DSA July 2012 by Defence and Security Alert

editor-in-chief

he Wakhan Corridor connects India to Afghanistan. That is on the maps that India claims to represent its post-1947 boundaries. Until independence in 1947 India and Afghanistan were neighbours, just as with Iran. All that changed on 14 August with the creation of Pakistan, thereby leaving the Wakhan Corridor as the only Indian border with Afghanistan. This too changed when the Pakistan army launched the first of its many operations to wrest Jammu and Kashmir from India. The subsequent ceasefire and the later recognition of a Line of Control between the two countries has altered the boundaries between India and Afghanistan. Between Jammu and Kashmir, India and the Wakhan Corridor now lies the Northern Areas, or Gilgit-Balitstan as the area is now referred to officially.

There are a number of activists from Gilgit-Baltistan who accuse India of ignoring their plight. The accusation revolves around the well documented fact that India has long been focused on what is referred to as Kashmir, under Pakistani occupation or areas that comprise the state of Jammu and Kashmir in India. The activists believe that the tragedy that has befallen the people of Gilgit-Baltistan remains far removed from public discourse and policy formulation. 'If you believe this area to be under the illegal occupation of Pakistan and have a claim on us as Indians, then there is every reason for you to raise your voice in our favour', said one recently in a seminar in New Delhi. It was a compelling argument, for if India claims Gilgit-Baltistan to be a part of Jammu and Kashmir state, which it once was, there is every reason for it to pay greater attention to the people of this area and what has been happening to them.

Since the Siachen battles began in April 1984 the people of Gilgit-Baltistan have been at the receiving end of a brutal policy of subjugation forced through sectarian programmes unleashed by the Pakistan army. Repeated attempts by the Pakistan army to wrest the initiative on Siachen failed. But as the failures mounted so did the atrocities on the hapless people of Gilgit-Baltistan. The well-documented is of course the massacre of Shi'a Baltis in 1988 when the Pakistan army's Brigade Commander was a certain Pervez Musharraf. It is no coincidence that his failure to dislodge the Indian army from its gains on Saltoro and Siachen led to the massacres and his subsequent attempt to take the heights of Kargil and Drass. That too came a cropper and then began the diplomatic attempts to evict India from Siachen. The latest round of talks has just ended in another stalemate in Islamabad.

This only highlights that there is more than a geographical connection between the heights of Siachen and the happenings in Gilgit-Baltistan. Sectarian violence raised its head once again viciously in April when a bus load of Shi'a pilgrims was attacked. This caused a shutdown in Kargil, once again pointing out the deep linkages between the people of this area. It is those linkages that beckon a more informed Indian policy on Gilgit-Baltistan. As the judicious claimant the onus is on India to renew its links with the area and its people. Anything that improves their lives is a better policy than not having one at all. China has quietly stepped into the vacuum that currently exists, raising the stakes for India. If India wants to be a global player it should first begin to play the game in its neighbourhood.

manvendra singh

July 2012 Defence AND security alert

executive editor

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Sino-Pak Perfidy: Alarm for India

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disclaimer all rights reserved. reproduction and translation in any language in whole or in part by any means without permission from Defence and Security Alert is prohibited. opinions expressed are those of the individual writers and do not necessarily reflect those of the publisher and / or editors. all disputes are subject to jurisdiction of delhi courts. defence and security alert is printed, published and owned by pawan agrawal and printed at graphic world, 1686, kucha dakhini rai, darya ganj, new delhi-110002 and published at 4/19 asaf ali road, new delhi (india). editor: manvendra singh.

ot many in India and even in Pakistan know much about Gilgit and Baltistan.

Team DSA decided to highlight the strategic importance, role of Pakistan and the baleful shadow of China on this region which together are directly going to affect the geopolitics of not only India but the entire South-east Asia and prove deleterious in the times to come. We need to understand the emerging game plan of both to understand their motives to destablise India and create conditions that will severely curtail India’s role and importance in the region. Since Gilgit and Baltistan are sparsely-populated barren lands, then what is the reason that China has been showing so much interest in this region over the past several decades. Let us recollect the historical facts to understand China’s interest in the region. Historically, the area has been a flashpoint of political and military rivalries amongst the Russian, British and Chinese empires. Rudyard Kipling described it as “The Great Game”. Immediately after the end of British rule in the sub-continent in 1947, the Muslim-dominated population was instigated by British agents to revolt against the government of the Hindu Maharaja of Kashmir. Since then this region was under the control of Pakistan government who later gifted away the Shaksgam segment on the north to China under the guise of a lease in 1963. Nonetheless the immutable fact remains that Gilgit-Baltistan was an integral part of the kingdom of Jammu and Kashmir which acceded to India in 1948; that Pakistan has no sovereign rights over Gilgit-Baltistan as confirmed by the Pakistan Supreme Court itself and therefore the transfer of Shaksgam to China and China’s presence in Gilgit-Baltistan is a violation of international agreements, Indo-Pak bilateral agreements as well as the Sino-Pak provisional border agreement of 1963. Since 1963 China’s involvement in Gilgit-Baltistan has increased multifold and it constructed the Karakoram Highway through this region. China is now planning to improve the infrastructure by constructing a railway and gas and oil pipelines none of which appear to benefit the people of the region but these devlopments are in the interests of the Chinese business groups who are largely involved in the mining business of gold and uranium. Chinese have been building many dams on the Indus River and it is very much evident that the Chinese army personnel disguised as civilians are involved in these activities as they are unable to get the local support from the people of Gilgit and Baltistan. At the Gomal Zam dam site two Chinese engineers were kidnapped and killed. The main reason for such Chinese interest in this region is the huge deposits of minerals, metals and uranium which Pakistan does not have the technology to exploit. Thus they are completely dependent on their “all-weather friend” China. So in a nutshell, Pakistan is parlaying the assets of the portion of Jammu and Kashmir which it has occupied by subterfuge for Strategic support from China to keep India confined by foreign instigated insurgencies within its homeland. The government of India and the Indian army have taken a strong stand on the Pakistan army chief’s suggestion of demilitarisation of the Siachen Glacier. India must also express its strong protest against the deployment of Chinese army in the name of so-called development works. The Chinese companies are actually the Chinese army engineering corps deployed in the region. Dear readers, team DSA is introducing two columns from this issue on homeland security. One by a highly qualified trainer on all aspects of homeland security and another by a very senior defence and security corporate leader on counter-terrorism and lessons for homeland security. I am sure you will enjoy the new columns. As new paradigms emerge on the defence and security horizon DSA will ensure that you get to read the most incisive and in-depth analyses on the topics of national and global interest. Jai Hind!

pawan agrawal

“The country comes first - always and every time”.

he rising salience of the Gilgit-Baltistan area stems from China’s muscular forays into this region. Selig Harrison had sent shockwaves by disclosing that 11,000 Chinese troops had entered this disputed region in 2011. Indian military sources place the current Chinese deployment at some 3-4,000 military engineering personnel working feverishly on widening the Karakoram Highway and creating a rail-road-cum-oil and gas pipeline corridor to the strategic Gwadar Port. This will help China bypass the critical Malacca choke point for her energy shipment and shorten the passage from 25 days to just 48 hours. There is also talk of China acquiring the Gilgit-Baltistan area on lease for 50 years. Will it be any surprise therefore if China simply declares a few years down the line that the Gilgit-Gwadar corridor is a core interest, even as Tibet, Taiwan and the South China Sea? There is speculation that the PLAAF may seek air bases at Gilgit, Chilas, Skardu etc. in a hot war scenario. In this issue a number of former Generals, Air Marshals and Admirals take a close look at the Gilgit-Gwadar corridor and the rising strategic salience of the Northern Areas. It is quite apparent that Jammu and Kashmir is fast becoming the theatre of choice for China and Pakistan to spark off a two front war with India. It is in this theatre they can attack India together. Why this sudden barrage of dovish noises from the Pakistani military establishment? The Pakistani civilians are fed up of constant conflict and their attempts to usher peace could help them marginalise and remove the stranglehold of the Pakistani army on its polity. For the time being however, the Pak army has pulled off a soft coup against PM Gilani and clearly shown who is in charge. What, however, are the motivations of the Pakistani army to seek peace now? The motivations are simple. With the US troop withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014, the Pak army senses a historic opportunity to reduce Afghanistan to a vassal status and acquire its dream strategic depth. For this they need a temporary truce on their Eastern Front with India. Hence the Peace Blitz. On 7th April this year, the Pakistani army suffered a painful disaster in the Siachen Front. A major avalanche-cum-mud slide wiped out the Battalion HQ and Adm Base of the 6 Northern Light Infantry unit at Ghyari. Despite help from the Chinese, American and European rescue teams, not a single body could be recovered. The entire adm base, helipads and road infrastructure have been wiped out. The Pakistani forward troops below our Saltoro positions are now in a pitiable state. Their Siachen positions in the Central Glacier (especially at Bilafond La, Ali Brangsa are fast becoming untenable for the Pakistani army. If the Pakistani army cannot take it anymore, why don’t they withdraw unilaterally? Their military and civilian sPoKesmen are claiming repeatedly that the area has no strategic significance whatsoever. Why then did they start the orographic aggression? They started the race for Saltoro and lost it. If this area really has no strategic significance - they are free to withdraw unilaterally. The insistence that India vacate its hard won edge is too clever by half. With the new China-Pak line up in Baltistan, it would be unwise for India to open its flanks to this pincer. Actually, what makes it worse for the Pak army is the fact that the Northern Light Infantry (NLI), which has borne the brunt of the casualties in Kargil and Siachen, has 49 per cent Shias, 23 per cent Ismailis and just 18 per cent Sunnis. 55 per cent of the Shias hail from the Gilgit area, 35 per cent from Baltistan. The Shias have been facing relentless persecution. In 1989, Gen Pervez Musharraf had brought in the blood thirsty Sunni Pathans to terrorise the Shias into submission. In the Kargil conflict the Pak army disowned the dead Shia troopers of the NLI and over 600 had to be buried by the Indians. The Anti-Shia pogrom continues. On 28 February this year, 18 Shia pilgrims were pulled out of buses and massacred in Pakhtunkhwa province. On 03 April 15-20 Shias were killed in Chilas and 50 were wounded. This led to riots where more Shias were killed. The Avalanche on 07 April therefore came as a climactic finale which shook the Shia troops. The legend of the Teram Shehr town, which was wiped out in a terrible avalanche, lives on in the folklore of Baltistan. The Shia troops are uneasy and restive and their Sunni commanders are deeply worried. That is why Gen Kayani was unnerved by the recent avalanche and the impact it has had on the unfortunate Shia troops of the NLI. That explains his smart moves to use the Indian softness in the head to get the Indian army off the Saltoro Ridge, which it had secured at such heavy cost in blood and treasure. Now we have mastered the logistical and environmental problems and can stay on, if need be, forever. If the Pakistani army has had it, they can withdraw and Indians will not interfere with their retreat in any way. The problem is their over-cleverness and lack of sincerity, based on the quest to gain an upper hand in Afghanistan by encouraging peace noises on the Eastern Front. The real problem is, this is a tactical gambit and not a sincere desire for peace. Hence, it would be foolish for us to get carried away by the gush of the "Aman Ki Asha brigade". We need to look at the overall geo-political scenario that will emerge in the wake of the US withdrawal in 2014 and the burning desire of some to give Pakistan a free hand to shape outcomes in Afghanistan is suicidal to say the least. Jammu and Kashmir and not Arunachal is the most likely theatre for the next two front war. Sino-Pak preparations / motivations to attack jointly here are plainly visible. The time is most inappropriate to lower our guard and accept that recipe for disaster dished out by our interlocutors. In the Features section of this issue we also cover the change of guard at the Army HQ. Team DSA welcomes Gen Bikram Singh and speculates about the agenda that he could / should set for himself - especially in terms of speedily addressing the hollowness in the army’s arms and ammunition procurement, as also stemming the distressing frequency of scams that have left us all a bit bewildered. In this onerous task he needs the support of one and all.

Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM (retd) July 2012 Defence AND security alert

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contents Gilgit-Baltistan Special Issue July 2012

An ISO 9001:2008 Certified Magazine

Vo l u m e 3 I s s u e 1 0 J u l y 2 0 1 2

A R T I C L E S the unfolding great game in Gilgit-Baltistan: India needs to safeguard its security interests

Dr Arvind Gupta and Dr Ashok Behuria

the Siachen imbroglio

the Gwadar-Karakoram-Xinjiang corridor

Lt Gen Arvind Sharma PVSM, AVSM, VSM (retd) Vice Admiral Vijay Shankar PVSM, AVSM, ADC (retd)

C O L U M N S insurgencies and collective consciousness Dr Rupali Jeswal counter terrorism: global learnings Dr Vivek Lall

F E A T U R E S change of guard: the Indian army Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM (retd)

plaaf-paf nexus in PoK

red dragon in Indiaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s north-west

Indian army: new coas has his work cut out ... Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (retd)

prison radicalisation: a global problem

NATO summit- 2012 road ahead Dominika Cosic

the red shadow in Gilgit-Baltistan: security implications for India

would Gwadar slacken the sloc noose at malacca for China?

Gilgit-Baltistan-Gwadar: the vital Chinese artery

Siachen magnanimity another Himalayan blunder?

geo-political dance macabre

strategic importance of Gilgit-Baltistan region

Gilgit-Baltistan on the boil

Gwadar port: Indiaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s achilles heel

Air Vice Marshal A K Tiwary VSM (retd) Lt Gen Kamal Davar PVSM, AVSM (retd) Patrick Dunleavy

Pallavi Ade

Rear Adm (Dr) S Kulshrestha (retd) Nitin Gokhale

Col Utkarsh S Rathore (retd) Cecil Victor

Maj Gen Afsir Karim AVSM (retd) Col J P Singh (retd)

Rahul Mishra and Sana Hashmi

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July 2012 Defence AND security alert

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@dsalert July 2012 Defence AND security alert

Gilgit-Baltistan

ALARMING DEVELOPMENTS

A Dr Arvind Gupta The writer an IFS officer is presently on deputation to the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi, India as Lal Bahadur Shastri Chair in Strategic and Defence Studies. Prior to joining the IDSA, he was Joint Secretary at the National Security Council Secretariat. At the IDSA he heads the South Asia and Internal Security Clusters and edits the Institute’s flagship bi-monthly journal Strategic Analysis.

new great game is beginning to take shape around Gilgit-Baltistan which is situated in a strategically pivotal area, at the confluence of central, west, east and south Asia. For China it is a crucial link to the Arabian Sea and a strategic outpost against regional powers like India. The Chinese efforts to access the Arabian Sea through Gwadar Port by developing road and railway links are being put under the scanner, especially after media reports since 2010 that the Chinese are stationing their troops and building critical infrastructure for strategic use. The recent reports of Pakistan considering proposal to lease out Gilgit-Baltistan to China for a period of 50 years in a local newspaper Roznama Bang-e-Sahar (13 December 2011) has raised the level of anxieties even further.

The Unfolding Great Game in Gilgit-Baltistan:

India Needs to Safeguard its Security Interests

n 1892, E F Knight wrote about Gilgit as the high roof of the world where three empires - Great Britain, Russia and China - met. Almost a century afterwards, the strategic importance of Gilgit-Baltistan is being increasingly realised by analysts around the world. Indian concerns about Sino-Pak collaboration to develop the Gilgit-Baltistan region as a strategic corridor were largely ignored until now. However, with the tectonic shifts in international politics - in the shape of transfer of the centre of gravity of the world politics to Asia - the strategic importance of the quiet ingress of China into the region is being debated in the world capitals with added anxiety and concern. The Chinese efforts to access the Arabian Sea through Gwadar Port by developing road and railway links are being put under the scanner, especially after media reports since 2010 that the Chinese are stationing their troops and building critical infrastructure for strategic use. The recent reports of Pakistan considering proposal to lease out Gilgit-Baltistan to China for a period of 50 years in a local newspaper Roznama Bang-e-Sahar (13 December 2011) has raised the level of anxieties even further.

Visit of US delegation Dr Ashok Behuria The writer is Fellow and Coordinator, South Asia Centre at IDSA. He is also coordinating the activities of the Project on Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) at IDSA. A new great game is beginning to take shape around Gilgit-Baltistan which is situated in a strategically pivotal area, at the confluence of central, west, east and south Asia. For China it is a crucial link to the Arabian Sea and a strategic outpost against regional powers like India

Against this backdrop, the recent five-day visit of a high level diplomatic delegation from the US embassy to Gilgit-Baltistan without taking permission from the government of Pakistan assumes significance. This was to be followed by a three-day visit by the outgoing US Ambassador, Cameron Munter starting 7 June 2012. In fact, in the earlier instance, the embassy delegation wrote directly to the Gilgit-Baltistan police chief, asking him for security and arranging for meetings with various lawmakers and professionals. The officials met, among others, the finance minister of the region, the leaders of the Gilgit-Baltistan United Movement and a female legislator from the newly elected assembly. According to media reports the nationalist leaders briefed them “about political deprivation of the region, exploitation and usurpation of the rights of the indigenous people at the hands of Islamabad rulers and plundering of the region’s resources by Pakistan”. The nationalist leaders also informed that the so-called autonomy package of 2009 was a total fraud and it provided benefits to a selected few and was hence unacceptable to them. There is a view that a new great game is beginning to take shape around Gilgit-Baltistan which is situated in a strategically pivotal area, at the confluence of central, west, east and south Asia. For China it is a crucial link to the Arabian Sea and a strategic outpost against regional powers like India. In view of the growing India-US relationship, China would not like its hold over the region to be relaxed. It has built-up its presence assiduously in the region in the name of infrastructural development over the last several years. This is a measure of its changing priorities in the South Asian region. Its efforts have been gratuitously facilitated by Pakistan which looks at Chinese presence as a deterrent vis-a-vis India. Moreover, the Chinese assistance in building Karakoram Highway and its involvement in hydel power projects have been economically beneficial for Pakistan too.

Chinese involvement The Chinese involvement in the whole of Pakistan occupied Kashmir and especially in

July 2012 Defence AND security alert

Gilgit-Baltistan has been quite spectacular. As per the 2006 agreement between Pakistan and China, the latter is engaged in the business of widening Karakoram Highway from existing 10 metres to 30 metres to expand its operational capacity for heavy vehicular movement at an approximate cost of US$ 500 million. China is also widening the 165 km long Jaglot-Skardu road and the 135 km long Thakot-Sazin road at a cost of PKR 45 billion. China is supposed to pay 85 per cent of the total cost while Pakistan will contribute 15 per cent. A rail link between the two countries linking Havelian with the Kunjerab Pass is also in the pipeline. Besides these, China is also heavily involved in the Hydel

sector. Currently Chinese firms are working on 15 mega projects in the energy sector in Gilgit-Baltistan and the so called ‘Azad Kashmir’. These projects include raising of the Mangla Dam reservoir by sixty feet, the Neelum-Jhelum Hydroelectric Power Project which aims at diversion of the water of Neelum River through a tunnel into Jhelum River, at a cost of US$ 12.6 billion and Diamer-Bhasha Dam (by China’s Three Gorges Project Corporation) on the Indus River with a total investment of US$ 12.6 billion. The Chinese firms are also working on six other mega power projects in Gilgit-Baltistan that include hydro power projects at Dasu (US$ 7.8 billion), Phandar (US$ 70 million),

Bashu (US$ 40.01 million), Harpo (US$ 44.608 million) and Yulbo (US$ 6 billion). China is also investing an additional amount of US$ 300 million in housing and communication sectors. The bilateral trade between China and Pakistan has reached US$ 10.6 billion and the two countries hope to expand it to US$ 15 billion by 2015. Moreover, in the last three years, China has become the largest development creditor of Pakistan and its loan portfolio has increased to US$ 3.3 billion. In 2012, Pakistan got the commitment of US$ 652 million from China, out of which it has received US$ 400 million for various projects of paramount importance.

July 2012 Defence AND security alert

Gilgit-Baltistan

ALARMING DEVELOPMENTS

China regards Kashmir as a disputed territory. It advocates the settlement of the dispute by India and Pakistan. However, this has not prevented it from meddling in the Gilgit-Pakistan. Leading Chinese think tanks hold the view that China’s investments in Gilgit-Pakistan will stabilise the region which needs development. This is a specious argument. If the territory is regarded as disputed, why should China interfere in it?

The strategic importance of the quiet ingress of China into the region is being debated in the world capitals with added anxiety and concern. The Chinese efforts to access the Arabian Sea through Gwadar Port by developing road and railway links are being put under the scanner, especially after media reports since 2010 that the Chinese are stationing their troops and building critical infrastructure for strategic use. The recent reports of Pakistan considering proposal to lease out Gilgit-Baltistan to China for a period of 50 years in a local newspaper Roznama Bang-e-Sahar (13 December 2011) has raised the level of anxieties even further

Pak-China differences In recent months however, there have been some concerns expressed by Pakistani authorities over China’s lackadaisical attitude vis-a-vis some projects. For example, the media reports in April 2012 indicated that the Chinese were delaying the disbursement of the credit-line worth US$ 448 million to support the construction of the 969 MW Neelum-Jhelum hydro power project which was delaying the completion of the project ahead of Kishenganga project being built by India on the same river. An analytical report in Pakistani media said that this was also running counter to Pakistan’s interest because as per the Indus Water Treaty, the country completing the project first will gain some advantages which Pakistan would not like to lose because of shortage of funds. However, Pakistani officials expressed their surprise over the prompt release of US$ 130 million for the Chilas Road in Skardu, “because of the fact that

the said road would connect border of China”, but when it comes to the country’s strategic project, it was “delaying the disbursement of the loan” (The News, 19 April 2012). Later in May 2012, after the Pak-China Joint Energy Working Group (JEWG) meeting with a high-powered visiting Chinese delegation, comprising of 28 members from the public and private sectors, including EXIM bank, the Chinese side assured Pakistan to release the funds later this year. However, the issue had generated a debate in Pakistan about the wisdom of awarding developmental contracts to China in violation of the bidding principles. In fact, in the August 2011 JWEG meeting, the Chinese side had proposed Pakistan to set up a fund of US$ 10 billion for development of energy and infrastructure which would be linked to Pakistani assurances that all the contracts would be awarded to Chinese companies without holding the international competitive bids (ICBs), in violation of the PPRA (Public Procurement Regulatory Authority) rules. China had also sought protection against exchange rate variation from the Pakistani authorities with regard to the Chinese Currency (RMB). Beijing had reportedly told Pakistan that it would extend credit lines in its currency and ensure repayment also in its currency as the US dollar was losing its value against the Yuan. Interestingly, in the latest meeting in May, the Pakistani side held their ground and expressed their inability to bypass the PPRA rules and asked the Chinese side to join the competitive bidding process for the five mega contracts under the Diamer-Bhasha dam project. Despite such temporary reverses, however, Pak-China cooperation in the region is likely to continue, because, as it has happened in the past - over the Neelum-Jhelum hydropower project and Nandipur and Cheechuki Malian project - the non-Chinese bidders from the West found it risky to work in the region because of security reasons, forcing Pakistan to request China to take over the projects. While Pak-China strategic axis is likely to continue, both because of inertia and the ongoing tension in Pak-US relations, the local

July 2012 Defence AND security alert

situation in Gilgit-Baltistan is a huge imponderable which may affect the rhythm of Chinese penetration into the region. The massacre of Shia pilgrims returning from Iraq at a place called Harban Nala at the borders between Kohistan and Gilgit-Baltistan on 28 February 2012, has revived sectarian violence and disturbed the entire region. The Grand Jirga constituted in 2005 to tackle sectarian issues has found it difficult to assuage the feelings on either side. The prolonged state of indecision by the state to address the genuine grievances of the Shia majority population of the region has led to widespread alienation among the people. This has forced the local leadership to look for outside help.

In 1892, E F Knight wrote about Gilgit as the high roof of the world where three empires - Great Britain, Russia and China - met. Almost a century afterwards, the strategic importance of Gilgit-Baltistan is being increasingly realised by analysts around the world. Indian concerns about Sino-Pak collaboration to develop the Gilgit-Baltistan region as a strategic corridor were largely ignored until now The Gilgiti and Balti diaspora in the West are beginning to create international awareness through blogs, e-magazines and web-based discussion forums. Some of the expatriate leaders are also seeking to influence governments in the West to take up the issue of human rights violation and sectarian and cultural aggression seriously. The local leadership is increasingly drawing the attention of the international community to the fact that Pakistan has used the terrain as a virtual colony, without granting it any constitutional status. Moreover, the way Islamabad has nourished sectarian animus over the years and encouraged militant sectarian groups like Sipah-e-Sahaba (now Ahle-Sunnat Wal Jamaat) to unleash their terror campaigns on the Shia population is being projected as the main reason for local alienation. In fact, it is being pointed out by the locals that Islamabad deliberately annulled the State Subjects Rule (SSR) in the 1970s during Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s rule, to allow people from outside to settle in the

region and change its demography. Moreover, some discriminatory measures were taken which gave a fillip to anti-Shia militant groups in the region. For example, in 1974, Ashura procession was banned in Gilgit whereas it was allowed in Shia-minority areas in rest of Pakistan. In 1988, hordes of sectarian militants, allegedly backed by state security forces, attacked more than a dozen Shia villages killing hundreds of them in cold blood. In 2000, the local school text books were altered in a manner, which the Shias thought, was designed to erase their identity. The recent killings in Kohistan and Chillas reinforce these sentiments.

The recent five-day visit of a high level diplomatic delegation from the US embassy to Gilgit-Baltistan without taking permission from the government of Pakistan assumes significance. This was to be followed by a three-day visit by the outgoing US Ambassador, Cameron Munter starting 7 June 2012 The local Sunni population also blame central government and its agencies for the sectarian polarisation that has destroyed sectarian harmony which was there for ages. The resultant local anger against the Pakistani state has also affected the local perceptions about China as well. The growing presence of China, perceived as a strong ally of Pakistan, is being resented by the local population. They would argue that the Chinese developmental intervention will only strengthen the hands of Islamabad and its policies vis-a-vis Gilgit-Baltistan will harden in future.

Local reactions Against this setting the interest being shown by the US deserves attention. The media reports from Pakistan suggested that the local leadership informed the US delegation about the reality of the sectarian killings and violence in the region and the involvement of Pakistan’s security agencies in it. They were also told that “the security agencies were in actual power in the region and orchestrated such incidents in order to pressure the government of the region to continue toeing their lines”. Drawing attention to the statement by the local chief minister that over

3,000 people in the region were working for Pakistani agencies, the nationalist leaders stated that the provincial government was “toothless and powerless”. They also held that “the people of the region were neither Pakistani nor Indian but had their own separate and unique identity and, therefore, they should be given independence”. The weekly Baang published from Karachi wrote editorially: “For the last over six decades, Pakistan is ruling the region by force and in order to prolong its rule it has enslaved the indigenous people ... It is obvious that Pakistan has been occupying Gilgit-Baltistan as an imperialist power and if any power on the surface of the earth offers any help to us we should welcome it ... We should also expose the conspiracies of making the region a scapegoat of Pakistan-China friendship (italics by the writers). Notwithstanding the friendship between Islamabad and Beijing, the people of Gilgit-Baltistan will never accept the policy of the two countries to strengthen their relations at the cost of the interest of the two million people of Gilgit-Baltistan. The visit of the US diplomats to the region seems to be a good omen for the future of the region.” The visit by the US official may indicate growing American interest in the strategic terrain and it may be a prelude to deeper engagement with the local forces and feed on their sense of alienation to balance the existing Pak-China strategic nexus in the region. The reaction from the Pakistani side says it all. The mainstream media in Pakistan reported that the intelligence agencies of Pakistan have expressed their concerns about unauthorised visits by foreign diplomats to “prohibited areas”. An intelligence report, cited in an interior ministry circular has reportedly advised foreign missions to avoid this practice to prevent any “untoward incident.” The report directs local law enforcement agencies “not to provide direct security to any foreign missions / diplomats until the foreign office formally gives them details of their presence and programme schedule”. On 4 June 2012, four US

diplomats and their three Pakistani employees were arrested on the motorway in Peshawar on their way back from Malakand and shifted to the nearby Chamkani police station. The embassy officials were released while their Pakistani employees were kept under detention. This is a move by Islamabad to signal its resentment about the unauthorised trip by the US officials to Gilgit-Baltistan. It needs to be mentioned that in the by-elections to the local assembly in April 2011, Nawaz Khan Naji, the founder of the nationalist Balwaristan National Front (BNF), won from Gilgit-Baltistan’s Ghizer constituency defeating the candidates fielded by Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PML-N). BNF had reluctantly contested and lost in two out of thirty three seats in the 2009 elections. The party has been demanding maximum autonomy for the region, bordering on outright independence. It detests the present policy of Pakistan to treat the region like a colony. If the BNF’s win is any indicator, the nationalist sentiments of the people in the region may gain further ground in the coming days and pose critical challenges for Pakistan in this sensitive region. There is a low awareness about the region in India despite the fact that it regards the entire territory as an integral part of India. The government needs to activate its diplomacy to pay heed to the sufferings and grievances of the people of Gilgit-Pakistan and to ensure that the great game unfolding in the region does not adversely affect India’s security interests.

July 2012 Defence AND security alert

Gilgit-Baltistan

PARAMOUNTCY OF NATIONAL INTEREST

Lt Gen Arvind Sharma PVSM, AVSM, VSM (retd) The writer is a former General Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Eastern Army Command. His operational responsibility encompassed borders with China, Myanmar and Bangladesh; all troops including Assam Rifles deployed in the north-eastern states for counter-insurgency operations were part of his command. An infantry officer, in his four decades plus of service in the Army, he has dealt with insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir and the north-eastern states. What are the compulsions for vacating Siachen? Some myths that are bandied about by Pakistan and by proponents of vacating the glaciers are that India is the aggressor and so it must vacate, heavy casualties are being caused to troops by altitude and extreme climate, environmental degradation being caused by continued troop deployments, heavy financial burden on respective countries to maintain and sustain these deployments and the effect on morale of troops deployed in such inhospitable terrain. We have not usurped any land but only occupied our own territory. Secondly, troops did suffer casualties due to climatic conditions and altitude initially, but with better equipment and improved living conditions, physical casualties are within manageable limits and no longer a matter of serious concern; thirdly, national security cannot be weighed only in fiscal terms, besides our economy is resilient to sustain this effort; as regards morale, a reality check will reveal that there is a waiting list of volunteers who wish to serve in Siachen, across various arms and services of the IA

s it only our responsibility to try and reduce the trust deficit with Pakistan? Why should resolution of the Siachen issue precede other issues? Is it to fulfil a personal agenda of some elements in the two countries? Whatever be the case, we must deal with this issue with prudence. Any agreement on the Siachen issue must incorporate the following - the AGPL must be authenticated on maps related to present deployment of armies of both the countries; it must also be unequivocally stated that at no stage in the future,would any of the armies deploy on the Saltoro Ridge; adequate implementable safeguards need to be built into the agreement. Secondly, resolution of Siachen must never be considered in isolation; it must form part of the resolution of entire Kashmir. In the absence of resolution of the boundary issue with both Pakistan and China, vacating posts on the Saltoro Ridge would be committing hara-kiri. We also need to guard against the proclivity of our political leadership to give away at the negotiating table what has been gained on the battlefield, at the cost of lives of our soldiers. Very sage counsel from a former GOC of 14 Corps who was subsequently The Army Commander of Eastern Command.

n avalanche hit the Pakistan army (PA) camp at Ghyari on 07 April 2012, as a consequence of which about 130 soldiers of the Northern Light Infantry and some civilians were buried under it. This natural disaster resulted in catapulting ‘Siachen’ once again to centre stage; more so because of visits by Nawaz Sharif and General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the PA chief. Kayani, during the visit sanctimoniously remarked that the Siachen dispute must be resolved, both countries should vacate the area and instead of troop deployments, shift their focus towards development. On the face of it, the statement indicated a possible rethink on part of the PA! Some strategists and diplomats in India also welcomed the statement! However, four days after Kayani’s statement, the Pakistan Foreign Office clarified that there is no change in the government’s stand on the issue. A few days thereafter, Kayani raised the issue again and added that a solution had almost been arrived at earlier, but of late, India has been hardening its stance on the issue! Subsequently, a few days prior to the Home Secretary level talks scheduled in the third week of May, Pakistan unilaterally declared that the ‘Sir Creek’ issue, included in the agenda previously, will be discussed at a later date! Speculations in the media were rife and indicated that Pakistan wanted resolution

July 2012 Defence AND security alert

of the Siachen issue to precede discussions on “Sir Creek”. Notwithstanding all these, there are individuals in India also, perhaps ardent followers of the Gujral Doctrine and/ or involved in ‘Track II’ diplomacy, who opine that this is an opportunity we must not forsake and vacate Siachen, once Pakistan agrees not to occupy posts vacated by us at a future date. In order to take a pragmatic view and seek a solution, it is imperative that we not only revisit the genesis of the problem, but also have a clear perspective of the ground realities. Having served in Ladakh in 1969-70 as an infantry company commander and later commanding the Corps there, charged with the responsibility of dealing with both adversaries - China and Pakistan including the Siachen area, through the period May 2003-June 2004, pre and post Cease Fire (CF) with Pakistan, I intend elucidating on the aspects referred to above. After partition and the 1947-48 war, as part of the Karachi Agreement of 1949, the Cease Fire Line (CFL) was delineated upto NJ 9842 (a point on the map on page 13), as the area beyond was glaciated and inaccessible and perhaps not surveyed. However, beyond NJ 9842 the CFL was to go “thence northwards to the glaciers”. Post 1971 war, the only change

THE SIACHEN IMBROGLIO

that took place was that the CFL was rechristened as the Line of Control. Point NJ 9842, is a point on the Southern glacier from where the watershed proceeds Eastwards for about a kilometre and thence the Saltoro Ridge moves in a North-westerly direction with Gyong La, Bilafond La and Sia La being the passes as you go Northwards towards Indira Col. The Siachen Glacier emanates South of Indira Col, runs South-eastwards for a distance of 72 km, with the Saltoro Ridge on its West and the Karakoram Range on its East. The Siachen Glacier is joined by the Teram Shehr Glacier which emanates from the East, the direction of the Depsang plateau and Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO), past Rimo 1 and Rimo 2 peaks. The fact is that only Indian troops move along the Siachen Glacier to occupy posts on the Saltoro Ridge; troops of the Pakistan army cannot even view the Siachen Glacier on ground, as they are on lower heights, further west of the Saltoro Ridge. Therefore, to state or even insinuate that PA troops are on the Siachen Glacier is a travesty of truth. The Indian army (IA) is occupying all dominating heights on the Saltoro Ridge and overlook most of the deployments of PA. Pakistan cleverly committed cartographic aggression with support of elements in USA and on maps of US and Chinese origin, showing the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) heading eastwards from NJ 9842 to the Karakoram Pass, in total contravention of the direction (northwards) mentioned in the Karachi Agreement, thus claiming Siachen Glacier to be theirs! The straight line heading Eastwards

(see map on page 13), violates the watershed principle, as it cuts across various terrain features naturally aligned Northwest to Southeast, which is universally applied while drawing boundaries in mountains.

