DSA November 2012 by Defence and Security Alert

editor-in-chief

“The country comes first – always and every time”.

The communism of caste

arge and multi-ethnic states like India, China and Russia generate tremendous amounts of entropy commensurate with their size. They are brittle and vulnerable to strong centrifugal forces that threaten to tear them apart. Small wonder that internal security (IS) is their primary obsession. China today has 2.2 million men in uniform. Of these almost half are in the People’s Armed Police that deals with internal security. The Chinese budget for IS now exceeds the budget for the PLA. In India the police and CAPFs now number 1.3 million and outnumber the armed forces (1.1 million). Internal security indeed is the primal concern of the large states in Asia.

Historically, fragility has been the prime bane of the Indian civilisation. No empire of history has been able to unify the Indic civilisation for more than 150-200 years. The current Republic is the successor entity to the British Empire. In just 60 years after independence it has started to show tremendous centrifugal strains based upon a sharp accentuation of religious, caste, ethnic and linguistic identities. These are now threatening to tear it apart. In the name of affirmative action and social reengineering India has opted for a communism of caste which is making the polity highly inefficient and eroding the competence that comes from promoting merit. Three front scenarios: India today is in a three front scenario. There is a rising and truculent China to its north. There is an implacably hostile Pakistan to its west. In the rear are increasingly lethal Jihadi Tanzeems and a highly militarised PLGA of the Maoists that is operating in the most ideal guerilla terrain in the world. Despite rhetoric, the Maoist threat remains the most underestimated and under-resourced IS challenge. The embattled BSF and CRPF have been called upon to undertake offensive CI operations in very difficult jungle terrain. Traditionally this task has been done by the armies. The country will soon have to take a call. What is more cost effective – to raise 5 or 6 army divisions (that can be used against the Naxals initially and subsequently would be available to fight against the Chinese / Pakistanis in case of any aggression) or to raise scores of CRPF battalions? The CRPF being raised in droves will take quite a few years to militarise itself and even then it would be of very little use in a conventional conflict. The CAPFs are neither equipped nor trained for this offensive CI role. The stress and strain on the untrained troops is now beginning to show. If the CAPFs are to continue with this task, they will have to transform their ethos and be militarised. Their leadership will need an urgent transformation from the managerial model of the IPS cadres who come in directly at the DIG rank and above. They will need the inspirational leadership that the former DG Vijay Kumar was trying to institutionalise. Operations will have to be led from the front and candidates for the higher appointments in the CAPFs should have served first as company and battalion commanders in the field. There is a strange new reluctance on the part of the government to use the army in any role. The military has been largely marginalised. Having ruled out its use in conventional operations, the government is energetically trying to keep it away from all IS tasks. This is a strange logic. After all right in 1948, the army had been deployed against the communist insurrection in Telangana and then in 1971 had been used in strength against the Naxals. Do we want to stress the CAPFs beyond their designed capacity? So far they have operated in CI / CT operations largely in support of military operations. They have largely been confined to protective CI / CT operations. Employing them in military operations in such terrain would call for their across the board militarisation. This could take upto a decade or more. Do we have the luxury of so much time? It is unfair to push troops beyond their designed capacities and prolonged deployment without a turnover system of rest and relief and a proper CI grid that secures the communication arteries. Overtime this could be dangerous and counterproductive. Need for a paradigm shift: Our most serious problem is systemic. It is our basal system of governance per se that is beginning to fail in terms of delivery and the fatal direction of our democracy which has started getting derailed. The leaders of the freedom struggle had tried to create a pan-Indian identity that would unify the diverse people of India into a modern nation state. The current generation of politicians, unfortunately, seem to have lost that overall vision and direction. Unable to mobilise the masses on the basis of issues and programmes they have resorted to polarising the Indian population on the basis of religious and caste identities. The first past the post system of elections requires a mere 15-20 per cent of the popular mandate to rule. Hence the leader of today aims at the minimalist mobilisation in terms of caste based identities which could reduce India to tribalism. This is at the direct cost of the nation building project. It is sharply polarising and splintering the Indian polity. Our inordinately expensive electoral system is at the root of all corruption and in turn the prime cause of all malgovernance. This panders unduly to moneybags, mafias and dynasties that have amassed illegal wealth. At this rate we are heading for a systemic collapse. The Republic needs to reinvent itself. We need a basal paradigm shift in the nature of our polity if we are to survive as a nation state. The very nature of our divisive and polarising politics is now becoming a serious threat to the nation state. It cannot be allowed to splinter into a thousand fragments based on caste and creed and the cheap populism of the Lowest Common Denominator instead of the Highest Common Good. India, as a great civilisational state, now needs to reinvent itself. It cannot be run on the whims of some foreign funded NGOs.

Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM (retd) November 2012 Defence AND security alert

security threat and challenges

publisher's view

Best weapons, best trainings and

ince independence, India has been developing remarkably and has now emerged as one of the most powerful countries in the Asian region and a global economic powerhouse because of its size, resources, the talent and zeal of its people, its defence and security forces and its administrative and diplomatic capabilities.

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Vo l u m e 4 I s s u e 2 N o v e m b e r 2 0 1 2 chairman shyam sunder publisher and ceo pawan agrawal founding editor manvendra singh editor-in-chief maj gen (dr) g d bakshi SM, VSM (retd) director shishir bhushan corporate consultant k j singh art consultant divya gupta central saint martins college of art & design, university of arts, london marketing and sales dhirendra sharma corporate communications tejinder singh creative vivek anand pant administration shveta gupta representative (Jammu and Kashmir) salil sharma correspondent (Europe) dominika cosic production dilshad and dabeer webmaster sundar rawat photographer subhash circulation and distribution mithlesh tiwari e-mail: (first name)@dsalert.org info: info@dsalert.org articles: articles@dsalert.org subscription: subscription@dsalert.org online edition: online@dsalert.org advertisement: advt@dsalert.org editorial and business office 4/19 asaf ali road new delhi-110002 (India) t: +91-011-23243999, 23287999, 9958382999 e: info@dsalert.org www.dsalert.org

disclaimer all rights reserved. reproduction and translation in any language in whole or in part by any means without permission from Defence and Security Alert is prohibited. opinions expressed are those of the individual writers and do not necessarily reflect those of the publisher and / or editors. all disputes are subject to jurisdiction of delhi courts. defence and security alert is printed, published and owned by pawan agrawal and printed at graphic world, 1686, kucha dakhini rai, darya ganj, new delhi-110002 and published at 4/19 asaf ali road, new delhi (india). editor: maj gen (dr) g d bakshi (retd).

There are very few nation states that have been able to stand on their own so well like we have in the past six decades. The political sagacity, the global vision of the nation and the synergy among the administration, defence and security forces and the diplomatic corps has made this turnaround possible. The way India has managed global economic slowdown and many other crises and come out on top in the last few years and the inherent industrious and enterprising nature of the Indian people prognosticate a great future for India as a leading and respected member of the comity of nations. But as we have traversed the path leading to well-rounded development of the country, the problems, threats and challenges have also increased multifold. Large scale migration from one state to another and the lustre of the lucre have changed the character of the republic and completely transformed the political landscape and atmosphere where people have become insensitive, intolerant and self-centered losing the cherished sentiments and feelings of national integrity, national solidarity, national aspirations and national prosperity. India with its multiple sub-cultures, languages, castes and creeds and so many states having international borders has also had to confront many threats and challenges to the security of the nation. After independence India has progressed in many areas but infrastructural development, defence preparedness and deteriorating homeland security environment leave a lot to be desired and accomplished on war-footing. Our population has increased exponentially in the past sixty years and thus the threats and challenges have also increased concomitantly both internally as well as externally. Our security forces have been able to handle most of the situations even with an insufficient infrastructure, poor police population ratio and inadequate tools to equip and help them perform their duties to the best of their abilities. The police and security forces are raison d’être for a harmonious and peaceful environment in the country for industrial and agricultural growth, economic well-being and overall progress of the people. The federal government and the state governments must ensure that our police and security forces recruit the best trainees, give the best training, equip them with the best arms and ammunitions, provide them and their families comfortable living and open for them many avenues for growth. It is essential that the morale of our police and security forces has to be of the highest level and only then can we expect appropriate security for our people. The equipment, gadgets, arms and ammunition, telecommunication and the entire infrastructure of the highest international standards must be provided to our police and security forces considering the threat level from the anti-national elements who are equipped with the latest means of killing, destruction and creating mayhem at will and at places wickedly selected by them for telling effect. These anti-national elements have easy access to all kinds of arms and ammunitions and communication systems which they procure from the international market through various syndicates and criminal networks. We hear every day about the modernisation of our police and security forces but has it ever been done in a serious and planned way? Have the authorities responsible for the modernisation programmes actually made a thorough research on the ground realities what our security personnel have to face and have they planned a long-term strategy to actually modernise our forces according to the threat perceptions that exist and are escalating both from the trans-border terrorists as well as home-grown Left Wing Extremists who are hell-bent upon destabilising India and people like Hafiz Saeed even going to the extent of dreaming of breaking or Balkanising India and making it a part of Pakistan! Most of the times these authorities have just provided the funds to various police departments of the states and have not bothered to monitor if the funds have been utilised properly for the earmarked heads. They are more worried about the utilisation certificates at the end of the fiscal year rather than ensuring that the funds have been utilised properly. There should be strict and binding conditionalities by the central government on the state governments that if the funds are not utilised or not utilised for the earmarked heads

November 2012 Defence AND security alert

esprit de corps will ensure effective policing and security! then the responsibility of this would be solely of the state government and disciplinary action must be initiated against the lax and incompetent officers responsible for such bloopers. Another very important area of concern which warrants urgent attention is the malady of stress engulfing our police and security forces in almost all parts of the country. I think the level of stress our police and security personnel face today is alarming and must awaken the police officers, bureaucrats and politicians responsible for the affairs of the police and security forces. The tolerance level has gone down drastically in the past few decades. The empathy and the personal touch in their interactions with the people have vanished. Any common man is hesitant, even scared of going to a police station to register his complaint as he feels that he will not receive a friendly atmosphere, a sympathetic ear and a fair and dignified treatment which he deserves as an honourable citizen of this country. We need to change this common perception about our police and security forces at the earliest so that they earn the confidence and trust of the people they are trained to serve and secure. To modernise our police and security forces it is an imperative that first of all our policy and decision-makers must formulate a long-term policy for a well articulated stress management programme. I think this is the most important factor for each police and security personnel as it’s universally recognised that no one can perform to the required levels under stressful conditions. And when we talk about the person handling challenging situations involving arms and ammunitions, well-being and security of the citizens and the nation then they have to be stress-free completely. We often see and hear about the loathsome incidents where the junior officers have misbehaved with their seniors or sometimes even gone to the extreme extent of killing their colleagues and officers. It is high time that we provide to our police and security personnel stress-free environment and working conditions for their best performance while offering their services to the citizens of the country and to effectively counter any threats and challenges from the enemies of a united and peace loving India. Training regimen for the police and security forces must now include psychological stress management modules in addition to the mandatory physical, professional and combat trainings. It is so disheartening to see police stations that do not have even the very basic facilities for the police personnel. The telecommunication systems are so poor that in case of any untoward eventuality it takes hours to inform the higher authorities which in turn creates more problems for the entire administrative system. Firstly, our forces are not well equipped as compared to the terrorists and other anti-national elements. Secondly, there is a lack of coordination among various security organisations and, thirdly, the long procedures for procuring requisite equipment contributes to the tardy responses of our security forces at crucial moments. We have all seen what happened in case of the Mumbai attack by Pakistani terrorists on 26/11. Our National Security Guard commandos could reach the site of the incident after many agonising hours due to logistic and bureaucratic delays. In contrast our politicians can arrange any chartered flight to fly anywhere at the shortest notice but our commandos are not provided an immediate means of transportation to be able to counter the terrorists and save our innocent people. Lame excuses are trotted out to cover up these faults and the unnecessary delays they create. Matters related to security should not be taken casually at any level be it the federal or state governments or even at the district levels and below because we have lost many of our brave police and security personnel and thousands of innocent people in various attacks by the terrorists and Left Wing Extremists. It is time to revise and re-frame the existing National Policy on the Police and Security Forces Modernisation and there should be very clear-cut guidelines for the states to implement the proposed modernisation and a constant monitoring and accountability mechanism should be an integral part of this. If it is not properly implemented then the concerned officers should not be promoted at all and serious action should be taken against them because it affects the morale of our police and security personnel. It is seen that it is the junior officers who have to face these indoctrinated, well-prepared and well-equipped terrorists and Left Wing Extremists and not the senior officers managing these critical field operations. Why must their lives be put in jeopardy for the casual attitude of their senior officers? Our police and security personnel should be equipped with the latest and the most lethal weapons, arms and ammunitions and telecommunication systems and they should be trained to use these aids to perfection. This alone will ensure adequate security for our people in a more professional manner. Team DSA salutes all our martyrs from the police and security forces who have sacrificed their lives in the line of duty securing India and the Indian people.

Jai Hind!

pawan agrawal Stop Press: What a pleasant coincidence! As DSA special issue on Police and Security Forces Modernisation was being printed we have the good news that the Union Cabinet has passed a proposal moved by the Home Ministry to declare retired CAPF personnel as "ex-Central Police personnel" and extend to them several benefits as ex-servicemen from the armed forces get. This should be welcomed by all. I congratulate our honourable Home Minister Mr Shinde for this initiative for the welfare of the CAPF personnel. November 2012 Defence AND security alert

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founding editor TM

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STATUS OF SEA POWER IN INDIA TODAY

he nation has just marked 50 years of the beginning of the 1962 Indo-China War. It is a war that scarred many in the country, leaving an indellible mark on the psyche of many an individual and many an institution. The day after the 50th anniversary event India marked its Police Day, an annual commemoration for those in Khaki who have sacrificed their lives for the country. Police forces of the various states conducted moving ceremonies in their respective capitals and the central police organisations were not to be left behind in their remembrance efforts. In all the din and ceremony of the event what gets overlooked is the origins of the Police Day.

A patrol of the Central Reserve Police Force engaged elements of the People's Liberation Army high in the Himalayas, in 1959. More than a dozen died, some taken prisoner, but all fought honourably and admirably. That was then and this is now, where the CRPF is routinely ambushed by Naxals in the jungles of India. How is it that in 1959 the same organisation was capable of patrolling the highest Indian borders, but in 2012 it finds itself in a bit of a struggle coping with the challenges of Naxalism? There are various pointers in this question, for the service as a whole, as well as India and its government functioning. There are constant voices being raised for the reorganisation of the Ministry of Defence, restructuring of the armed forces and etc. etc. But in hindsight and going by the daily situation reports, the greater challenge before the country is redoing the Ministry of Home Affairs. Its structuring, functioning and aimlessness, costs the country precious lives on a daily basis.

Police and security forces in India function under the directions of the Home Ministry. It is their cadre controlling authority, that 'power' which influences all oomph in Government of India. Over the years the Home Ministry has neglected the functioning of its police and security forces to such a degree that a dispassionate white paper is required. Scores of battalions are being raised, funds allocated, positions created, without a rationalisation of what, how much, where and when.

In India's national security scenario of today and the next 25 years, what is the nature of threat that confronts the country. It is not uni-dimensional and the totality of its needs have to be calculated. Which then leads us to the next question â&#x20AC;&#x201C; how much is the quantum of force that India needs in order to overcome its national security challenges. Where are these precious national resources to be applied and when are they to be deployed for their national tasks. These basic questions need to be addressed, first, before India can call itself a secure country getting the biggest bang for its buck. All of which then leads us to the fundamental national security concern â&#x20AC;&#x201C; the modernisation of the various police and security forces in the country. Modernisation does not start by changing weapons, or modes of transport. Modernisation starts by re-evaluating existing structures for current and future threats. A 19th century model of policing and its contagion into the other security forces is an unlikely victor in a 21st century war. The Ministry of Home Affairs needs to be woken from its slumber, primarily.

manvendra singh

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November 2012 Defence AND security alert

contents Police and Securit y Forces Modernisation Special Issue November 2012 A R T I C L E S needed clarity about greatest threat to internal security:

modernisation of forces to tackle the challenges Prakash Singh, IPS (retd)

c o n t e n t s

An ISO 9001:2008 Certified Magazine

Volume 4 Issue 2 NOVEMBER 2012

bloodiest years of naxal violence: strategic challenges 12 Lt Gen V K Ahluwalia PVSM, AVSM**, YSM, VSM (retd)

police modernisation: revamping the force 18 Joginder Singh, IPS (retd)

change to modernise 21 Manvendra Singh

Lt Gen Karan Yadava PVSM, AVSM, VSM (retd)

C O L U M N S transformational and progressive roles in policing Dr Rupali Jeswal

importance of 26/11 for our national security 34

F E A T U R E S

V Balachandran, IPS (retd)

internal security: need for a paradigm shift Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM (retd)

Assam Rifles: sentinels of the north-east 28

civil-military relations in India: 38 the soldier and the mantri

the internal front R S N Singh

Vice Adm Vijay Shankar PVSM, AVSM, ADC (retd)

police and security forces modernisation: 50 threats and challenges Amitabh Thakur, IPS

the enemy within: national security cannot be

a law and order issue Pathikrit Payne

crash proof barriers against vehicle based attacks

Paul Jeffrey

why Indiaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s mega cities need to be protected

Nitin Gokhale

central armed police force modernisation

Rohit Singh

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November 2012 Defence AND security alert

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November 2012 Defence AND security alert

security threat and challenges

INSURMOUNTABLE?

“The jihad is not about Kashmir only ... About 15 years ago, people might have found it ridiculous if someone had told them about the disintegration of the USSR. Today, I announce the break-up of India, Insha-Allah. We will not rest until the whole (of) India is dissolved into Pakistan” – Hafiz Saeed

Prakash Singh, IPS (retd) The writer, a recipient of Padma Shri, was Director General of the Border Security Force and also DGP UP and DGP Assam. Terrorists are opposed to the very idea of India; they want to destroy its icons and its symbols. They have been repeatedly causing explosions in Delhi because it is the political capital of India; they have been repeatedly attacking Mumbai because it is the commercial hub of the country; they have been perpetrating incidents of violence in places like Ayodhya and Varanasi because these are the holiest places of the Hindus; they have been active in Bangalore because it is the IT hub of the country. In other words, they want to destroy India politically, economically and culturally

The Maoist problem is essentially a domestic problem which is there because of our inefficiency, incompetence and corruption. Politicians lack the vision, bureaucrats are insensitive and the police are brutal. The tribals have grievances but, as these are not addressed, they take to arms. If governance could be improved and the weaker sections, particularly the tribals, given a fair deal, the Maoist problem would start withering away

he threat of terrorism and the ongoing Maoist insurgency pose formidable challenges to the police and the paramilitary forces. A comprehensive set of measures would be required to deal with these problems. The shortages of manpower must be met immediately. Training must improve. The police must be rejuvenated by freeing it from extraneous pressures and giving it the necessary firepower and equipment as also forensic support. The paramilitary forces must have better infrastructure and their transport, communications and weaponry would need to be upgraded. Modernisation of forces will be the key. It must be added however that the forces would also require political support and legal protection. The threat of terrorism would become far more serious and menacing after 2014 when the US forces start withdrawing from Afghanistan. The shortage of manpower at the ground level must be met immediately. The United Nations has prescribed an average of 222 policemen per lakh of population. As against this, we have only 128 policemen per lakh of population in the country. Weapons have been acquired but in a somewhat haphazard manner. Training is still a much neglected area with the most unwanted officers being posted in the training academies. Computerisation has made slow progress. Forensic support is quite inadequate. The writer has elaborated in detail about the ongoing modernisation programmes for the police.

hat is the greatest threat to India’s internal security today? There seems some confusion on this point, mainly because of government’s reluctance to acknowledge the harsh reality due to political considerations. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has said more than once that the Maoist threat is the greatest threat to the internal security of the country. The Maoist challenge is not to be underestimated. It covers a huge geographical area and, in terms of casualties, it is today the most lethal movement in the country. However, any analysis should be based on long-term considerations and, from that point of view, terrorism constitutes the greatest threat to the stability of the country.

Terrorism: The greatest threat Terrorists are opposed to the very idea of India; they want to destroy its icons and its symbols. They have been repeatedly causing explosions in Delhi because it is the political capital of India; they have been repeatedly attacking Mumbai because it is the commercial hub of the country; they have been perpetrating incidents of violence in places like Ayodhya and Varanasi because these are the holiest places of the Hindus; they have been active in Bangalore because it is the IT hub of the country. In other words, they want to destroy India politically, economically and culturally. Their mindset is best illustrated in the speeches of Hafiz Mohammed Saeed, the chief

November 2012 Defence AND security alert

Needed Clarity about Greatest Threat to Internal Security:

Modernisation of Forces

to Tackle the Challenges

of Lashkar-e-Taiba. The following excerpt from one of his speeches is illuminating: “The jihad is not about Kashmir only ... About 15 years ago, people might have found it ridiculous if someone had told them about the disintegration of the USSR. Today, I announce the break-up of India, Insha-Allah. We will not rest until the whole (of) India is dissolved into Pakistan.” Terrorist modules are today active in several urban conglomerations. The Indian Mujahideen, which has

elements of the Students’ Islamic Movement of India (SIMI), has been expressly created by the ISI of Pakistan with a view to spreading terror across the country and giving it the appearance of an indigenous movement. According to a recent report, the IM has links with the international terrorist organisation Hizb-ul-Tahrir also. The point to be understood and emphasised is that the terrorist threat would be there irrespective of whatever measures the government of India might take. We may have the best Prime Minister, a tough

Home Minister, stringent laws to deal with terrorism and a rejuvenated police force to tackle the threats – and yet it would be there in a horrendous form. In fact, the threat of terrorism would become far more serious and menacing after 2014 when the US forces start withdrawing from Afghanistan. On the other hand, the Maoist problem is essentially a domestic problem which is there because of our inefficiency, incompetence and corruption. Politicians lack the vision, bureaucrats are insensitive and the police are brutal. The tribals

November 2012 Defence AND security alert

security threat and challenges have grievances but, as these are not addressed, they take to arms. If governance could be improved and the weaker sections, particularly the tribals, given a fair deal, the Maoist problem would start withering away.

The greatest challenges on the internal security front for the Indian state, in order of their gravity, are:

What is the greatest threat to India’s internal security today? There seems some confusion on this point, mainly because of government’s reluctance to acknowledge the harsh reality due to political considerations. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has said more than once that the Maoist threat is the greatest threat to the internal security of the country. The Maoist challenge is not to be underestimated. It covers a huge geographical area and, in terms of casualties, it is today the most lethal movement in the country. However, any analysis should be based on long-term considerations and, from that point of view, terrorism constitutes the greatest threat to the stability of the country

What should be done on a priority to enhance the capabilities of the police and the paramilitary forces so that the Indian state is able to deal with these challenges effectively?

There lies the difference. The Maoist problem can be tackled if we address the dark spots in our governance. The terrorist problem, on the other hand, would be there whatever we may do to reorganise our civil administration and overhaul the law enforcement apparatus. The casualties inflicted by the Maoists can be brought down but the havoc which the terrorists could cause would be on a huge scale. The terrorist threat is thus far more serious and has the potential of destabilising the country. The government had, in the wake of 26/11, taken a number of steps to strengthen its anti-terror capabilities. NSG hubs were set up at Hyderabad, Kolkata, Mumbai and Chennai. Twenty counter-insurgency and anti-terrorism schools are being raised. The state governments were advised to augment their police strength. Coastal security is being beefed up. Multi-agency centre for collection and collation of intelligence was activated. A National Investigation Agency (NIA) was raised. However, we have still a long way to go. The counter-terrorism apparatus needs a lot more strengthening.

INSURMOUNTABLE?

the challenge of terrorism and the Maoist insurgency.

Manpower shortage The shortage of manpower at the ground level must be met immediately. The United Nations has prescribed an average of 222 policemen per lakh of population. As against this, we have only 128 policemen per lakh of population in the country. The Home Minister, while addressing the Conference of Directors General of Police in New Delhi on September 15, 2011, stated that there are over 5,00,000 vacancies in the state police forces. The authorised strength of the IPS, after cadre review, is 4,720; on January 1, 2011 however there were only 3,393 officers in position. Needless to say, these shortages affect the performance of police at the ground level. Urgent steps must be taken to fill-up the vacancies.

NCTC The proposal to have a National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC) to deal with the challenge of terrorism has unfortunately run into rough weather. In December 2009, while addressing a conference of the Intelligence Bureau, the Home Minister spelled out the need to have an over-arching National Counter Terrorism Centre for “preventing a terrorist attack, containing a terrorist attack should one take place and responding to a terrorist attack by inflicting pain upon the perpetrators”. The scheme encountered opposition initially from the other security related departments and subsequently from the state governments. Chidambaram’s intention was laudable, but he made three grievous mistakes. Firstly, the states were not consulted on such a sensitive issue

November 2012 Defence AND security alert

affecting centre-state relations, which they should have been. Secondly, the NCTC, both in USA and UK, are independent entities. Making NCTC part of the IB was questionable. Thirdly, it was wrong in principle to have vested the Intelligence Bureau with powers of arrest and seizure. The country must have an NCTC – and it must be a strong body with full authority over sharing, collation and dissemination of all intelligence relating to terrorism. However, the temptation to vest it with police powers must be resisted. Such powers would always arouse suspicion and the temptation to misuse them would always be there. The proposed NCTC should neither be crippled nor made more powerful than is actually necessary for combating terrorism. It would be a great pity if the proposal is shelved merely because of opposition of the state governments.

Modernisation Modernisation of police specifically aims at improvements under the following eight major heads: 1. Police Buildings: Construction of administrative buildings including police stations and outposts. 2. Police Housing: Construction of residential houses including barracks. 3. Mobility: Purchase of vehicles and motorcycles including bulletproof / mine-proof vehicles. 4. Weapons: Purchase of arms and ammunitions. 5. Equipment: Purchase of equipment for security, communication, crowd control, protective gear, bomb disposal, aids to investigation, disaster management etc. 6. Training: Enhancement of infrastructure facilities in the training institutes. 7. Computerisation: Use information and technology policing. 8.

Forensic

Science:

of in

Improving

forensic science laboratories infrastructural facilities.

and

The shortage of manpower at the ground level must be met immediately. The United Nations has prescribed an average of 222 policemen per lakh of population. As against this, we have only 128 policemen per lakh of population in the country. The Home Minister, while addressing the Conference of Directors General of Police in New Delhi on September 15, 2011, stated that there are over 5,00,000 vacancies in the state police forces. The authorised strength of the IPS, after cadre review, is 4,720; on January 1, 2011 however there were only 3,393 officers in position

The Maoist affected areas require personnel well trained in jungle warfare with specialised bulletproof equipment and mine-proof vehicles. It is learnt that the CRPF has started using satellite imageries to plan and execute operations against the Maoists. The force has been given GPS devices while GPS trackers are being procured. The Prime Minister, while addressing the police chiefs of the states on September 6, 2012, observed: “The Left Wing Extremists affected states also need to improve the police population ratio, strengthen police infrastructure and equip their police forces with better weapons, better communication systems and better training.”

