspondent and reported from the conﬂict zones in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in South East Asia as well as from Afghanistan. He is author of India: The Security Dilemma.

Though the factum of the efficacy of the flying boat organisations is feasible or adviseable. There can be no has become established within the Indian defence doubt that both require flying boats to patrol their respective establishment (and is seen as a binding force with areas of operation. What remains to be ascertained whether Japan within the diplomatic community) there is one qualitative staff requirement (QSR) will optimally need to establish the parameters within which India serve both purposes. The Indian requirement is largely will deploy such platforms. The dual-use in that it would require a threats to be dealt with – piracy, flying boat that is capable of both A flying boat on patrol can gun-running, contraband smuggling, civilian applications like day / night oversee a large convoy and jihadi operations, conventional naval search and rescue, casualty evacuation, by its presence can reduce surface warfare and anti-submarine pollution control and fire-fighting along the response time to tackle operations, protection of energy with capabilities to deal with pirates / commerce convoys – are with military means or decapacitating any emergency. In fact the concentrated within the latitudes that facilities (like rubber bullets, very presence of a flying constitute the Arabian Sea / Indian stun grenades etc) and some onboard boat in the vicinity will be Ocean ambiance between 28 degrees facilities to search for submarines with a dissuader for persons north latitude where the Persian Gulf sonobuoy deployment and, if necessary, involved in crime at sea choke point lies (and further south to attack with torpedoes. Whether this the Gulf of Aden) down to 23 dual requirement will come into conflict degrees south latitude along the Tropic of Capricorn with Japan’s policy is a hurdle that will need to be traversed. where the island nation state of Madagascar lies. By and Jet Or Turboprop large the same configuration exists in the Bay of Bengal / Indian Ocean salient in the eastern sector with the choke An assessment of what kinds of flying boats are available in other parts of the world reveals that the Russians have points at Malacca and north / south Australia. revived their own flying boat programmes led by the India is fortunate in possessing islands off both its Beriev design bureau. Its Be-200 (which it has sold to China) western and eastern seaboards which, if utilised by flying is a follow-on model of it’s A-40 Albatross, a jet-propelled, boats would extend the range and improve the speed with anti-submarine, anti-ship bomber. In civilian roles they have which flying boats can be deployed all along the rim of proven their fire-fighting capabilities by scooping up tons of the Indian Ocean littoral. Nonetheless, the ideal would be water from lakes, dam sites within seconds while flying – a to be able to deploy these multirole platforms where they facility admired by both America and the Europeans who are required within an hour in the event of an incident have bought the Russia aircraft. and be on station to prevent non-natural incidents like The Japanese flying boat US-2 has been built by piracy on the high seas by their very presence. ShinMaywa Industries. It is a four-engined turboprop with Multi-role Platform six-bladed propellers. Its range of 4,700 km is enough to Since India’s oceanic periphery is divided by the take it from Cochin to Tananarivo in Madagascar without Exclusive Economic Zone patrolled by the Indian Coast aerial refuelling. The government of India has developed Guard and the blue waters of the Indian Ocean littoral good relations with the government there and should be patrolled by the Indian Navy (with the Navy in overall able to seek operational turnaround facilities on the island command of maritime defence from the shoreline to in return for maritime security against a rising tide of IO rim) it needs to be ascertained whether a bifurcation piracy, gun-running, smuggling and jihadi terrorism of the requirements of flying boats of the two sea-going coming in from the sea.

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

sea power equations

INDO-JAPANESE COOPERATION open door (which would give greater ﬂexibility in the arc of ﬁre). In fact weapons and the means of quick deployment would be a common requirement for both the Indian Navy as well as the Indian Coast Guard. This could also mean that deployments can change at a moment’s notice depending on the threat perception with the Coast Guard assisting the Navy and vice versa.

Beriev Be-200

A-40 Albatros

Madagascar has been mentioned because halfway in the travel time between India and Madagascar lie some of the most crowded sea lanes of communications and many of the vessels carrying fuel both from the Persian Gulf as well as the Arabian Peninsula where lie the Saudi oilfields. These are joined by the west-east commercial carriers from Europe travelling through the Suez Canal The north Arabian Sea where the choke points at the Gulf of Aden and the Persian Gulf are situated too can be patrolled from bases in Gujarat and Maharashtra with this flying boat. What India needs is a platform that even while being fitted with the probe-and-drogue method of aerial refuelling should be able to cover the range and the refuelling facility to be used only in emergencies to extend time on station during patrols and interception operations. Given that the cruise speed of the ShinMaywa US-2 is 480 kmph it will take the flying boat more than nine hours to cover its range of 4,700 km. To be able to intervene effectively within one hour of receiving an SOS, it would need to improve its speed considerably. However, it is not as if a flying boat would be required to start up in Karwar or Cochin or from the Lakshadweep Islands only on receipt of actionable intelligence. It will have to be patrolling the area of interest in a specific pattern to look for suspicious boats in this vast expanse of sea. Whether this patrol pattern is dependent

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

ShinMaywa US-2 on aerial refuelling to extend the ﬂying boat’s endurance or whether the endurance is enhanced by visitations to certain pre-determined points for refuelling and may be even change of crew is a matter of choice and ﬂexibility.

Operational Turnaround Bases

Madagascar has been mentioned because halfway in the travel time between India and Madagascar lie some of the most crowded sea lanes of communications many of the vessels carrying fuel both from the Persian Gulf as well as the Arabian Peninsula where lie the Saudi oilfields. These are joined by the west-east commercial carriers from Europe travelling through the Suez Canal. These have fallen victim to pirates operating out of bases in the Horn of Africa and along its eastern coast. It is because of this great distance and the need to stay on station for a reasonable length of time that India had to use the INS Delhi behemoth to swat the flies of pirates that infest that area of the seas. Because endurance was the need of the hour. A flying boat on patrol can oversee a large convoy and by its presence can reduce the response time to tackle any emergency. In fact the very presence of a flying boat in the vicinity will be a dissuader for persons involved in crime at sea. The requirements of speed and endurance will determine whether the India-Japan joint venture will go for jet propulsion or turboprops. The numbers required to patrol the vast stretches of ocean on both sides of the Indian peninsula will also depend on the kind of propulsion incorporated in the joint venture.

A crew and cabin capacity of 31 persons translated into Indian requirements would mean that while 11 persons would be required to man the ﬂying system, the other twenty could deal with the external environment be it against pirates or other threats. Twenty marine commandoes with their full complement of weapons and accessories can be taken on board. This should include an appropriate number of inﬂatable motor-driven craft. Two, capable of carrying ten commandoes would be appropriate. Avenues for exit (doors on either side or ramp system) will make for speed of deployment.

Choice Of Conﬁguration

This kind of configuration would be the requirement of both the Indian Coast Guard to patrol the 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone which is enormous given India’s long coastline and offshore island territories on both seaboards and the Indian Navy the jurisdiction of which lies at the rim of the Indian Ocean. Since the Coast Guard is also responsible for pollution control and prevention its amphibious boats must cater for this. The designers will have to decide whether both maritime strike capability and pollution control and search and rescue will be incorporated in one vessel or it would be better to place the two requirements on separate variants. To be able to deal with malcontents at sea the flying boat would have to carry a weapon that can prevent a suspect from escaping without endangering the occupants. Whether such a weapon – a 12.7 mm calibre gun in a pod fixed to the nose cone or a weapon capable of being fixed to the

Recent experience at sea has shown that there is need to be cautious in the use of force given the crisis caused by the Italian commandoes by shooting Indian fishermen by mistakenly believing that they were pirates approaching their commercial vehicle with evil intent. There have been many cases when it is difficult to discern at first sight whether the boatmen are armed smugglers or innocent fishermen. A better surface environment will have to be created to ensure that identification of friend or foe is failsafe. For this every Indian fishing boat and legitimate seafarer must have a radio identification code to ensure that there is no mistake in identification. All flying boats would be equipped with a down link to question the suspect’s identity. Whatever be the final specifications the experts of the two countries decide, rapid deployment at appropriate portions of the oceans would be the prime characteristic for both the Coast Guard and the Indian Navy. One type of platform can do both jobs and it would be easy to create several different variants for conventional / sub-conventional warfare as well as anti-submarine roles. The Russian amphibious boats are capable of combining search and rescue with surface attack and anti-submarine roles. If you have an appropriate platform how you use it is constrained only by one’s imagination. One thing is clear that with such a long coastline and so many maritime states the requirement for fast coastal transportation where jetties and docking facilities are minimal or non-existant will generate a large demand for flying boats in the future. A joint venture it may well be between India and Japan but it can enlarge its ambiance both in building, repair and maintenance on the one hand and on creating a transportation system on the other. The project lends itself admirably to the concept of private-public partnership. It is a versatile platform that can be deployed from land if the sea state is rough.

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

sea power equations

TRANS-OCEANIC MATRIX

NEED TO BOOST INDIAN NAVY’S

POWER PROJECTION CAPABILITY

However, as things stand now, the biggest drawback of the Indian Navy in terms of power projection is its aging fleet of conventional submarines. After the tragic sinking of the Kilo class Sindhurakshak submarine off the Mumbai coast in August this year, Indian Navy is left with only thirteen of them against the actual need for least 30 submarines. Significantly, in the Asia Pacific region, China possess one of the largest submarine fleets comprising anything between 68 and 85 boats spread across nine different classes.

The recent developments in South China Sea, the whole of which is claimed by China, has highlighted the need for India to look beyond the Indian Ocean. The Indian naval strategy seeks development of networks for seamless integration of sea, shore, air and space platforms so that decision-making becomes knowledge based real time exercise.

he need for the tech-savvy Indian Navy, the youngest among the Indian services and the fourth largest maritime force in the world, to boost its power projection capability to take care of the Indian interests across the global oceanic stretch has become all the more pronounced in the context of the emerging multi-dimensional threat to the maritime security of the country. And by acquiring innovative technological tools and smart combat platforms, the Indian Navy, as part of its long-term vision of looking beyond the Indian Ocean, is planning to position itself as a three dimensional, network centric, bluewater naval power guided and propelled by a gamut of satellites high-up in the sky.

Paramountcy Of Indian Navy

As a principal littoral state in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) where piracy, smuggling, arms running and movement of terrorists and non-state actors is on ascendancy, India has all the compulsion to expand and strengthen its presence in this vital oceanic stretch through the doctrine of effective sea control and sea denial. Moreover, sustaining stability and peace in the Indian Ocean is also vital for India’s energy security. To this end, the Indian Navy should equip itself with a range of advanced submarines capable of delivering nuclear tipped ballistic missiles, a well-endowed aviation resources pool ably supported by aircraft carriers along with long range and high endurance surface ﬁghting platforms. Of course, a network capability supported by high performance satellites could boost the mobility and striking punch of the Indian Navy with a highly agile ‘sensor to shooter” architecture. The Indian naval strategy seeks development of networks for seamless

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

integration of sea, shore, air and space platforms so that decision-making becomes knowledge based real time exercise. Pakistani defence expert Lt Gen (Retd) Sardar ES Lodi argues, ‘The great oceans of the world have at least two or more littoral States with both maritime and economic strength to provide a power balance. But in the Indian Ocean, it is only India among its littoral States that has the economic potential, military strength and the political will to dominate this vast expanse of water to the detriment of her small neighbours.”

Threats To Maritime Interests

Rightly and appropriately, the foremost focus of the Indian maritime doctrine remains around ensuring the free ﬂow of trade including import of energy resources and providing security of coastal infrastructure from seaborne attacks. It talks of “the use of appropriate maritime forces” so that the Indian Navy in conjunction with other armed forces of the country could act to deter or defeat any threats of aggression against the territory, people or maritime interest of India, both in war and peace. Indeed, the recent developments in South China Sea, the whole of which is claimed by China, has highlighted the need for India to look beyond Indian Ocean. India, which has already made it clear that the South China Sea does not belong to any particular nation, is however, concerned at this Chinese stance as almost half of India’s trade trafﬁc passes through this vital sea lane. China has also objected to Indian oil exploration projects in the South China Sea stretch abutting Vietnam. On its part, Vietnam has asserted that it is well within the Indian rights to pursue “exploration and exploitation” work in the South China Sea.

French Submarine Deal

indefinitely, thus making the task of its detection pretty difficult. Powered by a compact 83-MW Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR), Arihant has catapulted India into the ranks of an elite group of countries capable of developing complex technological systems involved in building a nuclear submarine. Clearly and apparently, Arihant and its follow-on RADHAKRISHNA RAO submarines including Aridhaman The writer specialises will substantially strengthen in space technology, India’s nuclear strike capability. aeronautics, defence and security issues. He In the context of India’s policy of is a Visiting Fellow at “no first use of nuclear weapons” Vivekananda International the submarine arm of the nuclear Foundation. Before taking triad will provide India with a to full time writing he “credible second strike capability” was associated with the to inflict “unacceptable damage” Indian Space Research on the adversary. Incidentally, Organisation (ISRO) for strategic experts consider the about two decades. submarine based nuclear tipped missiles as the most effective and difficult to detect nuclear weapons delivery system. It is planned to equip the Indian submarine fleet with both the nuclear tipped and conventional missiles including the Indo-Russian supersonic cruise missile BrahMos. For Arihant, Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) is developing K-15 missile capable of carrying one tonne class nuclear warhead over a distance of 700-km.

Meanwhile, under the much delayed multi-billion Rupee contract, six hi-tech conventional submarines will be delivered to the Indian Navy as part of the Project 75-I in a phased manner. Two of the six Currently, the only operational nuclear powered submarines will be delivered in ready to use condition submarine with the Indian Navy is INS Chakra launched to the Indian Navy by the French in 2012 and taken on lease for a firm DCNS. And DCNS will period of ten years from Russia. This Meanwhile, under the transfer the technology to India Akula-II nuclear powered submarine much delayed multi-billion to build the remaining four boats. is well equipped for performing attack Mazagon Dock Limited (MDL) in functions. India is also planning to Rupee contract, six hi-tech Mumbai and Hindustan Shipyard acquire a second nuclear powered conventional submarines in Visakhapatnam will execute submarine from Russia. will be delivered to the the Indian part of the project. Indian Navy as part of the Naval Air Arm Two of these submarines will Project 75-I in a phased Indian Navy seems to be well on track come equipped with the advanced in so far as strengthening its aviation Air Independent Propulsion manner. Two of the six assets and air defence resources is (AIP) system which will enable them submarines will be delivered concerned. To begin with, it has already to stay under sea for longer periods in ready to use condition inducted first of the eight Boeing P-8I in comparison to the diesel driven to the Indian Navy by the long range maritime reconnaissance conventional submarines which and anti-submarine warfare aircraft are required to surface on a regular French firm DCNS. And DCNS that India had ordered in 2009. And in basis to charge their batteries. The will transfer the technology May this year, the first MiG-29K squadron Project 75-I is the part of a 30 year to India to build the of the Indian Navy was commissioned plan to boost the undersea capability remaining four boats at the naval air station INS Hans in of the Indian Navy and also Goa with 20 Russian origin fighter strengthen the indigenous base for the aircraft. To help improve the skill level of its fighter pilots, design, development and production of submarines. Indian Navy has inducted the fourth generation advanced jet Arihant Class N-Submarines trainer Hawk-132 which was built by the Indian aeronautical In a development of significance, India’s home-grown major Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) under license 6,000-tonne class Arihant nuclear powered submarine went from BAE Systems. “Four aircraft have been delivered to critical in August this year. It is expected to join the the navy marking the beginning of 17 such fighter trainers Indian Navy by around the middle of this decade. Unlike to be acquired by the navy over the next few years,” a conventional submarine, Arihant can remain submerged said a statement from the Indian Navy.

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sea power equations

TRANS-OCEANIC MATRIX

Chinese defence analysts have expressed their concern that with INS Vikrant in place, Indian Navy would be able to expand its operations to Pacific Ocean where China is strengthening its naval muscle to challenge the American dominance Vikramaditya’s Home Base

Meanwhile, in a boost to the Indian Navy, the government of India has cleared the proposal for a major expansion of the strategic naval air base in Karwar overlooking the Arabian Sea where the retroﬁtted Russian origin aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya will be berthed. The 45,000-tonne Kiev class aircraft carrier is all set to join Indian Navy’s already operational INS Viraat aircraft carrier. Vikramaditya, featuring Short Take off But Assisted Recovery (STOBAR) facility, will be the key component of India’s plan to operate at least two aircraft carriers on both the western and eastern seaboards for power projection in the Indian ocean region. “Two operational carrier battle groups give us opportunity to project power and maintain presence in the large number of sea lanes of communications which are the lifeline of the world as far as energy security is concerned,” says Admiral Shekhar Sinha, Flag Ofﬁcer Commanding-inChief of the Western Naval Command.

for its construction was developed by the state owned Steel Authority of India (SAIL). Over the next three years, the entire superstructure of Vikrant, including the landing deck and arrester wire, will be put in place with a view to complete extensive sea trials. Vikrant will be inducted into the fleet of the Indian Navy by 2018 as the third aircraft carrier. It may be recalled that India’s first aircraft carrier also named INS Vikrant, acquired from Great Britain way back in 1961 had played a stellar role in wreaking havoc on occupying Pakistani naval forces in Chittagong and Cox Bazar in Bangladesh during the 1971 liberation war. The aviation assets of the INS Vikrant would include Russian origin MiG-29K as well as the naval variant of the Indian made fourth generation fighter aircraft Tejas along with Kamov-31 deck based helicopters and naval version of India’s Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH) Dhruv. Further, it would be equipped with Indo-Israeli long range surface to air missile as well as close in weapons system. The follow on INS Vishal next generation aircraft carrier is expected to be a technologically superior and more capable warship in comparison to INS Vikrant. Chinese defence analysts have expressed their concern that with INS Vikrant in place, Indian Navy would be able to expand its operations to Pacific Ocean where China is strengthening its naval muscle to challenge the American dominance.