PLA troops can also cross over from the Karakoram Pass and move elements along the Teram Shehr Glacier, to threaten move of our troops along the Siachen Glacier, especially towards the northern portion of the glacier. Some may discount this option since the area is snow-clad and glaciated, however, having visited the area a number of times, in my opinion, it would be imprudent to negate this option; we must heed the adage, where there is a will there is a way. Let’s not forget that Siachen was a ‘no go’ area in the early 1980’s! The feasibility of a link-up between the Karakoram Pass and Shaksgam Valley cannot be ruled out, especially in a scenario where Indian troops have been withdrawn from the glacier. As on today, the Saltoro Ridge stands as a wedge between China and Pakistan In addition, in the late 1970’s PA started granting permission to foreign expeditions to climb various peaks in the region inclusive of the Siachen Glacier, so as to stake ownership in the region. Intelligence reports in 1982-83

July 2012 Defence AND security alert

Gilgit-Baltistan

PARAMOUNTCY OF NATIONAL INTEREST

suggested that the PA was planning to occupy portions of the Saltoro Ridge in the next summer. Resultant of the above, ‘Operation Meghdoot’ was launched by IA on 13 April 1984, to pre-empt PA occupation of the Saltoro Ridge. IA troops were helilifted on to Saltoro Ridge and managed to occupy them before PA troops could reach there. In an all out assault by PA SSG Brigade under then Brig Pervez Musharraf on Saltoro Ridge in 1987 they had captured Quaid Post, which was the most dominating post on the ridge. This post was recaptured by 8 JAK LI, under the leadership of then Nb Sub Bana Singh, who was awarded the Param Vir Chakra on 26 June 1987. Since then, PA has attempted to dislodge IA troops from the Saltoro Ridge on a number of occasions, but has not succeeded. PA never reconciled to our dominance of the Saltoro Ridge and their perceived loss of Siachen. The ill-conceived Kargil operation of 1999 was an effort towards this end (the operation intended at throttling logistics of the IA troops on the glacier, thereby forcing them to withdraw). The underlying issue is PA’s continued obsession with Siachen, which has neither diminished nor been revoked. We therefore, must never lower our guard on this issue, notwithstanding fulminations of various leaders and Generals of PA.

Kayani, during the visit sanctimoniously remarked that the Siachen dispute must be resolved, both countries should vacate the area and instead of troop deployments, shift their focus towards development. On the face of it, the statement indicated a possible rethink on part of the PA! Some strategists and diplomats in India also welcomed the statement! Speculations in the media were rife and indicated that Pakistan wanted resolution of the Siachen issue to precede discussions on “Sir Creek”. Notwithstanding all these, there are individuals in India also, perhaps ardent follower’s of the Gujral Doctrine and / or involved in ‘Track II’ diplomacy, who opine that this is an opportunity we must not forsake and vacate Siachen, once Pakistan agrees not to occupy posts vacated by us at a future date

The entire state of Kashmir had acceded to India by the signing of the Instrument of Accession on 26 October 1947 by Maharaja Hari Singh. The events that followed leading to the Karachi Agreement of 1949 are well recorded. The CFL indicated areas that were in possession of India and Pakistan. Area beyond NJ 9842 was neither delineated nor occupied by anyone, but was always a part of Kashmir which had acceded to India in 1947; it therefore, belonged to India and was rightfully occupied by own troops when the need arose, ipso facto it is in our legal possession.

In 1963, Pakistan unilaterally ceded 5,100 sq km of the Shaksgam Valley to China; the area lies to the North of Indira Col and was also part of erstwhile Kashmir. In the last two years there have been reports of PLA troops having moved into the Gilgit-Baltistan area What are the compulsions for vacating Siachen? Some myths that are bandied about by Pakistan and by proponents of vacating the glaciers are that India is the aggressor and so it must vacate, heavy casualties are being caused to troops by altitude and extreme climate, environmental degradation being caused by continued troop deployments, heavy financial burden on respective countries to maintain and sustain these deployments and the effect on morale of troops deployed in such inhospitable terrain. However, the truth about these myths is - as stated earlier, Siachen was always part of Kashmir and part of the accession of 1947 and therefore, we have not usurped any land but only occupied our own territory. Secondly, troops did suffer casualties due to climatic conditions and altitude initially, but with better equipment and improved living conditions, physical casualties are within manageable limits and no longer a matter of serious concern; thirdly, national security cannot be weighed only in fiscal terms, besides our economy is resilient to sustain this effort; as regards morale, a reality check will reveal that there is a waiting list of volunteers who wish to serve in Siachen, across various arms and services of the IA. Lastly, continued efforts are already on to reduce

July 2012 Defence AND security alert

degradation of the environment, however, this cannot be the solitary factor to dictate a military decision, which has multifarious dimensions. Finally, why must we place faith in the PA which refuses to address our main concerns of terror related issues by continuing to support jihadi groups, not allowing their government to take action against perpetrators of 26/11 or rein in Hafeez Saeed spouting anti-India venom in public meetings and being glamourised on TV? In 1963, Pakistan unilaterally ceded 5,100 sq km of the Shaksgam Valley to China; the area lies to the North of Indira Col and was also part of erstwhile Kashmir. In the last two years there have been reports of PLA troops having moved into the Gilgit-Baltistan area. Beijing has peremptorily dismissed these reports as false and misleading; subsequently, these have been explained as some PLA personnel undertaking construction work in that area. However, it is confirmed that approx 3,000 PLA troops are located in the area. There have been some reports of Pakistan having allowed presence of Chinese in the Northern Areas to work on the upgradation of the Karakoram Highway; other reports reveal that some areas have been leased to China; precursor to another ‘Shaksgam’? The Shaksgam Valley, being Chinese territory, presence of PLA troops in Gilgit-Baltistan area is ominous. Their presence is part of a long term Chinese plan; we should therefore, not be under any illusion. We must take cognisance of this development and factor it into our assessments of the emerging threat. The area to the South-east of the Karakoram Pass of Indian territory is the Depsang plateau; DBO is on the Northern part of this plateau. IA troops are deployed in this area, facing PLA troops deployed to the East viz. Line of Actual Control (LAC), West of Aksai Chin. PLA troops periodically transgress into the area of the Depsang plateau, beyond the LAC, resulting in face-offs with own troops in the area; the terrain favours the PLA in this area and in a crunch situation can cause embarrassment to our nation. Besides, PLA troops can also crossover from the Karakoram Pass and move elements along the Teram Shehr Glacier, to threaten

move of our troops along the Siachen Glacier, especially towards the northern portion of the glacier. Some may discount this option since the area is snow-clad and glaciated, however, having visited the area a number of times, in my opinion, it would be imprudent to negate this option; we must heed the adage, where there is a will there is a way. Let’s not forget that Siachen was a ‘no go’ area in the early 1980’s! The feasibility of a link-up between the Karakoram Pass and Shaksgam Valley cannot be ruled out, especially in a scenario where Indian troops have been withdrawn from the glacier. As on today, the Saltoro Ridge stands as a wedge between China and Pakistan. These two countries, at any given point in time, can certainly launch a joint effort to embarrass India in the Siachen Glacier area, if we afford them an opportunity in the form of withdrawing troops, before resolution of other important issues. A premature withdrawal from the glacier will result in encirclement of the area by armies of both the countries, leading to their virtually ‘knocking on the doors’ of Leh. A review of the track record of Pakistan at abiding by the agreements with India since 1947 is a litany of their chicanery over the last six decades. Starting with 1949 Karachi CF agreement, Tashkent Agreement of 1966, the Shimla Accord of 1972 or the 1999 Accord prior to Kargil, continued support to terrorists and failure to prosecute perpetrators of 26/11, has resulted in the trust deficit burgeoning further. During previous rounds of discussion on the Siachen issue, PA has refused to accept the AGPL as it exists today and has been insisting that troops of both the armies withdraw to the pre-1984 line; a preposterous proposition, to say the least. The reason for this demand is that the PA has been perfidiously claiming that it is holding dominating positions on the Siachen Glacier! Acceptance of the AGPL as suggested by India will expose their deceit, both domestically and globally. In view of the foregoing, is it only our responsibility to try and reduce this trust deficit? Why should resolution of the Siachen issue precede other issues? Is it to fulfil a personal agenda of some elements in the two countries? Whatever be the case, we must deal with this issue with prudence.

Movement of troops on the Siachen Glacier is not only arduous but also time consuming. It takes between one to three weeks to move from Base Camp to posts on the Saltoro Ridge including the period for acclimatisation. Besides, the altitude, the dominating heights and the terrain is tougher than what was encountered in Kargil-Drass-Chorbat La sectors in 1999. If the army is ordered to vacate posts on the Saltoro Ridge and relocate in areas South of the Siachen Glacier, it needs to be reiterated that it will not be possible to re-capture any posts at a subsequent stage; it will not only be fallacious but foolhardy to expect another Kargil in Siachen. Does it then imply that deployment on the Saltoro Ridge must remain forever? As a consequence of the Ghyari avalanche of 07 April, besides statements of important dignitaries, the issue has also gained prominence in public domain in Pakistan, resulting in a clamour for withdrawal from the area. Notwithstanding the outcry in both countries, we must be circumspect in our response. Any agreement on the Siachen issue must

incorporate the following - the AGPL must be authenticated on maps related to present deployment of armies of both the countries; it must also be unequivocally stated that at no stage in the future, would any of the armies deploy on the Saltoro Ridge; adequate implementable safeguards need to be built into the agreement. Secondly, resolution of Siachen must never be considered in isolation; it must form part of the resolution of entire Kashmir as Siachen is physically part of that state. We must not succumb to the wiles of diplomacy and posturing by our neighbours and become munificent on the Siachen issue. In the absence of resolution of the boundary issue with both Pakistan and China, vacating posts on the Saltoro Ridge would be committing hara-kiri. We also need to guard against the proclivity of our political leadership to give away at the negotiating table what has been gained on the battlefield, at the cost of lives of our soldiers a la Hajipir Pass in 1965 and 93,000 POW’s in 1971.

July 2012 Defence AND security alert

Gilgit-Baltistan

STRATEGIC MOSAIC

Vice Admiral Vijay Shankar PVSM, AVSM, ADC (retd) The writer holds an MSc in Defence Studies and is a graduate of the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, USA. He is the former Commander-in-Chief of the Andaman and Nicobar Command, C-in-C of the Strategic Forces Command and Flag Officer Commanding Western Fleet. His Command and operational experience are comprehensive and include Command of INS Viraat the aircraft carrier. He is a member of the adjunct faculty of the National Institute of Advanced Studies and he currently tenants the Admiral Katari Chair of Excellence at the United Services Institute.

It is China that leads the charge to secure a strategic corridor serviced by a maritime terminal that would quench not just its thirst for energy but also provide a secure alternative conduit for the ‘fruits’ of its Africa and Middle East ventures to feed its resource guzzling growth programme

n 1963, Pakistan ceded more than five thousand square kilometres of territory in the Karakoram region of Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK). This accommodated the construction of the Karakoram Highway that links China’s Xinjiang region through the Khunjerab Pass with Pakistan’s Gilgit-Baltistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa regions. Started in 1959 and completed in 1979, the 1,300 km highway connects Kashgar with Islamabad and traverses some of the world’s most hostile terrain. This energy channel serves to provide an efficient alternative to the exposed and vulnerable sea passage through the Malacca / Sunda / Lombok Straits. At the southern end of the Karakoram corridor is Gwadar Port on the Arabian Sea. Pakistan has urged China to use and take maximum benefits from the Gwadar Port. For China, it is this factor of securing the ‘right of passage’ in this troubled region that is of critical consequence. The Port of Gwadar with all its geostrategic features provides to its nascent ‘blue water’ navy a reach and control capability that would assure security of its energy lines and sanctuary to its raw materials emanating from Africa. It is towards this end that Chinese strategic policy is directed. A former head of India’s Strategic Forces Command takes a close look at China’s Malacca Bypass strategy.

he North and Northwest Passages were fabled sea routes conjured by adventurers, merchants and money chandlers over the last six centuries to link the Pacific with the Atlantic Ocean. The Route lay through the Arctic archipelago of what became Canada and the treacherous ice flows that frustrate passage across the Arctic Ocean. To discover, establish and control a commercial all weather sea line of communication that would have worldwide economic significance was the quest of early explorers. Some of these voyages ended in disaster while others in failure in the search for a viable deep sea channel amidst drifting icebergs and trapping ice flows. Not till 1906 when Amundsen made the transit over an arduous three year voyage was the feat achieved; and a feat it remained till Nature through global warming made the passage a distinct commercial and strategic verity. Today the route is a reality and in 2011 alone more than 18 commercial ships had made the now ice free crossing. To put matters in perspective, as a trade corridor the distance from China to markets in Europe has been cut down to less than 8,000 miles from 14,700 miles. Significantly the route avoids two sensitive ‘choke points’ the Malacca Strait and the Suez Canal . While a combination of strategic security considerations, geopolitical circumstances, commercial power rivalry, imperatives of economy in a globalised world and Nature made actuality of a fable; a very similar array of forces have set in motion another global quest. Only on this historical occasion it is China that leads the charge to secure a strategic corridor serviced by a maritime terminal that would quench not just its thirst for energy but also provide a secure alternative conduit for the ‘fruits’ of its Africa and Middle East ventures to feed its resource guzzling growth programme.

Compulsions of growth The China growth story over the last quarter of a century has been breathtaking. The transition from an economic backwater to the role of one of the prime movers of global economy is a narrative both intimidating and awe-inspiring. It is the world’s second largest and fastest growing economy with a growth rate averaging near 9.5 per cent during this period. China is also the largest exporter and second largest importer of goods in the world. What made it all happen? Was it a set of historical circumstances and economic fortuities? If at all there was a mantra then it may be attributed to four critical conditions; firstly, China’s rapid

July 2012 Defence AND security alert

The Gwadar-Karakoram-Xinjiang Corridor

transition to ‘State Capitalism’ since 1978; secondly, leadership that saw economic opportunities in the new globalised circumstance and had the sagacity to not just grab it on national priority, but also to dump the baggage of its immediate past and set aside all other political and ideological considerations; thirdly, the ability to harness the unique combination of a vast supply of young cheap labour and a willingness to open the country to the world; lastly, the single minded ruthlessness with which policy was implemented. China today exerts huge influence beyond her shores. Commodity prices and markets are today driven by her hunger for raw materials and energy which in turn has translated to cheap finished products. This cycle in the middle term is irresistible. Nearly every global manufacturer now has become vulnerable to the ‘China Price’.A cycle that is not so apparent and yet is equally unremitting is the rate of technological convergence that growth and development have set into motion. In time, indications are, ‘technological-catch-up and overhaul’ will provide the impetus to sustain growth. The extent of China’s global outward impulse in general can be appreciated by the fact that nearly 60 per cent of its oil demands come through imports (from once being an oil exporter in the 1980s) half of which is from the Middle East and 30 per cent from Africa. Sino-African trade in 2010 amounted to US$ 126.9 billion and while the balance of trade is equitable, it is the nature of policy in terms of political non-interference and content that is significant; 90 per cent of imports are made up of primary products (fuel 65 per cent, metals 25 per cent) while exports comprise finished products machinery and

Country

Economic type

Average annual trade, 2006-2010

(US$ million)

Share in total ChinaAfrica trade

Angola

Oil export

18,627

21 per cent

South Africa

Diversified economy

166,86

18 per cent

Sudan

Oil export

6,445

7 per cent

Nigeria

Oil export

5,774

6 per cent

Diversified economy

5,384

6 per cent

Algeria

Oil export

4,155

5 per cent

Libya

Oil export

4,154

5 per cent

Republic of the Congo

Oil export

3,241

4 per cent

Morocco

Diversified economy

2,548

3 per cent

Benin

Agriculture

2,097

2 per cent

Egypt

Weight of top ten trading partners in total China-Africa trade

76 per cent

Table 1: China’s top 10 trading partners in Africa. Source: Capital Week

transports 60 per cent, communication and IT 20 per cent. China’s direct investment in the region is US$ 40 billion (approx. up from US$ 200 million in 2005); of note is the US$ 34 billion in soft loans for cross continent and port infrastructure. More specific to this study, the value of energy from Africa is summarised in Table 1.

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Gilgit-Baltistan

STRATEGIC MOSAIC

The Port of Gwadar represents the maritime interface of the logistic and energy corridor. Its geography is what gives it strategic significance. Situated in the Balochistan province this deep water port combines proximity to the mouth of the Persian Gulf without being cloistered within the narrow Strait of Hormuz. Its commercial value lies in its potential for providing transshipment facilities for containers and bulk cargo and as a maritime outlet for Central Asian countries. Phase I was completed in March 2008 In terms of realpolitik, which we are concerned with, four vital interests drive China’s venture into Africa and the Middle East; in order of priority (as determined by sustenance of growth and therefore impact on regime durability) these are identified as follows: Access to energy, minerals, timber, agro products and their secure routing. Enhanced exports of technology and finished Products. Investment and control participation in cross continent infrastructure, roads, rail and ports. Support in international fora and recognition of one China. What will be evident is the enormous stake that China has in the region and the investments it continues to make to provide guaranteed and secure transit corridors to assure unimpeded flow of the instruments of growth. The Gwadar-Karakoram-Xinjiang passage is a key enabler for the Africa-Mid East enterprise and is the abiding focus of our examination.

The Gwadar-Karakoram-Xinjiang passage In 1941 a curious and little known war was fought in neutral Persia when the reigning Reza Shah refused the Allies access to the Trans-Iranian rail. Britain and the USSR saw in the rail link a continental conduit in addition to the two sea routes (Arctic and Pacific) to logistically relieve the Soviet Union. In August of that same year Britain and the Soviets invaded Iran and in a quick campaign, deposed the monarch and took control of the rail link to facilitate a land route from the Persian Gulf entry points at Basra, Bandar Shahpur and Bushehr to Tehran and onward to Azerbaijan for the American ‘Lend-Lease’ supplies. Statistically the ‘Persian Corridor’ accounted for 8 million of the 16.3 million tons of supplies that the USA delivered to the USSR during the War1. The purpose of recounting this particular episode is to highlight the critical importance of diversifying strategic logistic routes and the need to secure them to the extent of using military force. The lessons of the Persian Corridor have not been lost

on China. Their strategic quest to secure transit routes have impelled them to develop a trans-regional corridor from a maritime entry point at Gwadar diagonally along a north-eastern orientation across the Karakoram into the Xinjiang; the motivations are there as in war to diversify and establish alternative routes, only ‘war’ may not have been declared but the context remains a shaky and competitive peace. In the Karakoram, Kunlun and Himalayas, China has built rail, road, air and energy pipeline networks that can not only support its military deployment in Xinjiang and Tibet but also link up with the hinterland and the throbbing industrial coastal region. Importantly, the missing conduit is a multi-function corridor that provides a gateway to the North Arabian Sea which, indeed, is the crowning piece of China’s strategic mosaic to its Africa and Middle East undertaking.

The crowning piece in the strategic mosaic In 1963, Pakistan ceded more than five thousand square kilometres of territory in the Karakoram region of Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK). This accommodated the construction of the Karakoram Highway that links China’s Xinjiang region through the Khunjerab Pass with Pakistan’s Gilgit-Baltistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa regions. Started in 1959 and completed in 1979, the 1,300 km highway connects Kashgar with Islamabad and traverses some of the world’s most hostile terrain. The second tier to this logistic conduit is the establishment of rail links. A proposal was made in 2010 to launch a joint China-Pakistan project to link Kashgar in Xinjiang to Havelian near Rawalpindi in Pakistan by a 700 km rail link through the Khunjerab Pass. The proposal coincided with China designating the city of Kashgar as a Special Economic Zone2 (the mantra for change in China which allows adoption of economic management systems that are especially conducive to doing business), lending credence and an element of urgency to the project. The third and perhaps the most vital logistic layer and indeed, the most fragile in this strategic scheme, is the energy channel that serves to provide an efficient alternative to the exposed and vulnerable sea passage through the Malacca / Sunda / Lombok Straits. At the southern end of the Karakoram corridor is Gwadar Port on the Arabian Sea. Pakistan has urged China to use and take maximum benefits from the Gwadar Port. The port was built with Chinese financial assistance (80 per cent of its initial US$ 248 million development costs) and was offered to the Port of Singapore Authority (PSA) to conduct shipping operations in February 2007 for 40 years. The port performance has been unsatisfactory; only 72 ships have brought government cargo to Gwadar Port and PSA was reluctant to make a further investment of US$ 525 million in the next five years3. Pakistan is keen that China constructs oil / gas pipelines from Gwadar to Xinjiang ostensibly to transport Iranian

1. Coakley, Robert W. Global Logistics and Strategy Chap 9: The Persian Corridor, Washington 1955. 2. Dasgupta, Saibal. Times of India e-newspaper 07 July 2010, “China Plans Railway Link with Pakistan”. 3. Newspaper, Daily Time Islamabad, 03 January 2010.

July 2012 Defence AND security alert

Map 1: China’s Oil Pipeline Import Options. Source: Michael Rodgers PFC Energy 2009-2010 gas that was earlier part of the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) pipeline project. In 2008, Yang Jiechi, Chinese foreign minister, had stated that China was “seriously studying Pakistan’s proposal to participate in the IPI gas pipeline project”4, however a recent report suggests that China has pulled out of the deal to finance the project on account of US sanctions on Iran5. Map 1 graphically represents China’s Oil Pipeline import options in green.

The enormous stake that China has in the region and the investments it continues to make to provide guaranteed and secure transit corridors to assure unimpeded flow of the instruments of growth. The Gwadar-Karakoram-Xinjiang passage is a key enabler for the Africa-Mid East enterprise and is the abiding focus of our examination. China’s commercial and military engagement of Africa and West Asia and quest for an alternative, secure and controlled strategic energy and raw material corridor is no aberration but the start of a multi-pronged strategic trend

The pipeline from Gwadar to Tarim via Kashgar is flagged as unlikely to happen (in the near future, see Map 1); while this may be current appreciation based on the security situation in Pakistan, clearly the strategic logic for the pipeline is unmistakable. To put matters in perspective China’s oil imports total 6 million barrels per day (mbls/d); of this 7 per cent i.e. 4,30,800 bls/d comes from Iran while 30 per cent i.e. 18,00,000 bls/d comes from fields in Africa;6 all of which, today, transits in hulls via the straits as indicated in Map 1. This single fact must cause considerable strategic anxieties to Chinese planners since an alternative passage does not exist. The Gwadar-Kashgar pipeline, if and when realised, will span a distance of 2,000 km (approx.). Assuming the Canada-US Keystone pipeline (operationalised in 2010) as the model; then we are implying a 1 metre diameter conduit serviced by a pumping station aboutevery 120 km with a flow rate of 6 mtrs/sec and a capacity to deliver 5,90,000 bls/d (approx.) amounting to 9.8 per cent of their total imports. The economics of one such pipeline would be in the region of US$ 12 billion and given the nature of terrain may take up to 10 years to complete.7

4. Newspaper, Asia Times, 09 May 2010. 5. LA Times 14 Mar 2012, “Chinese bank pulls out of Pakistan-Iran pipeline project”. 6. All statistics in this section from US Energy Information Administration 2010. 7. O’Meara, Dina. Calgary Herald, 27 July 2010 “US delays decision on Keystone XL”. All computations and extrapolations are based on author’s estimates. July 2012 Defence AND security alert

Gilgit-Baltistan

STRATEGIC MOSAIC

In the Karakoram, Kunlun and Himalayas, China has built rail, road, air and energy pipeline networks that can not only support its military deployment in Xinjiang and Tibet but also link up with the hinterland and the throbbing industrial coastal region. Importantly, the missing conduit is a multi-function corridor that provides a gateway to the North Arabian Sea which, indeed, is the crowning piece of China’s strategic mosaic to its Africa and Middle East undertaking

The port of Gwadar The Port of Gwadar represents the maritime interface of the logistic and energy corridor. Its geography is what gives it strategic significance. Situated in the Balochistan province this deep water port combines proximity to the mouth of the Persian Gulf without being cloistered within the narrow Strait of Hormuz. Its commercial value lies in its potential for providing transshipment facilities for containers and bulk cargo and as a maritime outlet for Central Asian countries. The port as mentioned earlier is being constructed with considerable investment by China. Phase I was completed in March 2008. The facilities operationalised include 3 multipurpose berths with total wharfage of 602 metres, essential services and an approach channel dredged to 12.5 mtrs.8 Phase II of construction, which is of interest to this study, envisages nine additional deep water berths including two oil terminals capable of handling 2,00,000 dwt tankers (allowing for a conversion factor of 7.33 barrels to 1 ton of crude and a turnaround period of 4 days, the handling capacity is about 0.7mbls/d) which could feed directly into continental pipelines. The problem with Phase II is security, funding and the fact that the deal is mired in controversy9; at an estimated cost of US$ 932 million the PSA agreement is in the Pakistan Supreme Court for cancellation of project10. China’s response to the Pakistan request to step into PSA’s shoes is not entirely clear since the deal with PSA is yet to be closed and the security situation is not getting any better. 11The current status of Gwadar Port may perhaps vindicate the notation on the ‘red flag’ pinned on the port at Map 1.

The maritime military dimension Julian Corbett made a convincing argument when he stated that control of sea spaces is neither identical nor analogous in its strategic conditions with the conquest of territory. 12 The reasons are amply clear for

the seas are not susceptible to ownership (outside territorial waters) because neither can neutrals be excluded from it nor can forces and populations subsist on it for any cognisable duration of time. Therefore the only deliberate consideration is how best to secure the right of free and unfettered passage for both commercial and, should the need arise, military purposes. For China, it is this factor of securing the ‘right of passage’ in this troubled region that is of critical consequence. The Port of Gwadar with all its geostrategic features mentioned earlier, provides to its nascent ‘blue water’ navy a reach and control capability that would assure security of its energy lines and sanctuary to its raw materials emanating from Africa. It is towards this end that Chinese strategic policy is directed. Whether development as an international maritime power is going to cause friction with regional players such as India remains the moot question.

Its growing assertiveness is evident in the stance it has taken on Syria in the UN, continued technological and material support it provides to Pakistan; it’s blocking of sanctions and refusal to cut back on oil sourced from Iran and its very keen attention to the course of the confrontation there

Strategic impact on region China’s commercial and military engagement of Africa and West Asia and quest for an alternative, secure and controlled strategic energy and raw material corridor is no aberration but the start of a multi-pronged strategic trend. Like the Imperial Powers of the colonial era before and Super Powers in more recent times, China’s charge to acquire other discrete supply lines will demand that the primary prong to the ‘trend’ embrace continued enhancement of it’s naval capabilities in-region and exploit the willingness of Pakistan to replace the influence played by America on her affairs. The second prong is on the diplomatic front; its growing assertiveness is evident in the stance it has taken on Syria in the UN, continued technological and material support it provides to Pakistan; it’s blocking of sanctions and refusal to cut back on oil sourced from Iran and its very keen attention to the course of the confrontation there. In these dealings, what is most remarkable is the absence of political baggage. The third prong is its deployment of soft power in the region in terms of infrastructural, educational, technological, soft loans and other aid programmes. Against this backdrop is the centrality, to China, of continued rapid growth and regime perpetuation and therefore the imperative to temper and balance her strategic aspirations with a non-confrontational posture when dealing with other key regional players even at the cost of relations with secondary players. This, despite the fact that recent American actions in the region to replace unpalatable

8. Gwadar Fact Sheet, development and operations of the Port of Gwadar 2009. gwadarcity.info 9. Shahid, Saleem. Dawn e-news 14 May 2012, “Review of Gwadar Port Feasibility Report Urged. 10. Reuters. Dawn e-news 08 Dec 2010, “Supreme Court hears challenge to PSA deal”. 11. Tom Wright, Jeremy Page, The Wall Street Journal 30 Sep 2011, “China Pullout Deals Blow to Pakistan”. Ali, Kalbe. Dawn e-news 22 May 2011 “China Agrees to run Gwadar Port”. 12. Corbett, Julian S. “Some Principles of Maritime Strategy”, Longmans Green and Co. London, 1911, p 88-90.

July 2012 Defence AND security alert

dispensations are seen as destabilising events. Clearly China has little incentive in catalysing unrestricted rivalry with regional players, as such a situation will only serve to close markets and draw on resources which could better serve the cause of growth and development. Yet at the same time, it is rational to assume that they would extend themselves to ensure that their interests are not degraded either by forces inimical to them or as consequence of unrelated political or military action. The significance of the Gwadar-Xinjiang energy and raw material passage in both conditions remains strategically pivotal.

They would extend themselves to ensure that their interests are not degraded either by forces inimical to them or as consequence of unrelated political or military action. The significance of the Gwadar-Xinjiang energy and raw material passage in both conditions remains strategically pivotal

Challenges ahead and policy recommendations India’s interest in the region is strategic, enduring and diversifying just as China’s is and so too the sole super power’s. What form this strategic competition will take and the substance of it will perhaps only be clear when the dust of USA’s involvement in Iran, Afghanistan and Iraq settles down. However there is considerable congruency of interests which for starters provides a sub-structure for strategic entente. The challenge before Indian Planners is therefore to identify areas of common and overlapping interests and to enhance cooperation in these areas. The singular factor that is clearly in the domain of vitally shared interest of India, China and the United States of America (and her allies) is guaranteed energy security, safety of production facilities and protection of transportation infrastructure. The three also share a common sensitivity to the promotion and export of terrorism from the region particularly from the Afghanistan-Pakistan area. This could take the form of joint naval patrols working in tandem with littoral states and the use of their commercial and diplomatic clout to rein-in maverick states.

