DSA July 2013 by Defence and Security Alert

mission

The power of a King lies in his mighty arms â&#x20AC;Ś

Security of the citizens at peace time is very important because State is the only saviour of the men and women who get affected only because of the negligence of the State.

â&#x20AC;&#x201D; Chanakya

editor-in-chief

“The country comes ﬁrst – always and every time”.

he conundrum of China was once again painfully highlighted to us just before the visit of the Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang. Chinese troops carefully selected an area in Ladakh where Indians had only two approach routes. One took 12-15 days by foot and the better one around a week.

The Chinese in contrast could bring up an Armoured / Motorised Division to the area from Lanzhou MR within just a day. Having carefully selected the area for a showdown, the Chinese launched a deliberate provocation in the DBO sector. That highlights the painful differential in Border roads and infrastructure that has persisted from the 1950’s to date. This glaring failure to build infrastructure severely constrains India’s response options and our Foreign Ofﬁce has in consequence, developed kowtowing into a ﬁne art.

Logistical interior lines: The paradox is that in overall terms, India is on logistical

interior lines vis a vis China. Our railheads are within 200-300 km of the borders. Earlier the Chinese railhead in Gormo was almost 2,000 km from the border. The Chinese utilised the period of peace and tranquillity negotiated by us in the late 1980’s and 1990’s to push up their railways to Lhasa and even beyond. Eight Standard Gauge trains per day now come to Lhasa and enable China to build upto 30 divisions or more within the space of just one month. This marks a paradigm shift in capabilities. Earlier it used to take the Chinese two seasons to build a maximum force level of 22 divisions in Tibet. The scale and speed of the Chinese mobilisation capacity has been sharply enhanced. We have singularly failed to build roads in the last 200-300 km of the Himalayan borders. Earlier we had an amazing policy premised on cowardice. We wanted to keep the last 50-60 km of our Himalayan borders absolutely undeveloped so as not to give avenues of advance to the Chinese! This also implied that we just could not launch any counter attacks / counter strokes into Tibet in response to any Chinese invasion. This was an amazingly defensive stance. In the 1980’s Gen KV Krishna Rao had tried to change this nonsensical posture and push our infrastructure and deployments forward. The Sumdorong Chu incident ensued and Gen K Sundarji launched Op Chequerboard to give a ﬁrm response. It had shaken the Chinese. They backed down temporarily and sought peace but utilised the period of peace to upgrade their infrastructure while we conveniently went to sleep.

Resource differential: The infrastructure differential is compounded by the resource differential. By US estimates China

spends upwards of US$ 160 billion a year on its defence modernisation. India spends a paltry 37 billion dollars per year in comparison. No one is making a case for dollar to dollar parity. However a safe ratio has perforce to be maintained. That is not being done at all.

Defence modernisation differential: Far more worrying is the pace of our defence modernisation that has been reduced to a crawl by the series of never ending scams in our defence acquisition process. Unmindful of the dire threats spelt by our Honourable Raksha Mantri, the customary rent collectors thrive on the inbuilt delays in the defence import process. The result is a disaster about to happen. Our medium artillery, air defence equipment and army aviation fleets have not been modernised for the last 30 years. There is no sign of replacements materialising. The Chinese Air Force and Navy have made huge strides not just quantitatively but also qualitatively. Our air force strength is declining ominously as old aircraft are phased out and new ones fail to come. Same is the case with the submarine arm of our navy and we could soon be without an effective aircraft carrier even as China flaunts her first and readies to launch the second and third. We are tragically short of ammunition to sustain the fight. Who is responsible? Who will be held accountable if we suffer another military reverse? Our Finance Ministry has little funds to spare for defence. Last year it cut Rs 10,000 crore from our defence budget. It is busy dishing out doles to the tune of Rs 1,40,000 crore for schemes like MGNAREGA, 50 per cent of which have been siphoned off as per media reports. These leakages amount to US$ 14 billion and could have plugged some of the glaring gaps in our defence. China has completed the first phase of its military modernisation (that was scheduled for 2020). This was to make it capable of dealing with any power in Asia. China is ready and hence is being stridently assertive and aggressive on all fronts concurrently. The seminal question we must answer is “Are we ready”? Sadly the answer is a firm negative. Cooperation-Competition-or Conflict with China? That is the theme of our current issue. We may try for cooperation (The foreign ministry is bending over backwards in its efforts to appease Beijing). The sad truth is we may not want war with China, but we will get peace only if we are strong enough to deter China from any adventurism across the Himalayas. As the doyen of our Foreign service, Ambassador Rajan said, we may not want war with China but we simply cannot afford to lose the next conflict with China – whenever it comes. By our glaring lack of preparation, by the very tardiness of our response, we are precisely inviting such an outcome. Nations that fail to learn from their own history are condemned to repeat it.

Maj Gen (Dr) GD Bakshi SM, VSM (Retd) July 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

founding editor

publisher's view

Time for Chanakyan realpolitik "Never trust your enemies, be alert on all their moves even if they pose to be friendly with you".

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ndia’s greatest geostrategic thinker and the ideal and inspiration of the Defence and Security Alert (DSA) team – Chanakya – has only one contemporary legend Sun Tzu of China whose treatise Art of War is of perennial contemporary relevance. How many Indians know about them? I am sure not even 5 per cent of the total population knows about Chanakya and may be hardly 1 per cent is aware about Sun Tzu in our country. Our people are ignorant about these world famous great thinkers who changed the entire gamut of the socio-political situations of their times with their thoughts and their edicts and we can see that their thoughts are perhaps even more relevant to the geopolitics of today. We see the situation in our immediate vicinity as one in which all the neighbouring countries be they small Nepal and Sri Lanka or the bigger China and Pakistan exerting a negative influence on India’s geopolitical interests and all that we see ourselves doing is compromising with them on their terms. The aggressiveness of China towards India and other South East Asian countries is increasing day by day. We see how it has been bullying Japan and Vietnam on issues of suzereignty over offshore resources; and how it has been supporting Pakistan by providing it nuclear and conventional weaponry and encouraging it in the use of Islamist jihadi terrorism to try and delink the Kashmir Valley from the rest of India. The way China has constructed road and rail networks leading to the Line of Actual Control all along the Himalayas and its involvement in Gilgit and Baltistan in the name of supporting Pakistan’s infrastructure development is a real India-specific threat. The most recent intrusion across the Line of Actual Control in the Daulat Beg Oldi sector of Ladakh in Jammu and Kashmir coming as it did on the very eve of the visit of the newly elected Prime Minister of China to India had raised grave doubts about Beijing’s intentions vis-à-vis India. It appeared to be a threat to warn India to keep out of Pacific Ocean littoral geopolitics. But New Delhi was unfazed and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh made it a point to visit Japan as part of a Look East policy that has acquired a defence and security content involving Australia, Thailand, Vietnam, Singapore, South Korea and Mongolia. India is holding military exercises with all of them on land and sea over the years. If this is construed to be an anti-China phalanx by Beijing it has only itself to blame for its hectoring and hegemonistic attitude. Hopefully, the Chinese Premier’s visit to India soon after the intrusion episode will dispel such interpretations. Nonetheless, we appear to have taken a leaf out of Chanakya’s Neetishastra and his sage advice that “Never trust your enemies, be alert on all their moves even if they pose to be friendly with you”. In July 2011 I proudly informed you of DSA becoming the first and the only ISO certified magazine in India in the defence and security domain. Now in July 2013 I have another great news for DSA lovers and our friends in the defence and security fraternity worldwide. DSA has once again become the premier defence and security magazine available on the Intranet of Indian Air Force. Now DSA is at the fingertips of and reaches each and every officer and soldier of the Indian Air Force. This will be a great incentive for all companies in the defence and security arena doing business in India or planning to foray into the burgeoning Indian market. I take it as an honour for all our contributors, advertisers and of course the entire team at DSA for their excellent support which has made this possible. The quality of the content and the presentation of DSA has proved to be the best in the past and now its outreach has also been acknowledged in the public domain. It is another feather in the cap of DSA which we will wear with great pride!

hina is an enigma that continues to defy conventional analyses. It has in fact always been an enigma. From the time it came to regard itself as the Middle Kingdom, till the current era, there has been something about China that doesn't quite gel. It defies conventional wisdom on account of its many extraordinary achievements and simultaneous contradictions. The economic growth story is the envy of many in the world and an unparalleled success in human history. The largest number of human beings lifted out of poverty in the shortest span of time in an extraordinary achievement. But not all of China's achievements are worth emulating. Because at the same time as the growth story are wretched tales of environmental degradation, denial of basic human rights to its people, brutalities in Tibet and Xinjiang and flourishing corruption like there wasn't a tomorrow. It remains an enigma, therefore, because it displays extraordinary contradictions. In many ways it remains beyond scrutiny even in a networked age and information overkill. China does not like scrutiny because that entails, nay demands, transparency. And an absence of transparency is the greatest psychological weapon employed by China. The world doesn't know where China is headed. Is the direction benign, or is it more sinister, is the fundamental question raising eyebrows and nerves around the world. Nerves because China tends to overdo its territorial claims and displays some quite pathetic images of itself. Two soldiers holding the Chinese flag in knee deep waters on Scarborough Reef make for a terrible sight, even if the xenophobic laud the effort on the mainland. It was an overkill and like all such efforts it bombed. That is why the world needs to know where China is headed, so such pathetic scenes don't lead to scare scenarios that get out of hand. In the recent past there have been ample doses of that with its neighbours to the east, or the one to the west. Japan, Vietnam and Philippines can testify to Chinese edginess when it comes to border or boundary management. The East Sea, as the Vietnamese call it, or the West Philippines Sea as Manila calls it and the South China Sea, as the world refers to it, is the current focus of territorial claims by all; but in which China is pitted against them all. To the west China unilaterally sought to impose an alignment of the Line of Actual Control that took everyone by surprise. There was no reason to be surprised, because it was the culmination of an internal Chinese politico-military exercise that seeks to test responses. They learned their lessons, but have the Indian authorities learnt those that they are meant to? India and China are the only neighbours in the world that had never fought until well into the 20th century. Throughout their extensive and rich histories the Asian giants maintained peaceful relations. Something changed in the two post-colonial societies in the last century that created bad blood. And that has still to be resolved. Its resolution will be the greatest diplomatic, political and military success story in human history. But it can only be resolved provided both sides want it badly enough. One-way tickets in international relations are fraught with dangers. Of which China seems to have caused enough to ample number of countries.

To commemorate the 75th raising day of CRPF, our premier paramilitary force team DSA has researched and compiled a comprehensive feature highlighting the eventful journey of the force in the service of the nation and the challenges it faces unfolding in the internal security environment. Team DSA greets and salutes the ofﬁcers and jawans of CRPF. Jai Hind!

July 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

Manvendra Singh Pawan Agrawal July 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

Contents

SPECIAL ISSUE JULY 2013

An assertive China: Cooperation, competition or conﬂict? CRPF: A committed force for internal security

An ISO 9001:2008 Certified Magazine

A R T I C L E S The Anatomy of an Intrusion Lt Gen Gautam Banerjee PVSM, AVSM, YSM (Retd)

Evolution of China’s Ballistic Missile Programme and its Deployment: Implications for India’s National Security Prof Arvind Kumar

Commentary on China’s Eighth White Paper on National Defence-2013 Maj Gen PK Chakravorty VSM (Retd)

Sino-Indian Relations: Shifting Sands or an Enduring Mirage? Lt Gen Sudhir Sharma (Retd) PVSM, AVSM, YSM, VSM

China’s Maritime Strategy in the Indo-Pacific: Competition for India’s Navy Cmde Ranjit Bhawnani Rai (Retd)

The Chinese Incursion of April 2013: An Assessment Air Marshal Dhiraj Kukreja (Retd) PVSM, AVSM, VSM, ADC

Smart Strategies for Staying Ahead of China Brig Rahul Bhonsle (Retd)

Central Reserve Police Force: Staunch Sentinels Pankaj Kumar Singh IPS

Paramilitary: Positional Uncertainty Redefined Dr Rupali Jeswal / Damien Martin

The Rise of an Assertive China: An Australian View Ian Hall

Chinese Aviation Programmes: AWACS Air Vice Marshal AK Tiwary VSM (Retd)

India’s Submarine Fleet: A Dwindling Force Cmde S Govind (Retd)

India China Stand-off in Ladakh: Emerging Lessons Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (Retd)

India's Emerging Pragmatic Approach Towards China Anand V

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July 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

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Book Review 1962 and the McMahon Line Saga Claude Arpi

CRPF: THE MULTIPURPOSE FORCE Team DSA

Post the Kargil conflict, the Indian government designated CRPF as the lead Internal Security and Counter Insurgency Force of the country. Even before this designation, the CRPF has always been in action. The CRPF is already the world’s largest paramilitary force. There is a realisation in the government that the CRPF needs to be augmented to provide an adequate backup to its general role and responsibilities. To that end it is intended to raise its strength from the current three lakh personnel by the induction over the next five years of 22 new General Duty (Male) battalions (an addition of more than 25,000 officers and jawans) and one more Mahila battalion bringing the total to four with about 4,500 women personnel overall.

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F E A T U R E S B Raman: Ace Spymaster A tribute

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an assertive China

BORDER IMBROGLIO

THE ANATOMY OF

The Chinese Intrusion in Ladakh hit the international headlines and generated national outrage. Speculations are aﬂoat as to what made China do what she did. These aspects must cover the military signiﬁcance of the time and place of the intrusion, the extent to which the PLA is likely to have prepared before moving the platoon to occupy a spot across the LAC and how might the situation have unfolded, had the Chinese not relented. The SSN Sector is poorly connected with the rest of Ladakh. It is approached through two routes − one takes 4 to 6 days to traverse on foot the other 12-20 days. With such poor lines of communications, India’s capability to undertake any operation beyond the routine of border policing, in the SSN is near to nix. We must not trivialise the matter with inferences that the intrusion might have been triggered as a desultory act of an overzealous commander. The idea of a permanent intrusion into this area may have been mooted many years back. This particular location must have been selected after a series of terrain evaluation, reconnaissance and military appreciations conducted over a period. The location is easily approachable from the Border Guards Regiment’s base at Sogma (Qizil Jilga). Had the intrusion gained permanency, it would have been in an ideal location to dominate the proposed road that would emerge some day from the Bursa Gongma Gorge into the Depsang Plains before proceeding to connect DBO with Darbuk and Leh.

t was mid-April this year when the national mood – already severely dented by reports of corruption and nepotism at high places – was jarred by the reports coming from Ladakh. The news was that a platoon strength of Chinese troops had intruded across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in East Ladakh, set up five tents at a spot near the Raki Nala. After a week or so of conflicting reports and conjectures, the depth of the intrusion was finally settled at 19 kilometres West across the Indian side of the LAC in that sector. Meanwhile, a whole range of statements from the government, the parliament and politicians of various beliefs added to the people’s consternation – and confusion – over this development, particularly as it came when our strategic community was immersed in serious introspection over India’s mauling at the hands of Communist China exactly

ﬁfty years ago. It was clear that it was beyond India’s abilities to oblige the Chinese to vacate. In trepidation, our peaceniks prayed for the success of India’s diplomatic appeal and China’s benevolent acquiescence to break free of this logjam.

July 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

Better sense seems to have prevailed and the Chinese, after some show of brazen nonchalance, have spared India any further embarrassment – at least for the time being. Obviously, they have done so after having administered a message. It is certain

AN ‘INTRUSION’ that some conditions, implied from a position of strength, may have been dictated, which India has decided to paint as ‘reasonable’. There is informed hint that the ruling doves in the government have indicated some latent annoyance over the army’s ‘over-enthusiasm’ to patrol too far and keep under surveillance a stretch of the area across. As Late K Subrahmanyam had put it in the Kargil Committee Report, India has once again got away with least damage without having to make serious investments in her national security.

Military Analysis

Speculations are afloat as to what made China do what she did and as to what could be the significance of the place and time of the intrusion. Thus while it is for the political analysts and hard-boiled diplomats to unearth China’s political intent in carrying out the intrusion and so triggering a possible state of border confrontation, the defence establishment – military as well as the civilian decision-makers needs to direct its main concern towards the military aspects – our weakest link – of this event. These aspects must cover the military significance of the time and place of the intrusion, the extent to which the PLA is likely to have prepared before moving the platoon to occupy a spot across the LAC and how might the situation have unfolded, had not the Chinese relented to India’s plea to be let off.

this line delineates an ‘active space’ over which Indian troops have been operating. The oft repeated notion of ‘perception’, as far as the Indian version of the LAC is concerned, is therefore a fallacy1. China, conversely, has chosen to remain uncertain yet regarding her version of the LAC. The purpose obviously is to keep the options of settling the alignment as far into India as the latter could be bullied to reconcile with. Even if she is a powerful dictator of her arbitrary interpretations, China may not be allowed double advantage of talking of LAC and yet not committing to its deﬁnition.

LT GEN GAUTAM BANERJEE PVSM, AVSM, YSM (RETD) The writer was commissioned into the Corps of Engineers in June 1971. During his 40 years of service, the writer has taken part in all operations and has served in all ﬁeld and high altitude areas. He was the Chief of Staff, Central Command and then the Commandant, Ofﬁcers' Training Academy, Chennai before superannuating in June 2011.

It is becoming apparent that China is leveraging her yet undeﬁned LAC as a core determinant in negotiating the border alignment. Many in India too would be comfortable with that arrangement, as exempliﬁed by the self-destructive thought of ‘regularising’ the Line of Control with the Pakistan occupied Kashmir – an attitude that has been our undoing over the centuries past. It may therefore be the time to remind China that the notion of the post-1962 LAC does not replace the traditional Indo-Tibet Boundary. Further, we may borrow her own stance vis-a-vis the British to articulate that an alignment forced upon us under duress by the communist-imperialist regime will not be acceptable; it would be contested in the future when the time is ripe. That kind of argument might caution a habitual transgressor.

THE CHINESE STRATEGISTS MAY HAVE BEEN CHARY OF ANY FURTHER DELAY IN SHOWING INDIA HER PLACE BEFORE THE INDIAN MILITARY MUSCLE IS STRENGTHENED FURTHER

Indeed, it is possible to carry out an informed assessment of the military angle of China’s rendering of the ‘intrusion’ in question. In so doing, we must not trivialise the matter with ‘feel-happy’ inferences which suggest that the intrusion might have been triggered as a desultory act of an overzealous commander. We must remind ourselves that observation of the fundamental theories and near-perfect application of text-book military operations has been a strength of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and that in China’s political scheme, there is nothing tentative or superﬂuous. Indeed, an assessment of logically construed fallouts of the intrusion would be beneﬁcial. We may begin with the status of the LAC.

The LAC Fallacy

There seem to be many shades of opinion on the issue of the LAC. Keeping diplomatic niceties and political correctness to a limit, we need to be unreservedly clear that, one, the LAC as deﬁned by India is an alignment that ‘actually exists’ on the ground and that is well known to China and two, that

China’s Record of Border Domination

There is another recent development. Since the time PLA found itself settled on its way to modernisation and the ‘Chinese Empire’2 unveiled her innately hegemonic instinct that had remained suppressed by Deng’s advice to “lie low and bide time”, incidents of incursions across the LAC have become more frequent. From approximately 20-30 times in early 2000, by 2012, it has crossed the ﬁgure of nearly 200 annually. PLA has also been acting more and more pugnaciously, at one time or the other painting her messages well into the Indian controlled territory, chasing Indian herders away from their traditional grazing lands and dismantling India’s temporary

1. Following the Manchu imperialist tradition, Communist China has opted to establish an ‘empire’ to rule over, besides the nations of core China, Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, Tibet, Xinjiang and certain part or the other of her neighbour’s territories. 2. The Demchok Village, situated few kilometres to the South-East, even if well inside Indian territory, lies abandoned in deference to Chinese sensitivities.

July 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

an assertive China

BORDER IMBROGLIO 25 kilometres apart;  Three, availability of water from Raki Nala.  Four, had the intrusion gained permanency, it would have been in an ideal location to dominate the proposed road that would emerge some day from the Bursa Gongma Gorge into the Depsang Plains before proceeding to connect DBO with Darbuk and Leh and,  Five, the site is furthest in terms of India’s line of communication. Therefore, had there been a possibility of India taking any military action, it would have been constrained to stretch over an area which is the farthest and remotest from any of her bases. In undertaking even limited operations in an area not having a road connectivity, the Indian Army and the Indian Air Force would have been subjected to the limits of the tensions of the terrain as well as the friction of logistics.

Preparing for Operation ‘Intrusion’

SPECULATIONS ARE AFLOAT AS TO WHAT MADE CHINA DO WHAT SHE DID, AND AS TO WHAT COULD BE THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PLACE AND TIME OF THE INTRUSION. THUS WHILE IT IS FOR THE POLITICAL ANALYSTS AND HARD-BOILED DIPLOMATS TO UNEARTH CHINA’S POLITICAL INTENT IN CARRYING OUT THE INTRUSION AND SO TRIGGERING A POSSIBLE STATE OF BORDER CONFRONTATION, THE DEFENCE ESTABLISHMENT – MILITARY AS WELL AS THE CIVILIAN DECISION-MAKERS – NEEDS TO DIRECT ITS MAIN CONCERN TOWARDS THE MILITARY ASPECTS bunkers / shelters. In 2010, to meet a long standing demand of the locals, construction work on a track to connect the New Demchok Village3 was undertaken; it was abandoned when the Chinese objected, much to the local’s chagrin. The dismay that this kind of pussyfooting has caused among the locals is aggravated by the sight of electricity supply etc to the settlements

across. May be there is an intended message from the mandarin to our border people. All this while China has been frenetically building-up military oriented infrastructure along the Indo-Tibet border while expecting India to desist from doing so. If so far the Indian state had found comfort in compliance with that message in

the banal hope that the menace will melt away, recently it has gone a step deeper – it has taken to explaining away China’s adversarial causes, border violations for example. We do not seem to accept that the only way to humour a dragon is to allow it to roast you.

The Terrain

PLA had set up five tents in a Southern part of what we describe as the ‘Sub Sector North’ (SSN) of Eastern Ladakh, adjoining the Aksai Chin. The terra-firma here is a wind swept cold desert situated at an average height of 4,500 metres. The location chosen was situated between the Trig Heights and Depsang La posts, closer to the latter and on the Raki Nala, an ankle deep stream of slow flowing cool, fresh water. The ‘residents’ may have been from the ‘Border Guards Regiment’ of the PLA – but more likely to be regular PLA troops. The Border Guards base to control the Aksai Chin frontier is located astride the Western loop of the Western Highway (WWH, or G-219). India’s LAC posts here are manned by the Indo-Tibetan Border

3. Of course, the satisfaction would be in passing, only for the time being. It would whet China’s appetite to claim more.

July 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

Police (ITBP) and the alignment is patrolled at regular intervals by the Indian Army. It may be worthwhile to consider the situation that prevails in the SSN. This Sector is poorly connected with the rest of Ladakh. It is approached through two routes, to be traversed either man-pack or by dropping off from helicopters in hover–landing or engine switch-off is avoided unless there is an emergency. One route, the Western one, takes off from the Nubra Valley to take a steep climb to the 5,200 metres high Saser La (Pass) and an equally steep plunge into the Shyok Valley. Here, the Shyok River is crossed by an aerial ferry to reach a spot named Saser Brangza, from where a gradual foot trail leads to Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO). The journey on foot takes four to six days unless the last part of the traverse is covered by vehicles, few of these having been air-dropped at DBO. March along the second route takes off from Darbuk Village, North of Leh and runs against the Shyok River up to a desolate spot named Sultan Chushku. Thereafter, the trail traverses along the Bursa Gongma to Depsang La (Pass), situated at 5,450 metres altitude, beyond which it meets the great plain in contention, the Depsang Plains, where the intrusion has taken place, before linking up with the small garrison at

DBO. The march along this route may last between 12 to 20 days. Efforts had been made earlier to link DBO by roads, one over the Saser La which stands abandoned after some work was executed and the other along the Shyok River which is under construction since past one decade or so. With such poor lines of communications, India’s capability to undertake any operation beyond the routine of border policing, in the SSN is near to nix.

Choice of Location

Those who are familiar with the Chinese methods of military-diplomatic policy articulations would know that the idea of a permanent intrusion into this area may have been mooted many years back. This particular location must have been selected after a series of terrain evaluation, reconnaissance and military appreciations conducted over a period. Selection of this particular location may have been clinched on the strength of certain tactical parameters: One, the location is easily approachable from the Border Guards Regiment’s base at Sogma (Qizil Jilga) from most directions over miles of ﬂat-surfaced, gravelled ground which allows any vehicle to be driven virtually everywhere;  Two, non-existence of any reckonable obstacle or bottleneck between the base and the intrusion camp location situated

As distinct from the PLA’s ritualistic practice of sending out border patrols to show the Chinese flag far into India’s well articulated and physically dominated alignment of the LAC, it is obvious that this intrusion had to be a part of a deliberately conceived, planned, executed and supported military operation to promote specified political ends. Taking cue from their past practices, it may be inferred that once the idea of intrusion and the location had been deliberated upon and contingency preparations would have begun well in advance. The preparations would have included build-up of logistic infrastructure to support at least a ‘Group Army’ level operation. Construction of base facilities and installations, maintenance of the main axes and subsidiary roads, construction of operational tracks, revalidation of the airfields at Heitan and Gar Gunsa and development of Advance Landing Grounds close to the LAC etc, would have been undertaken thus. All that, even by China’s pace of engineering, would have taken five years or more to be tentatively in place. Considering that the intrusion took place at the first available opportunity after the winter freeze started thawing, it is certain that all preparations had been completed during the preceding season minus the last turn.