Indigenous Aircraft Carriers

Maritime Satellites

Clearly and apparently, Vikrant happens to be the largest warship built in India. The highpoint of Vikrant is that the military grade, high performance steel required

As things stand now, GSAT-7 also known as INSAT-4F, which weighed 2,550-kg at launch, will help the Indian Navy exploit its potential in an effective

By all means, the impressive launch of India’s home-grown aircraft carrier INS Vikrant at the Cochin Shipyard in August this year was a development of great signiﬁcance for the Indian Navy in its quest to become a major seaborne power in the world. Indian Defence Minister AK Antony described the launch as a proud moment that is a testimony to “our efforts at achieving self-reliance in the ﬁeld of warship design and construction as very few countries possess the capability to design and develop aircraft carriers”.

Boeing P-8I

INS Vikramaditya

Indian Navy’s “celestial dream” came true with the successful launch of India’s ﬁrst dedicated defence satellite GSAT-7 by means of an Ariane-5 vehicle of the European space transportation company Arianespace on August 30. Designed and developed by the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), the multi-band GSAT-7 will serve as Indian Navy’s exclusive space platform to link up resources spread across the oceanic sprawl as well as on the ground with a view to strengthen and expand its presence in IOR.

MiG-29K

GSAT-7

and integrated manner and in the process boost its power projection capability. In particular, this satellite with 1,000-nautical miles footprint over IOR, will transform the entire maritime domain awareness of the Indian Navy. The high-speed and safe communications network made available by GSAT-7 would make for vastly enhanced strategic operations and strengthen the Navy’s network centric capability. Further, it would pave the way for Indian Navy’s smooth transition into the architecture of India’s proposed tri-Service aerospace command which is awaiting the approval of the political dispensation in New Delhi. On another front, GSAT-7 will help the Indian Navy get a digital tactical battlefield view of the dispersed fleet formations, aircraft locations and even submarines moving stealthily in the depths of the oceans. The synergy between combat platforms moving in the high seas of the world with the land based nodes through GSAT-7 capability would help bring about a radical shift in the operational strategy of the Indian Navy. There is no denying the fact that a satellite based communications network is immune to many of the “deficiencies and limitations” associated with a conventional communications system. Looking ahead, the Indian Navy is keen on acquiring “space birds” meant for a variety of end uses. It is well aware that ocean-watch satellites snooping on the naval movements, electronic ferret satellites gathering data on radio frequencies, meteorological satellites predicting weather to facilitate an effective use of the weapons systems, navigation satellites guiding lethal weapons to designated locations with an unfailing accuracy, reconnaissance satellites providing vital data on the strength of the potential adversaries and the communications satellites ensuring a real time link-up for the effective use of the resources are all vital elements in the architecture of the present day battlefield. But then for now, GSAT-7 located over the Indian Ocean will enable Indian Navy to stand up to the expanding Chinese influence in the IOR region. As defence analysts point out with China strengthening its presence in India’s neighbouring countries including Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Myanmar and Maldives through its “string of pearls” strategy, India should make serious efforts to put in place a robust satellite based surveillance network designed to enable Indian Navy enhance its vigil in the Indian Ocean region with a view to ward off any threat to the Indian mainland. With the Indian Navy’s primary area of responsibility stretching from the Gulf of Hormuz in the west to Malacca Strait in the east – one of the busiest sea lanes in the world – a home-grown, reliable satellite networking system has become all the more essential for it to carry out tasks assigned to it in a hassle free manner.

BrahMos.

INS Chakra

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

Meteorological Satellites

For ﬁne-tuning anti-submarine warfare strategy through bathymetric studies and monitoring the movement of ships and vessels in the oceanic water, the Indian Navy can access data from the ISRO built Oceansat-II satellite launched in 2009. Further Indian Navy can use Oceansat-II data for forecasting wind velocity over the ocean surface as well as storms and hurricanes brewing in the oceanic depths.

Indian Navy can very well stand to beneﬁt from the advanced ocean monitoring satellite Oceansat-III that ISRO is planning to launch during the second half of this decade. Like two other wings of the services, Indian Navy has a limited access to the IRS earth observation and INSAT / GSAT communications spacecraft constellation being operated by ISRO. In the backdrop of the practical difﬁculties involved

GSAT-7 located over the Indian Ocean will enable Indian Navy to stand up to the expanding Chinese influence in the IOR region. As defence analysts point out with China strengthening its presence in India’s neighbouring countries including Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Myanmar and Maldives through its “string of pearls” strategy, India should make serious efforts to put in place a robust satellite based surveillance network in guarding the long, porous and easy to reach coastal stretch of India, Indian Navy is looking at a string of satellites specially designed to take care of India’s maritime security. On another front, the access that the Indian Navy could have to the fully Indian built navigation satellite, IRNSS-1A, which was launched in July this year, stands out as a very positive development in its quest to expand its area of “operation and influence.” Incidentally, IRNSS-1A, the first of the seven spacecraft that would constitute the space segment of the Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System (IRNSS), would offer a reliable system for location identification and navigational support for the warships and fighting platforms at sea. IRNSS would free India from its dependence on US military controlled GPS system. The coverage area of IRNSS includes the Indian subcontinent and around 1,500-km beyond the Indian geographical stretch. By making use of the capabilities of IRNSS constellation, weapons such as smart bombs, projectiles and cruise missiles could be guided to hit targets with “stunning precision”. Further, the uninterrupted access to this GPS space platform will help Indian Navy strengthen its network centric capability. In the backdrop of changing global power equation and stunning expansion of maritime terrorism along with the use of sea channels by smugglers and arms traffickers, Avinash Chander, Director General of Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has highlighted the need for India to put in place an effective mechanism to fully monitor IOR in a three dimensional manner. To accomplish this objective, he has projected the need for deploying about 80-100 satellites designed for covering the IOR. “They (satellites) should be ready to use ones which can be launched within a short time,” observed Chander. In the ultimate analysis, Indian Navy’s plan for expansion with a focus on power projection in IOR and beyond is in keeping with India’s momentous economic growth that would underpin the need for taking care of Indian interests across the global oceanic waters.

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sea power equations

ZONE OF CONTENTION unexplored resource bed. Although due to overlapping claims, surveyors have been unable to identify how much is really available, however, “China estimates that one of the world's largest natural gas deposits, containing some 250 trillion cubic feet, lies all but untapped in the East China Sea”[2].

CHINA, JAPAN AND THE ISLAND CONFLICT

The problem seemed to have escalated leading to a great divide and into a high zone of contention, when Former Governor of Tokyo, Shintaro Ishihara (known for his nationalist ideals and controversial remarks), started raising private money to start developing the uninhabited island chain for exerting their claims. On September 11, 2012, the Senkaku Islands were nationalised by the Japanese government.

hina and Japan are now engaged in a constant skirmish over the eight uninhabited islands of Diaoyu / Senkaku in the East China Sea. There is another player which has claims over these islands ie Vietnam, however, this article is only focused on China and Japan. The power politics has resulted in a rapid militarisation of the East China Sea, with an increased level of naval as well as aerospace activities especially by China in order to showcase their intent of not letting go of these supposedly resource rich islands. The increasing Chinese naval warships patrolling along the western Paciﬁc passing through the Japanese Straits has become a routine affair, creating an insecure environment in the East China Sea. The article aims at understanding the current developments in the East China Sea and make considerable suggestions.

complete access and control over resource rich regions. On this account, one can understand the dispute between China and Japan over the uninhabited islands ie the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands, just as the skirmishes over the Paracel and Spratley Islands in the South China Sea that are still hanging like an axe on the head. These disputes have led to rapid military build-up in the region. An ascendant and more aggressive China has sparked debate in Japan about bolstering its military capacity despite constitutional impediments, which since 1947 according to its Constitution is barred from setting up a traditional military to address international dispute and has been under the US security guarantee. The row over the barren clump of rocks in the East China Sea – administered by Japan – has badly affected relations between Beijing and Tokyo.[1].

An Overview

The importance of the islands lies in the fact, that ﬁrstly the islands are geographically close to the vital shipping lanes and most importantly the possibility of

The fast growing need for resources today explains the growing contentions among nations in order to gain

1. Paul Carsten, “Chinese Defend Contested Islands from Japanese Invaders Online”, August 2, 2013, The Globe and Mail, available at http://www. theglobeandmail.com/news/world/chinese-defend-contested-islands-from-japanese-invaders-online/article13574050/ (accessed on August 6, 2013)

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

Although, one can say that the dispute over the islands dates far back into history, “Japan annexed the unclaimed islands in 1895. It says China's assertion of sovereignty only came after discovering that this seabed was rich of resources around the 1960s. Beijing maintains that the islands have been its territory for hundreds of years and were illegally snatched by Tokyo at the start of its acquisitive romp across Asia that culminated in World War II”[3]. But this article attempts to discuss some of the contemporary events that led to the furious militarisation of the East China Sea.

Attempt At Privatisation

Senkaku Islands were nationalised by the Japanese government and since then, “the two nations’ militaries have shadow-boxed in international waters and international skies”[4]. For further understanding, views expressed in “INSIGHT: China puts Japan on notice that warship drills are now routine”[5] are summarised as – SALONI SALIL 2011 saw an escalated rise in Chinese The writer is a Geopolitics naval activities after the release of its and International 2008 White Paper, which suggested Relations research scholar. She is currently that China’s focus would be on a Visiting Fellow in the its operation ability in the oceans. Indian Ocean Research Chinese Navy embedded with Programme at Future cutting edge technology has been Directions International, making rounds and “a fleet of four Australia. Previously, she or so ships are always travelling completed a Non-Resident in waters around the disputed Research Fellowship Senkaku Islands in the East China from Centre for Air Power Sea after Japan purchased them Studies. Her research from private ownership and areas include the Indian Ocean Region, made them state property last South China Sea and the September 11”. Apart from an Indo-Pacific Studies. increased number of naval activities, China is being assertive in skies, too. Last year, “Chinese aircraft entered Japanese territorial airspace over the Senkaku Islands for the first time. The Japanese Air Self-Defense Force scrambled its fighter jets against Chinese aircraft on 306 occasions, the largest ever in 2012. Recently, for the first time, Chinese airborne early warning plane made a return trip through the airspace over the area between the Okinawa Island and Miyakojima”. “Drones have taken centre-stage in an escalating arms race between China and Japan as they struggle to assert their dominance over disputed islands in the East China Sea”[6]. The aim is to show intent and preparedness in case of any event of hostility on either side and to push back the other from using the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands as their own maritime territory. “China is rapidly expanding its nascent drone programme, while Japan has begun preparations to purchase an advanced model from the US. Both sides claim the drones will be used for surveillance, but experts warn the possibility of future drone skirmishes in the region’s airspace is very high”[7]. Reportedly, on August 8 (followed immediately after the release of China’s online military games), 2013, “China deployed ships to waters near islands disputed with Japan for a record 28 hours, drawing a formal protest as it repeated

2. Marianne Lavelle and Jeff Smith, “Why are China and Japan Sparring Over Eight Tiny, Uninhabited Islands?”, October 26, 2012, National Geographic Daily News, available at http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/2012/10/121026-east-china-sea-dispute/ (accessed on August 7, 2013) 3. “Japan on High Alert for Disputed Islands Anniversary”, September 11, 2013, available at http://www.france24.com/en/20130911-japan-high-alertdisputed-islands-anniversary (accessed on September 17, 2013) 4.Ibid. 5. “Insight: China Puts Japan on Notice That Warship Drills are Now Routine”, The Asahi Shimbun, July 30, 2013, available at http://ajw.asahi.com/article/ behind_news/AJ201307300099 (accessed on September 16, 2013) 6. Jonathan Kalman and Justin McCurry, “Japan and China Step up Drone Race as Tension Builds Over Disputed Islands”, January 9, 2013, The Guardian, available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jan/08/china-japan-drone-race (accessed on August 6, 2013) 7. Ibid. (Kalman and McCurry)

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sea power equations

ZONE OF CONTENTION

While the whole world was waiting for the name of the host country to be announced for the 2020 Olympic Games in Argentina where Tokyo was later declared winner in the bid and was announced as the Olympic Games destination, Japan took advantage of the opportunity in an International event and reiterated their emphasis on maintaining “effective control” on the islands

Although, various Chinese newspapers and sources reveal that it should just be received as a Game and should not be misinterpreted as any sort of Chinese posturing. However, the fact remains that, this is in a way a part of China’s strategy to push for the claim on the Diaoyu Islands (aka Senkaku Islands). “It simulates an amphibious assault by Chinese forces on the Senkaku or Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea. The release of the online version follows months of confrontation between Japanese and Chinese vessels in the disputed waters”[10]. Also a press release by the game maker Giant Interactive

bid and was announced as the Olympic Games destination, Japan took advantage of the opportunity in an international event and reiterated their emphasis on maintaining “effective control”[13]on the islands. Japanese and Chinese patrol ships and airplanes are shadowing each other around the islands so as to maintain a keen eye on each other’s movements[14]. The same day, a few hours later, it was reported that, “a pair of Chinese H-6 bombers flew in international airspace through the Ryukyu Island chain near Okinawa for the first time”[15]. Responding to that Japan sent out its fighter

Chinese H-6

meeting to resolve problems, they should stop with the empty talk and doing stuff for show”[17]. A very comprehensive study has been conducted by Council on Foreign Relations on “China’s Maritime Disputes” to understand the criticality of the situation. Some of the arguments and suggestions made through this study are summarised as [18] – the dispute in the East China Sea has become a source of concern for the United States and other countries where the two most dynamic economies of the world are engaged in power politics and the focus is on defence spendings. A small mishap might blow up into something much bigger. Because of mutual distrust and lack of agreeable rules of the road and the inability to define the territorial boundaries. If there is a use of force, it could be an all out conflict; where US automatically will get involved being a security guarantor. Therefore, these disputes need to be managed wisely in order to make sure that the East China Sea does not turn into a battlefield. The study suggests certain preventive measures that can be taken to de-escalate tensions – Joint sharing of resources: fisheries or oil and gas, joint military exercises, a multilateral binding, a code of conduct and international arbitration. However, in the event of a possible hostile confrontation, it should be handled with effective crisis management tools – which include diplomacy, economic sanctions and possible military action.[19]

A Way Forward

a strategy of pressing its territorial claims through bolder projections of maritime power. Ships from China’s newly formed coast guard remained in the Japanese-controlled waters for the longest time since Japan bought the islands last year.”[8]

Military Simulation Game

The use of military simulation games is not new in international relations. China’s latest release of its ﬁrst military tactical game “Glorious Mission Online,” co-developed by the People's Liberation Army (PLA). The day of the release of this online game coincided (intentionally or unintentionally) with the founding date of the PLA ie August 1 and was released to the public. It drew worldwide attention due to the way the game has been designed. At one level of the game, Chinese soldiers are pitted against those of Japan in order to claim the disputed islands currently under the control of Japan in the East China Sea that has gained momentum since last year and “have become the centerpiece of diplomatic tensions in Asia”[9]. To this event, Japan’s defence ministry had abstained from releasing any public statement.

Group (GIG) stated that, “players would be able to fight alongside Chinese armed forces and use weapons to tell the Japanese that they must return our stolen territory.”[11] “While the Diaoyu / Senkaku mission may be in bad taste, it is far from being the first videogame to pit old enemies against each other in a modern day conflict. Games in the Call of Duty franchise have envisioned WW III, specifically Russian-led nuclear attacks and a Russian ground offensive on US soil”[12]. There are a number of ways this can be looked at, one is that this is indeed just a game and means no sort of rhetoric or on the contrary, is Chinese way of posturing its intent, an attempt to emphasise that China is fully committed to take over the islands even if it is by force and what happens in an online game can also become an actuality if the problem is not resolved amicably between the two nations.

Words And Military Responses

While the whole world was waiting for the name of the host country to be announced for the 2020 Olympic Games in Argentina where Tokyo was later declared winner in the

8. Isabel Reynolds, “China Tests Japan on Island Claims After Philippine Success”, The Sydney Morning Herald, August 9, 2013, Available at http://www. smh.com.au/world/china-tests-japan-on-island-claims-after-philippine-success-20130809-2rmca.html (accessed on September 11, 2013) 9. JT Quigley, “Diaoyu Island Assault: PLA Designed Video Game Simulates Sino-Japanese Conflict”, August 2, 2013, The Diplomat: China Power, available at http://thediplomat.com/china-power/diaoyu-island-assault-pla-designed-video-game-simulates-sino-japanese-conflict/ (accessed on August 6, 2013) 10. “Chinese online game targets Japanese held Islands”, August 1, 2013, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-23535593 (accessed on August 6, 2013) 11. Scott Neuman, “In New Video Game, China Seizes Disputed Islands From Japan”, August 1, 2013, available at http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwoway/2013/08/01/207981972/in-new-video-game-china-seizes-disputed-islands-from-japan (accessed on August 6, 2013) 12. 12n. 1 (JT Quigley)

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jets. Similarly, on September 9, 2013, “Japan scrambled F-15 ﬁghters to intercept a high-altitude Chinese surveillance drone that appeared near the Senkakus. The following day, eight Chinese Coast Guard ships were sent to patrol the waters around the disputed islands, provoking a formal protest by Japan”. What is being observed is that two of the largest economies in the world ie China and Japan are now engaged in a confrontation. The article “China sees no basis for Japan talks as islands dispute simmers”, which was published in the Reuters on August 27, 2013, suggests that the government of Japan under the leadership of Shinzo Abe is committed to have a peace dialogue with China, however, China has turned down any such offers. They believe that, "a meeting between leaders is not simply for the sake of shaking hands and taking pictures, but to resolve problems”[16] and “If Japan wants to arrange a

This ongoing mutual exchange of military responses is only aggravating the situation and building-up tensions that could soon enough turn into a hostile battleground if the international community fails to intervene very strongly. China, although, has always maintained that it will not tolerate any outside interference in its bilateral matters such as in the case of South China Sea disputes and therefore, the most viable option would be to amicably resolve this dispute over the islands by laying out a common ground of understanding and devising a mutually agreeable policy for a peaceful resolution to come into effect that could bear beneﬁts for all parties involved. A win-win situation can be arrived at if both parties agree to share the resources following a stringent code of conduct. A military confrontation will not solve the problem and will only result in strong economic implications apart from the loss of life and property. A disturbed East China Sea is a bilateral problem in its nature, but the intensity of the problem would have repercussions for other seafaring nations and especially the United States and its strategic shift to Asia might not be able to translate, as smoothly, causing further turbulence should this matter not be resolved.