Participation of the three in forums such as India Africa Forum Summits (IAFS) and the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) would give relevance and substance to these institutions. After all not to include the main actors with governing stakes in the area, notwithstanding the fact that China and the USA are extra regional powers, is to denude these associations of context. The next logical step would be to give regulatory teeth to these bodies, since two of the objectives of IONS are “… to address present and anticipated challenges to maritime security and stability”. Secondly “To establish and promote a variety of trans-national maritime cooperative mechanisms designed to mitigate maritime security concerns within the Indian Ocean”. The relationship that oil producers have with their consumers is a symbiotic one; this interdependence provides the basis of a new security framework which could be driven by action to promote security to both consumer and producer in such a manner that stability becomes of interest to all parties. Given the stakes that China has in her own development and her justified security concerns, there are adequate signals to suggest that India needs to pull out of the state of paranoia that she transits through every time that China collaborates with Pakistan, particularly so in the case of the Gwadar-Karakoram-Xinjiang energy-cum-raw materials corridor. It is true that there are very serious unresolved territorial disputes that plague Sino-Indian relations and the proposed corridor runs through some of this territory; but what is of greater significance is the burgeoning trade between the two which is expected to reach US$ 100 billion by 2015. In this deepening of commercial relations lies the germ of friction resolution.

July 2012 Defence AND security alert

Gilgit-Baltistan

SINO-PAK MACHINATIONS

A Air Vice Marshal A K Tiwary VSM (retd) The writer commanded a MiG-29 Squadron in late 80s. His various command and staff appointments like Chief Operations Officer at a major Wing, operational planning at Command level, Director Concept Studies at Air HQ, Command of a major flying base, Head of the Training Team (Air) at Defence Services Staff College and Senior Directing Staff (Air) at National Defence College have conferred a rich practical experience. The air staff course at DSSC Wellington (TN), Command and Air War Course at the Air University, Maxwell Airbase, Montgomery (USA), all inducted and accelerated his interest in air war studies. After premature retirement he now flies as Commander on Boeing 737-800 NG.

It is quite possible for Pakistan to hand over the use of these airfields to PLAAF in a conflict against India. This would fulfill a serious shortcoming in PLAAF capability in the western sector. The smaller airbases could be used for combat support operations including use by UAVs. The bigger bases could house regular combat aircraft of PLAAF. If the Chinese troops help in PoK is used to beef up the infrastructure at these airbases, then it will give further boost to PLAAF capabilities

very incisive article that highlights the possibility of Pakistan handing over its critical airbases of Gilgit, Skardu, Chilas, Chitral and Muzaffarabad to the PLAAF in the context of a two front war with India. The writer points out the existing air power constraints that China suffers in the Western Sector of Tibet and Jammu and Kashmir because it has only two Airbases in this sector. In the western area opposite Jammu and Kashmir China has airfields at Kashgar and Khotan. These are 800 km and 600 km away from Indian bases. This drawback can be overcome by using the Pakistani airbases in Gilgit-Baltistan and PoK. This adds a new and very dangerous dimension to the Sino-Pak nexus in this vital region.

based in Sinkiang and the Chengdu military districts, able to support operations from Tibet against India by delivering flanking attacks or providing follow-on reinforcements.1

The current PLAAF threat

China has constructed fourteen major airbases on the Tibetan Plateau and a score of tactical airstrips. In the western area opposite Jammu and Kashmir China has airfields at Kashgar and Khotan. These are 800 km and 600 km away from Indian bases. The central and eastern sectors have more airfields in comparison. But it is the western sector that is more important to China. It is worth recalling that in 1959, Chinese premier Chou En- Lai had suggested to Prime Minister Nehru that China was willing to recognise McMahon line as the border in eastern sector if India ACCEPTED Chinese claim on Aksai Chin. This proves the strategic importance of Aksai Chin to China.

ubsequent to 9/11, when President Bush declared the policy of “either with us or against us”, for the global war on terror, Pakistan decided to be on American side, overtly at least. They allowed the use of ten airbases to the main instrument of war - the US air power. These were Peshawar, Zhob, Pishin, Jacobabad, Pasni, Karachi International, Panjgur, Dal Badin, Kharan Kalat and Shamsi. While the Pak-US relations fluctuate either way, the Pakistani cooperation with its “all weather friend” has been increasing over the years. Chinese presence in northern PoK is one of the recent manifestations. Overtly PRC claims its presence in PoK is to help improve the Karakoram Highway. In realty it is likely to be far more precarious for India. Let us visualise how?

In Aksai Chin a substantial portion of territory remains disputed between India and China. It remains under forceful Chinese occupation since 1956. Through Aksai Chin Plateau passes an important strategic Chinese highway connecting Xinjiang province with Tibet. The continuing Tibetan quest for autonomy/independence is seen as a result of Indian instigation. Tibetan unrest, despite 50 years of Chinese occupation and subjugation remains a big worry for China. In the Chinese view, if Tibet is somehow detached from China, Xinjiang will follow, then Hainan, Inner Mongolia, possibly even Manchuria. By the early 1990s, China had deployed 5,00,000 soldiers, a quarter of it’s standing army on the Tibetan Plateau, half of them based on the border between India and Tibet, half in central Tibet. Four additional Chinese armies, each the equivalent of a 60,000 man army corps, were

How can we be sure that PLA troops in PoK are not meant to improve the infrastructure at these airfields? This would need constant attention from all our intelligence agencies In the present scenario India and China are evenly matched in the Jammu and Kashmir sector - a fact unacceptable to the Chinese. They would like to dominate heavily in this sector. The terrain here is such that no significant gains can be made by surface forces of either side. It is the air power alone that will permit total domination. The two Chinese airfields in this sector do not provide sufficient basis for air power domination. Kashgar is the only regular airbase with logistics and associated infrastructure for air operations. It’s distance of 800 km puts it on the periphery with little impact on theatre of operations. PLAAF has

1. Eric C. Margolis, “War at the Top of the World- the Clash for Mastery of Asia”, Canada, 1999. P. 212.

July 2012 Defence AND security alert

PLAAF-PAF NEXUS in PoK

few aircraft with such radius of action. Their air refuelling capability presently is limited. Khotan is 600 km away. Though it has four large tarmacs which could accommodate two squadrons of combat aircraft, it has little associated infrastructure. Moreover, combat aircraft in the unsheltered tarmac are highly vulnerable to Indian air attacks. Shiquanhe was once considered an airfield. The Google earth imagery does not indicate presence of a regular airbase. Also, it is at an elevation of 4,240 meters. This makes its use as an airbase for combat aircraft suspect. The result is that Chinese air power capability is poor in this sector.

Aircraft / Missiles

Quantity

Role

Remarks

SU-30 MK

100

AD/GA

SU-27/J 11

171

AD/GA

200 more to come

J-10

AD/GA

Production rate to go up. Indigenous.

JH-7A

Indigenous

J-8 II

180

Indigenous

J-7

471

Indigenous

H-6

Bomber

ALCM armed

Cruise Missiles

In thousands

Ground launched

—

TBMs

In thousands

Conventional warhead

—

Out of 1,600 plus combat aircraft in PLAAF, around 400 aircraft are 4th generation. Its old bomber carrying long range cruise missile will be still effective. Ground launched cruise missiles (GLCM) and TBMs will add to the strike power. The Table on the left shows PLAAF strength. Yet in this sector PLAAF will remain weak. To overcome this weakness Chinese have been initiating a series of steps. Following three events are of relevance. In 2011 an exercise by the Group Army on Tibetan Plateau, a first of it’s kind in high altitude area of 4,500-5,000 m was held. It was a coordinated

July 2012 Defence AND security alert

Gilgit-Baltistan

SINO-PAK MACHINATIONS

battle between airborne troops seizing a pass at 5,000 m altitude and link up and attack by armour led formation closely supported by air. In March 2011 Pakistan Air Force and PLAAF conducted a joint air exercise in Pakistan codenamed Shaheen-1. A contingent of PLAAF compromising combat aircraft participated in the first ever operational exercise. The exercise dealt with various combat scenarios. In November 2011 in a joint exercise between PLA and Pak army - the PLA troops starting from China parachuted in the Pak territory.2

2. IDSAâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s China Report-2011.

July 2012 Defence AND security alert

Now let us have a look at the maps. Karakoram Pass is with Chinese. Opposite is Indian post Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO). If India captures Karakoram Pass, she cuts off Chinese road link into Pakistan which eventually links China with Arabian Sea via Gwadar Port in Pakistan. Or if Chinese capture Sasser Pass south of DBO, they get depth to their road link. So the army exercise to seize a pass at 4,500 m makes sense. The other two exercises of parachuting troops and PLAAF and PAF cooperation in operations operating from PAF bases also falls in place. Remember Bomdila and Sela battles in 1962 war - this scenario is highly likely.

July 2012 Defence AND security alert

Gilgit-Baltistan

SINO-PAK MACHINATIONS

Gilgit-Baltistan

RED DRAGON IN INDIA’S NORTH-WEST

Taking the US-Pak ongoing war against terror as an example, let us visualise possible Sino-Pak collusion in a joint war against India. In this sector Pakistan has airfields/airstrips at Gilgit, Skardu, Chashma, Chilas, Muzaffarabad, Rawalkot and Chitral. In addition there are many more regular PAF airfields nearby. See map below:

How can we be sure that PLA troops in PoK are not meant to improve the infrastructure at these airfields? This would need constant attention from all our intelligence agencies. The relevant details of airbases are given in the Table on the left.

Airbase

Runway Length

Elevation

Remarks

Kashgar

2800 m

1200 m

800 km. POL storage exists.

Khotan

2860 m

1380 m

600 km.

Shiquanhe

3000 m

4240 m

Rw appears as a road. 300 km

Skardu

3600 m

2300 m

PAF base

Gilgit

2680 m

1500 m

In PoK

Chilas

1500 m

1100 m

In PoK

Muzaffarabad

1250 m

800 m

In PoK

Chitral

2000 m

1400 m

In PoK

Rawalkot

1480 m

1600 m

In PoK

July 2012 Defence AND security alert

They allowed the use of ten airbases to the main instrument of war - the US air power. These were Peshawar, Zhob, Pishin, Jacobabad, Pasni, Karachi International, Panjgur, Dal Badin, Kharan Kalat and Shamsi It is quite possible for Pakistan to hand over the use of these airfields to PLAAF in a conflict against India. This would fulfill a serious shortcoming in PLAAF capability in the western sector. The smaller airbases could be used for combat support operations including use by UAVs. The bigger bases could house regular combat aircraft of PLAAF. If the Chinese troops help in PoK is used to beef up the infrastructure at these airbases, then it will give further boost to PLAAF capabilities. To guard against such possibilities India needs to first of all increase the surveillance in this area. The very first indication of this happening must result in India launching required diplomatic protests. Secondly, these airbase / strips must become part of IAF’s target list with due priority.

CHINESE PLOT

outh Asia scholar Selig Harrison was the first to break the news in August 2010 in The New York Times that an estimated 7,000-11,000 Chinese People’s Liberation Army soldiers were deployed in Gilgit-Baltistan in the guise of engineering personnel and civil labour. Pakistan, of course, unconvincingly stated that China had sent “a humanitarian team” to Gilgit-Baltistan to assist in flood relief operations! Harrison succinctly termed this development as the unfolding of a “quiet geopolitical crisis, India will do well to monitor the ever enlarging Chinese footprint in its north-west regions for now India will have to manage another front on its troubled peripheries with both China and Pakistan in unholy concert. As we delve deeper into the happenings of the last two years in Gilgit-Baltistan, it will be amply clear to all that in keeping with its long-term objectives, China’s growing assertiveness in South Asia is not only manifesting itself in Afghanistan, awaiting the exit of US troops by 2014, but right across India’s north-west periphery in the area of Gilgit-Baltistan and the rest of PoK as also Balochistan which is up in arms against its own government. Since the last couple of years, the Chinese centre of gravity in land operations has been increasingly getting oriented towards Jammu and Kashmir and this is the sector where China and Pakistan could together plan to attack India if the need for them ever arises.

Lt Gen Kamal Davar PVSM, AVSM (retd) The writer is a distinguished soldier having served in all theatres of operations in his 41 years of service. A veteran of the 65 and 71 operations, he was wounded in action in the 1965 ops. He was the first armoured corps officer to be specially selected to be GOC Ladakh where he implemented many innovative operational and logistical innovations. He has been Chief of Staff of a Corps HQ in Jammu and Kashmir and then as GOC 11 Corps responsible for the defence of Punjab. He was especially selected by the Government of India to raise the Defence Intelligence Agency after the Kargil war. After retirement he writes and lectures on security issues. He is widely known to passionately espouse the cause of jointness in the Indian Armed Forces. As the first DG DIA, many intelligence initiatives including abroad were taken by him.

The Saltoro Ridge is just not a tactically important feature for Indian hawks to satiate any militarily grandiose inclinations but importantly prevents the convergence of enemy forces from the Aksai Chin, the Karakoram Highway (KKH) and Gilgit-Baltistan in this bowl and thus is a critical military buffer separating the two “all weather friends,” China and Pakistan.

July 2012 Defence AND security alert

Gilgit-Baltistan

CHINESE PLOT

efence Secretary level talks between India and Pakistan held on 11-12 June 2012 at Islamabad for resolving the Siachen issue ended on expected lines with both nations sticking to their often stated traditional stands. The joint statement issued at the end of these talks piously affirmed the common desire of both the nations to continue talks in the future to “make serious, sustained and result-oriented efforts for seeking an amicable resolution of Siachen.” Rhetoric in diplomatese often hides the wide chasm in not only differing perceptions of nations but camouflages, in a suave manner, their distinctly different strategic and tactical interests.

Meanwhile a far more alarming development has been reported a few months back by a US based think tank, The Middle East Media Research. Confirming earlier apprehensions that Pakistan was seriously considering handing over Gilgit-Baltistan to China on a 50 years lease, it claimed that Chinese personnel have assumed de facto control of the Gilgit-Baltistan region. While briefing US lawmakers, it further opined that the area would end up like Tibet and East Turkestan if “China’s unwarranted interventions are not challenged.”A well known Kashmiri researcher Dr Shabir Choudhry who has toured Gilgit-Baltistan, subsequently expressed in UK that this region had the makings of becoming a battleground between Pakistan and China on one side facing the US and India on the other side For Pakistan, Siachen represents, historically, a military failure to have the Indians pre-empting them and occupying the redoubtable Siachen Massif namely the Saltoro Ridge in 1984. But a Siachen demilitarisation today, as the Pakistanis are propagating, will present them an opportunity for not only occupying the formidable Saltoro Ridge but consolidating and further enhancing their military deployments in the strategic Gilgit-Baltistan region in ever enlarging collusive efforts with its mentor China. That this otherwise entire glaciated inhospitable region lies at the fulcrum of India’s very vulnerable Sub Sector North in the Aksai Chin region to its east, Pakistan illegally ceded to China, Shaksgam Valley to its north, the restive Gilgit-Baltistan (erstwhile Northern Areas of PoK) to its immediate west and the Leh-Kargil garrisons of India’s Ladakh frontier to its south and south-west, gives Siachen an unparalleled strategic importance which Indian defence planners can disregard only at the nation’s peril. The Saltoro Ridge is just not a tactically important feature for Indian hawks to satiate any militarily grandiose inclinations but importantly prevents the convergence of enemy forces from the Aksai Chin, the Karakoram Highway (KKH) and Gilgit-Baltistan in this bowl and thus is a critical military buffer separating the two “all weather friends,” China and Pakistan. Amazingly, some peaceniks in our country underplay the strategic importance of this region for reasons best known to them. India does not have to react in any manner whatsoever to Pak army chief Gen Ashfaq Kayani’s recent statement on the Siachen

July 2012 Defence AND security alert

demilitarisation after 140 Pak soldiers were unfortunately buried in an avalanche on the much lower Pak occupied western slopes of the Saltoro. For to any military planner, it was a great googly bowled by Gen Kayani to the Wagah candle-brigade we have in our country. India must analyse its Siachen policy holistically bearing in mind the newer 'Great Game' being played by Pakistan in these regions in collusion with the Red Dragon whose footprints are ominously enlarging since the past two years or so. That Pakistan has indulged in perfidy vis-à-vis India on many instances in the past, especially in Jammu and Kashmir may be pardoned by some in our country but cannot by those who are charged with the defence of the nation. It must be well understood by all that India is paying much less a price, including in nature attributed casualties, than Pakistan in defending its snow-clad frontiers notwithstanding the cardinal fact that price can never be a factor when it comes to safeguarding one’s own sovereignty. Pakistan’s stubborn refusal to even authenticate the current deployments of troops in Siachen is but a manifestation of its devious intentions.

in the pursuit of its strategic objectives. Thus China’s expanding footprints in Gilgit-Baltistan necessitates in-depth and speedy analysis by India.

India must analyse its Siachen policy holistically bearing in mind the newer ‘Great Game’ being played by Pakistan in these regions in collusion with the Red Dragon whose footprints are ominously enlarging since the past two years or so. That Pakistan has indulged in perfidy vis-à-vis India on many instances in the past, especially in Jammu and Kashmir may be pardoned by some in our country but cannot by those who are charged with the defence of the nation. It must be well understood by all that India is paying much less a price, including in nature attributed casualties, than Pakistan in defending its snow-clad frontiers notwithstanding the cardinal fact that price can never be a factor when it comes to safeguarding one’s own sovereignty. Pakistan’s stubborn refusal to even authenticate the current deployments of troops in Siachen is but a manifestation of its devious intentions

Noted South Asia scholar Selig Harrison was the first to break the news in August 2010 in The New York Times by stating that an estimated 7,000-11,000 Chinese People’s Liberation Army soldiers were deployed in Gilgit-Baltistan in the guise of engineering personnel and civil labour. Pakistan, of course, unconvincingly stated that China had sent “a humanitarian team” to Gilgit-Baltistan to assist in flood relief operations! Harrison succinctly termed this development as the unfolding of a “quiet geopolitical crisis”. This ominous development was subsequently confirmed by the previous Indian army chief and other senior Indian army officers. Chinese mining companies are making inroads into Gilgit’s mineral rich region also. Meanwhile, China is going full steam ahead in its massive infrastructural investments in PoK keeping its strategic objectives in mind. Apart from dams, bridges, hydro-electric projects it is also widening the 1,300 km Karakoram Highway which connects Kashgar in China’s restive Xinjiang region with Gilgit-Baltistan and Abbotabad in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa region with the overall aim of linking the Karakoram Highway to the southern Port of Gwadar in Balochistan through the Chinese aided GwadarDalbandin railway which extends up to Rawalpindi also. Reportedly 22 tunnels have also come along this alignment which could be used as

Importantly, India will do well to monitor the ever enlarging Chinese footprint in its north-west regions for now India will have to manage another front on its troubled peripheries with both China and Pakistan in unholy concert. As we delve deeper into the happenings of the last two years in Gilgit-Baltistan, it will be amply clear to all that in keeping with its long-term objectives, China’s growing assertiveness in South Asia is not only manifesting itself in Afghanistan, awaiting the exit of US troops by 2014, but right across India’s north-west periphery in the area of Gilgit-Baltistan and the rest of PoK as also Balochistan which is up in arms against its own government. Since the last couple of years or so, the Chinese centre of gravity in land operations has been increasingly getting oriented towards Jammu and Kashmir and this is the sector where China and Pakistan could together plan to attack India if the need for them ever arises. Meanwhile deliberate preparations for such an eventuality by them have been in motion since the past few years. It must be stated to China’s eternal credit that while it makes all the right noises diplomatically and for world consumption on measures to increase trade, bilateral relations et al, it simultaneously - almost religiously - unabated continues its military build-up determinedly

For Pakistan, Siachen represents, historically, a military failure to have the Indians pre-empting them and occupying the redoubtable Siachen Massif namely the Saltoro Ridge in 1984. But a Siachen demilitarisation today, as the Pakistanis are propagating, will present them an opportunity for not only occupying the formidable Saltoro Ridge but consolidating and further enhancing their military deployments in the strategic Gilgit-Baltistan region in ever enlarging collusive efforts with its mentor China missile storage sites - thus another front in India’s north-west has come up for contention. Meanwhile a far more alarming development has been reported a few months back by a US based think tank, The Middle East Media Research. Confirming earlier apprehensions that Pakistan was seriously considering handing over Gilgit-Baltistan to China on a 50 years lease, it claimed that Chinese personnel have assumed de facto control of the GilgitBaltistan region. While briefing US lawmakers, it further opined that the area would end up like Tibet and East Turkestan if “China’s unwarranted interventions are not challenged.” A well known Kashmiri researcher Dr Shabir Choudhry who has toured Gilgit-Baltistan, subsequently expressed in UK that this region had the makings of becoming a battleground between Pakistan and China on one side facing the US and India on the other side. He further stated that the Chinese are opening banks and building permanent accommodation for themselves - all indicative of a long haul in the region. Noted Pak journalist Amir Mir of The News has recently opined that “While Pakistan wants China to further enlarge the huge naval base at Gwadar, the Chinese are more interested in building military bases in Pakistan’s northern areas.” The Gwadar Port will be useful for China only if it has connectivity by land / rail with the Chinese hinterland

and thus China’s keen interest in ensuring a permanent presence in Gilgit-Baltistan. Reliable reports indicate that China and Pakistan are shortly going to unveil a Plan for the Joint Military Management of Gilgit-Baltistan, a development which has ominous military implications in the long run for India.

Reliable reports indicate that China and Pakistan are shortly going to unveil a Plan for the Joint Military Management of Gilgit-Baltistan, a development which has ominous military implications in the long run for India India has to seriously factor, in its security calculus, the newer nuances of the growing Chinese footprint in its strategic north-western region especially the credible collusive threat from Pakistan and China in tandem. The Sino-Pak nexus has advanced far beyond their nuclear and strategic missiles collaboration as China now moves to establish itself permanently in some of the frontier regions of Pakistan. The strategic convergence of the two nations will only grow for the Chinese it’s a win-win situation as it will continue to use Pakistan as its proxy, a low-cost yet high dividend proxy against India in its strategic hegemonistic objectives in South Asia. Thus it will only be militarily prudent for India to speedily endeavour to be adequately prepared for a two-front war.

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HOLISTIC ANALYSIS

nsurgencies always show a mismatch between recognised government and the demographic map of ethnic group. To make any insurgent movement successful, it needs a unifying objective and strong leadership and popular support. Insurgents tend to be highly adaptable and flexible, at least at the tactical and operational levels. Significant focus should be given to - Terrain Knowledge, Zone Maps, Cultural Mapped Intelligence and Swarming Tactics. Population control plus mobilisation and intelligence gathering are two very vital tools to be used in counter-insurgency measures. Everyday an insurgent movement continues to exist; it tends to add legitimacy to the insurgent cause. As insurgents develop a strategic strike capability via terrorism, improved homeland security also must be seen as part of capability enhancement for counter-insurgency support. Fear binds us in the search for comfort and security. In such environments religious or political fundamentalism will self-perpetuate and become firmly entrenched in local culture. Conflict and Concept transformation approaches require analysis of conflict structures and reshaping the concept maps. Conflict can be used for positive or negative purposes. Used positively, conflict can help identify issues of injustice or oppression that need to be addressed. Used negatively, conflict can lead to violence and destruction. Focus should be on structural issues such as the allocation of resources, the creation of just and inclusive systems of governance and the reform of institutions. When we apply conflict transformation we engage in strategic Peace building. A highly analytical article on insurgencies that presents some very useful and unusual insights.

Insurgencies and I

Collective Consciousness

ndulging in verification techniques, empirical data and considering theoretical limitations led to this write-up. The ultimate goal of this column is to foster critical thinking, enhance and engage collaboration of experts in specific application domain to decipher collectively and act accordingly.

Every action a human takes, a decision made, is with a positive intent for itself, first. This decision-action undergoes transformation when this intent is expressed and made applicable, starting the wheels of cause and effect, which leads to transformation. The intent truly positive or absolutely negative depends on which side of the fence the actor and receiver are. Focus in this column: Phenomenon of being a human and the internal and external factors, collective consciousness, insurgency and counter-insurgency measures. Humans by nature are: •Territorial

•Live through social cohesion

•Isolation is demoralising

John Donne’s eloquent lines from Meditation XVII his 1624 prose conveys the core of this need eloquently “No man is an island entire of itself; every man is a piece of the continent, a part of the main …” Humans live by their cultural, zone-mapped values and form collective identity in this process. They feel or want to feel part of the “main” and have:

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•A sense of security •A sense of belonging •A sense of purpose •A sense of personal competence and pride •A sense of trust •A sense of responsibility•A sense of contribution •A sense of self-discipline and self-control •A sense of encouragement, support and reward •A sense of accepting mistakes and failure •A sense of self-esteem •A sense of family unit These are basic needs of a human being, when all of these needs are in jeopardy a disturbance in the human behaviour is seen, when this behaviour receives collective affective resonance, a collective consciousness is formed and the motivation to take action develops. Increasing evolution brings increasing complexities in human mechanism, which is correlated with increasing interior consciousness and gross external factors. Affective resonance is which refers to person’s tendency to resonate and experience the same affect in response to viewing a display of that affect by another person (Biologically also, “mirror neurons”).

The columnist is an Intelligence and Terrorism Analyst, Clinical Psychologist and Clinical Hypnotherapist based in South-East Asia. She has also received training in specialsed areas including counter-terrorism, intelligence and tactical operations. She specialises in cognitive learning processes and neural pathway response and how these factors apply to specialised trainings. She is an expert in the field of non-verbal micro and macro expression for deception and detection and also using non-verbal assets for psychological self-assessment in conjunction with Emotional Intelligence to enhance the human mind, personality, image and spirit. She is a member of ICPA (International Corrections & Prisons Association), IACSP (International Association for Counter-Terrorism and Security Professionals) and a member of APA (American Psychological Association), APP (Association of Professional Psychologists), UK Certified Hypnotherapist and General Hypnotherapy Register.

Dr Rupali Jeswal

Affective resonance is considered to be the original basis for all human communication. This resonance forms collective consciousness which signifies "Joint or mutual knowledge," "Internal knowledge or conviction." Thus an autonomous individual comes to identify with a larger group/structure and as such, patterns of commonality amongst individuals bring legible unity to those structures. In simple terms when a common theme binds a group, collective consciousness is experienced and this can be seen in any groups of like minded people. The four dimensions of cohesion: •Commitment

•Communication

•Cooperation

•Command

The level of loyalty a member holds for the team and the goals is based on clear exchange of information, which benefits in motivation, to work together in the accomplishment of team goals when adhering to the four dimensions mentioned above. This assists in administrative and managerial role of directing and maintaining teams as they progress in accomplishing established goals. A sense of purpose develops organisational identification. Social cohesion: Groups are cohesive when group-level conditions are producing positive membership attitudes and behaviours and when group members’ interpersonal interactions are operating to maintain the group’s level conditions. Thus, cohesive groups are self-maintaining and self-organising with respect to the production of strong membership attractions and attachments (This is seen in increasing amount in insurgent groups, terrorism cells and gang organisations). Members of a highly cohesive group, in contrast to one with a low level of cohesiveness, are more concerned with their membership and are therefore more strongly motivated to contribute to the group’s welfare, to advance its objectives and to participate in its activities.

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HOLISTIC ANALYSIS

Insurgent’s collective consciousness and social cohesion brings subjective recognition to their revolutionary goals and to their grievances; in other words cognitive liberation towards a common thought and belief that the political and economic system is unjust and vulnerable to change. Collective attribution comes when organisations help individuals by giving merit to their grievances and recognise the commonness and the movement emerges. One of the ironies and problems with insurgency is that the regime facing one often does not recognise it or denies it until the insurgency has had time to coalesce and develop. The insurgents always begin a conflict with a strategic initiative and a unifying objective, which makes them unpredictable and constantly fluid. This asymmetric power projection also picks up momentum in today’s era due to globalisation. Insurgency is a holistic threat; counter-insurgency strategies must also then be holistic in nature.

The brain-behaviour perspective Emotional meaning: Ideologies, which create emotions and meanings within an individual. Emotional support: Members of the group share the same feelings and each individual lends support to another that promotes the feeling of solidarity with the group, the collective cause and collective identity. Self-expansion: Once the collective identity takes root the group propels towards expansion, which means designing and executing their collective ideas into action.

they are embarking, neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.”

deciphered and made into applicable intelligence.

enhancement for counter-insurgency support.

How does decline of an insurgency come about?

Desourcing the insurgent movement both by curtailing funding streams and causing it to waste existing resources. Both of these require specific methodology.

Counter-insurgency interventions need the provision for training and equipment based on conditions at hand rather than on preconceived notion influenced by preferred worst-case scenarios. Basic assumptions and probabilities should be utilised when constructing threat prediction maps.

Is it because of Repression by the authorities, lack of leadership within that movement, due to success where their goals are met, or because the organisation becomes established in the mainstream? This “war amongst the people” is a struggle by both state and non-state actors to employ strategies that gain influence and control over the “relevant population(s).

So how does one do this? A Sisyphean task indeed but past records show that strategic methods have been employed to influence a population a) Method of winning “hearts and minds” b) Coercive strategy of force and threat of violence

Counter-measures A government is an organisation and the applicability of its internal resources must bring effective results externally. This fact is defined from an operational level than from a political level. Decision-making has to invoke the entire process; that is after the aftermath of the application of that decision. Despite globalisation, in fact more so because of globalisation ethnic distinctiveness still remains and has a powerful influence on collective consciousness.

Innate markers

Insurgencies always show a mismatch between recognised government and the demographic map of ethnic group. To make any insurgent movement successful, it needs a unifying objective and strong leadership and popular support. Insurgents tend to be highly adaptable and flexible, at least at the tactical and operational levels.

1. Challenging acts do not happen in a vacuum (Connectedness).

Prime focus should be given to - Terrain Knowledge, Zone Maps, Cultural Mapped Intelligence and Swarming Tactics.

2. Emotion-Reaction-Action (E-R-A) occurs in response to identifiable stimuli (Convergence an approach to achieve a balanced equilibrium in one’s internal and external mechanics).

Population control plus mobilisation and intelligence gathering are two very vital tools to be used in counter-insurgency measures.

3. Consequences that follow the above form the base for the next event (Continuity for the cause). 4. Emotion-Reaction-Action Communication.

form

5. E-R-A always has a purpose either to get something or to avoid or escape something. Which strategy makes more sense to be used in counter insurgencies if we keep the holistic facts mentioned above? As Clausewitz reminds us, “The first, the supreme and the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make” is to understand “the kind of war on which

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Everyday an insurgent movement exist; it tends to add legitimacy to cause.

continues to the insurgent

Intelligence itself is Two pronged - first a tool for coercive force, second a tool of management and prevention. Role of intelligence is not just for tactics to neutralise but also to link the information with deep core issues and to utilise the information for conflict transformation and for applying peace-building strategies.

For non-military strategies, instituting political and economic reforms requires diplomatic leadership and leverage, political acumen and economic expertise. Covert infrastructure requires police and criminal intelligence techniques. Together a controlled environment might be established. When identification of specific zones takes place a secure base of operation is set, this could aid the government to control and reduce the area in which insurgents operate, this is opposite of “brute force” as chasing them will only allow them to regroup elsewhere.

Conflict and Concept transformation approaches require analysis of conflict structures and reshaping the concept maps. This analysis can serve as a basis for a longer-term assessment of conflict-related areas of risks.

What is conflict sensitivity?

These points are to a particular conflict, at a specific time in order to alter the perceptions, relationships and behaviours of the parties involved in the conflict. Transformation is endless; it is needed to anticipate the next step. It deals with co-evolution of concepts and processes. Accurately prepared target inventory is a systematic way for violence prediction and risk analysis. The value of the cells can be low, medium or high and the scores are then computed to determine which targets are the most vulnerable and have the highest damage potential to the community.

• Understanding the operational context

• Probability of attack refers to the likelihood of that location being chosen as a target.

• Understanding the interactions between an intervention and that context

• Threat to security refers to the probability that security at the location could be breached.

Matrix organisation

Transformation

Adaptability can be maximised by an institution, that stresses it and gives maximum autonomy to lower level leaders. Then comes sustained capability enhancement. This includes leader development, war-gaming, concept development, research and analysis, professional education, focused training and red-teaming.

As with any form of energy, conflict can be used for positive or negative purposes. Used positively, conflict can help identify issues of injustice or oppression that need to be addressed. Used negatively, conflict can lead to violence and destruction.

• Impact of attack refers to the number of people who may be harmed by an attack.

Consideration for rapid creation of effective local security and intelligence forces is also a focus in matrix organisations. Cauterisation: The strengthening of states surrounding the state facing an insurgency will aid in setting a controlled environment to assist in neutralising the movement. Also a strategic damage can be contained should the insurgency escalate or become uncontrollable.