July 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

an assertive China

BORDER IMBROGLIO would have guessed that we were not the ones to adopt resolute action.

At this juncture, a regiment level PLA force would also be in location, duly equipped, acclimatised, trained and rehearsed to ‘counter-attack in self-defence’ against any ‘offensive’ that might purportedly be unleashed by the ‘intransigent’ Indians. More forces at a state of battle readiness would be placed on short notice to deploy from their bases in the hinterland Tibet as

The Time of Intrusion

China’s timing was perfect. Indian government, being hard put to stay on the course of economic security, has not been able to afford commitment of adequate investments in bolstering up the nation’s military security; it has not the fiscal, technical and strategic abilities neither the inclination to look at the aspects of external security concerns. Conversely, China’s military modernisation is well advanced, the new Chinese leadership has firmed-in and ‘defiance’ from Japan and other neighbours to her territory-grab missions are becoming strong enough to be responded by a message broadcast through intimidation of a reckonable force in the region. Another cause could be that with the publicity associated with India’s purported military modernisation, the Chinese strategists may have been chary of any further delay in showing India her place before the Indian military muscle is strengthened further. Whatever be the case, it is clear that this step stood already approved by the previous regime and that the Chinese do not take half-hearted measures. Conversely, with India accommodating their brusque decrees, the Chinese

July 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

298mm Trim

well from adjoining ‘Military Regions’. Lastly, misinformation and indignant excuses to ascribe the source of confrontation to India’s ‘provocations’ would have been invented by an army of propaganda specialists and kept ready to be broadcast with a farcical show of injured innocence. That is one pose the Chinese can assume with perfect seriousness even if denying any concession to the faculty of reason.

308mm in. Bleed

Once the intrusion was given a green signal at the highest level of Chinese government and approved by the Party President, Prime Minister and Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), ﬁnal activities associated with it would have commenced at least a month beforehand. Thus most of the preparatory works at the ‘operational base area’, located in the Chung Tash – Qizil Jilga areas astride the WWH, some semi-permanent and some of permanent nature and stocking of supplies, spares and ammunition would have been completed, more or less. Besides, some of the existing cross-country alignments of vehicular tracks would have been improved. Even if China may not have considered letting the intrusion escalate to war-like situation, it is certain that surveillance and reaction capability along rest of the LAC would have been organised to check any possible attempt on India’s part to react with quid pro quo measures. Even if China knew that India could not have taken recourse to force an eviction, she could not have adopted military measures in the half; she never does that, she prepares to the ultimate limit. On her rise to world power and regional hegemony, she cannot be seen to be backing off with a burnt ﬁnger.

China did not intend a war; if she had, then she would have found a justification. New Delhi’s obsequious approach to PLA’s border domination and of course, China’s overwhelming superiority in mind and material, had ruled that eventuality out of contention. However, it was likely that India might have needed a longer treatment before bending after some show of obstinacy for public consumption. PLA’s Plan B therefore may have called for the camp to be consolidated. No doubt, a permanent road from the base in the area of Sogma would be under development, cosy-living pre-fabricated huts and ancillary structures would be on their way and provisions would be stocked up. There would be a smart looking flagpole flying the People’s Republic of China flag. But apart from few well insulated sentry posts, there may be no defences constructed; PLA would have known that the Indians were in no position to force an eviction, neither was it possible to cut off the camp in that flat, ‘go anywhere’ terrain. Indeed, as the camp settled down to routine domesticity, a stretch of territory with its apex at the intruded location and base as wide as the Chinese might have chosen to feel satisfied with would have gone out of India’s courtyard. Even if the Indian government wished to recover that land, it could do so only by invoking some benediction in the Chinese heart in return of some humble offerings

280mm Live

PLA’s Plan B?

Resolution Eventually ...

The intrusion did take place. Eventually, however, the situation did not deteriorate to that extent when China’s preparation had to be put to test. China, with her priggish show of magnanimity, let India off ostensibly after the latter promised good behaviour. New Delhi was stoic and Beijing relented. The charade was ended after 21 days. The trade-off was stated to be conﬁned to Indian Army’s dismantling few ‘tin sheds’ in the heights of Chumar Sector, at the Southern most end of Ladakh, adjoining the Sugar-Sipki La Sector of Himachal Pradesh. Even if acceded under duress, that does not portend well for India’s case. Only the time will tell whether it was for India’s good or not.

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an assertive China

INDIA’S STRATEGIC OPTIONS Despite the onset of Cultural Revolution during mid 1960s, work on the development of various missiles continued. The DF-3 was tested for the ﬁrst time in 1970 and was deployed in 1971. The progress on DF-4 and DF-5 was slow because of the Cultural Revolution. The DF-4 became operational in 1980 and China tested DF-5 the same year.

EVOLUTION OF CHINA’S BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAMME AND ITS DEPLOYMENT: IMPLICATIONS FOR

INDIA’S NATIONAL SECURITY

Qian Xuesen, the father of China’s ballistic missile, became the Head of China’s ballistic missile programme in May 1956. After analysing the new commercial satellite imageries available in the public domain, one can easily identify the extensive Chinese deployment area with roughly 55 launch pads for their medium range ballistic missiles deployed at Delingha and Da Qaidam. The deployment area according to the available satellite imagery has been located at the Qinghai province. The 55 launch pads at Delingha and Da Qaidam have four different basic designs. The most common design found among the launch pads are rectangular and circular in nature. China currently is on a spree of developing and accelerating development in the ﬁeld of sophisticated and long-range missiles. A well-articulated and informative article.

hina’s ballistic missile programme, which began in the late 1950s’, is the most advanced in the Asian continent. In the last almost six decades, China has been able to build a robust and well established infrastructure for the development and production of ballistic missiles. China acquired ballistic missiles of all ranges from short-range to inter-continental ballistic missiles. Mao Zedong, who pushed this programme and started with a great hope after the deportation of Qian Xuesen from the US to China in September 1955, believed strongly that the acquisition of strategic assets (ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons) by any nation provides prestige and power among the comity of nations. Qian Xuesen, who has been supposedly the father of China’s ballistic missile, became the Head of China’s

July 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

ballistic missile programme with the establishment of the Fifth Academy in May 1956, which in due course of time became the Seventh Ministry of Machine Building that dealt with all categories of ballistic missiles (solid and liquid propellant systems) development. After a well crafted strategy and meticulous planning, the Fifth Academy in 1958 ﬁnalised an indigenous missile development plan. The emphasis and focus of the plan was on the indigenous development starting with a solid research and development infrastructure. The plan also called for the development of an indigenous Dongfeng (DF) series of ballistic missiles. There is no doubt, the plan certainly had an important element from the beginning itself and that is the time bound and the learning skills as essential ingredients of any robust R&D infrastructure. The Soviet component in the initial years of China’s ballistic missile programme was expected to be

huge. But, unfortunately, the Sino-Soviet bonhomie and cooperation during the onset of Chinese ballistic missile programme did not last long. In 1960, the ﬁrst Chinese version of the Soviet R-2 was launched.

Post-1964 Scenario

Qian came up with a new plan in 1964 called, the Banian Sidan Plan, which was basically a baseline plan. Under this plan, the Chinese version of the Soviet R-2 was re-designated as the DF-1. A DF-2 missile was to be built on the basis of DF-1. The DF-3 was designed keeping targeting Philippines in mind. The Banian Sidan Plan also envisaged the need of DF-4 and DF-5 of long-range so that both the missiles could hit Guam and the continental USA respectively. The post-1964 scenario in China, after China conducted a nuclear test, led to lots of changes, which resulted in the re-organisation of the existing infrastructure of Chinese strategic programmes. The Seventh Ministry of Machine Building, which had the responsibility of overseeing China’s ballistic programme, had ﬁve different Academies with neatly allocated tasks and time bound planning. The Third Academy and Fourth Academy were entrusted with the tasks of building the liquid and solid propellant systems with the headquarters at Beijing and Hohhot respectively. After going nuclear in 1964, China had a tough task to build a synergy between both the strategic programmes. For creating this synergy, China established the Second Artillery Force in 1966, which comprised six ballistic missile divisions and the special task of the Second Artillery Force was to direct China’s nuclear forces.

PROF ARVIND KUMAR

The writer is Professor and Head of Department of Geopolitics and International Relations at Manipal University, Manipal, India.

The solid propellant systems, which were being developed simultaneously, got a boost when the DF-21 missile was tested for the first time in 1985. The missile was certified for design finalisation in 1988 and entered operational service in the 1990s. During the mid 1990s, the Fourth Academy also introduced the improved version of DF-21 called DF-21A with increased range and accuracy. The SLBM development also had a setback and time lag because of the Cultural Revolution. It is generally believed from the estimated parameters that the DF-21 might be similar to the JL-1 SLBM in general aerodynamic configuration. China first launched SLBM (JL-1) from a Soviet Golf class submarine in 1982. It was followed by successful launch from a Chinese built nuclear powered submarine in 1988. China had to really master the technology associated with a successful launch of JL-1 after igniting the rocket under the water. It is still debatable whether China has been able to achieve this mastery. There is a lack of sufficient data on JL-1 parameters including thrust, specific impulse and burn time. As a part of China’s ongoing strategic modernisation programme for the last more than three decades, it has been diverting all its attention especially in the area of land based ballistic missile assets from a liquid propellant system to solid propellant system. The intelligence community has projected that the Chinese ballistic missile forces would increase several fold by 2015, but its future ICBM force deployed primarily against the United States – which will number around 75 to 100 warheads will remain considerably smaller and possibly less capable than the strategic missile forces of Russia and the United States.

China currently is on a spree of developing and accelerating development in the ﬁeld of sophisticated and long-range missiles. China has successfully tested the SLBM JL-2 / land version DF-31 in 2005. However, according to the available sources, DF-31 and JL-2 so far have not been deployed or operational. The DF-31 development programme is highly ambitious. China’s desire for a mobile 10,000 km range ballistic missile has challenged the Chinese scientiﬁc community. It is most likely that the DF-31 ballistic missile might have incorporated design aspects similar to those of

July 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

an assertive China

INDIA’S STRATEGIC OPTIONS

The post-1964 scenario in China, after China conducted a nuclear test, led to lots of changes, which resulted in the re-organisation of the existing infrastructure of Chinese strategic programmes current-generation Russian missiles. These could include upgraded mobility for the transporter-erector-launcher; advanced materials for the booster and payload; use of penetration aids such as decoys or chaff; and an improved solid propellant. China has acknowledged that its Second Artillery Corp tested DF-41 ICBM in 2012. The technical parameter of DF-41 also suggests that it is China’s ﬁrst strategic missile which has been armed with multiple warhead capability. It is a solid propellant system with 12,000 kilometre range. It has been designed to hit the targets in the United States. It is generally believed that the DF-41 is part of efforts by China to develop missiles that can defeat US strategic missile defences. The DF-31 could reach targets throughout Asia as well as Hawaii, Alaska and the western continental United States. The DF-41 has been an improved version of DF-31 ballistic missile.

China’s strategic modernisation programmes including the ballistic missile capability will certainly have wide ramifications on India’s force structure. China has been collaborating with Pakistan by supplying both nuclear and missile technologies as well as sharing technical expertise. Pakistan certainly stands to gain from the overall growth of China’s strategic modernisation programmes. Hence, India’s security will be adversely affected by the growth of China’s strategic weaponry, which ultimately triggers increased deterrent requirements for India. Under the prevailing circumstances, India will not agree to forego its strategic options. India’s successful test firing of surface-to-surface nuclear capable Agni-3 and Agni-5 missile has demonstrated its willingness to continue with increasing the deterrent feasibility and requirements against its adversaries. For an effective, credible minimum nuclear deterrent, India needs intermediate range ballistic missile with ranges between 3000–5000 kilometers in the context of containing threats from China. The successful test of Agni-5 has given India a big boost and confidence. Military analysts and government officials feel that India will probably field a modest nuclear force in the low hundreds. Most analysts feel that India does not need intercontinental ballistic

DF-15

DF-11

Apogee of missile ﬂight trajectrory Point to very trajectory in mid segment. Terminal guidance

Trajectory at launch site

Point of impact with initial guidance (location of the aircraft carrier when the missile was launched)

Point of missile without terminal guidance (location of the aircraft carrier with mid segment guidance)

July 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

Wide Ramiﬁcations

Target point (current location of aircraft carrier)

missiles because India does not need to reach beyond China. Hence, India should not be inﬂuenced by the Chinese possession of ICBMs. However, India’s path of development shows a trajectory where it might like to acquire ICBM in the foreseeable future. India has all the technical requisites to demonstrate such capabilities. The deployment of ballistic missile by China has always been a major source of concern for India’s national security. The technical assessment done on China’s ballistic missile capability has conﬁrmed that it has the capability to reach the continental United States and has been constantly improving upon the ranges, guidance and control systems. China has certainly the capability to target all parts of India. After analysing the new commercial satellite imageries available in the public domain, one can easily identify the extensive Chinese deployment area with roughly 55 launch pads for their medium range ballistic missiles deployed at Delingha and Da Qaidam. The deployment area according to the available satellite imagery has been located at the

PLA has already deployed sufficient number of DF-11 and DF-15 ballistic missiles required in the case of any eventuality in the region. These missiles have important role to play during potential regional wars. These missiles have been deployed in areas closer to China’s borders to ensure adequate target coverage Qinghai province. The 55 launch pads at Delingha and Da Qaidam have four different basic designs. The most common design found among the launch pads are rectangular and circular in nature. It seems that the existing large circular launch pads at Delingha and Da Qaidam have been the designs for the liquid propellant systems especially for Chinese DF-3 and DF-4. It is well known that the liquid propellant systems have more or less been at the stage of getting phased out and replaced with the solid fuel DF-21 and DF-31. It should be made clear here that the DF-31 has not been deployed at Delingha and Da Qaidam areas and at the same time this missile is not India-specific. The DF-31 could reach targets throughout Asia as well as Hawaii, Alaska, and the western continental United States.The DF-21 missile, a solid propellant system has been deployed at Delingha and Da Qaidam for several years and this missile (DF-21) can be launched from the rectangular 15 metre launching pad. It has also been estimated that so far around 40 to 50 missiles and around 40 launcher systems might have been deployed by the PLA Second Artillery Corps in 4 locations. It has been deployed at Tonghua in Liaoning province near Korean Peninsula, at Liangxiwang in Jianxi province near Taiwan Strait, at Jianshui in Yunnan province near South-East Asia and at Xining in Qinghai province near India-China border. The recent addition of Delingha and Da Qaidam in Qinghai province has added the enormity of crisis, which one can envisage while discussing its relevance in the current security environment in India’s neighbourhood. The proposal to develop the DF-21 land based medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) based on the JL-1 SLBM design and technology was finally approved by the PLA in June 1980. The DF-21 missile was first launched in 1985. The missile got

July 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

an assertive China

INDIA’S STRATEGIC OPTIONS

design certiﬁcation in 1988 after the second launch in 1987. This whole project was kept on fast track and hence entered operational service in the early 1990s. During the mid-1980s, the Fourth Academy, which was dedicated to build solid propellant systems, introduced the improved version of DF-21 in the form of DF-21A with increased range and accuracy.

Agni-5

July 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

It is most likely that India might institute a crash programme on priority basis to manufacture a limited number of Agni-3, India’s intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs). The success of Agni-3 test has boosted India’s conﬁdence and it is anticipated that there would be further improvement in the ﬁeld of range and payload in due course of time.

Agni-3

The total number of deployed DF-21 ballistic missiles may not increase signiﬁcantly because it is a well known fact that the PLA has already deployed sufﬁcient number of DF-11 and DF-15 ballistic missiles required in the case of any eventuality in the region. These missiles have important role to play during potential regional wars. These missiles have been deployed in areas closer to China’s borders to ensure adequate target coverage. China so far has deployed the DF-3, the DF-4 / 4A and the DF-21 to target India. The DF-3 is deployed at the Jianshui and Kunming bases in Yunnan province. The DF-4 is deployed at Da Qaidam, Delingha and Xiao Qaidam bases in Qinghai. At the Jianshui base DF-3 is being replaced by the DF-21. Chinese doctrine has been centred around the maintenance of a “limited nuclear deterrent” capable of launching a retaliatory strike after an adversary’s nuclear attack. For having an effective credible deterrent capability, China

The threat posed to India’s national security by Chinese ballistic missile deployment has challenged India’s readiness and preparedness. India to a greater extent feels confidant after it acquired the IRBM Agni-3 and Agni-5. India is not reassured by China’s no-first-use guarantee or its claims that its nuclear arsenal is purely defensive and not on hair-trigger alert, because of the lack of transparency in China and the absence of reliable warning systems in India

strategic options unless the same remedy is applied to the entire international structure, including the United States, Russia and China.

has also been concentrating on the survivable command and control capability.

increased for India.

deterrent

India’s defence concerns from the threats emanating from the China’s ballistic missile deployment would largely be conﬁned to its region. India’s technological aspirations in the ﬁeld of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons are largely a response to China’s capabilities and intentions. Hence, in the current circumstances, India is most likely to continue conducting ballistic missile tests of medium ranges to validate delivery systems for its nuclear deterrent while exercising strategic restraint. The technological

Strategic Options

requirements

advancement in India would help improving the various parameters of almost all the existing categories of ballistic missiles. In the existing geopolitical milieu in South Asia and the emerging regional security environment, India’s main target would be to contain China’s growing sphere of inﬂuence in the region. After articulating India’s threat perception, one can say that Indian strategic concerns including nuclear weapon and delivery systems requirements would be sized against China, which should also be sufﬁcient to cover targets in Pakistan. Under the prevailing circumstances, India will not agree to forego its

The military capability of any nation is critical to deterrence, whether it is conventional or ballistic missiles tipped with nuclear warheads. India would surely take China’s total force structure into account in developing a strategy to enhance its existing capabilities. If a credible nuclear deterrent is in place with respect to China, then conventional war waging abilities of India, even if inferior to China, could be exploited to their full potential. The threat posed to India’s national security by Chinese ballistic missile deployment has challenged India’s readiness and preparedness. India to a greater extent feels confidant after it acquired the IRBM Agni-3 and Agni-5. India is not reassured by China’s no-first-use guarantee or its claims that its nuclear arsenal is purely defensive and not on hair-trigger alert, because of the lack of transparency in China and the absence of reliable warning systems in India. Indian planners and scientific and technological community would keep concentrating on improving medium range IRBMs to have a second strike capability against China. India also at the same time needs a better sense of Chinese behaviour and intentions, which would in turn help India in shaping its strategies and planning for its force structure.

July 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

an assertive China

CONCEALING MORE THAN REVEALING

COMMENTARY ON CHINA’S EIGHTH WHITE PAPER ON NATIONAL DEFENCE-2013 Over 60 years since its formation the Chinese Army has accelerated its Revolution in Military Affairs with Chinese characteristics. The Paper on Diversified Employment of Chinese Armed Forces provides explicit official overview of Chinese military modernisation. The PLA which in the past relied on mass and numbers to overwhelm an opponent, would currently be fielding high-tech weapons and be a tactically efficient force. The paper also acknowledges that the Second Artillery is responsible for both nuclear and conventional missiles. Accordingly a conventional offensive against India is practicable and we must modernise our armed forces, improve our infrastructure and enhance our force levels to counter such a possibility. All this must be undertaken with speed to protect our country against an onslaught from the Northern borders. For the first time the White Paper is silent on the issue of “No First Use of Nuclear Weapons.” This may be due to the indirect anti-China stance undertaken by the US in repositioning bulk of its aircraft carriers to the Pacific Ocean.

hina is a nation which has developed into the world’s second largest economy. The present development was visualised by the great visionary Deng Xiaoping who gave a pragmatic path to China’s four modernisations in the ﬁelds of Agriculture, Industry, Science and Technology and Defence. This was deliberated at great length during the plenary session of the Chinese Communist Party meeting in

July 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

December 1978. Thereafter China has been able to gradually modernise in all spheres and become a Global player with the biggest armed forces and the second largest economy. It is anticipated that by 2050, China’s GDP would exceed that of the United States and it would boast of military forces with an Out of Own Areas reach. To enhance her transparency China has been publishing White Papers on Defence. The ﬁrst White Paper was published in 1998. Thereafter it is published

with Chinese characteristics. By adopting a strategy of strengthening the military by means of Science and Technology, the PLA has gradually shifted its focus from quantity to quality and from a manpower intensive force to a technology intensive organisation.

Slippages in procurement of weapons, equipment and ammunition must be dealt with expeditiously by all the three services. Presently the PLA has an edge qualitatively and quantitatively. The gap needs to be narrowed on priority biennially. The papers are generic and provide essential inputs regarding security concerns of Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The Eighth White Paper was released on 11 April 2013. This time it has been titled as “The Diversiﬁed Employment of China’s Armed Forces.” We would undertake an Overview followed by Comments, Implications and Recommendations.

Overview

Contents of the Eighth White Paper encompass aspects related to the New Security situation, Building and Development of China’s armed forces, Training and Other Issues. The paper commences like the preceding White Paper of 2011 with China’s commitment to the concepts of mutual trust, mutual beneﬁt, equality and coordination. This would lead to a harmonious world thereby enabling China to become a prosperous country with strong armed forces. China views that the international security situation remains complex. The situation has been especially complicated by Japan over the Diaoyu Islands. China follows a Defence Policy which is defensive in nature. She will never seek hegemony and would adopt the strategy of “attacking only after being attacked.” Further the paper insists that China would standby international conventions and obligations.

Continuing Modernisation of PLA

Background: Over 60 years since its formation the Chinese Army has accelerated its Revolution in Military Affairs

MAJOR GENERAL PK CHAKRAVORTY VSM (RETD)

Building of Elements of PLA: PLA currently comprises of army operational units The writer is an alumnus of National Defence which include 18 Corps in Academy who was addition to independent comissioned into the divisions and Brigades. Regiment of Artillery They are under the seven on 31 March 1972. Military Area Commands of A Silver Gunner who Shenyang, Beijing, Lanzhou, has undergone the Long Jinan, Nanjing, Guangzhou and Gunnery Staff Course, Chengdu. The paper states the Staff College and is a strength of the army is 8,50,000 graduate of the National which is questionable. The PLA Defence College. He has commanded a Navy (PLAN) has a total strength Medium Regiment and of 2,35,000 and has commissioned a Composite Artillery its first aircraft carrier in Brigade. He was Major September 2012. The PLA General Artillery of an Air Force (PLAAF) is China’s operational Command, mainstay for air operations and Commandant of Selection has strength of 3,98,000. An Air Centre South in Bangalore Command exists in each of the and Additional Director seven Military Areas. In addition General Artillery at Army it has an Airborne Corps. Each Air Headquarters. He has also served as the Defence Command has Aviation Divisions, Attache to Vietnam Artillery Brigades, Radar Brigades and is a prolific writer and Electronic Counter Measures on strategic subjects. Regiment. The PLA Second He is the consulting Artillery Force (PLASAF) has editor for Brahmand grown into a full-fledged strategic 2012 and is compiling a force equipped with nuclear and monograph for CLAWS, conventional missiles. It has a Firepower-2030. series of Dongfeng ballistic missiles and Chang Jian cruise missiles. The People’s Armed Police Force (PAPF) combats terrorism during peace and assists PLA in defensive operations during war. Finally the militia is an armed organisation composed of people not released from their regular work. It falls under two categories the primary and general. The primary militia has emergency response detachments, supporting detachments such as joint air defence, intelligence, reconnaissance, communications support, engineering rush-repair, transportation and equipment repair as also reserve units for combat, logistics and equipment support. In China border and coastal defences are looked after by the PLA in conjunction with state authorities. The People’s Armed Police handles internal security issues. Further all Services maintain high degree of combat readiness to respond operationally at short notice. This is being done by frequent exercises by all Services. The PLAN undertakes rigorous blue water training and the PLAAF participates actively in joint training.

July 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

an assertive China

CONCEALING MORE THAN REVEALING recent Chinese incursion close to DBO bears testimony to this issue.

Defence Policy: The structured force building within the PLA gives her a capability to project her might across her borders. Accordingly it is important to note the capabilities as intentions often change based on the situation. While China professes that her policy is Defensive; her offensive character is lucidly borne out by the occupation of Paracel Islands, domination of Spratly group of islands, intrusions in Arunachal Pradesh, Eastern Ladakh, claiming of Tawang as a part of Tibet and spat with Japanese ships near Senkaku Islands. She no longer maintains a low proﬁle and has in the preceding years become more assertive.

Other issues: The other aspects are pertaining to participation of PLA in National Development, maintaining social stability, participating in UN peacekeeping, joint training with 31 countries and safeguarding the security of international Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs). The PLA has performed creditably upholding the high traditions of the nation.