13. John Chan, “Sino-Japanese Tensions Flare Over Disputed Islands”, World Socialist Website, September 16, 2013, available at http://www.wsws.org/ en/articles/2013/09/16/chjp-s16.html (accessed on September 16, 2013) 14. Alexander Besant, “Japan Sends Fighter Planes After China Nears Disputed Senkaku Islands”, Global Post, July 24, 2013, available at http://www. globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asia-pacific/japan/130724/japan-sends-fighter-planes-after-china-nears-dispute (accessed on September 16, 2013) 15. Nightwatch 2013098, September 8, 2013, available at http://www.kforcegov.com/Services/IS/NightWatch/NightWatch_13000193.aspx (accessed on September 16, 2013) 16. “China sees no basis for Japan talks as islands dispute simmers”, (Reuters: US, August, 2013), available at http://www.reuters.com/ article/2013/08/27/us-china-japan-idUSBRE97Q02H20130827 (accessed on September 17, 2013) 17 Ibid. (Reuters) 18. Shen Dingli, Elizabeth Economy, Richard Haass, Joshua Kurlantzick, Sheila A. Smith and Simon Tay , “China’s Maritime Disputes”, Council on Foreign Relations, available at http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345?soc-Facebook-in-info_guide-china_maritime-first_ LinkedIn_post-091713#!/ (accessed on September 18, 2013) 19. n.18

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sea power equations

NAVAL DIPLOMACY

EXPANDING REGIONAL COOPERATION Indian Navy became the main tool for promoting India’s foreign policy with the small and weak states of the IOR and beyond in the changed world scenario. This it has done through naval exercises, naval assistance, disaster relief, material assistance and training.

n this age of globalisation, liberalisation and economic inter-dependence, extra-intra regional cooperation has become unavoidable for development and security of a state. Now the political and military alliances of 19th and 20th century have been replaced by economic and military cooperation. Accordingly due to growing maritime activities, naval cooperation has found a new shape and importance in the post cold war period in general and in 21st century in particular. Presently, India has very important economic interests and security concerns in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). For the protection and promotion of these vital national interests, Indian Navy (IN) has changed its age old policy of isolation and increased its naval diplomatic role with the IOR littoral countries. By these initiatives, India’s regional maritime identity has undergone a major change during the past two decades.

Flexible Naval Diplomacy

Analysing the strategic and economic importance of the IOR in the changing world, it was decided that a ﬂexible

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

but proactive naval diplomacy is essential to safeguard and protect our national interests. Without involving herself in active naval diplomacy a state can never be a major maritime power of the world. The major emphasis was given to increase the process of naval cooperation in the ﬁeld of joint naval exercises, goodwill visits, port visits, naval assistance, material assistance, training assistance and disaster relief operations. Accordingly, Indian Navy became the main tool for promoting India’s foreign policy with the small and weak states of the IOR and beyond in the changed world scenario.

Naval Exercises

The overall objective of joint naval exercises has been to develop inter-operability through common drills and procedures. It has played a signiﬁcant role in strengthening cooperation, trust, mutual understanding and transparency between the states. To promote these exercises, the IN has created three important organisations – Directorate of Indianisation, Directorate of Strategy, Concepts and Transformation and Directorate of Foreign

Cooperation and Transformation – for policy making. In the post cold war period, the ﬁrst joint naval exercise was held with the Australian Navy in 1992. After that IN has conducted naval exercises with several foreign navies such as USA, France, UK, Singapore, China, Russia, Sri Lanka, Indonesia etc. It has also conducted Passage Exercises with visiting warships of different navies. Between 1989 and 2000, the IN conducted nearly 45 joint naval exercises with at least 20 countries (http://www. bharat-rakshak. com/Monitor/Issue 6-1). Some of the most important naval exercises and port visits of this century are as follows:  The ﬁrst Sino-Indian naval exercise was conducted off Shanghai along the East China Sea on 14th November 2003.  The Malabar Series, the Indo-US naval exercise started in 1994 to foster cooperation between the two navies.

The thrust areas of Malabar naval exercises were anti-submarine warfare, sea control missions, ﬂeet air-defence, surface ﬁring, on-board search and seizure, anti-piracy and counter-terrorism action at sea (The Indian Express, New Delhi, September 24, 2005).  In 2003 India and Indonesia started Coordinated Patrol (CORPAT) in the Andaman Sea area with the aim of

The overall objective of joint naval exercises has been to develop inter-operability through common drills and procedures. It has played a significant role in strengthening cooperation, trust, mutual understanding and transparency between the states. To promote these exercises, the IN has created three important organisations – Directorate of Indianisation, Directorate of Strategy, Concepts and Transformation and Directorate of Foreign Cooperation and Transformation – for policy making

co-ordinated patrolling, anti-piracy exercise and search and rescue operation. The 17th CORPAT was conducted from 08-26 April, 2011.  After 458 days and 33,000 nautical miles in the great oceans of the world such as the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian Ocean, INS Tarangini successfully returned to her homeport at Kochi on 25 April 2004. The first PROF HARI SARAN Indo-Russian bilateral naval exercise The writer is Professor, INDRA 2003 was conducted both on Department of Defence the Western and Eastern seaboards and Strategic Studies, and INDRA-13 held recently DDU Gorakhpur University, Gorakhpur, in October 2013 in Rajasthan India. Mahajan Field Firing Range.  The fifth Indo-Japanese joint naval exercise ‘Sahyog-Kaijan’ was carried out by Indian and Japanese coast guard ships off the Mumbai coast on September 2, 2004.  In 2005, IN warships went to Singapore and conducted naval exercise with the Singapore Navy.  Indo-French naval exercise initiated in 1998, named Varuna series. Indo-France joint naval exercise Varuna 2013 was conducted off the Goa coast.  MILAN biennial naval exercises were initiated in 1995 with the aim to play a coordinating role and foster closer cooperation among navies of countries in the Bay of Bengal and Indian Ocean region under ‘Friendship across the Sea’ agenda. In 2012 MILAN exercise, navies of 14 countries participated at Port Blair.

 INS Viraat accompanied by INS Rajput and INS Ranjit (guided missile destroyers), INS Shakti and INS Khukri visited Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia in July/August 2005.  The ﬁrst Indo-Sri Lanka joint naval exercise “Operation Eksath” was conducted in December 2005, about 10 nautical miles off Colombo.  In December 2005, Indian Navy’s two warships INS Betwa and INS Kora went to Malaysia to take part in the Langkavi Maritime and Aerospace Exhibition (LIMA-eighth).  The Indo-Thailand Coordinated Patrol (Indo-Thai CORPAT) commenced in 2006. The 12th cycle of Indo-Thai CORPAT was conducted from 25 to 30 April, 2011 in Andaman Sea.

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

sea power equations

NAVAL DIPLOMACY

 The Singapore-India Maritime Bilateral Exercise (SIMBEX) started in 2007.  The Indian and Maldivian Coast Guard are regularly conducting exercises under ‘Dosti’ series.  The British Navy and Indian Navy conducted fully simulated war-at-sea exercise between May 17 and 29, 2006, code-named as ‘Konkan’.  Indian Navy decided to hold SALVEX exercises (biennially) with the US Navy. The ﬁrst SALVEX exercise was carried out by both navies in September 2005, off the Kochi coast.  In April 2007, the navies of USA, Japan and India undertook a joint naval exercise off Okinawa. training ship INS Sudarshini  India’s launched a six month long historic voyage (from 15th September 2012 to 25th March 2013) to commemorate the two-decade long partnership with ASEAN member states (Indian Ocean Watch, IDSA, December 2012).  Indian Coast Guard ship ICGS Samudra Prahari visited Oman from 7 to 10 March, 2013 to discuss ways to strengthen mutual cooperation with Royal Oman Police Coast Guard.  The ﬁrst Indian Ocean Naval Symposium was organised jointly by Indian Navy and National Maritime

All these naval assistance operations succeeded in sending signals to Indian Ocean littorals and other powers of the world that India has the capability to protect her men and assets anywhere in the world and Indian Navy is capable enough to tackle any such contingencies thousands of miles away from its shore

Foundation on 14th and 15th February 2008 at New Delhi. Representatives, mostly Chiefs of Navy from 27 IOR countries attended this symposium. India’s maritime identity has undergone a major change during this century due to these naval exercises with regional and external powers. Now, Indian Navy and Coast Guard can play an important role in conjunction with other regional navies to deal with both traditional and non-traditional maritime security threats in the IOR and beyond.

Naval Assistance

The small nations of the IOR not only look to India for help and support but also expect the Indian Navy to safeguard their interests. Indian government had provided military assistance to Sri Lanka in order to counter the Janatha Vimukthi Perumuna (JVP), an insurgent organisation of Maoist origin in 1971 (Strategic Analysis, June 1996, pp 324). In 1986, when South Yemen was embroiled in major disturbances, Indian government permitted an Indian naval frigate to proceed to Aden to rescue Indian nationals there. In August 1987, the Indian government sent naval warships off Colombo to evacuate members of Indian High Commission, whose life were endangered due to the prevailing circumstances of Civil War there. The Indian government sent INS Viraat to cruise off Colombo during July 1989. By the Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement of July 29, 1987, the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF 1987-90) was deployed in Sri Lanka. During this

period Indian Navy played an important role to provide surveillance, transportation and logistical support as well as active military support to Indian forces on the ground in Sri Lanka. In November 1988, Dr Abdul Gayoom of Maldives was overthrown by a group of mercenaries. On a request for Indian assistance, INS Godavari was dispatched along with a multi-dimensional force of airborne troops, marine commandos and air force aircraft to protect the Maldivian government under Operation Cactus. Operation Khukri was started on 15-16 July 2000 in support of UN operations in Sierra-Leone. Indian naval warships have actively participated in United Nations Peace Keeping Operations in Somalia. Under operation ‘SAGITTARIUS’, Indian Naval warships INS Sharda and Sukanya escorted 24 US high value vessels between April 2 and September 16, 2002 passing through the Malacca Straits. In June 2003, INS Ranjit and INS Suvarna executed a month long deployment in and around Mozambique for security assistance. The IN has provided seaward defence at the time of African Union Summit in Maputo in July 2003. Operation Sukoon was started on July 21, 2006 to evacuate nearly 12,000 Indian nationals from Lebanon. Maritime violence off the Horn of Africa generated immense global attention in 2008. India was one of the ﬁrst nations to send forces to respond to piracy in the Somalian water. In October 2008, the IN deployed

INS Ranjit

INS Viraat

China has released its first ‘Blue Book’ on the IOR in June 2013. In this book China has declared its intentions to protect her economic interests in IOR at any cost. On the other hand, India has only two options regarding this challenge that is to increase the strategic reach and depth of Indian Navy and to increase regional cooperation through naval diplomacy INS Tabar to participate in international anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden region. On February 24, 2011, IN deployed its Dornier aircraft in Seychelles for surveillance and anti-piracy patrols. All these naval assistance operations succeeded in sending signals to Indian Ocean littorals and other powers of the world that India has the capability to protect her men and assets anywhere in the world and Indian Navy is capable enough to tackle any such contingencies thousands of miles away from its shore.

Disaster Relief

On several occasions, the IN has responded to requests from neighbouring countries to provide aid and disaster relief. In 1991, IN started ‘Operation Madad’ to save Maldivian population, when a massive tidal wave struck some of its islands badly. The Indian armed forces launched their biggest ever peace time relief operation ‘Operation Sea Wave’ to provide help and relief to the people in the tsunami (December 26, 2004) affected areas in the Bay of Bengal and other adjoining region. Given the nature of disaster, it was the Indian Navy which played the major role in all the rescue operations. The relief operation in Sri Lanka was codenamed ‘Operation Rainbow’. The navy deployed 5 ships including one hospital ship and three helicopters here. Operation Castor was launched to provide relief to Maldives. Dornier 228-201, surveillance aircraft reached here within 24 hours of the disaster. The IN had sent four ships and helicopters to Maldives for rescue operation. The IN started ‘Operation Gambhir’ to carry out rescue and relief operations in Indonesia. The INS Khukri and a 46 bed hospital ship Nirupak were deployed in ‘Banda-Aceh’ carrying huge quantity of relief supplies (Frontline, January 05, pp 37). The IN has also provided help and succour to the Yogjakarta earthquake–stricken people of Indonesia in 2006. It has provided humanitarian help and relief to Myanmar in May 2, 2008, when it was hit by the devastating Cyclone ‘Nargis’. In 2013, India and UAE have decided to donate rehabilitation and relief work in the Seychelles that was hit by heavy rains and ﬂooding.

Material Assistance

The IN has also provided material assistance like radars, communication sets and patrol vessels to small friendly neighbouring countries during the past years. It has supplied a small seaward defence boat to Mauritius in

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

sea power equations

NAVAL DIPLOMACY

CENTRE OF GRAVITY

INS Kora

SULTANA YESMIN

The writer is Research Assistant at Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies (BIPSS) Dhaka, Bangladesh.

INS Suvarna 1993. In June 2005, the IN has supplied a large quantity of spare parts for the Vietnam Navy’s Osa II class missile gunboats. The spare consignment comprised 900 boxes of about 150 tonnes.

The IN has undertaken submarine training for foreign naval personnel for the first time in 2005 when a group of South African naval officers had finished their submarine training on Type 209 class submarine.

India gave INS Tillanchang, an indigenously built Fast Attack Craft to Maldives in April 2006 (Defence News, April 24, 2006). The Goa Shipyard built INS Tillanchang can carry out surveillance and detect hostile crafts.

INS Suvarna, an offshore patrol vessel has also sailed to Mozambique (August 2003) to be on a training mission. In 2004, around 116 ofﬁcers and 101 sailors from 14 foreign countries were trained at various training schools of the Indian Navy (JIOS, April 2009, pp 91).

In 2009, Defence Minister AK Antony on his visit to Maldives agreed to provide assistance to build a maritime surveillance system there. India agreed to install radar on island nation which will be linked to the Indian Navy and Coast Guard headquarters. India will also provide a Dhruv helicopter for maritime surveillance and patrolling activities and help to establish a twentyﬁve bed military hospital there. India has sent a Dornier surveillance plane to Seychelles in February 2013. Four Seychellois pilots are being trained in India to operate the plane. Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers, Kolkata has built an Offshore Patrol Vessel (US$ 58 million) that is to be delivered to Mauritius by September 2014. India made all arrangements for installation of a Coastal Surveillance Radar System (CSRS) in Mauritius from September 2013.

Training Assistance

India’s naval training facilities are excellent. The IN has a number of basic and specialised training institutions throughout the country. The hydrographic capability of the IN is the fourth largest in the world. The Indian Naval Hydrographic Centre at Dehradun has been organising and conducting training programmes on a regular basis for naval ofﬁcers of IOR countries. Hundreds of foreign ofﬁcers and sailors of the neighbouring countries get training in our naval establishments every year. A new Rs 5,000 crore Naval Academy INS Zamorin has been opened at Ezhimala near Kannur in 2009. It would impart training to around 500 naval personnel annually.

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

China’s Implicit Threat

India is a prominent littoral power in the IOR with proven ability to play a key role in the security structure of this water region. In the revised Maritime Doctrine 2009, India has clearly declared her maritime intentions and areas of interest. During the past decade, India has successfully gained the support of other major powers such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and America besides the ASEAN countries by way of participating in joint naval exercises and providing security to their vessels passing through the IOR. Presently the security structure of the IOR is in the hands of America. America is well aware of the growing Chinese influence in the IOR. China has released its first ‘Blue Book’ on the IOR in June 2013. In this book China has declared its intentions to protect her economic interests in IOR at any cost. China has made it clear that if countries like India, the US and China failed to engage with each other more constructively as their interests begin to overlap, the ocean could end up “as an ocean of conflict and trouble” (China details Indian Ocean Strategy and Interests, The Hindu, June 9, 2013). It is a clear message for India and the US. The US has visualised this situation quite early. Accordingly, it has increased its naval presence and diplomatic relations and engagements with South Korea, Japan, Vietnam, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand and India during the past few years. On the other hand, India has only two options regarding this challenge that is to increase the strategic reach and depth of Indian Navy and to increase regional cooperation through naval diplomacy.