Use of information technology

It is a significant initiative of the central government towards capacity building of state police forces, the objective being to foster a balanced development of the state police so that they are able to tackle various challenges of internal security and law and order situations arising from time to time. Unfortunately however, the implementation of the scheme leaves much to be desired. There is tardiness at all levels. The funds are released by the central government with delay. The state governments take their own time to communicate the allocations to the state police. The police headquarters also does not show the required degree of commitment. As a result, there is only partial utilisation of the earmarked funds – and that also not in the best possible manner for the most urgently required projects. Police buildings continue to be in poor shape and the housing satisfaction of the subordinate ranks is still at a low level. Weapons have been acquired but in a somewhat haphazard manner. Training is still a much neglected area with the most unwanted officers being posted in the training academies. Computerisation has made slow progress. Forensic support is quite inadequate.

CCTNS

The metropolitan cities and the Maoist affected areas particularly require modernisation of the police forces deployed there because of the nature of the challenges. The mega cities are throwing up complex problems which only a motivated and modern police force can handle.

The government has embarked on a Crime and Criminal Tracking Network System (CCTNS). The idea is to have a network which will facilitate storage and exchange of information among police stations throughout the country. Under CCTNS, 14,000 police stations and 6,000 higher

Technological inputs are absolutely necessary to enhance the capabilities of the police forces. Such inputs would in fact act as a force multiplier. Addressing the police chiefs of the country on September 15, 2009, the Prime Minister emphasised the importance of new technology and technological innovations and said that these would “go a very long way in improving our performance in all dimensions of the internal security challenges”. Developing this point, the Prime Minister said that “each police station should aim at being self-sufficient and needs to be given the required resources in terms of anti-riot gear, better weapons, the nucleus of a mobile forensic unit and be connected to a networked criminal data base management system”. Every city, he further said, should have a modern police control room with digitised maps. The key lies in the plans for the modernisation of our police force. The Home Minister also talked of “introducing technologies to augment the effectiveness the police force”. Two significant initiatives have already been taken by the government in this regard.

officers (circles, districts, ranges, zones and police headquarters) will be automated. The network will provide investigating officers with information, tools and technology to investigate as well as take preventive action. The scheme should go a long way in plugging the information gap in the collection and dissemination of criminal intelligence.

Chidambaram’s intention was laudable, but he made three grievous mistakes. Firstly, the states were not consulted on such a sensitive issue affecting centre-state relations, which they should have been. Secondly, the NCTC, both in USA and UK, are independent entities. Making NCTC part of the IB was questionable. Thirdly, it was wrong in principle to have vested the Intelligence Bureau with powers of arrest and seizure

NATGRID The government is also promoting Information Technology in intelligence gathering and has drawn up a plan to have a National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID). The objective is to consolidate the data collected by various law enforcement agencies with a view to analysing and giving appropriate help and guidance to officers and police organisations working in the field. This is also a step in the right direction.

Summing up The threat of terrorism and the ongoing Maoist insurgency pose formidable challenges to the police and the paramilitary forces. A comprehensive set of measures would be required to deal with these problems. The shortages of manpower must be met immediately. Training must improve. The police must be rejuvenated by freeing it from extraneous pressures and giving it the necessary firepower and equipment as also forensic support. The paramilitary forces must have better infrastructure and their transport, communications and weaponry would need to be upgraded. Modernisation of forces will be the key. It must be added however that the forces would also require political support and legal protection.

November 2012 Defence AND security alert

security threat and challenges

NATIONAL CONSENSUS

Lt Gen V K Ahluwalia PVSM, AVSM**, YSM, VSM (retd) The writer was the Army Commander, Central Command prior to his superannuation. He is a graduate of Staff College, Higher Command Course and National Defence Course (NDC) Dhaka (Bangladesh). With a balanced command, staff and instructional profile during his service, he has commanded the brigade, division and corps, all in the intense operational environment of Northern Command. As the Army Commander Central Command, he has analysed the Naxal problem, the ground realities and strategic challenges towards conflict resolution.

Due to lack of inter-state coordination; we have seen that the largest number of Naxal related incidents were close to the bi-junctions and tri-junctions of the affected states. Also, there has been a departure in the Naxal’s methodology of operating in the last decade or so. They are resorting to large scale extortion and other illegal activities to fund their movement. The Maoists’ total revenue from extortion, drug cultivation and racketeering was estimated to be 25 billion rupees (US$ 552 million) in 2010. This has to a large extent been possible due to the availability of large natural resources like minerals, which have attracted huge investments by the government and private corporations into the area. The Naxals extort ‘protection’ money from these corporations in order to let them function in peace. Drug trade also provides huge amount of funds to the Naxals for the party related tasks and for procurement of arms and ammunition

he Indian Army had been employed in 1948 itself against the first communist upsurge in Telangana. Then came Operation Steeplechase in West Bengal from July-September 1971. Currently the Indian Army is in an over-watch and training support role to the Police and CAPFs. The former Army Commander Central Command has closely followed the Maoist insurgency and lucidly highlights its grave destabilisation potential. The years 2009 and 2010 have been the bloodiest in the history of Naxal movement, with 2,192 persons being killed in all forms of violence including the deplorable act of terrorism perpetuated through the attack on the Gyaneshwari Express. The initial lot of Police and CAPF troops were not fully trained and equipped to operate against the Naxals. Thus, in the initial stages, the SF provided a large target to the Naxals, which led to a number of casualties. From 2007 to 2010, there was a reversal in attrition ratio wherein the SF suffered more casualties than the Naxals. Some of the key strategic challenges today are the absence of national consensus and national strategy, centre state relationship, non-inclusive growth, poor implementation of schemes on the ground, inter-state coordination among all agencies, lack of accountability and large scale unemployment among the youth. In order to sustain and to further strengthen their movement, the Naxals would make enormous efforts to seek external support, be it in terms of funding, weaponry, training, refuge, propaganda or ideological support. Also for India’s adversaries, this is perhaps the one movement which can provide them with a ready tool with which they can undermine the growing economic, political and military might of the country. By so doing, it would serve the strategic interests of our adversaries, as, besides slowing economic growth, the heartland of the country and its primary mineral belt would remain destabilised.

ndia faces a large number of external and internal security challenges due to her geostrategic location and the prevalent socio-economic conditions. Besides long international borders and coastline, it has a large number of island territories, Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and offshore assets to protect. The external challenges will continue to persist primarily due to the unresolved boundary disputes with Pakistan in the west and China in the north. With the ongoing sub-conventional conflicts in Jammu and Kashmir and the north-eastern states, she has a number of internal security challenges due to the rise of religious fundamentalism, caste conflicts, terrorism, illegal migrations, demographic inversions and

November 2012 Defence AND security alert

Left Wing Extremism (LWE). India is faced with the single biggest internal security challenge from the Naxalites. The Naxals have grown in strength at an accelerated pace with effect from 2001. It is astounding. Although a number of incidents of violence and sabotage took place in different states from time to time, yet they were brushed aside as a low level law and order problem. In other words, we had grossly underestimated the potency of the threat in being. Resultantly, adequate resources were neither allotted nor efforts made to harmonise the efforts to manage the conflict. To analise the pattern of Naxal violence, the period 1967-2012 can be broken down in three

Bloodiest Years of Naxal Violence:

Strategic Challenges

distinct phases. These are the initial Peasants’ Uprising phase, Dialogues, Negotiations and Mergers phase (PWG was formed by K Seetaramiah during this period) and the Maoist phase. During the third phase, the activities of the Naxals increased considerably due to the merger of the erstwhile Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCCI) and CPI (Marxist-Leninist) People’s War Group (or popularly known as PWG) on 21 September 2004. The merger brought about a paradigm shift in the level of violence. It also increased the potency of the newly formed People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA), which began to carry out bold, mass attacks against armed police posts and jails in strength, in far-flung areas. The aims were to loot weapons, ammunition, instill fear, tie down security forces on protective / defensive mode in widespread areas and then proceed to create liberated zones. The so-called liberated zones are the areas where the rule of the state

was ineffective due to voids in governance, administration and security apparatus. These zones are characterised by difficult terrain and remoteness of the area, which became the breeding grounds of the Naxals.

The national strategy must first necessarily address the ‘trust deficit’ between the government and the people and simultaneously take actions to overcome other deficits though a multi-dimensional and multi-pronged approach. In order to formulate and recommend a national strategy for conflict resolution of the Naxal problem, it would be prudent to lay out the key strategic challenges that must be addressed in a farsighted and resolute manner, to move towards a definite end state, which is conflict resolution

November 2012 Defence AND security alert

security threat and challenges

NATIONAL CONSENSUS

Peasants’ uprising phase

Dialogues, negotiations and mergers phase

Naxal violence started as an agrarian revolt in 1967 by the Santhal peasants of the Naxalbari village. It was a watershed in the armed struggle of the left wing extremists and beginning of violent struggle. Between 1970 and 1971, there were approximately 4,000 incidents of Naxal violence. Concerted police operations were launched. These culminated in a joint operation called, Operation Steeplechase, a joint Army-PMF-Police operation from 01 July 1971 to 15 August 1971. (Refer the map of Operation Steeplechase). In this, the army provided the outer cordon for joint operations, to seal the routes of entry and exit. The CRPF provided the inner cordon and the state police moved into the affected areas. The operation was generally succesul in containing the first agrarian armed rebellion in India, even as some of the die-hard Naxals escaped into the neighbouring areas. It led to decline in the movement from 1971 to 1980.

This phase refers to the period 1980-2004, during which PWG was formed on 22 April 1980. In the 1980s, there was a second surge of the left wing violence due to formation of PWG. When the Andhra Pradesh police started conducting sustained anti-naxal operations, the cadres shifted into the secure bases in areas bordering Maharashtra, undivided Madhya Pradesh and Odisha. During this phase, a series of mergers also took place to strengthen the Naxal upsurge.

Maoist phase The PWG and MCCI finally merged on 21 September 2004, to give a pan-India orientation to Naxalism in the form of CPI (Maoist). Naxalism continued to spread geographically to more areas, with progressive increase in the intensity of their activities from 2004 onwards. Some of the significant incidents of Maoists

violence are the Jehanabad jail break (2005), the Dantewada jail break (2007), the killing of Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM) MP Shri Sunil Mahato at Jamshedpur (2007), the Rani Bodli Post attack in Dantewada district (2007), the Nayagarh attack (2008), the attack on an East Frontier Rifles (EFR) post at Silda (2010), the ambush at Tadmetla (2010), the Dantewada–Sukma bus massacre (2010) and the kidnapping of District Collector Malkangiri (2011). In 2012, we have witnessed the kidnapping of the Italians, the Biju Janata Dal (BJD) MLA in Odisha and the district collector of Sukma in Chhattisgarh. In a major incident in Gaya district on 18 October 2012, the Naxals triggered an IED and ambushed a party of CRPF, killing six and injuring nine personnel.1

Some of the key strategic challenges are the absence of national consensus and national strategy, centre state relationship, non-inclusive growth, poor implementation of schemes on the ground, inter-state coordination among all agencies, lack of accountability and large scale unemployment among the youth. In order to sustain and to further strengthen their movement, the Naxals would make enormous efforts to seek external support, be it in terms of funding, weaponry, training, refuge, propaganda or ideological support. Also for India’s adversaries, this is perhaps one movement which can provide them with a ready tool with which they can undermine the growing economic, political and military might of the country. By so doing, it would serve the strategic interests of our adversaries, as, besides slow economic growth, the heartland of the country would remain destabilised

Analysis of violence During the initial formative years of the CPI (Maoist), it was given the much needed breathing space for organising and equipping its cadres to take on the SFs. The military wing created their force structure in three tiers, namely primary force, secondary force and people’s militia (jan militia). The Naxals organised themselves, grew in strength and managed to create semblance of a corridor, where the writ of the authorities did not run effectively, thus giving success to its strategy of first establishing the so-called liberated zone, before it commences its move towards the semi-urban or urban locations of the country. As per Martyrs’ Memorial Research Institute (MMRI), the total killings in the Naxal affected areas and Jammu and Kashmir from 2006 to 2010 have been 4,734 and 3,052 respectively.2 This shows that the Naxal violence is considerably more than that in Jammu and Kashmir. It is indicative of both the spread of the violence and the level of expertise gained by the Naxals. A detailed analysis of Naxal violence was carried out based on statistical data pertaining to number of incidents, civilians / SFs personnel / Naxals killed, number injured, arrests, blasts etc. The years 2009 and 2010 have been the

bloodiest in the history of Naxal movement, with 2,192 persons being killed in all forms of violence including the deplorable act of terrorism perpetuated through the attack on the Gyaneshwari Express. In addition, the statistics clearly show the areas that are critically / moderately / marginally affected by Naxalism in various affected states:

Critically affected areas Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha, Bihar and eastern fringes of Maharashtra consisting of districts of Gadchiroli and Gondia clearly have the highest incidences of Naxal related violence and hence are the critically affected areas / states. The worst affected areas amongst these states lie within the areas enclosed by Rivers Indravati, Godavari and Sileru (predominantly Bijapur, Sukma, Jagdalpur, Koraput, Malkangiri). The other areas are the forested regions of Dandakaranya, Abujhmad, Saranda, Latehar, Gumla, Gaya, Kaimur Hills area and West Medinipur (West Bengal).

Moderately to marginally affected areas With improvement in situation, northern parts of Andhra Pradesh comprising of the districts of Khammam, Warangal, Karimnagar and Adilabad, south-eastern parts of Madhya Pradesh and UP, south western parts of West Bengal and western parts of Maharashtra are moderately to marginally affected / influenced.

Insurgency is a result of accumulation of a large number of grievances pertaining to exploitation, deprivation, unemployment, lack of basic amenities and development of infrastructure. Until such time these genuine grievances are addressed and the faith of the population in the government restored, the problem cannot be effectively solved High rate of civilian casualties: As per data compiled from various sources, it is evident that the violence has always seen large casualties amongst the innocent civilians. The Naxals have been carrying out repression against the civilians by branding them as police informers or class enemies. The 28 May 2010 attack against the Gyaneshwari Express indicates that Naxalism, as a movement, has lost its clarity and direction – its ideology has undergone a change. The attack on the train led to 148 civilian casualties, which was an action against its own people. As per the latest MHA report available on their website and also published in The Times of India on 21 February 2012, it stated that the Naxals have killed 5,467 civilians and destroyed 281 schools from 2001 to 2011.3 It also gives the impression that the ultras do not want the tribals to join the mainstream through education. The civilian casualties have been high since 2003 and have consistently remained high until 2010.4 Naxal vs SFs casualties: After the merger of PWG and MCCI in 2004, merger of military wings of both the

1. ‘Six CRPF personnel killed in Maoist ambush,’ The Hindu, October 19, 2012. 2. “Naxals Surge Ahead - The Nation Under Siege”, Martyrs’ Memorial Research Institute (MMRI), 29 June 2011 and MHA Annual Report 2007-08. 3. Data accessed at MHA website giving out FAQs about Maoists accessed at http://mha.nic.in/pdfs/NM-FAQ.pdf 4. Ibid.

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security threat and challenges

NATIONAL CONSENSUS

organisations and the formation of the CPI (Maoist), there has been a steady increase in Naxal violence and in particular the SFs casualties. This can be attributed to two main factors namely – the merger of PWG and MCCI which also brought about the merger of the armed wings of the two groups and the formation of the PLGA as already discussed. This provided the movement with a potent force, which could now carry out decisive guerrilla attacks against the SFs. Secondly, the initial lot of troops were not fully trained and equipped to operate against the Naxals. Thus, in the initial stages, the SFs provided a large target to the Naxals, which led to a number of casualties. From 2007 to 2010, there was a reversal in attrition ratio wherein the SFs suffered more casualties than the Naxals. Thereafter, there has been an overall decline in the number of incidents, the level of violence and the attrition ratio is in favour of the SFs.

from these corporations in order to let them function in peace. Drug trade also provides huge amount of funds to the Naxals for the party related tasks and for procurement of arms and ammunition.

The terrain in the affected areas is inaccessible and thickly forested. This allows for greater freedom of movement for the insurgents without being easily seen / detected. It also allows them the ability to make full use of ‘Guerrilla Warfare’ tactics that has been the preferred method of the Naxals in their attacks on the SFs. Due to lack of inter-state coordination; we have seen that the largest number of Naxal related incidents were close to the bi-junctions and tri-junctions of the affected states. Also, there has been a departure in the Naxal’s methodology of operating in the last decade or so. They are resorting to large scale extortion and other illegal activities to fund their movement. The Maoists’ total revenue from extortion, drug cultivation and racketeering was estimated to be 25 billion rupees (US$ 552 million) in 2010.5 This has to a large extent been possible due to the availability of large natural resources like minerals, which have attracted huge investments by the government and private corporations into the area. The Naxals extort ‘protection’ money

A study of various statistics show that, post 2004, they have increased their armed violence and killings, with a view to show the state in poor light and, at the same time, gain moral ascendency and invincibility in the eyes of the local population. Also, there was a marked increase in the criminal activities and extortions in Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh and Odisha. The Naxals have also expressed their support to the separatist and secessionist ethnic organisation and established links with other militant organisations in the north-eastern states of India. To further strengthen the movement, they have established links with Nepal Maoists, militant organisation in the north-east, ISI, Islamic groups like IM and SIMI etc. As per the latest reports (19 October 2012), the Naxals have forged ties with the ISI with the support of overground radicals of banned outfit SIMI in West Bengal.6

Critically Affected Areas – Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha, Bihar and eastern fringes of Maharashtra consisting of districts of Gadchiroli and Gondia clearly have the highest incidences of Naxal related violence and hence are the critically affected areas / states. The worst affected areas amongst these states lie within the areas enclosed by Rivers Indravati, Godavari and Sileru (predominantly Bijapur, Sukma, Jagdalpur, Koraput, Malkangiri). The other areas are the forested regions of Dandakaranya, Abujhmad, Saranda, Latehar, Gumla, Gaya, Kaimur Hills area and West Medinipur (West Bengal)

The Naxals have been indulging in kidnapping of civilians and killing a few of them.7 They label the killed ones as police informers, so as to

terrorise the population. A few high profile soft targets were kidnapped to force the government to agree to most of their demands. There have been reports that the Naxals have been employing innocent civilians, including children, as human shields against the operations by the SFs.8 Besides covering some of their combat weaknesses, it does put a lot of psychological pressure on the SFs operating in those areas. Over the years, there has been a progressive increase in the IED attacks against the troop and load carrying vehicles of SFs, as part of the change in their tactics. By a standoff activation of the IEDs, the Naxals are least vulnerable and impose heavy casualties on the SFs in a single incident. However, the overall incidents and violence has declined to some extent in the years 2011 and 2012, which can be attributed to the sustained and surgical operations by the SFs, who have, over a period, learned from their mistakes. Now, they (SFs) have also been better equipped and trained in guerrilla warfare tactics. Resultantly, the attack on police / SFs posts have reduced in the recent past.

Strategic challenges It is no longer a security related issue, but more importantly, has its roots in socio-economicenvironmental-cultural and political problems, due to voids in governance and development of the region. Insurgency is a result of accumulation of a large number of grievances pertaining to exploitation, deprivation, unemployment, lack of basic amenities and development of infrastructure. Until such time these genuine grievances are addressed and the faith of the population in the government restored, the problem cannot be effectively solved. The Naxals, in consonance with the famous theorists of insurgency and counter-insurgency alike, have correctly identified the centre of gravity of the revolution – ‘the people’. Therefore, the national strategy

5. Mahadevan Prem, ‘The Maoist insurgency in India: between crime and resolution,’ ‘Small Wars and Insurgencies’ Vol. 23, Page 205. No 2, May 2012. 6. Mohan Vishwa, ‘Naxals have forged ties with SIMI’s help: Bengal,’ The Times of India, October 19, 2012. 7. In reply to a starred question in Lok Sabha on 22 November 2011, the minister of state for home affairs, Mr Jitendra Singh, stated that the Maoists had abducted a total of 1,554 people in Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha,West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh and other states between 1 January 2008 and 14 November 2011. Of them, 489 were abducted from Chhattisgarh, 463 from Jharkhand and 137 from Odisha. In total, 328 persons were killed by the Maoists. 8. Joshi Sandeep, ‘Abandon operations if Maoists use human shields, security forces told,’ The Hindu, 7 July 2012.

November 2012 Defence AND security alert

must first necessarily address the ‘trust deficit’ between the government and the people and simultaneously take actions to overcome other deficits though a multi-dimensional and multi-pronged approach. In order to formulate and recommend a national strategy for conflict resolution of the Naxal problem, it would be prudent to lay out the key strategic challenges that must be addressed in a farsighted and resolute manner, to move towards a definite end state, which is conflict resolution.

The years 2009 and 2010 have been the bloodiest in the history of Naxal movement, with 2,192 persons being killed in all forms of violence including the deplorable act of terrorism perpetuated through the attack on the Gyaneshwari Express. In addition, the statistics clearly show the areas that are critically / moderately / marginally affected by Naxalism in various affected states Some of the key strategic challenges are the absence of national consensus and national strategy, centre state relationship, non-inclusive growth, poor implementation of

schemes on the ground, inter-state coordination among all agencies, lack of accountability and large scale unemployment among the youth. In order to sustain and to further strengthen their movement, the Naxals would make enormous efforts to seek external support, be it in terms of funding, weaponry, training, refuge, propaganda or ideological support. Also for India’s adversaries, this is perhaps one movement which can provide them with a ready tool with which they can undermine the growing economic, political and military might of the country. By so doing, it would serve the strategic interests of our adversaries, as, besides slow economic growth, the heartland of the country would remain destabilised. The capacity and capability building of Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) and the state police forces should be the main focus to be effective against the Naxals. There is no substitute to effective training of troops – words of General Douglas MacArthur are most apt, “In no other profession are the penalties for employing untrained personnel so appalling or so irrevocable as in the military.” Therefore, both the

central and state governments must increase their capacities to impart quality training to their troops / police personnel. In the interim, the army should continue to provide anti-naxal training to the CAPFs and the state police. As per India census 2011, India has a huge youth bulge, in which about 47 per cent of the population is below 25 years of age and 63 per cent below 35 years. The youth population in the Naxal affected areas, in percentages, is much higher than the national average. Widespread unemployment, lack of job opportunities, rampant corruption and visible disparity can influence a youthful population towards social conflict and revolutionary ideologies. Unemployment among the youth in the Naxals affected areas is a strategic challenge, which must be addressed on priority. Therefore, the focus should be on implementation of projects on ground, participative development and generation of employment opportunities and accountability of functionaries responsible. As Naxalism is the biggest challenge to national security, it is the duty of all elements of national power to work collectively to resolve the conflict.

November 2012 Defence AND security alert

security threat and challenges

formidable

T Joginder Singh, IPS (retd) The writer is a former Director of Central Bureau of Investigation and is best known for bringing the Bofors papers from the Swiss courts to Delhi. As a student he was selected for the Indian Police Service at the age of 20. He is both a regular columnist of leading dailies in India and an author of repute, with 50 books (including versions in Indian and foreign languages) to his credit.

Some of the major items covered under the modernisation scheme include construction of secure police stations, outposts, police lines, ensuring mobility security, provision of modern weaponry, security, surveillance, communication, forensic equipment, upgradation of training infrastructure, police housing, computerisation etc

Unfortunately, the way police is treated shows that giving better policing to the country is not in the government’s priority

he strength of the police has almost remained the same, though the population since Independence has become five times more. As per the information given in Lok Sabha that India has a police-population ratio (number of police personnel per one lakh of population) of 134 as compared to minimum United Nations norm of 220. Bihar and Uttar Pradesh have worst ratio of 63 and 74 respectively. UP has nearly 5 lakh policemen. With a headcount of nearly 5 lakh, the Uttar Pradesh police is one of the largest police forces in the world. The same force, however, has the poorest police-population ratio in the country. This is primarily because 65 per cent of its total sanctioned posts are lying vacant. The Home Ministry’s budget for 11th Five Year Plan has a provision for police modernisation of Rs 1,000 crore, for 28 states and 7 union territories. If the budget provision is equally divided between 35 units of states and union territories, it comes to about 28.57 crore for five years and 5.71 crore per year. It is not enough even to build half a dozen police stations or improve the infrastructure of the police forces.

ndia is a vast country with an area of 3.28 millions km, with a length of about 3,214 km from north to south and breadth of 2,933 km from west to east. Its land boundary is 15,200 km long and the coastline of mainland including Andaman and Nicobar and Lakshadweep is 7,516.6 km. India’s total area is about 2.4 per cent of the total geographical area of the world. It is, six times bigger than France, nine times of Germany and twentythree times larger than Bangladesh. It consists of 28 states and 7 union territories. There are 22 official languages including English and Hindi and thousands of dialects are spoken in different parts of the country. Currently, population of India in 2012 is 1,220,200,000 (1.22 billion) of which male population in India is 628,800,000 (628.8 million) and female population in India is 591,400,000 (591.4 million) leading to a sex ratio 940 females per 1,000 males. So far as the policing is concerned, the factual position is best stated in the words of the then Home Minister of India, who minced no words, about the conditions of police while inaugurating a 40th All-India Police Science Conference in Raipur, Chhattisgarh, June, 29, 2010. He (Chidambaram) admitted that “inadequate and ill-equipped police forces” is the reason for the present sorry state of affairs of policing in the country. “Policing a country of over 1.1 billion is not an easy task. Policing a country in a troubled neighbourhood makes the task more difficult. And policing a country with insufficient police stations and inadequate and ill-equipped police forces makes the task almost formidable”. We need to at least double the police strength and create necessary infrastructure to impart them

November 2012 Defence AND security alert

quality training to improve the policing in the country. Presenting a picture of the current security set up in the country, he said, “Of the sanctioned posts of 21 lakh in all ranks in the police departments in the states, nearly 3,35,000 posts are currently lying vacant. Thus, the police-population ratio for the whole country is about 160 per 1,00,000 persons, which is much lower than the international norm.” “In a state like Bihar, the number is about 75. In UP it is about 115, in Andhra Pradesh it is about 125, in Orissa it is about 135, in Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand, two states most affected by Left Wing Extremism, it is about 205,” He admitted that there were not enough police stations. Besides, many police stations lack required strength of policemen, while some police stations exist only in name. It was because most states have not yet created infrastructures, to impart even basic training to Constables. The distribution of police force among the police stations is badly skewed, there are not enough police stations. Even where there is a police station, the strength of the police force in a station is often not more than 20 persons. In some of the districts affected by Left Wing Extremism, the police station exists only in name. There are police stations where the Station House has been blown up; there are police stations where there are no more than eight men; and even these eight men or less men do not hold any weapons for fear of the weapons being looted … You will recall

Police Modernisation: Revamping the Force the case of Lalgarh police station in West Midnapore in West Bengal. The police station was closed and locked from inside for several months until the CRPF ‘liberated’ it. About the central government, he added that centre has decided to set up one Central Academy for Police Training (CAPT), two Central Detective Schools (CDS) and twenty Counter-Insurgency and Anti-Terrorism Schools (CIATS) with a combined intake capacity of 4,000 personnel a year in order to assist the states. Police get blamed and take the blame because of the lack of training and equipment. While terrorists in Maharashtra for 26/11 were armed with AK-47s, the police were given only Lathis and Dandas. It is not just the Maharashtra government, but other states too are guilty of giving shabby, scant and dilapidated treatment to the police, in weaponry, training and accommodations to cops on duty. Here is a classic situation in Bihar, where most policemen claim that they are forced to live under a structure that is in a terrible state. The roofs leak, bricks or chunks from the slab fall over sleeping cops and instead of its capacity of 300, it houses 3,000 men in uniform. The policemen are compelled to serve for 16, sometimes even 18 hours of

duty at a stretch. The housing facilities are almost absent and the men then take turns at sleeping. The toilets are dysfunctional with broken doors, water shortages plaguing the privies. The housing facilities are almost absent and the men take turns at sleeping. It is the Constable and the people at the police station level, which are expected to implement the law and order and enforce the criminal justice system and the government policies. Apart from the state police forces, the following agencies are concerned with the security of the country:

Research and Analysis Wing Intelligence Bureau Directorate of Revenue Intelligence National Technical Research Organisation Defence Intelligence Agency Joint Cipher Bureau All India Radio Monitoring Service Signals Intelligence Directorate Aviation Research Centre Directorate of Air Intelligence Directorate of Naval Intelligence Directorate of Income Tax (Intelligence and Criminal Investigation) Directorate General of Income Tax Investigation

What they do is a hush-hush affair, as the numerous terrorist attacks in the country show. But the actual action to apprehend and prosecute for any criminal offence is to be taken by the state police in the states, whose condition has been stated above.