Comments and Implications for India

The White Paper released is an open government document. Such documents released for the public domain normally contain generic matter most of which is known. Yet the paper presents a glimpse into policy, doctrines and emerging trends of the PLA which pose a challenge not only for India but for the whole of Asia Paciﬁc. In the paper China gives an appearance which is deceptive. She is persistently stating that her rise to a great military power will cause no turbulence. She iterates that she is not keen on being a militarily powerful country. Despite her portrayal in the paper of a country with no hegemonic designs, her actions don’t match her statements. She has been assertive in 2012

By adopting a strategy of strengthening the military by means of Science and Technology, the PLA has gradually shifted its focus from quantity to quality and from a manpower intensive force to a technology intensive organisation 20

July 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

on a scale never witnessed before. India in particular has witnessed an assertive China, declaring Arunachal Pradesh as Southern Tibet and the recent incursion on 16 April 2013 at Raki Nala near Daulat Beg Oldi. She is ﬁrm in her opposition to change of composition of the UN Security Council and has been suggesting a change to the existing Bretton Woods international ﬁnancial system. Her hubris stems from the fact that she is the world’s second largest economy with a GDP of about 5.87 trillion dollars. She is expected to overtake the EU by 2030 and the US by 2050. There is a perceptible difference between China’s portrayal in the White Paper and her behaviour in the global arena.

Security Situation: The ﬁvefold challenge to China of Taiwan, East Turkestan, Tibet, East China Sea and South China Sea compels her to militarily build forces to combat these issues. Despite Chinese protests the US continues to supply arms and spares to the Taiwanese forces thereby ruling out brute force as a viable alternative. The current US policy of pivots at Japan, Vietnam, Australia and Philippines has alerted the PLA and efforts are on to launch anti-carrier ballistic missiles. With regard to the Uyghur movement in East Turkestan, China has been ruthless in quelling their protests. However, negotiations will pave the way for better understanding of the problem. As regards Tibet, China has left no stone unturned to impose Han culture on the Autonomous region. The Tibetan people have been resisting the Chinese onslaught. The Dalai Lama is very accommodating on all issues. China needs to be pragmatic in dealing with this community. Japan, Vietnam and Philippines have been opposing China on the islands claim in the East and South China Seas. China views the US, Japan, Vietnam, Central Asian Republics and India to be directly linked to these challenges and is accordingly adopting the correct posturing in dealing with these countries. The

Modernisation: PLA has on date a modern army which is the biggest in the world. The strength of the army, navy and the air force given in the White Paper is less than the actual figures. In comparison to the Indian Army which is 15 years behind her modernisation schedule, she has no dearth of infantry weapons, artillery guns, mechanised elements, surveillance capability, good logistics infrastructure and information warfare capabilities. She has a qualitative and quantitative edge over India and possibly by 2050 would pose a similar threat to the US. PLA Navy is gradually attaining Blue Water capability. Her ships are performing escort duties in the Gulf of Aden and Somalia waters. The Chinese state owned news agency Xinhua has reported that the Chinese aircraft carrier is undertaking sea trials. The 32,000 ton warship with a length of around 1,000 feet is originally a Russian Kuznetsov class ship which was auctioned in 1992 and purchased by China from Ukraine. Presently it is under final refit at the Dalian shipyard. The aircraft carrier is likely to operate the J-11 naval fighter jets from its decks. It is also believed that China is constructing a helicopter carrier. Our navy needs to note the enhanced Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean as also the build-up of the three Chinese fleets with their capabilities to threaten our maritime assets. In January this year China unveiled her fourth generation stealth fighter the J-20, an event that changes the capabilities of a networked Chinese Air Force exponentially. There are five airfields in Tibet which enhances the capability of Chinese

China is not keen that India becomes a permanent member of UN Security Council. She has been providing military assistance to Pakistan and has given overt as well as covert support to her nuclear weapons programme. Recently they have signed a nuclear agreement, which is on similar lines as the India US nuclear deal. She has also supplied two more nuclear reactors to Pakistan. With Chinese assistance Pakistan has crossed UK and become the custodian of the fifth largest number of nuclear warheads in the world ﬁghters lending active support to ground operations against India in Eastern Ladakh, Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh. Chinese Air Force has an Air Borne Corps which could be suitably poised for strengthening offensive formations during operations. Our own air force needs to note these developments and speed up the procurement process to acquire modern ﬁghters, transport aircraft and helicopters. Chinese Second Artillery has an array of missiles which the paper does not mention. Chinese missile DF-5 has a range of 13,000 km which enables engagement of targets in the US. To engage targets in India, China has deployed DF-4, DF-21 in Tibet, DF-31 and DF-31A at Delingha in Qinghai province. China has used an anti-satellite weapon effectively thereby demonstrating its capability of using missiles in outer space. Suitable measures need to be taken to counter the missile threat posed by the Second Artillery to India.

July 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

an assertive China

CONCEALING MORE THAN REVEALING

Chinese are possibly the only country which practice mobilisation religiously. The PLA, Reserves and the Militia are dedicated and mobilised with speed. Recent reports indicate that about 7,000 soldiers are in the Gilgit-Baltistan region in Pakistan occupied Kashmir. It is believed they are undertaking 14 infrastructure projects which would improve connectivity from Xinjiang to the port of Gwadar in Pakistan Mobilisation and Deployment: Chinese are possibly the only country which practice mobilisation religiously. The PLA, Reserves and the Militia are dedicated and mobilised with speed. Recent reports indicate that about 7,000 soldiers are in the Gilgit-Baltistan region in Pakistan occupied Kashmir. It is believed they are

undertaking 14 infrastructure projects which would improve connectivity from Xinjiang to the port of Gwadar in Pakistan.

do its utmost to ensure Pakistan remains strong in the ﬁeld of nuclear weapons, to keep a check on India.

No Mention of No First Use of Nuclear Weapons: It is important to note that for the ﬁrst time the White Paper is silent on the issue of “No First Use of Nuclear Weapons.” This may be due to the indirect anti-China stance undertaken by the US in repositioning bulk of its aircraft carriers to the Paciﬁc Ocean. China obviously would like to wait and watch how the situation develops before making any commitment on this issue.

Chinese ofﬁcials while releasing the White Paper emphasised that the document is intended to serve as a mark of China’s growing transparency in military affairs. Analysing the document one realises Chinese transparency has its limits. As stated ibid many important milestones of China’s military modernisation, be it the J-20 and J-31 stealth ﬁghters or the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile that threatens ships and aircraft carriers are not covered in the paper. However, careful examination of the document provides some indication of Chinese thought process on key security issues. China has categorically stated her main threats. Each of these problems leads to a country supporting the issue. The Taiwan problem is linked to the US. The East Turkestan problem is linked to the Central Asian Republics who are closely linked to Russia, the islands problem is linked to Vietnam and Japan as also the Tibet problem is linked to the Dalai Lama, who resides in India. Viewing China’s perspective, the following is recommended.

Other Issues: China has signed CBMs with numerous countries. With India the border issue remains unresolved, despite strategic consultations, dialogues and agreements. China is not keen that India becomes a permanent member of UN Security Council. She has been providing military assistance to Pakistan and has given overt as well as covert support to her nuclear weapons programme. Recently they have signed a nuclear agreement, which is on similar lines as the India US nuclear deal. She has also supplied two more nuclear reactors to Pakistan. With Chinese assistance Pakistan has crossed UK and become the custodian of the ﬁfth largest number of nuclear warheads in the world. This certainly is a major issue for India which has pointed out the same to China repeatedly. China has continued assisting Pakistan, despite causing annoyance to India. China would

Recommendations

Intelligence: There is a dire need to improve our intelligence regarding China. This could be attained by cultivating a close friend of our country Vietnam. The Vietnamese have developed mechanisms which

enable them to decipher Chinese intentions. Our agencies need to formulate a strategy to improve our intelligence gathering mechanism to ensure updated intelligence on China. Further we need to use satellites, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles as also electronic intercepts to improve our actionable intelligence.

Enhanced Force Levels: The border with China needs to be beefed up with additional formations possessing strike capability to undertake offensive operations so as to enable an effective riposte in the event of a Chinese attack. There is an immediate need for a Strike Corps in the mountains. This will give us the flexibility to respond effectively to a Chinese offensive. Upgrading Our Air and Sea Capabilities: There is a need to upgrade our aircraft to effectively operate by day and night in Extreme High Altitude regions with greater endurance. Our air force must have additional squadrons to be deployed permanently in the forward airfields to ensure parity in the areas around the Chinese border. The navy must have an Aircraft Carrier Task Force for the Western and Eastern fleet. Our navy must frequently patrol the areas from the Persian Gulf to the Straits of Malacca to escort our ocean going vessels, as also keep surveillance on movements of Chinese warships. Deployment of Missiles: Viewing the Chinese deployment of missiles against India, we need to take suitable measures to counter this threat. Our own deployment is necessitated to dissuade China undertaking a misadventure. Modernisation: Slippages in procurement of weapons, equipment and ammunition must be dealt with expeditiously by all the three services. Presently the PLA has an edge qualitatively and quantitatively. The gap needs to be narrowed on priority. Improvement of Infrastructure: Infrastructure on our side of the Chinese border needs to be upgraded. All roads agreed to by the China Study Group need to be completed. Further we should also plan a railway line to the Chinese border in Eastern, Ladakh, Sikkim and Kameng division of Arunachal Pradesh. This would integrate these regions thereby improve its defensibility.

Conclusion

The Paper on Diversified Employment of Chinese Armed Forces provides explicit official overview of Chinese military modernisation. The PLA which in the past relied on mass and numbers to overwhelm an opponent would currently be fielding high-tech weapons and be a tactically efficient force. The paper also acknowledges that the Second Artillery is responsible for both nuclear and conventional missiles. Accordingly a conventional offensive against India is practicable and we must modernise our armed forces, improve our infrastructure and enhance our force levels to counter such a possibility. All this must be undertaken with speed to protect our country against an onslaught from the Northern borders.

July 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

an assertive China

PRAGMATIC APPRAISAL

SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS SHIFTING SANDS OR AN ENDURING MIRAGE? While USA woos us and seeks us as a reliable strategic partner, we should be wary of being used to counterbalance an assertive China. It is not in our national interest to treat or perceive China as our enemy nor is it advisable to let our guard down. We should seek out areas of convergence and economic interdependence to slowly build-up mutual trust. This can start to happen once both sides develop a healthy respect for each other’s strategic reach and capability and realise that accommodation, collaboration and cooperation would in fact contribute to a “comprehensive strategic partnership”. India, Japan, United States and few other nations are stitching together a new “Indo-Paciﬁc order” that is in consonance with their national interests.

ew strategic paradigms are evolving rapidly in the Asian continent. While USA is ‘rebalancing’ its strategy in the Paciﬁc Rim and pivoting to Asia, India is focused on its ‘Look East’ philosophy. China’s new president talks of ‘revival of the great Chinese dream’. In this emerging scenario it would be prudent to reassess afresh the emerging dynamics of Sino-Indian relations pragmatically. ‘Strategicautonomy’ has for long been the bedrock of our international thought process, it is time to reinforce this policy, not jettison it. While USA woos us and seeks us as a reliable strategic partner, we should be wary of being used to counterbalance an assertive China. Japan too under the stewardship of Shinzo Abe the new premier is seeking to forge a more meaningful relationship with India, encouraging it to play a more active and stabilising role in the region. Both sides need each other, India for technological and economic interests, while Japan needs Indian markets and its strategic umbrella. USA, India and Japan make for a formidable triad which if inimical could be a justiﬁable cause for worry to China.

China is an emerging economic and military super power, yet a fragile one at best, more so because as a nation it still feels insecure. Its insecurities stem from its perceptions that many nations in general and US, Japan in particular would like to prevent China from taking its rightful place among the comity of nations especially so in its immediate neighbourhood. It is suspicious of the new paradigm shift taking place in ‘Indo-Pacific Asia’. India, Japan, United States and few other nations are stitching together a new “Indo-Pacific order” that is in consonance with their national interests. A strategic guidance document prepared by USA states “the United States is also investing in a long term strategic partnership with India to support its ability to serve as a regional economic anchor and provider of security in the broader Indian Ocean region.” China cannot but be nervous of the manifold increase of American deployment in the entire swathe from the Western Pacific and East Asia, including the Indian Ocean and South Asia. It has deployed marines in Darwin and after long moved back to Subic Bay and enhanced its presence in South Korea. Luckily for China India has resisted joining any bloc and has consistently adopted a fiercely independent strategic policy and is unlikely in the future to change this fundamental principle of its grand strategy. It is in this backdrop that one must view the recent visit of the Chinese PM Li Keqiang to India and his charm offensive. To make India his first port of call after assuming office is a significant political statement and could well be the start of a new era of accommodation, collaboration and pragmatic realpolitik. PM Li Keqiang remarked “we are not a threat to each other nor do we

July 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

seek to contain each other”. He also pledged to open China’s markets to Indian goods and help boost the trade between the two countries from the current US$ 60 billion to US$ 100 billion by 2015. Coming in the wake of the tense stand-off in Ladakh just a few weeks ago, the high profile meeting between the two neighbouring giants went off rather well, signifying a new maturity in the way the two nations deal with each other. Even on the emotive border issue the premier tried to soothe ruffled feathers by appealing to both countries to use their wisdom to find “a fair and mutually acceptable solution.” It is perhaps time for India to exorcise their demons of 1962 and carry out a reappraisal of Sino-Indian strategic compulsions and chart for the coming decades a more coherent and mature policy frame work which protects and furthers its supreme national interests. We should move from the era of confrontation to collaboration. It would be fair to state that but for the vexed boundary issue and China’s support to certain extremist elements in the past, there are not too many areas of major disagreement between the two countries. In fact there is fair commonality of interests and meeting of minds on various global and multilateral issues between India and China. Thus once the undemarcated border between the countries is formalised, or even if the perception line maps of the LAC of the two countries are exchanged the process to adjudicate the disputed areas which emerge as a result can be addressed and speeded up. This exercise would require not only strong political will but also a reasonable consensus at the national level. The only other area of a possible fault line is the ‘Indian Ocean’. It is therefore coincidental that China has for first time articulated its strategic thought process to secure its interests in the Indian Ocean in its “blue book” on the subject put out on 8 June 2013. The 350 page book released by Chinese politburo controlled think tank and the Yunan University is a candid assessment of the power play in the Indian Ocean region. The book is at pains to emphasise that China would focus on commercial rather than military objectives in the region. One part of the four part book is entirely devoted to India’s “Look East” policy, which some in China believe is mean t to encircle China. It also notes with concern the Indo-US axis in the Indian Ocean. It acknowledges ruefully the absence of a clear Chinese Indian Ocean strategy as compared to the well defined “Pivot” and “Rebalancing” policy of USA and India’s “Look East policy”. The book makes a cogent plea for China to deepen its economic linkages with Indian Ocean Region’s (IOR) littoral states. The book which gives us a ringside view of higher Chinese thought process, predicts that “no single regional power or world power, including the US, Russia, China, Australia or India can control the Indian Ocean in the future world” leaving “a fragile balance of power”. It emphasises that China is not a threat and believes that a collaborative cooperation between the dominant powers of the region is essential to make the Ocean a zone of peace. It also warns that if the three powers namely India, China and US fail to accommodate each other this vital ocean could become a turbulent area of conflict and instability. On the issue of Afghanistan too one can summarise, that, the geopolitical interests of the two countries generally coincide. India is very keen on a stable democratic and moderate Afghanistan relatively free from the stranglehold of Taliban. It

would not like Pakistan or the Haqqani network to muddy waters and destablise its western ﬂank. China has massive investments and future economic interests in Afghanistan and it would be willing to work with India and USA to restore a semblance of normalcy there. It is fully aware that India enjoys much goodwill and consequent leverage in Afghanistan. It too does not favour an extremist or Talibanised Afghanistan. On Pakistan, while China sees Pakistan as its strategic ally and all-weather friend it is troubled by the state patronage and support to Islamic terror, with Xinjiang province being its soft underbelly. With its economic interests paramount it would be happier if the Indo-Pak relations were to improve. Thus China’s friendship with Pakistan poses no speciﬁc threat to India. Some skeptics believe China would militarily side with Pakistan in the event of an Indo-Pak War. Realistically speaking, given the current regional realities this is highly unlikely.

LT GEN SUDHIR SHARMA PVSM, AVSM, YSM, VSM (RETD)

The writer is a graduate of the Staff College at Camberley (UK), and commanded his unit as part of IPKF in Sri Lanka and later Jammu and Kashmir. He was Military Adviser, Indian High Commission at London (UK). He retired as the Quarter Master General of the Army, wherein he made major contribution in modernising the logistic chain management of the forces. Decorated twice by the President for his exemplary service and devotion, he is an MPhil in defence studies. He writes on strategic issues and gives lectures on decision-making and positivity to the corporate sector.

It is therefore time to examine our overall strategic doctrine vis a vis China and create new paradigms which are more in step with the emerging ground realities. The ﬁrst principle should be to continue to build a strong and credible military capability with a tangible power projection capability in our areas of interest. A strong two carrier based blue water navy patrolling in strength the Indian Ocean and a submarine force to augment it is the minimum requirement. Long range maritime surveillance and commensurate amphibious capability to protect and preserve our continental shelf and island territories is also a sine qua non for a meaningful role in the region. Having created a powerful and viable military capability and infrastructure to support it India can engage with China in a collaborative endeavour where both powers respect each other’s spheres of inﬂuence. It is not in our national interest to treat or perceive China as our enemy nor is it advisable to let our guard down. We should seek out areas of convergence and economic interdependence to slowly build-up mutual trust. This can start to happen once both sides develop a healthy respect for each other’s strategic reach and capability and realise that accommodation, collaboration and cooperation would in fact contribute to a “comprehensive strategic partnership”. While it is fashionable and popular to label China as our consistent and long-term enemy it is perhaps time to stop playing to the galleries and invest instead in creating a more enduring security architecture, based on a sound economic base and credible military power.

July 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

an assertive China

MARITIME MUSCLE cheque book diplomacy in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and has ambitions to operate and safeguard its maritime interests beyond its shores. This has been ofﬁcially entered in a Chinese White Paper four years ago. The Janes Fighting Ships now dedicates the second largest section to the PLA(Navy) after the US Navy.

CHINA’S MARITIME STRATEGY IN THE INDO-PACIFIC

COMPETITION FOR INDIA’S NAVY Both China and India are in ascendancy to regain their past eminenceandareincreasingtheir maritime reach and strength, harking Mahan’s predictions that much will be decided on the waters of the Indian Ocean in the 21st century. China has creditably commissioned the aircraft carrier Liaoning (Ex Varyag) with indigenous powerful J-15 jets operating from its deck in ‘short take off and arrested landings operations’ (Stobar). The quality and quantity of PLA(N)’s Liaoning class and Jiangkai / Jiangwei – 052 / 054 series of new destroyers with long range missiles and HQ series VLS anti-aircraft systems with LM-2500 engines just like India’s Shivalik class possess, have improved and PLA(N) boasts of a large conventional (Qing and Yuan 042 series) and nuclear powered submarine ﬂeet (Xia-092, Shang-093, Jin-094/5 series). Chen Mingyi, a member of the Standing Committee of the CPPCC, has suggested that China should establish a national maritime commission to coordinate Chinese maritime policy and proposed that China should formulate a long-term comprehensive plan to transform China into a maritime power by 2020. This spells competition for the Indian Navy with China’s PLA(Navy) as both their strategies may clash with both showing interests in the Indo-Paciﬁc region. 26

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ndia’s growing international stature gives it strategic relevance in the area ranging from the Persian Gulf to the Straits of Malacca … India has exploited the ﬂuidities of the emerging world order to forge new links through a combination of diplomatic repositioning, economic resurgence and military ﬁrmness… India’s Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh in 2007.

The Chinese policy makers viewed PM’s statement above as India’s basic maritime strategy and opined China too had a stake in the maritime security of the Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOCs) in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) to safeguard its energy and trade supplies from the seas. This aim is now part of China’s Grand Strategy to rise to the top slot in the world and has become a part of their long-term maritime strategy which Deng Xiaoping had limited to the ﬁrst and second island chains in the South China and Yellow Seas, back in the 1980s, with words of advice, ‘hide your capabilities, you are not a leader yet’. Much has changed in China with each successive leader opening up China to the world and much water has ﬂown since Prime Minster Dr Manmohan Singh made the

above statement six years ago. Some waters have even been diverted from the Sang Po River in China which originates in Tibet and becomes the Brahmaputra in India. The world’s centre of gravity and economic power has shifted Eastwards with the reemergence of China, Japan, Russia, South Korea and ASEAN, while North Korea has become a nuclear state, which threatens South Korea, Japan and the Western world. In this scenario both China and India are in ascendancy to regain their past eminence and are increasing their maritime reach and strength, harking Mahan’s predictions that much will be decided on the waters of the Indian Ocean in the 21st century. China has moved ahead with considerable economic clout to deliver threats and

CMDE RANJIT BHAWNANI RAI (RETD)

China’s PLA(Navy) has The writer is a former uninterruptedly operated a three warship anti-piracy task force in Director Naval Intelligence and Director Naval the Horn of Africa since 2008 and Operations. Presently he successfully evacuated its citizens is Vice President of Indian in thousands in 2011 during Maritime Foundation, Egypt’s ‘Arab Spring’ proving its New Delhi. fleets’ improved expeditionary, logistics and sustenance capabilities, away from home port. PLA(N) ships have made port calls worldwide including San Diego and China has creditably commissioned the aircraft carrier Liaoning (Ex Varyag) with indigenous powerful J-15 jets operating from its deck in ‘short take-off and arrested landings operations’ (Stobar), like the Indian Navy plans for the Russian supplied MiG-29Ks from INS Vikramaditya (Ex Gorshkov) end 2013. The quality and quantity of PLA(N)’s Liaoning class and Jiangkai / Jiangwei – 052/054 series of new destroyers with long range missiles and HQ series VLS anti-aircraft systems with LM-2500 engines just like India’s Shivalik class possess, have improved and PLA(N) boasts of a large conventional (Qing and Yuan 042 series) and nuclear powered submarine fleet (Xia-092, Shang-093, Jin-094 / 5 series). Its, trimaran Hobbie class missile boats, landing, auxiliary and hospital ships are being built in numbers. The PLA(N) has a 25,000 strong Naval Air Force of maritime reconnaissance aircraft, bombers, Su-27 fighters and the Changhe Z-8 maritime helicopter with improvements over the Aérospatiale Super Frelon, that China acquired from France. China’s naval missile line-up is impressive and is supported from space with the latest ballistic anti-ship DF-21 missile, but China does not open its ships to visitors. Western strategists term the development of the PLA(Navy) from a Green-water navy into a Blue-water navy as a growing regional defensive and offensive navy with anti-access capability.

The world’s centre of gravity and economic power has shifted Eastwards with the reemergence of China, Japan, Russia, South Korea and ASEAN, while North Korea has become a nuclear state, which threatens South Korea, Japan and the Western world July 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

an assertive China

obituary

MARITIME MUSCLE

Yet, speaking at the IMDEX maritime exhibition in Singapore, in May 2013, Admiral Jiang Weilie, Commander of the PLA(N) South China Sea Fleet called on countries to increase exchange of information and cooperation for maritime security and push for peace and security at sea, hinting its need to be in the Indian Ocean, “The Navy, by nature, involves interaction with other nations and the PLA Navy has been active in cooperation with its international counterparts” and the Admiral cited China’s joint exercises with Russia and Pakistan, the joint patrol operations involving the forces of China and Vietnam in the Beibu Gulf, as well as the Chinese Navy’s escorting missions in the Gulf of Aden and the Somali waters. Prompted by Chinese naval rise and its claims in the South China Sea President Barack Obama announced USA was rebalancing its military with a maritime ‘pivot’ in the East. To contain India from the seas, China has been aiding Pakistan with nuclear and missile technology and has included Gwadar and other friendly ports into its maritime String of Pearls initiative. The Pearls’ thesis is based on the Chinese strategy of WEIQI, called GO in Japan which is the board game of 19 x 19 stones to surround the opponent with strategic moves to capitulate, which Henry Kissinger has so well explained in his tome On China (Allen Lane 2011) and compared it with Chess,

the game which Indians play and excel at. Proposals in China aimed at protecting China’s expanding maritime interests ﬂow from the age-old Chinese philosophy to ‘think big or get out’ and so PLA(N) is building a large ﬂeet of surface, under surface and aerial forces to deter USA from coming to the aid of Taiwan with an anti-access doctrine and support its String of Pearls initiative and safeguard its historical claims in the South China Seas. Liu Cigui, director of the State Oceanic Administration, indicated that China is serious about carrying out law enforcement activities in surrounding seas and all the maritime zones under Chinese jurisdiction, which extends to the Yalu River estuary in the north, the Okinawa Trough in the east and the Zengmu Reef (James Shoal) in the south. The PLA(N) patrols also include the Suyan Islet (Socotra Rock), Diaoyu (Senkaku), Huangyan (Scarborough Shoal) and the

Nansha (Spratlys) Islands. China is also bringing about maritime awareness and education by including it in its school curricula and setting up Admiral Zheng He institutes and his statues, glorifying his voyages into the Indian Ocean (1403-33). At a meeting in Beijing, the political commissar of the PLA(N)’s North Fleet noted that China’s possession of an aircraft carrier is justified because China owns a large maritime area – in his own words, three million square kilometres of ocean territory. This would presumably include most of the East China Sea and the maritime zone within the ‘nine-dotted line’ in the South China Sea, that China claims. Chen Mingyi, a member of the Standing Committee of the CPPCC, has suggested that China should establish a national maritime commission to coordinate Chinese maritime policy and proposed that China should formulate a long-term comprehensive plan to transform China into a maritime power by 2020. Wang Zhifa, deputy director of the National Tourism Administration, is working with Hainan province where the PLA(N) has a big naval base with submarine pens, to promote maritime tourism in the Paracels, to secure China’s claim to sovereignty over the islands. This shows that China has an ambitious long-term maritime strategy and may be harking the words of Lord Halifax (George Savile) the British politician and writer of late 17th century said “The first article of an Englishman’s political creed must be that he believeth in the sea”. He emphasised this for all Englishmen and it was political, not military creed, in other words he meant that the sea is and must be central to every Englishman’s existence. The Chinese leadership seems to have taken this attitude and in India’s case Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh while speaking at the foundation stone laying ceremony of the Indian Defence University near Gurgaon on 23rd May anointed the Indian Navy to become the provider of net security in the IOR and beyond without defining beyond. This spells competition for the Indian Navy with China’s PLA(Navy) as both their strategies may clash with both showing interests in the Indo-Pacific region.