STRATEGIC TRIANGLE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN It is said that the Indian Ocean will be the new battlefield for China and India in the next 10 years. In the 21st century, the IOR has emerged as a centre of gravity, as well as area of great powers’ rivalry, namely the United States of America (USA), China and India. The Indian Ocean area will be the true nexus of world powers and conﬂicts in the coming years. It is here that the ﬁght for democracy, energy independence and religious freedom will be lost or won. – Dr Robert Kaplan

he Indian Ocean, the third largest ocean in the world, encompasses Andaman Sea, Arabian Sea, Bay of Bengal, Flores Sea, Great Australian Bight, Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, Java Sea, Mozambique Channel, Persian Gulf, Red Sea, Savu Sea, Strait of Malacca and Timor Sea. Stretching eastward from the Horn of Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, the Iranian plateau, the Indian subcontinent and all the way to the Indonesian archipelago and beyond, the Indian Ocean comprises nineteen nation-states surrounding the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC).

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

sea power equations

CENTRE OF GRAVITY

As it is a vital transit route between the Pacific region, Africa and Europe, the Indian Ocean is often termed as West Pacific. The Ocean is also a place of national interests for land-locked Nepal and Afghanistan in the South Asian Region. It is said that the Indian Ocean will be the new battlefield for China and India in the next 10 years.

Map: Sea Lines of Communications

Besides, China is also launching joint naval exercises, anti-piracy missions in the IOR. It is seeking for permanent military bases in Pakistan with a view to countering American

US ‘Pivot Of Asia’ Policy

On the other hand, the USA is also not without concern. China’s long-standing desire of establishing string of naval bases across the Indian Ocean has been another fact of distress for the great power. The USA perceives China and its allies in the IOR as potential threat of state-sponsored terrorism, proliferation of non-state actors and emergence of failed states in the Indian subcontinent. Many security experts also remark that the Chinese naval port at Hambantota may generate new cold war to secure energy routes in the IOR.

Vital Transit Routes

One of the most significant aspects of the IOR is Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs). Its maritime choke points are transit routes of more than 80 per cent of the world’s seaborne trade in oil stretching from the Straits of Malacca, Sunda and Lombok into the South China Sea and north to China, Taiwan, Korea and Japan and to the west coast of North America as well. The Indian Ocean Region which was not considered as a major zone of potential competition before, nevertheless, in the 21st century, the IOR has emerged as a centre of gravity, as well as area of great powers’ rivalry, namely the United States of America (USA), China and India. First, the United States is now increasing naval presence in the IOR following its aspiration of ensuring unhindered trade and commerce, control over terrorist organisations in the Asia-Pacific region, as well as securing the USA’ alliances with key regional strategic partners like Australia, Thailand and Bahrain. The Indian Ocean came into limelight with the announcement of the USA’s new ‘Strategic Guidance 2012’. It prioritised Asia and the Pacific with a view to pursuing ‘smart defence initiatives’ as well as continuing the USA-North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) commitments. In June 2012, Leon Panetta, the US Defence Secretary, declared India as a ‘lynchpin in the USA pivot to Asia’. He also cited, “[w]e will expand our military partnerships and our presence in the arc extending from the Western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean region and South Asia …” The USA ‘pivot to Asia’ policy in 2013 also clearly signifies its rebalance strategy to the Asia-Pacific region.

Map: Great Power Competition in the

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

operations in the Indian Ocean, the USA has deployed two major naval task forces such as Combined Task Force 152 and Combined Task Force 150. Second, China is also increasing its engagement along the crucial choke points in the Indian Ocean following its potential rise as a soft regional hegemon, aspiration of expanding military space as well as maintaining balance of power in the IOR. China’s interests in the Indian Ocean broadly came into attention in 2013 when China revealed out “blue book” for the ﬁrst time identifying its strategic interests in the IOR, especially in the ﬁelds of energy, trade and commerce and sea lines of communications. Chinese Director of the General Logistic Department of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) said, “we can no longer accept the Indian Ocean as only an ocean of the Indians”.

inﬂuence and preserving long-term strategic interests in the region. Recently both China and Pakistan have discussed joint oil pipeline project from Gwadar in southwestern Balochistan to western China. China also intends to lay a pipeline from Kyaukpyu in Myanmar to Yunnan province.

Thus, the matter of concern is what may be the possible scenarios? The IOR may Map: String of Pearls in the Indian Ocean

We cannot afford to be weak at sea. History has shown that whatever power controls the Indian Ocean, has in the ﬁrst instance, India’s seaborne trade at her mercy and in the second, India’s very independence itself. – Jawaharlal Nehru

China’s Sphere Of Inﬂuence

In addition, China has extended its influence through investing billions of dollars in adjacent areas of the IOR. The New York Times has reported that China has agreed to take over operations of US$ 200 million for creating its spheres of influence in Gwadar, close to the Iranian border and to the entrance to the Persian Gulf. In order to enhance its visibility, under the Indian Ocean strategy of the “String of Pearls”, China has invested in a series of port projects in Chittagong, Gwadar and Hambantota Ports. As a tactic of expanding networks in the IOR and the Asia-Pacific region, China is building ‘string of pearls’ in the Indian Ocean to cut-off India from other nations and to build network of naval bases encircling the subcontinent, stretching from the coast of mainland China through the littorals of the South China Sea, the Strait of Malacca across the Indian Ocean and to the littorals of the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf. China has already gained control over the Gwadar Port in February 2013 from the Pakistani government. It is strategically important for China in order to reduce heavy reliance on the South East Asian sea route.

The United States has already established its naval bases in the Indian Ocean at Diego Garcia. Nevertheless, in order to safeguard continuous ﬂow of seaborne oil, counter piracy from the Gulf of Oman to Kenya, as well as support

Beijing-Islamabad joint military exercise in the IOR and in the Asia-Paciﬁc region. However, the Indo-USA collusion in the Indian Ocean is a major cause of concern for both China and Pakistan.

India’s Interests

Third, India, considering the fact of strategic triangle, is trying to expand its strategic involvement in the southwest Indian Ocean with a particular focus on building networks with ‘Four Ms’ eg Mauritius, Maldives, Madagascar and Mozambique. India is also enhancing its inﬂuence from the Plateau of Iran to the Gulf of Thailand as the IOR is a hub of energy. Recently, the country has agreed to spend almost US$ 45 billion over the next 20 years in order to develop nuclear submarines and secure SLOCs. India is continuing efforts to pre-empt China’s perceived presence by developing its military capabilities near the maritime choke points, not only particularly in the Malacca Strait, but also in the South China Sea. While having a bluewater navy, India also planned to launch four nuclear submarines and four aircraft carriers in order to extend its military capacities. The rapid military presence of these major powers in the IOR, especially China has been major issue of concern especially for India. China’s so called ‘encirclement’ policy raises suspicion about the potentiality of regional hostility against India and the decline of Indian commercial and military ﬂeets in the IOR. India is also suspicious about the spread of terrorism and hostilities against India through

be divided into three categories such as extra-regional, regional and sub-regional. The future scenarios could be both complex and opportunistic. As there is a possibility of spreading military footprints of great powers across the IOR, smaller countries may be benefited by making alliance with regional powers. Some experts, on the other hand, advocate that the IOR may be an area of conflict in the Asian region due to regional and global military interference, piracy and extremism etc. For instance, the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research cites that, IOR may be a zone of 42 per cent of world conflicts. Simultaneously, some also mention that neither China nor the USA is a threat for India. Chinese new premier Li Keqiang, during his recent visit in India, made it clear saying, “[w]e are not a threat to each other, nor do we seek to contain each other ...” Therefore, Chinese also claim that China’s strategic ports in South Asia are not to contain India, but to legitimise economic interests in the region. Nonetheless, whatever happens, it can undoubtedly be said that the Indian Ocean would be vital issue of concern not only in the Asia-Pacific region, but also across the world.

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

sea power equations

NAVAL BULWARK?

VIKRAMADITYA IS COMING

FINALLY

INS Vikramaditya

Team DSA

Admiral Gorshkov

MiG-29K

Indians can be forgiven for thinking that the Russian “gift” of the aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov had turned out to be a white elephant. When it arrives in India in December it will still be a “work in progress” given that its “close-in” defence system of missiles and rapidfire anti-aircraft / anti-missile guns would take up to three years to install. But the acquisition of Vikramaditya is sure to prompt China to accelerate its carrier programme to expend and enhance its military might.

t is to be hoped that all that was bad has happened and is now history – the most recent mishap was when the steam turbine / propeller shaft coupling disintegrated during sea trials causing a further delay in delivery by a year. What should have happened in 2008 is five years overdue and the cost has escalated from US$ 947 million to US$ 2.35 billion (which could rise to US$ 2.9 billion for additional labour costs but could be reduced if penalties are imposed on the Russian shipyard for delays and failure to meet schedules) considerably souring Indo-Russian special relations that had served India well since the 1960s. The hull was a “gift”, free of cost but the Russians milked the refurbishment and modernisation for all it was worth. Some of grief caused to Indian national interests was perpetrated by officials of the Indian Navy who failed to identify that the wiring needed to be replaced to handle new high watt fitments and electronic systems that were intended to be installed on a cruiser converted to an aircraft carrier role. The

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

thousands of kilometers of modern wiring was but one of the causes for the unexpected cost escalation both in actual costs as well as by time overruns. Large portions of steel hull, motors, turbines and boilers etc were also completely replaced. This resulted in long-winded renegotiation process that adversely affected Indo-Russian relations.

New Domain

After it leaves the White Sea in northern Russia the aircraft carrier should travel west, skirt the Scandinavian peninsula, sail past Britain and enter the Suez Canal through the Mediterranean Sea. This is because the route east is longer in the arctic zone and being on the threshold of winter could cause its own problems. In the Red Sea which is infested with pirates who are known to have hijacked larger tankers, its escorts, especially the helicopters on board will be sufﬁcient to deal with any such threat. The Vikramaditya’s home base is to be the new naval facility created at Karwar on the Karnataka coast south of Goa.

It is not as if the carrier cannot become operational immediately. Its complement of MiG-29Ks and the pilots are ready to operate from the ski-jump short take-off (STO) but assisted recovery (BAR) by practicing on a ground-based ski-jump after the first squadron of naval fighters arrived last year. The refurbishment in terms of adding the ski-jump for short take-off has been at the cost of operational space and the carrier is not able to take more than 20 MiG-29K fighter aircraft and ten helicopters for anti-submarine warfare and airborne early warning.

oceangoing submarines like the INS Arihant and has set up a production line for this class of submarines. It should be easy for it to create a nuclear power plant of sufficient size to install in an aircraft carrier of 60,000 tonnes capacity and three to five escorts that form a task force. It will enable a carrier task force to break loose of the dependence on a fleet tanker for replenishment of fuel at sea not just because it is a restraining umbilical cord but also because the cost of fuel is skyrocketing thereby affecting carrier operations adversely.

India has ordered 24 additional MiG-29Ks which it will base at INS Dega outside Visakhapatnam and could form a land-based quick-reaction force for deployment deep into the eastern approaches of the Indian Ocean from south of the islands of Sumatra one of the biggest of thousands of islands that comprise Indonesia. The new airbase INS Baaz on the southern tip of the Nicobar Island in the Indian group will act as a staging base for fuel replenishment for MiG-29K aircraft operating further into the Paciﬁc Ocean as combat air patrol for Indian shipping in times of hostilities.

Carrier Task Forces

Nuclear Propulsion

To be able to more cost-effectively patrol not just its huge area of interest in the Indian Ocean region but also Paciﬁc Ocean where things are hotting up, the Indian Navy will have to begin drawing up plans for installation of nuclear power plants in the follow-on aircraft carriers of the Vikrant class. It has already acquired the expertise in creating and installing nuclear power plants on

With the arrival of the INS Vikramaditya, the Indian Navy will have two carrier-borne task forces operationally deployed on its western and eastern seaboards with jurisdictions ranging from the northern land mass down to the frozen icelands of Antarctica where India has set up research bases. The choke points lie in the Gulf of Hormuz where China and Pakistan have set up a naval base at Gwadar on the Balochistan coast. Further south is the Gulf of Aden through which most of the world’s commerce and energy ﬂows. At its furtherest southern extremity lies the Cape of Good Hope of South Africa – a route invaders took to take possessions on the Indian mainland. The Portuguese Vasco da Gama was the ﬁrst followed by Britain and France. Colonialism may have perished but there are new methodologies by which former colonial powers seek to maintain their military presence in areas of their interest in the Indian Ocean littoral. The new method is cajoling the local population of island nations to acquire citizenship of metropolitan powers.

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

26/11 status appraisal

TARDY PROGRESS

STATUS APPRAISAL

Marine commandos (“Marcos”)

5 YEARS AFTER 26/11

V BALACHANDRAN IPS (RETD)

e need to go back to the time period prior to 26/11 to answer the question whether we are now better prepared than during 26/11. That alone will give us a better perspective. I am giving only bullet points and not a rambling essay. Due to lack of space I have addressed only some of the serious problems highlighted by the Enquiry Committee. In undertaking this assessment I have been guided only by media reports, as the Maharashtra government has not kept the Committee informed of the implementation of their proposals, nor is it necessary to do so.

the public had left the task of vigilance and resistance to the law and order authorities. This was perhaps natural in a city like Mumbai with huge commuter and migrant population resulting in their being deprived of stable lives to organise themselves. Eight million commuters use suburban trains daily while an equal number travel by buses. Also, not having been subjected to the 26/11 type of attacks but only time-bomb blasts, people in big cities like Mumbai were not psychologically aware how the whole city could be paralysed by a handful of terrorists. This was true of even the police force who had never experienced commando type of attacks earlier.

Improvements

Present Position: It is a measure of gratiﬁcation that the public, with the help of a vigilant media has become vanguard of public awareness to notice any negligence in public security. The police also are much more sensitive to the public opinion after 26/11.

(i) Weaponry, Equipment And Tactics Earlier Position: The 26/11 Committee had found that bureaucratic bottlenecks had held up regular supply of arms and ammunition for the police force in Maharashtra state. This had impaired their resistance capability. They had also found that special forces like QRT, Assault mobiles and “Striking Mobiles” were inadequately trained and dispersed for other duties, thereby adversely affecting their efficiency and thrust. The state Anti-Terrorist Squad (ATS) was structured with a duality of command which had created confusion. Present Position: From media reports I find that good improvement has been effected in the purchase of modern weaponry, vehicles and equipment for the Maharashtra Police. The same trend is seen in other states. Maharashtra has raised an elite commando force named as “Force-1”. QRTs have been reformed and better trained. New vehicles have been purchased and deployed for assault purposes. More policemen, majority of them young men and women are seen on the streets for counter-terrorist duties (CT) thereby instilling public confidence.

(ii) Public Awareness Earlier Position: One of the basic resistance tactics

against terrorist attacks is public awareness of the danger and how it would impact on their normal lives. Earlier

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

Not Effectively Addressed (i) Coastal Security Earlier Position: Both the centre and state neglected coastal patrolling. Coastal security should have been the centre’s direct responsibility under Article 355 as the bulk of arms and explosives had come through the sea from foreign sources during 1993 serial bomb attacks which had killed 257 innocent persons. The centre should have set up foolproof Coastal Security after that. They however neglected their constitutional responsibility and transferred it to the poor resources of the state who could set up only a “patchwork” patrolling: The local police had to cover shore to 12 nautical miles, Coast Guard 12 to 200 nautical miles and the rest by the Navy. For sea patrolling the Customs were to lend boats, staff to be provided by police and light machine guns to be given by the Navy. One by one other agencies dropped out. Our Navy which in 1993 agreed to provide 8 boats for coastal patrolling withdrew that offer in 2006 after establishing “Quick Response Teams” at Murud and Ratnagiri. This was not adequate as evidenced by the late arrival of marine commandos (“Marcos”) and their poor response to the 26/11 attacks.

Present Position:

The confusion exists even now. Immediately after 26/11, the Defence Ministry issued a secret order asking the Coast Guard to take over the entire coastal security. They did not implement it on account of the 2001 “Group of Ministers’ (GoM) recommendations that the immediate surveillance of the coast should be done by State Marine Police. Also, former Union Home Minister announced on February 9, 2009 that the centre would set up a “Coastal Command” by “integrating the functions of the Navy and Coast Guard, to combat possible terrorist attacks from the sea, in light of the recent Mumbai terror attacks”. He said that “The Navy would look after the security of blue waters, the Coast Guard would take the territorial waters and the coastal police would keep vigil at the grass root level”. However progress in this respect has been tardy. A 2013 IDSA paper said that coastal security is handled by 22 different ministries in government of India. A 2011-12 CAG “Performance Audit” revealed that the Indian Navy, Coast Guards, Customs and Marine Police do not share information. Severe practical problems are experienced on the ground. After 26/11 the Maharashtra state tried to achieve stricter vigilance over the coastline by creating 12 new Coastal Police Stations and by recruiting 932 policemen besides purchasing 24 speed boats, 25 “Trawlers’ and hiring 18 persons. Some senior state police officials who did not want to be identified then felt that it would be very difficult to ensure foolproof security along this coastline even for 5 nautical miles [Under the new regulations state responsibility is reportedly fixed to a distance of 5 nautical miles]. This is based on a hard reality that not all policemen can be trained to be adept in sea operations within the short training period especially since majority of police recruits came from the hinterland where they do not even have a major river. With the mandatory 3 year tenure fixed for State Police, even specially trained men for coastal security will have to be rotated with land tenures so that they do not become influenced by smugglers who operate all along the Indian coasts. Even in September 2013 there are reports that every State Marine Police System in the country is understaffed, ill equipped and inadequately manned. For example

The writer is a former Special Secretary of the Cabinet Secretariat. He was also a part of the high level committee appointed by the Maharashtra government to enquire into Mumbai 26/11 terror attacks. He is a proliﬁc writer on intelligence, terrorism and insurgency issues and has also given lectures on these subjects at several institutions in India and abroad.