Inadequate and ill-equipped police forces is the reason for the present sorry state of affairs of policing in the country. Policing a country of over 1.1 billion is not an easy task. Policing a country in a troubled neighbourhood makes the task more difficult. And policing a country with insufficient police stations and inadequate and ill-equipped police forces makes the task almost formidable Since policing and law and order is a state subject, the central government gives only a token aid to show that it is doing its bit. The Home Ministry’s budget for 11th Five Year Plan has a provision for police modernisation of Rs 1,000 crore, for 28 states and 7 union territories. If the budget provision is equally divided between 35 units of states and union territories, it comes to about 28.57 crore for five years and 5.71 crore per year. It is not enough even to build half a dozen police stations or improve the infrastructure of the police forces.

November 2012 Defence AND security alert

security threat and challenges Grandiose plans and schemes but almost no funding, is the stark reality. Infact, there is no clear policy as to how to improve the police forces. Even if the states want to improve the police, they do not do so, as improving the police does not fetch votes to the politicians. Political parties are more concerned with populist schemes, like giving free laptops, wheat flour and pulses. Central government has at its disposal the following central Paramilitary Forces:

UP takes the cake in giving Rs 30,000 to every Muslim girl who passes matriculation examination and building walls around Muslim minority graveyards. Forget about big lectures on how to police the country, I was an eye witnesses to the awful state of police, in NOIDA, closest to the capital. Apart from the senior officers, who have a vehicle each, the police station had a ramshackle jeep, for which petrol bills had not been paid for months together!

BSF (Border Security Force), CRPF (Central Reserve Police Force), CISF (Central Industrial Security Force), ITBP (Indo Tibetan Border Police) RPF (Railway Protection Force) and SSB (Sashastra Seema Bal). They number approximately 8 lakh. Other allied forces for defence of the country include:

A senior officer of UP told me that when in a conference with senior officers, some Station House Officers raised the question of providing budget for the running of the vehicle and clearance of the petrol bills, he was pulled up by saying that â&#x20AC;&#x153;What kind of officer he was, who could not manage such small thingsâ&#x20AC;??

The Assam Rifles (AR) 50,000 personnel (led by Indian Army officers reporting to the Ministry of Home Affairs), The Special Frontier Force (SFF) 10,000 personnel (led by Indian Army officers reporting to Indian Intelligence) The Indian Coast Guard 5,400 personnel (29 stations, usually led by Indian Navy officers and reporting to the Ministry of Defence). They are much better equipped and trained, than the state police forces, as the resources of the central government are far more than of the state governments.

Forget about the modernisation, even the tools for working of the police, which is expected to fight crime and maintain law and order are not available, because there is no single head of the force in India, unlike the army who can plead their cause. Unarmed Constables have been killed by the criminals or run over by rash and negligent drivers, most of who escape, for lack of CCTV cameras at vital spots.

Indeed sometimes, the government policies show the seamy side of even charging the state governments, for giving central police forces. The bill for guarding 26/11 accused, Kasab, for Rs 19 crore was sent to the Maharashtra government for payment. Obviously the right hand does not know what the left is doing in the government.

Modernisation However some of the major items covered under the modernisation scheme include construction of secure police stations, outposts, police lines, ensuring mobility security, provision of modern weaponry, security, surveillance, communication, forensic equipment, upgradation of training infrastructure, police housing, computerisation etc. These items only indicate the broad areas for which assistance is admissible under the scheme.

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There is a multiplicity of agencies even in putting up the traffic signals. One agency buys it, another repairs, the third replaces and the fourth maintains the roads, with each of them considering it more important than others. Unlike the army, where every soldier has a weapon, it is not so with the police.

Police to population ratio The strength of the police has almost remained the same, though the population since Independence has become five times more. As per the information given in Lok Sabha that India has a police-population ratio (number of police personnel per one lakh of population) of 134 as compared to minimum United Nations norm of 220. Bihar and Uttar Pradesh have worst ratio of 63 and 74 respectively. UP has nearly 5 lakh policemen. With a headcount of nearly 5 lakh, the Uttar Pradesh police is one of the largest police forces in the world. The

November 2012 Defence AND security alert

same force, however, has the poorest police-population ratio in the country. This is primarily because 65 per cent of its total sanctioned posts are lying vacant. The police-population ratio is computed on the basis of the total strength of the civil police as compared to the population of the area. The civil police here comprise the district police force or rather cops primarily responsible for maintenance of law and order and investigation of crime cases. It is this very section of the police that is majorly responsible for crime situation of any area. Even for the existing strength there are no adequate training facilities available for fresh recruits, forget about the refresher courses for the Constables and Head Constables at the cutting edge level. Unlike the defence forces, where every person before or after his promotion has to undergo some kind of a training or a refresher course it is not so in police because the government would have to spend more for creating training facilities. Both people and the governments in power expect miracles, from a highly abused, misused and inadequately equipped police, with vacancies galore. Attention to the police is sporadic only when riots take place, for which police is not even remotely responsible. This is apart from the laws of 1861 to 1863 framed by the British, when the conditions have totally changed and laws are not able to punish the criminals. The distrust of the police still continues under the Indian Evidence Act. Even if a person confesses to the commission of crime, to the police, it has no legal value. Everybody, except the government knows that talk does not cook rice. This is what the government is doing. By occasionally claiming, that it will improve the police and that also when any situation goes out of control. Knee-jerk reactions would not do. Both the central and state governments should remember that the shortest answer in resolving any problem lies in doing and action is more important than eloquence. Unfortunately, the way police is treated shows that giving better policing to the country is not in the governmentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s priority.

MAKEOVER MUSTER

Change to Modernise Manvendra Singh The writer is Founding Editor of Defence and Security Alert (DSA) magazine. He is a well known defence journalist and columnist. He was member of Indian Parliament till 2009 from one of the largest constituencies in Rajasthan.

succinct but incisive analysis of what ails our Police Force and CPOs today. An officer from one of the state polices sidesteps into a key command or staff appointment in one of the CPOs, or even the NSG. This to and fro between the state and CPO has had an impact on the functioning of both services, negatively. The first step to modernisation of the police and security forces should be the promulgation of a rule which states that an officer can only head a CPO if he / she has been a Company Commander in one of them. The most basic, step to take is the implementation of the National Police Commission Report. This excellent report is gathering dust in varvious Home Departments across the country.

overnor of West Bengal was formerly the National Security Advisor and has also been Director of the Intelligence Bureau. So when he speaks M K Narayanan should be heard, with care and concentration. He spoke recently at the Raising Day of the National Security Guard, the premier counter-terrorism force in the country. And he said some very prescient things, unusual for a speaker to take the bull by its horns. Which is precisely what he did when he observed that the NSG risks losing its elite status by being just another security force in the country. Unmonitored expansion of the NSG has the potential of putting the force in grave danger of becoming a glorified protection service. A Special Force, he said, will only remain special if it remains restricted to the best few. Unrestricted expansion is an unmitigated disaster and the NSG is heading there, to paraphrase what he said. The service must be structured, administered and deployed, solely on the basis of its core competencies and roles. There is no logic in having more, when less is better. This, in a nutshell, is the gist of what he said. And his words should be taken to analyse the real state of policing and securing the country. At any given time there is an expansion underway in the country of its myriad police and security forces. While the former can be restricted, in order to ease analysis, to the various police forces of the states, the latter term can be used to cover the various central police organisations that make up the bulk of the forces currently engaged in security operations in the country. While the army is of course the cutting edge of operations, the various CPOs form a vast body of troops deployed. In the sphere of paramilitary forces are the Assam Rifles, Coast Guard and constitutionally the NSG as well. They need to be analysed separately and will form the subject of a later piece. The priority now is to understand the need for the modernisation of the police and security forces of India.

No expertise or experience in the world prepares an officer to transition from staff or command appointments in state polices to those of CPOs. There is nothing common in the jobs to be done and there is also no common ethos between a state police and a CPO. Yet this practice persists and in it lies the decline in the efficacy of the police and the various security forces. This to and fro between the state and CPO has had an impact on the functioning of both services, negatively

In the minds of most Indians there is a nexus between the politician and the policeman, in which each scratches the others' back. As with all perceptions it has to be based on some elements of truth. There is an urgent need to break this nexus, if it exists and change perceptions, which certainly exist

The first and most basic, step to take is the implementation of the National Police Commission Report. This excellent report is gathering dust in various Home Departments across the country

October 2012 Defence AND security alert November

security threat and challenges

MAKEOVER MUSTER

security threat and challenges

REINVENTING INDIA

The process of understanding the need has to begin with answering the four basic queries – why the modernisation, how to modernise, when and what to modernise. In all of these short and simple questions lie the answers to India’s ailments, their cures. The ‘why’ of the matter is the most important, since it forms the basis of all arguments. Why is there a need to modernise? To answer that one needs to go back in time to when the concept of modern policing came to India. A colonial creation, the idea of policing India was to keep the imperial authorities reasonably well informed about the ‘nefarious’ activities of nationalistically inclined natives and to have a force of men available to check them from realising their dreams and designs. Police was an instrument of state power to prevent subversion, primarily and crime, secondarily. And so it was structured, recruited and administered accordingly. This was 19th century colonial India, but the structures remain essentially unchanged and therein lie the bases of decay. And hence the need to modernise. From the all-India selection process to the district level recruitments there is a seamless connection with the past. Thereafter the training process and despatch to the various states, or districts, remains a tale of continuity, rather than an innovation by a new democratic order. This process and this structure, are aimed at securing India from the upheaval of its masses, aka 19th/20th century mass based political movements, not 21st century wars of terror, intrigue and globalisation of violence. The structures made in the 19th century cannot hope to fight the wars of the 21st century. Wars of the past were based on mass mobilisation of manpower and machines. Whereas now they are based on the covert mobilisation of a select few who live amongst the masses. Therein lies the answer to the ‘why’ of change and modernisation.

Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM (retd)

While the army is of course the cutting edge of operations, the various CPOs form a vast body of troops deployed. In the sphere of paramilitary forces are the Assam Rifles, Coast Guard and constitutionally the NSG as well The ‘how’ to modernise begins with the realisation of the depth of the problem. There is now a direct co-relation between the state of the police and those of the various CPOs, the security forces. And that is on account of their cadre controlling authority, the Ministry of Home Affairs sitting in North Block of the impressive colonial era sandstone creations on Raisina Hill. Since the MHA began to view all of these organisations from the same prism the ailment has only spread. At the root of the problem and the answer to the ‘how’, is the issue of leadership. Since it happens a number of times in the year there is no reason to give examples. And here is what happens – an officer from one of the state polices sidesteps into a key command or staff appointment in one of the CPOs, or even the NSG. Command position in a CPO normally situated in that officers’ home state. Many a times there is a seamless transition from heading a state police to heading a CPO, highest positions entwined by a bizarre cadre management system. Therein lies the rub. No expertise or experience in the world prepares an officer to transition from staff or command appointments in state polices to those of CPOs. There is nothing common in the jobs to be done and there is also no common ethos between a state police and a CPO. Yet this practice persists and in it lies the decline in the efficacy of the police and the various security forces. An officer can and must only, take appointments in likeminded organisations, another state police or an investigation agency. This to and fro between the state and CPO has had an impact on the functioning of both services, negatively. In the case of the CPOs, since their efficacy impacts on India as a whole, there is already an in-house cadre. But they aren’t allowed to grow beyond a point, which then affects the overall functioning of the force. The first step to modernisation of the police and security forces, the ‘how’ of it, should the promulgation of a rule which states that an officer can only head a CPO if he / she has been a Company Commander in one of them. Whether it is the army, or a CPO, the key appointment is that of a Company Commander, the one that wins the battle, or the operation. Anyone unaware of what it takes to be a Company Commander cannot perform the tasks of a CPO Director General, for the simple reason that he / she would not have the faintest idea how to deploy troops and conduct an operation. This simple method of addressing the ‘how’ will go a long way in resolving the crisis that confronts the CPOs and state police forces. The ‘when’ of modernisation has the simplest answer – now. The time to modernise and change the functioning and structure of the police and CPOs has long come. It is imperative that the efforts begin now, as much time is required for the changes to be absorbed efficaciously. Any delay will only produce the inevitable Naxal ambush, or a police scandal in the state. The challenge of ‘what’ to modernise is the trickiest of them all, for the really logical step to take is the one that seeks to change the culture of policing. Currently policemen are as reviled as politicians. And in the minds of most Indians there is a nexus between the politician and the policeman, in which each scratches the others’ back. As with all perceptions it has to be based on some elements of truth. There is an urgent need to break this nexus, if it exists and change perceptions, which certainly exist. As with the changes and modernisation steps for the CPOs there is also a leadership change required here, but of a different order. The first and most basic, step to take is the implementation of the National Police Commission Report. This excellent report is gathering dust in various Home Departments across the country. There may be a need to revisit the document and update it for current days. But implementing it is absolutely necessary. There are some in the police who do not want it to be implemented, for their career has existed on the unholy nexus. But for the vast majority of policemen in the country implementation of this report will free their careers from political interference, improve working conditions and instil professionalism. All of the things the vast majority of Indians sorely crave from their police and security forces.

November 2012 Defence AND security alert

INTERNAL SECURITY:

NEED FOR A PARADIGM SHIFT nternal Security is not just a function of the number of Ia function Armed Police and Paramilitary personnel in uniform. It is primarily of the quality of our governance and its ability to create

a just and equitable society that bridges the gap between the rich and the poor and is imbued with a vision and sense of purpose and direction. The absence of such enlightened governance leads to Internal Security problems of varied hues. Today our system of governance per se has become flawed and is a cause for concern. Few nation states in recent history have regressed from an industrial era Society to tribalism on such a scale. Tribalism predates the modern state and is an archaic formulation that can overtime erode the very basis of the modern nation state per se. This Tribalism of Caste is fast becoming a danger to our unity and internal security. The primary basis for the endemic corruption in our society today is rooted in our electoral system that relies so heavily on money, muscle power and criminals. We need to reinvent ourselves as a republic, possibly transit to a Presidential model or switch to a system of proportional representation. Communism has not worked in Russia, Eastern Europe and China. How can a Communism of Caste succeed in India? All parties need to come together to carry out paradigmatic electoral reforms that reduce the role of money power and criminals; that do away with the First Past the Post system and ensure a more representative form of democracy and the emergence of national parties that fight elections on the basis of issues and programmes and not doles and caste-based mobilisations seeking to fragment society and destroy national unity.

The writer is a combat veteran of many skirmishes on the Line of Control and counter-terrorist operations in Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab. He subsequently commanded the reputed Romeo Force during intensive counter-terrorist operations in the Rajouri-Poonch districts. He has served two tenures at the DGMO. He is a prolific writer on matters military and non-military and has published 24 books and over 100 papers in many prestigious research journals. He is Editor-in-Chief of Defence and Security Alert (DSA) magazine.

Both jihadi terrorism and Maoist violence have acquired highly lethal forms and are seeking tie-ups with adversary nation states for the supply of arms and ammunition. The Indian state finds itself helpless in deterring such support or even acting strongly against such violent non-state actors within its own territory. All this is ascribed to high principles of universal human rights which are now being given primacy over the vital national interests of the state itself and the life and liberty of its ordinary citizens who are increasingly bearing the brunt of such depredations by non-state actors even as the political leadership hunkers down behind layers of Black Cat Commandos, as very visible symbols of power and pelf. Their cynical lack of concern for the safety of the common man is in sharp contrast with their touching concern for their personal security

November 2012 Defence AND security alert

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REINVENTING INDIA

arge states are traditionally prone to internal collapse through the impact of centrifugal forces and the natural entropy that large structures intrinsically generate. The Soviet Union was once the mightiest empire of history. It stretched from the Atlantic to the Pacific and spanned the continents of Asia and Europe. Yet in 1990 it suddenly collapsed without a shot being fired. Paul Kennedy ascribed this collapse to – imperial overreach and economic overstretch. This sudden collapse, it must be recounted, was economic – not military. It was not brought about by any external invasion but intrinsic collapse. India is also a very large state and as such vulnerable to the very forces of entropy generated by its sheer space and size. India as a civilisational state has seen just three periods of unity – in its 5,000 years of history. Each of these unifications lasted for just 150-200 years and was brought about by the three grand empires of Indian History – the Mauryan, the Mughal and the British. The present Indian Republic is a successor entity of the British Empire and due to the peaceful transition of power, inherited intact the governance structures of the empire like the army, the police and a competent civilian bureaucracy. The key lesson of Indian history therefore is the need to safeguard the civilisational state against the primary perils of the strong centrifugal forces that have led to the disintegration of all the empires of the past.

Even as the state in India seems to be withering away in a welter of caste cauldrons, we find the central leadership becoming weak and indecisive. Its willingness to use force to defend the vital interests of the country against state and non-state actors is visibly on the decline One of the key objectives of the Indian freedom struggle therefore was to foster the growth of a pan-Indian identity that would subsume the divisions of religion, caste, creed and language and promote nationalism. The nationalists had carefully studied Indian History and had realised that its primary shortcoming was its lack of unity and the fissiparous tendencies that caused the empires of the past to fragment into innumerable kingdoms and clan republics that could never present a united front to any external invader. Thus from the 3rd century BC onwards, India fell prey to one invasion after another, where the foreign armies were brutal in their rape and pillage. Generating the unifying impetus to overcome these fragmentary tendencies of the Indian polity was thus one of the primary area of emphasis of the Indian Nationalist movement. The British colonial masters had done their utmost to ridicule the idea of a unitary Indian state. The very idea of India as a basis for a nation state they said, was as illusory as the idea of the Equator as a basis for nationhood. In pursuit of this divide and rule strategy, the British gave separate electorates to the Muslims, Christians and Sikhs and were then keen to give it to the Scheduled Castes and Tribes as well. Each of these hardened identities then sought to leave the Indian Union or wage a struggle to breakaway later. The formation of Pakistan was the very first blow to the idea of India as a secular

November 2012 Defence AND security alert

republic. We later had the Sikh militancy and terrorism in the Punjab and before that tribes that had been converted to Christianity had revolted in the north-east. The British Colonial Administration had thus deliberately sowed the seeds of identity conflicts and fault lines in the Indian republic. These are unfortunately reaching a critical mass today because of the self-serving nature of our politics.

Reckless populism has created an unsustainable welfare state based on bizarre short-term fixes. Short-term populism designed to further the career of petty politicians has completely superseded long-term public good. The quest for votes at any cost leads to short-term maximisation and instant gratification. Any society needs an overall source of purpose and direction to grow. That needs a group of mature and visionary leaders at the helm, who put the larger national interest above their selfish quest for power and pelf

Post-independence consolidation The Nationalist Leaders of the Indian Freedom Struggle had therefore striven hard to counter the centrifugal and fragmentary tendencies in the Indian polity. They had striven their utmost to create a pan-Indian identity and play down the bewildering diversity which the British had exploited to the hilt. The Indian National Army (INA) of Subhas Chandra Bose was one attempt to forge a military organisation on the strength of a militant Indian nationalism. The Constitution also served to create a strong centre that would act as a bulwark against the historical, centrifugal tendencies in South Asia. One of the greatest unifiers was Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel – a forceful personality who used the instruments of colonial power to compel the Princely states to fall in line and cede to India. This rationalised a patchwork mosaic into a coherent and governable state entity. In Hyderabad and Junagadh, Patel had marched in the Indian Army and did not hesitate to use it against the first Communist insurrection in Telangana in 1948. The Indian polity thereafter however failed to consolidate its external boundaries, especially in the north along the Himalayan marches with China. This was possibly due to the untimely demise of the iron-willed Sardar. This led to the gradual decay and irrelevance of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet (DCC) system bequeathed to us by the British. Fears of a military coup led the armed forces to be completely marginalised from the national decision-making process. This period saw the ascendency of the overtly passive Nehruvian world view premised upon a rather personalised and self-serving form of diplomacy designed to promote a mythical pacific cult built around the persona of Nehru. It overly emphasised the Soft Power of Ahimsa (Non-violence) and deliberately neglected the instruments of hard power. For a decade the armed forces were starved of funds and the defence budget confined to just one per cent of the GDP. This pacific outlook cost us very dearly in the confrontation with China.

based on Jati and caste. All sub-groups wanted freebies and reservations based on identity markers. This in effect, has destroyed the Pan-Indian Identity Project of the Indian Freedom movement. Self-serving Indian politicians have managed thereby to inflict far greater damage on the Indian polity than even the British colonial masters had ever been able to do. One of the aims of this caste based mobilisation was to fracture the so-called Hindu vote and erode any chance of the majority religion of Hinduism acting as a unifying base for nationalism in the Indian context – a nationalism that is premised on a civilisational outlook largely based on the tolerant and inclusive approach of the Indic civilisation.

The rise of identity politics

The non-charismatic, modern politician lacks the ability to mobilise the people on the basis of issues. He has increasingly been resorting to caste-based mobilisation and the use of money power and muscle power, which has criminalised politics to an alarming degree

Meanwhile Mrs Gandhi was tragically assassinated. Her son Rajiv continued the emphasis on modernism, a strong centre and the creation of a pan-Indian identity. He was a moderniser and laid the basis of the IT revolution. However, as his popularity waned, he began to pander to populism and relied increasingly on identity based politics to secure his vote banks. The Shah Bano case was a classic example of this pandering to the lowest common denominator and generated a majoritarian backlash in the form of the Ram Janmabhumi movement.

Politics is not throwing up a creative minority of the elite but increasingly the Lowest Common Denominator. At the root of all corruption and debasement of governance in our country is an electoral system that has become so pathetically dependent upon black and unaccounted money Bofors raised the stink of corruption and forced his ouster. V P Singh, now displaced the centrist Congress with a coalition that brought the state satraps to Delhi. In a bid to contain the shenenigans of Tau Devi Lal, V P Singh unleashed the Mandal Genie of Caste from the bottle of history. Decades of modernisation and urbanisation had led to the increasing irrelevance of Jati and caste. In a desperate bid to shore up his sagging popularity, V P Singh inflicted the disaster of full-scale identity politics on to the Indian polity.

The communism of caste V P Singh unleashed the communism of caste by deliberately stifling merit and encouraging the onset of tribalism in politics. Communism, as an ideology, has failed the world over. A communism of caste was equally likely to create a civilisational disaster for India. The worst part of this identity based mobilisation was to create committed vote banks based on Jati and caste and thereby fragment the polarised polity even further. This was to give a most unwholesome fillip to identity based politics. The Indian polity was already sharply polarised on the basis of religion, creed and language. Caste was now revived to act as a strident marker of identity and become an opportunistic shortcut for a political mobilisation – not based any longer on issues, but identity. The Indian state therefore was forced to regress from a modernistic, industrial outlook to tribalism

Romilla Thapar and other Marxist ideologues, cheerled this promotion of sub-identity markers to the forefront of the political discourse in the Indian democracy. Our Modernist democracy has thus been forced to regress from modernism back to the anarchy of tribalism. Tilly and other sociologists aver that tribalism predates the state. To collect freebies, each caste today wants to portray itself as more marginalised and deprived. The Gujjars today are clashing with the Meenas and Jats; the Yadavs with the Kurmis and Mahatos. New narratives of deprivation have been dusted out and half the Indian population has now come into the reserved category. This is not positive discrimination any more. It is designed to derail merit and promote a mediocrity that could be ruinous in the long term. It dilutes the emphasis on the SC/ST categories that are genuinely deprived and has done the utmost to harden fractured caste identities and splinter the very idea of India. It is a pathetic spectacle. The pan-Indian identity has been fragmented almost beyond repair. The communism of caste is now breeding administrative inefficiency and tendency to a sharp polarisation of ethnic and tribal identities. The idea of India has been wholly and pathetically subsumed in this tragic quest of promoting Caste / Jati based mobilisation. Wasn’t there enough to divide this country already? Did we need to reinvent caste? Casteism was dying out under the impetus of industrialisation and urbanisation. A decade more and it would have become irrelevant. That was when V P Singh exploded his Mandal Bomb. In an unabashed effort to safeguard his floundering political career, he dealt a grievous blow to the nation building efforts of the architects of our freedom struggle. Few nation states in recent history have regressed from an industrial era society to tribalism on such a scale. Tribalism predates the modern state and is an archaic formulation that can overtime erode the very basis of the modern nation state per se. This tribalism of caste is fast becoming a danger to our unity and internal security.

The dangerous erosion of political morality Corruption on an endemic scale, breeds a political

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security threat and challenges

REINVENTING INDIA

elite who can be blackmailed and controlled by foreign intelligence agencies and interests. Democracy in India has been significantly derailed. Political mobilisation is no longer on issues and principles, but on the arithmetic of caste / tribal calculations. The non-charismatic, modern politician lacks the ability to mobilise the people on the basis of issues. He has increasingly been resorting to caste-based mobilisation and the use of money power and muscle power, which has criminalised politics to an alarming degree.