Dr Manmohan Singh while speaking at the foundation stone laying ceremony of the Indian Defence University near Gurgaon on 23rd May anointed the Indian Navy to become the provider of net security in the IOR and beyond without defining beyond

July 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

ACE SPYMASTER

B RAMAN – A TRIBUTE

ahukutumbi Raman, popularly known as B Raman died recently after a protracted battle with cancer. He was 77. He served in the R&AW for 26 years until his retirement in 1994. B Raman an IPS ofﬁcer of MP cadre was handpicked and brought to R&AW by RN Kao in the aftermath of war with China and Pakistan. Raman retired as Additional Secretary in the Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India. A staunch nationalist and a thorough professional, he headed R&AW’s counter-terrorism units from 1988 to 1994. In his much acclaimed book The Kao-boys of R&AW – Down Memory Lane (2007) Raman gave an interesting account of the signiﬁcant role of R&AW in the liberation of Bangladesh. RN Kao had given his boys two priority tasks − to strengthen its capability for collection of intelligence about Pakistan and China and for covert action in East Pakistan. Raman also played a key role in recording the secret negotiations Rajiv Gandhi had with Sikh leaders before Operation Blue Star in 1984. Indira Gandhi wanted these negotiations to be recorded for posterity showing how keenly she tried in vain for an amicable solution before she rushed in army into the Golden Temple. Raman was entrusted with this sensitive and important assignment.

B RAMAN

Raman was a member of the special task force initiated by Government of India in 2000 to revamp the intelligence operations and was also a member of the committee set up to examine the intelligence failure that led to Kargil incursion. He was also a member of the National Security Advisory Board. After retirement Raman was involved in writing about strategic affairs covering both internal and external security concerns. Raman was Director of Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai. He was also associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies and was a regular contributor to the South Asia Analysis Group. Team DSA salutes and pays tribute to the memory of a worthy son of India who contributed signiﬁcantly to the growth of external intelligence and counter-terrorism operations in the country.

May his soul rest in peace!

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an assertive China

2013 IS NOT 1962

THE CHINESE INCURSION OF APRIL 2013

new leadership which took charge in March, has its hands full with an “unstable, unbalanced, uncoordinated and an unsustainable” economic system, as the outgoing premier, Wen Jiabao stated in one of his departing speeches.

AN ASSESSMENT Without road links to the rest of Ladakh, DBO remains an isolated enclave. “The PLA had carefully chosen its spot. Along the entire 4,057 kilometres of the LAC, India is most isolated at DBO, being entirely reliant on airlift. In contrast, the PLA can bring an entire motorised division to the area within a day, driving along a ﬁrst-rate highway. The Border Roads Organisation (BRO), which has laboured for over a decade, so far unsuccessfully, to build an all-weather road over Saser La that will connect DBO with Leh, Partapur and Kargil. The BRO has failed equally in bringing another road northwards to DBO from the Pangong Tso Lake. Indian state should know where the national interest lies and increase the pace of the build-up of its infrastructure in the border areas and that of modernising the military.

o international conference, be it in the Western hemisphere or in Asia, is complete without a discussion on the expanding Chinese economy, its belligerent attitude towards its Asian neighbours and what it would mean for the region and the rest of the world. In India, however, it is only the analysts and strategists that discuss China on a regular basis, while the policy makers and their advisors soft-play any hostile activity on China’s part, reacting only on a need-basis and continue to believe in the bhai-bhai slogan even after all these years. Heart-of hearts, the policy makers probably do get perturbed, but do not show their unease, lest any statement or an action by them is misconstrued by China, especially when India too is looking for a healthy economic growth rate and correcting its trade imbalance with China. The Chinese have come and gone, but this time their coming was accompanied by oratory and loud noises in the Indian media, Parliament and other forums, as if China was knocking on the doors of Delhi. A great deal has been written and spoken about the incursion by the Chinese Army (PLA) and what it means for India, with commentators, analysts and strategists all crying hoarse over the response, or the lack of it, by the Indian government. No national daily, no news channel on TV, was found wanting in expressing opinions or debating

July 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

the incident. Yet, when the Chinese Prime Minister, Li Keqiang, departed the shores of India, the rhetoric ﬁzzled out and other eye-grabbing news replaced China. Now that all seems to be quiet on the northern frontier (or is it only a mirage) this article will make an attempt towards an assessment of the Chinese behaviour, why they did what they did and would have the temerity to make some suggestions to the policy makers.

Chinese Leadership

The Chinese leadership has continued to remain unreadable with their sphinx-like stony expressions, not directly stating where they would like to be in the coming

The priority for the new leadership is, therefore, the resurgence of the economy, where economic reforms are the call of the day with some political restructuring, but being resisted by vested interests in the party. Another major challenge facing the new leadership is the changing face of the Chinese population; the ‘single-child’ policy and an ageing population means fewer working hands and fewer young workers to contribute towards the maintenance of the senior citizens which could lead to a ﬁnancial crisis in the coming years.

decades, thus leading to vague conclusions about their plans for the future. While the Chinese government has always maintained that its development is peaceful and inclusive and therefore should be seen by other nations as an opportunity and not a threat or challenge, yet its actions in the region and in other forums belie the assertion. The inherent ambiguity in its long-term goals and some actions and iterations made in the recent past, particularly in relation to the territorial disputes with neighbours and claims of sovereignty on the disputed regions, makes it difﬁcult not just for India, but also other neighbours and Western nations to comprehend the motivation behind such behaviour. The unease is further aggravated because of the opacity of the curtain behind which the Chinese government operates. The Chinese leadership changes every once in a decade, the transition being made with the convening of the National Congress of the Communist Party of China. During the 18th National Congress held in November 2012, the changeover was as speculated and Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang succeeded the previous incumbents as President and Prime Minister, respectively. The

AIR MARSHAL DHIRAJ KUKREJA PVSM, AVSM, VSM, ADC (RETD)

The writer retired as the AOC-in-C of Training Command, IAF on 29 February 2012. A pilot by profession, he has flown various fighter and transport aircraft. In his long stint in the air force of about 40 years, he has held many operational and staff appointments. Prior to taking over as the AOCin-C, he was the Deputy Chief (Operations) in HQ IDS. He has commanded a premier transport squadron in the Northern Sector, Air Force Station, Yelahanka – the main transport training base of the IAF and the Air Force Academy at Hyderabad. He is the first air force officer to have undergone an International Fellowship at the National Defence University, Washington DC, USA. He is a postgraduate in ‘National Security Strategy’ from National War College, USA.

Can the leadership tackle these challenges without resorting to reforms? Even in a single-party system that China has, the leadership has to face the people, who are demanding social and governance reforms. The voice of the people can either be suppressed, as it has been done so far, or the attention of the people can be diverted to other issues, as is probably being done by raking territorial and sovereignty issues with neighbours.

Notwithstanding the cordial and ‘warm’ meeting between Dr Manmohan Singh and the Chinese President, Xi Jinping, on the sidelines of the recent BRICS Summit in Durban and the choice of the Chinese Premier, Li Keqiang, to visit India as his ﬁrst foreign country, the

The consolidation of the politics and policies of peace must be viewed through the prism of China’s internal affairs. China alternates between being confrontational with its neighbours at times and taking a softer stand at other times July 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

an assertive China

2013 IS NOT 1962 confrontational with its neighbours at times and taking a softer stand at other times, especially regarding territorial and border disputes. Whether this is a deliberate strategy to keep neighbours off balance, or the result of shifting power equations within the leadership, is difﬁcult to discern. Irrespective of the spontaneity or otherwise of such hostile actions, China’s leadership will continue to be viewed as unpredictable and as a nation, not averse to ﬂexing its muscles against weaker nations, if it feels that intimidation is required to achieve its ends.

The Chinese Military Guile

In its progress towards achieving its aspirations for world power status, China continues to want to engage the world on its own terms. It gives an assurance to maintain stability in great power relationships while wanting to declare its own power in the relationship. This amounts to wanting to do the proverbial act of ‘keeping the cake and eating it too’, thus increasing the suspicion that seems to be permanently attached to all international relationship proposals that China initiates. The assertiveness that is increasingly on display has created a sense of discomfort, further compounded by the sheer size of the Chinese economy and the rapid growth and modernisation of its military capabilities. China faces a basic, yet essential, military dilemma. Its quest for prosperity and economic growth is directly dependent on its ability to carry out sea-borne trade, unhindered by any constraints and challenges, especially from external sources. All its trade routes pass through the East China Sea and the South China Sea, both easy to blockade as they are surrounded by a chain of islands that are controlled by other nations and a denial of access can bring its trade to a standstill. China is acutely aware of the unkind geographical situation and has increased its efforts to counter any challenge that may be posed with efforts to build a ‘Blue Water Navy’ with a carrier-group. Steps have also been initiated to build an asymmetric capability with submarines and anti-ship missiles to deter any adversary (read USA) attempting to blockade the sea routes.

It should, however, know where the national interest lies and increase the pace of the build-up of its infrastructure in the border areas and that of modernising the military, as the insecurity in the Chinese minds appears to be at the root of this current crisis. Any attempts to appease China would not be in our interest, as docility on India’s part would only embolden it for further incursions 32

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underlying fact is that the Chinese Army did venture into Indian territory and when challenged, refused to vacate. As the world has witnessed a peaceful change in China’s leaders, it is not necessary that their attitude and policies towards neighbours and the outstanding issues with them, more so with India, would also change. The leadership has to consolidate its position, particularly with the army, hence, some ‘adventures’ can be expected, but not leading to an open conﬂict. While China has not fought a war in the past three decades or so and may not do so in the next few decades also, it has been adopting belligerent postures against its neighbours in the recent past. Chinese leaders may have been schooled in the Deng Xiaoping Theory of ensuring prosperity through peace, but being the pragmatics that they are, the consolidation of the politics and policies of peace must be viewed through the prism of China’s internal affairs. China alternates between being

China has gained access to the Indian Ocean by participating in the international efforts to combat piracy originating from the African coast. Under the pretext of providing assistance to build ports it has gained a foot-hold in the ports of Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Myanmar while providing logistical support and maintaining the combat ships on anti-piracy duties; this comes with the caveat of access being provided for Chinese use in what could be thought of as an attempt to circumvent a blockade, if it ever does take place. China occupied large tracts of Indian territory in Ladakh during the 1962 conﬂict, with Pakistan illegally ceding about 5,000 sq km in the Karakoram to it. Using this area as a launching pad, the Chinese are now making inroads into the Indus Valley with military presence reported in Pakistan-occupied-Kashmir (PoK) on the pretext of protecting the widening work on the Karakoram Highway and the construction of a railway line to link Tibet with the Pakistani port of Gwadar. The presence of Chinese troops poses a serious threat to Indian road communications to

2013 is not 1962. But with such an aggressive neighbour, India cannot be too calm and complacent in its responses and when it comes to modernising its military and replacing obsolescent equipment, the attitude has to be one of urgency Ladakh, running through Kargil, as the easiest approach by land to Leh is along this route. It is not only in the Ladakh region that China has increased its presence; it has also developed its infrastructure in Tibet to enable operations all along the North-eastern border (it is common knowledge the kind of infrastructure that the Chinese have prepared in comparison to India’s achievements). However, a recent White Paper, issued on April 16 by the State Council Information Office, titled "The Diversified Employment of China's Armed Forces", provides an unusually clear look into the structures and missions of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and has surprised Indian analysts by revealing the army strength as 8.5 lakh strong against what has always been believed to be 16 lakh soldiers. Notwithstanding the numbers, China’s road and rail infrastructure allows it the major advantage of being able to transfer troops rapidly, both intra-theatre and even inter-theatre. In comparison, India, with its existing rail and road network, would find it difficult to move the army as quickly to the threatened sector.

The Current Situation

A map of India, published by the Survey of India in 1950, demarcated the political divisions of the fledgling Republic. While the border with Pakistan was clearly depicted as it is now and included the PoK area, the borders with China were shown differently. The McMahon Line was shown as the border, except in the extreme East in the Tirap subdivision, where the border was shown as “undefined.” In the Central sector comprising of the present Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh and the Eastern portion of Jammu and Kashmir, including Aksai Chin, the boundary was illustrated by a colour wash and denoted as “boundary undefined.” In 1954, without any discussions with China, the ‘colour wash’ was unilaterally replaced by a hard line, depicting the border and the earlier maps were withdrawn from circulation. China put up objections and also claimed Aksai Chin region of Ladakh as the Western boundary of Tibet; the uninhabited desert region of Aksai Chin has few markers to demarcate the frontier in favour of one nation or the other. This could have been resolved through bilateral negotiations and a mutually acceptable solution arrived at, but it was not to be and the situation is as known today with needless tension and the threat of conflict. Well into the 20th century, camel caravans plied from Yarkand and Khotan in East Turkestan to travel

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an assertive China

2013 IS NOT 1962

to Leh and Kashmir for trading their goods. After crossing the Karakoram Pass into India, the traders would leave their camels at what is now Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO) and transfer their goods onto pack ponies for the hazardous journey, over the Saser La, into the more hospitable Shyok River Valley that led on to Leh, Turtok or Srinagar. This isolation has defeated even the Border Roads Organisation (BRO), which has laboured for over a decade, so far unsuccessfully, to build an all-weather road over Saser La that will connect DBO with Leh, Partapur and Kargil. The BRO has failed equally in bringing another road northwards to DBO from the Pangong Tso Lake, along the Indian side of the Line of Actual Control (LAC); such is the barrenness and harshness of the terrain. Without road links to the rest of Ladakh, DBO remains an isolated enclave. “The PLA has carefully chosen its spot. Along the entire 4,057 kilometres of the LAC, India is most isolated at DBO, being entirely reliant on airlift. In contrast, the PLA can bring an entire motorised division to the area within a day, driving along a ﬁrst-rate highway,” says Maj Gen Sheru Thapliyal, a former Division commander who has served in that area. What then could be the motivation for the Chinese to venture 18 km into inhospitable and isolated Indian territory? While the motivation can only be speculated, the area is of immense strategic importance to China for the control of Western Tibet and it was for this geopolitical reason that it built a road through Aksai Chin in the 1950s and fully secured it in 1962. Tibet is central to China’s strategy in this area; despite massive investments in the region, large numbers of Tibetans remain disaffected due to China’s heavy-handed and uncompromising attitude in dealing of the situation,

to Indian demands in river water resolution, status as a nuclear state, trade imbalance and territorial dispute resolution. On the other hand, the border dispute did feature prominently in the discussions, but did not cast a shadow over them.

What in the Future?

2013 is not 1962. But with such an aggressive neighbour, India cannot be too calm and complacent in its responses and when it comes to modernising its military and replacing obsolescent equipment, the attitude has to be one of urgency. The current storm does tell us that undecided frontiers are not mutually beneﬁcial for two neighbours as they can so easily become the grounds of a clash that neither may be looking for. The restraint shown by both nations did avoid a confrontation but can India continue to take such incursions quietly? The Indian government was not inclined to initiate a military confrontation for whatever reasons, even when the army was ready to forcibly evict the Chinese; it should, however, know where the national interest lies and increase the pace of the build-up of its infrastructure in the border areas and that of modernising the military, as the insecurity in the Chinese minds appears to be at the root of this current crisis. Any attempts to appease China would not be in our interest, as docility on India’s part would only embolden it for further incursions.

while it seeks assurances from India on the dealings with the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government in exile. Another possible explanation for the Chinese adventurism could be the building-up of infrastructure along the border by India and its military modernisation programme. While both, the border area infrastructure development and the modernisation programme,

The presence of Chinese troops poses a serious threat to Indian road communications to Ladakh, running through Kargil, as the easiest approach by land to Leh is along this route 34

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have been delayed by many years, India has made an attempt to get its act together since 2000 and has been making huge defence expenditures, much to the concern of China. Whatever be the Chinese motivation to venture into Indian territory of harsh terrain, it is a fact to be accepted that the boundary in that region is defined only by a notional Line of Actual Control (LAC), which is neither marked on mutually agreed maps, nor is defined by any specific geographical features. Notwithstanding the years of acceptance of the LAC through many rounds of talks, overlapping claims continue to be made up to the LAC and beyond through aggressive patrolling by both the militaries.

It could not be a mere coincidence that the incursion came some months after the changeover of power in China and the associated statements thereafter. While Xi Jinping, after meeting with the Indian PM on the sidelines of the BRICS conference in Durban, has been quoted in the Chinese media as saying that Beijing regarded its ties with New Delhi as “one of the most important bilateral relationships”, he has also been making the standard remarks after such a blatant border intrusion that the border problem “is a complex issue left from history and solving the issue won’t be easy”. Li Keqiang, the Chinese Premier, surprised many by making India as his ﬁrst international stop, while the

President chose Moscow for his ﬁrst visit. It needs to be carefully studied, whether this is a new international strategy that the duo would be adopting to ensure China has its rightful place in Asia by dealing with ‘powerful neighbours and partners’ while it asserts military power against smaller neighbours such as Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines. The joint statement after Li Keqiang’s visit to India had the usual phrases such as ‘strategic consensus with like-minded states’ and referred to India and China as the ‘largest developing countries promoting multipolar world, economic globalisation, cultural diversity and information revolution’; China, in its bilateral relations with India, however, conceded little

China seems to have abandoned its slogan of ‘peaceful rise’ by picking fights with its neighbours in the West as well as in the East, such as Vietnam, India, Japan, Taiwan and so on. This can prove costly to China and India should learn lessons from it; not that India has picked fights with any of its neighbours, but India has slowly lost the goodwill in the neighbourhood. China has implemented the strategy of ‘string of pearls’; India cannot undo what China has achieved, but it should attempt to minimise the damage being done. India should resist any further security arrangements that China may attempt, say with Sri Lanka or another nation, by offering better terms. Similarly, India should push its ‘Look East’ policy with vigour and convince the ASEAN nations that joining hands with India in defence, trade and diplomacy, is better for all in the long-term. But first, India needs to wake up from its slumber and face reality.

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an assertive China

AN INGENIOUS INDIA? manoeuvre of our offensive component in a manner as to channelise the Chinese forces into a sector of own choosing say any of the valleys in Arunachal Pradesh, bottle them up and destroy or threaten to destroy them.

SMART STRATEGIES FOR STAYING AHEAD OF CHINA

A kinetic military conﬂict, in the territorial, maritime or space dimension in the future or a non-kinetic one in the cyber and information domain will have to be factored in our preparedness to defend our sovereignty. Indian military strategy under such circumstances will have to ensure that war is preferably localised and limited and does not expand into a two front conﬂagration with Pakistan as well on the western front. A smarter course would be to use the buffer afforded by Tibet to our Northern borders effectively along with manoeuvre of our offensive component in a manner as to channelise the Chinese forces into a sector of own choosing say any of the valleys in Arunachal Pradesh, bottle them up and destroy or threaten to destroy them. It is frequently not appreciated that the Lanzhou Military Area Command of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has built a formidable force opposite Aksai Chin.

he discourse on India China relations has been generally structured around the dyad of competition and co-operation. There is also a third dimension to the same of conﬂict that has been interjected in times of border strife in particular but given the larger context of global, regional and bilateral developments gets pushed to the background. Given that there is a live dispute with a geographic and territorial context between the two countries which goes far beyond the

transgressions of April May 2013 to claims by China to Indian sovereign territory of Arunachal Pradesh and occupation of Aksai Chin as well as Indian territory ceded by Pakistan to China, namely the Shaksgam Valley, the context of the third C of conﬂict cannot be undermined and thus needs thorough consideration. Given the manifestation of state power in the post modern world the emergence of a military conﬂict between India and China may remain in the recessed window of adversarial

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relations till other tracks of cooperation or its lower order of engagement competition continues apace. Yet a kinetic military conﬂict, in the territorial, maritime or space dimension in the future or a non-kinetic one in the cyber and information domain will have to be factored in our preparedness to defend our sovereignty. The argument herein is therefore structured to address smart strategies that India can adopt to stay ahead of the three C’s curve be it conﬂict,

competition or cooperation for till international relations in the context of emerging powers are regulated by the realist balance of power paradigm, a zero-sum approach may provide a relevant context for debate of India China relations. Taking the paradigm of conflict first as this will be immensely harmful not just for India but also to China questioning its credibility as a great power, a status that President Xi Jinping sought from Washington during his visit to the US capital last month (June 2013). Great powers do not engage in interstate wars and the world is increasingly questioning their status as the US realised in the fateful intervention in Iraq in 2003 which has circumscribed American ability to intervene in situations that are far more challenging to security as Syria. Yet a military conflict could come about in case the differences over boundary and territory intensify leading for one or the other side deciding to resort to force.

BRIG RAHUL BHONSLE (RETD)

For this investment in The writer is Director surveillance resources both Security Risks Asia, an manned and unmanned Asian risk and knowledge including satellites will management consultancy have to be added up based in New Delhi to the present plans of and specialises in risk raising new formations management and for the ability to vector future warfare. the Chinese to a ground of choice will depend on employment of these to advantage. Obviously the option cannot be deliberated within the confined space afforded herein and will have to be wargamed and fleshed out but remains a viable one. This military option is also based on the premise that Tibet acts as a buffer for both the countries, India and China. The logistical challenges of build-up, deployment and maintenance of a force despite the extensive communication network constructed by Beijing on the plateau provide us as much advantage if we have the requisite resources to monitor movements in real time and on a 24/7 basis through indigenous satellites, high altitude long endurance (HALE) drones and other means. This does leave the Northern flank open and it is frequently not appreciated that the Lanzhou Military Area Command of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has built a formidable force opposite Aksai Chin. It was the forward elements of this force that President Xi Jinping visited after taking over as Chairman of the Central Military Commission in the peak of winter 2012-13 and this is also where the longest stand-off in recent times has taken place on the Depsang Plateau.

In the maritime domain India must take advantage of its own, “string of pearls,” in the Indian Ocean firstly our island territories Andaman and Nicobar and Lakshadweep and relations with countries in East Africa and South East Asia to advantage to establish dominance over the seascape

Indian military strategy under such circumstances will have to ensure that war is preferably localised and limited and does not expand into a two front conﬂagration with Pakistan as well on the western front. To achieve this there is much talk about raising an offensive mountain corps which is to be employed in the Eastern theatre for so called grab actions if the current discourse in open media is to be believed. A smarter course would be to use the buffer afforded by Tibet to our Northern borders effectively along with

Chinese concerns appear to be based on the premise that India could take demonstrative action in the Aksai Chin area especially after the recent activation of the advanced landing ground in Daulat Beg Oldi and acquisition of the C 130 J and C 17 heavy transport aircraft from the United States. The Chinese hierarchy may also not trust the US to restrain use of these assets for forward transportation of Indian troops to launch off points in case the need so arises.

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an assertive China

AN INGENIOUS INDIA? back was India’s preserve but of late has seen substantial Chinese influence not just in Pakistan but also in Sri Lanka with forays in Nepal, Bangladesh and Maldives that could be turned to advantage in case a government antagonist to New Delhi or favourable to Beijing occupies office in Kathmandu, Dhaka or Male respectively. India has itself to blame for Sri Lanka falling into China’s lap so to say due to complexities of management of internal politics of competing Tamil interests. While India has had a singular role to play in cutting off the supply of arms, munitions and other material to the LTTE from South East Asia this has remained low key whereas the far lesser role of supply of low quality arms and munitions to Colombo has been flagged from time to time by India baiters in Sri Lanka to give prominence to China and Pakistan.

Software and IT exports seem to be a lucrative alternative provided we develop more Chinese language experts and become a bridge between China and the English speaking world What emerges is the weakness of Indian military capability in the Northern Sector in Ladakh against China as well as Pakistan. Force accretion may therefore be in order. A smart strategy would also imply that the force build-up is carried out with as much transparency as possible while retaining operational security. In the maritime domain India must take advantage of its own, “string of pearls,” in the Indian Ocean ﬁrstly our island territories Andaman and Nicobar and Lakshadweep and relations with countries in East Africa and South East Asia to advantage to establish dominance over the seascape. Smart strategy also demands

military cyber, information technology and communications architecture from a debilitating strike even before the operations commence. It is important that the Cyber command being planned should be activated on priority.

building-up capability to protect assets in space howsoever limited they may seem in comparison with China’s own military satellite programme. This will require developing protection against hard and soft kills. In addition a satellite kill capability may also have to be considered and former DRDO chief Dr VK Saraswat had spoken about the same in 2012, what progress there is in this direction is difﬁcult to ascertain.

While all these measures outlined herein when fructiﬁed would provide a strong potential to meet the challenges of a future conﬂict with China by implication the same will act as deterrence against an open war, which should be the primary objective. But as sage military planning goes, India should not be found wanting to take to war be it in the territorial or space domain. That is what smart strategy is all about.