Andhra Police force with 21 coastal police stations to man 972 km of coastline have to share 18 interceptor boats among themselves to guard vital installations like Sriharikota Space Centre and Vizag Naval base. A survey by a leading national daily had said: “In essence, each patrol boat is supposed to pull over as many fishing craft and small boats as it can for random checking to deter intrusions by terrorists. Plans to fit transponders on India's fishing boats and coastal radar stations, though, are running behind schedule; field-tests are only scheduled to begin after the monsoon ends. That means authorities have no way of identifying which of the estimated 1,80,000 fishing boats out at sea across India might pose a threat”. The training by Coast Guards / Navy is only for a few weeks which is not enough for the policemen to acclimatise with the problems of operating on the seas. The national daily quoted an unnamed police officer: “No one wants this job … The only people stationed on these boats are the ones without enough goodwill to get themselves posted elsewhere.”

Both the centre and state neglected coastal patrolling. Coastal security should have been the centre’s direct responsibility under Article 355 as the bulk of arms and explosives had come through the sea from foreign sources during 1993 serial bomb attacks which had killed 257 innocent persons. The centre should have set up foolproof Coastal Security after that. They however neglected their constitutional responsibility and transferred it to the poor resources of the state who could set up only a “patchwork” patrolling It is difﬁcult to identify the boats from a distance all along Indian coast since all ﬁshermen whether Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi or Sri Lankan look alike. Their boats also are similar. Although government of India has set up an Integrated Coastal Security Command in

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

26/11 status appraisal

TARDY PROGRESS

The “Coastal Eye” of 2 radar stations inaugurated in August 2012 by our defence minister would be able to detect only vessels fitted with AIS (automatic identification system) transponders, but not boats and traditional dhows, which do not have identification systems. In other words the Coast Guard or Marine Police will have to approach the boats to identify them 2009, no legislation has been passed empowering them to prosecute offending operators. They can at best be prosecuted under “Foreigners’ Act” but the police cannot prove that they are foreign nationals. Under the new Coastal protection scheme, transponders to identify the

The “Coastal Eye” of 2 radar stations inaugurated in August 2012 by our defence minister would be able to detect only vessels fitted with AIS (automatic identification system) transponders, but not boats and traditional dhows, which do not have identification systems. In other words the Coast Guard or Marine Police will have to approach the boats to identify them.

(ii) Infrastructure Earlier Position: Even in normal times it was difﬁcult for emergency vehicles to reach destinations in Mumbai because of heavy vehicle density. The same is true of other major cities like Delhi, Bangalore, Hyderabad or Chennai. Transport bottlenecks prevented immediate intervention for life saving and to defeat armed terrorists.

24,000 policemen available for normal police duties like crime control, detection and prosecution. Since they work in 2 shifts only 12,000 men are available during a shift. Another burden is the increasing social responsibilities like protection of senior citizens and women, special duties like demolition of unauthorised colonies and also ﬁxed point duties which have to be mounted after every terror alert or communal incident. After 26/11 ﬁxed pickets were mounted at 86 places leaving no staff for patrolling or investigation.

Following 26/11 there was controversy over withdrawal of the police guards from one of the 5 Star hotels. Now the same demand is being raised following the September 21, 2013 attack on Westgate Mall in Nairobi. As member of the “Pradhan Committee” I had criticised this on the ground that we had no reason to subsidise hotel security by providing police guards

Present Position: There has been no change, since

we have not effected real police reforms by divesting

daily quoted our Home Ministry sources that the MHA would be writing to the states to beef-up

non-police functions to other agencies like municipalities or railway protection force. Although the Union Home Ministry has ﬂoated a policy paper to create municipal police to undertake municipal duties like demolition of illegal structures, it would take years for the states to agree to this good proposal. At the same time the centre’s over-enthusiasm for the police to take over private security would be a great drain on police resources. Following 26/11 there was controversy over withdrawal of the police guards from one of the 5 Star hotels. Now the same demand is being raised following the September 21, 2013 attack on Westgate Mall in Nairobi. A leading

the Mall security under the “Mega City” Policing Scheme. The “Mirani Committee” appointed by the Maharashtra government in 2009 had recommended static police posts at 5 Star hotels. As member of the “Pradhan Committee” I had criticised this on the ground that majority of the attacks since the 1980s had taken place in public places like crowded trains, buses, bazaars and slums and that we had no reason to subsidise hotel security by providing police guards. The 26/11 Committee had recommended that we should train good private security guards to do private security and the job of the police should only be supervision. This is yet to be done.

Sriharikota Space Centre

“Coastal Eye” of 2 radar stations

boats from a distance and provision of crew identity cards are prescribed. In Maharashtra alone there are at least 55,000 boats. According to a 2008 FAO study there were 2,80,491 ﬁshing vessels of 94 types in India in 2002-2003. No registration of boats has been attempted earlier. Hence there is no foolproof data. An ordinary transponder costs something like Rs 75,000. Many poor ﬁshermen cannot afford this. The central government’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has promised to develop cheaper transponders. However knowing the proverbial delays in any government organisation it is not known when cheaper transponders would be provided. Knowing how ordinary ID cards can be forged it is doubtful whether the new measures of identity would be foolproof (All the ten 26/11 terrorists had false ID cards showing Hindu names). Biometric cards would be very expensive.

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

Present Position:

Mumbai has tried to offer some solution to this by placing “Combat Vehicles” with small armed mobile squads at different spots in the city as recommended by 26/11 Committee. Such squads are also used for intervention in violent crime scenes with success. It is however necessary that these squads are not diverted for other duties as was experienced in Mumbai before 26/11.

(iii) Overburdened Police Stations Earlier Position: 26/11 Committee had observed that priority for security duties in Mumbai city had forced the police to neglect normal policing. A senior police ofﬁcer had told the Committee that nearly 16,000-17,000 men were utilised for special duties like security, trafﬁc, special branches etc out of 40,000 strength leaving only

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

26/11 status appraisal

GROUND REALITIES rivalry and threat / regions of conflict. It would be useful to remember that historically India has been prey to centuries of invasions. In the Indian context, we must be careful and be prepared to tackle demographic invasion (illegal migration, illegal infiltration) economic, industrial, psychological, religious, chemical, biological and nuclear invasion. Just ten terrorists who came to Mumbai by sea from Pakistan did not allow over one crore population of Mumbai to rest peacefully for almost three days! For three days our nation was held to ransom! Just one incident of 26/11 changed the concept and form of invasion and importance of coastal security. Asia-Pacific (Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean) region has emerged as region for further economic growth, trade, commerce, new geopolitical, geostrategic and geoeconomic equations. From Indonesia to Israel almost all countries are facing some form of conflict resulting in an enlarged zone / region of rivalries and conflict. The emergence of Arab Spring has added an entirely new diamension to internal conflicts, change of regime within the nation state totally supported, sustained and even militarily intervened by outside powers who wish to change ruling regime within a nation state. Due to its geographical location, connectivity, inter-dependability and geostrategic interests India cannot remain untouched and unconcerned.

INDIA’S EMERGING CONCERNS

26/11 A

AFTER

It would be useful to remember that historically India has been prey to centuries of invasions. In the Indian context, we must be careful and be prepared to tackle demographic invasion (illegal migration, illegal infiltration) economic, industrial, psychological, religious, chemical, biological and nuclear invasion. Just ten terrorists who came to Mumbai by sea from Pakistan did not allow over one crore population of Mumbai to rest peacefully for almost three days! 66

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

n analytical study of 19th and 20th centuries reveals that 19th century witnessed new power equations which impacted the world of 20th century. 19th century was the century of muscle power which destroyed or weakened old empires thus setting the stage for emergence of new power centres of 20th century. Europe, Atlantic region and western world were the centre of gravity during major part of 20th century. The later part of 20th century witnessed the domination of the world by the so called two super powers United States of America and Soviet Union. The world witnessed a “bitter cold war rivalry” which created “maximum heat” in different regions of the world ranging from Korea, Indonesia, Cuba, Middle East, Egypt, Israel, Vietnam, Iraq-Kuwait, Balkans, North Africa, Iran, Soviet Union-Afghanistan and of course India and Pakistan too.

Neoteric Warfare

After the terrorist attack on USA on 9/11, the war against terrorism has generated new form of conﬂict, new form of

Expanding Maritime Frontiers

Indian Ocean region is now being redefined or reorganised as “Indian-Ocean Pacific Region” due to US strategic interests and forays into North Africa, Middle East, Central Asia, South Asia and East Asia. Therefore when we now discuss and analyse evolving geopolitical and geostrategic equations which are changing due to geoeconomic power equations in Indian Ocean Region, it would be prudent to include Suez region, Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden to Straits of Malacca and even up to Indonesian waters. It also must be considered that in 21st century due to increasing connectivity, interdependency, interoperability and transparency extended Indian Ocean Region and Asia Pacific Region is a home to approximately four billion people and 62 per cent GDP! By 2025 world’s leading economies are likely to be in this region and India is and will continue to be a major stakeholder and balancing pivot. This has been acknowledged by USA. New emerging environment and reality calls for a “reorientation” of India’s own mindset regarding its neighbourhood; area of dominance, area of influence, area of immediate interests, area of contemporary geoeconomic, geopolitical and geostrategic interests combind with “extent of sustainable and lasting outreach”. There are as many as 36 countries on the periphery of Indian Ocean. Majority of them are glued to religious and ideological leanings or attachment. Most of these countries have got involved or sucked into inter-state and intra-state conflicts. The boundary issue with Pakistan and China and also terrorism, insurgency, encouraged, sponsored, supported and sustained by both our neighbours became an impediment to India’s desired focus towards Indian Ocean Region and our maritime and coastal security.

India’s Benign Role

Some of the state governments tend to impede the initiative taken by the central government to resolve the issues and create good environment with our neighbours. For their narrow, momentary political gains they tend to overlook and sacriﬁce long-term strategic interests of India as a nation. It is an issue for serious consideration that after the event like 26/11, attack on our Parliament, murder of our young and promising Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, increasing threats of terrorism, Maoism / Naxalism, illegal migration, drugs, weapons smuggling and so on the state governments must also assist the central government to ensure “Integrated and Comprehensive National Security of India”. For this everyone must keep aside the narrow, momentary, political interests leaving ideology aside to ensure security, stability and prosperity of India.

LT GENERAL (DR) DB SHEKATKAR PVSM, AVSM, VSM (RETD)

The writer has served as Additional Director General Military Operations and Additional Director General Perspective (Strategic) Planning at Army Headquarters, New Delhi. Presently he is the National President of Forum for India’s Integrated National Security and Samarth Bharat Vyas Peeth.

To highlight India’s capabilities and maturity in dealing with our neighbours to strengthern themselves just two examples are Maldives and Sri Lanka. India’s assistance to Maldives to ensure security and stability when the government was almost taken over by the undesirable elements, which could have changed security environment and geopolitical as well as geostrategic equations. But for India’s timely help the political map of Maldives would have been different today. India helped Sri Lanka also by sending peace keeping force (IPKF) to that country during “Operation Pawan”. I was Colonel General Staff (Col GS) of the Infantry Division which was earmarked for induction into Sri Lanka to restore peace, ensure stability of Sri Lanka. Due to the problems created by Pakistan on western border of India, the plan to ﬂy and induct Division into Jaffna was suddenly changed at the last minute and another Division based at Secunderabad was inducted in the initial phase of Operation Pawan. We were fully aware about the situation in Sri Lanka at that time. Despite all the criticism of the government of India for sending Indian Army into Sri Lanka, I would like to state with full responsibility if the government of India had not sent IPKF and saved Sri Lanka at a very crucial and critical time in the history of Sri Lanka, the political map of Sri Lanka would have impacted India too in the long-term. There were grand designs which would have seriously hurt India’s territorial, geopolitical and geostrategic interests. Young generation of India and specially Sri Lanka must be aware that it was India that prevented disintegration of Sri Lanka. In 2013 and since 26/11, Sri Lanka is gradually drifting away from India, thanks to the narrow, momentary and selﬁsh political interests of few in India. The forces of instability are active even today in both countries due to the encouragement and interests

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

26/11 status appraisal

GROUND REALITIES

China wanted to freeze any infrastructure development, force development, capacity building for combat capability and endurance. The aim was to force India to accept China’s proposal. Events in Ladakh region and Arunachal Pradesh in April-May-June 2013 were a deliberate play to force India to agree to China’s proposal. Pakistan helped China by reactivating India-Pakistan border in Jammu sector and LoC from Jammu to Rajouri to Kupwara by increased infiltration and LoC violations of few foreign powers. India could help both Sri Lanka and Maldives due to our combat capability and capacity. Both combat capacity and capability act as a difference which support diplomacy and geopolitics. In 21st century geopolitics and diplomacy will be increasingly supported by armed power. We have recently witnessed this in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and now in Syria.

Conjoin Forces Of Stability

India’s commanding position in the Indian Ocean Region gives us a unique opportunity to bring together the forces of stability in ensuring security of sea lines of communication and coastal region of other nations as well. This has gained importance after 26/11. Planned, sponsored, directed and executed by Pakistan’s ISI, Pakistan’s Army and Navy terrorist attack on Mumbai on 26/11, so forcefully demonstrated as to how indifferent we were to India’s coastal security and unfortunately we continue even today! The terrorist, separatist and insurgent groups are still very active in Philippines, Indonesia, Myanmar and Bangladesh. Because of the emergence of Al Qaeda and other terrorist organisations in Middle East, Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Egypt, Libya and beyond a new theatre of conflict has emerged. This has a bearing on India’s economy, trade, peace and security therefore India’s area of interest and influence will have to be extended as explained earlier. Now geopolitical equations will have to be considered and evolved to ensure security in Indian Ocean Region. Diego Garcia and Maldives will remain of special significance in Indian Ocean Region. Diego Garcia was

Diego Garcia

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

developed into a strategically important US naval and air base in Indian Ocean and played an important role during ﬁrst Gulf War, invasion of Afghanistan and invasion of Iraq. America’s lease period of Diego Garcia is likely to be over shortly. America has to look for an alternative in case the lease of the island is not renewed. The next best in close proximity is Maldives, where Chinese interest and inﬂuence is increasing day by day. Pakistan has been trying its best to establish a fundamentalistic regime. It is for this reason India is keeping leadership in Maldives engaged. India’s geographic location, India’s capability for dominance in Indian Ocean and proximity to Maldives is important to world powers specially to USA and could be a cause of concern to China as well as Pakistan.

Tool Of Instability

Both USA and China are enamoured of Pakistan for several reasons, however the most important of which is Pakistan’s geographic location which results in its strategic importance. Location, location and again location is everything when it comes to security and strategic consideration. Unfortunately since most of our so called experts are over influenced by western philosophy, we do not correlate the Chanakya’s philosophy which is ever relevant. Pakistan’s geographic location and connectivity is linked to America’s strategic interests in Afghanistan, Central Asia, Western flank of China, Eastern flank of Iran and Western flank of India. The same holds good for China too. China is keen to use Pakistan as captive and exclusive transit territory, transit route to Iran, Middle East, Arabian Sea and short route to Eastern coast of Africa. China is also using Pakistan to take care of Western and Southern flank of China, by Pakistan keeping India under pressure and also keep India focused towards Pakistan. India’s security mechanism got fooled and trapped and become Pakistan centric and totally ignoring China front! China is at least 30 years ahead of India in development of infrastructure and capacity building along India-China Line of Actual Control. We are now waking up to the emerging ground realities. It is for this reason China wanted to freeze any infrastructure development, force development, capacity building for combat capability and endurance. The aim was to force India to accept China’s proposal. Events in Ladakh region and Arunachal Pradesh in April-May-June 2013 were a deliberate play to force India to agree to China’s proposal. Pakistan helped China by reactivating India-Pakistan border in Al-Shabaab in Somalia Jammu sector and LoC from Jammu to Rajouri to Kupwara by increased infiltration and LoC violations. China’s overall interest is to extend, enlarge and consolidate China’s hold in Ladakh and Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) to include areas of Gilgit and Baltistan! Chinese help to insurgent groups operating in North-east India and Naxalites in 11 states of India to keep India focused 36 countries on the periphery of Indian Ocean

on terrorism sponsored by Pakistan, Insurgency in North-east and Naxalites (Maoist) threats and thus slow down India’s combat building process and capacity building. The discovery of large deposits of minerals, fossil fuel oil in Central Asia and Afghanistan have pushed US and China’s interests in Pakistan. Pakistan does not fear depletion of America’s support no matter who rules Pakistan; irrespective of America’s cry for establishment and restoration of democracy; the creed much touted by USA around the world! India with its strong maritime and air capabilities has been attempting to play a key role in establishing peace and stability in the Indian Ocean region. However the mutual distrust between the rim countries, have prevented the creation of an overall security umbrella or architecture in the region despite interdependent and common security interests. India therefore has to play a key role to develop binding relations with rim countries (There is a need to reorientate our vision, philosophy, thinking and strategy). American leadership wants a stronger presence in the region to counter greater threats to stability and peace. America’s new diplomatic and military strategy is explicitly geared towards hacking the emerging threats from terrorists and from China’s massive and rapid build-up and growing economic, industrial, trade and diplomatic clout. This has encouraged America to reorient and refocus America’s military might from Atlantic to Paciﬁc and Indian Ocean. India is a major trustworthy nation in the region with geostrategic advantage.