Our Modernist democracy has thus been forced to regress from modernism back to the anarchy of tribalism. Tilly and other sociologists aver that tribalism predates the state. To collect freebies, each caste today wants to portray itself as more marginalised and deprived. The Gujjars today are clashing with the Meenas and Jats; the Yadavs with the Kurmis and Mahatos. New narratives of depriviation have been dusted out and half the Indian population has now come into the reserved category. This is not positive discrimination any more. It is designed to derail merit and promote a mediocrity that could be ruinous in the long term. It dilutes the emphasis on the SC / ST categories that are genuinely deprived and has done the utmost to harden fractured caste identities and splinter the very idea of India. It is a pathetic spectacle. The Pan-Indian identity has been fragmented almost beyond repair Politics is not throwing up a creative minority of the elite but increasingly the Lowest Common Denominator. At the root of all corruption and debasement of governance in our country is an electoral system that has become so pathetically dependent upon black and unaccounted money. Individuals who hold the key to illegal bank accounts in foreign banks have become the keys to electoral victories. Political parties are thereby forced to rely on criminals, dynasties and moneybags for illegal funding of inordinately expensive election campaigns. Populism in such campaigns has reached dangerous levels. Pathetic individuals hope to win by providing free country liquor and sarees to the electorate or offering inducement of plain cash. It is obvious that individuals who get elected in this manner will spend their term looting the public exchequer, so that they can fund their next election and refund their criminal mafias. Reckless populism has created an unsustainable welfare state based on bizarre short-term fixes. Short-term populism designed to further the career of petty politicians has completely superseded long-term public good. The quest for votes at any cost leads to short-term maximisation and instant gratification. Any society needs an overall source of purpose and direction to grow. That needs a group of mature and visionary leaders at the helm, who put the larger national interest above their selfish quest for power and pelf. The absence of talented, visionary, selfless and charismatic leaders in our political parties is giving rise to a kind of petty politics that can mobilise only on the basis of highly divisive politics designed to sharply polarise and fragment Indian society into its Lowest Common Denominators. The Highest Common Good is therefore the first casualty.

November 2012 Defence AND security alert

First past the post: The pity is that the ‘First Past the Post’ system has made our democracy entirely non-representative. A candidate merely needs the support of 10-15 per cent of the electorate to win. The attempt therefore is to segment the society and impel identity-based groups to vote en bloc in a manner that provides him the minimalist margin of victory. This can only be done by aggravating their atavistic fears – set one caste against another. We need to shift to proportionate representation to strengthen the national outlook. Democracies have taken roots in countries where two strong and equally balanced national level partiers have emerged. In our case the centrist and national parties are in steep decline and regional and sectoral political parties are proliferating due to the rising levels of polarisation. Regionalism has been the primary impulse towards the disintegration of the empires of our past. Derailment of the democratic process: More than a dictatorial Lok Pal, we need a genuine and paradigmatic reform of our electoral system. We need to clearly see the road to disaster, polarisation and fragmentation that we have set ourselves on. We need to create an electoral system that will enable our brightest and best to enter politics and place their talents at the disposal of the country. The current system’s reliance on money, muscle power and criminals is creating a serious threat to our Internal Security. The kind of politics we are pursuing is splintering and polarising the polity and creating the conditions for a break-up or disintegration of this country. And this is just after 60 years of independence. The empires of the past had lasted at least a century and a half. We need to urgently reinvent ourselves as a civilisation and arrest this winding down spiral. We need to reinvent ourselves as a republic, possibly transit to a Presidential model or switch to a system of proportional representation. Communism has not worked in Russia, Eastern Europe and China. How can a Communism of Caste succeed in India?

The shock of 1962 however saw the demise of Nehruvian naiveté and idealism and the onset of hard realism in the Indian polity. This reached its apogee in 1971, when under the ultra-nationalist leadership of Indira Gandhi, India emerged as the pre-eminent power in South Asia. It broke Pakistan into two and midwifed the birth of a new nation state with the force of arms A system of education must throw up an elite who can provide the vision and guidance for our growth. India has tremendous potential. It must reinvent itself to harness that potential. Poor governance is at the root of the present Internal Security crisis. Crony capitalism has become the means to fund a set of leaders whose sole motivation is self-aggrandisement. Leaders should be able to mobilise the masses on issues that concern the polity. Where are those leaders? We had a whole crop of them in the freedom struggle. Whatever their shortcomings, they were selfless and dedicated visionaries. The present set of politicians are pygmies in comparison. Failure to mobilise the masses on issues is twisted into attempts to polarise the population, focus on tribal

identity markers that fragment society and rely on the First Past the Post system to rule with the votes of just 10-15 per cent of the Indian population. We are fragmenting the society by this divisive kind of politics. In doing so, we are eroding the very basis of a nation state. India is a great and ancient civilisation and the time has come to reinvent itself. A failure to do so could be catastrophic. The decay is seriously jeopardising our continued existence as a nation state. We need a paradigm shift in our politics to safeguard our polity from disintegration.

We need to urgently reinvent ourselves as a civilisation and arrest this winding down spiral. We need to reinvent ourselves as a republic, possibly transit to a Presidential model or switch to a system of proportional representation. Communism has not worked in Russia, Eastern Europe and China. How can a Communism of Caste succeed in India?

Internal security paradigm Internal Security is not just a function of the number of Armed Police and Paramilitary personnel in uniform. It is primarily a function of the quality of our governance and its ability to create a just and equitable society that bridges the gap between the rich and the poor and is imbued with a vision and sense of purpose and direction. The absence of such enlightened governance leads to Internal Security problems of varied hues. Today our system of governance per se has become flawed and is a cause for concern. The primary basis for the endemic corruption in our society today is rooted in our electoral system that relies so heavily on money, muscle power and criminals. We need to strike at the roots of this nexus. All parties need to come together to carry out paradigmatic electoral reforms that reduce the role of money power and criminals; that do away with the First Past the Post system and ensure a more representative form of democracy and the emergence of national parties that fight elections on the basis of issues and programmes and not doles and caste-based mobilisations seeking to fragment society and destroy national unity. Our politics that should provide the solutions has itself become the primary problem that is endangering our Internal Security. It is time to effect a Paradigm Shift. Otherwise, India as a large and plural society is once again in danger of fracturing and unravelling as it has done so often in the past. At the time of the redoubtable Kautilya – the country was splintered into 16 Mahajanapadas (large states) and many smaller clan based republics and fiefdoms. It was pillaged by Alexander and his Greek armies. The Acharya recognised our lack of unity as the key problem. Kautilya devoted himself to unifying the country under a single and highly centralised administration. Those who lecture us today on the need to promote local identities need to have their heads examined. Nationalism may have declined in Europe. It is stridently on the rise in Asia. We need to revert to the project of fashioning a pan-Indian identity that the leaders of our freedom struggle had striven so hard to create. They were men who had cared to read Indian history.

Today our politicians need at least to be able to read and rise beyond the tribalism of caste and creed to a national and inclusive outlook. Chanakya was very clear – India needs a strong state that can defend itself – not a weak and fractured polity that keeps inventing new reasons to splinter even further. It needs a visionary and selfless leadership. Otherwise the greatest danger to our security will arise from the very fragmentary nature of our politics. The time for a civilisational paradigm shift is upon us. We cannot afford to fail.

Poor governance is at the root of the present Internal Security crisis. Crony Capitalism has become the means to fund a set of leaders whose sole motivation is self-aggrandisement. Leaders should be able to mobilise the masses on issues that concern the polity Perils of a soft state: Even as the state in India seems to be withering away in a welter of caste cauldrons, we find the central leadership becoming weak and indecisive. Its willingness to use force to defend the vital interests of the country against state and non-state actors is visibly on the decline. We seem to have tied ourselves in knots with a debilitating debate on the use of force even against highly lethal and militarised groups dedicated to the overthrow of the state itself. The discourse of vote bank politics further inhibits the state from acting against elements that are clearly operating at the behest of foreign powers. Both jihadi terrorism and Maoist violence have acquired highly lethal forms and are seeking tie-ups with adversary nation states for the supply of arms and ammunition. The Indian state finds itself helpless in deterring such support or even acting strongly against such violent non-state actors within its own territory. All this is ascribed to high principles of universal human rights which are now being given primacy over the vital national interests of the state itself and the life and liberty of its ordinary citizens who are increasingly bearing the brunt of such depredations by non-state actors even as the political leadership hunkers down behind layers of Black Cat Commandos, as very visible symbols of power and pelf. Their cynical lack of concern for the safety of the common man is in sharp contrast with their touching concern for their personal security. Their magnanimity in forgiving Pakistan for sponsoring terrorist violence that leaves hundreds of our citizens dead or wounded every year and their ever willingness to engage it in dialogue (at the behest of foreign powers) is somewhat disconcerting for the ordinary citizen.

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security threat and challenges

GLORIOUS HISTORY

T Lt Gen Karan Yadava PVSM, AVSM, VSM (retd) The writer was commissioned in the Indian Army in November 1971 and joined the 4/3 Gorkha Rifles. He retired from the army as Director General Assam Rifles in September 2010. He is presently Vice Chancellor of YMCA University of Science and Technology at Faridabad, Haryana.

Assam Rifles is the oldest Paramilitary Force (PMF), having been established in 1835. It has had a special and close relationship with the army and has been built on a military pattern over the years. The force has gradually been integrated into the army ethos, training and way of life

Assam Rifles had its first taste of field operations in 1951 when an outburst of communist insurgency took a serious turn in the state. Assam Rifles succeeded in restoring a semblance of order in the state and thereafter, the situation remained peaceful

he history of Assam Rifles, the oldest paramilitary force of our country is entwined with the history of growth and development of the tribal areas of the north-east region of our country. Assam Rifles has been continuously operating in the north-eastern region since its inception in 1835 and is the only existing witness to the vicissitudes through which this region has passed. In fact the history of Assam Rifles is the history of the north-east region. Assam Rifles has served the Nation both in war and in peace with exemplary devotion, dedication to duty and courage. The force has taken an active part in World Wars, the Indo-China War of 1962, Indo-Pak War of 1971, as part of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka and counter-insurgency operations in Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir. It now has a contingent under the UN Charter at Haiti. It has provided continuous service in the most difficult and inaccessible tribal areas of the north-east region and has assimilated the tribals of the area into the national mainstream, successfully tackling insurgency, restoring peace, winning confidence of the local population and establishing efficacy of the civil administration. It has helped the Nation gain a deeper understanding of the north-east region and played a role in ushering the atmosphere of peace and prosperity.

Evolution of the Assam Rifles Assam came under the British rule after the conclusion of the Anglo-Burmese War in 1826. The British takeover led to the improvement in the administrative set up, economic growth and prosperity of the region. The tea, oil, coal and timber industry became a great source of wealth. The new settlements also became attractive targets for the tribals. In order to meet the threat posed by the tribals and to reduce the prohibitive cost of keeping regular troops in Assam, a levy or militia body was raised and placed on a footing better than the armed police to enable it to also perform military duties to reduce the burden on the regular army. The first unit of this organisation comprising of 750 all ranks was named as the ‘Cachar Levy’ and raised in 1835 by Mr Grange, an officer of the civil administration. With the increased demand, the Jorhat Militia was raised in 1838 and the Kuki Levy in 1850. With the changing roles for the organisation, it came to be known as the Frontier Police in 1862 and as the Assam Military Police in 1882. In 1917, in recognition of the meritorious

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services rendered by the Assam Military Police battalions during World War I in the Middle East, the name of the force was finally changed to ‘The Assam Rifles’.

Early history The task assigned to the Cachar Levy immediately after its raising in 1835 was to guard the eastern frontier of Assam, extend and, establish unquestioned British authority and maintain law and order against unending incidents of violence on the part of tribal warriors who raided tea gardens and murdered British officials or hunted human heads in neighbouring villages. In World War I, the Assam Military Police fought alongwith Gorkha Regiments and participated in various actions in France, Egypt, Gallipoli, Mesopotania, North Persia and the North West Frontier of India. As a recognition of the excellent services rendered during World War I, the government not only approved the change in the title of the force to ‘The Assam Rifles’ but also affiliated the existing five Assam Rifles batallions to Gorkha Regiments of the regular army.

Immediately after the independence of India in 1947, Assam Rifles as part of extension of administration of free India into various parts of Manipur established posts at Ukhrul, Tamenglong, Churachandpur, Thanlon and Tengnoupal. These posts helped in preventing illegal entry and smuggling of arms from Myanmar as well as for controlling the activities of communists During World War II, the Assam Rifles were the backbone of the Burma Campaign with their excellent knowledge of local areas and language. They were an essential part of Wingates Brigade.

Post-independence The most immediate organisational change in the Assam Rifles after independence was the separation of the Assam Rifles from the police. Accordingly, on 17 September, 1947, Mr H G Bartley was appointed as the first Inspector General of Assam Rifles, directly under the Governor of Assam. On 15 August 1948 Col Sidhiman Rai, MC took over as the first army officer and the first Indian Inspector General of Assam Rifles. Since then army officers on deputation have officered and have been appointed as the head of the force. The aim of independent India was to socially integrate the tribals of the north-east region into the national mainstream and to ensure that the fruits of good governance of independent India were enjoyed by the entire region. The ethos of Assam Rifles was thus moulded accordingly.

ASSAM RIFLES: SENTINELS OF THE NORTH-EAST A

former Director General of the Assam Rifles traces the history and valuable contributions of this force towards integrating the north-east states and their populations into the body politik of our country as also their stellar role in facing foreign aggression. The Assam Rifles is India’s oldest paramilitary force with a glorious history and tradition of frontier guarding, counter-insurgency operations and regular operations (including in the two World Wars). If the north-eastern states are with India today, a major part of the credit for this must go to the Assam Rifles. A very informative tribute to this force by its former DG. It also provides a brief overview of the many tribal insurgencies that have been contained in this volatile region. The Assam Rifles due to its role and continuous deployment in the north-east region had identified more closely with local inhabitants than any other force operating in the region. Hence in the years to come the government had to rely more and more on Assam Rifles for extending government policies and administration into the interiors of the north-east. The force which started with only 750 men in 1835 and till independence consisted of only five battalions was ripe for expansion. The growing expectations as well as discontentment amongst tribals in the north-east coupled with political and social changes in independent India led to unrest in various parts of the region. In 1955 full fledged insurgency started

in Nagaland. In 1956, when it became apparent that insurgency was likely to continue and probably would increase in intensity, the government decided to raise a number of Assam Rifles battalions on a permanent basis. Thus by 1959 the force had a total of 17 batallions raised and deployed in the region of the north-east. After the Indo-China war of 1962, in which again the force proved its worth, further expansion took place and two more battalion were raised. In August 1965, the administration of the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) was transferred from the Ministry of External Affairs to the Ministry of Home Affairs and with this the control of Assam Rifles was also transferred to the Ministry of Home Affairs

After the Indo-China war of 1962, in which again the force proved its worth, further expansion took place and two more battalion were raised. In August 1965, the administration of the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) was transferred from the Ministry of External Affairs to the Ministry of Home Affairs and with this the control of Assam Rifles was also transferred to the Ministry of Home Affairs. In 1966, due to the sudden outbreak of insurgency in Mizoram, two more battalions were raised along with modernisation of arms and equipment. The insurgency forced the strength of Assam Rifles to be further raised from 21 to 31 batallions alongwith the required controlling headquarters and administrative units between 1985 and 1988. Fifteen more

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security threat and challenges battalions were raised in 2001-2004 as border guiding battalions to cater for the need to guard the border with Myanmar. A case for raising 26 more battalions is under consideration. The headquarters of the force is located at Shillong in Meghalaya. After World War I, the recruitment of the force was standardised. The Gorkhas formed the base of the force and constituted about 70 per cent, the Garhwalis and Kumaonis constituted another 20 per cent and tribals of the north-east constituted the balance 10 per cent. However, in 1982 the recruitment policy was changed to the national policy on all India basis. Officers, initially were from the civil services, however, since 1884 the force has been manned and commanded by army officers. Presently, the broad role of the force is to conduct counter-insurgency operations and internal security under the operational control of the army, ensure security of Indo-Myanmar border, rear area security and assist the army in any other operational task in war and peace.

Sentinels of the north-east The Assam Rifles was raised as a regional force and hence, since its raising in 1835 till date it has been continuously operating in the north-east. After independence, the force helped in extension of the writ of the Indian administration into remote areas of the north-east. As some of the north-eastern states became an arena for secessionist and insurgent activities, maintenance of law and order, countering insurgency and reassuring the peace-loving people of the region became important tasks for the Assam Rifles alongwith other Security Forces (SFs). These tasks initially fell on Assam Rifles and when the army eventually assumed control, the latter relied heavily on the experience and competence of the former. The unique role played by the Assam Rifles in all the seven states of the north-east is a part of its history and ethos.

Assam Assam has special significance in the history of the force, because way back in 1835, the Assam Rifles was born at Nowgong, a district of Assam

GLORIOUS HISTORY

under the title of “Cachar Levy”. The forbears of Assam Rifles had taken part in all types of operations starting from defending tea gardens and British settlements from tribal raids to all big and small punitive expeditions, escorting of survey parties to unsurveyed areas and protection of road construction parties in remote areas. Assam’s multi-ethnic and multilingual composition combined with hills and plains divide created by the British had its effect. Assam soon became a hot-bed of trouble and faced a series of agitations and movements, some linked to language and others to ethnic rivalries, which led to the gradual breakaway from Assam of Nagaland in 1963, Meghalaya in 1972 and Mizoram in 1986. The problem in Assam state itself started with the issue of a large number of illegal immigrants staying in the state. The first organisation to agitate against it was the All Assam Students’ Union (AASU) followed by a number of regional parties. The United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) was established in April, 1979 as a strong revolutionary organisation with the aim of creating an independent, socialistic Assam. It soon felt betrayed by government agencies and in 1986 started extortion, kidnapping and blackmailing a number of major industrial houses and tea gardens in Assam. This led to the imposition of President’s rule and the ULFA was declared a terrorist organisation and was banned. In order to control the situation, the Assam Rifles took active part in dealing with disturbances created by the language problem, ethnic conflicts and foreigners’ issue. It also took an active part in counter-insurgency operations under operational control of the army to control the militancy. Assam is far from normal even today. Despite relentless pressure from SFs, terrorist outfits are active in the state. Their activities of extortion, kidnapping, killing of government officials, targeting railways and SFs administrative convoys continues. In addition to the issue of illegal immigrants, the other major causes of unrest in Assam are unemployment, Assam-Nagaland border issue,

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demand for a separate state by the Bodos and creation of a ‘sovereign and socialist’ Assam, free of ‘Indian imperialism’.

helped in preventing illegal entry and smuggling of arms from Myanmar as well as for controlling the activities of communists.

Manipur

On 21 September, 1949, the Maharaja of Manipur, Bodha Chandra signed the Instrument of Accession with India and on 15 October 1949, Manipur became a part of India. This merger with India was objected to by a section of the Manipuris and a revolutionary government of Manipur (RGM) was established.

Manipur came under British influences after the British helped Raja Gambhir Singh to drive the Burmese out of Manipur in 1826 followed by a treaty between them in 1833. In 1891, five British officers including the Chief Commissioner of Assam and the British Political Agent of Manipur were killed by Manipuris. War between the British and the Manipuris followed. The British won and the young Prince Yuvraj, C o m m a n d e r - i n - C h i e f Tikendrajit Singh and General Thangal were hanged by the British, other princesses and some high officials who were involved in the killing of British officials were given life imprisonment. The old Palace, Fort Kangla and most of the buildings in its compound were razed to the ground and occupied by the British forces. Though, in August 1891, Manipur was annexed by the British, they allowed the establishment of native rule in Manipur. The Assam Rifles were shifted to Imphal in Manipur, in March 1915 and since then Assam Rifles troops have been located in the state. The politicisation of Manipur started in 1934 when a group of Manipuris formed the Nikhil Hindu Manipur Mahasabha under the patronage of its ruler. World War II created a new sense of political consciousness among a section of Manipuri elite. It was least expected that with their “Vaisnavite” faith Manipuris would resist integration with the Indian mainland. But this fond hope was soon broken. In 1956-57, a Pan Mongolian Movement started in Manipur which led to the Meitei Liberation Movement and in due course laid the basis for the establishment of the United Liberation Front (UNLF) and the agitation for statehood grew in intensity. Immediately after the independence of India in 1947, Assam Rifles as part of extension of administration of free India into various parts of Manipur established posts at Ukhrul, Tamenglong, Churachandpur, Thanlon and Tengnoupal. These posts

Assam Rifles has served the Nation both in war and in peace with exemplary devotion, dedication to duty and courage. The force has taken an active part in World Wars, the Indo-China War of 1962, Indo-Pak War of 1971, as part of the Indian Peace keeping Force in Sri Lanka and counter insurgency operations in Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir. It now has a contingent under the UN Charter at Haiti During the Indo-Pak War 1971, army formations were withdrawn from Manipur. Insurgency in the state was still rampant and the responsibility for counter-insurgency operations fell on Assam Rifles. On 21 January 1972 full statehood was granted to Manipur. In September 1975 the “Shillong Accord” between the central government and the Naga UGs was signed, leading to most Naga hostiles coming overground and surrendering, however, discontentment among the Nagas and Manipuris continued leading to the formation of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) with the objective of organising a revolutionary front covering the entire north-east and uniting all tribals including Meiteis, Nagas, Kukis and Chin to liberate Manipur. In September, 1980, the Manipur Valley was declared a ‘disturbed area’ and the army and Assam Rifles were inducted to restore the situation. In 1992 a new dimension to violence started in Manipur with the outbreak of Naga-Kuki clashes resulting in the loss of hundreds of lives and torching of villages. This resulted in the induction of more Assam Rifles troops for counter-insurgency operations. The successful operations led to the

holding of elections in 1995. At the time of Operation Vijay in 1999, army units and formations were withdrawn from Manipur and the operational responsibility of the entire area fell on Assam Rifles. The force controlled the situation effectively. Manipur has been the most disturbed state in the north-east for more than three decades. There are two types of insurgencies going on in Manipur, one in the valley and another in the hills. The former is mainly by Meiteis, the latter is by Nagas and Kukis. The valley area is more prone to violence. Ethnic clashes between Nagas and Kukis occur here with periodic regularity. The Meira Paibies, the women’s organisation carries out direct protection of UGs in towns and villages. Despite the relentless operations, which have resulted in many apprehensions and recoveries of large quantities of weapons and ammunition, Manipur is far from normal.

Nagaland The early history of British relations with the Nagas was one of the perpetual conflict. To control the Nagas, the British had to undertake many expeditions in Naga areas. The British administration termed Naga areas as “Backward Tracts” region with ‘excluded’ and ‘partially excluded’ areas as part of the Assam province. The forbears of Assam Rifles had started operations in Nagaland soon after raising in 1835. Mr Grange, the Civilian Officer in charge at Nowgong, conducted the first expedition into the strongest and most turbulent area of the Angami Nagas in 1839 with 50 men from the Cachar Levy. This expedition was followed by many expeditions into Nagaland by the Assam Rifles singly and also in conjunction with the army, which ultimately resulted in the extension of British administration into Nagaland

and also helped in stopping the practice of head hunting in Nagaland. During the Japanese offensive in World War II, Kohima was besieged by the Japanese and Assam Rifles fought gallantly. World War II had far reaching effect on the Nagas. They learnt guerrilla warfare, use of modern weapons and were able to get many weapons as well as ammunition from war stragglers. In 1946, the Naga National Council (NNC) was formed to fulfil the social aspirations of the Nagas. The problem of Naga insurgency has confronted the Indian government since the dawn of Indian independence. A flamboyant leader of Nagaland, A Z Phizo declared independence of Nagaland on 14 August 1947 and in 1953 he organised war like tribes into units of Naga Home Guard (UG Army) and announced the formation of the “Naga Federal Government”. At the time of the Naga uprising in 1954, Assam Rifles was the only force in Nagaland to bear the brunt of the offensive by the Naga hostiles. Later on, the army and more Assam Rifles units were inducted to tackle the worsening situation. In October 1955, in order to coordinate the activities of all SFs operating in Naga Hills district, a Joint Headquarter was set up with Inspector General Assam Rifles as its chairman. However, in 1956 the scale of SFs commitment in fighting Naga insurgency had increased so much that the joint Headquarters had to be upgraded to a unified command, under the

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security threat and challenges

GLORIOUS HISTORY

General Officer Commanding of an Infantry Division.

insurgents continued as a common feature in Nagaland.

This period of insurgency in Nagaland saw fierce battles between Naga insurgents and SFs in which hundred of lives were lost. The Assam Rifles units performed exceptionally well and won a number of decorations for gallantry, including two Ashok Chakra Class I, the highest peacetime gallantry award.

On 1 August 1997, cease-fire was declared once again in Nagaland and since then, this cease-fire is being continuously extended.

During the 1962 Indo-China War most of the army units / formations were withdrawn from Nagaland. The void created in Nagaland was filled by the Assam Rifles and the force took over the entire responsibility for the counter insurgency operations in the Naga Hills and Manipur. It is to the credit of the force that despite the sudden shortage of troops, it kept the insurgency under control till it could hand over the responsibility back to the army. On 1 December 1963 Nagaland was made the sixteenth state of the Indian Union, however, violence in Nagaland persisted. After irrefutable proof of earlier unconfirmed reports of militants being sent to China for training, the Indian government announced termination of peace talks and SFs started their operations, the successful operations by Assam Rifles in conjunction with other SFs during 1974-75 had a telling affect on the insurgency movement in Nagaland. They sought a peaceful political settlement within the Indian Union and on 11 November 1975 the Shillong Accord was signed which brought peace to the region and most of the UGs into the national mainstrteam. Isak Chisi Swu and Thuingalang Muivah who were in China at that time, denounced the agreement as a betrayal and swore to fight on. In January 1980, the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) was formed based on communist ideology which proclaimed a new government of the People’s Republic of Nagaland. In 1988, the NSCN split into the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isaac Muivah) NSCN(IM) and National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Khaplang) NSCN(K) and till date there is a bitter inter-group rivalry existing between the groups. Occasional encounters between SFs including Assam Rifles and Naga

Arunachal Pradesh Arunachal Pradesh (previously known as North-East Frontier Agency or NEFA) is inhabited by many tribes and sub-tribes such as Daphlas, Akas, Bhutias, Mikkir and Miri etc. Ancient Indian literature since 400 BC has made numerous reference to this area. Till the eighth century, Kamarupa was ruled by the Hindu dynasties of the Varmans, the Salasthambas and Palas. They then came under the pressure of the Ahoms, a branch of the Shan tribe, who finally in about 1228 AD became masters of Kamarupa and gave the territory their name Ahom (now Assam). The Britishers in 1864 raised a Frontier Police Force (forbears of Assam Rifles) for service along the borders of Sadiya and Lakhimpur districts. The force independently and in conjunction with regular army carried out various expeditions to put a stop to the practice of head hunting and slave trading. During World War II, the Assam Rifles were the backbone of the Burma Campaign with their excellent knowledge of local areas and language. They were an essential part of Wingates Brigade At the time of the Chinese aggression in NEFA, the Assam Rifles troops were guarding all the outposts along the border under operational control of the army. They were the first to be attacked by the Chinese and took the initial shock and had to bear the major initial brunt of the battle. Though they were outnumbered and outmatched at various outposts, they fought gallantly resisting the Chinese advance and put up determined resistance. The contribution made by Assam Rifles to the overall war effort in 1962 in NEFA and the gallantry of individual officers and men once again proved the military value of the force. The Assam Rifles also played an important role in opening up the

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NEFA area. They handled the influx of Tibetan refugees and escorted them to refugee camps including the convoy of the Dalai Lama. Assam Rifles troops have contributed meaningfully towards development of Arunachal Pradesh. The developmental activities undertaken by Assam Rifles are multifaceted and include construction of roads and tracks, provision of medical facilities in the remote areas, animal husbandry etc. Assam Rifles has also been in the forefront of activities related to environmental protection and preservation of the flora and fauna of the region. After the reorganisation of the security forces, Assam Rifles no longer has a presence on the Chinese border.