Delinking and desourcing

Capability enhancement should include increasing the ability and willingness of regional states and other regional security organisations to provide counter-insurgency support.

Delinking insurgent movement from its internal and external support by understanding and destroying the political, logistics and financial connections also depends primarily on superior results of accurate information collected and

As insurgents develop a strategic strike capability via terrorism, improved homeland security also must be seen as part of capability

A focus on structural issues such as the allocation of resources, the creation of just and inclusive systems of governance and the reform of institutions that have benefited some groups while harming others. When we apply conflict transformation we engage in strategic Peace building. The science of conflict transformation is grounded in a research-informed understanding of the stages of conflict and the ways conflict both changes and is changed as a result of the perceptions and actions of individuals and groups. The art of conflict transformation involves matching specific interventions, including: • • • • •

Non-violent advocacy Peace-making Mediation Facilitation Negotiation

Conclusion Everything counts even if in small amounts. Threat matrix and conflict trends should be observed critically for accurate awareness - of zones of conflict, culturally shaped mindsets, availability of natural resources and the lack of it. The ultimate ratio for the use of irregular methods of war is to achieve political results although religion, culture, ethnicity and technology remain important elements of irregular warfare. Refocus on current strategies, tactics and the aftermath should be employed to decipher loopholes to reinvent measures, transfer the knowledge into action and reconnect the dots. Dexterity when employing situational awareness results in building new competencies and efficiency due to awareness of new incoming information, comprehension of its meaning in the context and designing prediction maps significant for projection of future status due to the ever-changing and fluid nature of this warfare.

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LESSONS FOR ALL

n excellent article on the lessons to be learnt from the US, British and French experience in Counter Terrorism (CT) operations. The writer highlights the need for an effective CT strategy that should be reviewed regularly. Homeland Security should be treated as the pivot of such a strategy and we must invest in prevention and ensure effective investigation and prosecution. India’s vulnerability to terrorism to a large measure is attributable to its geography - its borders are not secure. An open border with Nepal and a porous border with Bangladesh as well as the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir allow for unhindered movement of terrorists. India’s coastal security also needs to be beefed up. errorism is a global phenomenon - developed and developing countries like India have equally felt the scourge of terrorist attacks. The events of 9/11 highlighted vividly the links between security, terrorism and globalisation and drew into sharp focus the need to understand and counter the threat of international terrorism. As more sophisticated technologies emerge, new risks proliferate at an exponential rate. The information technologies of the 1980s facilitate international crime and assist terrorism. We live in an age of globalisation and it is now accepted wisdom that the risks we face are more catastrophic than those of the past because they are global.

security. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was inaugurated in March 2003 as the lead federal agency to secure the nation which is now the third largest department with 1,80,000 employees with the Secret Service, Customs, Coast Guard, Immigration and Naturalisation Service as well as the Transportation Security Administration under its control. In order to reduce the impact of any large scale terror attack, the DHS is responsible for crisis preparation, management and response.

Experience from across the world shows us that terrorism may be contained or reduced but not completely eradicated. Some countries that have succeeded in controlling terrorist attacks include France, England, Germany, USA and, nearer home, Indonesia and Sri Lanka. Based on their experience in handling terrorist activities in their respective territories, various countries have adopted diverse strategies and different measures to counter terrorist threats. Some of the common themes adopted by countries in countering terrorism are discussed here.

A major focus of UK and Netherlands counter-terrorism strategy is to educate the public about the steps taken to prevent terrorist attacks.

Counter Terrorism: Global Learnings

Earlier he was Vice President and Country Head, Boeing Defence Space and Security and had also served as Managing Director of Boeing Commercial Airplanes in India. Prior to Boeing he worked for Raytheon and with NASA Ames Research Center in various multidisciplinary engineering fields. He has his PhD in Aerospace Engineering from Wichita State University in Kansas and his MBA from City University in Washington. He served as Chairman of the Defence Committee of the Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India (ASSOCHAM). He also served as the Chairman, Defence Equipment Committee, AMCHAM and is on the panel of the FICCI Defence Task Force. He had the distinct honour of representing 2,500 companies as Regional President of the Indo-American Chamber of Commerce, the only US-India bilateral chamber. In April 2012, he has been appointed as Chairman of the Indo-US Strategic Dialogue by the Indo-American Chamber of Commerce.

Dr Vivek Lall

Effective counter-terrorism strategy

Protect homeland

An effective counter-terrorism strategy based on domestic, regional and global threat perception is vital. Such a strategy should be articulated in clear terms to avoid mis-interpretations by stakeholders at the federal as well as at the state levels. The strategy should incorporate multi-dimensional threats and lay out comprehensive national objectives. A regular review of the strategy should become part of the strategy itself.

Homeland security should be the pivot of an effective counter-terrorism strategy. This calls for identifying threats posed not only from outside but within, disseminate the information about the threats and steps to mitigate such threats among the security forces as well as the general public. An effective homeland security not only needs an extraordinary coordination among intelligence agencies but also should incorporate security forces as well as investigating agencies of non-security wings of the government.

Some countries that have succeeded in controlling terrorist attacks include France, England, Germany, USA and, nearer home, Indonesia and Sri Lanka Following 9/11, the United States launched a large scale, multi-dimensional global war against terrorism. This war includes military, diplomatic and intelligence efforts that transcend America’s shores to include operations across the world. Measures relating to immigration; prevention and reversing radicalisation or extremism; international cooperation; securing critical infrastructure; institutional development; attacking terror financing; empowering the police and other agencies are all components of this strategy. The NCTC was set up in 2004 as the primary organisation in US government for analysing and integrating all intelligence possessed or acquired by US government pertaining to terrorism and counter-terrorism except purely domestic counter-terrorism information. The NCTC also conducts strategic operational planning for counter-terrorism activities, assigns operational responsibility to lead agencies and serves as central shared knowledge bank on terrorism. Composed of representatives of all intelligence agencies the NCTC coordinates all counter-terrorism activities on US soil. The PATRIOT Act provides leeway for law enforcement agencies in dealing with matters pertaining to national

The columnist is President and Chief Executive Officer, New Ventures, Reliance Industries Limited and Distinguished Fellow, Observer Research Foundation.

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India’s vulnerability to terrorism to a large measure is attributable to its geography - its borders are not secure. An open border with Nepal and a porous border with Bangladesh as well as the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir allow for unhindered movement of terrorists. India’s coastal security also needs to be beefed up France’s counter-terrorism strategy is considered one of the most effective in Europe. The country experienced violence from muslim activists since the 1980s through 1995/96.The key elements of France’s strategy were privileged relationship between intelligence agencies and the magistracy, qualification of terrorist acts as autonomous offences and centralisation of terrorist related judicial proceedings. Vigipirate (security alert plan) a nation-wide pre-planned security measure was formulated. Other preventive measures included movement control to risky countries, provision

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LESSONS FOR ALL

of personal data by airlines and shipping companies to state, retention of data by cyber cafes and telecom providers for one year, major expansion of video surveillance and easier access to files by investigators. The strategy also visualises the use of military, law enforcement, intelligence and other resources to identify, circumvent and neutralise terror groups within France. For overseeing and coordinating anti-terror activity, the Inter-Ministerial Liaison Committee was set up that supervises the Anti-terrorism Coordination Unit with members from Interior and Defence Ministries.

Invest in prevention Prevention should be the driving force of an effective counter-terrorism strategy. This calls not only for greater coordination among security forces and intelligence agencies but also considerable investments in these agencies to expand their areas of operation and mandate. An effective preventive strategy will necessarily call for a greater cooperation with security agencies and governments across the world. This means a more robust working relationship between diplomacy and security agencies at the decision-making as well as operational level. In other words, there is a need for policemen to increasingly understand the nuances of diplomacy and diplomats to realise the security imperatives. A successful preventive strategy also calls for a greater engagement between the government or the security forces with the civil society. Such an engagement not only acts as a force multiplier for security and intelligence agencies but also enables the government to effectively implement programmes like de-radicalisation, civil-police interface or to defuse communal, sectarian and other identity tensions.

Following 9/11, the United States launched a large scale, multi-dimensional global war against terrorism. This war includes military, diplomatic and intelligence efforts that transcend America's shores to include operations across the world. Measures relating to immigration; prevention and reversing radicalisation or extremism; international cooperation; securing critical infrastructure; institutional development; attacking terror financing; empowering the police and other agencies are all components of this strategy The UK’s Prevent strategy, launched in 2007, seeks to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. It is the preventative strand of the government’s CONTEST strategy. The Prevent strategy includes responding to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat from those who promote it; preventing people from being drawn into terrorism and ensure that they are given appropriate advice and support; and working with sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalisation that need to be addressed.

Effective investigation and prosecution Investigation and prosecution of terrorist incidents and terrorists are often a key to help prevent future terrorist activities and attacks. An effective, credible investigation can often lead to terrorist hideouts, networks, support bases, financial networks and other crucial information which can help prevent future attacks. Not only does such successfully carried out investigations boost the morale and capability of the investigating agencies but also instill a sense of confidence in the general public. It also does defuse fears and doubts about unfair targeting of certain select groups or communities. A successful investigation, backed by credible forensic evidence, leads to an effective prosecution of terrorism cases which establishes the credibility and strength of the state as well as create a sense of security among the people. Poor investigations often lead to prosecution failures with detrimental consequences for CT officials but also the country as a whole. India’s vulnerability to terrorism to a large measure is attributable to its geography - its borders are not secure. An open border with Nepal and a porous border with Bangladesh as well as the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir allow for unhindered movement of terrorists. India’s coastal security also needs to be beefed up, as the Mumbai terrorist attack has demonstrated. Homegrown terrorist groups, abetted and aided by external help, have also established a foothold. Socio economic and political motivations have also been contributing factors to violent activities. Homeland Security in India is a very complex issue and the government will have to put in place measures that address all these threats.

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Patrick Dunleavy The writer is the former Deputy Inspector General for the New York Correctional System and author of The Fertile Soil of Jihad. He has also written for the Washington Times and the New York Post and teaches a class at the United States Military Special Operations School. Following September 11, 2001, at the request of various international agencies he has been a speaker on the topic of terrorist recruitment to organisations such as the FBI, CIA, Scotland Yard and Canadian Intelligence Services. Recent example of the transformation from common criminal to committed jihadist took place in France in March 2012. Mohamed Merah was the son of Algerian immigrants living in Toulouse, France. He was an unremarkable individual described by some previously as a “petty criminal.” He had been arrested at least fifteen times before being sentenced to a French prison for two years. There, according to his own words, he began to study the Koran. Following his release from prison, he travelled to Afghanistan and Pakistan for training. After that he described himself as a member of Al Qaeda as he went on a rampage killing seven people

JIHADI TENTACLES

The writer, a former Deputy Inspector General for the New York Correctional System, provides chilling examples of radicalisation of prisoners while serving their prison sentences.He highlights the need to monitor such prisons and also address the sizable prison population who are most susceptible to radicalisation. Those common criminals who if left to themselves will only progress from bad to worse. Whether this is done by de-radicalisation programmes or counter radicalisation programmes is open for debate. “If the devil leaders of New York think placing me in [prison] will end the war, they are wrong; this is only the beginning.”

hese words were spoken by El Sayyid Nosair following the first attack on the World Trade Center. Nosair would later be convicted of the crime in United States Federal Court and sentenced to life in prison, along with his co-defendants and their spiritual leader, Omar Abdel-Rahman. Were his words prophetic? Did he truly believe that even in the confines of a prison cell a jihadist could still operate? Where does such belief come from? And the more important question, is it an issue that needs to be addressed by Counter Terrorism experts around the globe? El Sayyid Nosair was an Egyptian immigrant who came to the United States in 1981. Little was known about him until 1990 when he shot and killed a Jewish - Rabbi Meir Kahane, in New York City. He was arrested while trying to flee the scene of the crime. However after a lengthy trial he was found not guilty of the murder. He was found guilty of illegally possessing a gun and for shooting the police officer who attempted to arrest him. For this he was sentenced to seven years in a New York State prison. He was sent to Attica. At the time, Attica was one of the most secure prisons in the United States. It is an ominous fortress like structure with gun towers and a foreboding look of authoritarian control. Ordinary criminals feared being sent there. Inmates were afforded very few privileges and their movement was strictly monitored by the ever present guards. In the prison there was a Chapel and a Chaplain for each of the major religions. Nosair declared himself a Muslim and was given an assignment to work in the Prison Imam’s office. He faithfully attended Jummah service in the prison mosque every Friday with the other Muslim inmates, the majority of which were African-American. Several of those inmates helped him to learn how to use the prison phone system to call friends and family. He taught them the way of jihad. The Chaplain for whom Nosair worked in the prison either knowingly or unwittingly also allowed Nosair to use the phone in his office, which is contrary to the rules and regulations of the Department and a breach of security because that phone was not monitored nor were there any restrictions on who could be called

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Prison Radicalisation:

A Global Problem

from it. As a result El Sayyid Nosair was able to maintain contact with his associates in the greater New York / New Jersey area. He also received visits from them. Thus he was able to conspire with them to send a truck loaded with explosives into the basement of the World Trade Center on February 26, 1993.

Richard Reid, a common criminal of no significance, converted to a radical form of Islam in prison. After his release he attended a mosque led by radical cleric Abu Hamza al-Masri. Then he travelled to Afghanistan and Pakistan for training. Following that he boarded a Paris to Miami flight with a quantity of PETN and TATP explosive in his shoe. He attempted to detonate the “shoe bomb” while in mid air and failing that he was subdued by fellow passengers and taken into custody upon landing The bombing killed six civilians and injured over one thousand. The jihad had come to America and one of its soldiers was an inmate in prison. Before his co-conspirators were arrested they had also planned to bomb several landmark sites in New York City including the United Nations Headquarters. They acted with a global mindset. The ensuing investigation revealed that Nosair was a member of an Islamic terrorist organisation called al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya. Omar Abdel-Rahman, also known as the Blind Sheikh, was the spiritual leader of the group which had ties to Ayman al-Zawahiri, the co-founder and present leader of Al Qaeda. Prison administrators finally realised Nosair was no ordinary inmate sitting in a prison cell. Shortly

thereafter authorities transferred all the involved jihadists to a more secure prison and sought to isolate them from other inmates in hopes that it would neutralize their ability to act or to influence. Yet it did not end there.Another of their followers, a Palestinian with Jordanian citizenship, was in prison for Robbery and Kidnapping. He had sworn allegiance to Osama bin Laden and quietly began to create an Islamic education programme in the prison he was confined. What appeared as a benign programme to teach inmates Arabic and to help them study the Koran was later discovered to be a recruiting programme that helped newly released converts travel overseas to training camps to become mujahideen. This inmate recruiter also utilised the prison Chaplain’s office, the phone system and visitors to facilitate the process of radicalisation in prison.He sought out the most vulnerable, those alienated individuals who were seeking acceptance and looking for meaning in their life. He often manipulated their feelings of animosity toward authority and steered them to hate a common enemy, the infidels, the non-Islamists and the Jews. This inmate recruiter was identified by counter-terrorism investigators as a member of HAMAS. His sole purpose in prison as he saw it was

to gain soldiers for Allah in the jihad. He did not discriminate. He chose African-Americans, whites, and Latinos for the cause. His methodology was simple; isolate, commiserate, and then indoctrinate. And it worked.

then add them to a prison population full of alienated, disenfranchised common criminals with a propensity for violence, you get the “Perfect Storm.” Often what comes out of prison is much worse then what went in.

He also made alliances with other non-Islamic terrorists in prison, members of domestic terrorists organisations with ties to leftist and communist organisations who had been incarcerated in the 1970s for a series of murders and bombings of government buildings. Both now sought to inject their influences and opinions into the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. Several of them became active in the Viva Palestina movement, posting statements on the internet in support of Palestinian terrorist organisations, even from their prison cells. Though these groups differed in ideology they found unity In the ancient proverb, “The enemy of my enemy is my friend.”

This problem is not an isolated one, nor is it confined only to one country’s borders. It has happened in the United States, Europe and elsewhere.

Prison can produce strange bedfellows. When you take domestic terrorists whether them be Maoists, Naxals, or Anarchists and put them in prison with Islamic terrorists and

In the US, individuals like Jose Padilla1, Michael Finton2 and James Cromitie3, are prime examples of prison converts who went on to become committed jihadists willing to kill the innocent for the cause of Allah following their release from prison. In the United Kingdom, Richard Reid4, a common criminal of no significance, converted to a radical form of Islam in prison. After his release he attended a mosque led by radical cleric Abu Hamza al-Masri. Then he travelled to Afghanistan and Pakistan for training. Following that he boarded a Paris to Miami flight with a quantity of PETN and TATP explosive in his shoe. He attempted to detonate the “shoe bomb” while

1. http://intelwire.egoplex.com/padilla011104.html 2. http://www.justice.gov/usao/ilc/press/2009/09September/24Finton.html 3. http://www.fbi.gov/newyork/press-releases/2009/nyfo052009.htm 4. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1783237.stm

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in mid air and failing that he was subdued by fellow passengers and taken into custody upon landing.

We must focus on those terrorists already in prison, creating conditions of confinement that, while humane, render them inoperable. One of the ways we accomplish this is by closing off communication avenues often used by prisoners Another example of this prison phenomena in the UK was Muktar Said Ibrahim5, an Eritrean immigrant who became radicalised while spending five years in a British prison for robbery. After his release from prison in 2001, he conspired with several others to attack London’s public transport system. He attempted to detonate a bomb on a bus and having failed that, was arrested by authorities on July 21, 2005. The most recent example of the transformation from common criminal to committed jihadist took place in France in March 2012. Mohamed Merah6 was the son of Algerian immigrants living in Toulouse, France. He was an unremarkable individual described by some previously as a “petty criminal.” He had been arrested at least fifteen times before being sentenced to a French prison for two years. There, according to his own words, he began to study the Koran. Following his release from prison, he travelled to Afghanistan and Pakistan for training. After that he described himself as a member of Al Qaeda as he went on a rampage killing seven people. Three of the victims were French military personnel, one was a Rabbi and three were children from a Jewish School. After these horrific acts, Merah was killed in a shootout with French police. The first description of Merah in the media was that he was “self-radicalised.” This was not only factually erroneous, but also misleading. The relationship between his time in prison and his radicalisation

was known by authorities. More than five years earlier, the director of France’s intelligence agency said this about Islamic radicalisation in the prison system; “It is there, in prison that a minority of radical Islamist terrorists hook up with petty criminals who find their way back to religion under its most radical form.”7 The cause for this was the result of the successful prosecution of members of the terrorist organisation GIA (Armed Islamic Group) in the 1990s by French authorities for a series of bombings in Paris. Numerous individuals associated with the group were sentenced to long prison terms. The GIA originated in Algeria having been formed by mujahideen returning from Afghanistan after fighting the Soviets in the 1980s. By placing them in prison they were able to permeate the correctional environment with their global jihadist ideology. The misleading aspect of the “self radicalisation” term ignores the fact that a terrorist is not hatched overnight. A person, radical or not, is a sum of many parts, made up of their cultural background, influences and experiences. No one sits alone in the vacuum of a prison cell and suddenly becomes radicalized. It is a multi-layered process influenced by both internal and external stimuli. Can incarcerated jihadists continue to operate from a prison? The answer is a resounding yes. In 2004 Mohammed A. Salameh, a co-conspirator of Nosair, serving a life sentence in a United States prison for the first World Trade Center bombing, was able to smuggle letters8 out of the “SuperMax” prison in Florence, Colorado to Mohamed Achraf, an Algerian who had spent a time in jail for minor crimes. Achraf was the architect of the railway system bombing in Madrid, Spain that resulted in one hundred and

5 . http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/email_news/6634901.stm 6 . http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-17456541 7 . http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5btt_ news%5d=853&tx_ttnews%5bbackPid%5d=181&no_cache=1 8 . http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a02wtcbombersencourageqihad#a0 2wtcbombersencourageqihad

Gilgit-Baltistan

JIHADI TENTACLES

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DEVIOUS GAME PLAN

ninety-one deaths and almost two thousand injured. Then in 2011 at Pul-e-Charkhi prison, the National Detention Center in Kabul, authorities had in custody Talib Jan. Jan was member of the Taliban and part of the Haqqani network of insurgents committing terrorist acts against NATO forces in Afghanistan. The group, based in Waziristan, has been suspected of receiving covert support from Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).

Pallavi Ade

While in the prison, run by Afghan police under the guidance of American trainers, Talib Jan was able to direct terrorist operations. His involvement included the selection of both personnel and targets for attacks. In addition, according to authorities he had the ability to communicate specific instructions to the would-be suicide bombers from his cell. There are more cases, but as we have seen from these numerous examples world wide the committed jihadists does not stop their efforts when incarcerated. They find new and clever ways to achieve their goal. They are, if anything, patient and adaptable to even the most adverse environment. What can be done to neutralise this threat? First we must recognise that it is an international problem and a global strategy is necessary to be successful. Second we must develop a multi-pronged approach to dealing with it. We most focus on those terrorists already in prison, creating conditions of confinement that, while humane, render them inoperable. One of the ways we accomplish this is by closing off communication avenues often used by prisoners for elicit gain. We must also address the sizable prison population who are most susceptible to radicalisation. Those common criminals who if left to themselves will only progress from bad to worse. Whether this is done by de-radicalisation programmes or counter radicalisation programmes is open for debate. We must however do something. Ignoring the problem will not make it go away.

The Red Shadow in Gilgit-Baltistan:

Security Implications for India C

hina’s increasing presence in the Gilgit-Baltistan region will complicate the Kashmir dispute for India, changing it from a bilateral concern into trilateral one. In the future, given the proximity Pakistan enjoys with China, it might demand a seat at the discussion table for China, on the Kashmir issue. Indian officials need to start taking these developments in Gilgit-Baltistan seriously as China’s presence in the region has long term strategic and security implications for India. China is jockeying to be a major power in the region due to the strategic location of Gilgit-Baltistan which would give China a shorter access route to Middle-East and Africa, where most of its oil-resources come from. This would reduce China’s dependency on the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) which pass through the narrow Malacca Strait.

The writer is currently the Publications Manager at Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi. Before joining CLAWS, she has worked with Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security (RUSI), London. At RUSI, she researched on India and its neighbourhood and also worked as project manager for projects related to India. She has completed her MA in International Studies and Diplomacy from School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) in London. Her current research interests lie in strategic aspects of Indian Defence, India's defence modernisation and study of India's relations with its neighbours.

China is jockeying to be a major power in the region due to the strategic location of Gilgit-Baltistan which would give China a shorter access route to Middle-East and Africa, where most of its oil-resources come from. This would reduce China’s dependency on the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) which pass through the narrow Malacca Strait

July 2012 Defence AND security alert

Gilgit-Baltistan

DEVIOUS GAME PLAN

ilgit-Baltistan is situated between the mountain ranges of Hindu Kush, Karakoram and Western Himalayas. It lies at the confluence of Central Asia, China and South Asia; bordering Wakhan Corridor of Afghanistan, Xinjiang Province of China, Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province, Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) and Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. Its geography offers the advantage of being the vital hub for trans-regional trade and commerce for all the countries in its neighbourhood. Both India and Pakistan lay claim to Gilgit-Baltistan, which is now under the control of Pakistan after the 1949 ceasefire. The 1949 ceasefire resulted in the division of Jammu and Kashmir with Pakistan gaining control over approximately 85,793 sq km area. In 1963, Pakistan ceded a part of Hunza-Gilgit - called Raskam - and the Shaksgam Valley of Baltistan region to China, even though the Kashmir dispute was ongoing with India.

For Pakistan having China involved in the disputed Gilgit-Baltistan region of PoK makes strategic sense. Pakistan would, arguably, benefit from a closer military relationship with a regional economic power, such as China, to give it added weight in territorial negotiations, but this could ultimately make it even harder for India and Pakistan to find an amicable solution to the problem of Kashmir. With the 2014 withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan nearing, Pakistan is looking to China to fill in this void. The Chinese foray into Afghanistan and Gilgit-Baltistan may be endeavours to fill in this vacuum and gain strategic stronghold in the region. A closer relationship of Pakistan with China may be a cause for concern in Washington as well as New Delhi Fast-forward to August 2010, New York Times carried Selig Harrison’s report on China’s growing footprint in the disputed region of Gilgit-Baltistan of PoK. News reports claimed that, first during the 2005 earthquakes and then during the devastating 2010 Pakistani floods, China has gained access to

the disputed region of PoK under the pretext of rescue and relief operations and then for reconstruction projects. China’s increasing presence in the Gilgit-Baltistan region will complicate the Kashmir dispute for India, changing it from a bilateral concern into trilateral one. In the future, given the proximity Pakistan enjoys with China, it might demand a seat at the discussion table for China, on the Kashmir issue. Indian officials need to start taking these developments in Gilgit-Baltistan seriously as China’s presence in the region has long term strategic and security implications for India. Gilgit-Baltistan is a resource rich region, rich in uranium, copper, gems and gold; and abundance of glaciated water bodies due to the presence of the Himalayas. The Chinese investment and involvement in the region has steadily increased over the last few years. The 2010 New York Times story estimated that 7,000-11,000 soldiers of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) are now located in the region of Gilgit-Baltistan. The last Indian army chief, General V K Singh, during his tenure had publicly admitted to the media that the army was worried about the increased activities of China as well as increasing numbers of Chinese in the disputed region - more than 4,000, according to intelligence reports, possibly including PLA troops. The PLA soldiers entering Gilgit-Baltistan are largely working on infrastructure development projects such as the Karakoram Highway which will link China’s Xinjiang province to Pakistan’s ports, including, for example, Gwadar. Other projects include civil engineering projects such as dams and expressways. China Mobile is also setting up cell towers in Gilgit and Baltistan, implying Chinese control over the telecommunication network in the region. A highly confidential Indian government report accessed by Headlines Today, an Indian news channel, stated that the PLA is playing a crucial role in Gilgit-Baltistan, supplying engineers, technicians and computer professionals for these infrastructure projects. Reports suggest that one of the PLA battalions was also stationed at Khunjerab Pass, for the security of Chinese workers, although this battalion was withdrawn in

July 2012 Defence AND security alert

May 2010 after sustained international pressure. Now Pakistan has deployed additional troops, in an already militarised and highly sensitive region, to provide security to the Chinese workers. Normally, Chinese workers were brought in on a temporary basis and moved back home after projects are completed, but a permanent colony of twenty buildings for Chinese workers in Chattar has already been constructed. Some argue such measures will give China a permanent presence close to the Indian border and that, more generally, the direct collaboration of the PLA with Pakistani forces is an obvious source of security concern for India. China is jockeying to be a major power in the region due to the strategic location of Gilgit Baltistan which would give China a shorter access route to Middle East and Africa, where most of its oil-resources come from. This would reduce China’s dependency on the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) which pass through the narrow Malacca Strait before reaching the Chinese shores. Using the land route through Gilgit-Baltistan via the Karakoram Highway will reduce the transportation time to about 48 hours instead of the present two to three weeks. China is already constructing the Gwadar Port in the Balochistan region of Pakistan which will be linked to China’s Xinjiang province through the Karakoram Highway. To this effect, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed in June 2006 between China and Pakistan to widen the Karakoram Highway, resulting in its operational capacity going up threefold catering for heavy vehicular movement.

To reiterate that Jammu and Kashmir are two of India’s ‘core interests’ - just as Tibet and Taiwan are for China - and to request that Beijing respect Indian sensitivities on this issue. India may also need to start looking at its partnerships with countries such as the US, Japan, Vietnam, South Korea and others with similar concerns about China. Ultimately, India cannot remain indifferent to the situation emerging on its doorsteps Despite this, concerns persist that

China’s encroachment into PoK has other motivations besides the energy trade. Recently Pakistan made a proposal to lease Gilgit-Baltistan to China for 50 years which has caught the Indian establishment unawares. These developments indicate that China is keen on getting involved in the region not just for economic but for strategic and security reasons.

News reports claimed that, first during the 2005 earthquakes and then during the devastating 2010 Pakistani floods, China has gained access to the disputed region of PoK under the pretext of rescue and relief operations and then for reconstruction projects. China’s increasing presence in the Gilgit-Baltistan region will complicate the Kashmir dispute for India, changing it from a bilateral concern into trilateral one. In the future, given the proximity Pakistan enjoys with China, it might demand a seat at the discussion table for China, on the Kashmir issue. Indian officials need to start taking these developments in Gilgit-Baltistan seriously as China’s presence in the region has long term strategic and security implications for India Chinese involvement in the Gilgit-Baltistan region needs to be viewed in the wider context of Sino-Indian relations, which have been strained since India provided refuge to the Tibetan Dalai Lama, who fled from the Chinese forces in the 1950s and settled in India. China is progressively integrating PoK into its Central Asian geostrategic calculus and many analysts fear it is attempting to extend its regional influence, using its economic clout to gain a foothold in struggling regional economies, such as Pakistan. China has already stationed troops in the Aksai Chin region to India’s east and its presence in the Gilgit-Baltistan region would bring it closer to India’s Kargil border. China has also been questioning the legality of India’s claims to the Jammu and Kashmir region, issuing applicants from the region with stapled visas. In 2010, it rejected the visa application made by Lieutenant General B S Jaswal - of the Northern Command of the Indian army - on the grounds that he

commanded a disputed territory. The aggressive engagement of China in Afghanistan, PoK and Gilgit-Baltistan is a strategy to alter the geo-strategic equations and to expand its sphere of influence. As India and China grow, it benefits China to have India involved in the regional squabble and thus preventing it from focusing on growth and development and reducing India’s influence in its own neighbourhood. For Pakistan having China involved in the disputed Gilgit-Baltistan region of PoK makes strategic sense. Pakistan would, arguably, benefit from a closer military relationship with a regional economic power, such as China, to give it added weight in territorial negotiations, but this could ultimately make it even harder for India and Pakistan to find an amicable solution to the problem of Kashmir. Pakistan views the issue of Kashmir and Afghanistan through the same prism of these regions being its own strategic backyard. With the 2014 withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan nearing, Pakistan is looking to China to fill in this void. The Chinese foray into Afghanistan and Gilgit-Baltistan may be endeavours to fill in this vacuum and gain strategic stronghold in the region. A closer relationship of Pakistan with China may be a cause for concern in Washington as well as New Delhi. In April this year, Lt Gen KT Parnaik, the incumbent GOC-in-C of Northern Command while at a seminar in Jammu spoke about how China had made inroads around India thus posing substantial security challenges not only along the China-Indian border but also along the Line of Control (LoC). India needs to take notice of these developments in the Gilgit-Baltistan region of PoK before Pakistan hands over de facto control of this region to China. This would mean China is too close to India for India’s own comfort. China’s presence in Gilgit-Baltistan would mean China is near the Siachen Glacier, which is presently under India’s control. Pakistan has already conveyed its desire ‘non-paper’ desire - for China’s involvement in the resolution of

Siachen dispute as the northern part of the glacier lies adjacent to the Shaksgam Valley which is under Chinese control. The Shaksgam Valley was once a part of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, which was then illegally occupied by Pakistan in 1948 and ceded to China in 1963. With the present clamour in both India and Pakistan over the demilitarisation of Siachen, India, for sure, would not want Chinese involvement in the dialogue process or the region of the glacier. Siachen offers to India a vantage listening point and a natural watchtower over the activities of Pakistan and China on the other side of the region. China’s increased role in the Gilgit-Baltistan region has long-term political and security implications for India, especially in regards to the Kashmir dispute. It could make the Kashmir dispute a trilateral one and would shift the balance in Pakistan’s favour , given the strategic significance of Sino-Pakistan relations. Militarily, India may need to be prepared for a two-front strategy involving China and Pakistan on its northern border, especially in consideration of a heighted border crisis. Until recently, China had maintained a neutral position on the Kashmir issue, taking a stand that Kashmir was a bilateral issue between India and Pakistan, but its increasing presence in the Gilgit-Baltistan region complicates the dispute for India, changing it from a bilateral concern into trilateral territory and leading some to imagine if China will start demanding a seat at the discussion table. India needs to diplomatically take up the issue of China’s involvement in the Gilgit-Baltistan region. It may also need to engage more constructively with China to find mutually agreeable solutions to pending disputes, to reiterate that Jammu and Kashmir are two of India’s ‘core interests’- just as Tibet and Taiwan are for China - and to request that Beijing respect Indian sensitivities on this issue. India may also need to start looking at its partnerships with countries such as the US, Japan, Vietnam, South Korea and others with similar concerns about China. Ultimately, India cannot remain indifferent to the situation emerging on its doorsteps.