US Opening To Iran

Latest American initative towards Iran is an indicator of possibility of new power equation may be by end of the second decade of 21st century. Americans and western world do not trust Pakistan any more. Osama bin Laden episode has shaken the faith and trust of USA and major western powers towards Pakistan. It is very likely that division of Pakistan is already on drawing boards of Western Powers! The aim seems to be to deprive Pakistan of sea coast which is linked to Balochistan and Sindh provinces of Pakistan. There seems to be very strong feeling and conviction in the western world that to combat terrorism effectively and establish peace, stability, prosperity in Afghanistan, Pakistan must be delinked from sea. Landlocked Pakistan will lose its geostrategic importance and will be of very limited signiﬁcance and use to anyone. Landlocked Pakistan will also impact China’s dependence on Pakistan. It will impact the concept of strong bonds, inter-dependence, lasting friendship between Pakistan and China may undergo a change if Pakistan is delinked from sea. It is a well-established fact once the western world specially America decides on a course of action it is always taken to a logical conclusion. There are no date-lines and time limits. However India will have to be very careful about such an eventuality. A further dismemberment of Pakistan may not be in India’s long-term interests. In any case no government in India has ever considered such an eventuality and it is unlikely in future also. India has always been keen on stable, prosperous, peaceful and friendly Pakistan. The episode of 26/11 has undone every initative of India. To marginalise and neutralise Pakistan’s geostratagic importance it will be in America’s long-term geoeconomic and geostrategic

Power Balance

Improved and friendly relations between America and Iran will change all geopolitical and geostrategic power equations in South Asia, Indian Ocean Region, Middle East and even in Central Asia. It may sound impractical at the moment but is going to become a reality well before 2025. Stable and friendly Iran west of India and peaceful, progressive, prosperous and stable Myanmar east of India will be in the long-term geopolitical interest of India, USA and entire Indian Ocean Region. To ensure stability and security there is a need to ensure “power balance”. Historically in international relations a power imbalance has always led to instability and eventually to war or conflict. As the events since 2001 across the world suggest that in 21st century power imbalance will not only encourage inter-state wars / conflicts but more importantly, will encourage unconventional, low intensity wars / conflicts and also internal instability and conflict as we have recently witnessed in Tunisia, Yemen, Libya and are now witnessing in Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. A stronger power will try to achieve influence and dominance. While India has never been nor in future would wish to dominate any one we must ensure that no one else is in a position to dictate terms to us either. For this it is essential to build, maintain a credible deterrent and military capability to respond to any emerging situation at a short notice to guard India’s interests. Apart from ensuring India’s territorial integrity, we now need to also focus and reorient our philosophy to protect India’s national interests. It is for serious consideration that India’s governing, diplomatic and security mechanism, vision, philosophy and strategy must change from self-imposed doctrine and label of “Indian Defence Forces” to “Indian Armed Forces”. Finally it is also recommended that cooperative and convergent approaches to integrated and comprehensive security of Indian Ocean Region will be a potential source of regional peace, stability and prosperity. This would encourage nation state to develop new cooperative and convergent security structure. There will be a shift from confrontation to cooperation and engagement which would lead us and our coming generations towards a bright, positive and prosperous future.

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

internal security

UNIQUE CAPABILITIES

OPERATIONAL ART OF

LEADERSHIP SKILLS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENTS O

perational art is creative thinking resulting in a unifying process of course of actions to achieve the goal, enhancing the forces capability, strengthening the intellectual frame and increasing accountability of risk management at all levels. This holistic approach reduces tactical dilemma in the operational environment when unconventional crisis scenario of hyper-targeted violence are encountered. A battlefield mind is a mind, which is resilient, “toughened up”. A resilient mind is able to operate in high performance even under combat or operational stress while in the field, has psychological survival “know-how” and does not get affected with trauma or PTSD. Battlefield mind is a warrior mind-set consisting of two things: 1. Clarity of goals 2. Will to move forwards But this mind-set is only developed when there is a culture of leadership in the organisation and a climate, which promotes and strengthens the operational leadership skills mentioned below. An organisational design based on strategic leadership skill, at all levels work in the parameters of: Keeping a broad perspective Having a strategic view Having situational awareness of the environmental sensitivity A team design based on leadership intelligence is: Action-oriented Flexibility in terms of interoperability Result-focus A personnel design based on self-leadership skill is:

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

Managing inter-personal sensitivity Communication Stress management and utilisation Technology competency

Character Of An Operational Leader Leadership is a strategic skill, which comes through an orchestrated immersion and then application of force multipliers in the environment. Awareness and Leadership, they must have communication and synchronisation and a deliberate doctrine to swarm and decentralise the negative environment created by the challenge. Prober Locator Ability to rise above personal weaknesses Ability to look at issues as whole and in parts and having a bird’s view as well as awareness to levels of details to lead the team during critical and non-critical situations Investigator Forming conclusion thinking and analysis

through

Extender critical Approachable attitude for creating openness in the team, promoting thought-exchange and ﬁnding avenues to help convert thoughts into actions

Detector Ability to anticipate and decipher problems. Director In creative words: be a sensor and a beacon To lead efﬁciently through all situations and crisis by having a premeditated mind to others Helper Ability to support others and be a mentor

Checker Ability to be non-biased and allow a ﬂexible feedback loop

Leader To have self-leadership qualities

Follower Ability to be a leader and a follower to promote interdependence and cohesiveness in the team

Antecedents: Leaders can manipulate antecedents in the environment, to increase positive behaviour when they apply different roles with awareness. When the tools of strategic leadership are applied, an awareness of force multipliers is created and this generates intrinsic motivational attitude. People rise to the challenge when it’s their challenge. Conﬁdent leaders disperse discretion and autonomy, give visibility and recognition and build strong relationships.

DR RUPALI JESWAL

The writer is an Intelligence and Terrorism Analyst, Operational Psychologist and Clinical Hypnotherapist based in South-East Asia. She has also received training in specialised areas including counterterrorism,intelligence and tactical operations. She specialises in cognitive learning processes and neural pathway response and how these factors apply to specialised trainings. She is an expert in the ﬁeld of non-verbal micro and macro expression for deception and detection and also using non-verbal assets for psychological self-assessment in conjunction with Emotional Intelligence to enhance the human mind, personality, image and spirit. She is the Director of Counter Extremism Research & Training Program: IACSPSEA (International Association for Counter-Terrorism and Security Professionals, South-East Asia) and member APA (American Psychological Association), APP (Association of Professional Psychologists), FPRI (Foreign Policy Research Institute) and UK Certiﬁed Hypnotherapist and General Hypnotherapy Register. She is CEO of Xiphos-ISS, a multidisciplinary training organisation and Chief of Training Operations, DX India.

The above factors are a Force Design, which is creative and intelligent, proactive rather than reactive thus creating effectiveness. Leadership is a combination of strategy and character. If you must be without one, be without the strategy. —Gen H Norman Schwarzkopf

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

internal security

UNIQUE CAPABILITIES

Strategic guidance helps the mechanism of the policing system and looks into solutions to reach the best effective way to attain the objective of the target-mission.

This strategic mission has a thinking cycle, which is encompassed by exterior responsibility. Exterior responsibilities are:

Planning guidance helps in trainings, keeping staff-capabilities continuum to take the solutions from strategic guidance and convert them into best effective tools for action. All this leads to clear analysis of the mission objective, inﬂuencing performance positively, followed by assessing best practice ﬁtting the facility, implementation of it, evaluating assumed discrepancies and developing assumptions as guidelines to assist in reducing errors.

 Building and maintaining political and legal support for the services  Ensuring the facility has the capability to support the services  Deﬁning the value and accountability to the public of its services

Leadership is a mission-critical intelligence and it is not just about leading others but leading oneself ﬁrst. When an individual leads from within she / he sets the pattern for leadership culture for the whole unit / team.

The cognitive cycle phase uses perception through observation and assessment, understanding of it and the meaning-making units of it – Reasoning (Reasoning employs a road map to develop core strategy and the ways to implement it with full effectiveness).

The dependent variable is the ofﬁcer’s commitment and the commitment is correlated to intrinsic motivational factors. Motivationally-signiﬁcant goals are more attractive to pursue.

A strategic thinker acquires and employs insight based on past and current experience and then with insertion of creativity, intuition and conceptual thinking to develop foresight for projection of future status.

As shown in this illustration the motivational process for a goal starts with instinct approach (what we naturally are good at) and if it satisﬁes our needs, if not then we need an incentive to move forward, once the right incentive is found it triggers an arousal state of wanting to move forward using our cognitive and emotional make-up and we succeed in reaching our goal.

Strategic levers include what stakeholders value and matching those levers with the capability of the organisation. Leadership skill is a mission-critical intelligence.

Through inspiring leadership strategies the ofﬁcers’ commitment and motivation converge and connect resulting in high performance. A strategic thinker sees issues in the context of systems and their relationships to other systems (in parts and whole).

The table below is adapted from a book, Smart Thinking by Jeri Wilson and Lesley Wing (2008). Exclusive distribution to the members of primary English teaching association, Australia. I have taken the teacher’s approach to promote learning in their students and have applied it as concepts on the roles of leadership, because a leader is also a teacher in many ways.

Roles

Characteristics

Leader as an Assessor

 Gauge prior knowledge, experience and interest.  Monitor groups and individual progress; install peer review process and mentoring programmes.  Support self-assessment and ways to develop professionally and personally.  Be able to reﬂect on their own practice and accept feedback on their performance and improve further.

Leader as a Questioner and Challenger

 Provide an appropriate and timely level of challenge and speciﬁc feedback for each individual on their strengths and weakness.  Encourage questions and make time to ﬁnd answers together through appreciative inquiry where the weakness is transformed into strengths.

Leader as a Model and Coach

 Demonstrate strategies that you wish to facilitate with reasoning and specifics on the goal objectives.  Make thinking visible through sharing of ideas, brainstorming and making learning applicable.  Lay out your expectations and assessment requirements clearly with an approachable attitude.  Encourage measured risk-taking to encourage interdependence and building self-confidence.  Have enthusiasm for reflective thinking strategies through crafted continuous trainings.

Leader as Strategic Planner

 Implement methods, which are appropriate for the learning in context and purpose and matching the unit and individual qualiﬁcations, skills and capabilities.  Understand each individual’s needs and use this information for timely choices about tasks and grouping arrangement during operations.  Allow time to staff to practice what is learnt.

Strategic thinker is able to consider a broad range of alternatives when addressing a challenge and employ different forms of thinking:  Conceptual – knowing and understanding the endgame due to the course of action chosen which are simultaneous and in-depth.  Creative – applying leverage in managing synergies, anticipating and creating balance between capabilities, skills and course of action.  Intuitive and insight – to manage timing of action and tempo, knowing the operational reach and avenues and methods of approach.  Sense making and mindfulness – of the forces and their functions which are asset-based to produce optimal advantage in containing or neutralising the threat and crisis.  Holistic and divided – to understand the entire system of operation in whole and parts and delegate responsibilities matching capabilities and level of skills. Knowing how to lead through direct or indirect command during direct vs indirect threats.  Sequential and simultaneous – information and commands to focus on the ﬂuid centre of gravity (COG), decisive points of opportunities and vulnerabilities in the course of action.  Network and individual – team communication systems, interpersonal relations, managing motivation, instigating self-leadership skills, tools for fear management, critical thinking and post-incident debrieﬁng.  Analytic and logical – premeditated plans for culmination and termination of the operation.

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

internal security

UNIQUE CAPABILITIES

What effect do leadership trainings have?

A culture of leadership provides cohesive quality to the unit, a clear sense of the unit’s importance, unique capabilities and dedication to professionalism. This culture also cultivates “mirroring” and others learn through examples of what they observe in their organisation, which is also known as visual conditioning. Leadership as mission-critical intelligence, that focuses on the levers that drive creation, value incubation and ﬁnally harvesting of leadership skills, mobilisation and empowerment in the team. This is returned to the organisation through empowerment of their employees, amassing professionalism and bringing trust in the communities of their safety, leadership skills and gathering of mentors. This leads to true capacity development and building in motion.

Latent Behaviour And Performance Markers Of Leadership Culture

Interpersonal skills use self-science, emotional intelligence and understanding our own behaviour-response system. Ability to build teams uses art of communication along with emotional intelligence principles, which makes a leader know how others feel and think.

During crisis the effect and affect of high performance leadership, well-being and survival of the leader and the ones being led is witnessed, during this phase the intensity of intrinsic motivation in the form of trust and confidence in an individual and a team greatly depends on the quality of the leader who guides decisions and actions

Adaptability is utilisation of the strengths within an individual and motivates others to move forward, especially during time of crisis. This has much to do with stress-response system. In other words the ability to instill positive self-inﬂuence, which emphasises concepts of self-navigation, self-control and self-management.

As a broader construct, self-leadership encompasses a set of three complementary cognitive and behavioural strategies, which impact subsequent outcomes. These are: A) Behaviour-focused strategies B) Natural reward strategies C) Constructive thought pattern strategies (“Self-leadership skills and innovative behaviour at work”. Abraham Carmeli, Graduate School of Business Administration and Department of Political Science, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan, Israel and Ravit Meitar and Jacob Weisberg, Graduate School of Business Administration, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan, Israel. The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available at www.emeraldinsight.com/0143-7720.htm) Learning occurs as a ‘response’ to certain deﬁnite and identiﬁable stimuli in one’s environment. Learning activities in constructivist settings are characterised by: active engagement, inquiry, problem solving and engagement with others. Leadership culture is to foster an “organisational climate” where these elements are produced, recognised and practiced:

Clarify

Create

Measure

Recognise

Reinforce

Reward

Mentor In general we are all aware of the components of leadership: i) Interpersonal skills ii) Ability to build and lead teams iii) Adaptability

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

Monitor

Future warfare mentioned in this report is the present state now, correlating with studies which have identified that our bag of competencies must include: “ an ability to deal with cognitive complexity, tolerance of ambiguity, intellectual flexibility, a meaningful level of self-awareness and an enhanced understanding of the relationships among organisational sub-systems that collectively construct the prevailing ‘climate’ ”

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

internal security

UNIQUE CAPABILITIES

26/11 status appraisal

SOUL-SEARCHING

Leadership Style Behaviours in the Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire (MLQ) Short Form.

Leadership Style

Behaviour

Description

Transformational

Idealised Inﬂuence

The leader acts as and is perceived as a strong role model for followers. The leader is respected and trusted by followers and provides a sense of both mission and vision that others want to follow. The leader communicates high expectations for performance. Through images and emotional appeals, the leader inspires followers to pursue a shared vision over individual self-interests.

Transactional

Non-transactional

Intellectual Stimulation

The leader stimulates and encourages both creativity and innovation. The leader provides an environment fostering experimentation, empowerment and new approaches to problem solving.

Individualised Consideration

The leader actively listens to and cares about the individual needs of followers. The leader acts as a mentor or coach and provides attention and direction to followers individually.

Contingent Reward

The leader achieves agreement and performance from followers through negotiated exchange. The leader uses positive reinforcement to encourage followers to achieve outcomes.

Management-by-Exception

The leader uses corrective criticism, negative feedback and negative reinforcement to encourage followers to achieve outcomes.

Laissez-Faire Leadership

The leader minimises exchange with followers and allows followers to “do their own thing” with minimal intervention, feedback or support.

K Lowe, KG Kroeck and N Sivasubramaniam, “Effectiveness Correlates of Transformational and Transactional Leadership: A Meta-Analytic Review of the MLQ Literature,” The Leadership Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 3, 1996, pp 385–425. The MLQ short form (MLQ-6S) was developed by Bernard Bass and Bruce Avolio and is available through the Center for Leadership Studies at Binghamton University) During crisis the effect and affect of high performance leadership, well-being and survival of the leader and the ones being led is witnessed, during this phase the intensity of intrinsic motivation in the form of trust and confidence in an individual and a team greatly depends on the quality of the leader who guides decisions and actions. A 1982 report from the Walter Reed Army Institute for Research noted that leaders must sustain “intellectual and cognitive effort” when future warfare will have a pace, intensity and technological complexity of unprecedented dimensions. (Walter F Ulmer, “Military Leadership into the 21st century: Another ‘Bridge Too Far?” Parameters 38 (Spring 1998):7) The future warfare mentioned in this report is the present state now, correlating with studies which have identified that our bag of competencies must include: “an ability to deal with cognitive complexity, tolerance of ambiguity, intellectual flexibility, a meaningful level of self-awareness and an enhanced understanding of the relationships among organisational sub-systems that collectively construct the prevailing “climate.” These would supplement timeless leader qualities: integrity, high energy, courage and commitment to institutional values.” (Walter F Ulmer, “Military Leadership into the 21st century: Another ‘Bridge Too Far?” Parameters 38 (Spring 1998):7)

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

PM KAMATH

The writer is a former Professor of Politics in University of Bombay; he guided sixteen students for their PhD, one of which was on Terrorism as an Instrument of Foreign Policy. He is currently, Director, VPM’s Centre for International Studies and Adjunct Professor, Department of Geopolitics and International Relations, Manipal University, Manipal.