Mizoram The association of Assam Rifles with the present Mizoram (then Lushai Hills, a district of Assam Province) goes back to 1871, when the Police Battalion of Surma Valley, forbearer of Assam Rifles (Lushai Hills Battalion) took part in a joint operation with the Army against Lushais. At the end of the operation, the battalion was asked to establish a line of strongly manned posts in the area along the Cachar, Sylhet and Chittagong border. Thereafter, the forbearers of Assam Rifles carried out both independently and jointly with the army, a number of military operations in Lushai Hills to subjugate the Kuki and Lushai tribes and also to put a stop to the practice of head hunting prevalent among them at that time. At the time of India’s independence, the Mizos had opted to continue to stay within the then state of Assam (Indian Union). However, insurgency in Nagaland and the great famine of Mizoram in 1959 provided the much-needed spark. In 1960, the Mizo Cultural Society was converted into the Mizo National Famine Front. The Mizo National Front (MNF) was established in 1962 and Laldenga, earlier a Havildar Clerk in the army and later an accountant in the District Council, became its President. The Mizo National Army (MNA) had been raised clandestinely. On

March

1966,

the

MNF

launched ‘Operation Jericho’ to liberate Mizoram and proclaimed it an independent sovereign state. This move took everyone totally by surprise, the MNF had cut all communications from outside to Mizoram and had taken over lightly manned government buildings and installations. The main stumbling block in the MNF design for gaining control was Assam Rifles. The initial shock of Mizo insurgency was borne by Assam Rifles and fierce armed encounters took place between them. Later on, army units were rushed to Mizoram. The Assam Rifles units acquitted themselves very creditably.

developed along the border with the Bengal plains. The state was totally isolated, with Pakistan threatening to absorb it.

The first election in Mizoram was held from 24 to 27 April 1979 and Assam Rifles helped in the conduct of fair and tension free elections. The People’s Conference, a relatively new political party led by Brigadier T Sailo (Retired), who was once a Commandant in Assam Rifles won by a wide majority, which was a clear indication that Mizos wanted peace.

Tripura Tripura is almost entirely surrounded by Bangaladesh. The only access of the state to the rest of India by land is through the Cachar Hills (Assam). The British got control of the plains of Tripura in 1761 without any fight. However, they did not annex it and the rulers of Tripura always enjoyed internal sovereignty with full power of legislation. The British gradually came to be recognised as the ultimate paramount power in their relations with the state of Tripura, therefore, Tripura rendered whatever assistance it could to the Britishers by providing detachments of Tripura State Forces and also made payments towards general expenses of war as and when required, especially during the great revolt of 1857, suppression of Kukis and Lushais in 1871, World War I and World War II. On the eve of Indian independence, the Tripura Maharani’s Regency Council acting on behalf of her minor son acceded to India on 13 August 1947. Meanwhile, the creation of East Pakistan virtually isolated Tripura as all towns of Tripura including Agartala had been

Tripura weathered the initial storm of partition with the help of the Indian government and simultaneously urgent efforts were made to open a road through Silchar to ensure safe movement and guarantee of essential supplies to Tripura. On 15 October 1949, the Tripura Durbar also decided for complete merger with India. “Tripura Rifles”, the Tripura State Force was merged with the Assam Rifles.

Tripura has been having Assam Rifles deployment ever since the state merged with India and its only State Force Battalion, the ‘The Tripura Rifles’ was merged with Assam Rifles. The situation in Tripura remained stable for some time, however, the demographic imbalance caused by the large scale inflow of Bengali-speaking immigrants from East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), which had resulted in making the original inhabitants, the tribals of Tripura a minority in their own state, ultimately led to an upsurge of discontentment amongst the tribals and also the birth of insurgency. Since the law and order situation in the state was not stable and there was a likelihood of large scale disturbances in February 1988, the Central Government declared Tripura a “disturbed area” and all Assam Rifles units were placed under the army’s operational control. In October 1992, Assam Rifles along with the Central Reserve Police Force controlled an unusual critical situation when the Tripura State Police and Home Guards went on strike. The agitation was resolved by November, 1992. Thereafter, situation in Tripura was relatively peaceful. Assam Rifle battalions are deployed under operational control of the army

to control the situation in Tripura.

Meghalaya Meghalaya consists of Khasi, Jaintia and Garo Hills. Through expeditions, the British gained control over the Khasi and Jaintia Hills portion of Meghalaya by 1833. During the period 1860 to 1863, Synteng Tribes (Khasis and Jaintias), under the leadership of Ukiang Nangbah, rebelled against the British and besieged Jowai town located 32 miles east of Shillong for nearly three weeks. The Nowgong and Cachar Frontier Police in conjunction with the army suppressed the rebellion and relieved Jowai with much difficult fighting. Thereafter, the Khasis and Jaintias, essentially peaceable people, gave no trouble in the years to come. As regards the Garo Hills portion of Meghalaya, in 1866, the British had posted a Special Officer with a detachment of Frontier Police (later of Assam Rifles) at Tura to control the Garo Hills. In 1872, a raid by independent Garo villagers on a Garo village under British control gave the British an excuse to subjugate all independent Garo villages by sending a large expeditionary force in which the Frontier Police also participated. The Headquarter of Assam Rifles has always been in Shillong, first when it was a part of the Inspector General of Police and later when it was separated from the police in September 1947 as Headquarter, Inspector General of Assam Rifles (HQIGAR).

Conclusion Assam Rifles is the oldest Paramilitary Force (PMF), having been established in 1835. It has had a special and close relationship with the army and has been built on a military pattern over the years. The force has gradually been integrated into the army ethos, training and way of life. The high efficiency of the force is essentially due to the fact that it is modeled on the army lines and is officered almost entirely by army officers on deputation. British army officers had started coming on deputation to the force from 1882. Its staff, structure, organisation, training, uniform, badges of rank and equipment are on the army pattern. It is subject to the Indian Army Act since 24 June 1942.

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V Balachandran, IPS (retd) The writer is a former Special Secretary of the Cabinet Secretariat. He was also a part of the high level committee appointed by the Maharashtra government to enquire into Mumbai 26/11 terror attacks. He is a prolific writer on intelligence, terrorism and insurgency issues and has also given lectures on these subjects at several institutions in India and abroad.

Experience in other countries has made their governments to conclude that terrorist incidents cannot be prevented by the police or even heavily armed counter-terrorist forces that operate in a “stand-alone” fashion

Terrorism can be resisted only through a joint strategy of preventive intelligence, preventive structural arrangements in public buildings and by drawing in the support of the local community. In USA and UK the Counter-Terrorist (CT) strategy evolved since 9/11 and 2005 London transit bombing (7/7) is codified participatory system by central and state agencies, lead role by central government, regionalised CT units, codified role by private security and local administration in preventing, handling and mitigating terrorist attacks and a transparent system of forewarning the public about the possibility of attacks

n USA the local police carry on their normal activities of crime investigation and maintenance of law and order to enforce state penal laws. Terrorism is handled by 4,400 officers in 106 multi-agency Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) led by FBI. Each JTTF has representatives from federal agencies, local police and other departments. They prowl around the country pursuing intelligence leads supplied by various intelligence agencies. The idea of forming joint teams is to ensure that intelligence collected by agencies like MI-5 or FBI are utilised for launching prosecutions without endangering the identity of sources or covert operations. As against this, in India both the centre and states collect intelligence only through police led intelligence teams, which had been found to be inadequate by these countries. In addition, a senior officer designated as Senior National Coordinator Counter-Terrorism (Earlier known as National Coordinator Terrorist Investigations) coordinates investigations into terrorist crimes in order to ensure that different investigating agencies do not arrive at conflicting conclusions as has been happening in India. India did not think of setting up a Central enquiry committee although a number of central agencies like the Army, Navy and NSG were involved in the process of countering the attack in addition to the central intelligence agencies. The public were not told why NSG arrived in Mumbai so late despite standing orders that a team should be ready in a plane 24 hours 365 days in a year.

1. The 9/11 Commission report- chapter 13 page 399.

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IMPORTANCE OF 26/11 FOR OUR

ovember 26 attack on Mumbai should have been an important milestone in our national security planning process like the 9/11 attack for USA, Madrid rail attack (11th March 2004) for Europe and London railway bombings (7th July/25th July 2005) for UK which totally changed the way they looked at security. As Kean-Hamilton National Commission on 9/11 observed: “Instead of facing a few very dangerous adversaries, the United States confronts a number of less visible challenges that surpass the boundaries of traditional nation states and call for quick, imaginative and agile responses.”1 After Madrid bombings the European Union introduced “European Arrest Warrant”, strengthened “Europol” to deal with terrorism and introduced a number of measures to check terrorist financing. After the London transit bombings, which was the worst attack since World War II, Prime Minister Tony Blair outlined a 12 point plan like detention of suspects for 90 days under Terrorism Act (which was reduced to 28 days), Identity Cards Act etc. Also “CONTEST”, the British counter-terrorist strategy was totally revised.

N AT I O N A L SECURITY

786.7 million, more than double US population, passed through US airports. All the 9/11 hijackers had entered US legally. In July 2011 Heritage Foundation reported that USA was able to prevent 39 terror plots, 11 against New York City alone.

Terrorism can be resisted only through a joint strategy of preventive intelligence, preventive structural arrangements in public buildings and by drawing in the support of the local community

Can we say the same thing about India after 26/11? Certainly “No”. First of all, our central government treated it only as an attack against Mumbai city and not against the nation despite the terrorists coming all the way from Pakistan by sea. Unlike other countries, India did not think of setting up a central enquiry committee although a number of central agencies like the Army, Navy and NSG were involved in the process of countering the attack in addition to the central intelligence agencies. The public were not told why NSG arrived in Mumbai so

late despite old standing orders that a team should be ready in a plane 24 hours 365 days in a year, as pointed out by me in an article I wrote for a national daily on 15 December 20082 before I was appointed as member of the HLEC. No doubt Home Minister P Chidambaram, who assumed charge after his predecessor resigned, got parliamentary approval with commendable speed to 2 important laws i.e., National Investigating Agency (NIA) Bill and Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Act within 20 days of the attack.3 However India’s attempts

2. Times of India “ The Guilty Men”. 3. On December 18, 2008. November 2012 Defence AND security alert

security threat and challenges to introduce a new counter-terrorist framework stopped there due to many reasons including political dissensions and central government’s own inertia. As I remarked earlier in these columns we lost that “window of opportunity” to forge a national consensus of countering terrorism out of the ghastly 26/11 attack.4 Since then 26/11 anniversaries have been largely ritualistic.

Till 9/11 counter-terrorist methodology in USA was as ineffective as ours. Shock and national shame led to a massive re-organisation of internal security apparatus within 46 days following enactment of “Patriot” Act (“Uniting and strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism) which amended 12 important laws in one go. The new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was charged with the primary responsibility of preventing terrorism within America. A number of departments like Coast Guards were put under DHS. Major legal and procedural loopholes were plugged. Enhanced powers to detect suspected terrorist funding were given. “Intelligence Reform & Terrorism Prevention Act” (2004) created Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to co-ordinate 16 intelligence agencies known as Intelligence Community (IC). Since 9/11 no actual terrorist attack has taken place within US borders despite massive internal surveillance problems K e a n - H a m i l ton National Commission on 9/11 had observed: “A ‘smart’ government would integrate all sources of information to see the enemy as a whole. Integrated all-source analysis should also inform and shape strategies to collect more intelligence.” A step towards this was initiated by Home Minister P Chidambaram by trying to set up an “NCTC” on the lines of the US system, but unfortunately the whole exercise floundered since he introduced certain additional responsibilities like investigation and operations on our version which was vehemently resisted by the states as “encroaching”

STOIC ENDURANCE

into their jurisdiction. The US system had only responsibilities of integrating intelligence. In fact there was no need to add these two additional responsibilities on our NCTC since NIA was already empowered to do investigation and operations, which was accepted by the states. In the politically divisive atmosphere some states found it convenient to use this as a weapon to fight against New Delhi without realising that their police systems are too antiquated and feudal to be of any use in counter-terrorist operations. A detailed paper prepared by the US DHA “9/11 Commission Recommendations-Progress Report 2011” is available for the public on the present cooperative counter-terrorist architecture in USA. Similarly a speech “Counter Terror Expo Speech: Tackling Terrorism – Achieving National Security Policing the Terrorist Threat” (19 April, 2011) by John Yates, Metropolitan Police Service Assistant Commissioner, Special Operations gives details of the CT operations in UK. A perusal of these will indicate why we are not able to prevent terrorist incidents after 26/11. I shall briefly summarise these two reports and other developments: Experience in other countries has made their governments to conclude that terrorist incidents cannot be prevented by the police or even heavily armed counter-terrorist forces that operate fashion. in a “stand-alone” Former Canadian Supreme Court Chief Justice Hon John Major’s enquiry report on Air India’s “Kanishka” crash in 1985 which was released on June 17, 2010 had given the reasons why intelligence agencies and investigating agencies should share information to prevent terrorism. The enquiry which began in 2006 found that a great deal of information was available with Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) but was never acted upon. In particular, Air India’s June 1985 telex about the danger of luggage bombs was not shared by RCMP. The report made harsh comments on both CSIS and RCMP for not cooperating during

investigation, neglecting witnesses and indulging in turf wars.

November 26 attack on Mumbai should have been an important milestone in our national security planning process like the 9/11 attack for USA, Madrid rail attack ( 11th March 2004) for Europe and London railway bombings (7th July / 25th July 2005) for UK which totally changed the way they looked at security. As Kean-Hamilton National Commission on 9/11 observed: “Instead of facing a few very dangerous adversaries, the United States confronts a number of less visible challenges that surpass the boundaries of traditional nation-states and call for quick, imaginative, and agile responses” Terrorism can be resisted only through a joint strategy of preventive intelligence, preventive structural arrangements in public buildings and by drawing in the support of the local community. In USA and UK the Counter-Terrorist (CT) strategy evolved since 9/11 and 2005 London transit bombing (7/7) is codified participatory system by central and state agencies, lead role by central government, regionalised CT units, codified role by private security and local administration in preventing, handling and mitigating terrorist attacks and a transparent system of forewarning the public about the possibility of attacks. We do not have this system in India. Everything is left to the poorly equipped state police with the centre watching from the sidelines. Nor will the feuding state satraps allow central government to participate in any such planning. After every terror attack there is constant sniping between New Delhi and states that intelligence was provided to the states, while the latter saying that it was not specific. We never thought of setting up a cooperative preventive architecture. In USA the local police carry on their normal activities of crime investigation and maintenance of law and order to enforce state penal laws. Terrorism is handled by 4,400 officers in 106 multi-agency Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) led by FBI. Each

4. It was James Baker, former US Secretary of State who had coined the expression “Window of Opportunity” during the October 1991 Madrid Peace Conference to lay emphasis that such “windows” in dealing with complicated situations did not last long.

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JTTF has representatives from federal agencies, local police and other departments. They prowl around the country pursuing intelligence leads supplied by various intelligence agencies. For example the New York JTTF has 500 investigators with only 130 from the local police (NYPD). They are coordinated by the National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF) in Washington DC. The JTTF which investigated “underwear bomber,” Farouk Abdulmutallab, in the 2009 Christmas Day bombing attempt of Northwest Airlines Flight 253 who was sentenced on February 16, 2012 to life in prison was the Detroit Joint Terrorism Task Force. It was led by the FBI and included US Customs and Border Protection, Homeland Security Investigations (HIS), the Federal Air Marshal Service, Transportation Security Administration, the State Department’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security and the Wayne County Airport police.

In July 2011 Heritage Foundation reported that USA was able to prevent 39 terror plots, 11 against New York City alone In UK dedicated regional Counter-Terrorist Units (CTU) have increased by 70 per cent since 2007. As of now there are 4 regional CTUs in operation besides the London based Counter-Terrorism Command (CTC). A July 2011 report to the Parliament said that more than 7,700 officers are on CT duty in UK. The regional Counter-Terrorist Intelligence Units (CTIU) have large presence of non-police officials. The report also said that each CTIU consisted of detectives, community contact teams, financial investigators, intelligence analysts, hi-tech investigators, ports officers and embedded MI5 personnel. The idea of forming joint teams is to ensure that intelligence collected by agencies like MI5 or FBI are utilised for launching prosecutions without endangering the identity of sources or covert operations. As against this, in India both the centre and states collect intelligence only through police led intelligence teams, which had been found to be inadequate by these countries. In addition, a senior officer designated as Senior National Coordinator

Counter-Terrorism (Earlier known as National Coordinator Terrorist Investigations) coordinates investigations into terrorist crimes in order to ensure that different investigating agencies do not arrive at conflicting conclusions as has been happening in India where even within a state conflicting conclusions are arrived by state police teams. In addition, the National Coordinator Domestic Extremism (established since 2004) works with local police forces to curb extremism among the youth. We have not even thought of a “Deradicalisation” programme even now. Countries like US, UK and Singapore have entrusted large amount of work to private groups in countering terrorism. In USA coastal patrolling by the Coast Guards is actively helped by a private volunteer organisation and Congressional mandated “United States Coast Guard auxiliary” dating back to 1939/1941 consisting of about 34,000 members who utilise their own boats and small aircraft for coastal patrolling. This is because of a realisation that without public participation, no counter-terrorist operations will succeed. This will be clear from the following findings, released in 2010, by the Institute of Homeland Security Solutions (USA), a private research body on the terrorist incidents in USA between 1999 and 2009:

There were 86 attacks or attempts during this period 18 took place including 9/11

20 each were foiled by the alert public and federal agencies 13 through advance intelligence

15 by local law and order, police and other local agencies

Contrary to conventional wisdom still held by many in India that only intelligence agencies could prevent incidents, only 13 were foiled by advance intelligence. Another research by The Heritage Foundation (USA), a private think tank, in May 2011 revealed that at least 39 terror plots were foiled in America since 9/11 due to domestic and international cooperation, as well as efforts in tracking down terror leads among local communities. This also included the Dhiren Barot group detected in 2004 for plotting attack on New York Stock Exchange. Later they were also found to have been involved in plots in England. The very fact that Maharashtra government classified our 26/11 enquiry report thereby preventing the common public from knowing what went wrong on that wrenching day would eloquently prove our government’s cynical attitude on the need to consider the common public as “partners” in the counter-terrorist efforts. The central government also did not consider it necessary to advise Maharashtra government to promptly release the report. So what is the use of this ritual of commemorating the “sacrifices’ of 26/11 martyrs by holding public meetings when both the central and state governments are not prepared to change their outdated counter-terrorist strategy?

68 were foiled

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Vice Adm Vijay Shankar PVSM, AVSM, ADC (retd) The writer holds an MSc in Defence Studies and is a graduate of the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, USA. He is the former Commander-in-Chief of the Andaman and Nicobar Command, C-in-C of the Strategic Forces Command and Flag Officer Commanding Western Fleet. His Command and operational experience are comprehensive and include Command of INS Viraat the aircraft carrier. He is a member of the adjunct faculty of the National Institute of Advanced Studies and he currently tenants the Admiral Katari Chair of Excellence at the United Services Institute.

Civil-military relations describe the correlation between society and the military institutions founded to safeguard it from threats both external and internal. Clausewitz, very insightfully, saw in military activity an orientation that was not only directed at “material force” alone; but also saw an impetus towards “moral forces which give it life” by which is meant all the psychological factors which include civil-military relations that in fact emphasise that military activity is a continuation of policy by other means. In a more comprehensible and narrow sense civil-military relations portrays the association between the political dispensation of a society and its military establishment

ndia has faced many traumatic events since 1947 that have had critical impact on security of the nation including five wars, insurgencies, gory terrorist acts, periodic crumbling of the law and order mechanism and even a period of authoritarian rule; but what stands out is a lack of strategic vision instigated by a distorted civil-military correlation. India’s military is characterised by an apolitical nature and exults in its professionalism. It responds best to objectivity in purpose and control as can only be provided by a synergic relationship between the civil authority that defines policy and the military that gives to policy the necessary energy. Prime Minister Nehru had an abiding undertone of aversion to matters military. Resolute action and control of the military in the more successful initial operations in Jammu and Kashmir and Hyderabad was exercised in both instances by Vallabhbhai Patel, the then Home Minister and Deputy Prime Minister of India. Post Patel’s demise, the Defence Committe of the Cabinet system bequeathed by Lord Mountbaten broke down and the military was totally marginalised. Politico-bureaucratic unilateralism in the formulation of military strategy botched calamitously in the 1962 war against China. It brought into stark contrast the relative efficiency with which the First Kashmir War and Hyderabad operation was planned, coordinated and waged. Therinlie the roots of the recurrent crisis in civil-military relations in India.

Civil-Military Relations in India

The Soldier and the Mantri

etween April 1904 and August 1905, an intriguing incident occurred in the governance of the Raj, the tremors of which are felt to this day. The then Viceroy Lord Curzon, emphasising the need for dual control of the Army of India, deposed before the Secretary of State, at Whitehall, imputing that the Commander in Chief, Lord Kitchener was “subverting the military authority of the Government of India” (almost as if) “to substitute it with a military autocracy in the person of the Commander-in-Chief.” This was in response to Kitchener having bypassed the Viceroy and placing a minute before the home government where he described the Army system in India, as being productive of “enormous delay and endless discussion, while the military member of the (Viceroy’s Executive) Council rather than the Commander-in-Chief, was really omnipotent in military matters.” He further remarked that “no needed reform can be initiated and no useful measure be adopted without being subjected to vexatious and, for the most part, unnecessary criticism, not merely as regards the financial effect of the proposal but as to its desirability or necessity from a purely military point of view.”2 In the event, both Viceroy Curzon and the Military Member of his Council, Sir Elles, on receipt of the Imperial Government’s direction subordinating the Military Member to the Commander-in-Chief, resigned. Indeed times are different, the government then was an imperial one, India was a colony to be exploited, its material capital defended and the monarchy was at its zenith. Yet, the Viceroy’s largely unencumbered authority was challenged successfully, to all intent and purpose, by the military face of British India. Curzon had shot his bolt when he emphasised superior dual control of the army which in effect asserted operational control bereft of accountability; while Kitchener of Sudan brought to the debate indisputable military experience and underscored the criticality of unity of command without which the army would be condemned to bureaucratic meddling and operational impotence (the ultimate check and strategic orientation, at any rate, would remain with the Secretary of State and the India Council at Whitehall). Delving into the Commander-in-Chief’s mind, it was clearly the closed loop of the ‘responsibility-accountability and therefore authority’ chain that was in danger of being subverted and replaced by a skewed system that neither had the competence to fully understand the utilisation of the military and yet exercised operational control over it, nor the tradition to stand accountable for its actions. It is this hapless legacy that periodically surfaces whenever independent India has been faced with a situation when the application or even the preparedness and posture of military power could perhaps have provided resolution or, indeed, deterred an armed conflagration.

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The nature of the Indian military: The sum of misplaced fears Independent India was founded on the belief that the Anglo-Indian services was neither Indian, nor civil, nor provided service of any import to India.3 The civil services in this setting was nimble enough to morph into the Indian Administrative Service and in time to politicise and adapt to a context that nurtured sycophancy, redefined the idea of authority sans accountability and found virtue in the ills of a fragmented society.4 In all this forgetting the words of Lord Wavell when he declared “The English would be remembered, he believed, not by this institution or that, but by the ideal they left behind of what a district officer should be.5 ”

In 2008 India’s Defence Minister Mr A K Antony told Parliament that the Henderson Brooks-Bhagat Report could not be declassified because its contents ”are not only extremely sensitive but also of current operational value.” Half a century on it is challenging to comprehend what the report could contain that would warrant such sarcophagal silence The military on the other hand, noting that its strength lay in its apolitical tradition, professionalism and of loyalty to colours and constitution did not make any attempt to either deconstruct its ethical foundation (to India’s benefit) or seek to play a more enduring role in nation building and in national security decision-making (to its abiding distress). 1. Mantri is a word of Sanskrit origin meaning sage, it is used for a variety of public offices. It is also the root of the English word mandarin for an official of the Chinese empire. 2. “The Curzon-Kitchener Controversy,” Outlook, 19 August, 1905, pp. 941-2. Free access online via www.unz.org and The Gazette of India Extraordinary, 23 June 1905, available online. 3. Nehru, Jawaharlal. “Glimpses of World History” Lindsay and Drummond Ltd. 1949, pg 94. 4. IAS the late P N Haksar, doyen of the IAS and a close confidant of the Nehru family in the keynote address to the Naval Higher Command College in 1988, speaking on civil-military relations suggested that the “only progression for a bureaucrat was if he hitched his wagon to a politician” whether this was said in resignation, matter of factly or as an objective reality was never entirely clear, yet what was, was that the apolitical nature of the Administrative Services as a governing principle had suffered a premature cardiac arrest. 5. Mason, Phillip. “The Men Who Ruled India”, Pan Books 1985, pg 399.

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In the causation of a newly independent nation confronted by a variety of mortal security challenges the latter lack of impulse posed an awkward dilemma which as events unfolded, only served to elbow the military establishment to the status of an a ‘attached’ office, to be heard only when consulted shorn of any part in strategic decision-making. Why this came to pass is a question that is not easily answered, but clearly two dynamics were at play, the first was the misguided fear of a ‘Kitchener redux’ and therefore the misplaced trepidation of military control of the state and the second was a flawed belief that civilian control of the military not only implied superior dual control by the politico-bureaucratic alliance but also a self-fashioned conviction that military matters were essentially of execution and had little to do with policy making or strategic planning.

What was conspicuous in its omission was a statement on the blemishes in higher defence management, the failings in the political direction of the war and ‘courtiership’ being promoted in the military

A general theory – societal values and military imperatives Civil-military relations describe the correlation between society and the military institutions founded to safeguard it from threats both external and internal. Clausewitz, very insightfully, saw in military activity an orientation that was not only directed at “material force” alone; but also saw an impetus towards “moral forces which give it life” by which is meant all the psychological factors which include civil-military relations that in fact emphasise that military activity is a continuation of policy by other means.6 In a more comprehensible and narrow sense civil-military relations portrays the association between the political dispensation of a society and its military establishment.