On the non-kinetic front, the exposure of the PLA’s Unit 61398 based in Shanghai has underlined the need for developing cyber defences to meet threats that such outﬁts pose on a real time basis in a peacetime situation. This will have to be supplemented by defence of the

In as much as the next level of engagement competition, presently this is evident in three intersecting domains, regional, global and resources. In the global and regional domain India and China are contesting for inﬂuence in the same zones, South Asia or Indian subcontinent which till some years

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Reversing this perception is important and resetting relations with Sri Lanka which would require Tamil political leadership to be on board has to be a part of the smart strategy in this domain. Similarly preventing loss of inﬂuence in other countries in the region is essential though this need not imply denial of access to China but only to be able to engage with these countries taking advantage of shared geographical borders and age-old political and cultural relations that transcend what may be more of a transitory relationship that has been established by Beijing. The battle for inﬂuence in other parts of the world including Africa and resources may require much investment in soft power of which fortunately India has aplenty based on our leadership role in assisting many of the former colonies of this continent in gaining independence, people to people relations including diaspora in countries as South Africa and proximity across the Indian Ocean. Increasing engagement to match China in this sphere will require far greater focus than seen hitherto fore. While Chinese engineers and businessmen

are seen all across Africa harvesting minerals, building dams and selling engineering goods, India will have to provide incentives to our dynamic private sector to make up for lost time. India’s strategy to engage China cooperatively will be based on common interests be it on issues as global trade, climate change and having a greater say in the Bretton Woods institutions as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. Working out common strategies for interaction in these forums and combating inﬂuence of the developed world would be necessary. Bilateral and multi-lateral forums as BRICS will remain important to not just take along China but also to be able to lead a coalition of the South. Trade and economic engagement is an important arm of this strategy,

while there is focus on the adverse trade balance this cannot be set right by complaining to China about the same but through creating tradable surplus. Software and IT exports seem to be a lucrative alternative provided we develop more Chinese language experts and become a bridge between China and the English speaking world. There is no doubt that a triad of competition, conﬂict and cooperation is likely to rule India China relations in the near future. An aggressive China need not necessarily mean an adversarial China if we develop some of the strategies outlined in each domain to successfully defend our national interests while blunting the rough edges that may arise due to differences either on the border, in relationship with neighbours, trade or resources.

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internal security

HOMELAND BULWARK

CENTRAL RESERVE With a strength of 230 battalions the CRPF is the largest Central Armed Police Force in India. It was raised in the year 1931 and has now been designated as the main counter-insurgency force for the country. The force has a deployment of almost 60 Bns in Jammu and Kashmir, 35 Bns in NE and almost 75 Bns in the LWE-affected areas. A specialised force called the Rapid Action Force (RAF) was thereafter raised in the year 1992 to deal with rioting and other grave law and order problems. Today there are 10 BnsofRAF.AspecialisedCommando Force was raised in the year 2008 and was named Commando Battalion for Resolute Action. Today there are 10 CoBRA Battalions. Presently there are three Mahila Bns and there is a proposal to raise another Mahila Bn in the near future. In the last three years, this force has done exceedingly well and is the proud recipient of 04 Shaurya Chakra’s, 18 PPMGs, 178 PMGs.

RPF today is the largest Paramilitary Force in the country with the strength of almost 230 Bns. The total strength of the force today is approx 2.9 lakh and it is deployed all over the country from Kashmir in the north to Thiruvananthapuram in the south, Gandhinagar in the west to Manipur in the east. This force, which was raised in the year 1931, has now been designated as the main counter-insurgency force for the country. This mandate was given in the report ﬁled by the Group of Ministers on National Security after the Kargil war incident.

Deployment

CRPF is today deployed in 3 major operational theatres of the country namely Jammu and Kashmir, North-east and the Left Wing Extremism-affected areas. The force has a deployment of almost 60 Bns in Jammu and Kashmir, 35 Bns in NE and almost 75 Bns in the LWE-affected areas. There are a number of other states also where CRPF is deployed namely Haryana, Punjab, Rajasthan, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Karnataka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh etc.

Special Forces

RAF: CRPF was initially raised to counter the varied law and order situations arising in the country. A specialised force called the Rapid Action Force (RAF) was thereafter raised in the year 1992 to deal with rioting and other grave law and order problems. Today there are 10 Bns of RAF located at

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places, which have traditionally faced law and order problems in the past. This Force has rendered invaluable service during the 1993 ﬂoods in Delhi, 1994 ﬂoods in Surat, 2001 Earthquake in Gujarat, 2004 Tsunami in South India. In recognition of all such efforts, this force was decorated with the President’s Colours in the year 2003. It has also proved its competence on a global level by regularly sending specially trained contingents of Female Formed Police Units to Liberia since 2007 and also Male Formed Police Units to Liberia since 2009.

CoBRA: A specialised Commando Force was raised in the year 2008 and was named Commando Battalion for Resolute Action. This is a specialised commando force whose expertise is in conducting stealth jungle operations and has the capacity to stay covertly inside jungles and survive on their own for more than a week. The skill-set of personnel of all the 10 Bns have been honed by getting them trained in the Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School (CIJWS) at Vairengte, Mizoram. They have also been given intensive anti-naxal training to counter the strategy and the designs of the naxals by getting them trained with the Greyhounds force of AP and also conducting joint operations with them. Since their inception, they have proved their worth by apprehending over a thousand naxals and insurgents and neutralising almost a hundred such anti-nationals.

POLICE FORCE STAUNCH SENTINELS This Force is presently much in demand by the different states and nine of its Bns are currently deployed in the LWE area whereas one of its Battalion is conducting anti-insurgent operations in Assam.

Hot Springs Incident

After the occupation of Tibet by China wherein Dalai Lama was forced to flee Tibet, the Indian Government sent two Coys of CRPF to Ladakh to guard its borders. 10 outposts were established deep inside territory of Ladakh to prevent any Chinese aggression and act as a first sound post for the Army authorities. At that point of time there were no roads or any communication link. However, on 21st October 1959, twenty CRPF personnel who were out patrolling in Hot Springs area came under severe attack from the Chinese troops without any provocation. 10 CRPF personnel were killed immediately whereas the others fought bravely and were able to repulse the attack for quite some time. This act of the Chinese caused widespread resentment in the country and the Indian Government decided to salute the bravery of these martyred CRPF personnel by declaring 21st October as a Police Commemoration Day. Every year on this day police forces all over the country pay homage to the martyred police personnel who have made the supreme sacrifice of laying down their lives for the cause of bringing peace and order to their motherland.

The brave Female ofﬁcers of CRPF have done their service proud with Mahila Constable Kamlesh Kumari being awarded the highest peace-time Gallantry Award Ashok Chakra for her act of bravery in defending the Parliament in terrorist attack on 13th December, 2002. Constable Bimla Devi was conferred the Sena Medal for recovering a large quantity of explosives on 31st August, 1988 at Jaffna where she was posted as a part of Indian Peace Keeping Force. Similarly AC Smt Santosh Devi was awarded the President’s Police Medal for Gallantry in the year 2002 for bravely defending the holy Ayodhaya shrine against the militants.

PANKAJ KUMAR SINGH IPS

The writer is IG Operations, CRPF Directorate and has had an eventful tenure as IG, Operations Chhattisgarh, one of the worst Naxal affected areas in the country. He is an alumnus of National Defence College, New Delhi, FBI Academy, USA and CBI, New Delhi. He has been awarded President’s Police Medal for Distinguished Service, Police Medal for Meritorious Service and UN Peace Medal.

A police contingent is sent every year to this location at Hot Springs in Ladakh where a memorial service is held on this day at the Martyr’s column, which has been erected at the site of the incident.

Foreign Missions

CRPF ﬁrst participated in the IPKF Mission in Sri Lanka in the year 1987-89. It has subsequently participated in the UN Mission in Cambodia (1991-93), UN Mission in Haiti (1994-95), UN Mission in East Africa, Somalia and Mozambique (2000-05), UN Mission in Kosovo (2000-05), Female Police Unit in Liberia (2007 onwards), Male Police Unit in Liberia (2009 onwards).

Mahila Battalion

The Mahila Battalion was ﬁrst formed in the year 1986. It has come a long way since then and has proved its worth in a number of sensitive situations. Today there are three Mahila Bns and there is a proposal to raise another Mahila Bn in the near future.

Decorations

This force whose main task earlier was to control law and order in the country has now graduated to become the main counter-insurgency force in the country. It has proved its worth in all the major disturbed theatres of the country and has won laurels for its performance in Jammu and Kashmir, in all states of north-east and also while controlling the naxal menace in the LWE affected states. Since its inception the force has been the proud recipient of various decorations as the George Cross Kings Police Medal for Gallantry, Ashok Chakra, Veer Chakra, Shaurya Chakra, Padma Shri and other medals for gallantry. With a strong thrust on anti-naxal operations in the last three years, this force

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internal security

HOMELAND BULWARK and is definitely the most preferred Central Armed Police Force by the different states for conducting joint operations. The CRPF presently along with specialised CoBRA Forces have launched aggressive operations in remote and inaccessible areas by using excellent technology support and have achieved excellent results. The CRPF did suffer setbacks in Chhattisgarh in the year 2010 at Chintalnar where it lost 75 of its personnel and once again at Dhaudai where it lost 27 of its personnel within a time gap of three months. However, the force was quick to learn its lessons – laid a great amount of emphasis on training, provided excellent leadership by posting operationally ‘A’ class officers in all these areas and showed an excellent learning curve whereby on the one hand they were able to inflict heavy losses on the naxals, ensured large amount of apprehensions and on the other hand they started moving tactically, using the best available technology support and reduced their losses in a major way. The CRPF personnel have in the last two years moved into so called inaccessible liberated areas and launched major antinaxal operations in Maad area and southern Bijapur of Chhattisgarh, in cut-off area of Odisha, Bhimbandh and Chakrabandha in Bihar and Saranda, Budha-pahar and Latehar areas of Jharkhand. All these have led to an increase in the number of naxals apprehended / neutralised and

has done exceedingly well and is the proud recipient of 04 Shaurya Chakra’s, 18 PPMGs, 178 PMGs in last two and a half years only (2011-13).

Operations

The main thrust of operations as on date is in the three major theatres of Jammu and Kashmir, north-east and LWE areas. There are 60 Bns of CRPF deployed in Jammu and Kashmir, 35 Bns in north-east and 75 Bns in LWE areas. In Jammu and Kashmir, CRPF has been ﬁghting shoulder to shoulder with Jammu and Kashmir Police and Army. Very good intelligence based joint-operations have been conducted and a number of militants and

leaders of banned outﬁts have either been apprehended or neutralised. A signiﬁcant amount of arms and ammunition have also been recovered in the process. There is excellent coordination with all different agencies in Jammu and Kashmir and it is a result of this good synergy that CRPF is much in demand in the state of Jammu and Kashmir and is today the preferred force for anti-insurgency operations. In north-east, CRPF is deployed in all the seven sister states and has done commendable work in curbing the insurgent activity herein. Over 200 insurgents have been arrested in the current year and quite a few have also been neutralised. There has also been substantial recovery of arms and ammunition and with the pressure mounted by security forces, a number of insurgents have also surrendered in the process.

The force personnel have graduated from the use of mere lathis and cane-shields in controlling law and order situations to using UBGL, CGRL and GPS and other related devices while conducting operations. There is great emphasis on specialised training 42

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The LWE poses the maximum challenge to the security scenario of the country and that is why even the Prime Minister of India dubbed it as the number one internal security problem facing the country today. CRPF which is deployed in all the LWE states is the main bulwark for conducting anti-naxal operations in these states

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internal security

announcement

HOMELAND BULWARK

The CRPF did suffer setbacks in Chhattisgarh in the year 2010 at Chintalnar where it lost 75 of its personnel and once again at Dhaudai where it lost 27 of its personnel within a time gap of three months. However, the force was quick to learn its lessons also an increase in the number of encounters with the naxals. As a result of this, the recruitment amongst the naxals has gone down, the number of reported training camps have reduced and their holding of Jan Adalats has also gone down. Intelligence sources have indicated that the senior naxal leadership of the Maoists is concerned about the regular ingress of security forces in their safe-havens, the constant attrition in the naxal cadres and the losses which the security forces have inﬂicted on them in the last one and half years.

Training

A great emphasis has been laid on training the CRPF personnel

for anti-insurgency and anti-naxal operations by opening new specialised schools and also by opening new training centres at different places. A new Institute of IED Management has been opened at Pune, which provides complete information about the different kinds of IEDs that are being used by naxals in different theatres to all the CRPF personnel so that this threat can be neutralised in a major way. It is to be kept in mind that since the ﬁrepower and training of the security forces has become much better in the last couple of years, the naxals have been resorting to IEDs in a major way to inﬂict damage

on the security forces. A National Institute of Jungle Craft has also started functioning at Belgaum, Karnataka which has been approved by MHA. The specialised training of the CoBRA Force is held here to give them the cutting edge in their anti-naxal operations. The use of latest weaponry as UBGL, MGL and CGRL has been incorporated and emphasis has been laid on use of latest technology in navigation as GPS and ensuring various kinds of surveillance methods. There is great emphasis in this school on employing the right kind of ﬁeldcraft and tactics and preparing the specialised CoBRA Force for long duration stealth operations in the remote jungles for periods ranging from 7-10 days.

The First and the Only ISO 9001:2008 Certified Defence and Security Magazine in India

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A Dog Breeding & Training School has also been opened at Taralu near Bangalore where specialised dogs as Labradors, German Shepherds and Belgian Malinois are being trained to track the movement of naxals and to sniff-out explosives from jungle tracks and other areas wherein the security forces move. The school has been very successful and the canines have been providing invaluable support to the security forces while conducting operations inside deep jungles. A new National Academy of Public Order Management has also been opened at Meerut, UP wherein the RAF personnel are being trained to scientiﬁcally deal with law and order situations by using latest techniques in non-lethal weapons.

Conclusion

The CRPF has come a long way from merely dealing with law and order situations to being the lead force for counter-insurgency and anti-naxal operations in the country. The force personnel have graduated from the use of mere lathis and cane-shields in controlling law and order situations to using UBGL, CGRL and GPS and other related devices while conducting operations. There is great emphasis on specialised training and this is what is helping the force to achieve laurels in different theatres in the country today. The force is young, has good leadership and with excellent ﬁrepower and training is today well equipped to serve the country in an effective and professional manner.

July 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

We invite distinguished subject experts to write for DSA and share their views with our readers, defence and security professionals and policy and decision-makers around the world. The themes and sub-themes are: September 2013: Theme: CPOs and their critical role in homeland / internal security Sub-theme: Role of intelligence in internal and external security Deadline for Submission of article: 5th August 2013

October 2013: DSA 4th Anniversary Special Theme: Indian Air Force: Girding for the Future Sub-theme: Global Air Power Trends Deadline for Submission of article: 5th August 2013

Articles received at DSA HQs are subject to approval of the editorial team

For subscription write to: subscription@dsalert.org online@dsalert.org Or call: +91-11-23243999, 23287999, 9958382999

internal security

WANING AUTHORITY?

PARAMILITARY

lives and inﬂuences, ancient cultural practices by means of natural selection dilute and modify organically. Greek history tells us that Zeus was the God of Gods and from the ﬁrst Persian Empire, Ahura Mazda was the Divine One. In Persia, where once it was Zarathustra, now in Iran and Iraq it is someone and something else.

POSITIONAL UNCERTAINTY REDEFINED

Is the Maoist movement gaining ground or has part of the insurgency relocated to surrounding states? AP is bordered by other states like Chhattisgarh, Orissa and Maharashtra which all add saturation and hues to the Red Corridor. The Greyhounds have been effective in their campaigns, however without respective forces in other states isn’t the current strategy failing to eradicate or adequately suppress enemy activities? Utilising paramilitary forces is easier said than done. Maoists attempting to decimate Caste systems and positions of governmental power hold little value in the grand scheme to stabilise India and protect the people. Stalin and Mao were not in favour of education, instead opting for the lowest common denominator in their proletarian revolution. Science by its very nature is evidence-based. Marxism, Leninism and Maoism separate or collectively attribute to millions of deaths and crimes against humanity. How successful were these revolutions? Selling false hope in an intangible product is criminal and morally unacceptable. It begs the question, what exactly is the “people’s war”?

ddressing the Maoist issue in India is a conundrum. On one hand increasing paramilitary activity is much needed but it’s not the total solution for the insurgencies that India continues to face head-on. To deploy a force in order to remove an opposing one leaves space for another opposing force to take its place. A winning trifecta of paramilitary deployment welded with education, training and a support programme which is then incorporated into an overall plan of governmental transparency is needed. The ﬁrst question should always be … why? Why are there anti-government forces? Is the government of any country, not just India, involved in activities unbeﬁtting its people? Is a government corrupt and / or tyrannical in its pursuit of the goals of a few? Looking at the 7 demands from the Communist Party of India CPI(M) may be indicative of the driving force of the uprising.

A common Modus Operandi (MO) of insurgents and X-political movements is to act under the auspices of “rights”. These ad hoc groups claim to be ﬁghting for the rights of the people yet more often than not the “rights” of the “people” are

July 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

ORISSA

MAHARASHTRA

CHHATTISGARH

ANDHRA PRADESH

never listed, defined nor legitimised on merit. Stemming from a hatred of an opposing ideology / philosophy is at the forefront of most objections. This hatred is quite often a result of an injustice to a small group of individuals and feeds darkened revenge. Other times it's a simple case of greed for money, power and territories. The line of true purpose often becomes blurred and the plight of local people entwined in the misguided ideals of insurgents. One of the topics raised by groups such as CPI(M) is that of the Indian caste system. There is substance in critiquing a caste system that continues to persist in the face of modern ideals like democracy, equal opportunity and individual freedom, however dissolving cultural roots artificially by war isn’t guaranteed to bring balance to social inequality. India, a middle power nation, with limited resources and lax human rights standards runs on internally uncooperative and ineffective governmental institution with flaws in various sectors overlapping and reinforcing the deficiencies leading to multiple omissions and violations. The essence of counter-insurgency operation lies in the structure and not in the roots anymore. The caste system is deeply rooted in Hinduism, historically setup by Vedic leaders. It has served India for thousands of years and to date in part has brought about solidarity and survival. Endogamy, a caste characteristic is also common in many other cultures and ethnic groups throughout the world. India is not the only country in the world to battle the question of caste. With contemporary

Japan is an example of successful religious evolutionary integration. Originally a Shinto country – Shinto being spirituality indigenous to Japan and the people of Japan – at one point in time the Japanese government socially merged Buddhism with Shintoism. Nowadays Japan looks at religion and culture in a syncretic manner. That is to say there have been many events in history that have shaped modern Japan by way of integration. The royal family is still respected, the history and culture is being celebrated daily whilst the country / society continues to develop in parallel with modern global trends. Maoists attempting to decimate caste systems and positions of governmental power hold little value in the grand scheme to stabilise India and protect the people. Stalin and Mao were not in favour of education, instead opting for the lowest common denominator in their proletarian revolutionist plans. Yes, the distribution of wealth needs to be addressed but Maoism is not the answer. Marxism-Leninism-Maoism − how can they coexist and prove the efﬁcacy of wealth distribution? This theoretical trichotomy is a cocktail of disaster. Saying something is true doesn't necessarily make it so. Applying critical thinking instead of relying on blind faith to discover the true nature of a form of government is needed. Science by its very nature is evidence-based. Marxism, Leninism and Maoism separate or collectively attribute to millions of deaths and crimes against humanity. How successful were these revolutions? Selling false hope in an intangible product is criminal and morally

DR RUPALI JESWAL

The writer is an Intelligence and Terrorism Analyst, Clinical Psychologist and Clinical Hypnotherapist based in South-East Asia. She has also received training in specialised areas including counter-terrorism, intelligence and tactical operations. She specialises in cognitive learning processes and neural pathway response and how these factors apply to specialised trainings. She is an expert in the ﬁeld of non-verbal micro and macro expression for deception and detection and also using non-verbal assets for psychological self-assessment in conjunction with Emotional Intelligence to enhance the human mind, personality, image and spirit. She is a member of ICPA (International Corrections and Prisons Association), IACSP (International Association for Counter-Terrorism and Security Professionals), APA (American Psychological Association),APP (Association of Professional Psychologists), FPRI (Foreign Policy Research Institute) and UK Certiﬁed Hypnotherapist and General Hypnotherapy Register.

DAMIEN MARTIN

The co-writer is an IT and Security professional, Counterterrorism and Combatives expert based in Japan for the last 10 years. He specialises in cyber threats, social engineering and corporate security and a regular keynote presenter for ASIS and OSAC. Currently he is the Director for the IACSP Japan and an Associate Professional with the OPSEC Society and a Certiﬁed Master Anti-terrorism Specialist. He is the only PDR (Personal Defence Readiness – Tony Blauer’s SPEAR system) coach in North East Asia.

July 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

internal security

WANING AUTHORITY? units take the form of doing their utmost to preserve their structure and strength on one hand and destroy that of the enemies.

Mobile Warfare: Mao carefully deﬁned as the form in

which regular armies wage quick-decisions, offensive campaigns and battles on exterior lines along extensive fronts and over big areas of operations after this comes the strategic stalemate and then counteroffensive in the form of international allied powers. A successful people’s war is about gun rising! Phase III of a protracted war encompasses – Mobile warfare! As reported in many newspapers in May – “An audacious Maoist attack in broad daylight killed 24 people, including the top Congress leadership in the state.”

unacceptable. It begs the question, what exactly is the “peoples war”? Evidence that corruption exists even when the imperialistic slate is wiped clean is stated here. From an article from Businessweek it stated the following:

“China’s attempt to level the playing ﬁeld only broadens it.” “The richest 70 members of China’s legislature added more to their wealth last year than the combined net worth of all 535 members of the US Congress, the president and his Cabinet and the nine Supreme Court justices.” http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-02-27/ china-s-billionaire-people-s-congress-makes-capitol-hilllook-like-pauper

Paramilitary: The birthplace of The Greyhounds is the state of Andhra Pradesh (AP). Formed in 2005 this elite unit was created speciﬁcally to address the activities of left wing groups. It has in recent years been successful in reducing Maoist support in Andhra Pradesh. AP is bordered by other states like Chhattisgarh, Orissa and Maharashtra which all add saturation and hues to the Red Corridor. Is the Maoist movement gaining ground or has part of the insurgency relocated to surrounding states? The Greyhounds have been effective in their campaigns, however without respective forces in other states isn’t the current strategy failing to eradicate or adequately suppress enemy activities? Utilising paramilitary forces is easier said than done. The simple answer may feel like “Lets get rid of the Maoists and our troubles are over” when the real solution is the unison of Paramilitary (elite forces and intelligence), health and education, transparency of government. All of these elements will help quash any future uprising or insurgency and threaten internal security. Wars of today are all asymmetric in nature, what is happening with Free Syrian Army is also a pattern ﬁtting to Mao. It’s the second phase of the people’s war. In a revolutionary war the principle – to strive to the utmost to preserve one’s own strength and destroy that of the enemy is directly aligned with political principles. From military history – in China’s war of resistance against Japan, the military action meant use of armed force to defend the motherland and to attain this, the operations of the armed

July 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

The states that harbour the CPI contain similar characteristics; a rural identity, impoverishment, contain an abundance of natural resources, home to tribal populations and comparatively higher illiteracy population rates. These areas are generally hostile and inaccessible making intelligence and policing slow and cumbersome. Not only are the guerrillas difficult to locate but so too are the weapons. Assault rifles are a combination of smuggled, used, homemade or reverse engineered and the explosive material used is generally fertiliser based. The latest attack in Chhattisgarh improvised approximately 30 kilograms of Ammonium Nitrate (H4NO3) in powder form. If the explosives contained a military grade substance like C-4 or Semtex or a putty derivative, the ability to control access and monitor is easier. Controlling, monitoring and tracking agriculturally based explosive material in rural areas like Chhattisgarh is likened to a needle in a haystack. Guerrilla units in operation work swiftly, act secretly, ambush, bringing quick decisions and avoiding passive defence. With strategy the tactical defensive also includes the disposition of forces for resistance at narrow passes, strategic points, villages and rivers. The objective is to exhaust and deplete the enemy. However, the basic principle of guerrilla warfare must be the offensive and guerrilla warfare is more offensive in its character than regular warfare. The offensive, moreover, must take the form of surprise attacks. The attack in May (Chhattisgarh) shouldn't be all that surprising. Roughly termed, the insurgents utilise a flypaper strategy (strategy based on the Flypaper Theory) even in computer hacking there is a similar stratagem – A Honeypot. Did the convoy ignore the guidelines when travelling through Maoist-dominated areas? Taking into account technology, intelligence gathering and SOP it should not have been difficult to sanitise the route those key politicians travelled on. Indian forces combined operate approximately 60 Heron drones. The Indian media had also questioned why the US$ 4 million-plus Israeli-made Heron long-range surveillance drones flown across the region didn’t pick up a Maoist ambush team. Countries with regions affected by insurgencies become a vanishing point for incompetent and corrupt officials, perverse interest of political parties harnessing assets to meet their own needs and maintain a semblance of normalcy, structuring electorate interest of dominant political party for their ‘hot seat’ lack of capable public

administration, police agencies operating on rudimentary weapons, undermanned forces, weak infrastructures, deep-rooted conﬂict over landownership, struggles for the rights over mineral and forest wealth, exploitation of peasantry, unsupportive and corrupted Sarpanch, denial of wages, human dignity, justice – all this plays a signiﬁcant role in alienating a large chunk of the working class. Dandakaranya forests are called the “Liberated Zone.” Carving out a “liberated zone” requires a military confrontation with the forces of the government. At what point did this fail?