July 2012 Defence AND security alert

Gilgit-Baltistan

NEW EL DORADO?

Rear Adm (Dr) S Kulshrestha (retd) The writer has held the post of Director General Naval Armament Inspection at the NHQ prior to his superannuation. He is an ardent exponent of indigenisation and self-reliance in the field of military weapon systems and armament.

Gwadar, in this way, becomes the hub of a new Silk Road, both land and maritime; a gateway to landlocked, hydrocarbon-rich Central Asia; an exotic 21st-century place-name. Gwadar lies in the Balochistan province of Pakistan. A province, which is rich in natural resources like oil and gas. In fact, of Pakistan’s ~28 tcf gas reserves, ~19 tcf are in Balochistan. The Baloch claim that, despite being the largest gas producer in Pakistan, they receive only 20 per cent of the royalty payments received by the other two gas producing provinces. They thus subsidise the rich provinces, even though they are in fact the poorest in the country and also that nothing much has been done by the government for their development from the vast revenue generated from Balochistan

il tankers from Gulf transit about 6,000 nm and those from the African coast transit about 10,000 nm before they discharge their energy cargo at Chinese ports. Both the tanker routes have to pass through Malacca Straits in addition to problem zones in their respective routes. If tankers can unload at Gwadar, they would have to travel only about 680 nm from the Gulf and about 3,000 nm from African coast. To overcome this major strategic vulnerability, China is making major investments in the Karakoram-Gwadar corridor. This explains the upsurge of Chinese activity in the Gilgit- Baltistan region and the Gwadar Port. In 2008 the then chief of Naval Staff, Indian navy Admiral Sureesh Mehta said Gwadar could be used by Pakistan to “take control over the world energy jugular. This port and corridor pose a major threat to India’s energy security and would have grave implications in any two front war.”

NOOSE AT MALACCA FOR CHINA?

If we can think of great place-names of the past - Carthage, Thebes, Troy, Samarkand, Angkor Wat and of the present - Dubai, Singapore, Tehran, Beijing, Washington - then Gwadar should qualify as a great place-name of the future1. Kaplan

entral Asia’s Caspian-Caucasus region, with its estimated reserves of approximately 200 billion barrels of oil, is the holder of potentially the nearest and the largest oil and gas reserves to Europe and Asia2.

Web of pipelines Unfortunately, for exporting of oil and gas, the regional states are dependent upon other transit countries which have direct access to international waterways. Oil and gas pipeline networks have to cross large areas and attract high transit fees before the region’s resources reach the world markets3. A brief look at the various oil and gas pipeline routes would be of help in appreciating pipeline geo-politics at play. The shortest route to Arabian Sea ports is the South Eastern “Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (TAP)” route. This has the blessings of the US and India has recently signed agreement for the TAPI pipeline project to partly quench its energy thirst.

The Eastern route is dominated by China since it shares its borders with Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. China is building a 4,000-5,000 km long pipeline from Kazakhstan to Xingjiang and beyond as also a 6,700 km long pipeline from Turkmenistan, crossing Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and feeding Chinese markets in Far East. The western route is favoured by the US as it does not involve Russia or Iran. The pipelines originate in Azerbaijan (Baku) and end at Supsa in Georgia on the Black Sea. Another route favoured by the US, Georgia and Azerbaijan is the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, which forms part of the larger plan to develop an East-West axis of influence and commerce in the Eurasian region4. Russia’s Blue Stream project plans to connect Turkey with Russia after crossing Black Sea. To counter this the US has planned a Trans Caspian Pipeline (TCP) which is a submarine pipeline between Türkmenbaşy in Turkmenistan, and Baku in Azerbaijan. It would also connect Türkmenbaşy and Tengiz Field in Kazakhstan, bypassing Russia and Iran.

1. Robert D. Kaplan, Pakistan’s Fatal Shore, The Atlantic ,May 2009 http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2009/05/pakistan8217-s-fatal-shore/7385/ 2. Bulent Gokay, “ Caspian Uncertainties: Regional Rivalries and Pipelines” Journal of International Affairs, Ankara, Volume, 3, No. 1, 1998, p. 49 3. Alam Shah. Pipeline Politics in the Caspian Basin. Strat Analysis, January-March 2002, p. 8 4. Shah Alam, “Pipeline Politics in the Caspian Basin” Strategic Analysis, January-March 2002,

WOULD GWADAR SLACKEN THE SLOC

July 2012 Defence AND security alert

‘Great Land Robbery’ story was published in The Herald in June 2008, claiming that hundreds of thousands of acres of land had been illegally allotted to non-resident military and civilian personnel and resold to builders for residential and industrial purposes. The Baloch realised that their illiterate poor had been deprived of a rightful share in Gwadar’s growth. The insurgent attacks spiralled to about 33 attacks per month in 2009 and continue to this day, Pakistan blames India and Afghanistan for fanning the tribal Baloch sentiments against military excesses and economic exploitation. Many foreign analysts have however not found any credible evidence actively linking India with the Baloch insurgency. Gwadar has thus become the lynchpin for the Baloch hatred of Punjabi elite The Southern pipeline routes are strongly opposed by the US as they pass through Iran to end in the Persian Gulf5. India is very keen on these routes and is hopeful that the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) pipeline would see the light of the day. The Northern routes are from the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk to Tenzig oil field in Kazakhstan and from Novorossiysk to Baku. Unfortunately conditions in Afghanistan, the political instability in the Caucasus (Chechnya and to a lesser extent Dagestan), problems with Iran and uncertainties in Pakistan cast a dark shadow on all these endeavours which have 5. Ibid.

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Gilgit-Baltistan

NEW EL DORADO?

the capability of radically transforming the complete region into a formidable economic powerhouse.

Shortest route ports Due to the geographical locations of Pakistan and Iran to the Caspian region and the fact that both provide the shortest routes to Arabian Sea ports, has led both the countries to progress developing infrastructure and connectivity of their ports with the Central Asian Region (CAR). Apart from oil and gas the ports expect to harvest other trade commodities like cotton, which currently are routed through Russia to Middle East, East Asia and South Asia6.

Russia’s Blue Stream project plans to connect Turkey with Russia after crossing Black Sea. To counter this the US has planned a Trans Caspian Pipeline (TCP) which is a submarine pipeline between Türkmenbaşy in Turkmenistan and Baku in Azerbaijan. It would also connect Türkmenbaşy and Tengiz Field in Kazakhstan, bypassing Russia and Iran Just over 100 km apart, Chabahar the Iranian port and Gwadar the Pakistani port are thus competitors for accessing the CAR markets and are rushing to complete transportation corridors to Afghanistan. Both Iran and Pakistan are wooing Afghanistan by giving trade and fees incentives to favour their respective port. Pakistan however fears that “Chabahar port would inflict a huge financial setback for Pakistan”.7 Interestingly Chabahar is being funded by FDI from India and Gwadar by China.

Gwadar “An exploding sea bangs against a knife-carved apricot moonscape of high sand dunes, which, in turn, gives way to crumbly badlands, ... So now imagine a bustling deepwater port at the extreme south-western tip of Pakistan, ... equipped with a highway and oil and natural-gas pipelines, extending north all the way through ... the Karakorams, ... to China’s burgeoning middle-class markets farther east. Another branch of this road-and-pipeline network would go north from Gwadar through a stabilised Afghanistan and on into Iran and Central Asia. Gwadar, in this way, becomes the hub of a new Silk Road, both land and maritime; a gateway to landlocked, hydrocarbon-rich Central Asia; an exotic 21st-century place-name.”8 Kaplan. Gwadar lies in the Balochistan province of Pakistan. A province, which is rich in natural resources like oil and gas. In fact, of Pakistan’s ~28 tcf gas reserves, ~19 tcf are in Balochistan. The Baloch claim that, despite being the largest gas producer in Pakistan, they receive only 20 per cent of the royalty payments received by the other two gas producing provinces. They thus subsidise the rich

provinces, even though they are in fact the poorest in the country and also that nothing much has been done by the government for their development from the vast revenue generated from Balochistan. No wonder that the Sui gas fields which lie in Bugti tribe controlled region, are the ones most affected by militancy. Baloch militants pose a credible threat to the vast span of gas pipelines which are not possible to police or monitor effectively (e.g. The Sui Southern Gas Company has a pipeline network of over 27,500 km covering Balochistan and Sindh).

Current phase of insurgency The Gwadar Port development project was commenced in 2002. Millions of dollars poured into the quiet village of Gwadar from Chinese and Pakistani investors (~US$ 200 million was the Chinese investment for the first phase of the project completed in 2005). The premise was that Gwadar would be converted into major port hub on the lines of Dubai9 and the locals would benefit most. The Baloch, soon realised that this was not to be and that once again their natural resources were being siphoned out by the central government. In 2006, Pakistani Cobra helicopter gunships and F-16 fighter jets attacked Baloch areas suspected of insurgency; state organised disappearances and kidnappings culminated in killing of the Baloch leader Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti. The then President Musharraf told his core commanders “the writ of the Pakistani government will never be challenged. Let that be a warning … if anyone challenges the writ of the government, I will crush it.” 10 ‘Great Land Robbery’ story was published in The Herald in June 2008, claiming that hundreds of thousands of acres of land had been illegally allotted to non-resident military and civilian personnel and resold to builders for residential and industrial purposes. The Baloch realised that their illiterate poor had been deprived of a rightful share in Gwadar’s growth. The insurgent attacks spiralled to about 33 attacks per month in 2009 and continue to this day, Pakistan blames India and Afghanistan for fanning the tribal Baloch sentiments against military excesses and economic exploitation. Many foreign analysts have however not found any credible evidence actively linking India with the Baloch insurgency. Gwadar has thus become the lynchpin for the Baloch hatred of Punjabi elite.

Gwadar master plan Gwadar had a population of about 5,000 in 2001, mainly comprising of poor fishermen, once the Chinese assisted deep water port development began, it has crossed a population of 1,25,000. Apart from a network of roads, rail, air and infrastructural projects, Pakistan plans include a liquid natural gas (LNG) terminal, an international

6. Ziad Haider, “Balochis, Beijing and Pakistan's Gwadar Port,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 2005, 95-112, 95 7. ibid 8. Robert D. Kaplan, Pakistan’s Fatal Shore, The Atlantic ,May 2009 http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2009/05/pakistan8217-s-fatal-shore/7385/ 9. Saleem Shahid, “Gwadar Project Launched: Musharraf Lauds China's Assistance,” Dawn, March 23, 2002. 10. Nirupama Subramanian, “Musharraf cites Bhindranwale's killing,” The Hindu, October 12, 2006.

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airport, a cement plant, an oil refinery and a steel mill. China’s interests at Gwadar are very clear; China is looking for monitoring of its Gulf oil supply route as well as an opening for import / export trade from its Muslim majority Xinjiang Autonomous Region. The first phase of Gwadar Port was completed on schedule by the Chinese in 2005. The running of the port has been leased for 40 years to PSA International of Singapore in 2007 by the Pakistani government. The agreement has however run into problem with Pakistan blaming PSA of not keeping their end of contract with respect to the investments promised by them. With Gwadar Port commencing operations it has given the Chinese an opening into the Arabian Sea, a strategic depth to Pakistan navy and some cause for worry to India. In 2008 the then chief of Naval Staff, Indian navy Admiral Sureesh Mehta said Gwadar could be used by Pakistan to “take control over the world energy jugular.”11 With this backdrop, the impact of Gwadar Port for the Chinese would be discussed in some detail in the succeeding paragraphs.

Slackening of the SLOC noose at Malacca As per some estimates China’s maritime industries could contribute up to US$ 1 trillion by 2020. Chinese investments in Latin America and Africa are not only in energy sectors but span white goods, automobile parts and textiles amongst others, but the linkage with China is through the sea lanes. This coupled with inbound humungous requirements of oil from gulf and

African countries has given rise to the Chinese fears about disruption of its imports and exports through choking of SLOCs due to state, non-state or natural factors. This has led to a rethink in the traditional maritime strategy of China, as per Ni Lexiong, “the ultimate drive to develop sea power is over sea trade”12. The increase in sea trade implies its inherent protection by reducing vulnerabilities in the SLOCs of interest to China.

However, as far as existing capabilities of PLAN are concerned, as per Pentagon’s 2007 report to the US Congress, “China can neither protect its foreign energy supplies nor the routes on which they travel, including the Straits of Malacca” Malacca Dilemma thus may not explicitly refer to the very narrow Malacca Straits per se but relate to the vulnerabilities of the complete maritime transit hawsers from Gulf /African coast, through Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean right up to the point where the energy is shipped inland to China including the reverse routes where goods are shipped out of China to markets up to Latin America. As for Malacca Straits, 50 per cent of the shipping originating from the African Coast and the Gulf, crossing this choke point, carries energy and goods pertaining to China. Thus Malacca constitutes the biggest threat to a growing China’s economy. In light of the above it can be appreciated that maritime economic security has become the main pillar of China’s maritime strategy.

11. Abdus Sattar Ghazali, “India Alarmed as Chinese Built Gwadar Port of Pakistan Becomes Operational,” Countercurrents.org, February 8, 2008 12. Ni Lexiong: Sea Power and China’s Development, the Liberation Daily, 17, April, 2005

July 2012 Defence AND security alert

Gilgit-Baltistan

NEW EL DORADO?

GILGIT-BALTISTAN-GWADAR:

Just over 100 km apart, Chabahar the Iranian port and Gwadar the Pakistani port are thus competitors for accessing the CAR markets and are rushing to complete transportation corridors to Afghanistan. Both Iran and Pakistan are wooing Afghanistan by giving trade and fees incentives to favour their respective port. Pakistan however fears that “Chabahar port would inflict a huge financial setback for Pakistan”. Interestingly Chabahar is being funded by FDI from India and Gwadar by China Maritime economic security implies decreasing SLOC susceptibilities to disruption by developing alternate energy routes which tend to minimise SLOC transits, developing beneficial relations with countries in IOR and building a capable navy to counter piracy, terrorism and if required tackle interdiction by hostile navies in the region. China has been progressing strategically along these lines, by building port facilities, enhancing bilateral initiatives and upgrading its naval capabilities. However, as far as existing capabilities of PLAN are concerned, as per Pentagon’s 2007 report to the US Congress, “China can neither protect its foreign energy supplies nor the routes on which they travel, including the Straits of Malacca.”13 Oil tankers from Gulf transit about 6,000 nm and those from the African coast transit about 10,000 nm before they discharge their energy cargo at Chinese ports. Both the tanker routes have to pass through Malacca Straits in addition to problem zones in their respective routes. If tankers can unload at Gwadar, they would have to travel only about 680 nm from the Gulf and about 3,000 nm from African coast (Angola).

The premise was that Gwadar would be converted into major port hub on the lines of Dubai and the locals would benefit most. The Baloch, soon realised that this was not to be and that once again their natural resources were being siphoned out by the central government. In 2006, Pakistani Cobra helicopter gunships and F-16 fighter jets attacked Baloch areas suspected of insurgency; state organised disappearances and kidnappings culminated in killing of the Baloch leader Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti The contribution of Gwadar Port to reduction in Chinese SLOC vulnerabilities needs to be assessed under the above premises. Pak-China pipeline from Gwadar to Kashgar in Xinjiang, is likely to run parallel to the Karakorum Highway and cover a distance of about 1,500 miles over tough mountainous terrain. Indicators that China is seriously contemplating Pak-China energy corridor are evident from the following development projects: Phase II of Gwadar Port and International Airport at Gwadar by China Harbour Engineering Company

THE VITAL CHINESE ARTERY

N Petrochemical city (including oil refining capacity of 4,21,000 bpd) by Great United Petroleum Holdings Company Limited Rail link up to Xingjiang by Dong Fang Electric Supply Corp Upgrading of Karakoram Highway Construction of Kazakhstan-China and Turkmenistan-China pipelines and their eventual augmentation by feed from Gwadar-Kashgar Pipeline If this project at Gwadar fructifies on expected lines it is estimated that it would account for about 8 per cent of the 2020 Chinese oil import requirements14. The impact on outbound trade from China to Africa and Latin America would be phenomenal. This, coupled with China-Myanmar pipeline from Kunming to Kyaukphyu (Myanmar) and associated infrastructure of port development, road, rail, refinery etc. which are under construction, would definitely reduce the critical dependence on Malacca Straits. In addition it would allow movements of Chinese goods bound for Indian Ocean region without having to transit Malacca Straits. Currently both the ports do not show any signs of building of Chinese naval bases and are only gearing up for supporting Chinese and regional maritime economy ‘thus in effect loosening the SLOC noose at Malacca for China’ rather than tightening of string of pearls for India. However, considering the prohibitive time and cost investments in developing individual strategies to deal with vulnerabilities at sea it would be worthwhile for all stakeholders, especially China and India, to work out a co-operative strategy to ensure a peaceful, growth oriented, piracy and terrorism free, transit in the Indian Ocean. A welcome step was taken by India and China at Rio+20 conference on 20 June 2012 to ensure that bilateral trade reaches US$ 100 billion by 2015.

13. “Annual Report to Congress, Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2007,”(Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defence, 2007). 14. Corey S. Johnston, Transnational Pipelines And Naval Expansion: Examining China’s Oil Insecurities In The Indian Ocean, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, June 2008.

July 2012 Defence AND security alert

INDIAN SECURITY CONCERNS

ew York Times columnist Selig Harrison has argued that it takes 16 to 25 days for Chinese oil tankers to reach the Gulf through the circuitous sea route whereas if there is a high speed rail or road link, the time taken to transport cargo across the Karakoram Highway is 48 hours. The aim would be to get to the Chinese-built Pakistani naval bases at Gwadar, Pasni and Ormara, just east of the Gulf, within 48 hours. China’s immediate access and permanent presence in the Persian Gulf is a serious security concern for India which imports 70 per cent of oil from the Gulf. It is this Chinese Malacca Bypass strategy that explains the rising strategic salience of the Gilgit-Baltistan region. It is this region which serves to provide China with an opening to the Gulf. It is amazing that segments of the Indian state are now getting so keen to offer Pakistan major concessions in this vital region.

ndian policy-makers, in their obsession with Kashmir and now of late Siachen issues, have tended to ignore major and potentially dangerous developments in the Gilgit-Baltistan region of the Pakistan-occupied Northern Areas of Kashmir. Since early this year, sectarian violence unleashed by Pakistan army backed armed groups against Shias has killed over 50 people and created an atmosphere of fear and distrust. The Ahle-e-Sunnat-Wal-Jamaat (ASWJ), a radical Sunni group widely suspected to be a front for the banned Sipah-e-Suhaba, is a prime suspected behind the violence.

Democratic and human rights activists in the Gilgit-Baltistan region point out that the natives of the region are fast becoming a minority in their own areas. Senge H Sering, a noted activist from the region, now based in the US, said recently: “Pakistan denies constitutional rights to the natives of Gilgit-Baltistan and with the passage of time; they are becoming a minority in their own land. Like the Tibetans and Uighurs, they are losing control over their resources to the outsiders and their national identity is threatened by the influx of the Pakistanis and the Chinese. Pakistan promotes economic marginalisation by denying trade along the historical routes linking Gilgit-Baltistan with India, Afghanistan and Tajikistan.” Senge Sering, who also had a stint in India’s New Delhi-based, government-funded think tank, the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), is not off the mark. Gilgit-Baltistan is blessed with diverse kinds of resources including precious gems, gold, uranium, copper, molybdenum, mica, forests, glaciers, lakes and rivers. However, the revenue from resource exploitation has failed to benefit the natives.

Nitin Gokhale The writer, a journalist with 28 years of experience behind him in various conflict theatres, is currently NDTV's Security and Strategic Affairs Editor.

There is a systematic attempt at ethnic cleansing and forced demographic changes in Gilgit-Baltistan, not unlike the ‘Han-isation’ of Tibet Autnomous Region. Like China, Pakistan has over the years carried out demographic changes by pushing in people from other regions mainly Punjab to dilute the ethnic majority of Gilgit-Baltistan. But in addition to the worries over the sectarian violence, New Delhi should be worried over the attempt by the Chinese to gain control of this strategically vital region which is legally part of India. Gilgit-Baltistan, formerly known, as Northern Areas was once part of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, which India terms as Pakistan occupied Kashmir. India has a moral and legal obligation to claim Gilgit-Baltistan along with the rest of Pakistan occupied Kashmir. In 1994, the Parliament of India passed a resolution seeking the handover of those regions occupied by Pakistan and proclaiming India’s territorial integrity and sovereignty over those regions

But in addition to the worries over the sectarian violence, New Delhi should be worried over the attempt by the Chinese to gain control of this strategically vital region which is legally part of India. Gilgit-Baltistan, formerly known as Northern Areas was once part of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir

July 2012 Defence AND security alert

Gilgit-Baltistan

INDIAN SECURITY CONCERNS

The Institute of Gilgit-Baltistan Studies says after the abrogation of the state subject rule (SSR) in Gilgit-Baltistan by Pakistan’s Federal Government in 1974, the natives have lost out in large measure. The state subject rule until then protected ethnic and religious demography and economic rights of the natives of Gilgit-Baltistan. The rule is still practiced in Indian-administered Kashmir as well as Muzaffarabad and Mirpur divisions of Pakistani occupied Kashmir. There is a systematic attempt at ethnic cleansing and forced demographic changes in Gilgit-Baltistan, not unlike the ‘Han-isation’ of Tibet Autnomous Region. Like China, Pakistan has over the years carried out demographic changes by pushing in people from other regions mainly Punjab to dilute the ethnic majority of Gilgit-Baltistan. But in addition to the worries over the sectarian violence, New Delhi should be worried over the attempt by the Chinese to gain control of this strategically vital region which is legally part of India. Gilgit-Baltistan, formerly known, as Northern Areas was once part of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, which India terms as Pakistan occupied Kashmir. India has a moral and legal obligation to claim Gilgit-Baltistan along with the rest of Pakistan occupied Kashmir. In 1994, the Parliament of India passed a resolution seeking the handover of those regions occupied by Pakistan and proclaiming India’s territorial integrity and sovereignty over those regions. The resolution, in parts, said: On behalf of the People of India, the Parliament firmly declares that: a) The state of Jammu and Kashmir has been, is and shall be an integral part of India and any attempts to separate it from the rest of the country will be resisted by all necessary means; b) India has the will and capacity to

firmly counter all designs against its unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity and demands that; c) Pakistan must vacate the areas of the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir, which they have occupied through aggression and resolves that d) All attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of India will be met resolutely. Despite this and earlier resolutions, in 2009, Pakistan formally annexed the region of Gilgit-Baltistan. More importantly and dangerously, it has allowed the Chinese to come into the area. Intelligence reports about Chinese troop presence and the construction of tunnels possibly to store missiles aimed at India have also been available for some years now. And to top it all, Pakistan ceded part of this illegally occupied territory to China. The area known as Shaksgam Valley borders the East Turkestan region of China. This was seen as an attempt to make China a party to the Kashmir conflict.

Indian policy-makers, in their obsession with Kashmir and now of late Siachen issues, have tended to ignore major and potentially dangerous developments in the Gilgit Baltistan region of the Pakistan-occupied Northern Areas of Kashmir. Since early this year, sectarian violence unleashed by Pakistan army backed armed groups against Shias has killed over 50 people and created an atmosphere of fear and distrust Those who are of late clamouring for withdrawal of Indian troops from the forbidding heights of Siachen also ignore the implications that such a move will have for India’s security. Retired Lt Gen P C Katoch, who commanded the Siachen brigade in the 1990s, has aptly highlighted the threats in an article for the website of another think tank, the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS). Gen Katoch says: Major fallouts of hurried demilitarisation of Siachen are as under: • “Widening the China-Pakistan handshake (collusive threat)

July 2012 Defence AND security alert

to include Gilgit-Baltistan (reportedly being leased out by Pakistan to China for 50 years), Shaksgam Valley (already ceded by Pakistan to China in1963), Saltoro-Siachen region (that Pakistan may reoccupythrough “Kashmiri Freedom Fighters”or cede to China), own Sub Sector North (SSN) east of Siachen with Chinese sitting on the northern slopes of the Karakoram Pass if not on top of it already and Aksai Chin already under Chinese occupation. • SSN and Eastern Ladakh will become focused objectives of Chinese strategic acupuncture. Defence potential of SSN will be totally degraded with western flank exposed and KK Pass to north, which India stopped patrolling years back for fear of annoying the dragon. We continue to remain thin in Eastern Ladakh against Chinese threat via Aksai Chin – heightened more now with possibility of two front war. • Our next line of defence will perforce base on Ladakh Range with possibility of Leh coming within enemy artillery range.” But there is more. Chinese involvement prolongs Pakistani stay in Gilgit-Baltistan and complicates Kashmir issue. There is a possibility of China establishing consulate at Gilgit and accepting Pakistani sovereignty over Gilgit-Baltistan. For Beijing, PoK is a geo-strategic card. Bordering as it does the Xinjiang province, China would like to keep a watch on events in these areas. China’s interest lies in the geography that links coastal city of Gwadar to the Himalayan Kashgar region on the Chinese border and the resources and market of 180 m people along the route. This is precisely why the Karakoram Highway was built. New York Times columnist Selig Harrison has argued that it takes 16 to 25 days for Chinese oil tankers to reach the Gulf through the circuitous sea route whereas if there is a high speed rail or road link the time taken to transport cargo across the Karakoram Highway is 48 hours. The aim would be to get to

the Chinese-built Pakistani naval bases at Gwadar, Pasni and Ormara, just east of the Gulf, within 48 hours. China’s immediate access and permanent presence in the Persian Gulf is a concern for India which imports 70 per cent of oil from Gulf – given future supplydemand ratios, tension may increase.

projects in the area.

Moreover, increasing Chinese involvement in Gilgit-Baltistan may enable Pakistan to make her illegal presence in Gilgit-Baltistan permanent and allow China to develop a stake in the region and claim to be a party to dispute.

But more than anything else, China understands its own self-interest and therefore would do its utmost to secure Gilgit-Baltistan for its own compulsions. After all, this arrangement gives Beijing instant access to Pakistani ports making the security arrangements foolproof. It also safeguards oil supplies, 30 per cent of which comes comes from West Asia. The access to Pakistani ports also compensates China’s lack of blue-water naval capacity.

Apart from roadways, China has invested heavily in infrastructure, telecom, rail links and tourism. Not only is Beijing investing funds in the upgradation of the Karakoram Highway, but it is also planning to build rail links to the NA. It is also working on hydro-electric

Control over Shaksgam Valley also offsets any choke points strategy that India or the United States may have in mind against China. The overland access to West Asia and Afghanistan help reduce threats arising from adversary presence in the Persian Gulf. This route also allows China to

bypass Afghan route to Central Asia, in the process avoiding competition with Russia for strategic depth. Although Pakistan benefits from maintaining a constant state of fear in Gilgit-Baltistan, the people of the area face a lose-lose situation. Islamabad benefits from promoting extremism and militancy and blackmailing the natives on religious basis. It benefits from damaging indigenous identity by banning school curriculum in local languages and scripts. It benefits from denying natives an access to their own resources and means of production and forcing them to depend on handouts. It is in India’s interest therefore to see that the people of Gilgit-Baltistan do not remain hostage to the selfish interests of a country which enjoys physical control over the land but lacks the means to grant constitutional rights to its inhabitants.

July 2012 Defence AND security alert

Gilgit-Baltistan

BEWARE SINO-PAK ANIMUS

Col Utkarsh S Rathore (retd) The writer was commissioned into Maratha Light Infantry in 1980. He has served in high altitude areas and counter-insurgency operations. He commanded an infantry battalion during Operations Rakshak and Parakram. He is a defence and security expert and threat and risk analyst. Peaceniks are taking a very simplistic view of the problem. They tend to forget that Siachen means convergence of strategic interests of Pakistan and China against India. Like Pakistan, China also considers its boundary issue with India in the same sector as unsettled. Indian withdrawal from Siachen without iron-clad guarantee would mean linking up of Chinese-held Shaksgam Valley with Pakistanheld Gilgit-Baltistan through a trans-Karakoram movement of troops. Downgrading Siachen’s strategic importance just to facilitate demilitarisation will not only nullify Indian army’s hard-fought advantage over Pakistan and China but also jeopardise defence of Aksai Chin, Turtuk and Leh sectors in the long-term

otaries of peace at any cost with Pakistan tend to forget that Siachen means convergence of strategic interests of Pakistan and China against India. Like Pakistan, China also considers its boundary issue with India in the same sector as unsettled. Indian withdrawal from Siachen without iron-clad guarantees would mean linking up of Chinese-held Shaksgam Valley with Pakistan-held Gilgit-Baltistan through a trans-Karakoram movement of troops. Today the Indian army is deployed on Saltoro Range and controls major passes such as Turkistan La (connecting Shaksgam Valley with Siachen), Indira Col, Sia La, Bilafond La. Downgrading Siachen’s strategic importance just to facilitate demilitarisation will not only nullify Indian army’s hard-fought advantage over Pakistan and China but also jeopardise defence of Aksai Chin, Turtuk and Leh sectors in the long-term. Indians have a knack of throwing away advantages.

n April 7, 2012, a massive avalanche and landslide obliterated a Pakistan army base at Ghyari, burying 124 soldiers and 11 civilians. Ghyari base camp served as headquarter and administrative base for controlling operations in Bilafond and Chumik Glaciers sub-sectors. The tragedy was enormous, despite the best efforts from Pakistan army and rescue help from United States, Germany, Switzerland and China neither the bodies of the victims could be recovered nor have the lines of communication east of Ghyari been restored. After a visit to Ghyari base camp on April 11, Pakistan army chief General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani while speaking to reporters at Skardu airport said, “Peaceful coexistence between the two neighbours is very important so that everybody can concentrate on the well-being of the people.” General Kayani is known for his reticence, seeing him chanting peace mantra has generated a fresh wave of speculations regarding the Indo-Pak talks over Siachen. Why was General talking of peaceful coexistence at Skardu? Since India and Pakistan have locked horns on Siachen, Ghyari was the single largest mass casualty in this sector claiming lives of 139 soldiers belonging to Northern Light Infantry (NLI). The NLI regiment is composed of locals from Gilgit-Baltistan area - predominantly Shias. It is the same regiment whose soldiers were sent in as ‘Mujahideens’ during the Kargil war to occupy heights along Kargil-Leh road. As the war wore on and Indian army started recapturing peak after peak, Pakistan

July 2012 Defence AND security alert

disowned the beleaguered soldiers of NLI and even refused to accept their dead bodies. The NLI troops suffered heavy casualties during Indian army’s offensive. Due to Pakistan’s apathy there was a widespread dissension among the ranks and file of the NLI. Hence the tragedy was certainly not an occasion to resort to usual belligerence for General Kayani. The genesis of Siachen problem lies in the delineation of Cease Fire Line (CFL) during Karachi Agreement - July 1949 under the aegis of United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP). The CFL in Jammu and Kashmir was marked connecting identifiable geographic features on ground till it reached village Chalunka in Leh on Shyok River. Beyond Chalunka a map coordinate (NJ 9842) on one inch scale map was selected as last point of the CFL. Further alignment of the CFL was left unmarked with annotation thence north to the glaciers. The interpretation of these five words has led to present standoff in Siachen. Pakistan argues that the CFL from NJ 9842 should traverse in north-east direction straddling Rimo Glaciers to connect the Karakoram Pass on Sino-Indian border. All territory west of the CFL would belong to Pakistan including about ten-kilometer stretch of Sino-Indian border that lies between the eastern tip of Shaksgam Valley and Karakoram Pass. Pakistan adopted this line of argument after the US Defence Mapping Agency extended the CFL from NJ 9842 to the Karakoram Pass in its maps. Many believe that it was a CIA ploy to stoke tension between India and Pakistan after creation of Bangladesh in 1971.

SIACHEN MAGNANIMITY ANOTHER HIMALAYAN BLUNDER?