The woeful neglect of defence preparedness, an unreal approach to international relations, particularly with China and the dangerous inadequacies of higher defence management significantly the intrusive, extemporised and incompetent manner in which civil-military relations had evolved Even in theory, this correlation generates two dynamics that shape military institutions. The first of these is characterised by societal values that tend to make military action increasingly ineffective as that social order becomes ever more liberal; while the second dynamic is one that shapes military institutions purely by violent functional imperatives that provide the logic for arming forces and using it either to coerce or in hostile action. The intensity with which these two forces collide is determined largely by the extent to which security needs bear on societal values. Balance is not an inevitability in this conflict.7 The dilemma of civil-military relations is to seek stability within this framework. If we were to analyse the civil-military correlation in India and in China against two attributes of efficiency and coherence of response we would find that in India’s case, the nation is often swayed by its democratic mores, cultural traditions, historical and pluralistic ideals to fully realise the significance of its military as a direct consequence of which there is a persistent undertone of friction and unease in the relationship which fails to recognise that the professional soldier is in fact a subordinate and supporting partner of the statesman. In turn, this manifests as a lack of cohesion, tardiness in response and a general inefficiency in attaining a decisive strategic posture, the aftermath of the terror attack on Parliament and 26/11 are symptomatic; while in China it is the intensity of security concerns that prevail, as a result of which central authority in the civil-military connect is far less polarised and enjoys heightened focus, the rapid adoption of strategies such as ‘Access Denial’, ‘The Assassi’s Mace’ and an anti-satellite programme are indicative.

The Indian context an atypical paradigm The military in the Indian context is uncharacteristic for a variety of reasons. Firstly, its apolitical training and tradition of allegiance to flag and constitution and secondly, its lack of vigorous involvement in the independence struggle which in the main was driven by a political movement motivated by rules made by the colonists and holding non-violent beliefs. Yet in Clement Atlee’s words lie an awkward irony; he reportedly stated that the two most important reasons for the haste with which the British left India were “the Indian National Army’s activities of Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose, which weakened the very foundation of the British Empire in India and the Royal Indian Navy mutiny which made the British realise that the Indian armed forces could no longer be trusted to prop up the British.” 8 The disproportionate impact of such an underplayed role ought to have suggested to our founding fathers the enormous power potential that a well harnessed military represented rather than rekindling anxieties of a Kitchener encore. A direct consequence of the latter disquiet was the deliberate putting in place structures that kept the military far removed from strategic security decision-making. 6. Clausewitz, Carl Von. “On War” Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton University Press 1976, pg 86, 87 and 137. 7. Huntington, Samuel P. “The Soldier and the State”. Harvard University Press 1957, the interplay between societal values and the functional imperatives of the military is a recurrent theme in Part 1 between pg 2 and 102. 8. The Tribune online edition, February 12 2006. Clement Atlee the British Prime Minister who presided over India’s Independence in conversation with P V Chuckraborty, Governor of West Bengal in 1956 as extracted from a letter written by the latter on 30 March 1976.

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The formulation of national security strategy, as Julian Corbett pointed out, is “neither a substitute nor a surrogate for judgement and experience, but is a means of fertilising both”.9 In amplification, the process must obviously embrace those professional departments of government that are the institutional repository of wisdom and understanding of the field. From this standpoint to have deliberately left out the military from strategic decision-making only speaks of the estrangement and disaffection that pervades civil-military relations. The perils of alienation became evident in several embarrassing instances of national and military ignominy that unfolded soon after independence. These will be discussed later in the article.

The quest for definition The essence of civil-military relations is the energy that it potentially gives to policy. Recognising this Sun Tzu (544-496 BC) the Chinese military general, strategist and philosopher declared that “order or synergy within a State’s (security) organisation provides it with Shih translated to mean ‘force’, ‘authority’, influence or ‘energy’; an essential ingredient for success while disorder spells failure”.10 The arena for civil-military relations is strategic and its burden is the potential or, indeed, the actual application of force that it may entail in order to achieve political ends. For the establishment to be in denial of both domain and purpose of the correlation is to effectively stunt the drive and advancement of the state to its rightful place amongst nations.

To counter the growing threat from China, Thimayya wanted the political leadership to consider seriously the proposal mooted by President Ayub Khan for joint defence arrangements between India and Pakistan. Nehru had previously turned this down, as it would imply forsaking non-alignment. Menon, too, was opposed to this course. Thimayya broached this matter and others directly with the prime minister and was assured that he would discuss the issues with Menon. When things did not progress, Thimayya sent his resignation The narrative, of this much misread dimension, of nation building in India begins with the circumstances of independence. Bellicose imperial legacy of the previous two centuries and the calamitous effects of military adventurism in Europe and East Asia in the first half of the twentieth century had left in Prime Minister Nehru an abiding undertone of aversion to matters military. This despite the fact that within the first year of nationhood the Indian Army had in Jammu and Kashmir assured that the instrument of accession was championed, the Pakistan Army and tribal militias vacated in a bitterly fought campaign and a Line of Control established; while in September 1948 Operation ‘Polo’ was launched to integrate the princely State of Hyderabad into the Indian Union. But it must be said that to a very large extent resolute action and control of the military (with discerning understanding of the correlation between the civil and military) was exercised in both instances by the exertions of Vallabhbhai Patel, the then Home Minister and Deputy Prime Minister of India.11 At independence, Mountbatten’s legacy was a three tiered control edifice for civil-military correlation with the Prime Minister and his cabinet at the apex and the Defence Ministers Committee along with the Chiefs of Staff Committee forming the other two tiers. This structure, unsurprisingly, took inspiration from the then defunct ‘Committee of Imperial Defence’ to form the Defence Committee of the Cabinet (chaired by the PM with the Chiefs of Staff as members along with key ministers and secretaries) with the declared purpose of creating a structure that could not only provide 9. Corbett Julian S. “Some Principles of Maritime Strategy”, Longmans Green and Co. New York, Bombay and Calcutta 1911, pg 8. 10. Sun Tzu.“The Art of War”. Translated by Samuel B. Griffith, Oxford University Press, New York 1963, pg 92-93. 11. Gandhi, Rajmohan. “Patel: A Life”. Navjivan Publishing House, Ahmedabad 1990, pg 455 and 480.

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civil-military correlation and cater for the needs of higher defence management but also to develop a strategic vision, formulate military strategy and provide planning support to implement strategy and realise vision.12 Theoretically it was to be supported by the Defence Minister’s Committee, the Chiefs of Staff Committee, the Joint Planning Committee and the Joint Intelligence Committee. In concept this presented a very robust civil-military framework. However, by 1949 the controlling element of the structure, the Defence Committee of the cabinet became defunct leaving the supporting elements headless and, put a ceiling on their ambit as defined by the operational level.

persuade Thimayya to withdraw his resignation without giving him any assurances. But by this time the issue had been leaked to the press. When questioned in Parliament, Nehru played it down as arising out of temperamental differences. Nonetheless, Nehru’s concerns were obvious when he stressed that ‘civil authority is and must remain supreme.’14 Palpably in this setting, that ‘civil authority’ meant unilateralism, was implicit.

Clearly it was the dominant persona of Nehru, his anti-militaristic disposition, his flawed obsession with internationalism and allure of non-alignment (in a milieu that was driven more by opportunism than idealism) that must have had much to do with the decision. The larger consequence of the absence of a controlling stimulus to civil-military relations was the inability to articulate a strategic vision that linked with policy and to promote long term planning and force development that serve to implement and attain a strategic posture and in turn influence the future Why such a turn of events occurred is not entirely apparent, nor have the reasons for bringing about a precipitate closure to a perfectly compelling system been recorded. Unauthenticated reports suggest that it was General K M Cariappa, the newly appointed Commander-in-Chief’s verbal forays in the field of policy making and strategic security matters that triggered the premature demise of the system. Then again, clearly it was the dominant persona of Nehru, his anti-militaristic disposition, his flawed obsession with internationalism and allure of non-alignment (in a milieu that was driven more by opportunism than idealism) that must have had much to do with the decision. The larger consequence of the absence of a controlling stimulus to civil-military relations was the inability to articulate a strategic vision that linked with policy and to promote long-term planning and force development that serve to implement and attain a strategic posture and in turn influence the future.

Unilateralism in the formulation of military strategy botched calamitously in the 1962 war against China. It brought into stark contrast the relative efficiency with which the First Kashmir War was planned, coordinated and waged and so too the competence with which civil-military planning and action brought about the integration of Hyderabad into the Union. The government of the day faced harsh criticism despite enjoying an overwhelming majority. The primary condemnation was the woeful neglect of defence preparedness, an unreal approach to international relations, particularly with China and the dangerous inadequacies of higher defence management significantly the intrusive, extemporised and incompetent manner in which civil-military relations had evolved. President Radhakrishnan went on to censure the Nehru government declaring that they had been “crude and negligent about preparations.” Lack of preparedness of the military was blamed on the Defence Minister who had to demit office. Nehru assured the Rajya Sabha on 09 November 1962 (during the three week lull in fighting) “People have been shocked, all of us have been shocked, by the events that occurred from 20 October onwards, especially of the first few days and the reverses we suffered. So I hope there will be an inquiry so as to find out what mistakes or errors were committed and who were responsible for them.”15

As India trundled into the 1950s to find itself on a canvas that was dominated by the two ‘Cold Warriors’ it was armed with little else than the towering character of Nehru, his romanticism over the virtues of non-alignment and its teeming millions. Despite the gloom of failing economic policies (growth during the decade averaged a dismal 3 per cent), the depressing prognosis of a nuclear holocaust and disturbing militaristic concerns in the region; it was critical to come to grips with two distinct problems both of which had significant bearing on security policies. First, the existing world order was unwilling to stomach a hypocritical approach to taking sides in the cold war between the power blocs and the many proxy wars that it had fired up. Second, the simmering unresolved border question with both China and Pakistan on account of historical aberrations that formed a part of baggage of the partition award. Though the predicaments appeared separate they were in fact linked by the precedence India conferred on her own statehood, sovereignty and national interests. Flawed civil-military relations saw to it that neither was reverential adherence to the forlorn non-aligned policy corrected nor was there a serious attempt at exploiting early opportunities to resolving the border question13. In addition, given that there was far less tolerance amongst states to the asymmetries of power, there were no long or even short-term strategic military options placed before civilian authority.

If we were to analyse the civil-military correlation in India and in China against two attributes of efficiency and coherence of response we would find that in India’s case, the nation is often swayed by its democratic mores, cultural traditions, historical and pluralistic ideals to fully realise the significance of its military as a direct consequence of which there is a persistent undertone of friction and unease in the relationship

The military in the Indian context is uncharacteristic for a variety of reasons. Firstly, its apolitical training and tradition of allegiance to flag and constitution and secondly, its lack of vigorous involvement in the independence struggle which in the main was driven by a political movement motivated by rules made by the colonists and holding non-violent beliefs. Yet in Clement Atlee’s words lie an awkward irony; he reportedly stated that the two most important reasons for the haste with which the British left India were “the Indian National Army’s activities of Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose, which weakened the very foundation of the British Empire in India and the Royal Indian Navy mutiny which made the British realise that the Indian armed forces could no longer be trusted to prop up the British.” The disproportionate impact of such an underplayed role ought to have suggested to our founding fathers the enormous power potential that a well harnessed military represented rather than rekindling anxieties of a Kitchener encore. A direct consequence of the latter disquiet was the deliberate putting in place structures that that kept the military far removed from strategic security decision making

The Chief of Army Staff, who was designated to conduct the inquiry, labelled it as an ‘Operational Review’ and set five terms of reference. First, adequacy and potential of training for high altitude warfare; second, material and equipment appropriateness; third, system of command; fourth, physical fitness of troops and lastly, capacity of Commanders to influence the men under their Command. Going by the scope of an ‘Operations Review’ and the terms of reference handed down, these would suggest that the aim of the convening authority was to deliberately limit and straitjacket the investigators to the operational level of the conflict. This may even have been understandable, given that the Army Chief had been deliberately relegated to that level. However, conventional wisdom and military analytical tradition will advocate the need to start a scrutiny of this nature with an understanding of the political direction, strategic posture, preparation and higher military decision-making in the run-up to war and its prosecution. Leaving the Inquiry divorced from the functioning and decision-making at service headquarters, ministry of defence and indeed by the cabinet of ministers headed by the Prime Minister (where decisions on strategic orientation and the political direction of the war were made), was not only to castrate the Inquiry, but was also to insinuate that all was well in the realm of higher defence management and civil-military relations. Facts had made it pretty apparent that it was here that an inquiry was most needed. The Supreme Commander’s terse censure of the Prime Minister and his government had underscored where the fault lines ran.

Against this backdrop a controversial episode that underscored the state of civil-military relations came centrestage when the army Chief General K S Thimayya offered to resign in September 1959. Thimayya’s resignation was sparked off by a disagreement with Defence Minister V K Krishna Menon over the promotion of senior army officers. However, the archival evidence now available shows that the reasons for the resignation ran deeper. Just a few weeks before the affair, Indian and Chinese forces had clashed along the eastern frontiers. To counter the growing threat from China, Thimayya wanted the political leadership to consider seriously the proposal mooted by President Ayub Khan for joint defence arrangements between India and Pakistan. Nehru had previously turned this down, as it would imply forsaking non-alignment. Menon, too, was opposed to this course. Thimayya broached this matter and others directly with the prime minister and was assured that he would discuss the issues with Menon. When things did not progress, Thimayya sent his resignation. The prime minister naturally saw this as a step to force his hand on policy issues. Nehru managed to 12. www.ids.nic.in/history.htm 13. Offer made by Premier Zhau Enlai in a letter to Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in 1959, “The Sino-Indian Boundary Question (enlarged edition)”, Foreign Language Press, Peking, 1962, pgs 47-50.

November 2012 Defence AND security alert

The inquiry took the form of the Henderson Brooks and Bhagat Report which was presented to the new Defence Minister Mr Y B Chavan on 02 July 1963. Earlier in April, in reply to a question in Parliament, he affirmed that Army Headquarters had already instituted measures to implement the lessons to be learned based on the terms of reference of the report. These included quality of planning, air-land cooperation, training for high altitude warfare, depth of officer man relationship, focused intelligence service and the creation of a chain of strategic airfields.16 What

14. Srinath Raghavan, “War and Peace in Modern India: A Strategic History of the Nehru Years”. Permanent Black, Ranikhet, 2010, pg 267-269. 15. Noorani, A G, “Publish the 1962 War Report Now”, The Hindu, e-paper, 12 July 2012, Opinion. 16. Arpi, Claude, The War of 1962: Henderson Brooks-Bhagat Report, Indian Defence Review Vol 26.1 Jan-Mar 2011.

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security threat and challenges

SYNERGY AND SOLIDARITY

was conspicuous in its omission was a statement on the blemishes in higher defence management, the failings in the political direction of the war and ‘courtiership’ being promoted in the military. He also mentioned that the contents of the report in its entirety were not being disclosed for considerations of security. On 02 September 1963, an intriguing statement was made by the Defence Minister in Parliament, he disclosed that the Inquiry Committee had not confined its investigations to operations alone but had also examined the “developments and events prior to hostilities as also the plans, posture and the strength of the army at the outbreak of hostility.” Further, that a detailed review of the actual operations had been carried out “with reference to terrain, strategy, tactics and deployment of troops.” He also summarised the main recommendations of the report sticking to the terms of reference (which by now was well known) and later (on 09 September) in a statement on defence preparedness, he confirmed that changes were underway which encompassed expansion, reorganisation, modernisation, development of comprehensive infrastructure and enhancing operational efficiency. The value and effectiveness of these sweeping changes were soon to be confirmed during the wars of 1965 and 1971 against Pakistan.17 What remained disturbingly unanswered was the out-of-mandate areas that the report addressed with regard to “developments and events prior to hostilities, strategic posture and plans, which must be taken to have included civil-military relations, higher defence management, decision-making and the political direction of war.” In 1963 to divulge these may well have compromised national security, but to persist through time is to invite long shadows to loom over the military establishment.18

The mystifying continuity Even after the passage of fifty years we note that the fixing of liability for the 1962 debacle remains unfulfilled despite the four thousand plus casualties (killed, wounded, missing), the humiliation and indeed the loss of credibility. The report remains under a shroud. In 2008 India’s Defence Minister Mr A K Antony told Parliament that the Henderson Brooks-Bhagat Report could not be declassified because its contents ”are not only extremely sensitive but also of current operational value.”19 Half a century on it is challenging to comprehend what the report could contain that would warrant such sarcophagal silence.” The perpetuation of this inability to bring about change that reflects and recognises that ‘civil-military correlation provides energy to policy’ is long overdue. The skewed nature of the association may be directly linked to four recent happenings. First, the curious sacking of the Chief of Naval Staff on 30 December 1998 based on a hastily compiled ‘booklet’ by an Additional Secretary that had pretensions of being a ‘White Paper’ (it was distributed to all MPs) which invoked Article 310 of the Constitution that officers serve at the pleasure of the President. Primary reason apparently was the officer’s refusal to brook bureaucratic interference and high handedness in service matters.20 Second, the Group of Ministers that reviewed the national security system in the wake of the Kargil conflict 1999 recommended the creation of a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) so that civil-military correlation could be put on an ‘even keel’ and the military perspective would be reflected at the strategic level of warfare. While successive Service Chiefs have themselves to blame for not having followed up with the necessary vigour for petty reasons of turf protection and internal incoherence, the office most affected would have been the Defence Secretary who currently perpetuates and plays at being the de facto CDS with no liability to that office. Third, the Group of Ministers also recommended the integration of service headquarters into the Ministry of Defence. This while given lip service has not happened. Service headquarters continue to be treated as attached offices to service the Ministry of Defence as hitherto. Responsibility and accountability for operational matters remain with the military while controlling authority and higher defence decision-making resides in the Ministry of Defence. And lastly, the recent General V K Singh age fiasco could well have been resolved discreetly without compromising integrity of the army. This was not done and there is reason to believe that behind the scenes civil-military tensions ensured that the matter, by design was allowed to rupture in public.

Conclusion India has faced many traumatic events since 1947 that have had critical impact on security of the nation including five wars, insurgencies, gory terrorist acts, periodic crumbling of the law and order mechanism and even a period of authoritarian rule; but what stands out is a lack of strategic vision instigated by a distorted civil-military correlation. India’s military is characterised by an apolitical nature and exults in its professionalism. It responds best to objectivity in purpose and control as can only be provided by a synergic relationship between the civil authority that defines policy and the military that gives to policy the necessary energy. The First Kashmir War and the integration of Hyderabad into the Union provided us with an acute insight of how the correlation ought to work; in these episodes, the primary virtue visible was that development of policy and the force to back it form a unity. 17. Ibid. 18. Extracted from author’s article titled “The Ghosts of Henderson Brooks and Bhagat” first published in the September 2012 issue of Defence and Security Alert. 19. Ibid. 20. Bhagwat, Vishnu, Betrayal of the Defence Forces: A Soldier's Diary. Manas Publications 2001. The fact of bureaucratic officiousness is a recurrent theme.

November 2012 Defence AND security alert

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security threat and challenges

MULTIDIMENTIONAL CHANGEOVER

Transformational and progressive

roles in Policing

The columnist is an Intelligence and Terrorism Analyst, Clinical Psychologist and Clinical Hypnotherapist based in SouthEast Asia. She has also received training in specialised areas including counter-terrorism, intelligence and tactical operations. She specialises in cognitive learning processes and neural pathway response and how these factors apply to specialised trainings. She is an expert in the field of non-verbal micro and macro expression for deception and detection and also using non-verbal assets for psychological self-assessment in conjunction with Emotional Intelligence to enhance the human mind, personality, image and spirit. She is a member of ICPA (International Corrections and Prisons Association), IACSP (International Association for Counter-Terrorism and Security Professionals), APA (American Psychological Association), APP (Association of Professional Psychologists), FPRI (Foreign Policy Research Institute) and UK Certified Hypnotherapist and General Hypnotherapy Register.

Dr Rupali Jeswal

“Mindset: Continuous learning through innovation in practice and professionalism to achieve national coherence.” “Simply put policing is a verb, meaning action – the quality and effectiveness of this action depends on wealth of knowledge, training and synchronisation within the various departments.”

olice departments need to develop into a learning organisation to be ahead, no longer can the departments rely on methods of the past to just recruit, train and conduct occasional specialised courses. Learning organisations indulge in constant, regular empowerment and enhancement trainings along with refreshers, table-top planning exercises for rapid response (these are being conducted in western countries to improve the ability of local jurisdictions to prepare, protect and respond), on-the-job trainings and mentoring programmes so the senior level can lead the new officers and set leadership by example – efforts through this system bring a culture of dispersed leadership.

mergence of new global players, especially China and India will bring transformation in Modernisation of police force incorporates a the geopolitical landscape through their expected rise in economic and political power. multidimensional model With a full bag of expanding military capabilities, large populations and sustained high of police tradecraft, it is economic growth, the uncertain factor remains about the smooth flow of transformation. all about the mental edge and high performance Uncertain scenarios also encompass the growing power of non-state actors, political Islam and enhancing the core and it’s impact, conflict and expansion of jihadist ideology and ability of terrorist to acquire of policing which is the weapons of mass destruction. This scenario also contains weak governments harbouring Police Officer. Modern religious extremism, acculturation due to technology and its radicalized affect on unemployed concept of policing mass of youth, which may give way to regional conflicts. Cross border conflicts resulting in is the ability of the an exodus causing increased phenomenon of IDP. officer to swarm in an increasingly complex Matter at hand environment with With this backdrop and potential developing factual scenarios we move on to establishing rapid solution-focused strategies. Shared and table-top scenario framing, which will offer a dynamic view of practical, professional policing dispersed leadership in these current times and situations. Table-top framing exercises when conducted by engages highly sophisticated Police Executives are useful in forecasting measures against uncertain potential threats and workforce to meet the risks; they focus on forecasting and developing new methodologies for policing. ever-increasing needs of the community and Tech-tools solving crime No doubt technology and its advancement has benefited policing in this century

November 2012 Defence AND security alert

with fingerprinting databases, computerised crime mapping, SDRs (software-defined radio technologies) bring forth the possibility of cognitive radio technologies. Cognition is the ability of radios to “sense” the operational environment and adjust themselves accordingly. The coming of the tactical robots is breather, as it can assist the Police in high-risk situations, responding to barricaded subjects, monitoring large perimeters, checking area for hazards and remotely communicating with potentially hostile subjects. Weapon Modernisation has given way to semi-automatic with high capacity fast loading magazines from cap-and-ball revolvers, flintlock and wheel locks of the past and with new categories like CEW’s and Intermediate weapon also known as less-lethal weapon being included in the police arsenal, 4-in-one Tacshell jacket, optimising human weapon system, police pursuit vehicles (PPV) equipped with an infrared night vision camera, an automated license plate scanner (ALPR), MILO Range Modes being introduced as a very effective, interactive training simulator, it is a way to bring real scenarios (up to 425 ready to train scenarios) into the training class to hone the skills for firearms drills and exercise. RBT or reality based trainings are gaining momentum for combat stress and marksmanship skills. The job of a police officer comes pre-packed with unique, unpredictable risks and demands. Stress is a pre-requisite in this field, if stress can be mastered and utilised as a force multiplier the performance is enhanced. To master combat stress, for example is improving

Uncertain scenarios also encompass the growing power of non-state actors, political Islam and it’s impact, conflict and expansion of jihadist ideology and ability of terrorist to acquire weapons of mass destruction Table-top framing exercises when conducted by Police Executives are useful in forecasting measures against uncertain potential threats and risks; they focus on forecasting and developing new methodologies for policing

November 2012 Defence AND security alert

security threat and challenges

MULTIDIMENTIONAL CHANGEOVER

the marksmanship skill because

Police departments without mastery in combat need to develop into a stress even the best marksman learning organisation to will miss. be ahead, no longer can the departments rely on The list of highly advanced methods of the past to just tech-tools is long and absolutely recruit, train and conduct essential but for all these occasional specialised technical advances there is one courses. Learning salient component that ensures organisations indulge success in any operation and in constant, regular which remains unchanged that empowerment and is the Human Factor – the Police enhancement trainings Officer. along with refreshers, table-top planning Police departments – A exercises for rapid learning organisation response (these are being conducted in western Police departments need countries to improve to develop into a learning the ability of local organisation to be ahead, no jurisdictions to prepare, longer can the departments protect and respond), rely on methods of the past on-the-job trainings and to just recruit, train and conduct occasional specialised courses. Learning organisations mentoring programmes indulge in constant, regular empowerment and enhancement trainings along with refreshers, so the senior level can table-top planning exercises for rapid response (these are being conducted in western countries lead the new officers and to improve the ability of local jurisdictions to prepare, protect and respond), on-the-job trainings set leadership by example and mentoring programmes so the senior level can lead the new officers and set leadership by – efforts through this example – efforts through this system bring a culture of dispersed leadership. system bring a culture of dispersed leadership Culture of Dispersed Leadership is an all-level initiative with a slogan of “every officer is a leader!” When the goal is personalised one takes responsibility for the success of that goal.

Police Force of a Nation collectively represents the face of the country and collectively provides protection to the citizens; it is synonymous with the “brand name” of the country

Police executives must develop a supportive structure of dispersed leadership with a swarming methodology and with an understanding of changes due to the global shifts in culture, technology, methods of information dissemination, urban diversity, social and economic factors. The challenges are certainly diversified, the pace of world events and dissemination of activities is much faster than before, crime is not centralised and criminals no longer bound by borders, so the existing and new generation of Police must be equipped with effective recognition of these challenges and to relate and forecast changes.

Best practices, performance measurement, reality-check makes a full circle when local police departments team up with professionals from scientific and educational fields to conduct analysis which helps with identifying and planning for the challenges, to develop, maintain and nourish a high definition of workforce. This will bring forth points of focus for coping and working strategies in our asymmetric operational environment. Joint alliance of this kind will guide the police force for greater gains in performance at the same time being cost-effective. Scarce resources is a cry emoted by many in the Police force, ATS and Crime branch, so how should we allocate scarce resources to improve effectiveness – is the question at large. Cost associated with effective policing is a factor not to be ignored and at the same time decision-makers must congregate with various experts to assess and analyse and create “connects” between scarce resources, effective policing and serving the community better. To do this, police force in all states need to evaluate the current procedures they use, to obtain measurement of performance that can accurately assess progress, quality, efficiency and accountability. Systemic approach through a methodology will appraise the department’s overall performance and record specific functions and activities, which have proved effective in the past to be used as “best practice” and reinvention upon those for new effective systems, data-driven decisions to combat new challenges. Analysing crime patterns must be accompanied with what police are doing about them and to what effect, based on this analysis constant development and restructuring of strategies must be carried out to deal with issues, these strategies tallying with issues then must be dispersed to all within the department written in structured format so it can be immediately understood, applied and the result obtained through application and evaluated for effectiveness to improve upon further.