Endogamy, a caste characteristic is also common in many other cultures and ethnic groups throughout the world. India is not the only country in the world to battle the question of caste

Objective: Build combat power, arsenal and equipment and gain popular support. Risking their own life they need to build a reputation as the winning power. This means quick attacks against isolated government checkpoints, outposts, convoys etc – hit, inflict, capture and show. Propaganda war equals real war. Mao eloquently simplified the process by saying that rebel forces “must accumulate the results of these partial destructions of the enemy into major strategic victories”. Education is the opposite of ignorance. Are the Adivasis involved and if so is it by ignorance, necessity or coercion? What if there are innocent supporters that wish to leave. Is there apostasy from Maoist Movements? To educate people occupying rural areas there needs to be a compromise, a meeting of the minds between government officials and tribal leaders. Exposure to modern education in the fields of science, language, health and society should assist in moulding a more informed tribal society and including them in India’s future.

"We'll gladly put you at the helm of our little ﬂeet. But our ships must all sail in the same direction." – Licio Lucchesi The Maoist issue in many ways hinges on the education of the tribes people. They should receive quality assistance to emphatically stamp out the use and abuse by inﬂuential leaders of resistance groups. It may be Maoists now but could be another extremist revolutionary group later on. Providing qualitative solutions to quantitative issues is the key to regional cohesion.

Basic Infrastructure: Roads, communication, energy, water, the building blocks of development are all largely missing. Operation Green Hunt may have hurt the Maoists but they are now more determined than ever. Remote areas not only lack administration but also schools and hospitals therefore preventing any competent ofﬁcer being posted there. These areas are similar to Thailand and it’s own insurgency issues. Posting in these areas is termed as “punishment post”. Insurgents can merrily rally the local populace and foster an environment conducive for establishing parallel agencies and services replacing the government. Didn’t the Taliban arise from the status of a mujahideen group, a military unit and after the Soviet invasion ended they rose in power due to the weakness in the government and replaced the Soviet warlords in

the Afghan government? The third phase of the Sino-Japanese protracted war began in the summer of 1945, as the Japanese forces were withdrawing from China. But they had not been defeated by a people's war; they had been defeated by the overwhelming power of the allies. Both Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong had been farsighted in planning their "joint" struggle against the Japanese. Each had realised that the Allies would ultimately defeat the Japanese and that the crucial struggle for control of China would be between them. As for Mao's theory of the protracted war, it remains a classic of the military art and can be applied universally. (Mao’s protracted war: Theory vs practice. Lt Col John Woodmansee Jr USA). The insurgents in India are talking about building-up of armies and preparing for a decisive defeat on the armed forces of the state. Whether it is decisively 2016 or 2050 the point is that with formation and progression of base areas and mobilising the masses, increasing their political consciousness to overthrow the state through gradual gain in the military strength and moving towards mobile warfare is a need to be met. If the age long Mao’s pattern is followed then next comes conventional war and counteroffensive in the form of international support, which is not just a rhetoric because the result of the Hamburg Conference last year in November clearly showed the international support to “People’s war” in India. In the case of Uganda the protracted war went through all 3 stages, starting with agitation and clandestine operations between the years 1971-1978 then guerrilla warfare, mobile warfare and then conventional warfare with capture of Kampala in 1985. Through the “Naga Narrative of Conﬂict” we know that politics provides the frame of reference in counter-insurgency. In the Mizo and the Naga insurgency the Indian Army was sent to quell the violence. The growing underground violence, the lack of visible political direction from Assam, the attitude of the local population towards the suffering of Naga population due to insurgent and counter-insurgent crossﬁre severed the link between Assam and the Naga Hills beyond any hopes of reconciliation. As a result the Nagaland state was formed in 1963. The Maoist strategy is that not only do they oppose development, but also they take advantage of this feeling of neglect in remote underdeveloped areas. Indian counter-insurgency operations have always been enemy

July 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

internal security

an assertive China

WANING AUTHORITY?

1 July 2013

International Day of Support to the People’s War in India In the anniversary of the martyrdom of comrade Azad, leader of the CPI(M), beloved by the revolutionary masses in India and the peoples in the world, all proletarian and anti-imperialist forces strengthen their support to the People's war and honour all the martyrs of the revolution. Nothing can subdue the fighting spirit of the revolutionary people of India and the CPI(M).

The Indian regime has unleashed suppression: murders, rapes, massacres - the infamous Operation Green Hunt - against the oppressed and fighting people of the country in general and the Adivasis in particular, against Maoist leaders and cadres, in order to crush the rebellion of people and stop the march of the People's War toward a New Democratic and anti-imperialist power. But the people's war cannot be stopped. The people's war with an historic attack hit the political rulers responsible for inhuman atrocities and fascist terror against masses. Rulers in India were in the big illusion that they were unbeatable, but the People are invincible. People only are the makers of the history. Now more than ever the international support to the people’s war cannot be stopped. After the great international Conference in Hamburg on 24 November,

an international day of support in various countries is launched on 1st July The people's war in India is our war against imperialism and our best support is to intensify the antimperialist struggle on world-level!

International Committee to Support the People’s War in India

csgpindia@gmail.com

1 July 2013

International Day of Support to the People’s War in India Historic attack to India rulers ! ‘Green Hunt’ cannot stop the People's War! All together until Indian people’s victory !

To subjugate insurgent activities an institutional overhaul is needed. The militants maintain their centre of gravity, which shifts for the task being carried out in dispersion, they have clearly deﬁned tasks, ﬁelds of operations, places for reassembly, time limits for actions and ways and means of liaison.

"Those who cannot remember the past, are condemned to repeat it". – George Santayana. This quote is mentioned by many but understood by so few. Resolute, ethical leadership is a necessity for any counter-insurgency operations. Men like Briggs, Templar, David Petraeus, Maj Gen RK Kochar (Retd) of the Indian Army, played key roles in getting agencies to work together towards a common goal. Insurgency affected areas contain 3 different categories of population: minority support base for the insurgent, a passive neutral majority and a silent minority that is against the insurgency. Counter-insurgency operators must be strategic enough to form a bridge between the silent minority and the neutral minority.

References

1. http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/ Detail/?lng=en&id=151748 2 . h t t p: / / w w w . r e d i f f . c o m / n e w s / s l i d e - s h o w / slide-show-1-the-maoists-are-looking-to-overthrow-theindian-state-by-2050/20130527.htm 3. http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/chairmanmao-vs-president-assad-people’s-war-in-syria 4. http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/ selected-works/

rs rty ma e’s he pl ll t Peo and and d a he st ia an in t riali Ind zad ive pe in e A n l tim les rad lutio e an r ugg Comrevo d th r y st of rs antiona d Wa olu worl rev the in

We call all the solidarity forces in all countries, using all the forms of struggle, to inform and mobilize the masses against the Indian regime and imperialism

6. Small Wars Journal: Counter-Insurgency Best Practices: Applicability to Northeast India, Namrata Goswami, Journal Article | December 6, 2012. 7. Selected works of Mao Zedong: The Period of the War of Resistance Against Japan (I) [Paperback] ISBN-13: 978-0898752342. 8. MILESTONES: 1945-1952; The Chinese Revolution of 1949. Ofﬁce of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, United States Department of State.

International Committee to Support the People’s War in India

9. The Naga Narrative of Conﬂict: Envisioning a Resolution Roadmap, Namrata Goswami, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 31, Iss. 2, 2007.

centric away from “hearts and mind” strategy and the successes of the Indian forces have never been clean, involving tradeoffs in the shape of criminal activity, corruption, dysfunctional systems and resulting in – further insurgency.

10. Imperialism and Fascism in Uganda, Mahmood Mamdani.

csgpindia@gmail.com

5. India’s Approach to Counterinsurgency and the Naxalite Problem. October 31, 2011, Sameer Lalwani.

July 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

11. In Fight, No: 53, of Afghanistan.

Published by Islamic Emirates

BOOK REVIEW

1962 AND THE MCMAHON LINE SAGA

hina is an extremely fascinating country and so are the Chinese people. Naturally, China provides so many challenges to researchers to explore unexplored areas and issues. Of the several such issues one issue of ever growing interest is Chinese aggression against then a newly independent and a developing country, like India was in October 1962. While that interest was there to study India China war debacle, it has grown in many folds since the nation went through in October 2012 ﬁftieth year − not a golden jubilee, but a “Black Jubilee”. Claude Arpi – a French national living in India, has been writing extensively on China, Tibet and Europe. What I have noticed in his scholarly writings, is his abilities to see a foreign / security policy from a domestic political perspective. It is not uncommon for a foreign / security policy maker to use an issue some times to enhance his political power or divert attention of people from his domestic problems.

them seize a big piece of land … Since Nehru sticks his head out and insists on fighting, for us not to fight with him would not be proper. Courtesy emphasizes reciprocity.” Yes, Nehru and his close advisers, CLAUDE ARPI who created a scenario to fight Chinese, without any military, strategic planning on the assumption that China, would not fight with India. You do not fight a war, what China described as a ‘massive attack’ as the author rightly says with “total lack of preparedness of the troops in terms of armament, ammunition, clothing and food supply. Some senior officers in the Army Headquarters in Delhi may have dreamt to ‘throw out the Chinese or take ‘the Thagla Ridge’ but it was a pipedream only.”

All this was done in the name of protecting the McMahon Line drawn by Henry McMahon to define boundaries between British India and an independent Tibet—with Chinese representative participating. Krishna Menon as In this book, the author, after tracing the history of British Defence Minister did not take the trouble to protect McMahon efforts to open up to Tibet, discusses at length the origin Line in the west when Chinese occupied Aksai Chin. As the and implementation of McMahon Line, discusses at length author remarks: “Delhi had made a fool of itself by not his thesis that Sino-Indian border war was largely a result of having noticed the occupation of Aksai Chin for several years Mao Zedong’s effort to reassert his fullest control on policy …” Krishna Menon thought something had to be done “a sort of psychological and political compensation.” Thus he making towards India. launched ‘Forward Policy.” While Chinese said they did not Though, Indian security establishment then did not know, recognise McMahon Line, for India, the McMahon Line was 1962 was, as author says, a turning point for Mao, who was sacrosanct; but in the eastern sector, India moved north of it “depressed over the agricultural crisis and angry with the in the Thagla Ridge. Chinese wanted to enforce India’s respect party elite … he was less able to work his will … was in to the McMahon Line as Mao was looking for an excuse. War followed; Sir Henry McMahon must temporary eclipse, spending most his never have envisaged that “hurriedly time in bed.” In January 1962 at a 7,000 conducted survey” would trigger a war cadre conference, Mao came under one day! India could have protected attack; as a result, decided to temporarily McMahon Line, in the 1950’s by taking retire. But as the author says: “By the a firm stand against Chinese violation Fall of 1962, Mao would return with a of Tibetan independent / autonomous bang. The conflict with India was closely status. McMahon Line’s status is closely linked with his comeback.” linked to Tibetan status. India could have tried to physically demarcate By September 1962 Mao was in India-China borders based on McMahon complete control of India policy. India’s maps. Hence, India must take much swift takeover of Goa, according to some, of the blame for not seeking to transfer had its impact on Mao’s thinking. In this McMahon’s “thick red line on a map” background, there was an increased on the ground by physical demarcation Chinese pressure on India to negotiate. soon after independence. Let India In the absence of Indian readiness to leaders declassify the entire Henderson negotiate, on 6 October, China decided Brooks Report on Himalayan to go to war. Chinese then got accurate Blunder so that nation can know the intelligence that Indians are planning TITLE exact truth. to attack on the Thagla Ridge on 10 1962 and the McMahon Line Saga October. Mao, then had said: “It seems AUTHOR Reviewed by Prof PM Kamath, former Professor like armed coexistence won’t work … CLAUDE ARPI of Politics in Department of Civics and Politics, Nehru really wants to use force … He PUBLISHER University of Bombay, currently, Hon. Director, always wanted to seize Aksai Chin and VPM’s Centre for International Studies LANCER PUBLISHERS Thagla Ridge.” He recalled: “We fought (Regd), and Adjunct Professor, Department ISBN NO a war with old Chiang [Kai-Shek] … of Geopolitics and International Relations, 1-935501-40-2 fought a war with Japan … one with Manipal University, Manipal. His most recent YEAR OF PUBLICATION America … we cannot lose ground edited book is, India-China Relations: An … it would be tantamount to letting 2013 Agenda for Asian Century .

July 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

internal security

THE PRIME MOVER

THE MULTIPURPOSE

FORCE Team DSA

oday on page one and tomorrow snippets strewn across the media, the Central Reserve Police Force is almost always in the news. The Maoist attack on the Congress convoy in Darba Ghati in the Bastar district of Chhattisgarh in May or the Lashkar-e-Toiba attack on a CRPF picket in Srinagar in June, highlight the fact that this Central Armed Police Force is in the thick of battle against threats to India’s security – both internal and external. The CRPF is already the world’s largest paramilitary force but given the endemic nature of violence of various kinds from various sources across the subcontinent there is a realisation in the government that the CRPF needs to be augmented to provide an adequate backup to its general role and responsibilities. To that end it is intended to raise its strength from the current three lakh personnel by the induction over the next five years of 22 new General Duty (Male) battalions (an addition of more than 25,000 officers and jawans) and one more Mahila battalion bringing the total to four with about 4,500 women personnel.

July 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

internal security

THE PRIME MOVER

Action Force is looking at new modern means of crowd control. It is evaluating long-range audio transmitters that broadcast at wavebands that cause intense irritation in the ears and induce disorientation; laser dazzlers that can temporarily blind violent mobs; and tasers – electronic gadgets that impart a nasty jolt to anyone with mayhem in mind.

Over the years since independence its role and responsibilities have expanded exponentially covering all kinds of dangers and threats. It can well be said that for Indians the CRPF is all things to all people. Consider the responsibilities: Crowd control and riots; counter-militancy / counter-insurgency operations against both indigenous malcontents as well as foreign terrorist groups; handling Left Wing Extremism; elections; protection of VIPs and vital points and installations; providing security for the Ram Janmabhoomi and Babri Masjid and several other sensitive shrines; checking environmental degradation and protecting flora and fauna; participating as a second line of defence during wartime; participating in UN Peacekeeping Operations; and rescue and relief operations at times of national calamities. Nothing seems to have been left out. Created prior to the attainment of independence as the Crown Representative Police in 1939 it acquired its new name after independence in 1949 when the Act was passed by Parliament. It has sprouted adjuncts for specific operational requirements like the Rapid Action Force (RAF) that boasts of being able to be deployed anywhere at a minute’s notice in its very distinctive light blue-dark blue disrupted colours; the Commando Battalion for Resolute Action (CoBRA) for counter-insurgency / counter-terror and anti-Maoist operations; the Mahila Battalion for dealing with women in riotous situations, particularly in communally sensitive areas; and a National Disaster Relief Force intended to quell man-made disasters as part of the riot situation.

RAF Attitude The Rapid Action Force was raised in October, 1992, for deployment

All encompassing as it sounds, the role and responsibility of the RAF include a presence in UN Peacekeeping Operations. As a representative of the Indian nation the Rapid Action Force personnel have, almost from the moment of its creation, been posted out to trouble-torn Haiti on the other side of the globe off the coast of North America. It was attached to the US Army’s Military Police Battalion for a tour of duty that lasted one year. For recognition of the healing touch and deft handling of local problems it was awarded a US Army Commendation medal, six US Army Achievement medals and 120 UN medals. Its longest stint of duty under the UN flag was in Kosovo in embattled Eastern Europe where its personnel were rotated over a five year tenure.

The Cult of the CoBRA

in communally sensitive areas and wherever law and order had broken down and whenever the state government wanted its help. It is its training and ethos of the “right behavioural traits and attitudinal orientation” that gives it an aura of an impartial tool of intervention in situations where the local police appears to have succumbed to the communal virus. For those who would rush to deny any such disease exists should read Justice Anand Narain Mullah’s comments on

THEY ARE FOREVER READY TO MOVE AT A MOMENT’S NOTICE. IT WOULD TAKE ABOUT AN HOUR IF THEY ARE TO BE DEPLOYED OUT OF THEIR PERMANENT BASES IN TEN WIDELY DISPERSED LOCATIONS IN INDIA 54

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the UP police behaviour during the Aligarh riots. The conventional wisdom behind the creation of this specialised force was that the sooner the intervention, the quicker the malaise would dissipate. In keeping with that concept the ten battalions of the RAF consisting of nearly 9,000 personnel are distributed in the north (New Delhi) and east (Jamshedpur) two in the south (Coimbatore and Hyderabad), two in the west (Mumbai and Ahmedabad), one in central India (Bhopal) and three in Uttar Pradesh (Allahabad, Aligarh and Meerut). They are forever ready to move at a moment’s notice. It would take about an hour if they are to be deployed out of their permanent bases in ten widely dispersed locations in India. Each battalion of 1,296 officers and men is self-contained and self-reliant in that it carries is own rations and equipment and does not

require replenishments for up to a week – a commendable arrangement where movement of supplies could create a logistical nightmare in an unstable situation. Even though it uses the same nomenclature for its echelons, a Battalion has 1,296 personnel (larger than the General Duty Battalions) and the smallest is known as a Team and is about as large as an Army Platoon. Every Company of the RAF has one team of Mahila personnel to handle women agitators. Every team is organised into an independent strike unit with its organic riot control element, a tear gas element and an armed element to deal with weaponised demonstrators / attackers. To ensure that the RAF is physically capable of handling its charter of operations a conscious effort has been made to keep its profile as young as possible. The age limit for

the constabulary is 20-27 years and for junior officers it is 30-35 years. More importantly, given the nature of its responsibilities, its cadres include minorities and weaker sections and to keep the Force as an exemplary mirror of Indian society there is a great deal of emphasis on social engineering and communal camaraderie. Outside the barracks too the general effort is to be a catalyst for benign change. This is done through such socially useful work as helping in children’s education, adult literacy, re-afforestation, medical treatment and hygiene. Villages are adopted in areas around their static bases which makes for trust and inter-dependence. In keeping with the times and changes in mob behaviour and the kind of tools of destruction that are available to rioters and mobs the Rapid

The jaw breaking Commando Battalion for Resolute Action (CoBRA) is a recent addendum to the CRPF family. This strike arm with some very impressive capabilities was created in 2008 when the Red Menace of the Maoists had made deep inroads into the villages and district headquarters through a wide swathe of central India. Its military depredations forced the Ministry of Home Affairs to think in terms of a force that could match the jungle warfare / guerrilla tactics of the Maoists in their own habitat. Ten CoBRA battalions were raised between 2008 and 2011 and it is a measure of how desperately they were needed is seen in the figure of 160 operations per month over the past 21 months. They have demonstrated, day after day the following feats of determination and endurance:   That they can stay unsupported in the jungle, entirely on their own without any supply of food, water or ammunition from outside for up to 11 nights and 12 days.

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internal security

THE PRIME MOVER

IT HAS SPROUTED ADJUNCTS FOR SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS LIKE THE RAPID ACTION FORCE (RAF) THAT BOASTS OF BEING ABLE TO BE DEPLOYED ANYWHERE AT A MINUTE’S NOTICE IN ITS VERY DISTINCTIVE LIGHT BLUE-DARK BLUE DISRUPTED COLOURS; THE COMMANDO BATTALION FOR RESOLUTE ACTION (CoBRA) FOR CI / CT AND ANTI-MAOIST OPERATIONS; THE MAHILA BATTALION FOR DEALING WITH WOMEN IN RIOTOUS SITUATIONS, PARTICULARLY IN COMMUNALLY SENSITIVE AREAS; AND A NATIONAL DISASTER RELIEF FORCE INTENDED TO QUELL MAN-MADE DISASTERS AS PART OF THE RIOT SITUATION world. A vision of the then Prime Minister Shri Rajiv Gandhi, it was approved vide GOI Order No. 12013/1/85-FP-IV of 22nd May 1985 and raised on 6th February, 1986. More than an armed battalion, it ensures protection of human rights of citizens of the country especially women and children.

  That they can stay in the most difficult terrain that includes hilly terrain, absolutely dry patches and so on. That they can operate even when the monsoon is in full fury, as demonstrated in forest are like the Saranda forests. That in spite of this, they can march with loads of 48 lbs per person and higher limits for those carrying the Light Machine Guns, mortars, Under Barrel Grenade Launchers and radio carriers.   They have demonstrated the capability of marching up to 45 km

continuously in just 15 hours against the international standard of 18.9 hours. That even in a place like Aboojhmadh, they marched @ 15.86 km per day amidst hostile fire almost every day and yet covered a total of 111 km in 7 days. Its most significant strike was when CoBRA units surrounded Maoists on 24 November 2011 in the jungle near vill-Burisole, west Medinipur where Maoist politbureau member Koteshwar Rao alias Kishanji was killed, his dead body and an AK-47 and AKM were recovered. In April last year during Operation

July 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

Octopus – Phase-2 in the area of village Sanya, PS-Bhandaria, distt-Garhwa, Jharkhand 29 Naxals were killed (though no dead body were recovered) During the course of operations across two years it has recovered 377 weapons, killed 120 Maoists, captured 923 cadres, secured the surrender of 60 others and seized 7,191 kg of explosives and improvised explosive devices. As the results show, it is well-equipped and appears to be well-officered and motivated. Their training is conducted at the Indian Army’s elite Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School

at Viriangate in Mizoram and CRPF’s anti-terrorist school in Silchar. They are adept in the art of camouflage and jungle warfare. Their role is to carry out reconnaissance and long range patrols, gather intelligence on the whereabouts of the insurgents and also carry out ambushes and precision strikes when required. Whether they are sufficient in numbers to deal with the kind of control the Maoist / Naxalite cadres enjoy in large swathes of several states of India only time will tell.

Healing Touch of Mahila Units

The Mahila Bn. of CRPF has the unique distinction of being the first armed women Paramilitary Battalion in the

The Mahila Battalions of the CRPF predate the CoBRAs. The first was raised in New Delhi in 1986 because of the legal complications that arose when men handled women during agitations. Their numbers were insufficient and so another was raised in 1995 with headquarters in Gandhinagar (Gujarat). Apart from the three separate Mahila battalions (one more is planned to be raised) there is a separate component of 96 lady staff in each RAF battalion to deal with women agitators. It would be splitting hairs if one were to try and classify if they qualify as being in a “combat zone” but they are there and they have done a commendable job in such hotspots as Jammu and Kashmir, Ayodhya, Manipur and Assam. Not only that, India has sent four groups of 100 each all-female Mahila battalions for tenures of duty in War-torn Liberia on the west coast of

Africa since 2007. The Female Formed Police Units as they are called are trained in crowd control and conflict resolution and are primed for rapid response where there have been bloody civil wars since 1989. More then 2,50,000 Liberians are believed to have been killed and hundreds of thousands are internally displaced. More feathers in the CRPF cap!

Disabilities As with several other paramilitary and Central Police Armed Forces the CRPF suffers several hardships in housing, leave, stress and suitable weaponry. Director General of the CRPF Mr Pranay Sahay at a recent seminar in New Delhi had given voice to the discomfort within the force over the kind of equipment and facilities available to the CRPF. He pointed out that “indigenous research and development done by local companies was ‘not up to the mark’. Import of gadgets and weapons for security forces is ‘not a happy situation’ as foreign manufacturers do not meet Indian requirements in an optimal fashion.” He made it a point to mention that the ready-to-eat food rations for CRPF personnel in the field areas is “too heavy” and government must provide

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internal security

THE PRIME MOVER

its strike forces the same kind of rations that other nations give their fighters. With regard to the other occupational hazard – stress and its undesirable manifestations the DG said that panacea for stress control like Yoga and recreation, better man-management and improved leave systems are beginning to show results. The central attempt is to create good officers and greater synergy between officers and the men they lead.

Constructing Failsafe Systems Having created a strike force with incredible credentials in the ten CoBRA battalions, the Rapid Action Force and

the Mahila battalion the CRPF put some suggestions before the government for improvement in the kind of precooked rations, accommodation, hygiene and travelling comfort for its men and women. Director General Pranay Sahay has voiced concern at the diet, pointing out that it was too heavy and its nutritional content needs to be improved and brought up to standards available to strike teams of other nations like the British Special Air Services (SAS) commandos and the US Navy SEALS. Team DSA has found out that the government has made provisions for different paramilitary forces operating in high altitude areas to receive rations of predominantly dry fruits and nuts

especially in the high mountain regions where they operate. The CRPF will have to create a menu for itself that has high nutritional value and is attractive to the men and women of the many different regions from where they have been recruited.

Placebos Similar is the case with its suggestion for more comfortable vehicles for cross country travel and more mine-protected vehicles, better helmets and bullet-proof jackets. In its study of casualties in conflict situations, Team DSA has discovered that the experience in Kargil has shown that there are no helmets that will provide

protection against a bullet hit on the head. If it does not pierce the composite materials that modern day helmets are made of, the kinetic energy of the bullet in flight will break the neck of the soldier, either killing him outright or rendering him paralysed from the neck down. Similar is the case of the so-called mine protected vehicles. Photographs of minefields laid by Maoists in various parts of the country show the mine protected vehicles lying in crumpled heaps after a mine blast triggered by the Maoists / Naxals. They learned very early and very quickly that these vehicles, first imported from South Africa, could

Pranay Sahay, IPS DG CRPF sustain a blast of only up to 14 kg of explosives. The extremists decided to pack up to 50 kg of explosives in a single mine and have triggered it by remote control as the vehicle passed over it. The result was a totally disrupted suspension and the chassis that can carry about a dozen troops in uncomfortable bucket seats lying in a badly dented heap several meters away from the huge crater caused by the explosion. The CRPF will have to do its own R & D on patrol vehicles born out of the experiences of its own personnel in cross-country patrols over the different types of terrain they operate in. Trying to dash through areas infested by Maoists/Naxals in a vehicle that can be recognised from miles away and ambushed is a tactic that needs to be reviewed.