FIVE YEARS AFTER 26/11 A CRITICAL APPRAISAL

From the debates in Lok Sabha, it is clear that federal government also considered their role ends with transmitting message to state governments. State administrative heads also merely forwarded intelligence inputs received to police department. Hence, international terrorism should be added to the Union List in the Indian Constitution to make it pretty clear that it is federal responsibility. In the nation’s fight against international terrorism, it should be left to the military or quasi-military forces to decide on the right course of action in consultation with the political leadership.

n 26 November 2013, Indian memory completes ﬁve years after they experienced directly or indirectly, as citizens of the entire country but particularly those who live in Mumbai and abroad, the unique seaborne Pakistani Army blessed, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) promoted, Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) organised international terrorist attacks on Mumbai – the economic gateway of India. In some ways it is comparable to the US experience of 9/11 international terrorist attacks seven years earlier.

Comparison Of 9/11 And 26/11

A comparison between the two heinous international terrorist attacks is not directly relevant to the topic under review. But it should help us to critically appraise Indian record of handling the international terrorist threats

constantly faced by India even after 26/11 in contrast to the way Americans tackled it. Foreign terrorists, in the case of 9/11 demonstrated their ingenuity in using the American aircraft to hit targets American within the US which was a novel way of attacking a super power, until then not used in the history of terrorism. In the case of 26/11, while India was accustomed to cross-border terrorism promoted from across the borders, Pakistani terrorists used sea for the ﬁrst time to conduct long-distance terrorist attacks on Indian targets by using India-registered boat, Kuber by capturing it from its owner, Amar Singh Solanki after beheading him. Both – Indian and American terrorist experiences were fully loaded with international impact. In Indian targets, at least 23 foreigners were killed while in attack

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

26/11 status appraisal

SOUL-SEARCHING

on World Trade Center, at New York, of the 3,300 killed, 327 were foreigners. However, two major differences, between 9/11 and 26/11, in our efforts to ﬁnd similarities, should not be lost sight of. First, the US attack was planned by a global terrorist network, Al Qaeda founded by Osama bin Laden. However, Mumbai attack was planned, controlled, ﬁnanced and executed by ISI, under the control of Pakistan’s Army. Its chosen instrument was a well funded, superbly trained and totally ISI / Pakistan Army protected terrorist group – LeT. Second and the most important for my purpose, however, is the fact that after 2001 Americans have seen to it, through various national and international steps taken that the US mainland is well protected as no terrorist attack inside the US has taken place since then. But in case of India, Pakistan-trained Pakistanis and Indians of Islamic faith have operated with impunity in conducting terrorist attacks within India. Pakistan promoted terrorist groups have continued to carry out, terrorist attacks on Indian interests at will directly or with its subsidiary sleeper cells lying dormant in India. India has faced beginning from January 2009 to October 2013 nearly 16 terrorist attacks. Indian government in power 2008-2013 has been out of sync to promote and protect Indian national security. How do we then explain the Indian failure to perform its primary task of protecting Indians’ limb and life and property?

What Went Wrong?

We can understand what needs to be done to make Indian motherland safe against international terror attacks only with knowledge: What went wrong that made the nation to suffer most humiliating scenario of not being able to protect itself from external terrorist attacks? Best place to get some illuminating clues is to read Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh’s 11 December 2008 speech in Parliament. He looks at international terrorism’s highest aim as being intended to create communal divide. The Prime Minister is wrong. Communal divide is a minor collateral consequence of Pakistan-promoted terrorism. However, its ultimate aim in promoting terrorism in India is: Disintegration of India by causing irreparable political and economic damages to Indian interests. This was acknowledged by General Pervez Musharraf when he said that main problem with India is its size. If India disintegrates most of the security threats from it will also disappear. Hence, terrorism is the ﬁrst line of defence for Pakistan’s Army.

Worse still, along with existing agencies like Intelligence Bureau (IB), Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), for foreign intelligence gathering and several others with military intelligence, naval intelligence and air intelligence wings etc when you set up so many institutions to protect national security, there is an imperative need also to have national level policy and intelligence coordination at the highest level of the government

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

There was also no proper analysis of available intelligence. The top ofﬁcials in the federal government in Delhi and in Mumbai were only acting as channels through which intelligence moved, without most of them applying their mind, energy and time to understand the impending crisis. Though the Pradhan Committee did not comment on political level policy making, certain policy fault lines can easily be mentioned. There is an urgent need to correct certain misconceptions in decision-making that came out during the 26/11 mishandling. Since handling terrorism is not a law and order problem, there seem to be no lessons learnt in federal government’s tackling of international terror attacks. From the debates in Lok Sabha, it is clear that federal government also considered their role ends with transmitting message to state governments. State administrative heads also merely forwarded intelligence inputs received to police department.

No Correct Analysis

P Chidambaram who had then become Home Minister said intelligence was not actionable! What does he mean? Does he expect accurate description of targets, perpetrators’ names and the exact date of attack! Raw intelligence is never so clear! Intelligence analysts have to obviously analyse from their experiences and determine its reliability before dismissing it as non-actionable! “Non-actionable intelligence” has now become a standard phrase among politicians and top bureaucrats to cover up their failures. Looking at the targets attacked, CST the busiest railway terminus, or like Taj and Oberoi – the luxury hotels where international and national businessmen who come on economic activities stay were mentioned in intelligence received. As a result, in the absence of correct analysis of the intelligence talented police officers went with their service revolvers and with a posse of constables armed with traditional lathis in hands and bravery in hearts and do or die attitude in their minds! While best officers died in action in the terrorists’ chosen grounds, IAS officers in Maharashtra government’s political and top officials in administrative echelons sitting in their air-conditioned chambers did not act on the very vital intelligence. Additional Chief Secretary, Home Department did not even know that she had received such an intelligence brief! No action of any kind was taken against these officials. If it is said that we learn from experience, state officials refused to learn, as though it is not in their jurisdiction. Indian security establishment is known for pronouncing grandiose policies to protect and promote Indian national security but equally known for diluting them. Classical case of diluting tantamounts to non-implementation is Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh’s announcement of calling offdialoguewithPakistanasaresponseto26/11,tillitprosecutes perpetrators of crime of international terrorism. However, under the pressure from the US, he initiated composite dialogue under a convoluted logic, as reflected in the Joint Statement issued by Prime Minister Singh and Pakistani PM, Gilani, at Sharm-el-Sheikh when it said: “Action on terrorism should not be linked to the composite dialogue process and these should not be bracketed.” The wavering Indian resolve to seek trial of the brains behind international terrorism in the last five years, has made the real brain, Hafiz Sayeed, behind 26/11 not only to roam free, despite a US prize on his head and Pakistan’s commitment to the UN Security Council

to ban his newly created Jamat-ud Dawa in December 2008. Now, news is that Pakistani Federal Investigation Agency says that global terrorist outﬁt, LeT is now defunct!

Italian tanker

What Needs To Be Done?

Hence, it should clearly be understood that international terrorism is a national security threat; its use against India is equivalent to waging war against India. The 26/11 was investigated at the administrative level by High Level Enquiry Committee under RD Pradhan as chairman. The administrative level report, musters courage to describe 26/11 as a “Warlike planned terrorist attack.” Then, it is not a matter of law and order. If you accept this as a correct prognosis, then the nation’s policy makers have to consider international terrorism to be dealt by the Federal Government as safeguarding nation’s unity and integrity is the task assigned to the nation’s armed forces. Hence, international terrorism should be added to the Union List in the Indian Constitution to make it pretty clear that it is federal responsibility. In the nation’s ﬁght against international terrorism, it should be left to the military or quasi-military forces to decide on the right course of action in consultation with the political leadership. Naturally then, trial of captured foreign terrorists must be conducted by the military courts with limited option of appeal. There is also the need for ﬁxing correct political and administrative accountability. Though nominally, it was secured at the state level by making Home Minister, RR Patil and Chief Minister, Vilasrao Deshmukh to resign. But even before bloodstains of the 26/11 outside the Taj or CST faded, RR Patil came back to his old portfolio while Deshmukh was accommodated at the federal level!

Federal Hiatus

At the Federal level, there was no sense of political or administrative failure; hence, no question was raised of enforcing accountability for the failure either. Under the new Home Minister, P Chidambaram, a National Investigation Agency (NIA) was created to handle investigations of terrorist attacks in the country. A super-secret electronic gathering agency, National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) has been created. For coordination of policy on terrorism, National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC) was also proposed. While NIA and NTRO have been set up, NCTC is bogged down in a dispute between rights of states vs federal powers. Worst still, along with existing agencies like Intelligence Bureau (IB), Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), for foreign intelligence gathering and several others with military intelligence, naval intelligence and air intelligence wings etc when you set up so many institutions to protect national security, there is an imperative need also to have national level policy and intelligence coordination at the highest level of the government. This can be done in a democracy only at the political level. It is because long back Harvard Professor, who served as National Security Adviser to John F Kennedy and Lyndon B Johnson

said: “Coordination is power and only he who has the power can coordinate.” Since in India ultimate power lies with the Prime Minister (normally), he or his National Security Adviser should alone coordinate with well established publicly known machinery.

These shortcomings of policy are further aggravated by policy makers’ irresistible temptation to introduce communal angle to show that not all terrorist attacks are perpetrated by Muslims! Defunct NSC

To achieve that very purpose, NDA government led by the BJP had created in 1998 a National Security Council (NSC) with a National Security Adviser (NSA) and then existing Joint Intelligence Committee acting as the National Security Secretariat. But in practice it was used only once for national security policy making during the Kargil War, instead, the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) was used in practice. When I asked George Fernandes about it, he had told me that many think that NSC is only duplicating existing arrangement for policy coordination! NDA also used the post of NSA as a second hat of Vajpayee’s Secretary, Brajesh Mishra. However, UPA since 2004 only used the NSA post to accommodate JN Dixit, MK Narayanan and Shivshankar Menon, without ever worrying about security policy coordination! While NDA had used NSC at least once, UPA has not even mentioned existence of NSC even once. Revival of NSC with clear mandate is an absolute need. Certain steps to strengthen coastal security to prevent use of seas were promised by the UPA government. But experience has shown, at least from two instances of foreign ships – Italian tanker firing on fishermen of Kerala in February 2012 and US ship, Seaman Guard Ohio laden with undeclared arms intruding into India’s exclusive territorial waters – in October 2013 show how vulnerable is coastal security to seaborne attacks! These instances, with reports on coastal policemen unable to swim in sea or delay in buying bulletproof speedboats equipped with radars, GPS and marine communication facilities can only enhance sense of vulnerability of Mumbai for another seaborne attack! These shortcomings of policy are further aggravated by policy makers’ irresistible temptation to introduce communal angle to show that not all terrorist attacks are perpetrated by Muslims! Thus, Indian policy making is vitiated by the dangerous mix of communal politics with national security thereby only compromising efficacy of security policy!

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

26/11 status appraisal

GAPS GALORE

UNDERESTIMATED THREAT FROM SEA Marine Police

The Indian Navy has been made responsible for overall maritime security including coastal and offshore security. The navy is assisted by ICG, marine police, customs and other agencies. JOC’s at Mumbai, Kochi, Visakhapatnam and Port Blair have been established under the Commanders-in-Chief of Navy, who are designated as Commanders-in-Chief Coastal Defence. These JOCs are jointly manned and operated by the IN and ICG personnel. But chronic turf wars and bureaucratic wrangles bog down multi-agency coordination.

ndia has nine coastal states, four Union Territories (UTs) with 7,516 kilometre-long coastline running along Indian Peninsula and the island territories. 2.172 million kilometre square of Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), 13 major and 183 minor ports and 25 population centres are located along the coastline. Maritime security is an important matter with regards to safeguarding country’s maritime boundary, EEZ, strategic installations, coast, ports and population centres and preventing piracy, terrorism, trafﬁcking, crime, poaching and marine pollution. Indians, proscribed by religion and customs to shun sea voyage have been complacent towards maritime threats and vulnerabilities. It is rather difﬁcult to justify that as to why a nation has ignored 7,516-kilometre-long coastline and an expansive EEZ, which is no less important than its 15,106-kilometre-long land borders.

Threats And Vulnerabilities

Sub-conventional threats from land, air and sea are not new to India. We have had insurgents and terrorists ﬂitting across the porous land borders with Pakistan, Nepal,

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

Bangladesh and Myanmar. In December 1995, several hundred AK-47 rifles and a large quantity of ammunition were air-dropped by a foreign aircraft over Purulia, West Bengal. In April 2004, truckloads of arms and ammunition – enough to equip an infantry division were off-loaded at a jetty in Chittagong harbour in Bangladesh. Inquiries later revealed that the consignment was ferried through the sea route and meant for United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA). India’s preoccupation with the management of disputed land borders with neighbouring countries and inherent conventional and sub-conventional threats since 1950’s, had blurred the threat perception of its security planners as regards to maritime threats. Traditionally economic offences, crimes and infiltration were main maritime threats that the country had envisaged. Prolonged conflict in Sri Lanka witnessed the use of Tamil Nadu coast by Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) for sustaining their struggle. OperationTasha was launched by Indian Navy (IN) in June 1990 to stop infiltration by Sri Lankan Tamils and LTTE cadres. Despite similar and

much vigorous efforts by Sri Lankan Navy, the operation was unsuccessful in plugging the porous Palk Strait and Gulf of Mannar. March 1993 Mumbai blasts shattered our orthodox threat perception about the security of urban centres. Investigations also revealed that the explosive used in the blasts was smuggled in from Pakistan and had landed at Shekhadi coast in Raigad, Maharashtra in fishing boats. In April 1993, Operation Swan was launched with an aim to stop clandestine landings and infiltration along Gujarat and Maharashtra coasts. It was intended to evolve a multi-layered surveillance and patrolling system involving IN, Indian Coast Guard (ICG), customs and local fishermen. However, the operation despite being in currency for 15 long years did not succeed. Kargil Review Committee constituted after Kargil War – 1999 had recommended having a de novo look at the country’s security apparatus. A Task Force was thus set up to examine border management problems, which prescribed strengthening of ICG, setting up of Joint Operation Centres (JOC), streamlining of vessel traffic management procedures, installation of static radars along the coast, raising of marine police, setting up of additional coastal police stations and issue of identity cards to fishermen as part of comprehensive coastal security policy. Post-Mumbai blasts, India took 15 years to realise that the maritime threats spectrum spans from petty crimes to high profile terror attacks. In Special Forces’ parlance, 26/11 attack was a novel plan – unorthodox, audacious and swift; unleashed upon an unsuspecting country, which has repeatedly failed to learn from its own or other’s mistakes. A band of 10 terrorists held Mumbai – the economic capital of India, hostage for four days, killing 166 and injuring hundreds of people.

Coastal Security Scheme

In 2005, to improve patrolling and surveillance of the coasts, Coastal Security Scheme (CSS)-Phase I was launched. It involved setting up of 73 coastal police stations, 97 check posts and 58 outposts; provision of land and sea mobility assets and allied infrastructure from central government’s assistance in all coastal states and UT’s. States’ marine police force was also raised under this scheme. CSS-Phase I was declared completed in March 2011. Post-26/11, coastal states and UTs were asked to carry out threat analysis in consultation with ICG and project their additional requirements. In April 2011, CSS-Phase II was launched. It envisaged setting up of additional 121 coastal police stations, upgradation of 20 existing police stations in A&N Islands and construction of 60 jetties along with provision of motorised boats and other vehicles by 2016. However, the implementation of CSS, despite centre’s generous funding has been patchy. In October this year, the Department of Border Management, Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) reprimanded government of Maharashtra for having failed to set up seven coastal police stations – three out of 12 sanctioned in CSS-Phase I

and four out of seven from Phase II. Similarly, three jetties, which were to be constructed along Maharashtra coast for berthing the interceptor boats during CSS-Phase II were also not ready.

Identiﬁcation Friend Or Foe

Maritime traffic is enormous; everyday about 8,000 fishing trawlers and boats are at sea, with no foolproof system of identification. Persistent problems of identification friend or foe (IFF) at sea were planned to be addressed by:

COLONEL US RATHORE (RETD)

The writer is a threat and risk analyst and defence and security expert.

 Registering all fishing and non-fishing boats under the department of shipping by assigning these numbers and different colour codes.  Fitting Automatic Identification System (AIS) Type-B transponders in all vessels, which are more than 20 metres in length. The vessels, which are less than 20 metres are to be fitted with Radio Frequency Identification Device (RIFD).  Issuing biometrics identity cards to 1.8 million coastal fishermen.  Issuing multi-purpose national identity cards for the population residing in coastal villages, towns and cities.

Multi-agency Coordination

Maritime security involves coordination with many ministries, state and UT governments, armed forces, departments and public sector undertakings. In August 2009, a National Committee for Strengthening Maritime and Coastal Security against threats from the sea was constituted under the cabinet secretary. In September 2010, Land Ports Authority of India, a statutory body under the MHA for administration and management of entry points and ports was formed.

Operational Coordination

The IN has been made responsible for overall maritime security including coastal and offshore security. The navy is assisted by ICG, marine police, customs and other agencies. JOC’s at Mumbai, Kochi, Visakhapatnam and Port Blair have been established under the Commanders-in-Chief of Navy, who are designated as Commanders-in-Chief Coastal Defence. These JOCs are jointly manned and operated by the IN and ICG personnel. The ICG has been additionally made responsible for coastal security in territorial waters including the areas to be patrolled by marine police. The Director General ICG is designated as Commander of Coastal Command. Considering the vulnerability of Gujarat and Maharashtra coasts, joint patrolling of coastal waters by IN, ICG, marine police and customs has been initiated. Three additional ICG stations at Dhanu and Murud Janjira in Maharashtra and Veraval in Gujarat were planned. Stations at Murud Janjira and Veraval have been operationalised.