November 2012 Defence AND security alert

Police Force of a Nation collectively represents the face of the country and collectively provides protection to the citizens; it is synonymous with the “brand name” of the country. A learning organisation adopts a “System Thinking Process”, which means – maintain effective rapport, effective communication system, brand control, perception management of the force and the community, resources and methods on “self-training” along with collective trainings. A learning organisation cultivates an atmosphere of innovation, personal commitment, ample amount of knowledge and hands-on, correct mental-modes, critical thinking knowing latent failures and gives the workforce personal mastery of their own and collective unique skill sets. Above all this form of system thinking projects in action the shared vision understood by all, to reach the goal and team learning to execute action with high performance. The department becomes a sanctuary for like-minded professionals where the individual grows and is not deterred or de-motivated. Learning occurs as a ‘response’ to certain definite and identifiable stimuli in one’s environment. Learning organisations maximise potential for success in execution of their objectives and increase productivity, trust and performance, as people in these organisations share more powerful connections. Active engagement, inquiry, problem solving, solution focused mental-mode and engagement with others, characterise learning activities in constructivist setting. Facilitating environment for personal and professional growth: Congruence: This is an approach towards a definite value, a goal to reach a fixed state of cognition-oriented-action equilibrium.

Many countries are adopting a trend for a culture of police leadership and creation of seamless response units where various agencies and departments run “live” exercises to prepare for possible critical case scenarios of that particular city

Transparency: Being authentic without any false front and having a match between internal and external factors. This in turn allows climate of open communication. Many countries are adopting a trend for a culture of police leadership and creation of seamless response units where various agencies and departments run “live” exercises to prepare for possible critical case scenarios of that particular city. In countries where there are behavioural science units in all police departments, result in increased efficiency and increase morale in the police officers has been recorded, these units offer a systemic view in developing intervention and empowerment strategies. These units benefit and assist the officers professionally and personally in critical assessment, problem identification, better understanding of criminal and terrorist minds and also as a supportive aid for the emotional and psychological well-being of the officers, to lessen the stress of trauma and reduce the impact of potential trauma faced in the line of duty. First-hand or second-hand trauma becomes a shackle in functioning of a police officer taking away the motivational factor needed for their high performance.

Conclusion Multifaceted teamwork through dispersed leadership is being adopted in policing. When employees are allowed to practice job involvement they assume a level of responsibility and control over location-specific working conditions that directly affect them. This ensures a level of ownership that results in greater motivation, communication and innovation. Modern concept of policing is the ability of the officer to swarm in an increasingly complex environment with rapid solution-focused strategies. Shared and dispersed leadership engages highly sophisticated workforce to meet the ever-increasing needs of the community and solving crime. Modernisation of police force incorporates a multidimensional model of police tradecraft, it is all about the mental edge and high performance and enhancing the core of policing which is the Police Officer.

November 2012 Defence AND security alert

security threat and challenges

CONSENSUS VITAL

Police and

Amitabh Thakur, IPS The writer is an IPS officer from UP cadre. He is also associated with a civil society National RTI Forum working in the field of accountable governance. Police being a state subject under the Constitution of India, it is the primary responsibility of state governments to take care of the requirements of respective police forces, including those related to modernisation. The Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) supplements efforts of the state governments through grants and also technical assistance. It also carries out modernisation activities directly for the Central Police Forces. Police Modernisation has been included as an Integrated Mission Mode Project (MMP) under the National e-Governance Plan (NeGP). The establishment of a nationwide Crime and Criminal Tracking Network and Systems (CCTNS) is a major initiative being undertaken under the MMP presently. In addition, a number of other initiatives are also underway. The basic objective of the MMP is to meet the identified deficiencies in various aspects of police administration

well researched and an in-depth article on Police modernisation that highlights the difficulties being currently faced at the centre and state level. The Ministry of Home Affairs has been implementing a Non Plan Scheme for Modernisation of State Police Forces since 1969-70 on Centre : State cost sharing basis ie (50-50) basis when Rs 50 lakh were allocated annually for the Scheme. In 1978-79 the allocation of amount was raised from Rs 50 lakh to Rs 7 crore per annum. From 1999-2000 allocation was further enhanced to Rs 100 crore. In 2001 the annual allocation under the Scheme was raised Rs 1,000 crore wef 2000-01 onwards to counter challenges of terrorism and militancy effectively. This enhancement was based on the base survey conducted by the BPR&D in the year 2000 to assess the deficiency in various areas of police administration in the states. This survey had indicated that a sum of Rs 25,000 crore would be required to meet the current deficiencies in the State Police Forces in the country in the areas of mobility, police buildings, police housing, weaponry, forensic setup, training etc. Subsequently, the central allocation was further enhanced to Rs 1,400 crore per annum in 2003-04. This scheme was reviewed again in the year 2005, where the state of Jammu and Kashmir and all 8 NE states namely, Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Sikkim, Mizoram, Nagaland and Tripura have been classified as ‘A’ category states entitling them 100 per cent central assistance and the remaining 19 states fall in category ‘B’ allowing 75 per cent central assistance with a provision of 25 per cent of state share wef 2005-06.

efore touching upon the issue of Police and Security Forces Modernisation, I want to present a few statements made by Gurmeet Kanwal, a Delhi-based defence analyst as regards a similar and possibly even more topical issue in his essay “India’s Military Modernisation: Plans and Strategic Underpinnings”. He said, “In order to meet future threats and challenges and achieve interoperability with US and other friendly armed forces for joint operations in India’s area of strategic interest, the Indian military needs to modernise and create force

November 2012 Defence AND security alert

structures that are capable of undertaking network-centric warfare on land, at sea and in the air.” He adds by saying, “Gradually, but perceptibly, the Indian armed forces are upgrading their capabilities, enhancing their kinetic effectiveness and command and control and improving interoperability.” In the same article, Kanwal says, “Many of its weapons and equipment are bordering on obsolescence and need to be replaced.” Having described the various issues, Kanwal makes this useful remark, “Nonetheless, India’s modernisation plans are moving

Security Forces Modernisation:

Threats and Challenges

ahead at a very slow pace. However, the process is certainly underway and there is hope that it will receive bipartisan support across the political spectrum because of the realisation that no alternative exists for addressing emerging threats and challenges but for India to quickly modernise its armed forces.” In a different study as regards police forces by Om Shankar Jha, a BSF officer, titled “Impact of

Modernisation of Police Forces Scheme on Combat Capability of the Police Forces in Naxal-Affected States: A Critical Evaluation” he begins by presenting a wonderful quote from the legendary US President, Theodore Roosevelt, “In any moment of decision the best thing you can do is the right thing, the next best thing is the wrong thing and the worst thing you can do is nothing.” This is almost exactly the same thing being said by Kanwal. He says, “In order

to address the long felt need of police capability building, the Centre as well as State Governments have initiated numerous measures to enhance the combat capability of SPFs in Naxalism-affected states, like raising of special anti-Naxal forces, specialised training to SPFs in counterinsurgency and jungle warfare, providing better arms, ammunitions, equipment, communication gadgets, bulletproof vehicles, land-mine-proof vehicles, intelligence support, improved

November 2012 Defence AND security alert

security threat and challenges infrastructural and resource supports etc.” Jha is also critical of the measures taken in this regard when he says, “The Centre has been implementing the presently ongoing Modernisation of Police Forces scheme (MPF) since 2000-01, with an annual budgetary allocation of Rs 1,000 crore for ten years, with assistance of States. The MHA claims that, this scheme provides the much needed assistance and impetus to police organisation in States. However, on ground, things appear different. Almost eight financial years have passed since this scheme was launched. The SPFs in most of the affected States are still combat capability deficient and unable to take the Naxals head on.”

Both the Centre and the various States need to plug-in all the possible loopholes in the present way of implementation of these schemes I also find it pertinent to quote from a recent news article “Goswami reviews police, security forces’ modernisation” in State Times dated June 15, 2012 that says, “Union Special Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), Anil Goswami visited Jammu Police Headquarters (PHQ) where he said that the Central Government is very liberal in providing funds to the State for modernising Jammu and Kashmir Police and security agencies working in the State. Goswami asked the heads of Jammu and Kashmir Police and other security forces to project their demands and proposals in time to Ministry of Home Affairs so that the same are processed well in time. He asked them to ensure maximum utilisation of funds released from time to time adding that adequate funds would be released to them periodically. Goswami took a detailed status review of weaponry procurement, communication and mobility, infrastructure and accommodation, upgradation of police hospitals, schools, civic action programmes, police workshops, housing sector, LoC trade and travel and installation of CCTNS for better monitoring.” The e-Gov magazine in the article “Police Modernisation: Projects and Experiences” dated April 3, 2012 discusses the topic of

CONSENSUS VITAL

police modernisation programmes in India and presents the views of some key people involved with police modernisation projects. It begins by saying, “Police being a state subject under the Constitution of India, it is the primary responsibility of state governments to take care of the requirements of respective police forces, including those related to modernisation. The Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) supplements efforts of the state governments through grants and also technical assistance. It also carries out modernisation activities directly for the Central Police Forces. Police Modernisation has been included as an Integrated Mission Mode Project (MMP) under the National e-Governance Plan (NeGP). The establishment of a nationwide Crime and Criminal Tracking Network and Systems (CCTNS) is a major initiative being undertaken under the MMP presently. In addition, a number of other initiatives are also underway. The basic objective of the MMP is to meet the identified deficiencies in various aspects of police administration.”

Modernisation will make available all data in time, so that senior hierarchy can analyse and take informed and timely decisions In this article, we have a few statements made by S Suresh Kumar, Joint Secretary (Center State), Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India as regards CCTNS. He says, “The Crime and Criminal Tracking Network and Systems (CCTNS) project is a Rs 2,000 crore project. Spread over an implementation span of 5 years, it involves 35 different units and more than half-a-dozen other stakeholders in the government.” At the same time, what is even more relevant is the fact that he openly admits some uncomfortable truths about this project, “The project has faced some criticism on aspects such as delay, growth and so and so but the overall vision and the road map that has been laid down for the project, has to an extent, been working out well.” S K Basu, Vice President, NIIT Technologies, a key partner in these projects said, “Modernisation will make available all data in time,

November 2012 Defence AND security alert

so that senior hierarchy can analyse and take informed and timely decisions.” He also made a few useful suggestions, “Criminal profiling should be done so that predictive policing can be implemented for all critical crimes impacting society and good living. Police officers should be provided gadgets like Personal Digital Assistants (PDA) so that police can note the details of finding at a location on the system for faster data capture and processing.”

The role, power and authority of the Police officials, including the State DGPs, need to be made central in this entire scheme of things so as to imbibe more professionalism in the scheme A very useful statement was made by Rajvir P Sharma, Additional Director General, Bangalore Metropolitan Task Force. He said, “Merely cosmetic adoption of technology is not going to help. We need to ensure real adoption of technology if the true effects are to be realised.” He was also truthful enough to admit, “We conducted a survey to measure the level of technology adoption in police and found out that the police department and government agencies lack effective mechanisms to absorb technology; the Police and government machinery are not sufficiently security enabled and that there is lot of wastage of resources in absorbing or by absorbing outdated technology.” In an article “Looking In, Looking Out: Surveying India’s Internal and External Security Challenges” Michael Kugelman, programme associate for South Asia at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars brings forth another very vital issue related with security expenditure and police modernisation, “Any new or expanded counterinsurgency initiative will require ample national expenditure. Yet even as matters stand now, the insurgency is causing the central government to run up a steep bill. The financial burdens of Operation Green Hunt, as with any major security operation, are considerable.” He is not incorrect when he says, “Given India’s natural resource problems, the stakes of addressing the country’s present security challenges will only intensify

in the future. This suggests that better natural resource management will become as important a priority as tackling the Maoist threat and strengthening India’s national defences. Therefore, the watchwords of India’s security future will likely be not just counterinsurgency, arms procurements and naval modernisation, but also resource equity and efficiency.” The Ministry of Home Affairs puts it on record that the Ministry of Home Affairs has been implementing a Non Plan Scheme for Modernisation of State Police Forces since 1969-70 on Centre : State cost sharing basis ie (50-50) basis when Rs 50 lakh were allocated annually for the Scheme. In 1978-79 the allocation of amount was raised from Rs 50 lakh to Rs 7 crore per annum. From 1999-2000 allocation was further enhanced to Rs 100 crore. In 2001 the annual allocation under the Scheme was raised Rs 1,000 crore wef 2000-01 onwards to counter challenges of terrorism and militancy effectively. This enhancement was based on the base survey conducted by the BPR&D in the year 2000 to assess the deficiency in various areas of police administration in the States.

This survey had indicated that a sum of Rs 25,000 crore would be required to meet the current deficiencies in the State Police Forces in the country in the areas of mobility, police buildings, police housing, weaponry, forensic setup, training etc. Subsequently, the Central allocation was further enhanced to Rs 1,400 crore per annum in 2003-04. This scheme was reviewed again in the year 2005, where the state of Jammu and Kashmir and all 8 NE states namely, Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Sikkim, Mizoram, Nagaland and Tripura have been classified as ‘A’ category States entitling them 100 per cent central assistance and the remaining 19 states fall in category ‘B’ allowing 75 per cent central assistance with a provision of 25 per cent of State share wef 2005-06. Another Special component for strengthening the police infrastructure in the 76 naxal affected districts in 9 States at the rate of Rs 2 crore for affected districts per year initially for 5 years was introduced in the Scheme from 2005-06. Similarly, a special provision of Rs 1 crore per district, per year, initially for a period of 5 years for 30 districts situated on the Indo-Nepal and Indo-Bhutan borders

was included in the scheme from 2005-06.

Given India’s natural resource problems, the stakes of addressing the country’s present security challenges will only intensify in the future. This suggests that better natural resource management will become as important a priority as tackling the Maoist threat and strengthening India’s national defences. Therefore, the watchwords of India’s security future will likely be not just counterinsurgency, arms procurements and naval modernisation, but also resource equity and efficiency MHA says that the objectives of Police modernisation are: To meet the identified deficiencies in the various aspects of police administration and operations. To reduce the dependence of the State Governments on the Army and Central Paramilitary Forces. To control internal security and

November 2012 Defence AND security alert

security threat and challenges Law and Order situation by way of equipping the State Police Forces adequately. Balanced development of the State Police Forces. At this present point of time, the main items provided under this scheme in India include construction of secure police stations, outposts and police lines, ensuring mobility and security, provision of modern weaponry, surveillance / communication / forensic equipment, upgradation of training infrastructure, police housing and computerisation.

Michael Kugelman, programme associate for South Asia at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars brings forth another very vital issue related with security expenditure and police modernisation, “Any new or expanded counterinsurgency initiative will require ample national expenditure. Yet even as matters stand now, the insurgency is causing the central government to run up a steep bill. The financial burdens of Operation Green Hunt, as with any major security operation, are considerable" The Annual Action Plans, covering these broad areas, are prepared by the State Governments and submitted to the Ministry of Home Affairs for consideration and approval. Based on the approval of Annual Action Plans, Central funds are released to the States, as per the items of the Scheme. The Scheme has made perceptible impact in all the States and has provided the much needed assistance and impetus to police modernisation. Yes, there are certainly a large number of problems and challenges associated with these modernisation programmes. 1. While Central Government has been seen regularly reminding the States to send perspective action plans for police modernisation well within time, many a times the States have been found wanting sending their requirements within the due dates. This does create severe and serious problems as regards formulation and implementation of these programmes.

CONSENSUS VITAL

2. The second issue is related with utilising the allotted funds. The lack of initiative on the part of a majority of States in the early stage of the MPF scheme was apparently due to their inability to spare requisite matching funds. 3. The third problem is related with misutilisation and / or improper utilisation of funds against the mandate prescribed by the Central government. For this, there have been suggestions that only a part of the Central share of the funds should be allotted to the States in cash, to meet their requirements for improving physical infrastructure such as police stations etc. Insofar as weaponry, gadgetry, equipment, vehicles etc., the Central assistance should always be in kind. 4. Another issue is related with delay in Release of Fund to States by MHA. After receiving the funds from the MHA, the States have to release matching share but the States take further time in issuing the allocation. This often results in the fund getting released at the end of the financial year. Hence, the tender formalities are not completed in time and budget is not utilised in the same financial year. 5. The amount allocated annually under the MPF scheme is regarded as being far less than the actual requirement. There is a huge gap in basic policing requirements in this State, be it for upgradation of police communication equipment, vehicles for basic policing, BP and mine-proof vehicles, housing requirements, training and so on. There is a huge gap between demand and what is made available. 6. There are also a large number of problems of Implementation associated both with the MHA and the States. 7. Problems Faced by MHA include the fact that while the States are required to submit an Action Plan well in advance, many of them do not send it in time. Many a times they submit unrealistic Plans beyond the scope of the MPF scheme, States do not utilise the budget in time and do not furnish the utilisation certificate, Funds allotted in a particular

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financial year get carried forward to the subsequent financial years, they are unable to provide matching State share (25 per cent) in time due to funds crunch and so on. 8. Problems Faced in the States include the fact that the financial and decision-making powers lie with the officers of the State Government and not with the State DGP. As a result, the Police HQ is intimated to act in the end of the financial year. Hence, tender formalities are often not being completed in time and the budget gets lapsed. Presently the State DGPs have little financial sanction power. They are highly dependent on the State government. Again, there is little scope for manoeuvring of the funds as per the local needs and the sudden change in requirements/ perspective. That summing it up, the schemes of Police modernisation are a big boon to the policing in India but at the same time, we need to understand the following ground realities: India is not a rich country and we always face resource crunch. Hence, there shall not be any pilferage in the name of police modernisation. There shall always be a focus on minimum wastage of resources and money in all the police modernisation programmes. Any kind of duplicity in purchase and expenditure need to be strictly prohibited. Both the Center and the various States need to plug-in all the possible loopholes in the present way of implementation of these schemes. The role, power and authority of the Police officials, including the State DGPs, need to be made central in this entire scheme of things so as to imbibe more professionalism in the scheme. It is only when we are deeply concerned and responsive to each of the above-mentioned issues that the gains of police modernisation as envisaged by the Government of India can be thoroughly realised.

Pathikrit Payne

The Enemy within

National Security cannot be a Law and Order issue

hard hitting article which talks of a need for transformation in the leadership of police and CAPFs engaged in difficult Counter-Insurgency operations against the Maoists in dense jungle terrain. The old managerial style of police leadership has to change to an inspirational, military style of leadership from the front, as former DG CRPF Mr Vijay Kumar was trying so hard to usher in. Motivation and incentives are needed for the rank and file. The critical infrastructure protection is perhaps one of the most decisive aspects of modern day internal security architecture. Since 2009 Maoists have been responsible for 1,183 incidents of targeting economic infrastructure. Substantial portion of India’s key economic infrastructure today is in the joint sector or the private sector and needs to be protected with same vigour. In spite of the token action of deploying CISF in protecting refineries of Reliance Industries in Jamnagar as well as that of software centres Infosys and a few others, it has to be acknowledged that CISF with a force strength of a little more than 1,25,000 is grossly inadequate to secure every critical infrastructure in the private sector. It is time that India’s Union Home Ministry takes the next logical step in terms of allowing select private security agencies of repute to procure small arms for the creation of a practical first line of defence. There is a strong case for relaxing the archaic rules that prohibit the purchase of guns for self-defence by law abiding citizens in India. Terrorism and organised crime simply cannot be considered as petty law and order problems. The 5th Report of the Second Administrative Reforms Commission has brought out 152 recommendations, which among others have reiterated the need for police reforms and separation of investigation from day to day policing activities.

The writer is an alumnus of S Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. He was previously associated with The Sunday Indian magazine and is presently a Senior Researcher with a New Delhi based think tank.

All such deployments should be only for a temporary period not exceeding three months, which could be extended by another three months after authorisation by Parliament. Such an enactment is extremely important in dealing with menaces like that of Maoism. As of today in spite of the major hype surrounding the Operation Green Hunt, fact remains that each state is fighting its own war against Maoists and calling truce whenever it suits their purpose. There is sheer lack of a coherent national policy and coordination among the states on the same. Maoists take optimum advantage of it by simply slipping into an adjacent state during a police operation in a particular state. The central forces deployed to assist the state police face numerous problems ranging from lack of authority to take decisions to sheer apathy of the authorities. A new law giving the forces more freedom and legal immunity is needed

National security and criminal threats are often intertwined. Our ability to integrate intelligence and investigations makes us uniquely situated to address our nation’s threats and vulnerabilities

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security threat and challenges

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n the eve of the 4th anniversary of the 26/11 terror attack in Mumbai, one can safely state that India today is reasonably well prepared for the previous or the last terror attack but as usual, is horribly unprepared for the next one.

On 8 February 2012, in one of the remotest corners of India, a BSF jawan was brutally assaulted and killed by Bangladeshi smugglers. Shockingly, the deceased Head Constable Sartaj Singh, posted at Indo-Bangladesh border at 24 Parganas in West Bengal, had his service rifle with him at the time of assault and yet he did not fire in return to thwart the fatal attack on him by an estimated 100 Bangladeshi smugglers. So what made Sartaj Singh not fire at them? Reports state that there have been clear instructions from the Home Ministry to the BSF not to fire at intruders. This has been done to literally appease the Bangladeshi government whose synchronised cross-border infiltrations and rampant smuggling continue to be real cases of worry even today. Therefore for Sartaj Singh, the choice was between persecution and sure death at the hands of criminals or prosecution and slow death at the hands of his own government. On February 9, 2012, The Telegraph published an article which stated, there had been 52 attacks on BSF jawans by cattle smugglers in the border areas of south Bengal between January 1, 2011 and February 7, 2012 and 75 jawans had suffered injuries. Ravi Punoth, the Inspector General of the BSF (south Bengal), said: “Although such attacks are increasing, jawans have been asked not to open fire except under extreme provocation.”

The private sector also has to chip in with its resources in taking the lead to protect its own assets as there is a limit to how much the state can do. Further, there is a strong case for relaxing the archaic rules that prohibit the purchase of guns for self-defence by law abiding citizens in India. In its quest to check the proliferation of small arms, India has created a unique scenario where there are more than 40 million illegal small arms floating around and every crook with a wrong intention has access to an illegally made small arm in the country but a law abiding citizen finds it next to impossible to acquire a licensed gun legally In the last five years an estimated 51,000 personnel from the Central Armed Police Forces have taken premature retirement. Reasons vary from sheer discontentment of job, lack of promotional avenues, indifference of superiors to lack of timely sanction of leave and basic medical facilities. Incidentally 51,000 personnel is almost the size of ITBP and is perhaps bigger than the size of army of many of the smaller European nations. Yet, even as India’s Union Home Ministry was reeling under the exodus of 51,000 personnel, the news of several BSF officers filing a case against the Home Ministry and IPS Officers on the issue of discrimination and deprivation of financial and promotional benefits must have come as a jolt. The contention of the BSF officers was that most of the promotional benefits at the highest level of the organisation are reserved for the IPS cadre even when majority of them have no field experience. As reports state, 40 per cent of the posts of DIG, 66.66 per cent of the posts of IG and all the posts at the level of DG in BSF are reserved for the IPS cadres. The situation is almost the same for other Central Police Forces like ITBP, CISF, CRPF and SSB too. This happens even when commissioned officers of the Central Police Forces join through exams conducted by UPSC and leave alone being inferior, are more battle hardened and have far more field experience of counter-insurgency than most IPS officers. Later on CRPF and ITBP officers too became co-petitioners for the case to be heard in December.

Two of the four targets of the 26/11 terror attacks were private sector assets, ie the Taj and Oberoi hotels. Even though several of the respective state governments have initiated the process of raising their own state level industrial security forces, it would still never be adequate and at best law enforcement agencies can only come in the aftermath of a terror strike but they can never be the first line of defence for India’s vast array of industries in the private sector. For that, India’s private sector would have to continue depending on private security agencies or raise their own cadre of security officers as is being done by the likes of Reliance Industries Limited Reports emerged in the first week of October that over 65,000 personnel, the entire strength of Bihar Police are planning to go on mass leave. The demands surprisingly are extremely simple and what ideally should have been taken care of by the state home ministry long time back. The demands include provision for a grade pay of Rs 2,000 for all the Constables, sanctioning the post of a Head Constable post for every four Constables and one Assistant Sub-inspector for every 12 Constables. The Jharkhand Police with strength of almost 70,000 personnel had similarly planned a six day mass leave in the month of September to push through similar demands but eventually called it off after such threats galvanised senior officers and promises of promotions were made to the whole constabulary.

right to anyone in the country to honour the assassins of an Indian Army General who all his life obeyed the orders of the government and always risked his life to protect the nation. One wonders what would be the stand of the Union Home Ministry if tomorrow some people attempt to make a similar memorial for Osama bin Laden in India or a memorial for the Pakistani terrorists of 26/11 attack, who were eventually gunned down by security forces.

The other key important issue that needs equal deliberation is that of protection of critical infrastructure as well as security of national highways and railways. The critical infrastructure protection is perhaps one of the most decisive aspects of modern day internal security architecture. With time the concept of terror-target has undergone a paradigm shift with non-state and state sponsored actors of terrorism no longer interested in merely striking civilian or military bases but key economic infrastructures which hit a nation harder than anything else. The Home Ministry has gone on record in stating that since 2009 Maoists have been responsible for 1,183 incidents of targeting economic infrastructures which among others include power infrastructure, railways infrastructure, telephone exchanges as well as government establishments including schools and panchayat offices Now that the CRPF, BSF and police are heavily involved in difficult Counter Insurgency operations against the Maoists in dense jungles there is a dire need to switch to a military and inspirational style of leadership from the front. Old managerial styles of leadership will not work anymore in such operations. Is it possible to win the war against terrorism when the concept of freedom in this nation has been taken to such a bizarre level where terrorists of all shades and their sympathisers, talk about their democratic rights to break-up and insult India, even while Indian jawans are beaten to death by foreign miscreants and the Union Home Ministry maintains tacit silence on it? Is it possible to win this war on terror merely by acquiring modern equipment when we witness that the foot soldiers of India’s Central Armed Police Forces like CRPF or BSF and that at the state level, hardly ever find their super senior officers by their side. In April 2010, when 76 Jawans of CRPF were massacred in Dantewada how many senior officers of the rank of IPS were leading such a big contingent in such a treacherous terrain? While it is a norm rather than an exception to see young army officers dying in the war against terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir, it is a rarity to find an IPS officer putting himself in the line of fire in the battlefront by leading his men in the fight against Maoists. On 14th September, 2012, the India Today website published a news article titled ‘Posts lie vacant as IPS Officers prefer easy jobs’ in which it was stated how ‘an overwhelming majority of critical level posts in paramilitary forces remain vacant because of the apparent reluctance of IPS officers to serve in difficult and low key postings.’ The article further stated how in BSF, CRPF and ITBP the vacancy of IPS officers at the level of DIG are between 75 per cent to 90 per cent. No one denies the valour of iconic IPS officers like K Vijay Kumar who just retired as DG of CRPF or K P S Gill and several others, but the likes of them are more of an exception today than the rule. Vijay Kumar made it a norm to spend nights with his jawans in the worst and riskiest of Maoist infested terrain. Very surprisingly, he was not given an extension and wasted out. Not many among his peers do it and there is no denial that a sheer disconnect between the India Police’s leadership and its foot soldiers does exist. In a country where a Constable languishes in the post of a Constable for decades before getting a meagre promotion to the rank of a Head Constable, in a country where the constabulary has to fight it out to get its basic dues, no wonder that 51,000 CAPF personnel have quit in the last five years and prefer to do the job of a private security guard than don the mantle of a frontline soldier in the fight against terrorism. In an article titled ‘Bihar Police: United in khaki, divided by caste barracks‘ published in Indian Express on October 7, 2012, the author quoted a Constable stating , “Has anyone thought that there is a three-acre space for one police officer and another three acres housing 3,000 of us?” This was in reference to the huge bungalows being given to senior officers, who most of the times unfortunately are extremely unaware of the plight that an ordinary Constable goes through. The hapless Constable on the border or the one fighting the Maoists is today the ultimate difference between the failure and success of India in her battle with internal enemies of all shades and colours. For India’s sake it is time to give the constabulary and his immediate officers their due respect and remuneration. He can no more be treated as a beast of burden or a mechanical robot who can be ordered to stay for months in hostile regions of Jammu and Kashmir and then instead of a peacetime posting, is asked to move to the dense forests of Chhattisgarh to fight a 360 degree war 365 days of the year. As per the website of Delhi Police, a Delhi Police Constable with commando training gets a Commando allowance of a mere Rs 100 per month!