Panacea A critical analysis of how CoBRA battalions move with such amazing speed across open country; the nascent dog squad that the CRPF has begun to raise belatedly at its breeding centre in Taralu; and the studies of the Institute of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) Management in Pune can be conjoined to create a methodology of engagement of the Maoists / Naxals in their own habitat. That dogs have

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an extremely acute sense of sight and hearing is an established fact. The marching stamina of the CoBRA battalions should be tempered by the presence of a large enough dog squad per marching contingent. The men can slow down their pace to accommodate the dogs (or carry them in a comfortable cart) and together they will be able to detect ambushes well before they walk into them and avoid IEDs by deploying the sense of smell of the dogs. Avoiding the minefield, the CoBRAs can lay a counter-ambush and be in a position to offer resistance and exchange gunfire on an equal footing. The episode on 09/04/12 during Operation Octopus Phase-2 near village Sanya in the Garhwa district of Jharkhand would have had a different ending if there was a dog squad with the CRPF. Twenty-nine Naxals were believed to have been killed but no dead bodies were recovered. The dogs would have made it difficult for the Naxals to pick up their dead comrades and disengage. The CRPF could have given chase and in the hot pursuit more casualties could have been inflicted on the Naxals leading to area domination by the CRPF. Proven guerrilla warfare experts from the Punjab insurgency have said that it is better to walk across terrorist-held territory than drive through it.

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an assertive China

CHALLENGING AMERICAN PRIMACY? impact on the environment. And they worry about the impact of China’s economic rise on their jobs and national wealth, whether in terms of the decline of Australian manufacturing caused in part by Chinese competition or in terms of an over-reliance on mining caused, again in part, by China’s demand for resources.

THE RISE OF AN ASSERTIVE CHINA

AN AUSTRALIAN VIEW

A very candid Australian viewpoint on the rise of China. The most recent Australian Defence White Paper reaffirmed the US alliance and Australia’s commitment to it and called for further, deeper cooperation between like-minded states in the region, including India. But there is no doubt that the emergence of a more assertive China in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis has resulted in the intensification of debate in Australia about how to manage relations with it and intense discussion of alternatives to the current policies of ‘congagement’ and hedging. Hugh White, in his book, The China Choice: Why America Should Share Power (Melbourne: Black Inc., 2012) argues that China’s growing military capabilities pose a significant challenge to what he calls American ‘primacy’ in the Asia-Pacific. That primacy, he asserts, rests upon the ‘hub-and-spokes’ alliance system the US created in the aftermath of the Second World War and which is looking like more of a liability than an advantage today and on America’s military might, especially its Pacific Fleet and the sizable forces it has on bases on Okinawa in Japan and in the Republic of Korea.

ustralians – like most people in the region – are divided about the rise of China. At the extremes of opinion, there are, of course, fervent Sinophiles and Sinophobes, but neither have much clout. The Sinophiles are mostly on the ‘hard’ Left, but their enthusiasm for China is driven less by a commitment to Marxism or Maoism and more by a deep-seated anti-Americanism. This group welcomes the rise of China – even an assertive China – because they think it heralds the end of American ‘hegemony’ and post-Western world order. They are mostly found in universities, though they have some followers outside them, but their inﬂuence on the wider public and on government policy is marginal. The Sinophobes, on the other hand, are a mixture

July 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

of staunch anti-communists or staunch democrats and some who are simply prejudiced against China or the Chinese, for one reason or another. This group fears a rising China and wishes for stronger efforts to contain it or to promote its democratisation. There are, however, fewer of these in Australia than the extreme Sinophiles and they exercise even less inﬂuence. The views of the majority of Australians – and the majority of Australian China watchers in government and outside it – sit somewhere between these two poles. Most Australians think the rise of China is an impressive development and that the lifting of hundreds of millions of Chinese out of poverty is a good thing for China and the world. They have some concerns about China’s government, however and about the side-effects of rapid growth, especially the

Most Australians hold these ambivalent views because Australia and China have few clashing interests and a number of common (mainly economic) ones. Unlike India, Japan or the states of South East Asia, Australia has no territorial dispute with China. Most Australians do not therefore perceive China as posing any kind of imminent or realistic threat. They know, of course, that China possesses both nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles and they know that Australian cities could be targeted by Beijing if a conflict broke out with the United States. But they have faith in Australia’s long-standing alliance with the US and they believe that America would respond in kind to a Chinese nuclear attack America’s ‘extended nuclear deterrence’ gives confidence to Australia, as it does to Japan. Australians also know that China’s conventional forces will not be capable of threatening their country for some time (if ever) and that, if Australia was called upon to fight elsewhere in Asia, perhaps in the Taiwan Straits or the South China Sea, they would likely have a choice whether to commit their forces. It is hard to imagine any other circumstances in which Australia’s conventional forces would clash with China’s anytime in the near future.

them feel both assured and, at the same time, a little vulnerable. Over the past decade, China has become Australia’s greatest trading partner. In the Australian ﬁnancial year of 2011-12, Australia’s two-way trade with China amounted to some US$ 128 billion, signiﬁcantly higher than two-way trade with the second- and third-placed partners, Japan and the United States, which came to US$ 76 billion and US$ 57 billion respectively. Australia’s trade with India is valued at only about one sixth of its trade with China. Australia is also unusual in that it maintains a considerable trade surplus with China – in 2011-12, that surplus was about US$ 38 billion.

IAN HALL

The writer is a Senior Fellow in International Relations at the Australian National University. His research focuses on the intellectual history of International Relations and Indian foreign and security policy.

Partly because Australia has done so well out of China’s rise, selling it the resources it has needed to fuel its economy, especially to build its infrastructure and urbanise its population, polls of ordinary Australians have consistently shown them better disposed to China than many others in the Indo-Paciﬁc region. The Sydney-based Lowy Institute for International Policy, which regularly surveys Australian and regional opinion on foreign policy issues, found in 2012 that some 59 per cent of Australians have ‘warm’ feelings towards China. By contrast, a 2013 poll, also by the Lowy Institute, found that only 44 per cent of Indians felt such feelings towards China and other polls by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, among others, have found that opinion elsewhere in the region is similarly lukewarm.

Australians know that the rise of China is one of the principal reasons for their present prosperity. China’s thirst for Australian resources – especially iron ore – was one of the principal drivers of higher incomes and living standards prior to the Global Financial Crisis and continued Chinese demand has allowed Australia to ride out that crisis and its consequences without experiencing the deep recessions seem elsewhere in Western states

Lastly, Australians know that the rise of China is one of the principal reasons for their present prosperity. China’s thirst for Australian resources – especially iron ore – was one of the principal drivers of higher incomes and living standards prior to the Global Financial Crisis and continued Chinese demand has allowed Australia to ride out that crisis and its consequences without experiencing the deep recessions seen elsewhere in Western states. This knowledge of China’s importance for the wealth and well-being of ordinary Australians makes

This is not to say, of course, that all Australians hold positive views about China. Many perceive that Australia has become overly-dependent both on the mining sector and on China as an export market. Others are concerned about Chinese investments in Australia, in mining but also in real estate and in agricultural land. And Australian politicians and analysts have repeatedly expressed alarm at actual and potential threats to the cyber-security of government and the private sector emanating from China.

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an assertive China

CHALLENGING AMERICAN PRIMACY? good thing, especially for those Chinese raised out of poverty in the past three decades. But they worry about the ability of the international order to accommodate China and the demands it may begin to make on other states in the region and on international institutions. In particular, they are deeply concerned about the ability of the US to continue to serve as the principal guarantor of regional security. They argue that Australia needs to break this news to Washington, which they believe is dangerously over-conﬁdent about its capacity to play the role it has played since 1945.

Most Australians think the rise of China is an impressive development and that the lifting of hundreds of millions of Chinese out of poverty is a good thing for China and the world. They have some concerns about China’s government, however and about the side-effects of rapid growth, especially the impact on the environment. And they worry about the impact of China’s economic rise on their jobs and national wealth, whether in terms of the decline of Australian manufacturing caused in part by Chinese competition or in terms of an over-reliance on mining caused, again in part, by China’s demand for resources

At present, the optimists outnumber the fatalists, despite the latter having some very eloquent and persuasive champions, among them my colleague at the Australian National University, Hugh White. His book, The China Choice: Why America Should Share Power (Melbourne: Black Inc., 2012), has done a great deal to focus the Australian debate on China’s rise and to clarify the terms of ofﬁcial, scholarly and public opinion on the issue.

Optimists and Fatalists

Against this background, Australian analysts’ views of the rise of China – and the emergence of a more assertive China since 2009 – fall into two broad categories: Optimistic and fatalistic. Very few, if any, analysts are out-and-out advocates of some kind of ‘containment’ of China or disengagement from China and few argue for outright ‘appeasement’. Instead, they divide into those that think that ‘congagement’ and ‘hedging’ are the best ways to persuade China to become a reliable and responsible international stakeholder and those who think that ‘congagement’ and hedging are unrealistic and unnecessarily risky.

The optimists think that China’s rise poses fewer challenges, that today’s international order is sufficiently flexible to accommodate it and that the United States, in particular, will continue to play a major role in the security of the Asia-Pacific region for the foreseeable future. They argue that ‘congagement’ – a mix of mainly economic engagement and military deterrence – has worked so far, allowing China to get richer while its neighbours, especially Japan, Taiwan and South-East Asia are reassured by American security guarantees. They note China’s growing defence expenditure and its acquisition of missile, naval and cyber capabilities that could pose significant threats to other regional militaries and the US.

Reports of the pace of America’s relative decline have been exaggerated. It is also apparent that Australia needs to think beyond its traditional approach to its security, namely relying upon a single dominant power and think about more flexible and more regionally-focused partnerships with states in the Indo-Pacific, including Indonesia, India, Japan and South Korea 62

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But the optimists also note that China has a long way to go to be a true peer competitor to America in economic or military terms and that China faces very signiﬁcant challenges today and into the future, in governance, economic management and so on. Finally, they observe that China’s foreign policy is itself evolving and that it has been active in positive as well as problematic ways, for example in its commitment of resources to United Nations peacekeeping operations. The fatalists also acknowledge that China’s rise is, on balance, a

White argues that China’s growing military capabilities pose a significant challenge to what he calls American ‘primacy’ in the Asia-Pacific. That primacy, he asserts, rests upon the ‘hub-and-spokes’ alliance system the US created in the aftermath of the Second World War and which is looking like more of a liability than an advantage today and on America’s military might, especially its Pacific Fleet and the sizable forces it has on bases on Okinawa in Japan and in the Republic of Korea. White points out that China has moved not to match the US like for like, but instead has focused its military modernisation programme on developing ‘asymmetric’ capabilities, acquiring anti-ship missiles with which to target carrier battle groups and antisatellite weapons to attack command and control systems. These Chinese investments, he thinks, have shifted the balance of power in the Western Pacific in their favour, greatly increasing the potential costs of war for the American side and making it much harder for the US to play its traditional ‘pacifying’ role. Worse, White argues, the US can no longer rely on even its longest-standing allies to fight alongside it, if war broke out – he thinks that Japan, South Korea and even Australia would have second-thoughts about their alliances if a conflict with China loomed. For these reasons, White thinks that Australia has a duty to go to Washington and explain that America needs, as he puts it, to ‘share power’ with China. What that would mean in practice is a little bit vague. White suggests something like a condominium, in which the US and China agree to act together as regional leaders and security-providers.

So far White’s argument has not had much influence on Australia’s strategic policy makers. The most recent Defence White Paper reaffirmed the US alliance and Australia’s commitment to it and called for further, deeper cooperation between like-minded states in the region, including India. But there is no doubt that the emergence of a more assertive China in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis has resulted in the intensification of debate in Australia about how to manage relations with it and intense discussion of alternatives to the current policies of ‘congagement’ and hedging. This conversation is unlikely to stop anytime soon, but it will likely change over time because some of its underlying assumptions may well be wrong. The emergence of fatalism in Australian analyses of China’s rise is strongly connected to perceptions of American decline and to Australia’s tendency to think its international relations and its security are determined by its relations with dominant powers and little else. Both of these sets of beliefs are problematic. It is apparent that America is emerging from its economic crisis and that many of the underlying indicators suggest it will continue to grow. Of course, the political malaise in Washington will likely continue, but it looks as though reports of the pace of America’s relative decline have been exaggerated. It is also apparent that Australia needs to think beyond its traditional approach to its security, namely relying upon a single dominant power and think about more flexible and more regionally-focused partnerships with states in the Indo-Pacific, including Indonesia, India, Japan and South Korea. The rise of an assertive China demands, indeed, not a choice between it and the US, but a more subtle approach to Australia’s relations with neighbours that it has sometimes neglected or even ignored as potential partners. It demands creativity which Australians often claim to have, but which its diplomacy sometimes failed to display and an acuity to the changing dynamics of the region.

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an assertive China

HI-TECH WARFARE

Chinese Aviation Programmes

AWACS The Chinese quest to develop their own AWACS was pursued in three parallel approaches, in order to hasten the development as well as guard against failure in one or more approach. The ﬁrst was to develop an AWACS based on fuselage mounted rotodome type aerial. The radar inside, however was to be AESA type of radar. Thus an AWACS named KJ-2000 based on Russian Il-76 aircraft was produced. Aviation watchers claim four such platforms to have been developed. The second route to AWACS capability was by mounting a radar on Y-8 transport aircraft produced in China based on Russian An-12.

“The weapons that USA employed in Iraq War had made use of top level scientiﬁc inventions and knowledge … This is really a brand new and epoch-making military revolution. It changed from ground wars featuring large scale assembling of ground forces, to wars which depend on air control force powered by high-tech-electronic systems and which complete strategic objectives by air operations.” − Lt Gen Liu Yazhou PLA

n recent years certain aviation programmes in China have made impressive growth. Their status suggests maturing of Chinese capabilities in aviation industry and shows their potential to be world-class in another decade or so. In fact in 18th century, Chinese were the largest exporters of goods, nearly comprising one quarter of world trade. They have again achieved the same distinction now, but the list excludes high-end military technology. Earlier, as the industrial revolution and academic renaissance blossomed in Europe, it was Europe and Europeans developing new colonies; later to emerge as new countries of USA, Canada that came to dominate the modern industries. Aviation, a recent development thus was largely conﬁned to the West. The newly independent countries of Asia, Africa and Americas were way behind in aviation industry. It is only in the last 4 to 5 decades that certain amount of aviation industry came into being in these countries. Aviation industry is the top-end of technology and thus most difﬁcult to master. Rocketry alone is simpler even

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though it involves faster speeds and higher temperatures. But aviation is far more complex and results from a ﬁne integration of numerous technologies. The ﬁrst half of aviation industry basically consisted in developing good airframes and powerful engines. A sound grasp of aerodynamics and metallurgy met the above requirements. But the latter half of aviation industry is a combination of good airframe, aero-engine and whole lot of avionics comprising hardware and even more complex software. To master these and be able to marry it harmoniously together to produce a modern aircraft, thus, becomes probably the most challenging task for nations. The emerging Chinese capabilities seem to suggest arrival of Chinese aviation industry. A brief review of their Airborne Warning and Control aircraft programmes follows. The PLA-AF had shown interest in AWACS type aircraft which resulted in their trying to make a conventional AWACS on Tu-4 aircraft. However this remained an experiment only. The prototype Tu-4 is on display in their aviation

museum. The phenomenal success of Multi National Forces predominantly led by modern airpower, against the Iraqi force operating more on the lines of People’s army, in 1991, sent shock waves amongst Chinese leaders. The dominating inﬂuence of airpower on modern battleﬁeld goaded the Chinese to develop PLA-AF as a modern force. One of the major programmes was to acquire AWACS capability as soon as possible. This led to Chinese interest in developing an AWACS on Russian Il-76 platform. Since the performance of Russian AWACS was poor, a result of their poor avionics and its integration, the Chinese sought Israeli participation to mount their ELTA Phalcon L band radar on Il-76. Before this deal could be consummated, the Americans vetoed the proposal forcing Israeli hand to cancel it. This was the status in the year 2000. The Chinese leadership vowed publicly to build indigenous AWACS. Whereas, work on developing modern radar technology including AESA / PHASED ARRAY radar had been going on since 1995. These radars having an electronically shaped, variable antenna can scan in multiple patterns to optimise radar performance, thereby performing better than conventional radars. They are more accurate, have less clutter and can be shaped differently as for differing requirements.

PAF, which gets the beneﬁt of modern tactics from Americans will help. Chinese have entered into an agreement with the Russians in 2011 to produce Il-76 in China by Chinese owned companies. This should cater for continued availability of more platforms and spare support in future. The NATO name for KJ-2000 is Mainring. Chinese have established an aviation regiment with a mix of KJ-2000 and KJ-200 AWACS / AEW&C in 2004. The unit started receiving aircraft in 2005 and has been ﬂying these in training and exercises. In 2013 the unit conducted 24 hours long exercise both over land as well as over sea. The nature of surface has a direct effect on the radar returns and needs different processing in the computers. So probably these are on going trials to learn and improve the AWACS handling.

The Chinese quest to develop their own AWACS was pursued in three parallel approaches, in order to hasten the development as well as guard against failure in on or more approach. The ﬁrst was to develop an AWACS based on fuelsage mounted rotodome type aerial. The radar inside, however was to be AESA type of radar. Thus an AWACS named KJ-2000 based on Russian Il-76 aircraft was produced. The photograph of such an aircraft started appearing on the internet sometime in 2003. The aviation watchers claim four such platforms to have been developed. What is the actual capability of these platforms is anybody’s guess. Though Chinese have claimed to use these AWACS in exercises, the actual performance is difﬁcult to predict. The radar is named NRIET and has been developed under the famous radar designer Mr Wu Manqing at Research Institute of Electronic Technology located at Nanjing. It is also referred to as 14th Institute. Wu Manqing had earlier designed phased array radars for the PLAN and these are in use on naval ships. He has also designed radars for Chinese space programmes. What is creditable about this radar is that it uses a Chinese developed processor based on Chinese designed chip called Spirit # 1, which was six times faster than western chips available at that time. So the radar performance is claimed

The second route to AWACS capability was by mounting a radar on Y-8 transport aircraft produced in China based on Russian An-12. Here also, two types of radars have been tried out. One is the phased array design housed in a circular radome on top of the fuselage. The other is the phased array radar mounted on a long antenna on top of the fuselage as done by Sweden in their Saab-2000 AEW&C aircraft. The same design has also been proposed by the Lockheed Martin Company on their Hercules-130. These Chinese AEW&C are called KJ-200. The picture on the left is of KJ-200 exported to Pakistan and named ZDY-03.

to be better than on USA’s E3 C Sentry AWACS. However a word of caution is in order at this stage. System integration is the most complex procedure and it evolves slowly based on extensive and continuous user feedback. This will take quite some time for the Chinese. Though interaction with

AIR VICE MARSHAL AK TIWARY VSM (RETD)

The writer commanded a MiG-29 Squadron in late 80s. His various command and staff appointments like Chief Operations Ofﬁcer at a major Wing, operational planning at Command level, Director Concept Studies at Air HQ, Command of a major ﬂying base, Head of the Training Team (Air) at Defence Service Staff College and Senior Directing Staff (Air) at National Defence College have conferred a rich practical experience. The air staff course at DSSC Wellington (TN), Command and Air War Course at the Air University, Maxwell Airbase, Montgomery (USA), all inducted and accelerated his interest in air war studies.

So the three AWACS / AEW&C designs and development give the Chinese backup against failures. No doubt, the dorsal mounted long phased array antenna has only sideways cover of 120 degrees on either side, with blind areas in front and rear. So the coverage is limited. But its development serves multiple purposes. It is proving technology for a subsequent smaller version to be used on Chinese aircraft carriers. Its export to Pakistan, so early in the programme is for two purposes. The ﬁrst is to operationally develop it with PAF’s help which is better versed with concepts of modern air warfare compared to the Chinese. Because PAL-AF has remained isolated and is yet to learn the modern tactics and technique. In BVR missile era old tactics KJ-200 with long antenna on top of the fuselage are totally outdated as so fatally learnt by the Iraqis. The second is to demonstrate to the third world that Chinese weapons are more easily available for export than Western nations and are even cheaper. Thus they are well suited for their armed forces. This is a well-planned Chinese strategy to capture increasing share of global arms trade. The PLA-AF will continue with Il-76 based AWACS for its own requirement. Thus we can see an extremely well planned strategy to meet all Chinese goals as far as AWACS / AEW&C are concerned.

July 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

an assertive China

COVERT POWER

INDIA’S SUBMARINE FLEET

20 are likely to be built and the last few of them are likely to be equipped with AIP. There are reports of a joint design and development effort with the Russians for acquisition of 4 Lada class submarines with AIP.

A DWINDLING FORCE

Submarines, with their second strike capability as well as the ability to operate in unfriendly waters covertly, form a vital component in any nation’s arsenal. Since the mid-1990s, the PRC has emphasised the submarine force as one of the primary thrusts of its military modernisation efforts. It is estimated that due to this focused approach, the Chinese have been producing and commissioning more than 2 submarines on an average per year. Indications are that at this rate, the Chinese submarine ﬂeet would stabilise around 80 modern boats in the next 5-7 years. It was only in 1999 that the CCS approved the “30 year submarine building programme” which envisaged construction of 24 submarines in India. The scope of the programme included simultaneous construction of six submarines under project 75 using Western technology and six submarines under project 75(I) using Eastern technology. This was to be followed by another twelve submarines based on an indigenous design, which was to incorporate the best of both Western and Eastern designs. These programmes are a decade behind schedule. 66

July 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

he commissioning of INS Chakra on 4 April 12, a nuclear powered Akula class SSN on lease for 10 years from Russia, is the only addition to the Indian submarine ﬂeet in the last decade. Compounding this fact are the recent reports of delays in the Project-75 Scorpene submarine building programme and the bureaucratic hurdles coming in the way of issuance of RFP for the next submarine Project-75(I), which are likely to affect the submarine force levels. India not only shares a common land border with China but also shares its ambitions and aspirations of becoming a super power. However unlike the Chinese, the intent does not seem to be backed up by the will to transform the aspirations into reality, atleast in the context of power projection capabilities. This becomes rather evident when viewed against the backdrop of the Chinese naval modernisation programme with particular reference to its indigenous submarine construction programmes.

Submarine Building Programme

The Chinese submarine building programme started in the 60s and initially relied on Soviet assistance. Whilst the decline in the Sino-Soviet relations may have temporarily set back their acquisition plans, the Chinese continued with their indigenous effort due to which the development periods were

The August 2009 ONI report states that “since the mid-1990s, the PRC has emphasised the submarine force as one of the primary thrusts of its military modernisation efforts.” It is estimated that due to this focused approach, the Chinese have been producing and commissioning more than 2 submarines on an average per year. Indications are that at this rate, the Chinese submarine ﬂeet would stabilise around 80 modern boats in the next 5-7 years.

rather long. The first Han class SSN was launched in 1977 and entered service in 1980. Three more boats were commissioned in the next 10 years. The lone Xia class SSBN was launched in April 1981 and commissioned in 1987. Construction of the Ming class diesel submarines based on Romeo class design was also commenced around the same time. Work on three new classes of submarines – the Jin class SSBN, the Shang class SSN and the Song class conventional boat, seems to have started in the 80s. The first Jin was launched in 2004 and commissioned in 2008. Whilst two more have already entered service in 2010 and 2012, three more are set to be commissioned in the next 5 years. Two Shang class SSNs were inducted in 2007 and 2010. There are conflicting reports on the number of Shang class with some saying 4 being in service. It is believed that 5 boats of Type-095, a third generation of SSNs, are to follow the Shang class. In all probability the Chinese have acquired advanced technologies as well as greater assistance to overcome the deficiencies in reactor design in the last few years, since the first of the Type-095 is expected to be ready by 2015-16. Even though work on the Song class diesel submarine commenced in the 80s, they appear to be based on the Russian Kilo class of the 80s. It is no coincidence that two Kilo class boats were commissioned in December 1994 and the first Song class was commissioned in 1999. It appears that the Chinese have successfully copied various design features from the Kilo and its successors and incorporated them in Song and Yuan class, including the quieting technologies. The latest in the construction line is Yuan class of which

CMDE S GOVIND (RETD)

The writer is a submarine specialist with more than 3 decades experience. He commanded submarines, ships, submarine training establishment as well as operating base. He has also headed the directorates of submarine operations as well as submarine acquisition at Naval Headquarters. He retired from HQ IDS where he served in the Perspective Planning and Force Development branch.

India on the other hand embarked on the path of submarine construction in the late 70s. Surprisingly, the initial thrust was towards the nuclear propelled submarines under the Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) programme which remained shrouded under secrecy till the launch of the ﬁrst boat in July 2009. There seem to be similarities with the Chinese programme, most important being problems in designing and ﬁtting a compact nuclear propulsion plant. Russian assistance in realising the project was acknowledged by the Indian Prime Minister at the launch of the submarine. Construction on the second of the class is reported to have commenced.