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

26/11 status appraisal

GAPS GALORE

The architecture of the network is based on radar stations and VHF communication system, electro-optic sensors, Met sensors, AIS and transponder installed in the lighthouses along the coast. Each station is linked to the nearest ICG station, known as Remote Operating Station (ROS). The ROS is further linked to the Regional Operating Centre (ROC) at ICG Regional Headquarters at Mumbai, Gandhinagar, Chennai and Port Blair

An eight-year comprehensive security plan for A&N Islands has been drawn up in consultation with IN and ICG and approved. Standard operating procedures for all coastal states and UT’s has been ﬁnalised and issued. Joint coastal exercises Sagar Kavach involving all stakeholders are being held biannually.

Force Augmentation

Sagar Prahari Bal a 1,000-personnel strong force has been raised by IN for the protection of its bases and neighbouring vulnerable areas and points. Security of 12 major ports of the country has been transferred to Central Industrial Security Force. However,

Following the ‘son-of-the-soil’ policy ﬁshermen and villagers have been organised into Sagar Suraksha Dal and Gram Rakshak Dal, who take part in patrolling and surveillance exercises regularly.

The network will also be linked to the National Automatic Identiﬁcation System Network (NAIS) and Vessel Trafﬁc Management System (VTMS) installed at 12 major ports and Gulfs of Khambhat and Kutch. The data generated by these systems will be available to other agencies through National Command Communication Control and Intelligence Network (NC3I) operated by IN.

Coastal Surveillance System

Blind Spots

security norms for 183 minor ports are yet to be evolved.

A Coastal Surveillance Network project involving installation of static radars at 36 locations along the peninsular coast and 10 on the island territories in Phase I and 38 locations in Phase II has been undertaken. The network was conceptualised by the Group of Ministers on reforming national security system post-Kargil to plug the porosity of the coasts. The radar chain will be able to detect vessels ﬁtted with Type A or B transponders and will provide surveillance up to 25 Nautical Miles (nm).

Maritime security is all about raising a robust security infrastructure, forging coordination between stakeholders and following failsafe procedures. However, as a nation, project management is not our forte. Many a good projects ﬂounder due to their unenthusiastic implementation. Chronic turf wars and bureaucratic wrangles bog down multi-agency coordination.

In August 2012, radar cluster for Gujarat and Maharashtra coasts was unveiled. In September 2012, radar network for Kerala coast was operationalised. In November 2012, east coast network at Visakhapatnam was made operational. Phase I of the project which was to be completed by mid-2013 has lagged behind the schedule. In April 2013, the Cabinet also cleared the Phase II of the project.

The IN and ICG are struggling with shortage of ships and manpower. Their extended mandate on coastal security will strain the existing resources. There are differing perceptions about the roles and responsibilities. Post-26/11 the National Security Guards had established four regional hubs at Kolkata, Hyderabad, Chennai and Mumbai to cut down the reaction time. Efforts are afoot to establish a regional centre at Hyderabad. But due to expansion and decentralisation the NSG is facing shortage of manpower, equipment and aviation assets. Vulnerability from maritime threats has been highlighted since 1993, but the remedial measures were not taken up in the right earnest till 26/11 happened. State governments’ lackadaisical approach, despite complete funding from the centre in implementation of CSS is perplexing. In some cases the states have lagged behind in acquiring land for police stations, recruiting of personnel and maintenance of boats. Successive events in 2011 exposed our chinks in multi-agency coordination mechanism. In June, MV Wisdom – a 9,000-ton cargo ship drifted through the territorial waters of Mumbai and ran aground at Juhu. In August, MV Pavit – an oil tanker was stuck at Juhu. In the same month, MV Rak sank near Dahej, 20 nm off Mumbai coast raising the fears of marine pollution. In March 2013 a foreigner had sailed in his yacht from Goa to Mumbai and landed unannounced at Gateway of India. The sailor was not intercepted by any agency enroute. MV Seaman Guard Ohio – a US ship was nabbed in the territorial waters off Tuticorin coast, Tamil Nadu on

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

Crime and terrorism co-exist. Policy-makers fail to see this universal linkage. Dawood Ibrahim and Abu Salem were once petty criminals, before becoming gangsters and terror-facilitators. Criminals and smugglers had acted as conduits to bring in explosives used in 1993 Mumbai bomb blasts. Prevailing criminality of a region should therefore raise hackles of law enforcement agencies, as it can be made use of by terrorists

12 October 2013. It had a band of 25 men armed with assault rifles. The ship or the crew had no valid papers to support its claim that it was on private anti-piracy task. Use of small ships by non-state actors under the garb of anti-piracy operations could be a possibility. IFF still remains a serious problem in our marine security matrix. While a vessel fitted with AIS Type A or B transponders can be asked by a ship or radar to reveal its identity, the other crafts are plying without any IFF arrangement. Installation of RFID in such crafts is behind schedule. Cooperation from fishermen and coastal population is needed for the success of identification schemes, which is not forthcoming as experienced in fitting of RFID in fishing boats. In the aftermath of 26/11, Pradhan Committee was set up to suggest measures for securing Mumbai. Installation of CCTV cameras and establishing a surveillance grid in the city was one the recommendations of the committee. Since 2010, three Requests for Proposal have been issued by the state government but CCTV cameras for Mumbai are still a pipe dream. Crime and terrorism co-exist. Policy-makers fail to see this universal linkage. Dawood Ibrahim and Abu Salem were once petty criminals, before becoming gangsters and terror-facilitators. Criminals and smugglers had acted as conduits to bring in explosives used in 1993 Mumbai bomb blasts. Prevailing criminality of a region should therefore raise hackles of law enforcement agencies, as it can be made use of by terrorists. Unfortunately, Mumbai is known as ‘crime capital’ of country. Since 2008, Mumbai has topped the charts in having maximum Indian Penal Code cases among the cities. There is a need to curb the criminality in our society. The aim of terrorists is to challenge the authority of a nation by causing casualties and mayhem. Since there are many other soft targets strung along the coasts and land borders, Mumbai may or may not be revisited. An aerial threat like 9/11 is not an improbability. There is a need to strengthen the overall intelligence system, crisis response mechanism and basic policing to prevent the rerun of 26/11.

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

26/11 status appraisal

STRANGE STASIS

It is very clear from three incidents from three different cities over a period of one week that we have not learned any lessons from the 26/11 incident and if we have learned then we are not able to apply them within our system at pan-Indic level.

cities in the same proportion. As a result the smaller cities like Malegaon, Varanasi, Ayodhya, Gorakhpur, Panipat, Patna, Lucknow, Jaipur and Ahmedabad have been on the target of these terrorists in the recent times.

particularly after the inputs of Indian Mujahideen’s Darbhanga module was reported in the previous blast activity at Bodh Gaya.

Examples To Emulate

3. The failure of our intelligence agencies at some other fronts can also be underlined. Not only the agencies have failed to pre-access the terrorist activities but they have failed to analyse the motives, effect, the intensity and strength of the organisations involved in the act. The terrorist strike of 26/11 was at ﬁrst assumed as a probable gang war which resulted in a complete strategy fallout and failure. Recently in Muzaffarnagar the intensity and the magnitude of the incident was misjudged which resulted in a complete system collapse. In Gandhi Maidan, Patna the police seemed to be waiting for more blasts after the ﬁrst blast took place. In the absence of proper strategy and approach the system collapsed. This can be easily established by the fact that live bombs were recovered from the Gandhi Maidan even on the next day of the mega rally where lakhs of people had gathered the previous day.

It is an idiom that the misfortunes of others are occasion for learning for one, but unfortunately we have never learned from the past terrorist strikes in different parts of the globe including our own country. There are a series of such occasions. 1. After 9/11 the Americans acted fast and constituted a separate Department of Homeland Security in the State Department and assigned four important tasks. First: To keep an eye on the border and transportation security. Second: To carry out counter response in the case of emergency alert.

efore analysing the changes in the situation after five years of 26/11 it is important to have a look at some of the recent media reports. There were a series of blasts at Gandhi Maidan in the capital of Bihar, Patna during the BJP’s prime ministerial candidate Narendra Modi’s rally where six persons lost their lives and another 50 were injured. This incident took place even after the proposed rally was announced beforehand and the preparations were in full swing for the past three months. After the attack by three unidentified bikers on a couple resulting in the death of a woman, violence broke up in the city of Muzaffarnagar. The violent mob attacked the police and damaged public property. The police force stood helpless during these incidents. Panic gripped a crowded area in the heart of the city of Gorakhpur after an unclaimed bag was found on the 29th October evening. The police reached the site after 35 minutes and instead of checking the unclaimed bag became embroiled in a dispute over jurisdiction among two police stations. The action for evacuation of the area was executed only after an hour of the report. The process of identification and defusion of the explosive was carried out with extremely unprofessional and unscientific tools and methods for the next two hours. This was carried out when the point of the incident was merely 20 meters away from a petrol pump and 200 meters from a cracker market and jampacked with hundreds of people. It was a relief that there were no explosives in the bag otherwise there would have been devastating consequences. This was the picture of the police action in the city where three serial blasts took place in the year 2007.

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

No Lessons Fron 26/11

It is very clear from these three incidents from three different cities over a period of one week that we have not learned any lessons from the 26/11 incident and if we have learned then we are not able to apply them within our system at pan-Indic level. Though, it is visible in some selected cities with some question marks. It has been repeatedly said that the theatre of war in the twentyfirst century has become city centric rather than the borders. It is a global phenomenon. The cities around the world are on the target of terrorist organisations because these attacks give them more popularity and leave their long-term effect. The motives of these attacks are always well defined. Firstly, they aim at spreading their agenda across specific borders at the national and international level and secondly they aim to get a broader coverage in the national and international media and sensationalise their issue and reach out to the masses. For the past few years this phenomenon is spreading its tentacles towards the smaller towns from the big cities. This shift has some well defined motives. First the tightening up of the security and the upgraded skills of the forces in the capital and the bigger cities and secondly the reach of the electronic media which was confined to the bigger cities has spread itself to the smaller cities also. Now it is easy for them to achieve their target with a comparatively lesser risk as compared to the bigger cities. It is a fact that the terrorist organisations are continuously changing their strategic targets. The government and the security forces have failed to update and upgrade themselves for the security requirements of the smaller and the medium

Third: To analyse and transmit the information and inputs from the intelligence sources and to provide necessary inputs to the concerned agencies. Fourth: To ensure the critical infrastructure security in case of any WMD. This restructuring paved the way for good results and no big terrorist activities have been reported there since 2001.

No Paradigm Shift

At the same time in India these structural changes and their outputs were not considered and looked into even after 26/11 where the Home Ministry is solely responsible for looking after the internal security, central police forces, border management, VIP security, intelligence, Jammu and Kashmir, Nepal border, North-east, Maoist and Naxal violence. In this digital age when time is a constraint in decision-making, it is not comprehendible at all why we prefer the old structure instead of decentralising the system. 2. Our second major failure is the failure of our intelligence system. The things were streamlined and were moving at a positive pace when Mr P Chidambaram was our Home Minister. The work on the Multi-Agency Centre (MAC) was in progress but we could not maintain the pace. Though, we have been able to strengthen our intelligence and security system in the national capital region but we are unable to replicate it in the rest of the country. The incident in the state capital of Bihar is the recent example of the intelligence and system failure. A series of blasts took place at the Gandhi Maidan in BJP’s prime ministerial candidate Mr Modi’s rally. The incident took place when the alertness was expected

DR HARSH K SINHA

The writer is associate professor, Dept of Defence and Strategic Studies, DDU Gorakhpur University, Gorakhpur. He has been a fellow of Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, Colombo and his areas of interest are conﬂict and media, urban security, strategic culture and non-traditional security threats.

4. The output of the situational analysis at different levels after the incidents of 26/11 and post 26/11 indicate that we have failed to adopt and adapt planned counter-response mechanisms to deal with the terrorist activities and attacks. This includes the model to cordon off the site of the attack, to design and keep open the protocol for an alternate way to carry out the rescue operations without any hindrance. The work on this particular issue has been done but it is restricted to some metro cities like Delhi and Mumbai. As a result the police could not make way for the ambulance and ﬁre services team to the site of the blasts which took place in the Sankat-Mochan temple in Varanasi and the Golghar serial blasts in Gorakhpur.

NSG Decentralisation

5. The idea and the pace of the proposed decentralisation of the NSG after 26/11 is very slow. It was suggested that trained forces equipped with the latest weapons named quick reaction teams (QRT) should be deployed in the big and medium cities. A hundred-member Special Weapons And Tactics (SWAT) team equipped with facial recognition software and digital map like Google Earth was also proposed to be deployed in the big and medium cities to counter the big terrorist attacks and the cases of captivity / hostages. There seems to be no progress in this direction. 6. It is important to identify the most vulnerable targets in the cities in case of a terrorist attack so as to give a ﬁnal touch to

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

STRANGE STASIS the border security, the ground intelligence and the proper use of the latest techniques and equipment to counter the problem.

Abdul Kareem Tunda

Yasin Bhatkal

the plans and strategies in case of emergency. This task seems to be waiting for another terrorist attack for its completion. 7. After the attack on the shopping mall in Kenya the shopping malls have emerged as probable and effective targets for the terrorist organisations in recent times. The malls could be easy targets for these groups in our country. The police force in majority of cities still doesn’t have the maps, exit and emergency escape roots of these malls and lack speciﬁc plans for such probable attacks.

Degrading Political Ethos

8. Lack of political will, unethical approach and degrading values in the political system have severely affected the process of the ﬁght against terrorism. The differences between the centre and the states regarding the structure of the NCTC, the counter claims of the IB and the CBI in the Ishrat Jahan encounter case, not taking appropriate action against the 400 odd modules and sleeper cells of the terrorists in spite of the information of their activities in more than 35 districts, the government’s role and action to set free the people involved in the terrorist activities in spite of the fact that they were undergoing judicial trials have severely damaged the process of ﬁght against terrorism. Similarly, in spite of the arrests of more than 27 terrorists associated with IM and Hijbul since 1994-2013, the Bihar police could not interrogate and take the dreaded terrorists like Yasin Bhatkal and Asadullah into custody, due to vote bank politics. 9. The Indo-Nepal border in the states of UP and Bihar has been the easiest route for the anti-national elements for quite a long time. The presence of the Pakistani intelligence agency ISI and China in the neighbouring country has given a new edge to the problem. The arrests of Lashkar terrorist Abdul Kareem Tunda, Yasin Bhatkal and Asadullah point to the sensitivity of this border. Bhatkal claimed to be carrying his operations from Loknath Nagar Parishad area, 8 km from Pokhra in Nepal which is said to be a safe hideout for Pakistan supported terrorists. It is very easy to carry out their operations in the border cities of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar in India through their sleeper cells and active modules. Pokhra is a tourist destination and is easily accessible. The terrorists Quafeel Ahmed, Alkash, Taalal Abdalli alias Israar, Tariq Anjum, Haroon Rasheed, Naqi Ahmed, Bani Ahmed Seikh, Gauhar Aziz Khumaini, Mohd Aadil and Aaftab Aalam arrested from Bihar cities like Darbhanga, Samastipur, Madhubani, Laharia Sarai admitted during their interrogation that they were receiving help and directions from the Indian Mujahideen from the Pokhra channel. Though the Indian and the Nepal governments have moved a step ahead to deal with the problem with mutual understanding but still there is an immediate need to strengthen

December 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

Inadequate Counter Response

10. The failure of the structure of counter response in the state of Uttar Pradesh is clearly visible, where more than three dozen cases of communal violence have been reported in the past eighteen months. The following were the common things in all the cases of violence:

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 The administration failed to assess the magnitude of the incident and tried to handle it with a short term approach and a long-term strategy was missing.  The intelligence failure in all the cases was clearly visible. The police and the intelligence agencies completely failed to assess the plans and the people behind the activities and their hideouts.  Lack of effective mechanism to counter the rumours was common among all the cases. The administration seemed helpless and directionless at the time of the incidents. The police officers in some of the affected cities told this writer that the biggest problem they faced was to counter the rumours. There was no such plan and reliable arrangement to counter it.  It was also found that the police was unaware of the presence, quantity and quality of illegal weapons in the area of the disturbance. This was a hurdle for the police force to act in the riot hit areas because in some cases the miscreants had better weapons than the police force.  The police force had no details regarding the people or committees from both the communities who could act as a bridge to tackle the grim situations and to address the mobs positively. To tackle communal problems community participation can play a significant role in resolving the tensions in the area along with the civil administration. In recent past when Allahabad High Court judgment was expected in Babri Mosque-Ram Janmabhoomi dispute district administration in almost every city of Uttar Pradesh constituted a committee of local citizens at every police station level that paid rich dividends in terms of managing and gagging expected rumour mongering and diffusing tensions. 11. Post incident scenario is even bleaker. The administration in most of the towns and cities has not yet prepared any blueprints to tackle these problems by diverting traffic routes, carrying out emergency evacuation, alternative fire fighting arrangements and hydrants, emergency medical facilities etc. These incidents like 26/11 are learning experiences to evolve our security system and sensitise the administration and public both towards these activities so that we may be safe. The gloomy feature is that both administration and citizens have failed in discharging their duties. Alas, public in general does not behave as a citizen but as a spectator and leaves the onus only on administration and the political masters whose agenda list is full with other items of their own interest.

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November 20 13

26/11 status appraisal

5 Years After

26/11

Status Appraisal