Map-1

Has anyone analysed the scale of military operations required to recapture the demilitarised Siachen? Combat modelling post-Kargil war showed us that for recapturing lost positions a combat ratio of 1:12 i.e. to capture a post held by a ten-man squad, 120 men were needed. Considering the altitude and difficulty of terrain in Siachen the combat ratio is likely to go up twofold. Operations at high-altitude need trained and acclimatised troops. Where will we get so many battle-ready troops at short notice? And, if we have to maintain a reserve of such troops, occupation of glacier is a better idea India’s arguments are based on precedence and cartographic common sense. One, the CFL from NJ 9842 should head north and not north-east. Two, it should follow a watershed to head to the north, in thiscase Saltoro Range offers an uninterrupted and delineable feature on ground. Three, Indira Col will be the culmination point of the CFL from where southern boundary of Shaksgam Valley goes eastwards and connects with Karakoram Pass. Four, the word glaciers implies the cluster of glaciers at the junction of Saltoro Range with Karakoram Range at Indira Col. There are some very long glaciers in this area - Siachen (70 km, second longest glacier outside the polar region); Biafo (63 km, third longest glacier), Baltoro (62 km, fourth longest glacier) and Hispar (49 km). Hispar and Biafo Glaciers together form world’s longest glacial system outside the polar region (See Map 1). Five, this delineation does not disturb the status of Sino-Indian border and Karakoram Pass. Last but not the least, at the time of Karachi Agreement, Siachen was not held by Pakistan (unlike Shaksgam Valley) and all such ‘no man’s land’ was awarded to India by UNCIP by virtue of Jammu and Kashmir’s accession to India. India and Pakistan did not avail subsequent opportunities during Tashkent Agreement (1966) and Shimla Agreement (1972) to settle the ambiguity. Meanwhile Pakistan ceded Shaksgam Valley to China; many international atlases started depicting the course of CFL as per US Defence Mapping Agency and Pakistani version. Indian diplomatic corps remained oblivious to all these developments till Pakistan army’s forays into glacier region in the guise of mountaineers and surveyors became public. Siachen Glacier is least understood region. A geographical and historical account would be essential.

As the war wore on and Indian army started recapturing peak after peak, Pakistan disowned the beleaguered soldiers of NLI and even refused to accept their dead bodies. The NLI troops suffered heavy casualties during Indian army’s offensive. Due to Pakistan’s apathy there was a widespread dissension among the ranks and file of the NLI Karakoram Range connects Central Asia and China with Indian sub-continent. The area is full of ranges, mountain

July 2012 Defence AND security alert

Gilgit-Baltistan

BEWARE SINO-PAK ANIMUS sending regular expeditions into this area. Indo-Pak rivalry to control Siachen had commenced. In 1981 it was evident that Pakistan was contemplating military occupation of the glacier. To pre-empt Pakistan, India on April 13, 1984, launched Operation Meghdoot (Cloud messenger) by heli-dropping troops at Bilafond La and later at Sia La. Captain (now Brigadier) Sanjay Kulkarni of 4 Kumaon planted Indian tricolour on `Bilafond La. India had beaten Pakistan by occupying Siachen Glacier. A slanging match of raids on the posts, firing and artillery duels ensued claiming many lives from both sides. In June 1987, Indian troops in a daring day time raid captured Pakistan’s Quaid post (21,153 ft) on Saltoro Range near Bilafond La, which eliminated Pakistan’s domination in central sector of Siachen. Incidentally, Brigadier Pervez Musharraf was commander of Pakistan’s Dansam Brigade under whose area of responsibility the Quaid post fell. Captured post was renamed as ‘Bana Top’, honouring Naib Subedar Bana Singh who led the assault and won Param Vir Chakra. Indian army is deployed on Saltoro Range and controls major passes such as Turkistan La (connecting Shaksgam Valley with Siachen), Col, Sia La, Bilafond La. Indira is strung along The deployment Saltoro Range and is known as Actual

Ground Position Line (AGPL). See Map 2. The AGPL is about 110 kilometers long. Entire 77-kilometer long Siachen Glacier from its head at Indira Col to snout in Nubra Valley is under Indian army’s control. Contrary to popular belief in Pakistan, Pak army does not control any part of Siachen Glacier and is only deployed on the western slopes of Saltoro Range. As compared to Indian army’s positions, Pakistan army’s positions are at much lower altitudes and are far easier to maintain.

Map-2 Showing India and Pakistan Positions Along Actual Ground Position Line in Siachen Sector passes, peaks and glaciers. Its passes gave access to traders and invaders into Leh and Skardu and Indus, Nubra and Shyok Valleys. It remained unexplored till western adventurers and surveyors commenced exploring it from different directions in early nineteenth century. First among them was William Moorcroft, who in 1820 reached Leh through Karakoram. Henery Strachey is credited with the discovery of Siachen Glacier, who in 1848 came into Nubra Valley and ascended glacier from its southern end for about a mile. In 1909, Dr Tom Longstaff, a British explorer reached Siachen Glacier via Bilafond La. Longstaff explored the glacier up to its snout and also surveyed it. In 1911-12, Dr William H Workman and his wife along with a team explored glacier for two summers and trekked up

to its northern extremity. It was Workman, who named the northern extremity of glacier as Indira Col perhaps on his wife’s insistence, after goddess Lakshmi. Workman also named glacier as Siachen (sia - rose and chen - place in Balti language). However, Prof Giotto Dainelli, an Italian explorer and surveyor completed the survey of Siachen, Teram Shehr, Rimo and other subsidiary Glaciers, peaks and ridge lines between Karakoram Range and Saltoro Ridge. He named a pass connecting Teram Shehr and Rimo Glaciers as Col Italia. Adventurers and mountaineers have always been attracted to this area which has highest concentration of peaks ranging between 7,000-8,000 metres. Since early fifties Pakistan started permitting mountaineering expeditions into

July 2012 Defence AND security alert

this area from Saltoro Kangri side. One such four-week international expedition ‘Saltoro Expedition’ was flagged off in July 1960 to explore areas of Baltoro Glacier, Sia Kangri, Indira Col and K12. A commemorative stamp was also issued. The expedition did not reach Indira Col and Sia Kangri (?). See photographs. Many such expeditions were launched from Pakistan into this area but the Indian government and intelligence agencies did not get wind of the oropolitics being played by Pakistan. It was Colonel Narendra Kumar ‘Bull’, an acclaimed mountaineer of Indian army who came across a report in an international mountaineering journal regarding an expedition having ventured into Siachen from Pakistan side in 1977. He in 1978 led an expedition to Siachen Glacier. From 1979 onwards, India too started

July 2012 Defence AND security alert

Gilgit-Baltistan

Years of human presence and military activity on the glacier has affected its ecology. Every year tonnes of human excrement, metal waste, packaging material, military equipment and soot from weapons and oil stoves is being consigned to glacial ecosystem. It has accelerated the melting of glacier. Noise from weapons, helicopters and snowmobiles cause premature avalanches and do not let snow to settle into ice Maintenance of troops at such altitudes is a challenge. Troops need special clothing, shelters and equipment to survive in this area. Both sides are spending a lot of funds to maintain their troops. Before induction all troops undergo a strict regimen of acclimatisation schedule to make them fit for operation in high altitudes. Induction to the posts is a time consuming process as it is mostly done at night and by walking. Indian troops make good use of Siachen Glacier for their movement and administrative support. Over the years troops have learnt their lessons in Siachen - there are less casualties and wastages and the procedures have been streamlined to achieve combat and administrative efficiency. Both armies for their operational and administrative convenience have divided the glacier into northern, central and southern sub-sectors. Interestingly, their boundaries are more or less congruous. Since movement on glacier is cumbersome and restricted, troops resort to firing to dominate each other. The glacier is bristling with all types of weapon systems - heavy machine guns, high kinetic energy rifles, anti-aircraft guns, mortars, artillery guns, anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles etc. have been deployed and used by both sides. This sector had witnessed heavy attrition from both sides, till in 2003 a ceasefire was announced. Mercifully the truce is still holding out. The high altitude ecosystem is fragile; only handful of plant and animal species that have adapted to this harsh climate survive here. Down in the Nubra and Shyok Valleys diversity in flora and fauna is perceptible as compared to the upper reaches of the glacier.

Gilgit-Baltistan

BEWARE SINO-PAK ANIMUS Years of human presence and military activity on the glacier has affected its ecology. Every year tonnes of human excrement, metal waste, packaging material, military equipment and soot from weapons and oil stoves is being consigned to glacial ecosystem. It has accelerated the melting of glacier. Noise from weapons, helicopters and snowmobiles cause premature avalanches and do not let snow to settle into ice. Since 1984, veterans feel that Siachen has receded at its snout. The ill-effects of military presence on glacier are more evident during summers, when we find crevasses and water streams - wider and more in numbers than previous year. Situation is the same on Pakistan’s side; Ghyari incident is being linked to ecological degradation. In fact, sustained deployment of forces, armed conflicts and human habitat have caused imbalances to the most sustainable ecological landscapes the world over. Why single out army’s presence in Siachen alone? Thinning out of troops’ presence or total demilitarisation of the area is desirable but can it override national security concerns? Suddenly in the Indian strategic circles Siachen’s strategic importance has plummeted. Peaceniks are taking a very simplistic view of the problem. They tend to forget that Siachen means convergence of strategic interests of Pakistan and China against India. Like Pakistan, China also considers its boundary issue with India in the same sector as unsettled. Indian withdrawal from Siachen without iron-clad guarantee would mean linking up of Chinese-held Shaksgam Valley with Pakistan-held Gilgit-Baltistan through a trans-Karakoram movement of troops. Peaceniks’ argument that no large-scale operational movement of troops is possible at such altitudes; but given the operational capability of our adversaries movement of troops across Saltoro and Karakoram Ranges to threaten Nubra Valley and Turtuk sector is a distinct possibility. Downgrading Siachen’s strategic importance just to facilitate demilitarisation will not only nullify Indian army’s hard-fought advantage over Pakistan and China but also jeopardise defence of

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Aksai Chin, Turtuk and Leh sectors in the long-term.

Pakistan adopted this line of argument after the US Defence Mapping Agency extended the CFL from NJ 9842 to the Karakoram Pass in its maps. Many believe that it was a CIA ploy to stoke tension between India and Pakistan after creation of Bangladesh in 1971 In the event of Pakistan reneging on a demilitarised Siachen, it is being advocated that India would be free to take military action to recapture Saltoro Range and Siachen Glacier. It is easier said than done. Has anyone analysed the scale of military operations required to recapture the demilitarised Siachen? Combat modelling post-Kargil war showed us that for recapturing lost positions a combat ratio of 1:12 i.e. to capture a post held by a ten-man squad, 120 men were needed. Considering the altitude and difficulty of terrain in Siachen the combat ratio is likely to go up twofold. Operations at high-altitude need trained and acclimatised troops. Where will we get so many battle-ready troops at short notice? And, if we have to maintain a reserve of such troops, occupation of glacier is a better idea. Indians have a knack of throwing away advantages. We halted military operations in Jammu and Kashmir in 1948, when Indian army was winning; in Tashkent Agreement, we gifted away Hajipir Pass; during negotiations for Shimla Agreement nobody thought of removing the prevailing ambiguity of CFL in Siachen. Same euphoria and benevolence is being drummed up again by stating that Indo-Pak relations can only improve once Siachen issue is resolved. The onus of proving sincerity must not be allowed to shift from Pakistan, which has a long history of reneging on promises and embarking on misadventures. Kargil war - 1999 and 26/11 are cases in point. Resolving Siachen is desirable but not at the cost of national strategic concerns. Our magnanimity should not turn into another Himalayan blunder. We should pay heed to what Indian army and well-meaning defence analyst are saying.

SINO-PAK PLAYGROUND

Geo-political dance macabre T

he situation in Gilgit-Baltistan attained such alarming proportions for the Pakistan-China entente cordiale that Beijing insisted that the security of the Karakoram Highway be transferred to the People’s Liberation Army. This happened when the local population began to refuse to work on the Chinese aided project of expansion and upgradation of the Karakoram Highway with plans unveiled for railway line and gas and oil pipelines to run along it. Increasingly frequent demonstrations have blocked traffic on portions of the highway that are not affected by the landslide of 2010 that created a huge lake north of Gilgit at Attabad. China deployed (by US Central Intelligence Agency estimates) up to 9,000 personnel into the Northern Areas along the Karakoram Highway disguised as labourers and engineers. The situation in Baltistan is turning serious and merits a close watch by all those concerned with security in South Asia.

Cecil Victor The writer has covered all wars with Pakistan as War Correspondent and reported from the conflict zones in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in South East Asia as well as from Afghanistan. He is author of “India: The Security Dilemma”.

The stakes around the hinterland of the Karakoram Highway are very high. The highway supplemented by a railway and oil and gas pipelines would open up the mineral-rich Xiangjiang province to exploitation enabling ingress and egress to Chinese commerce within much shorter time frames than that provided by the Malacca Straits or the seas south of Indonesia. Strategically too, the Gwadar Port on the Balochistan coast of Pakistan will enable China to post its navy in an area that is on the boil with Iran and the US-led western alliance at loggerheads over the nuclear issue and the boycott of Iranian oil could have far-reaching consequences for a nation like China whose phenomenal industrial growth could be jeopardised by any disruption of oil supplies from the Gulf

romised prosperity and new horizons for the children of the land with the passage of the Karakoram Highway through their territory, the people of Gilgit-Baltistan have been rueing the day they allowed themselves to be literally shanghaied into a Pakistan that has spread only ruination within itself and in its neighbourhood. From 1947 when a British officer named ‘Major’ Brown illegally raised the Pakistani flag over the Gilgit cantonment up to 2009 the people of this land lived under the anonymity of “the Northern Areas”. Pakistan’s claims to sovereignty over a predominantly Muslim population on the basis of the two-nation theory fell flat when the Supreme Court of Pakistan ruled in 1999 that “Balawaristan (its prehistoric name) was disputed territory and the government of Pakistan

July 2012 Defence AND security alert

Gilgit-Baltistan

SINO-PAK PLAYGROUND

has no claim over it”. The Balawaristan Nationalist Front is fighting a lonely battle for independence from Pakistan little realising that creeping Chinese suzereignty may well have blighted their future forever.

Pakistan’s claims to sovereignty over a predominantly Muslim population on the basis of the two-nation theory fell flat when the Supreme Court of Pakistan ruled in 1999 that “Balawaristan (its prehistoric name) was disputed territory and the government of Pakistan has no claim over it”. The Balawaristan Nationalist Front is fighting a lonely battle for independence from Pakistan little realising that creeping Chinese suzereignty may well have blighted their future forever

Emerging geo-politics This year’s winter has sent a chill to the hearts of the people of Gilgit-Baltistan that warm rays of the summer sun will not thaw. They have been subjected to a systematic pogrom of elimination in a Pakistan-China game plan that sees in the very existence of the predominantly Shia and Ismaili (Aga Khan sect) Muslims a threat to their perceived geo-political outreach encompassed in an overarching connect between the Gwadar Port on the Balochistan coast to the Chinese province of Xiangjiang bringing across the existing Karakoram Highway railway lines, oil and gas pipelines. For China this is a strategic outreach to the north Arabian Sea to which it intends to connect the landlocked Xiangjiang province reducing travel time to days rather than the months it takes Beijing to service a population placed more than 5,000 kilometers from the Chinese Pacific coast and its bustling ports. However, over the past decade and more the local populace has time and again disrupted traffic on the highway and have refused to participate in the maintenance and repair that is frequently required in the face of landslides leading to impounding of river waters. The most serious disruption of traffic on the highway occurred in June, 2010 when a landslide created a 19-km portion of the Karakoram Highway to disappear into a huge lake that threatened towns

and villages downstream. What was supposed to have been a blessing to the peoples of Pakistan and China has turned out to be a nightmare for the local people of Gilgit-Baltistan.

British imperialist divide The history of Gilgit-Baltistan alias Balawaristan was perverted in its cradle in 1947 by a Briton named ‘Major’ William Brown who was incharge of the Gilgit Scouts after the agency was returned to the Dogra king. His grouse was that the largely Muslim Gilgit Scouts should not be handed over to the Hindu ruler and so when the moment of partition came in 1947 and the Dogra king was vacillating over whether to declare independence from both India and Pakistan or join India, ‘Major’ Brown, political agent in military uniform that he was, threw in the lot of the Gilgitis into the Pakistani cauldron. The Pakistani flag was raised in Gilgit under his tutelage. Little wonder that for this act of perfidy he was awarded the Sitara-e-Pakistan for a geopolitical drama that appears to be in the final stage of its evolution but in a manner even beyond the wildest imagination of its progenitor. ‘Major’ Brown may have been eclectic in his understanding that “Muslim” encompassed a monolithic whole thereby brushing under the carpet the major flaw in the two-nation theory by which Pakistan was created and to which ‘Major’ Brown subscribed with ardent zeal.

Talibanisation of province Unfortunately for Pakistan the fact that the Muslim community is divided into Sunni and Shia sects with some minor outgrowths like the now banned Ahmediyas and the totally irrepressible Ismailis (followers of Aga Khan) and Nurbakshis in Gilgit-Baltistan. This combination is more particularly accentuated in Gilgit-Baltistan where the Shias are in the majority in large parts of the district and there are significantly large groupings of Ismailis, Sunnis and Nurbakshis interspersed within this mélange. Tribal affinities had tended to iron out differences over the centuries but General Zia-ul-Haq’s Sunni Islamisation programme injected a poison that is increasingly becoming more potent.

July 2012 Defence AND security alert

By the time General Pervez Musharraf, the so-called “moderate Muslim” arrived on the scene (as Brigadier in command of the local military / paramilitary forces), the schism had attained endemic proportions and the targeted killings of Shias became a norm that has resulted in the communalisation of even the bus routes. This has facilitated the kind of massacre that occurred at Kohistan where Shia bus passengers were ordered to disembark and were shot dead. In a copycat act the Shias in Gilgit did the same with Sunni passengers.

Kargil effect

giving them a decent burial with full military honours provoked sentiments among the Shias of Gilgit-Baltistan who demanded that their kin be brought home. This Musharraf finally did in his own inimitable fashion. He accepted the dead bodies but made sure that the bodies were delivered to their families in the middle of the night so that no demonstrations occurred against the regime. It is said that the Northern Light Infantry was amalgamated into the Pakistan army for its “outstanding performance” in Kargil. This is not borne out by General Musharraf’s blatant discrimination against the non-Sunnis of this regiment.

The infiltration of Sunni fundamentalist elements ostensibly intended to provide protection to the Karakoram Highway and to ensure un-interrupted connectivity between Pakistan and its all-weather friend China has exacerbated sectarian tension. It appears that one major attempt to retain a semblance of balance between the communities - the creation of the Northern Light Infantry within the Pakistan army by amalgamation of the Gilgit and Northern Scouts - has come apart at the seams because of the negative policies of the government in Islamabad. Here again it is Musharraf’s baleful actions that cast a long shadow on the Shia and other components of the communities in Gilgit-Baltistan. The rank of ‘Major’ was accorded to William Brown, the British political agent who gave up his commission in the British Indian army and became a mercenary in the Maharaja’s army which at that point of time was being reorganised after the lease of Gilgit was abrograted unilaterally by Mountbatten. Clearly ‘Major’ Brown had malice aforethought because it was rumoured that the Gilgit Scouts under Brown were planning to create a ‘Republic of Gilgit’ rather than allow a majority Muslim military entity to serve a Hindu Maharaja.

Demographic reality

Post-Kargil, chief of the Pakistan army General Pervez Musharraf allowed his anti-Shia sentiments to rise to the surface again and he refused to accept the dead bodies of the soldiers of the Northern Light Infantry who were killed in the Kargil war. With Indian television grabs beamed to Pakistan occupied Kashmir showing Indian troops bringing down the bodies of Pakistani soldiers from Kargil and

The situation in Gilgit-Baltistan attained such alarming proportions for the Pakistan-China entente cordiale that Beijing insisted that the security of the Karakoram Highway be transferred to the People’s Liberation Army. This happened when the local population began to refuse to work on the Chinese aided project of expansion and upgradation of the Karakoram Highway with plans

The composition of the Northern Light Infantry Regiment is: 49 per cent of the sepoys are Shias and 18 per cent Sunnis, while the Ismailis and Nurbakshis make up 23 and 10 per cent, respectively. Fifty-five per cent of the sepoys come from Gilgit area while 35 per cent hail from Baltistan. The regiments are led by Pathan, Baloch and officers drawn from the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa “warlike tribes”. Because they are so predominant, the Shias in the Northern Light Infantry have been treated shabbily by the Sunni Pakistani army. The resentment of the local population over the treatment meted out to them has grown given that there is simultaneously a campaign against the Ismailis who are followers of the Aga Khan in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and against the Shias of Balochistan by Pakistan army nurtured Jundullah. The men of this region are being used as cannon fodder by the Pakistan army in their half-hearted operations against the Tehrik-e-Pakistan Taliban in the former North-west Frontier Province (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and their dead bodies are used as bargaining chips to release hardcore jihadi commanders.

unveiled for railway line and gas and oil pipelines to run along it. Increasingly frequent demonstrations have blocked traffic on portions of the highway that are not affected by the landslide of 2010 that created a huge lake north of Gilgit at Attabad. China deployed (by US Central Intelligence Agency estimates) up to 9,000 personnel into the Northern Areas along the Karakoram Highway disguised as labourers and engineers (Indian estimates as given by outgoing Chief of Army Staff General V K Singh are 4,000 personnel). Either way they represent a substantial number of foreigners who have made their home in territory that is rightfully India’s. China has objected to Indian participation in a joint venture to search for oil in what is known as the South China Sea off the coast of Vietnam on the ground that it is “disputed territory”. It does not seem to want to apply the same yardstick to Pakistan occupied Kashmir.

Strategic outreach The reason is obvious. The stakes around the hinterland of the Karakoram Highway are very high. The highway supplemented by a railway and oil and gas pipelines would open up the mineral-rich Xiangjiang province to exploitation enabling ingress and egress to Chinese commerce within much shorter time frames than that provided by the Malacca Straits or the seas south of Indonesia. Strategically too, the Gwadar Port on the Balochistan coast of Pakistan will enable China to post its navy in an area that is on the boil with Iran and the US-led western alliance at loggerheads over the nuclear issue and the boycott of Iranian oil could have far-reaching consequences for a nation like China whose phenomenal industrial growth could be jeopardised by any disruption of oil supplies from the Gulf. It is in this general milieu that the sudden volte face of the Pakistan army chief General Ashfaq Kayani over the issue of withdrawal of troops from the Siachen Glacier acquires a new connotation. The Indian army has made the point that once vacated it would be extremely difficult for it to recapture the Saltoro Range from any

intruders. It has asked that the Actual Ground Position Lines be monitored and drawn on maps indicating exactly where the two armies are currently posted. It is clear that the Pakistan army is nowhere close to the Siachen Glacier being held to positions at the foothills of the Saltoro Range by Indian troops posted on the heights. That distance between the two armies would have to be delineated and designated as “no man’s land” in the interest of peace and tranquillity between the two countries. It would be puerile for any Indian to believe that General Kayani’s insistence on the resolution of the Siachen Glacier issue is based on grievous pain over the demise of more than 130 troops of the Pakistan army Northern Light Infantry in an avalanche recently. The Pakistan army has no love lost for the Northern Light Infantry because of its predominantly Shia and non-Sunni character. As the hesitancy in accepting the bodies of those killed in the Kargil war shows, the tears spilt over those killed in the avalanche are those of crocodiles. Pakistan wants the Indians out of Siachen (to which the Saltoro Range is the gateway) so as to allow the Chinese to do a Kargil. With a bilateral agreement between India and Pakistan to clear the Saltoro Range of Indian presence it will leave the Chinese a free hand to occupy the vacated territory on the ground that occupation is nine / tenths the law just as they have been doing along the Line of Actual Control that can only be enforced if Indian troops are present on the ground. As the government of India has noted the Chinese have made 500 incursions across the Line of Actual Control - a commentary on how sacrosanct is a line that does not exist. As for the people of Gilgit-Baltistan any withdrawal of Indian troops from the Siachen Glacier would leave them at the mercy of an expansionist Han army and a obsequious Pakistan that has already ceded the Shaksgam portion of Gilgit-Baltistan to China long ago and is now preparing to hand over suzerainty of the rest of the Pakistan occupied territory to its “all-weather friend”. If India allows this to happen it will be a geo-political development akin to the bartering away the future of the Tibetans without a quid pro quo.

July 2012 Defence AND security alert

Gilgit-Baltistan

REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE

T Maj Gen Afsir Karim AVSM (retd) The writer is a well known retired Indian army general and a military scholar who has authored several books on strategic affairs and military studies. He is a graduate of the Defence Services Staff College, Wellington and the National Defence College.

The deployment of combat troops and the latest developments in this area point towards a long term joint Pakistan-China plan for this region that could translate into a joint offensive without warning. A rail link is under construction from Tibet to link up with the Pakistan rail network leading to Gwadar Port. Permanent military barracks have been constructed in this region for stationing of Chinese troops. In the situation, we can no longer watch the joint Pakistani designs on our territory and remain indifferent to deployment of Chinese troops in Gilgit-Baltistan. It is essential that India evolves a policy process that provides it a viable solution for safeguarding its national interests in view of the aggressive Chinese-Pakistani postures in this region

he great Himalayas, the high Karakoram Range and the Hindu Kush meet in the trans-Himalayan region of Gilgit and Baltistan and form a strategic triangle. Northern frontiers of Kashmir reach up to the Karakoram Range which forms the watershed between the Xinjiang and India. In the west, the frontier merges with the Pamir and Hindu Kush mountains. The narrow valley of the Wakhan corridor on the southern slope of the Pamir provides passage from Afghanistan into northern Kashmir. In the eastern region, the boundary merges into the high plateau of Tibet, with the Karakoram mountain range in the north and the great Himalayan range in the south.

GILGIT-BALTISTAN REGION

The Gilgit-Baltistan region is the next door neighbour of Central Asia, Afghanistan, Xinjiang and Tibet; this makes this an area of vital interest to America, Russia, China, Pakistan, India and the Republics of Central Asia. This region is of special importance to India as it provides major routes of ingress into the sub-continent across the high Karakoram ranges, in the east is the Ladakh route and in the west the Gilgit route, routes across the Hindu Kush enter this area in the north-west. All the routes eventually lead to various parts of Jammu and Kashmir across high passes through the Indus Valley and its tributaries and provide avenues for trade and interaction across the mountains. This region originally comprised a number of autonomous political and geographic entities that lay scattered over 27,188 sq miles, but realising the strategic significance of the region British created a separate Gilgit Agency in 1868, surrounded by three famous mountain ranges, the north-western Himalayas, the great Karakoram and the Hindu Kush. All these three ranges have their origin in the great Pamir Knot, three well known mountain peaks, Nanga Parbat. Hurmoshand and K2 the world’s second highest peak, are located in this area. In the mountain fastness of the Himalayas, the Karakoram and the Hindu Kush, there are many scantily populated, high and isolated valleys that are of great strategic importance because the boundaries of Afghanistan, China, India, Pakistan and the Central Asia converge here and Tajikistan and Afghanistan in the west are their immediate neighbours.

China has no intention of settling the border issue in a hurry and if our troops are pulled out from the glacier area it will make a link between China and Pakistan across the Karakoram Pass much easier. In these circumstances we cannot afford to vacate our positions from the Saltoro Ridge or base areas under any agreement to earn Pakistan’s goodwill; we will in fact need to strengthen the entire Shyok Valley sector from Daulat Beg Oldi to Turtuk and the entire Ladakh range particularly the Khardungla Pass to safeguard our areas The geo-strategic importance of Gilgit-Baltistan has long history, The Russian, Chinese, Persian, Tibetan and British Indian Empires vied for this area with a view to dominate this region and to prevent ingress through this area. However, the high mountain passes of the Karakoram Range around Gilgit-Baltistan in the past were a formidable barrier but modern technology has made passage over these passes much easier. The Chinese succeeded in constructing the Karakoram Highway in 1978 and got an easy access to the warm waters of Indian Ocean. The distance between China and the Middle East, which used to take months of travel through sea routes, can now be covered in a matter of days. The pronged turbulence in Pakistan-Afghanistan has increased the importance of Gilgit-Baltistan for all the countries in the region. Pakistan presently occupies and controls all the routes from Xinjiang and Central Asian region into the Indian sub-continent. By helping Pakistan in constructing the Karakoram Highway China got a direct access to the Gulf region, Central Asia and Africa and has been able to establish base facilities in Gwadar in Pakistan and some ports in Indian Ocean littoral states by sending men and material via the Karakoram Highway. The projected oil and gas pipeline from Iran to China may also pass through this corridor. The geostrategic importance of this area is growing under the present strategic environment, no wonder China is making special efforts to make further inroads in this region. India can directly reach Central Asian markets through this region only but presently all such routes remain blocked.

STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF

July 2012 Defence AND security alert

he writer, a reputed military analyst, provides a regional perspective to the Gilgit-Baltistan issue. The Gilgit-Baltistan region is the next door neighbour of Central Asia, Afghanistan, Xinjiang and Tibet. China has no intention of settling the border issue in a hurry and if our troops are pulled out from the glacier area it will make a link between China and Pakistan across the Karakoram Pass much easier. In these circumstances we cannot afford to vacate our positions from the Saltoro Ridge or base areas under any agreement to earn Pakistan’s goodwill; we will in fact need to strengthen the entire Shyok Valley sector from Daulat Beg Oldi to Turtuk and the entire Ladakh range particularly the Khardungla Pass to safeguard our areas. It is essential that India evolves a policy process that provides it a viable solution for safeguarding its national interests in view of the aggressive Chinese-Pakistani postures in this region. Being in occupation of this region Pakistan has gained great strategic advantages while India has been a prime loser in this situation because all surface routes to Central Asia and oil rich regions beyond are not available to it. China on the other hand got access to Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf through the Gwadar Port that provides a vital short cut to the sea-lanes in this region. China and North Korea have been supplying Pakistan with lethal weapons and clandestine nuclear material through the Karakoram Highway.

July 2012 Defence AND security alert

Gilgit-Baltistan

The Karakoram Range which forms the watershed between the Xinjiang and India. In the west, the frontier merges with the Pamir and Hindu Kush mountains. The narrow valley of the Wakhan corridor on the southern slope of the Pamir provides passage from Afghanistan into northern Kashmir. In the eastern region, the boundary merges into the high plateau of Tibet, with the Karakoram mountain range in the north and the great Himalayan range in the south The government of Pakistan had ceded about 5,180 sq km territory in the Shaksgam Valley to China that rightfully belongs to India in an illegal border agreement in 1963. Now China’s western highway, known as the Lhasa-Kasha or Xinjiang Highway connects Xinjiang to Tibet, by linking Kasha and Lhasa (3,105 km). From Quilanaldi, the road branches off to the Khunjerab Pass via the Shaksgam Valley, subsequently, becoming the Karakoram Highway leading to Gilgit. The Northern Areas renamed Gilgit-Baltistan that is under illegal occupation of Pakistan since 1948 can be used both by Pakistan and China as a base of aggression against India. We must pay greater attention to this fact in the context of the presence of large number of Chinese combat troops in this region and the news that Pakistan has leased out this area to China. Reports of the increased Chinese military presence and infrastructure in this region should be a cause of grave concern to us, as in the past India had failed to realise the importance of this region to its loss. After independence and as the partition of India approached, the lease obtained by the British from the Maharaja was terminated and Gilgit reverted to Jammu and Kashmir. If our government had too like the British understood the strategic significance of this area they would have not allowed Major Brown, commanding the Gilgit Scouts, tostage a military coup on November 1, 1947. In the absence of the Indian forces in this area, Brig Ghansara Singh, the governor appointed by the Maharaja of Kashmir had no choice but to

Gilgit-Baltistan

REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE surrender and a Pakistani flag was hoisted on his palace. On November 1, 1947 when this coup took place, irregular forces of Pakistan were already entering the Kashmir Valley and their intention to seize the entire state was quite apparent. The lack of understanding of the Pakistani military design to capture the Gilgit-Baltistan area proved very costly for India in the long run. Even when we had captured most parts of the valley and were in a position to advance to Gilgit via the old trade route from Srinagar to Gilgit and across the Gurais Valley and the Zojila-Kargil route to Skardu, there was no attempt made to recapture Skardu or Gilgit at any stage. The main thrust of our offensive was towards Muzaffarabad, Gurais Valley was, however, secured to thwart any Pakistani offensive from Gilgit through this route. The relief of Skardu was planned but never carried out subsequently, although the Skardu garrison held out heroically for six months; soon the ceasefire came into force and Gilgit and Baltistan remained in the hands of Pakistan. The deployment of combat troops and the latest developments in this area point towards a long term joint Pakistan-China plan for this region that could translate into a joint offensive without warning. A rail link is under construction from Tibet to link up with the Pakistan rail network leading to Gwadar Port. Permanent military barracks have been constructed in this region for stationing of Chinese troops. In the situation, we can no longer watch the joint Pakistani designs on our territory and remain indifferent to deployment of Chinese troops in Gilgit-Baltistan. We need to build our military muscle to deter military adventurism against us by China and Pakistan. Belatedly, some efforts are being made to get a better foothold in this sensitive area but these must be completed on a war footing to safeguard our national interests. Various developments indicate that China has no intention of settling the border issue in a hurry and if our troops are pulled out from the glacier area it will make a link between China and Pakistan across

July 2012 Defence AND security alert

the Karakoram Pass much easier. In these circumstances we cannot afford to vacate our positions from the Saltoro Ridge or base areas under any agreement to earn Pakistan’s goodwill; we will in fact need to strengthen the entire Shyok Valley sector from Daulat Beg Oldi to Turtuk and the entire Ladakh range particularly the Khardungla Pass to safeguard our areas.