On the conventional boat front, construction started only in the 80s wherein two Type-1500 submarines were built at Mazagon Dock Limited (MDL) under an agreement and assistance with HDW, Germany. However, these construction lines at MDL became defunct and the expertise withered away as no further orders were placed due to allegations of kickbacks. Even though efforts to revive conventional submarine construction started in 1995, it was only in 1999 that the CCS approved the “30 year submarine building programme” which envisaged construction of 24 submarines in India.

Chinese Navy has about 10 old and 9 new Ming class submarines; 12 Kilo class submarines acquired from Russia during 1994-2006 of which the last eight are believed to be of the improved version 636 capable of firing LACMs; 13 Song class submarines commissioned between 1999 and 2006; and 12 Yuan class submarines commencing 2007 July 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

an assertive China

COVERT POWER

The scope of the programme included simultaneous construction of six submarines under Project 75 using Western technology and six submarines under Project 75(I) using Eastern technology. This was to be followed by another twelve submarines based on an indigenous design, which was to incorporate the best of both Western and Eastern designs. Submarine construction recommenced at MDL with the signing of a contract with DCNS, France for six Scorpene class submarines in October 2005, under Project 75. Subsequently, the Project 75(I) which had been kept on the backburner was revived and indications are that it may not necessarily be of Eastern technology.

that a test ﬂight of the JL-2 was conducted in August 2012 which means that it may be another couple of years before their actual deployment onboard. Even with this range, their reach is limited to targets in Russia, India, Japan and Hawaii, if deployed around their territorial waters. Alternately, these boats would have to be deployed closer to the target locations to provide credible second strike capability. Open sources indicate that yet another Tang class of SSBNs – Type- 096 is under development.

Today, India can only lay claim to possess one SSBN in the form of INS Arihant which was launched on 26 July 2009. Even though scheduled to be commissioned in Comparison of the submarine fleets 2012, the boat is yet to undergo comprehensive 60 56 sea trials. The boat is to be equipped with the short 50 range Sagarika missile which is undergoing launch 40 trials from a submersible pontoon. Considering the 30 China statements of DRDO which indicate that the onboard 20 14 India nuclear reactor would be going critical shortly as 10 5 1 4 1 well as the time required in 0 undertaking various trials, it may be assumed that the Class Class Class boat could enter service Ballistic Missile Nuclear Attack Conventional / AIP earliest by end 2015. Taking Submarines (SSBN) Submarines (SSN) Submarines (SS) into consideration the long development period of almost 30 years and short range of the missile, this boat may turn out to be Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBN): The Xia, a more of a “technology demonstrator”, thereby realising Type-092 class SSBN was the first to enter service in 1987 the third leg of the nuclear triad. Three to four more boats and was equipped to carry the short range JL-1 SLBMs. The are expected to follow and greater range SLBMs are being Xia class is followed by three modern Type-094 Jin class contemplated to provide credible sea based deterrence. SSBNs with three more to be commissioned in the next five years. The Jin class boats are to be armed with 12 x JL-2 Attack Submarines (SSN): The SSNs in the SLBMs with a reported range of 8,000 km and would form the Chinese inventory comprise of three first generation backbone of their sea based nuclear capability. It is believed Type-091 Han class and two second generation Type-093 Shang class submarines. The newer attack submarines which joined service in 2006 and 2007 carry LACMs, ASCMs and wake-homing torpedoes as well as being fitted with advanced technology sensors to cater for all intended missions, with greater emphasis on intelligence gathering patrols as well as anti-access operations.

Submarine force levels -2012

It is universally known that both L&T and the Ship Building Centre (SBC) were involved in the construction of INS Arihant. Taking into account the number of nuclear propelled boats required (both SSBN and SSN), a roll-on plan needs to be drawn up using the life cycle concept. Such a plan would address issues like refits and midlife upgrades including reactor fuel changes so as to maintain the requisite number of operational boats

July 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

Indian Navy acquired and operated a Charlie class SSN in 1988 for 3 years from the erstwhile Soviet Union and returned it after the expiry of lease period. On 04 April 2012, the navy commissioned an Akula class SSN, again on lease from Russia for a period of ten years. While the former lease enabled the designers to understand the intricacies of a nuclear propulsion

Ming class submarines CHINA

Sindhughosh Submarines INDIA plant, the latter will afford training opportunities for the future crews of INS Arihant class. The Chakra would enable the crew to hone their skills in carrying out various operational tasks and gain experience in undertaking long duration patrols.

Conventional Submarines (SS): Latest figures show that the Chinese Navy has about 10 old and 9 new Ming class submarines; 12 Kilo class submarines acquired from Russia during 1994-2006 of which the last eight are believed to be of the improved version 636 capable of firing LACMs; 13 Song class submarines commissioned between 1999 and 2006; and 12 Yuan class submarines commencing 2007. Like the Shang class SSNs, these modern boats are expected to carry LACMs, ASCMs as well as wake-homing torpedoes. These boats are primarily meant for patrolling along SLOCs and for interdiction operations. In contrast, the Indian Navy operates ten Sindhughosh (EKM) class and four Shishumar (SSK) class submarines. A majority of the EKM boats have the capability to fire LACMs, ASCMs and wake-homing torpedoes. However, the SSK boats are only armed with torpedoes. Of the total 14 boats, 8 EKM and all 4 SSK boats have been commissioned in the decade 1986-1995 and hence would be reaching the end of their service life commencing 2016. Even though the first of the Scorpene submarines was to join service in 2012 with the remaining 5 following at one year intervals, the whole project has run into delays. It is expected that the first Scorpene would be commissioned only in end 2016.

Way Ahead

Only few countries in the world have the expertise in building submarines built-up over long periods. The long development period of the nuclear boat and the delays in implementing the 30 year submarine building programme have resulted in huge cost escalation, irregular acquisition patterns and uneven growth conﬂicting with required force levels and as per the last CAG report – reduced operational availability of the existing force. Whilst the force structure depends on the type and quantum of missions to be undertaken, the necessity of drawing up long term acquisition plans and ensuring their timely implementation needs no emphasis.

In order to protect and preserve the expertise being gained in the field of submarine construction, the normal procedures may have to be replaced with logical steps to make the best use of available resources. It is universally known that both L&T and the Ship Building Centre (SBC) were involved in the construction of INS Arihant. Taking into account the number of nuclear propelled boats required (both SSBN and SSN), a roll-on plan needs to be drawn up using the life cycle concept. Such a plan would address issues like refits and midlife upgrades including reactor fuel changes so as to maintain the requisite number of operational boats. On a similar note, the prospect of buying outright a complete design of a conventional submarine and going into a series production in batches seems a better idea than the trials and tribulations involved in producing an indigenous design based on design and technology transfers from both Project 75 and 75(I). A compendium of existing technologies as well as indigenous equipment already available could be drawn up and factored into the design. Such an approach would afford the country to concentrate in developing equipment and technologies on a long-term basis in adequate quantities. This would also enable greater participation from the private industry and better material support during the service life of the submarines. Due to the stringent standards of quality requirements, proliferation vendor development needs to be discouraged. It is reported that an MoU exists between MDL and Pipavav Shipyard for building and outfitting submarines jointly. The construction of hulls at Pipavav followed by outfitting at MDL, akin to the arrangement between L&T and SBC, would enable implementation of a concerted submarine building programme. Submarines, with their second strike capability as well as the ability to operate in unfriendly waters covertly, form a vital component in any nation’s arsenal. Building and operating a diverse submarine force requires expertise that cannot be built-up overnight and needs to be nurtured constantly. A comprehensive plan for constructing and maintaining the requisite force levels to meet the national objectives, in addition to developing a strong industrial base to ensure material support, is the need of the hour. Then and only then can india hope to be on the path to attain super power status.

July 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

an assertive China

DEMARCATION THE KEY?

INDIA-CHINA STAND-OFF IN LADAKH

EMERGING LESSONS The LAC between India and Tibet, implying de facto control since the 1962 war, is yet to be physically demarcated on the ground and delineated on military maps. The un-delineated LAC is a major destabilising factor. Patrol face-offs are commonplace. Such meetings have an element of tension built into them and the possibility of an armed clash can never be ruled out. Such a clash with heavy casualties can lead to a larger border incident that may not remain localised. Hence, the topmost priority of Indian diplomatic engagement with the Chinese should be to clearly demarcate the LAC without prejudice to each other’s territorial claims. The responsibility for the management of disputed borders that are active (like the LoC with Pakistan) and semi-active (Like the LAC with China) should be solely that of the army even during peacetime so that duality of command is avoided. The principle of ‘single point control’ must be followed if the borders are to be effectively managed. It is imperative that the ITBP battalions deployed on the Ladakh border be placed under the army’s operational control. The early raising of a Strike Corps for the mountains is an inescapable operational imperative, along with the rapid upgradation of India’s border infrastructure.

on India-China Border Affairs (agreed during the 15th round of border talks held in New Delhi in January 2012 between the two Special Representatives) succeeded in resolving the impasse. The next time it may not be so simple. Given the known rift between the People’s Liberation Army and China’s Foreign Ministry in the execution of border management policies, it is possible that similar incidents could recur in future. It is time now to reﬂect upon the lessons that are beginning to emerge from this avoidable episode.

he Chinese patrol that crossed the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the Daulat Beg Oldi sector of Ladakh in mid-April and pitched tents 19 km inside Indian territory ﬁnally withdrew after a three-week stand-off with Indian troops and the tactical level incursion in response to

a pro-active Indian stance along the LoC ended without a showdown. Eventually the unprecedented stand-off was resolved through military-to-military dialogue and diplomacy as neither country stood to gain from a border skirmish. This time the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination

July 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

It is not so well known that the LAC between India and Tibet, implying de facto control since the 1962 War, is yet to be physically demarcated on the ground and delineated on military maps. The un-delineated LAC is a major destabilising factor. Incidents such as the Nathu La clash of 1967 and the Wang Dung stand-off of 1986 have occurred in the past and the

present impasse was waiting to happen. In fact, the two sides have failed to even exchange maps showing each other’s ‘perception’ of where the LAC runs. According to the grapevine, at one of the meetings of the Joint Working Group the two sides ‘showed’ their respective maps of the LAC in the Western Sector to each other. The Chinese took one look at the Indian map and said please take it back. Both sides habitually send patrols up to the point at which, in their perception, the LAC runs. Patrol face-offs in the so-called ‘no man’s land’, which lies between the two LACs as perceived by both sides, are commonplace. A drill has been evolved to tell the other patrol to withdraw peacefully. Both sides carry large banners in each other’s language and English. These are unfurled to tell the other patrol that it has transgressed the LAC and must go back. So far both sides have been going back peacefully after leaving some tell-tale signs like biscuit and cigarette wrappers and creating a burji or a pile of stones to mark their presence. However, such meetings have an element of tension built into them and despite the best of military training the possibility of an armed clash can never be ruled out. Such a clash with heavy casualties can lead to a larger border incident that may not remain localised. While the government invariably advises caution, it is extremely difficult for commanders of troops to advocate a soft line to their subordinates. There is an inherent contradiction in sending soldiers to patrol what they believe are Indian areas and simultaneously telling them that they must not under any circumstances fire on the intruding Chinese soldiers. Hence the dire need for demarcating the LAC on ground. Once that is done, GPS technology can be exploited to accurately navigate up to the agreed and well-defined LAC on the ground and even unintentional transgressions can be avoided. The present stand-off clearly shows how intractable the challenge is and how loaded the situation can become. Hence, the topmost priority of Indian diplomatic engagement with the Chinese should be to clearly demarcate the LAC without prejudice to each other’s territorial claims. The LAC in Ladakh is manned during peacetime by the Indo-Tibetan Border Police that is a Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) police force. The army often sends troops to maintain its forward defences and conducts periodic ‘operational alerts’ to practice fighting a defensive battle should the need arise. The army has little knowledge of the ITBP’s patrolling plans and other movements as this border management force reports directly to the MHA through its own channels. This arrangement is not conducive to fostering a professional relationship between the two forces and for reacting quickly and cohesively to border violations of the kind

that has occurred in the DBO sector. The responsibility for the management of disputed borders that are active (like the LoC with Pakistan) and semi-active (Like the LAC with China) should be solely that of the army even during peacetime so that duality of command is avoided. The BRIG GURMEET KANWAL principle of ‘single point control’ (RETD) must be followed if the borders are to be effectively managed. Divided The writer is a Delhi-based defence analyst. responsibilities invariably lead to ineffective control. Maintaining unity of command is a fundamental principle of war. Hence, it is imperative that the ITBP battalions deployed on the Ladakh border be placed under the army’s operational control for greater synergy in border management. A key prerequisite for effective border management is the employment of available national technical means for continuous all-weather surveillance and reconnaissance. These include satellite, aerial and electronic surveillance to detect and warn about suspicious movements and construction activities through photographic reconnaissance by day and night, the employment of UAVs for real-time intelligence and the use of electronic eavesdropping. India has not invested adequately in these modern methods and continues to rely primarily on human ‘eyes and ears’. This manpower intensive approach must change immediately. Also, networks need to be developed to constantly share available information with all those who need to act on it. As long as the territorial dispute is not resolved, China remains India’s foremost military threat. The Ministry of External Affairs must make all out efforts to seek an early resolution of the dispute and not be lulled by Deng Xiaoping’s gratuitous advice to former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi that it is a dispute left over from history and should be left to future generations to resolve. This strategy of postponing dispute resolution may suit China, but it certainly does not suit India.

Given the known rift between the People’s Liberation Army and China’s Foreign Ministry in the execution of border management policies, it is possible that similar incidents could recur in future. It is time now to reflect upon the lessons that are beginning to emerge from this avoidable episode

Simultaneously, India must upgrade its military strategy against China from dissuasion to genuine deterrence, which can come only from creating the capacity to launch meaningful offensive operations across the border into Tibet in response to China’s border war – if it chooses to launch one. In this context, the early raising of a Strike Corps for the mountains is an inescapable operational imperative, along with the rapid upgradation of India’s border infrastructure. China’s growing power and inﬂuence in Asia poses a long-term strategic challenge for India. This is a reality that will not change.

July 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

an assertive China

BRIDGING THE DIFFERENCES

INDIA’S EMERGING PRAGMATIC APPROACH TOWARDS CHINA

It was unfortunate that China’s incursions across the Indian side of the LAC happened at a time when both India and China were moving on a positive trajectory and making attempts to understand each other better. Such China’s actions have played a negative role in terms of bridging the differences. The most compelling explanation so far is that this move is a result of internal political divisions within China. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the hardliner factions within the Communist Party of China (CPC) in collusion would like to signal to the new leadership in Beijing clearly that the Sino-Indian border dispute should not be taken lightly. This is also seen by some as a means by China to pressurise India ahead of the visit politically in general as well as to stop the latter’s border infrastructure development in particular. There is a need to keep India’s China strategy ﬂexible so as to suit the complicated geopolitical realities in India’s neighbourhood and beyond. A pragmatic approach which focuses on closer engagement without any slackness in vigilance offers the best strategy towards India’s emerging relationship with China.

he true nature of Sino-Indian relations in the 21st century has been undergoing a signiﬁcant transformation. The view in India about China as a classical adversary caught in a zero-sum game has given way in the past two decades into one which is much more complex. There is a growing military modernisation and build-up on both sides of the borders, though the threat perceptions as well as capability developments are not just necessarily of the same degree, but also much to India’s disadvantage. This has led to an atmosphere of increasing distrust which has the potential to slide into escalation, as both nations are nuclear armed. However, recent overtures by China to India at ofﬁcial levels indicate that the bilateral relations

are also showing signs of warming up. This contradictory state of affairs has been dominating the current nature of Sino-Indian relations, as manifested especially in the past one month. The timing of recent intrusion of the Chinese troops in Ladakh, just weeks before the visit of the Chinese Premier Li Keqiang to India has left the strategic community in India divided over China’s intentions and fundamental goals. However, an analysis of the events which unfolded demonstrates a pragmatic approach adopted by India, which appears to shape the way it will further deal with China. It was unfortunate that China’s incursions across the Indian side of the LAC happened at a time when both India and China were moving on a positive trajectory and making

July 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

attempts to understand each other better. Such China’s actions have played a negative role in terms of bridging the differences. China ofﬁcially reacted to the Indian allegations of transgression by denial and expressed assurance and expectation that the incident will not affect bilateral ties or disrupt peace at the borders. India also handled the incident with lot of caution. India calibrated a strategy of “no escalation”, but at the same time signalled its desire to counter if China would have continued their presence. The troops from both the sides later retreated, ending the two week long stand-off. However, there are apprehensions about the bilateral understanding on the withdrawal of troops from both the sides. There is an apparent lack of political will to have a consensus on the

deﬁnition of the LAC, which makes the frontiers susceptible to territorial misinterpretation by both Indian and Chinese forces. However, this incursion appears to be deliberate since the Chinese forces have set up post inside the Indian side of LAC, breaking the recent precedent. This move can therefore only be considered as a deliberate act. The most compelling explanation so far is that this move is a result of internal political divisions within China. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the hardliner factions within the Communist Party of China (CPC) in collusion would like to signal to the new leadership in Beijing clearly that the Sino-Indian border dispute should not be taken lightly. This seems to be so, especially because it was timed just weeks before the much planned visit of the Chinese Premier to India. The visit of Li to India is his maiden foreign visit after taking over charge as the Premier of China in March 2013. This visit certainly symbolised China’s willingness to carve out a strategy which could be in mutual interest. However, as far as the hardliner sections within the PLA and the CPC are concerned, their interests do not appear to converge with that of the new leadership which came into power in Beijing. China’s sole remaining major dispute on its land borders is with India, making it a signiﬁcant source of threat which the PLA can claim. This step is also aimed to signal to the new Chinese leadership about the role of the PLA and the CPC hardliners in framing India-centric policies. It can be seen that the increase in the number of transgressions across the LAC coincides with the leadership transition in Beijing. Hence, the crux of what the incursion apparently aims to convey is that the further development of Sino-Indian relations should not be at the cost of China’s territorial interests as well as geopolitical concerns about India. Other explanations which had been put forth suggest that the move appears to be planned to elicit response from India. This is also seen by some as a means by China to pressurise India ahead of the visit politically in general as well as to stop the latter’s border infrastructure development in particular. China’s intent for transgression is also perceived in India as part of a plan to gain strategic depth for its dual-purpose projects including highway, railway, tunnels and dams in the Pakistan-occupied-Kashmir (PoK) and the China-controlled Shaksgam Valley. There are even other views which suggest that the act was designed to warn India against partnering with Japan ahead of the Indian Prime Minister’s visit to the country.

visit as well as other new initiatives until outstanding issues are sorted out. This could have meant the undoing of the efforts and results accumulated over the past few years with respect to the co-operation between the two biggest growing economic powers. Instead, India acted pragmatically and moving ahead with the visit, by downplaying the event as evident by the ofﬁcial statements. Perhaps the Indian government was aware of the internal divisions within China’s policy making system. As a result, it would have chosen to respond to the new leadership favouring warmer relations with India rather than playing into the hands of hardliners and risk losing the beneﬁts arising from a closer partnership with China.

ANAND V

The writer is a PhD Candidate and Senior Research Fellow at the Department of Geopolitics and International Relations, Manipal University. His areas of interest include China’s strategic culture, its strategic capabilities and foreign policy as well as Sino-Indian relations.

The trade between both the nations is at US$ 66 billion as of 2012 and is expected to cross US$ 100 billion by 2015. The visit was supposed to help in faster resolution of existing economic roadblocks between the countries like the lopsided balance of trade and low investment levels. There is a huge market in India for Chinese infrastructure ﬁrms and a similarly huge market in China for the Indian service industry to capitalise on. There is an increasing awareness and enthusiasm from both the Indian as well as Chinese industrial, economic and political sectors to tap into these markets, especially at a time when the Western economies are facing a sustained downturn for about half a decade. The recent moves by the current leadership in China to bring in the long pending next wave of economic reforms would be highly beneﬁcial to India. This is because the key players in the new wave of business opportunities arising out of these reforms will be driven by a nascent private sector and not the heavily protected, large, State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). Indian private enterprises are more experienced and are hence better positioned to take advantage of the expanding Chinese market compared to its emerging counterparts in China. The possibilities in this case for bridging the trade gap and lack of Indian investments in China will be immense. China does not want India to team up with the US in keeping a check on its rise and does not want its Southern neighbour to become another Japan, Philippines or Vietnam. This was evident especially in the former Chinese Defence Minister, Liang Guanglie’s visit to India in 2012 when he particularly emphasised on enhancing bilateral defence

The most compelling explanation so far is that this move is a result of internal political divisions within China. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the hardliner factions within the Communist Party of China (CPC) in collusion would like to signal to the new leadership in Beijing clearly that the Sino-Indian border dispute should not be taken lightly especially because it was timed just weeks before the much planned visit of the Chinese Premier to India

In the wake of the Ladakh transgression, India was left to respond spontaneously in an atmosphere caught by surprise. India could have acted with military force, risking escalation. Alternatively, on a less risky move, India could have also acted with force diplomatically. India could have done this by asking for a suspension of the

July 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

an assertive China

BRIDGING THE DIFFERENCES

co-operation. This came in context of the US pivot to Asia strategy as well as the growth of Indo-US strategic partnership. Therefore, it becomes important from the side of India to take advantage of China’s changing attitude towards India to reap benefits in its favour. The official statements from both India and China which speak about the immense potentials of Sino-Indian co-operation and its implications for the global geopolitical shift also suggest a significant intent in the direction of a strategic partnership. Li Keqiang’s article which was published in The Hindu during his visit entitled “Handshake across the Himalayas” reflected the role of his personality in improving the bilateral relations and his close links with India. However, this decision to further warm up to China need not be seen as appeasement or concession, as the visit proved. A few aspects of the joint statement signed during the visit suggest to the diplomatic pressure applied by India at least in terms of symbolic signalling. However, it remains to be seen how much such rhetoric materialise in the future. Both sides once again reiterated the agreement to make efforts towards peaceful settlement of the boundary issue based on mutual consent. However, the seriousness of China in such a settlement remains ambiguous. Most notably in the joint statement, the adherence to India’s “One-China policy” was not reiterated, which the Chinese leadership keeps mandatory for all their foreign visits. India’s tougher stand on Tibet this time is in context of China’s increasing strategic build-up in the area along with the recent wave of discontent in the region against Beijing’s rule, expressed through more than 100 cases of self-immolations. India’s coercive diplomacy appears apt in such

a situation where China is experiencing a marked insecurity over its control over Tibet. The statement also held that “the two sides are committed to taking a positive view of and support each other's friendship with other countries”. This evidently refers to China’s “all-weather friendship” with Pakistan and India’s strategic partnership with the US. Thus, India has apparently used the US-card to its advantage in persuading China to accept that a power balance is at play in Southern Asia. Also remarkable is the decision for bilateral co-operation in nuclear energy and hydrological information sharing on the Brahmaputra River where China has been building a series of dams much to the distress of New Delhi, but downplayed by Beijing. However, the extent to which China would co-operate on information sharing on the hydel projects is yet to be seen. The other issues of India’s concern like the trade imbalance with China (which accounts to almost 40 per cent of the bilateral trade) and efforts to “democratise” international relations were also reiterated. The recent effort to further decrease the role of the government in China’s economic affairs provides the best opportunity for India to close this trade gap. The 80-member business delegation which accompanied Premier Li to Mumbai, along with the three working groups created under the Joint Economic Group to plan, promote and analyse trade and economic activities especially in the service sector, are signiﬁcant pointers to the upward trend in bilateral economic co-operation. Enhancing border trade and people-to-people contact was yet another agenda of the visit through the development of the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar

July 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

(BCIM) corridor. The protocol signed on the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra, a Memorandum of Understanding for a joint working group on translation of classics from either side, an agreement to identify sister cities and sister states / provinces in India and China, co-operation in Chinese language were notable in this respect. Enhancing greater people to people contacts would play its part in adding to the strategic depth of the bilateral relations. At the same time, these measures would become the basis for more such initiatives which would lead to a better understanding by an increasing class of Indian stakeholders on China. Hence, India was prudent enough to follow a pragmatic policy, avoiding the pressures of escalating the border crisis and derailing bilateral ties. However, efforts to settle the border issue in favour of India will be a severely uphill task, as China keeps buying more time while strengthening its hold on Tibet, Aksai Chin as well as PoK. India should remain mindful of the potentials existing in China’s growing vulnerabilities such as the increasing unrest in Tibet, which now has a self-declared government based in Indian territory. India should not be viewed as a weak point in China’s neighbourhood through the act of opening up for further co-operation. India should gear itself up internally in such a way so as to absorb the beneficial aspects emanating from warmer ties with China and simultaneously remaining cautious of its elements which undermine national security. For this, external diplomacy should be backed with strong domestic policies. The pace of change in the Sino-Indian bilateral ties as a result of historic differences, have been gradual enough to bring in the much needed modifications into the national economic infrastructure so as to be at a position to better utilise its emerging partnership with China. Moreover, India’s relations with China are no longer limited to bilateral issues. As a result, India needs to be careful in tuning its relations with China, where it needs to think in a broader perspective. This is in context of the larger game of power balance in Asia played between the US and China. Therefore, there is a need to keep India’s China strategy flexible so as to suit the complicated geopolitical realities in India’s neighbourhood and beyond. A pragmatic approach which focuses on closer engagement without any slackness in vigilance offers the best strategy towards India’s emerging relationship with China.

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