Pakistan presently occupies and controls all the routes from Xinjiang and Central Asian region into the Indian sub-continent. By helping Pakistan in constructing the Karakoram Highway China got a direct access to the Gulf region, Central Asia and Africa and has been able to establish base facilities in Gwadar in Pakistan and some ports in Indian Ocean littoral states by sending men and material via the Karakoram Highway. The projected oil and gas pipeline from Iran to China may also pass through this corridor. The geostrategic importance of this area is growing under the present strategic environment, no wonder China is making special efforts to make further inroads in this region. India can directly reach Central Asian markets through this region only It is essential that India evolves a policy process that provides it a viable solution for safeguarding its national interests in view of the aggressive Chinese-Pakistani postures in this region. A policy reconstruct for India’s Himalayan frontier has now in fact become overdue and the challenges and dangers of the Chinese-Pakistani manoeuvres require a new and appropriate military and diplomatic response. India must take steps to offset the strategic disadvantage it suffers because of the close military cooperation between Pakistan and China in a region from where they can threaten India’s security from a position of strength. To discourage any thought of such adventures we must create a suitable military infrastructure and take appropriate diplomatic initiatives to meet any Chinese and Pakistani inroads in this region.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

GILGIT-BALTISTAN

ON THE BOIL A

Col J P Singh (retd)

n interesting article on the Gilgit-Baltistan region. The writer provides an essential historical perspective and highlights the sharp sectarian fault lines that have riven this region. He recounts how till 1988 the people of Gilgit-Baltistan boldly fought for their democratic rights. Gen Zia-ul-Haq subverted their campaign by clamping martial law and dividing them on sectarian lines. Gen Zia posted Brig Musharraf (the architect of Kargil and later President of Pakistan) to suppress this regional uprising. Killing and vandalising the minorities is getting institutionalised in Pakistan. People have been attacked and butchered in mosques, schools, hospitals, in buses and other public places. Administration is paralysed in various towns and cities which emboldens brutalities and benefits terrorists and further creates unrest in the region. Sectarian killings in Gilgit-Baltistan have evoked reactions in Kargil and many places of Pakistan.

The writer was commissioned in 4 BIHAR on 13 June 1971 from IMA Dehradun. He took part in 1971 war in Poonch sector of Jammu and Kashmir and later served in IPKF in Sri Lanka. On ERE, as a Capt served in Infantry School Mhow in the Weapon’s Wing, as a Major in NDA Khadakwasla as Squadron Commander and as Lt Col in Infantry School Belgaum as Senior Instructor and staff of HQ 26 Inf Div. As Col served in the NCC in Odisha and Maharashtra and in the staff at HQs Northern Command. Gilgit-Baltistan is seething with discontent. ISI managed Jihadi camps have been established in Gilgit-Baltistan. Senior retired Army officers have been employed to train Jammu and Kashmir militant groups like the redundant JKLF, HM and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and to infiltrate them back into the valley. Latest intelligence reports suggest that youths from Afghanistan, Pakistan and Kashmir are trained together in camps run by ISI in Ghowadi, Skardu, Darel, Astor and Gilgit. After the Kargil war, military build-up has been augmented in Northern Areas with construction of roads and helipads within three kms of LOC. A High Altitude Training School has been opened near Gilgit and SSG Commando Training Centre has been established near Skardu. It amounts to military encirclement of India from this direction. Fearing American drone attacks in Swat Valley, Al Qaeda and Taliban militants have migrated to Gilgit-Baltistan where they intimidate and endanger indigenous Shia population

July 2012 Defence AND security alert

Gilgit-Baltistan

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

od has blessed Gilgit-Baltistan region with high mountains, huge water resources, enchanting lakes, large variety of fruits, lush green forests, rivers, springs, largest glaciers, variety of minerals and above all hardy people. We often heard such wonderful tales from our forefathers who took part in battles of Skardu and Chitral, survived and later served in these areas as part of state force. Its enchanting beauty is enshrined in our folklore and often sung by pahari folk singers. Ironically it is forsaken by India. The lapse of British paramountcy, led to the termination of 1935 lease of Gilgit Agency. The entire area of Gilgit Agency was restored to the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir. In view of strategic importance of the area, the state government brought about some administrative reforms and named it as Frontier Province. Accordingly Brigadier Ghansara Singh was deputed as Governor. He took charge from British political agent on 1 August 1947. The local Rajas welcomed the return to Maharaja’s rule but the Gilgit Scouts under the command of Major Brown, a British officer, continued to defy the Governor. After Pakistan invaded Jammu and Kashmir, there was pandemonium in Gilgit. Rumours were afloat that Srinagar had fallen. Gilgit Scouts and Muslim elements of state force hatched a conspiracy and staged a coup. On 31 October 1947, Gilgit Scouts mutinied and arrested Brigadier Ghansara Singh. Later the rebel troops captured Baltistan. For 17 days these areas were called ‘People’s Republic of Gilgit and Baltistan’. A rebel provisional government was established under a local fief Rias Khan. Major Brown hoisted Pakistani flag in Gilgit on 4 November 1947. Hence India lost Gilgit-Baltistan to Pakistan without facing any military invasion. Knowing well the strategic importance of this region, India made no attempt to get it back. It was indeed ironic that despite the heroic resistance put up by state forces troops, the Indian army did not attempt to link up with Skardu or assist the garrison. Pt Nehru, a great historian and statesman failed to appreciate the necessity of recovering this region. Infact Nehru had no vision of Kashmir beyond Sheikh Abdullah. His tunnel vision was further blurred by Mountbatten’s indifferent attitude. For some inexplicable reasons, the Air Force also did not undertake any supply sortie to Skardu. Starved of rations and ammunition, the Skardu garrison finally succumbed on 14 August 1948. With the surrender of Skardu garrison, the control of Baltistan passed over to Pakistan. Later Pakistan signed an agreement with the Presidents of PoK and Muslim Conference on 28 April 1949 under which the government of Pakistan secured the right to keep Gilgit-Baltistan under its direct control. In 1970s, the former Gilgit Agency, Gilgit Wazarat, Astor Wazarat, Skardu Tehsil of Ladakh Wazarat as well as erstwhile states of Hunza and Nagar, earlier under princely state of Jammu and Kashmir; were amalgamated into one entity and named ‘Northern Areas’. This was totally illegitimate as Gilgit-Baltistan had legally been a part of Jammu and Kashmir state and the Maharaja had legally acceded to India in the face of a Pakistan sponsored Tribal invasion.

In addition the region has the mines of Uranium-238, Ruby, Emerald, Topaz, Quartz, Iron, Marble, Sulphur, Alum and oil. Pakistan is building mega hydroelectric dams at Skardu and Bhasha which will inundate millions of acres of fertile land and displace large population to provide cheap electricity to the rest of Pakistan Till the sixth century Gilgit-Baltistan was called Brooshal, later called Bloristan and till mid twentieth century it was Dardistan. Local residents call it Balwaristan. Legally it is Indian Territory and has been fulcrum of Central Asia being at the cross roads of the ancient Silk Route. Like Kashmir it is yet another paradise on the earth. It is blessed with abundance of natural resources despite which it is the most backward area in entire South Asia. The Karakoram Highway which passes through Gilgit-Baltistan enables easy Chinese access to the sea Port of Gwadar at the mouth of Persian Gulf. Karakoram Highway has been so aligned and extended to Chinese territory that it will facilitate export from Chinese factories located in North-western China straight to Gwadar deep sea port. Pakistan offered to serve as the ‘energy corridor’ between China and the Persian Gulf. The two countries have started a rail link between them. Gilgit-Baltistan borders Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Tibet, China, Afghanistan and Pakistan, hence is a bridge between India and Central Asian Republics. Being in Pakistan occupation, however, India is denied the right of direct access to Afghanistan and Central Asia. Pakistan allows access to China but deprives the real inheritor this right of passage. Therefore we are struggling to seek a route through Iran and Afghanistan to reach Central Asian Republics instead of seeking one through this region. The area has never been given any democratic dispensation and continues to be ruled arbitrarily from Islamabad with a status of something like a colony. Until 1988 the people of Gilgit-Baltistan boldly fought for their democratic rights. Gen Zia-ul-Haq subverted their campaign by clamping martial law and dividing them on sectarian lines. Gen Zia posted Brig Musharraf (the architect of Kargil and later President of Pakistan) to suppress this regional uprising. The details of Pakistan’s deceit and treachery in respect of these areas may take volumes to recount. Some brief accounts have been enumerated below to project the appalling state of affairs in a piece of land and group of people who have nothing in common with Pakistan except that they also profess Islam of a different shade. Killing and vandalising the minorities is getting institutionalised in Pakistan. Predominantly Shia dominated Gilgit-Baltistan has been subjected to unjust treatment and unfair killings by Sunni musclemen of the region who have been brought in from Punjab for the purpose. Some nationalist organisations have been espousing the cause of justice to local people at various levels including the United Nations but in vain. Recently Kargil district in Jammu and Kashmir observed a day long complete shutdown to mark their protest against massacre of Shias in Baltistan.

July 2012 Defence AND security alert

Sectarian clashes between Shias and Sunnis have taken many precious lives and created bitterness among two communities. Sectarian organisations have come up with the avowed objective of striking at each other. This is an unfortunate situation for a country which was carved out of India on the assumption that it would be a homeland for all Muslims. People have been attacked and butchered in mosques, schools, hospitals, in buses and other public places. Administration is paralysed in various towns and cities which emboldens brutalities and benefits terrorists and further creates unrest in the region. Sectarian killings in Gilgit-Baltistan have evoked reactions in Kargil and many places of Pakistan blaming the government for silently watching the decimation of Shia community. It is only during the Assembly and Parliament sessions that PoK, Northern Areas and Aksai Chin become imaginary part of India for a short duration. This disparaging memory passes over from Indian minds when nasty political and criminal issues take over the proceedings of the House. Issue of illegal occupation of one-third part of Jammu and Kashmir was seriously debated in the Legislative Assembly on 21st March 2012. Ironically no resolution emerged from the House debate. Gilgit-Baltistan is seething with discontent. ISI managed Jihadi camps have been established in Gilgit-Baltistan. Senior retired army officers have been employed to train Jammu and Kashmir militant groups like the redundant JKLF, HM and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and to infiltrate them back into the valley. Latest intelligence reports suggest that youths from Afghanistan, Pakistan and Kashmir are trained together in camps run by ISI in Ghowadi, Skardu, Darel, Astor and Gilgit. After the Kargil war, military build-up has been augmented in Northern Areas with construction of roads and helipads within three kms of LOC. A High Altitude Training School has been opened near Gilgit and SSG Commando Training Centre has been established near Skardu. It amounts to military encirclement of India from this direction. Fearing American drone attacks in Swat Valley, Al Qaeda and Taliban militants have migrated to Gilgit-Baltistan where they intimidate and endanger indigenous Shia population.

China occupied 2,500 sq miles in Aksai Chin after 1962 aggression which is Indian Territory of Ladakh region. In 1963 Pakistan gave away 2,700 sq miles of Hunza district to China. Mir of Hunza protested but his voice was ruthlessly suppressed. Pakistan has always acted as untitled owner of Gilgit-Baltistan. In 1974 rest of Hunza district was merged with Northern Areas by then Prime Minister Z A Bhutto to further suppress Mir of Hunza for his protest against ceding his territory to China. Out of 87,000 sq miles area of Jammu and Kashmir, 1/3rd is under illegal possession of China and Pakistan presently.

Gen Zia-ul-Haq subverted their campaign by clamping martial law and dividing them on sectarian lines. Gen Zia posted Brig Musharraf (the architect of Kargil and later President of Pakistan) to suppress this regional uprising Planned induction of Punjabis, Pathans and Pakhtoons has started altering the population profile of the region. Sunni militant organisations are being encouraged to set up mosques and madrasas in the Shia areas. ISI has sown the seeds of sectarian violence in Gilgit-Baltistan. The predominant Shia, Ismaili and Nurbakshi communities have come under planned attacks from the Sunnis. Besides religious strife, political tremor is also shaking Gilgit-Baltistan. Public is exasperated with the activities of Islamist Jihadis most of whom are Punjabi who carry out proxy war inside Kashmir Valley from their soil. For India to put forth its legitimate claims on whole of PoK, the time is now when the Shias of Gilgit-Baltistan are being persecuted. Military imposes curfew at the drop of the hat and indulges in human rights violations with impunity. People deserve attention of International Red Cross and UNO. There is no Dalai Lama for Gilgitis and Baltis. There may be some in the making but lying low for fear of persecution at the hands of Pak army. Even if they get the support of the kind which Pakistan gave to Khalistan movement and now to the Kashmiri separatists, it would be suicidal for them to undertake the cause of their identity and ethnic cleansing because

Pak army will eliminate them as it did in case of Nawab Bugti, the most popular Baluch leader. Gilgit-Baltistan region abounds in numerous precious metals and important radioactive materials and has huge reserves of gold. 1,480 gold mines exist in this area out of which 123 have gold content much higher than the world famous mines of South Africa. Only 70 of these mines in Gilgit-Baltistan are estimated worth US$ 500 trillion and the reserves of others are yet to be estimated. If the gold from these 70 mines were to be distributed among the 2 million people of Gilgit-Baltistan, the share of each person will be US$ 1.25 million per year for 100 years. Even before 1947, vassal states of this region used to pay tributes to the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir in gold. Pakistani and Chinese governments are exploiting these gold mines. In addition the region has the mines of Uranium-238, Ruby, Emerald, Topaz, Quartz, Iron, Marble, Sulphur, Alum and oil. Pakistan is building mega hydroelectric dams at Skardu and Bhasha which will inundate millions of acres of fertile land and displace large population to provide cheap electricity to the rest of Pakistan. The Indian mind is not poised to think in terms of understanding the potential of vast area of the kingdom of Jammu and Kashmir beyond Muzaffrabad. The geography of the erstwhile vast princely state, which merged with India, has almost disappeared from Indian memory. Violation of international conventions, violation of human rights, ceding of Indian territories to China and construction of Karakoram Highway in Indian territories whether contested bilaterally / globally or not is not in the public knowledge. India did very little diplomatically through UN and friendly countries to prevent Pakistan from ceding territories of India to China in 1963 followed by construction of Karakoram Highway by China and persecution of aborigines. Politicians and the government have not made the average Indian aware of the fact that Pakistan has ceded large area of Jammu and Kashmir to China and almost leased entire PoK to construct Karakoram Highway and Karakoram Railway line. What follows from this silence? Will India remain silent if Pakistan cedes Gilgit-Baltistan to China?

July 2012 Defence AND security alert

Gilgit-Baltistan

HIDDEN AGENDA o other place has created as much anxiety in Indian corridors of power as the Gwadar Port. India maintains N that the port is a further step to strengthen the so-called

Rahul Mishra The writer is a researcher at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi, India.

Sino-Pakistan alliance. It has also been argued that motives behind the construction of the Gwadar Port were not simply economic but they have concealed expansionist, political and militaristic reasons behind the construction of such strategically important port. Strategic community in India reckons this to be a potential threat for Asia’s security. India’s recent decision to withdraw from Vietnam had pure economic reasons, it would still be called a strategically misplaced decision. India could very well use its presence on Vietnam’s coast as a counter to Chinese presence in Pakistan occupied Kashmir.

N Sana Hashmi The writer is associated with Centre for Air Power Studies and her area of interest is China and its neighbourhood.

However, it is interesting to note that Chinese submarines and ships are indeed present in the land of Pakistan. This all makes it lucid that China is expanding its paws in almost all the Asian nations basically to encircle India. India, which is already concerned about China’s assertiveness, has substantive reasons to feel threatened by Sino-Pakistan alliance and China’s increased presence in Pakistan, specifically its military build-up in Pakistan. What is worrisome for India is that China supplies missiles and nuclear weaponry to Pakistan. This, compels India to expand its defence budget every year

Gwadar Port is one of the major milestones in achieving short and long-term goals of Pakistan for accelerating economic growth and strategic profile

o other place has created as much anxiety in Indian corridors of power as the Gwadar Port, the second major seaport of Pakistan. Situated at Gwadar a port city of Balochistan in south-west Pakistan, it is one of the three major seaports in Pakistan; other two being Karachi and Muhammad bin Qasim. Gwadar is located at the pinnacle of Arabian Sea, Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz. It is located right next to the Strait of Hormuz, which is strategically important in the sense that about 20 per cent of the world’s oil is transited through this strait. According to the study done by US Energy Information Administration, the Strait of Hormuz is, by far, world’s most important choke point with an oil flow of almost 17 million barrels per day in 2011. It is beyond doubt, therefore, that Gwadar’s strategic location caters Pakistan with an opportunity to scrutinise the vital Gulf trade route. Evidently, Gwadar has achieved a remarkable growth rate and emerged into a major trading hub over a decade. It was a rural area few years ago but developed into an urban strip only recently. It is one of the four planned cities in Pakistan viz. Islamabad, Faisalabad, Jauharabad, and Gwadar, thereby making it one of the strategically crucial areas for Pakistan. It is 500 km away from Karachi, 200 km from Strait of Hormuz, 450 km from India and just 120 km from its south-western neighbour Iran. The port is said to be approximately 46 feet deep. Owing to the importance attached to the port, Pakistan has mapped it as a Special Economic Zone (SEZ). In 2007, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan Shaukat Aziz enunciated, “Gwadar could change the map of shipping in the world and serve as a regional energy hub for shipping and refining oil from the Persian Gulf.” Construction

work

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for

building

Gwadar Port:

India’s Achilles Heel

Gwadar Port commenced in 2002 and the first phase of its construction was completed in 2005. All the phases were completed by 2007 and the port was inaugurated by the then President of Pakistan General Pervez Musharraf. However, it became functional only in December 2009. Pakistan anticipates enhancing the road and rail connectivity with China and Iran, thereby, making it more convenient for enhancing oil and gas exploration activities and to boost overseas trade via this port. Gwadar Port is one of the major milestones in achieving short and long-term goals of Pakistan for accelerating economic growth and strategic profile. Pakistan not only aims to improve the overall infrastructure of the city but also enhancing its connectivity with immediate neighbourhood and strategically important regions for Pakistan. For instance, several reports suggest that government of Pakistan has imparted that it will undertake various developmental programmes in order to enhance the security of the city and boost the growth of the country. It has also affirmed to construct a new shipbuilding centre at Gwadar in cooperation with unrevealed country. However, it is anybody’s guess that the country would be none other than Pakistan’s all weather partner - China.

The very existence of Gwadar Port also seems to threaten India’s central and strategic position in the IOR given that Gwadar Port further enables China to cut down its dependence on Strait of Malacca and on other nations for its import of oil and natural gas It has been estimated that so far US$ 248 million has already been spent on the port’s construction. It is said that additional investment will be done for the further

development of the port, making it fully functional and linking it to Sindh and Punjab, two states of Pakistan through the Rato-Dero-Gwadar link road. Initially, several countries expressed enthusiasm in developing the port. Interestingly, due to its advantageous geographical location and proximity to Iran, latter acceded to fund the development of the port. It is promulgated that Sultanate of Oman also signed a contract for the development programme of the port during the tenure of Benazir Bhutto as Prime Minister, in 1994. However, successive government of Nawaz Sharif abandoned it. There have been accounts showing interests by private companies as well, specifically the US based companies. However, post-Chagai economic sanctions of 1998 on Pakistan by the US strained their relations and this placed the US out of the scene.

China, since the inception of the port, has been using it for transiting oil for China from Iran and for importing other natural resources. This port, in due course, would endow with facilities for sea-borne trade, essentially for the transshipment of oil and natural gas from Central Asia to China, which has already started facing the dearth of natural resources It was at that time that Pakistan sought China’s support and aid for the development of the port. It is also apprehended that first phase of construction of the port was completed with China’s assistance at a cost of US$ 248 million of which US$ 198 million was invested by China. What is more interesting is that not only Chinese capital is involved but its human resource and military personnel are also positioned in the region.

The operational responsibilities of the port were granted to Singapore in early 2007; however, so far no tangible success has been achieved by the Port of Singapore, an auxiliary of the government of Singapore, to make it fully functional, which led to a controversy and raised concerns in China and Pakistan.

China’s role Beijing and Islamabad established diplomatic relations in 1951 and since then their relations have been on a rise. At the moment, their cooperation ranges from economic to political dimensions. Till now, they have conducted numerous joint military and naval exercises. It is no more an obscured tip-off that China, the long-time ally of Pakistan, was majorly responsible for the construction of the port and assumed to have borne 80 per cent of the total development cost of

July 2012 Defence AND security alert

Gilgit-Baltistan

HIDDEN AGENDA

the port. Nightwatch, a newsletter that tracks and assesses threats to US national security, claimed that since 1993 Pakistan’s governments have worked to develop Gwadar as a planned, modern, deep water port and city, as well as a “sensitive defence zone.” China and Pakistan have been the primary investors in the port, adjacent road and rail infrastructure and planned city of Gwadar. It is apparent that China, since the inception of the port, has been using it for transiting oil for China from Iran and for importing other natural resources. This port, in due course, would endow with facilities for sea-borne trade, essentially for the transshipment of oil and natural gas from Central Asia to China, which has already started facing the dearth of natural resources. Arguably, since early 1990s, China has heavily depended on the Persian Gulf for its energy requirements, which makes it one of the major importers of oil and natural gas. Another major advantage of the construction of the port is that the port enhances the already boosting trade and military ties between China and Pakistan.

No other place has created as much anxiety in Indian corridors of power as the Gwadar Port, the second major seaport of Pakistan. Situated at Gwadar - one of the provinces of Balochistan in south-west Pakistan, it is one of the three major seaports in Pakistan; other two being Karachi and Muhammad bin Qasim From the very beginning, the port has been a subject of debate among strategic community of many countries, particularly India. Pakistan has, time and again, claimed that the port has been built to accelerate the economic growth and development of the country. However, its counterparts in India have a different story to recount. Policy makers in India hold the outlook that the port is a further step to strengthen the so-called Sino-Pakistan alliance. It has also been argued that motives behind the construction of the Gwadar Port were not simply economic but they have concealed expansionist, political and militaristic reasons behind the construction of such strategically

important port. Strategic community in India reckons this to be a potential threat for Asia’s security, notably for India, given that India already has strained relations with Pakistan since the establishment of Republic of Pakistan as a separate state in 1947 and precarious relations with China since it imposed a war on India in 1962. Since then India is concerned of China’s assertive policies and postures. India’s strategic community is also of the opinion that the port was constructed to keep a check on the sea-lanes passing through the Persian Gulf.

Policy makers in India hold the outlook that the port is a further step to strengthen the so-called Sino-Pakistan alliance. It has also been argued that motives behind the construction of the Gwadar Port were not simply economic but they have concealed expansionist, political and militaristic reasons behind the construction of such strategically important port. Strategic community in India reckons this to be a potential threat for Asia’s security

Implications for India China’s robust foothold in Asia can be gauged from its deep engagement with Pakistan, which, in the past, has led to severely strained India-China ties and has the potential to damage it further in future. China’s naval and military presence in Pakistan is the clear proof that it is more than an attempt to curtail India’s rising influence in Asia. China’s involvement in the construction of this port is an upright exemplar of this. This port indeed helps China in containing India’s increased influence in Asia given that China is very well aware of the fact that India is the only probable country in the region that could perhaps counter China’s potential hegemony in Asia. Sino-Pakistan alliance is deemed as one of the most potential threats for India in the contemporary times. Increased military alliance and economic cooperation between China and Pakistan makes India all the more insecure and leads India to deal with two troubling neighbours at its northern frontier. Pakistan has

July 2012 Defence AND security alert

even ceded 5,180 sq km of Pakistan occupied Kashmir to China which was under its control when ceasefire was declared at the time of independence in 1947. China potentially uses the ceded area to reach to Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf. In the mid 2011, Pakistan Defence Minister Chaudhry Ahmad Mukhtar told The Times in an interview that it would like China to set up a naval base in the port but China did not pay any heed to the statement and Chinese foreign ministry sPoKesperson asserted that China is not aware of any such proposal by Pakistan. Many strategic analysts saw this refusal as the deceiving ploy to make the world believe in China’s so-called peaceful development. Gideon Rachman, an eminent journalist and the chief of the Financial Times, London, stated in one of his columns that “the Chinese may be wincing at the appearance of the story about building a military base on the Pakistani coast in the Western press because it will heighten the perception that China is overplaying its hand in the Pacific.” Furthermore, Nightwatch studies suggest, “Pakistan is building or will build a naval base at the port, probably with Chinese assistance and it will host the Chinese navy as well. Chinese naval ships will call at Gwadar when the base is complete, as they do at Karachi. However, the base will be a Pakistani naval base.” However, it is interesting to note that Chinese submarines and ships are indeed present in the land of Pakistan. This all makes it lucid that China is expanding its paws in almost all the Asian nations basically to encircle India. India, which is already concerned about China’s assertiveness, has substantive reasons to feel threatened by Sino-Pakistan alliance and China’s increased presence in Pakistan, specifically its military build-up in Pakistan. What is worrisome for India is that China supplies missiles and nuclear weaponry to Pakistan. This, compels India to expand its defence budget every year. India’s defence minister, A K Antony has, on several occasions, expressed the concern about increased threat from Chinese lands and suggested to enhance the capabilities of Indian troops on the northern border. China has comprehended India as the only bone of contention for China in the

IOR (Indian Ocean Region). The very existence of Gwadar Port also seems to threaten India’s central and strategic position in the IOR given that Gwadar Port further enables China to cut down its dependence on Strait of Malacca and on other nations for its import of oil and natural gas. China is conscious of the importance of the Indian Ocean; hence, trying to establish its bases in the IOR to safeguard its energy sea-lanes from the Persian Gulf. The Gwadar venture of China and Pakistan is an indication that Sino-Pakistan alliance has escalated to the higher level. China’s boosting ties with Pakistan and other Asian countries are envisaged by West as a manoeuvre to establish its position in the IOR, which strategic community in the West terms as the ‘Strings of Pearls’. This term implies that China is building close partnerships with countries like Pakistan, Myanmar, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka by providing aid, arms and constructing ports at their lands particularly to encircle India, threaten its central and strategic location in the IOR and establish its foothold in the region.

India’s recent decision to withdraw from Vietnam had pure economic reasons, it would still be called a strategically misplaced decision. India could very well use its presence on Vietnam’s coast as a counter to Chinese presence in Pakistan occupied Kashmir Furthermore, China has emerged as a major exporter of arms to Pakistan. People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has their bases in many Asian countries. China, since its emergence as a nation, is on a steady mission of promoting cordial diplomatic relations with these developing countries in order to reach out to Bay of Bengal and subsequently to the IOR. Hence, Gwadar Port is one of the major attempts to reach to the IOR by China with the assistance of Pakistan. Although China and Pakistan have been denying any militaristic motives behind the construction of the port and publicise it as a joint venture for boosting the economy

of both the countries, particularly that of Pakistan. However, Indian government and policy makers are quite convinced that this port will prove to be perilous for the security of India. However, in the contemporary times, the situation is quite different from the past since China attempts to keep itself out of India-Pakistan tension. Nevertheless, Sino-Pakistan alliance is still an area of grave concern for India given that both China and Pakistan consider India to be their biggest competitor in the region and for that matter on the international forum. India should remain vigilant of their actions and keep a track on their activities.

Since Japan is heavily dependent on the Gulf oil for its energy requirement needs, India should establish deep, robust and sustained ties with Japan to put more pressure on China. Additionally, India needs to regularly conduct joint naval and military exercises with other Asian countries to enhance its naval and military capabilities, in a planned manner. One would also argue that India, in an attempt to put pressure on China, can bring the issue of oil and gas exploration activities in South China Sea on various international platforms such as East Asia Summit as a policy to counter China’s growing political influence in the region.

It is one of the four planned cities in Pakistan viz. Islamabad, Faisalabad, Jauharabad and Gwadar, thereby making it one of the strategically crucial areas for Pakistan. It is 500 km away from Karachi, 200 km from Strait of Hormuz, 450 km from India and just 120 km from its south-western neighbour Iran. The port is said to be approximately 46 feet deep. Owing to the importance attached to the port, Pakistan has mapped it as a Special Economic Zone (SEZ)

While India’s attempt at enhancing ties with south-east nations through its Look East policy have been commendable, one must note that China virtually dominates Southeast Asia with the biggest Free Trade Agreement in terms of population. However, Southeast Asian nations are still apprehensive of China predominantly because of its greater assertiveness in South China Sea. This apprehension provides India with an opportunity to strengthen its regional dynamism in the region, thereby, countering China’s expanding influence.

What it means for India

Over and above the aforementioned points, one may argue that though India’s recent decision to withdraw from Vietnam had pure economic reasons, it would still be called a strategically misplaced decision. India could very well use its presence on Vietnam’s coast as a counter to Chinese presence in Pakistan occupied Kashmir. This is important in the light of the fact that for China, South China Sea is a matter of supreme national interest. Even if India had to withdraw from Vietnam’s oil blocks, it could have used that as a pressure point in forcing China to withdraw from its PoK ventures. Arguably, India must also raise the Chinese presence in Gilgit-Baltistan at all forums assertively as the region is sensitively placed for India’s concerns.

Considering the gravity of the situation, it can be said that on one hand, India needs to maintain cordial relations with China and Pakistan while on the other; it needs to beef up an effective defence system to counter future threat emanating from Sino-Pakistan alliance. Furthermore, the ongoing process of improved trade ties between India and China should continue to create opportunities for conceiving and realising of more confidence-building measures. Additionally, India needs to ameliorate strained relations with Pakistan, possibly by enhancing trade opportunities and employing confidence-building measures. Addressing issues, which lead to more precarious India-Pakistan relations, is the need of the hour. Moreover, high level diplomatic visits will certainly help India and Pakistan who are entrapped in a berserk relationship since 1947.

July 2012 Defence AND security alert

army chief

VISION FOR SUPREMACY

Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM (retd) The writer is a combat veteran of many skirmishes on the Line of Control and counter-terrorist operations in Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab. He subsequently commanded the reputed Romeo Force during intensive counter-terrorist operations in the Rajouri-Poonch districts. He has served two tenures at the highly prestigious Directorate General of Military Operations. He is a prolific writer on matters military and non-military and has published 24 books and over 100 papers in many prestigious research journals. He is also Executive Editor of Defence and Security Alert (DSA) magazine.

The Indian Economy has gained tremendous traction and today is in a position to fund India’s Third Arms acquisition cycle which should see us through the next 25-30 years. India will, at the end of it, spend some US$ 120-150 billion to recapitalise its armed forces capital military stock of the Soviet era. Unlike China, India has the advantage of being able to buy current military technology from the USA, Russia, Europe and Israel. What the Gen V K Singh-MoD spat has painfully exposed however is the dangerously slow pace of this retooling process which is caught up in a scam induced bureaucratic inertia and red tape grid-lock

he Change of Guard has taken place at the Army HQ. The task of the new Army Chief is well cut out for him. He will need to calm down frayed nerves and tempers in the higher military echelons and try his bit to restore synergy between the civil military interface. The bureaucracy will have to shed its adversarial outlook and stop arrogating to itself the job of civilian control. In a democracy these controls are vested in the political authority and cannot be entirely usurped by the bureaucrats. Genuine integration of the Service HQs with the MoD will go a long way to redress this systemic problem. The New Chief must make the speeding up of the Arms acquisition process his key result area and primary focus. Moral Health of the upper echelons is also a concern that will also need the urgent attention of the new Chief.

he feisty Gen V K Singh handed over charge to Gen Bikram Singh on 31 May this year. It was a tenure unfortunately marked by bitter acrimony between the civil and military establishments of the country. In fact, the last time civil-military relations had touched such a nadir was with the Krishna Menon-Gen Thimayya spat in 1960. At the core of both episodes was a lack of Military modernisation and acrimony over the lines of succession. Gen Thimayya resigned and was then persuaded to withdraw his resignation. He was subsequently humiliated and went home a sadly embittered man. Two years later, the country faced the ignominy of a resounding tactical defeat at the hands of the Chinese. This painful episode served to cure the Indian establishment of its soft power fixation and impelled it to rapidly expand and modernise its armed forces. For over a decade before the 1962 debacle, India’s defence expenditure had been reduced to just around one per cent of the GDP in a lopsided bid to give primacy to economic development. The traumatic debacle, led the Indian establishment to subsequently spend almost over 4 per cent of its GDP on defence to make up for over a decade of neglect. The Nehruvian state had tried to fashion a contrived national narrative of exceptionalism. It felt, it was altogether an exceptional state, as its basis of formation was the soft power or Ahimsa, non-violence and Satyagraha. Ergo sum it did not need the irritant of hard power capabilities. Personalised diplomacy, charisma and a passion for global peace would be adequate to safeguard the state. 1962 rudely cured the Indian state of its soft power hubris and led to the onset of Realism in its security outlook. Our

July 2012 Defence AND security alert

politico-military leadership learnt rapidly on the job in 1965 and by 1971 had won a brilliant military victory. Four decades later soft power has returned centre stage in New Delhi with the return of the UPA establishment. The new soft power narrative replaces peace rhetoric with economic power as the sole criterion perhaps of state power. Everything is now viewed in economic-developmental terms. The second plank of this new soft power orientation of the UPA is premised on a presumption that with the nuclearisation of South Asia-war is just not a possibility-even limited wars, seem to have been ruled out. The UPA has therefore gone slow in translating economic power into military power. The UPA administration seems to act as if it has no option but to pursue peace at any cost, not only with Pakistan but also with China. We hear talk of a new phase of Non-alignment between the USA and China, a country that had attacked us in 1962. Are we then accepting a new Bi-Polar order in which we are bit players who must offend none? What about the notions of a Multi-Polar world order where we would be one of the many poles? The spectre of Bofors has radically slowed down the Arms acquisition process. With the current upsurge of the economy, the state has turned to unsustainable welfarism on a massive scale to win elections for the political elite. In the bargain, the economy has started back-sliding from a 9 per cent growth rate of the GDP to around 5-6 per cent per annum as the new Hindu rate of growth. In this milieu of indecision it is taking over 25 years to induct any new weapon systems. This is opening serious windows of vulnerability in our military readiness profile. Most major Arms manufacturers of the world have been

CHANGE OF GUARD: THE INDIAN ARMY

blacklisted. The Indian army has not been able to induct a medium gun after Bofors. The entire AD guns and missile systems are 40 years old and almost the entire Army Aviation fleet is badly obsolete.

It is preposterous how we have managed to blacklist almost all the major weapons manufactures. Probity and transparency in such deals is a must but surely we need to safeguard our national interests in such dealings. Our arms acquisitions procedures must now be fine-tuned to deal with such delay inducing irritants in the light of recent experience. It is about time that functionaries must be held accountable not just for corrupt practices but equally for inordinate delays in the arms acquisitions process. An acceleration of our arms acquisition procedures is now a crying need of the hour

The primary take away from the Gen V K Singh-MoD spat was not so much the issue of age / succession. At the national level it remains the painfully slow pace of the retooling of our Capital military stock. It is essential to understand the backdrop of the current dilemma. Since Independence Indian Armed Forces have passed through two cycles of weaponisation and are now into the third cycle.

The first cycle The first cycle after independence was largely planned with British advice and was Pakistan driven. India’s war services loans to Britain helped pay for the purchase of subsonic British and French jet fighters, tanks and naval ships. This was a seriously under resourced and underfunded build-up. For a decade before 1962-India’s spending on Defence hovered around 1 per cent

of the GDP and we courted military disaster in the bargain. The US and European countries initially stepped in to offer small arms to equip Light / Mountain divisions. Their loyalty to Pakistan however inhibited them from offering any major weapon systems. In fact inordinate pressure was put on India to gift Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan to placate that state and buy peace as a price for support against China.

The second arms build-up Exasperated by the Western refusal to meet India’s weaponisation needs, the country had no option but to turn to the former Soviet Union. From the mid 1960s to mid 1980s the USSR massively subsidised the Indian Military Build-up. Not only was this designed to over match Pakistan but also made India a counterweight to China. India received MiG-21s, 23s, 25s, MiG-27s along with Su-7 as also T-54 / T-55 Tanks and Soviet 122 mm

July 2012 Defence AND security alert

army chief

VISION FOR SUPREMACY

and 130 mm Artillery. The Indian navy acquired virtual Blue water status with a heavy infusion of Soviet Destroyers, Missile boats and Submarines - all virtually for the cost of bananas.

In this milieu of indecision it is taking over 25 years to induct any new weapon systems. This is opening serious windows of vulnerability in our military readiness profile. Most major Arms manufacturers of the world have been blacklisted. The Indian army has not been able to induct a medium gun after Bofors. The entire AD guns and missile systems are 40 years old and almost the entire Army Aviation fleet is badly obsolete. The primary take away from the Gen V K Singh-MoD spat was not so much the issue of age / succession. At the national level it remains the painfully slow pace of the retooling of our Capital military stock Most of this Soviet era equipment of the 1970s vintage had become due for replacement by 1990. It was then that the Soviet Union collapsed creating a serious spare parts crisis for an Indian Military, 70 per cent of whose capital stock was of Soviet origin. A year later the Indian economy itself came perilously close to collapse and India’s capital military stock modernisation had to be postponed by over two decades. This enabled Pakistan to attain virtual conventional parity with massive US Aid during the Afghan War and equally massive Chinese military equipment doles.

The third arms acquisition cycle India is currently in the process of a third arms acquisition cycle. Despite all talk of indigenisation, the quick-fix of licensed production has caused our design and development capabilities to atrophy. The only service to really indigenise has been the Indian navy which owned up the R&D process rather than outsourcing it entirely to the DRDO and then acting as a trenchant critic of its sub-optimal projects. Thankfully, the Indian Economy has gained tremendous traction and today is in a position to fund India’s Third Arms acquisition cycle which should see us through the next 25-30 years. India will, at the end of it, spend some US$ 120-150 billion to recapitalise its armed forces capital military stock of

the Soviet era. Unlike China, India has the advantage of being able to buy current military technology from the USA, Russia, Europe and Israel. What the Gen V K Singh-MoD spat has painfully exposed however is the dangerously slow pace of this retooling process which is caught up in a scam induced bureaucratic inertia and red tape gridlock. Not only are major weapon system replacements not coming in time, Gen V K Singh’s leaked letter also highlighted the dangerous shortfalls in ammunition holdings in critical areas like tank ammunition and even other categories of ordnance.

authority and cannot be entirely usurped by the bureaucrats. Genuine integration of the service HQ with the MoD will go a long way to redress this systemic problem. The New Chief must make the speeding up of the Arms acquisition process his key result area and primary focus.

Ammunition management

In specific, he will have to redress the following issues:

Ammunition management has been a historically neglected aspect in our armed forces in general and the Indian army in particular. In the 1965 war, the then Prime Minister asked his Army Chief as to what significant gains he hoped to make if the war was continued for another ten days. Gen Chaudhary shocked his Prime Minister by informing him that he had just two days of tank ammunition left. After the 1965 war, it was revealed that the Pakistan army was in an even more perilous situation as to ammunition and had we persisted, Pakistan resistance could have collapsed suddenly. It was also revealed that more tank ammunition stocks were available but they were in ammunition depots deep in the hinterland and nowhere close to the border. Gen V K Singh’s letter highlights the continuing serious vulnerability with regards to ammunition. Strapped of cash in the 1990s, the country purchased weapon systems without adequate or well spaced out ammunition backups. This drift needs to be arrested urgently in the interests of national security.

Task of the new chief The task of the new Army Chief is well cut out for him. He will need to calm down frayed nerves and tempers in the higher military echelons and try his bit to restore synergy between the civil military interface. The bureaucracy will have to shed its adversarial outlook and stop arrogating to itself the job of civilian control. In a democracy these controls are vested in the political

July 2012 Defence AND security alert

The last time civil-military relations had touched such a nadir was with the Krishna Menon-Gen Thimayya spat in 1960. At the core of both episodes was a lack of Military modernisation and acrimony over the lines of succession

Night blindness of the tank fleet: Almost 70 per cent of the tank fleet was night blind. It has been stated that this has been redressed to a degree but not removed entirely. This is a critical battle winning factor. It may be recalled that in the First Gulf War, the Iraqi T-72 tanks had held their own in day engagements with the US Abram tanks. It was at night that they courted disaster. US tanks had picked them up at 1,500 m with image intensifier sights at night whereas the T-72 tanks could not see beyond 300 m with their IR sights. Even this range was seriously degraded by the dust. Almost all battles of South Asia will rage at night. Hence night fighting capability for all Tanks, (as also the infantry and Special Forces) are indeed a key result area. The fiction that one / two NVDs per section / squad will suffice needs to be urgently dispensed with. Each infantry soldier must have his own NVD. Medium guns: The ghost of Bofors has prevented the Indian army from getting a new medium gun. A plethora of South African, Swedish, Singapore and other firms got blacklisted. It is now learnt that the designs of the Bofors guns were available all along with our ordnance factories as part of TOT. The Bofors gun has proved itself in battle and to speed up the process it should rapidly be manufactured within the country. The Indian design teams that made the 75/24 and 105 mm field guns have all been wasted out. We need the army to develop in-house design teams

in concert with the DRDO for the next generation of artillery systems. Defence artillery (AD): The entire army defence inventory is obsolete. The L-70 guns need to be replaced urgently. The entire Soviet era stable of surface to air missiles must be phased out. The working frequencies of these had been compromised in the Israel-Arab conflicts of 1973 and in Lebanon. Retrofitting may have enhanced life cycles but these now need urgent phasing out. Army aviation: The 1960 and 1970 fleet of Cheetah and Chetaks needs to be phased out urgently before (like the MiG-21s) they start falling out of the skies. The scuttling of the Eurocopter deal has needlessly delayed the entire revamping. Luckily, indigenisation has been a relative success story with the Dhruva helicopter and now the Light Combat Helicopter. The indigenous production needs to be speeded up and economies of scale ensured with export to third world countries. UAVs: Advanced armies and air forces are almost aiming at a 50:50 ratio between manned and unmanned systems. We need to induct the Predator class armed UAVs, increase the number of Heron and Searcher Mark IIs and induct smaller UAVs for the brigade / battalion; and micro aerial vehicles at the company level for radically enhancing situational awareness. Small arms: The INSAS rifle now needs be phased out and we urgently need a new carbine. We should replace all 9 mm pistols (which are largely decorative) with machine pistols. Ammunition management: It is inconceivable how the purchase of major weapon systems like Tanks were done in the past without acquiring ammunition production facilities. One time bulk purchases of ammunition at the time of induction leads to bulk obsolescence a few years down the line. The live ammunition cannot all be transformed into training ammunition. This leads to large scale wastage and sudden and alarming levels of deficiency. We need to go slow with our penchant for blacklisting firms at our own cost.

TOT for manufacture of ammunition is a must for every weapon purchase. It is preposterous how we have managed to blacklist almost all the major weapons manufactures. Probity and transparency in such deals is a must but surely we need to safeguard our national interests in such dealings. Our arms acquisitions procedures must now be fine-tuned to deal with such delay inducing irritants in the light of recent experience. It is about time that functionaries must be held accountable not just for corrupt practices but equally for inordinate delays in the arms acquisitions process.

The task of the new Army Chief is well cut out for him. He will need to calm down frayed nerves and tempers in the higher military echelons and try his bit to restore synergy between the civil military interface. The bureaucracy will have to shed its adversarial outlook and stop arrogating to itself the job of civilian control. In a democracy these controls are vested in the political authority and cannot be entirely usurped by the bureaucrats. Genuine integration of the service HQ with the MoD will go a long way to redress this systemic problem. The New Chief must make the speeding up of the Arms acquisition process his key result area and primary focus An acceleration of our arms acquisition procedures is now a crying need of the hour. It must be the top priority of the new army chief and the KRA that he must personally monitor as the key index of the army’s health and readiness for battle. Moral health: This brings us to the vexed issue of the moral health of the Army that his predecessor had raised. Relatively speaking, the army is still one of the cleanest and most respected institutions in the country. It prides itself on its distance from the rot that is endemic in its parent society. However the Firewalls that it

had raised to insulate itself from the decay in the civil establishment have lately begun to fray. Most hallowed institutions begin to decay in the absence of a real challenge from the environment. The army has not really been engaged in any major conflict for almost a decade plus and the peace time army syndrome is perhaps beginning to take a toll. It would be incumbent on the new Chief to ruthlessly set an example whereever such cases of moral turpitude surface. The army’s justice system is quick and remorseless and hence can be relied upon to correct any aberrations. The top leadership as a collectivtiy must set the tone and example.

The new chief Gen Bikram Singh represents a transition to the post 1971 generation of officers. Luckily he has extensive experience of low intensity combat operation in Jammu and Kashmir and the north-east and to that extent has ample combat experience-a must for such leadership assignments. He has had invaluable tenures in the Directorate General of Military Operations and other key directorates of the Army HQ. He is intelligent, well read, experienced and articulate and should match the needs of the hour. He has his task cut out for him and will need all the support he can get from all quarters to transit the army beyond the recent phase of acrimony and controversy. Team DSA offers him it’s very best wishes and looks forward to him taking this wonderful organisation to new heights of glory and achievement.

July 2012 Defence AND security alert

army chief

AGENDA AND PRIORITIES

Indian Army:

Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (retd) The writer is a Delhi-based defence analyst.

The mechanised forces in the plains are still partly night blind, the capability to launch offensive operations in the mountains continues to remain inadequate to deter conflict. The capability to launch precision strikes from ground and air-delivered firepower, which will pave the way for the infantry to win future battles, is much short of the volumes that will be required. The MoD must immediately ask for additional funds to kick-start the army’s stalled modernisation process

In real terms, the increase in the budget for 2012-13 from Rs 1,64,415 in 2011-12 to Rs 1,93,007 crore (US$ 38.6 billion) is barely adequate to allow for inflation, which is ruling at about 7.5 to 8.0 per cent and the consequent increase in pay and allowances

eneral Bikram Singh has taken over the reins of the Indian army at a time when it is passing through a rough patch in its history. The higher leadership of the army has been facing criticism for putting ‘self’ before ‘service’. A dispassionate SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats) analysis reveals that up to the level of combat units the army continues to remain a force to reckon with. However, a number of officers comprising the army’s leadership ranks from Brigadier onwards appear to have lost their moral compass. The new COAS also has to simultaneously take stock of the army’s preparedness for war and internal security challenges. The previous army chief, General V K Singh’s leaked letter to the Prime Minister and the CAG’s recent report have revealed that the state of defence preparedness is a cause for serious concern. Stocks of several critical varieties of ammunition for tanks and artillery guns have fallen to as low as less than 10 days war reserves. Also, ammunition has a shelf life of about 12 to 15 years, at the end of which it is no longer usable for combat but can still be used for training. Hence, the shortages continue to increase every year. Consequent to the leakage of the chief’s letter and the major he writer presents that a European on Minister the recentis uproar in Parliament resulted,perspective the Defence Conference onapproved Afghanistan and Defence is pessimistic about and the reported to have the 12th Plan 2012-17 outcome. Mr Obama and the other 27 NATO leaders agreed to a the LTIPP 2012-27 in early-April 2012. The new COAS has his modified of theThe plan coming outwill of the work cut version out for him. government do Lisbon well to summit appoint in 2010. The aim is for Afghan forces to take the lead security a National Security Commission to take stock of the lack of role in three-quarters of the country before the end of this year preparedness of the country’s armed forces. and the other, most congested areas by the middle of 2013. The summit, says only highlighted weakness NATOhisas eneral sheBikram Singh has withthe the highest integrity.of However, tenure taken over the reins its of failure the astoCOAS was marred by his routes own fightvia against an alliance - especially get the logistical Indian army at a time when this the government on the issue of his date of birth Pakistan, reopened. great army - often referred to as the and various other unseemly controversies that

‘last man standing’ in a country riven by corruption, land and corporate scams, political expediency and much else - is passing through a rough patch in its history. The higher leadership of the army has been facing criticism for putting ‘self’ before ‘service’, contrary to the Chetwood motto that is ingrained into an officer’s psyche from his training days at the Indian Military Academy (IMA), Dehradun: “The safety, honour and welfare of your country come first, always and every time. The honour, welfare and comfort of the men you command come next. Your own ease, comfort and safety come last, always and every time.” (From a speech delivered by Field Marshal Sir Philip W Chetwood during the inauguration of IMA in 1932.) When General V K Singh had become the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) two years ago, there were huge expectations that he would restore the moral health of the army as he came in with the reputation of an officer

July 2012 Defence AND security alert

have not done the reputation of the army any service as a first class fighting force. These controversies are too well known and too recent to bear recounting. While individually, none of them have amounted to much, collectively these have severely dented the image of the army in the eyes of the public that has constantly supported the army and even internationally. A dispassionate SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats) analysis reveals that up to the level of combat units, i.e. infantry battalions, armoured and artillery regiments and other arms and services, the army continues to remain a force to reckon with. The combat-level army is a cohesive fighting force and its operational ethos is marked by professional excellence. However, a number of officers comprising the army’s leadership ranks from Brigadier onwards appear to have lost their moral compass and have strayed in their approach to moral uprightness. These officers are increasingly

New COAS has his Work Cut Out Urgent action needed to restore moral health

and make up critical deficiencies

taking chances with ventures that are shady and downright wrong (e.g. land and housing scams), hoping that they will get away with it without being discovered. Perhaps they have fallen victim to the ills that plague civil society, which spawns them.

The armed forces are unlikely to be satisfied as their plans for modernisation have been stymied year after year by the lack of committed budgetary support. The ongoing RMA (revolution in military affairs) has passed the Indian army by. It is still a first rate fighting force, but one that is equipped mostly with obsolescent weapons and equipment Some of the senior officers have apparently forgotten the lines in the National Defence Academy (NDA), Khadakwasla, prayer that exhorts officers to ‘choose the harder right instead of the easier wrong.’ This is a serious development with grave long-term consequences for the army’s operational ethos. It needs to be immediately arrested and then corrected. The armed forces have always held their officers to higher moral standards than the civil society that they come from and it is for this reason that they have remained untainted by the many ills that have plagued the nation for several decades. It is to be hoped that General Bikram Singh will immediately initiate remedial measures to arrest and correct the present downslide in

the moral standards of the army’s higher ranks. This issue merits his highest consideration in the months ahead.

Preparedness for war Of course, the new COAS also has to simultaneously take stock of the army’s preparedness for war and internal security challenges. The previous army chief, General V K Singh’s leaked letter to the Prime Minister and the CAG’s recent report have revealed that the state of defence preparedness is a cause for serious concern. The chief’s letter has brought into the public domain what has been known for long to army officers in service and those who have retired from service. The leakage of an ultra-sensitive Top Secret letter will certainly have an adverse impact on national security as it has given undue advantage to India’s military adversaries by publicly disclosing sensitive information about the deficiencies in weapon systems, ammunition and equipment in service in the army. However, now that these facts are in the public domain, surely these will help to focus the nation’s attention on the need to speedily make up the shortages and give the army the wherewithal that it needs to fight and win future wars. General V K Singh was not the first COAS to have apprised the PM about the poor state of preparedness; his

predecessors have done so as well. General K M Cariappa had gone to Pandit Nehru to ask for additional funds for military modernisation and was reported to have been told, “India does not need an army; it needs a police force.” Well, the ignominy of 1962 followed. The late General Bipin Joshi had written to PM Narsimha Rao to urge him to help the army to make up the long standing large-scale shortage of ammunition. While the shortage was worth over Rs 10,000 crore, Army HQ had reportedly identified a “bottom line” figure without which the COAS said the army would remain unprepared for war. Perhaps the country’s precarious financial condition in the early-1990s did not allow PM Narsimha Rao to provide the necessary funds to immediately make up the shortage. A few years later the Kargil conflict took place and the whole nation heard the COAS General V P Malik make the chilling statement on national TV, “We will fight with what we have.” It is well known that India had to scramble to import 50,000 rounds of 155 mm ammunition for its Bofors guns, besides other weapons and equipment. Stocks of tank ammunition and that for other artillery and air defence guns were also low and it was just as well that the fighting remained limited to the Kargil sector and did not spill over to the rest of the LoC or the plains.

July 2012 Defence AND security alert

army chief

Approximately 2,50,000 rounds of artillery ammunition were fired in that 50-day war. The government has authorised the stocking of sufficient ammunition to fight a large-scale war for 50 to 60 days. This is known as the “war reserve”. As the army chief’s letter and the CAG report bring out, not enough new stocks were apparently procured to make up even the ammunition expended during the Kargil conflict. Stocks of several critical varieties of ammunition for tanks and artillery guns have fallen to as low as less than 10 days war reserves. Also, ammunition has a shelf life of about 12 to 15 years, at the end of which it is no longer usable for combat but can still be used for training. Hence, the shortages continue to increase every year if action is not taken to constantly make up the deficiency. The other major issue highlighted in the letter written by the COAS pertains to the continuation in service of obsolescent weapons and equipment and the stagnation in the process of military modernisation aimed at upgrading the army’s war-fighting capabilities to prepare it to fight and win on the battlefields of the 21st century. While the COAS has pointed out several operational deficiencies, the most critical ones include the complete lack of artillery modernisation since the Bofors 155 mm howitzer was purchased in the mid-1980s, “night blindness” of the army’s infantry battalions and mechanised forces and the fact that the air defence guns and missile systems are 97 per cent obsolescent. The inadequacy of the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems, with an adverse impact on command and control during war, adds to the army’s difficulties.

Lack of defence planning This sorry state of affairs has come about because of the flawed defence planning and defence acquisition processes in existence, a grossly inadequate defence budget and the inability to fully spend even the meagre funds that are allotted. Funds are surrendered quite often due to bureaucratic red tape - civilian as well as military, scams in defence procurement and the frequent blacklisting of defence firms accused of adopting unfair means to win contracts.

global security

AGENDA AND PRIORITIES Long-term defence planning is the charter of the apex body of the National Security Council which meets very rarely due to the preoccupation of the PM and other members of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) with day to day crisis management. As such, the 15-years Long-term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP) and five-year Defence Plan do not receive the attention that these merit. The 11th Defence Plan, which terminated on March 31, 2012, was not formally approved by the government and, hence, did not receive committed budgetary support that would have enabled the three Services to plan their acquisitions of weapons and equipment systematically, rather than being left to the vagaries of annual defence budgets. Consequent to the leakage of the chief’s letter and the major uproar in Parliament that resulted, the Defence Minister is reported to have approved the 12th Defence Plan 2012-17 and the LTIPP 2012-27 in early-April 2012. While this is undoubtedly commendable, it remains to be seen whether the Finance Ministry and, subsequently, the CCS will also show the same alacrity in according the financial approvals necessary to give practical effect to these plans. The defence budget has dipped below 2.0 per cent of the country’s GDP despite the fact that the Service Chiefs and Parliament’s Standing Committee on Defence have repeatedly recommended that it should be raised to at least 3.0 per cent of the GDP if India is to build the defence capabilities that it will need to face the emerging threats and challenges and discharge its growing responsibilities as a regional power in Southern Asia. In real terms, the increase in the budget for 2012-13 from Rs 1,64,415 in 2011-12 to Rs 1,93,007 crore (US$ 38.6 billion) is barely adequate to allow for inflation, which is ruling at about 7.5 to 8.0 per cent and the consequent increase in pay and allowances. The Rupee’s recent slide against the US dollar to below Rs 55 to a dollar has further eroded its purchasing power. Annual inflation

July 2012 Defence AND security alert

in the international prices of weapons, ammunition and defence equipment is generally between 12 to 15 per cent. Each year’s delay in the procurement of operationally critical items substantially increases the burden on the exchequer. Giving his reaction to the Finance Minister’s budget speech, Defence Minister A K Antony said, “By and large we are very happy about the budget because apart from the allocation, the finance minister has said that if the defence needs more money, there won’t be any problem.” However, the armed forces are unlikely to be satisfied as their plans for modernisation have been stymied year after year by the lack of committed budgetary support. The ongoing RMA (revolution in military affairs) has passed the Indian army by. It is still a first rate fighting force, but one that is equipped mostly with obsolescent weapons and equipment. The lack of progress in the replacement of the army’s obsolescent weapons and equipment and its qualitative modernisation to meet future threats and challenges is worrisome as the army continues to maintain large-scale deployments on border management and internal security duties. It needs to upgrade its rudimentary C4I2SR system and graduate quickly to network centricity to optimise the use of its combat potential. While the mechanised forces in the plains are still partly night blind, the capability to launch offensive operations in the mountains continues to remain inadequate to deter conflict. The capability to launch precision strikes from ground and air-delivered firepower, which will pave the way for the infantry to win future battles, is much short of the volumes that will be required. The MoD must immediately ask for additional funds to kick-start the army’s stalled modernisation process. While the new COAS has his work cut out for him, the government will do well to appoint a National Security Commission to take stock of the lack of preparedness of the country’s armed forces and to make pragmatic recommendations to redress the visible inadequacies that might lead to yet another military debacle.

EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE

NATO SUMMIT- 2012

Road Ahead

Dominika Cosic The writer is a journalist and political correspondent based in Brussels. She specialises in NATO and European Union affairs. She is correspondent (Europe) of Defence and Security Alert (DSA) magazine.

he writer presents a European perspective on the recent Conference on Afghanistan and is pessimistic about the outcome. Mr Obama and the other 27 NATO leaders agreed to a modified version of the plan coming out of the Lisbon summit in 2010. The aim is for Afghan forces to take the lead security role in three-quarters of the country before the end of this year and the other, most congested areas by the middle of 2013. The summit, she says only highlighted the weakness of NATO as an alliance - especially its failure to get the logistical routes via Pakistan, reopened.

Instead of working to strengthen NATO, the Obama administration has taken actions that will only undermine the alliance. Also republicanpresidential candidate Mitt Romney attacked President Obama over war spending. Last year, President Obama signed into law a budget scheme that threatens to saddle the US military with nearly US$ 1 trillion in cuts over the next 10 years. ... Gen Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has plainly said that such a reduction means "we would not any longer be a global power"

ithout any doubt the most important subject was the situation in Afghanistan. However, Afghanistan does not exist in isolation. So it was Pakistan and its president which were the second major problem. Last November, after a disastrous error led to the killing of 24 Pakistani soldiers by American air strikes, the supply route between Pakistan and Afghanistan was closed. For the alliance it was like a logistical disaster. So the summit in NATO was a good opportunity to talk with Pakistan’s president. Asif Ali Zardari was considered as one of the most important guests at the conference. Pakistani decision has been attacked not only by Americans, but also the British prime minister. At a press conference, David Cameron, described as "frustrating" the Pakistan president's refusal to re-open the route.

Mr Obama and the other 27 NATO leaders agreed to a modified version of the plan coming out of the Lisbon summit in 2010. The aim is for Afghan forces to take the lead security role in three-quarters of the country before the end of this year and the other, most congested areas by the middle of 2013. They will then have 18 months to hone their abilities and learn from their mistakes while still having support from Western (mainly American and British) combat troops. Thereafter, America and other donor countries have agreed to provide US$ 3.6 billion a year for the Afghan national security forces Both sides had their own goals and expectations. Mr Zardari wanted an apology from America for the death of his soldiers which was considered as a kind of political trophy,

July 2012 Defence AND security alert

global security

EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE

very important for a not very popular president and in some way a diplomatic justification for travelling all the way to Chicago. Mr Obama has offered his condolences but not said "sorry". It is not only not fair but couldbe as well, a political mistake - this example of political "bad manners" only reinforces the anti-American mood among the Pakistan people and can be very easily used against the United States and NATO. The second request was much more material - a “tax” of US$ 5,000 for each truck passing through Pakistan to Afghanistan (NATO is prepared to pay US$ 500, double the previous amount); and an end to drone attacks on militants in Pakistan’s lawless tribal areas (drones deserve much of the credit for the decline of “core” Al Qaeda and remain central to America’s counter-terrorism strategy).

NATO will also keep an unspecified number of military trainers in the country (around 2,000) and, under an agreement reached last month, America will keep up to 20,000 military personnel in Afghanistan, to provide the Afghan army with the battlefield “enablers” it lacks. These include close air support, logistical back-up, medical evacuation and aerial surveillance "Pakistan has to be part of the solution in Afghanistan," Obama says. "It is in our interest to have a Pakistan that is independent and stable. The US and Pakistan share common enemies in extremists in the region" - repeats the American president. But in the end the Pakistani president’s demands were deemed so unreasonable that Barack Obama refused to meet him more than fleetingly.

Future of Afghan mission Sometimes pictures are not consistent with reality. It was a case of a nice "family photo" of Mr Obama and Afghan president Hamid Karzai. They made a joint media appearance in which Obama praised Karzai's war cooperation. But the reality is bitter. NATO members have reached a formal agreement to handover security duties in Afghanistan to Afghan security forces next summer, in preparation for the pullout of American troops at the end of 2014 but what is clearly visible is that the coalition is breaking.

As expected, new French President François Holland announced that he was accelerating his country's withdrawal from the coalition force in Afghanistan. French troops will leave the country by the end of this year, he said. More and more countries share the same doubts. The summit also laid bare NATO’s need to please three different audiences. Mr Obama and his European counterparts are desperate to persuade their voters, weary of war and austerity, that the expenditure of much blood and even more treasure on what many now count as a hopeless cause, really is coming to an end. At the same time, they also want to reassure Afghans, a large majority of whom dread the return of a resurgent Taliban that the world is not going to abandon them to civil war after 2014. That is what happened when the Soviet Union threw in the towel two decades ago. Third, they need to show the Taliban (and some of Afghanistan’s unhelpful neighbours) that, even when most Western combat troops will have gone, the government in Kabul will still have the support it needs to survive. To that end, Mr Obama and the other 27 NATO leaders agreed to a modified version of the plan coming out of the Lisbon summit in 2010. The aim is for Afghan forces to take the lead security role in threequarters of the country before the end of this year and the other, most congested areas by the middle of 2013. They will then have 18 months to hone their abilities and learn from their mistakes while still having support from Western (mainly American and British) combat troops. Thereafter, America and other donor countries have agreed to provide US$ 3.6 billion a year for the Afghan national security forces (ANSF), with the Afghan government chipping in US$ 500 million, for a further ten years. Some doubt whether this will be enough. NATO will also keep an unspecified number of military trainers in the country (around 2,000) and, under an agreement reached last month, America will keep up to 20,000 military personnel in Afghanistan, to provide the Afghan army with the battlefield “enablers” it lacks. These include close air support, logistical back-up, medical evacuation and aerial surveillance.

July 2012 Defence AND security alert

Future of NATO The enlargement of NATO was a big and spectacular political success, especially that this decision, inviting to membership countries from former communist Warsaw Pact, definitively destroyed the Iron Curtain. Today NATO is an alliance of 28 countries with completely different situation (political, economic, military), different goals and vision. Apart from it there are internal conflicts like this one between Greece and Turkey (on Cyprus case). Some of European countries would like to progress more European defence policy and to reinforce NATO. Afghanistan was dividing Pact from the beginning. And now there is also problem of upcoming presidential election in US. Mr Obama is not considered as a real leader. Instead of working to strengthen NATO, the Obama administration has taken actions that will only undermine the alliance. Also republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney attacked President Obama over war spending. Last year, President Obama signed into law a budget scheme that threatens to saddle the US military with nearly US$ 1 trillion in cuts over the next 10 years. ... Gen Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has plainly said that such a reduction means "we would not any longer be a global power." So it is Washington that has to answer about which direction it would like to go. The alliance had other pressing issues too, such as “smart defence” (an attempt to pool capabilities to get a bit more bang for the euro), pressing on with a European ballistic-missile defence system (in the face of much angry growling from Moscow) and politely brushing aside the hopes of politically inconvenient applicants (partly because of wanting not to annoy Russia still more). And there is also no clear message. If Mr Obama wanted to have some visible success before the presidential election, it was not so in this case. Apart from the massive demonstrations in Chicago and some brutal reassertion of harsh realities, the summit was not a great event. It only underlined the weakness of NATO.

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