On July 9, 2012, Sujan Dutta and Nishit Dholabhai’s article in The Telegraph titled ‘Army tip: Ask IPS officers to fight Maoists’ stated how a senior army officer had told the Union Home Secretary in no uncertain terms to get IPS officers to command battalions and lead from the front in anti-Maoist Operations instead of making them babus behind desks, reflecting the reluctance of Senior Police Officers to lead their men in war against Maoists.

The remedy

And finally, even as India’s war against terror continues with a bloodied nose, the nation is witnessing a new kind of an insult to the soldiers being bestowed by the sympathisers of terrorists. Even as SGPC honours the assassins of General Vaidya, one of the commanders of Operation Blue Star, India’s Union Home Ministry remains a mute spectator with the Home Minister himself stating that it would not intervene in the issue of the making of memorial inside the Golden Temple (Pioneer, 10th October, 2012). One wonders which clause of Indian Constitution gives the

The constabulary’s aspirations and that of the subordinate officers (of the rank of Sub-inspector and Inspector) who become the core of the fighting force, will have to be given due importance. There is no reason why every Constable (and not a mere few) cannot be promoted to a position of a Senior Constable after say five years of service and promoted to a Head Constable after a mandatory 10 years of service and likewise to an Assistant Sub-inspector after 15 years of service. On the contrary, in the present state of affairs, the mandarins of Union Home Ministry

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DISGRACEFUL DISCONNECT have altogether abolished the position of a Senior Constable in the Central Armed Police Forces, which means that a Constable even with a work experience of 10-15 years continues to be called a Constable (Instead of a Senior Constable) and is equated rank-wise with a new recruit. With that kind of experience, an Army Jawan easily makes it to JCO rank while a CAPF Constable continues to remain a Constable devoid of chevrons he rightfully deserves.

There is no reason why a Constable who today has to know the nuances of operating even a mini-UAV and a GPS based hand held device, who has to understand the best of strategies of jungle warfare and border management, would still be considered an unskilled or a semi-skilled labourer and be put at the lowest grade of pay scales. Further, there is no reason why personnel of state level Police Special Forces should not be called Specialists and given special allowance for the extra risk they undertake. There is no reason why every Sub-inspector of armed police or CAPFs cannot be promoted to the level of an Inspector after a mandatory 8-10 years of service and to an Assistant Commandant after say 15 years of service. Rank insignias, chevrons and badges are matters of pride not just for the elite but also for the foot soldiers and that defines their standing in the society and among the peers and juniors. Also there is no reason why commissioned officers of CRPF, BSF, CISF or say ITBP or SSB and the state level police forces would languish at the same post and be deprived of promotions. Ultimately it is these personnel at the rank of Assistant Commandants and Deputy Commandants who form the cutting edge of leadership and if they see that their promotions are being blocked by IPS personnel, then where is the motivation to risk life and fight it out in the uncharted terrains of Dantewada or Bastar. I remember a retired army officer and now a prominent strategic affairs analyst telling me once that the reason why the army man puts his life at stake so willingly is because of the concept of camaraderie that is developed and he knows that in his absence, his regiment would take care of his family forever. Contrast this with the condition of Indian police system. The policeman is not sure if it would be like that if he gives up his life. Does he have the same belief that his senior officers and the ministry would take care of his family in the same manner as is the case with his army counterpart?

The need for organisational reengineering – time for integrated law enforcement agencies While the issue of motivation is of paramount importance, the other key issue is of organisational structure. Even though over the years the concept of terrorism, acts of disruption by non-state actors have become extremely organised, the organisational architecture at hand to deal with the same hasn’t undergone the much needed restructuring. There have been several successes in dismantling terror modules and Maoist camps and no one can deny that the several police personnel work day in and day out to keep the nation as safe as possible. But the moot point is that the mechanism at hand to help them in their endeavour has to be improved further with time. It is surprising that through the Comprehensive Crime Control Act and the Rendition Programme, USA allows its law enforcement agencies to hunt down perpetrators of crime against American citizens anywhere in the world whereas India’s central law enforcement agencies are still not empowered to unilaterally arrest perpetrators of crime against the nation within the country since law and order is a state subject, barring some rights given to NIA.

There is a very strong correlation between organised crime, money laundering, illicit trade and financing of acts of terror. All the more reason why disparate organisations dealing with different kinds of organised crimes have been brought under the aegis of Department of Homeland Security in US In the post 26/11 environment, National Investigation Agency (NIA) was created along with plans for the development of CCTNS, NATGRID and proposed formation of a National Counter Terror Centre. If one looks at any successful counter-terror organisation in the world, its success is always centred around the successful coordination of its three critical pillars of investigation, intelligence and special operations units. If one looks at FBI, it is not only USA’s primary investigation agency but is also one with its own intelligence unit and Special Forces for special pre-emptive operations. A critical component of FBI is its National Security Branch about which the FBI webpage states something very interesting. The page states, “It’s not just a box on the org chart – it’s a way

November 2012 Defence AND security alert

to unite the capabilities of the FBI’s national security operations into a single, seamless force.” Another interesting thing about FBI operations is the way it gives importance to integration of intelligence and investigation. The FBI webpage states, ‘National security and criminal threats are often intertwined. Our ability to integrate intelligence and investigations makes us uniquely situated to address our nation’s threats and vulnerabilities.’ This article is not trying to state that coordination does not happen in India but it is high time that the disparate organisations are integrated into one. It is of paramount importance to integrate NIA with NSG and further bring Intelligence Bureau (IB) under its purview. There is no reason why IB has to continue to be discrete and clandestine. There is no reason why it cannot be under the purview of the Parliament. Surprisingly, NSG was created on the lines of FBI’s Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) but unlike in case of India where we have created disparate organisations, FBI is one and integrated. An integrated NIA, NSG, IB and with an NCTC created under the NIA Act would be far more effective than the disparate way they all operate now. Further, there is a very strong correlation between organised crime, money laundering, illicit trade and financing of acts of terror. All the more reason why disparate organisations dealing with different kinds of organised crimes have been brought under the aegis of Department of Homeland Security in US. Take for example the issues of Customs and Immigration. The issue of illegal entry of contraband products, drugs, counterfeit currencies, weapons as also the illegal entry of foreigners in a country play critical role in endangering the security and sanctity of a nation’s economic and social architecture. In the post 9/11 arena, the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (USICE) was brought into the fold of Department of Homeland Security. Contrast that with the situation in India. Customs is still under the Ministry of Finance and leave alone any synergy and coordination, it is most of the time at loggerheads with Police and other Law Enforcement Agencies. A case in point is the recent friction and alleged tussle between Customs and CISF personnel in Mumbai International Airport, so much so that the airport literally remained unsecured for almost three hours. Each agency in India lives with its own bloated ego and the nation suffers. There is no reason why Customs should continue to be with Finance Ministry instead of Union Home Ministry.

In the last five years an estimated 51,000 personnel from the Central Armed Police Forces have taken premature retirement. Reasons vary from sheer discontentment of job, lack of promotional avenues, indifference of superiors to lack of timely sanction of leave and basic medical facilities Likewise, take the case of immigration. It is an irony that 65 years after independence and in spite of facing numerous terror attacks by cross-border elements in addition to facing major problems due to illegal immigrations, India still does not have a National Immigration Policy. Even an issue as critical as illegal immigration is left to the state governments to handle under the ridiculous aegis of law and order being a state subject. Indeed law and order is a state subject, but can national security be considered a law and order issue? Illegal immigration of millions of Bangladeshis has been responsible for large scale demographic change in border districts of India and it has been witnessed in Assam as well as in West Bengal as to how respective state governments have little incentive to be tough on illegal immigrants. Connivance of the politicians and officials at the lower level makes it very easy for an illegal immigrant to easily and illegally get legal documents to prove that he is an Indian citizen. The large scale violence that rocked Assam in the recent past is a vindication of the tinderbox that India is sitting on, thanks to letting states handle issues as critical as illegal immigration. In August 2012, Additional Sessions Judge Kamini Lau lambasted the government for its laxity in deporting illegal Bangladeshis from India. She stated, “While the genuine citizens of this country continue to suffer in abject poverty, what is it that prevents a firm, resolute and intense government action against these three crore Bangladeshi nationals illegally staying in India, enjoying all benefits which are otherwise the entitlement of citizens.” India does have a Bureau of Immigration under the Union Home Ministry, but it is appalling to witness that they are present only in international airports of India. Does one expect an illegal immigrant to come only through international airports? What about the vast array of borders? The Bureau of Immigration website states that District Superintendent of Police of every district acts as Foreigners Regional Registration Officer. The moot question is where is enforcement of the same? Does the District Superintendent of Police have the time and liberty to run after illegal immigrants? Do the concerned border states take any responsibility when an illegal immigrant enters India through that state’s international border and then slips into a neighbouring state? Where is enforcement of law? Where is proactive pursuit and systematic deportation as well as punishment to illegal immigrants? Even those who have entered India with valid papers continue to stay behind after the lapse of papers and no one bothers because the local police is too busy with local law and order issues to take any more extra burden and there is no central agency to catch the illegal immigrants and deport them. It is no more a secret that Nigerians control a large part of the illegal drugs and cocaine trade in most of India’s metropolitan cities. Does India have any central agency to check this organised racket and bust it? The issue is that there is a limit to how many things that can be left at the mercy of the lackadaisical state governments in the name of federalism. There is much to learn from US as to how to run a federal system. Therefore India desperately needs a National Immigration Policy and Bureau of Immigration needs to be made a national level enforcement agency with respect to dealing with illegal immigrants and having the statutory right to deport them. Likewise, Enforcement Directorate too needs an enforcement role and better coordination with the Ministry of Home Affairs. It is even better if Enforcement Directorate and Central Economic Intelligence Bureau too are brought under the Home Ministry or at least made part of the Multi Agency Centre (MAC) and are given the statutory rights to investigate all cases of money laundering and counterfeit currencies.

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security threat and challenges

DISGRACEFUL DISCONNECT

The urgent need for a national level critical infrastructure protection policy The other key important issue that needs equal deliberation is that of protection of critical infrastructure as well as security of national highways and railways. The critical infrastructure protection is perhaps one of the most decisive aspects of modern day internal security architecture. With time the concept of terror-target has undergone a paradigm shift with non-state and state sponsored actors of terrorism no longer interested in merely striking civilian or military bases but key economic infrastructures which hit a nation harder than anything else. The Home Ministry has gone on record in stating that since 2009 Maoists have been responsible for 1,183 incidents of targeting economic infrastructures which among others include power infrastructure, railways infrastructure, telephone exchanges as well as government establishments including schools and panchayat offices. In the recent crackdown in Karnataka resulting in the arrest of 17 terror suspects, among others, also in their hit list were Kaiga Nuclear Power Plant as well as defence establishments of South India. It is also a known fact that India’s Bhabha Atomic Research Centre as well as key dams like Bhakra Nangal have been in the list of prime targets of Lashkar-e-Taiba for a long time. While India’s airports, nuclear installations and research establishments are fairly well secured, the same cannot be said about Indian Railways which in spite of having a dedicated Railway Protection Force, have often been the victim of turf war between the Railways owned RPF and the Government Railway Police which belongs to the respective state governments. Not a single day goes without an incident of crime of molestation, rape, robbery or blasts in trains or stations. It has become an easy target of the Maoists who at their own will burn down stations, uproot rail tracks, hijack trains and destroy locomotives, while police stations and states keep on fighting as to in whose territory and jurisdiction it actually happened.

It is high time that the disparate organisations are integrated into one. It is of paramount importance to integrate NIA with NSG and further bring Intelligence Bureau (IB) under its purview. There is no reason why IB has to continue to be discrete and clandestine. There is no reason why it cannot be under the purview of the Parliament. Surprisingly, NSG was created on the lines of FBI’s Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) but unlike in case of India where we have created disparate organisations, FBI is one and integrated In spite of being at the receiving end of terrorism for long, India still doesn’t have a Critical Infrastructure Protection Policy. The presumption that only government buildings and government installations sum up the concept of critical infrastructure is fallacious and it is time that a new definition of critical infrastructure is conceived and the government realises that a substantial portion of India’s key economic infrastructure of today is in the joint sector or the private sector and that they need to be protected with same vigour. In spite of the token action of deploying CISF in protecting refineries of Reliance Industries in Jamnagar as well as that of software centres Infosys and a few others, it has to be acknowledged that CISF with a force strength of a little more than 1,25,000 is grossly inadequate to secure every critical infrastructure in the private sector such as steel plants, power plants, refineries, oil pipelines, software centres, research institutions, financial institutions and universities. Today, a terror attack on a major private sector power plant or software park would have the same impact on the nation as it would have been had it been on a governmental installation. Incidentally the two of the four targets of the 26/11 terror attacks were private sector assets, ie the Taj and Oberoi hotels. Even though several of the respective state governments have initiated the process of raising their own state level industrial security forces, it would still never be adequate and at best law enforcement agencies can only come in the aftermath of a terror strike but they can never be the first line of defence for India’s vast array of industries in the private sector. For that, India’s private sector would have to continue depending on private security agencies or raise their own cadre of security officers as is being done by the likes of Reliance Industries Limited. Therefore it is time that India’s Union Home Ministry take the next logical step in terms of allowing select private security agencies of repute to procure small arms for the creation of a practical first line of defence. One cannot expect a private security officer with a metal detector in hand to defend an installation against a barrage of fire from an assault rifle of a terrorist as was witnessed in the case of 26/11. Even a 9 mm pistol, a .38 calibre revolver or a 12 bore pump gun would have given the security personnel some chance of forming a credible resistance against the terrorists. Therefore the need of some legislation to allow the same is paramount. It is quite appalling that when every politician of some standing gets so much security cover, India’s private sector, on whose shoulders, a substantial portion of India’s economy depends, would be denied even the basic security it deserves.

Security eventually has to be a shared responsibility Also, it is important to state that eventually security has to be a shared responsibility and the private sector also has to chip in with its resources in taking the lead to protect its own assets as there is a limit to how much the state can do. Further, there is a strong case for relaxing the archaic rules that prohibit the purchase of guns for self-defence by law abiding citizens in India. In its quest to check the proliferation of small arms, India has created a unique scenario where there are more than 40 million illegal small arms floating around and every crook with a wrong intention has access to an illegally made small arm in the country but a law abiding citizen finds it next to impossible to acquire a licensed gun legally. Security of a nation is not just about securing the nation from terror attacks but about everyday security of its citizens. A glance at the crime statistics put up by National Crime Records Bureau does not show a rosy picture with respect to level of crime that the ‘hapless and unarmed’ common man faces every day. In 2011, there were

November 2012 Defence AND security alert

2,56,329 reported cases of violent crimes in the country and 2,28,650 cases of crimes against women. If not all, at least a substantial portion of the crimes could have been avoided if the hapless common man had some kind of arms to defend himself and his family. It is appalling how much money is spent in this county for the security of the high and mighty and how much Gandhian principles are preached to keep the common man deprived of a simple handgun to protect his loved ones. There is also a strong need to make the common man the eyes and ears of the law enforcement agencies as also there is a pertinent need for the creation of National Resilience. In this respect India would do well to emulate the Project Griffin Model of London Metropolitan Police which has successfully integrated the private sectors and civilians in their Standard Operations Procedure in the eventuality of a terror attack.

Can anything related to national security be termed a law and order issue? And finally, there is a strong need to junk the fallacy of law and order being a state subject and that it is a holy cow which cannot be touched. It is surprising that a nation which talks about federalism still does not have a list of federal crimes which can be investigated by central agencies. Terrorism and organised crime simply cannot be considered as petty law and order problems. The 5th Report of the Second Administrative Reforms Commission has brought out 152 recommendations, which among others have reiterated the need for police reforms, separation of investigation from day to day policing activities. Most importantly, the ARC has come out with two very critical recommendations which can go a long way in improving the internal security environment of India. Recommendation No 139 talks about enacting a law to empower the Union Government to deploy its Forces and to even direct such Forces in case of major public order problems which may lead to the breakdown of the constitutional machinery in state. However, such deployment should take place only after the state concerned fails to act on a ‘direction’ issued by the Union under Article 256 of the Constitution. All such deployments should be only for a temporary period not exceeding three months, which could be extended by another three months after authorisation by Parliament. Such an enactment is extremely important in dealing with menaces like that of Maoism. As of today in spite of the major hype surrounding the Operation Green Hunt, fact remains that each state is fighting its own war against Maoists and calling truce whenever it suits their purpose. There is sheer lack of a coherent national policy and coordination among the states on the same. Maoists take optimum advantage of it by simply slipping into an adjacent state during a police operation in a particular state. The central forces deployed to assist the state police face numerous problems ranging from lack of authority to take decisions to sheer apathy of the authorities. A new law giving the forces more freedom and legal immunity is needed.

There is no reason why Customs should continue to be with Finance Ministry instead of Union Home Ministry The other key recommendation is with respect to the creation of a list of federal crimes which is what India badly needs now. Recommendation No 149 talks about the need to re-examine certain offences which have interstate or national ramification and include them in a new law. Among others, it talks about including the following crimes into the realm of federal crimes: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

Terrorism Acts threatening national security Trafficking in arms and human beings Sedition Major crimes with inter-state ramifications Assassination of (including attempts on) major public figures Serious economic offence

Source: Administrative Reforms Commission Report If these recommendations see the light of the day then perhaps India would not be impeded from taking stern action against those who honour the assassins of an Indian Army General right inside Indian Territory (SGPC’s honouring of the assassins of Gen Vaidya) or directly intervening against state level laws taking whose advantage the jailed Maoist leaders get the benefit of political prisoner by petitioning in High Court in West Bengal. However, given the recalcitrant nature of Indian polity and the way Indian states more often than not behave as a confederation of 28 independent states rather than one nation, it is highly unlikely that the state governments would be willingly giving their tacit approval to such legal reforms even though such laws might help India in its entirety. And last but not the least, the Union Home Ministry needs a dedicated cadre of personnel who understands issues of security in depth. Gone are the days of generalist bureaucrats deciding issues. There is a sheer disconnect between the ground realities of security issues and the way they are perceived from the corridors of New Delhi. Unless that changes, India would continue to remain soft target for terrorists and India’s front line soldiers who risk their lives would continue to feel disgruntled and keep quitting. It’s time India starts acting as one nation instead of 28 disparate states.

November 2012 Defence AND security alert

security threat and challenges

PHYSICAL PROTECTION

S Paul Jeffrey The writer has been Managing Director of Avon Barrier Company for over 16 years. He pioneered Avon Barrier’s crash testing programme, which coincided with the British government’s development of what is now a World recognised standard for impact testing of vehicle barriers – PAS 68. He is a founder member of the PSSA. The PSSA is the trade association for companies involved in the supply of equipment and services designed to provide the highest levels of physical protection for sites and their perimeters from terrorist or criminal attack that involves the use of extreme force or explosives.

Physical security may require more than a single product type and instead may require a combination of several options. With physical protection these may include rising arm barriers, road blockers, sliding armoured gates plus bollards and fencing. Often a combination of product types may be used, especially on larger sites

Crash testing is the only way of proving that a particular product can actually perform how it is intended to in a ‘real life’ situation and although testing obviously adds significantly to the cost of product development, it is a vital consideration

adly we live in a world where advances in technology and our ability to stop terrorism have been matched by a steady escalation of methods and determination of the terrorists themselves. While intelligence and surveillance will always have a vital role to play, determined, vehicle borne terrorist attacks can wreak havoc against unprotected sites or buildings. Therefore, the more determined the terrorist attack, the more determined and comprehensive the deterrent has to be. For potentially vulnerable sites and buildings, physical protection against Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) attacks is an essential consideration for all entrance / egress routes, perimeter access points and other vulnerable points including car parks and storage areas. The days when a manual barrier and a nearby single guard were considered an acceptable defence have long gone. The type of site that may be vulnerable to a potential terrorist attack is increasingly broad and may include many types of public buildings, commercial sites and utilities. Each site will have its own specific requirements and also considerations such as aesthetics, site engineering (whether shallow foundations of surface mounting is required) and both robustness and longevity of any solution, plus the ease of interface with existing, or planned additional security measures such as surveillance and alarm systems. As with other security options, suitability for each situation is a paramount consideration and physical security may require more than a single product type and instead may require a combination of several options. With physical protection these may include rising arm barriers, road blockers, sliding armoured gates plus bollards and fencing. Often a combination of product types may be used, especially on larger sites where different types of access and infrastructure may need protection. These can then be linked back into any central system and integrated with other measures as appropriate, such as certain alarms ‘locking down’ designated entrance points. The second aspect to consider is that any products used are not only of the right type, but also of an appropriate standard. For potential VBIED attack this must mean that products have been suitably crash-tested. The most relevant standard for the Indian marketplace is the UK government developed PAS 68* standards which are similar to United States DoS K12, K8 and K4 specification – now superseded by US ASTM 2656-07.

November 2012 Defence AND security alert

PAS 68 crash-tested sliding and hinged security gates are designed to withstand substantial direct impact forces, such as hostile vehicle attack. The road blockers are designed for ease of installation and include options of a traditional deep blocker, a shallow foundation blocker and a surface mounted blocker, depending on the installation and risk Crash testing is the only way of proving that a particular product can actually perform how it is intended to in a ‘real life’ situation and although testing obviously adds significantly to the cost of product development, it is a vital consideration. Robust physical security measures also send out a very visual signal that can assist in deterring terrorists or indeed anyone else interested in gaining non-authorised access.

CRASH PROOF BARRIERS AGAINST VEHICLE BASED ATTACKS T

he writer considers the growing need for physical protection and looks at the range of options available. Physical protection may include rising arm barriers, road blockers, sliding armoured gates plus bollards and fencing. Often a combination of product types may be used, especially on larger sites. To stop potential Vehicle based IED attacks such barriers must be crash tested. Robust physical security measures also send out a very visual signal that can assist in deterring terrorists or indeed anyone else interested in gaining non-authorised access.

For areas with a high risk of terrorist or hostile attack such delivery areas, service areas or any other area that could cause mass casualty, should an incident occur, then Avon Barrier Company’s high security rising arm barriers have been proven in crash tests to PAS 68, resisting a 7,500 kg truck travelling at 30 / 50 mph. Models in this range include the EB950CR and EB1400CR. The EB950CR Armstrong Security Barrier is proving particularly popular in India thanks to its no-nonsense robust design and cost-effective, yet high level of protection. Currently it is being installed to protect oil refineries, but is suitable for a wide range of applications. With superbly engineered construction using heavy gauge materials the barrier provides a traditional looking deterrent with a special design that means that it can be easily installed with the very minimum of civil engineering works, with shallow mounting (less than 500 mm overall depth required). Security gates provide another measure against a determined aggressive attack and PAS 68 crash-tested sliding and hinged security gates are designed to withstand substantial direct impact forces, such as hostile vehicle attack. The SG1500CR, SG1100CR and GC1100CR PAS 68 High Impact Security Gates provide very robust heavily engineered protection for access routes, yet can also be installed without the need for extensive civil engineering works, due to their shallow footings requirement. Road blockers are designed for ease of installation and include options of a traditional deep blocker, a shallow foundation blocker and a surface mounted blocker, depending on the installation and risk. Again all of these products

have been subjected to a rigorous impact tested programme. Models include the RB780CR, the RB880CR shallow-mounted road blocker and the RB980CR Surface-mounted Road Blocker designed mainly for temporary requirements such as high security control points for conferences or military checkpoints. For more information you can visit http://www.avon-barrier.co.uk/ Many systems are available that are either promoted or considered suitable for use as vehicle security barriers. As their characteristics differ in both function and form,

a comparative means of assessing their performance is required. PAS 68 identifies impact test methods, tolerances, test vehicle type and vehicle performance criteria that need to be met in order to conform to PAS 68. Design guidance for installing barriers is provided in PAS 69:2006.

The EB950CR Armstrong Security Barrier is proving particularly popular in India thanks to its no-nonsense robust design and cost-effective, yet high level of protection. Currently it is being installed to protect oil refineries

PAS 68 cites a classification system for the performance of vehicle security barriers and their supporting foundations when subjected to a single horizontal impact. * What is PAS 68? PAS 68 Impact test specifications for vehicle security barriers: This Publicly Available Specification (PAS) has been prepared by the UK government to address the needs of organisations who want assurance that vehicle security barriers will provide the level of impact resistance they are aiming for.

November 2012 Defence AND security alert

security threat and challenges

R S N Singh The writer is former Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) officer and has authored books on strategic and military aspects.

There is rather heavy reliance on creating and using internal leverages or fifth columnists in this war. These internal leverages are in form of Maoists, jihadis, organisations like SIMI and Popular Front of India, politicians, journalists, media, NGOs, political parties and lawyers. The grant of ‘political prisoner’ status by one of the courts of the country to Maoist terrorists, many of them hardened criminals, has pernicious security portends. The internal facets and the enemies within are now posing serious threat to the very idea of India not only in ideological terms but physical as well

The military can no longer afford to be just prisoners of ‘frontier mentality’ and shy away from this war. In this new kind of war reality it must perform the lead role in dealing with both the internal and external facets, all other agencies should be in the support

PERNICIOUS PREVARICATION

The ‘secure’ space in India is shrinking at a frightening pace. Little economic development is possible in insecure environment. The leaders however fail to conflate security and overall development. Indian decision-makers must realise that today’s wars are not about territory. It is about influence, political manipulations, effecting regime changes, engineering social and economic instability by terror, insurgency and ideological subversion and eventually causing internal collapse of the target country. In the north-east and Kashmir, notwithstanding the ‘peace’ that is rigged from time to time, the existence of insurgency and terrorism has come to be accepted as fait accompli. There is the attitude of diffidence that these areas will continue to be a drag on the Indian economy as the security environment will only oscilliate between low and high, but cannot be favourably altered on an enduring basis. There has never been a decisive, no-nonsense and multi-pronged approach to ‘kill’ the problems. This prevarication is now costing the Indian heartland. More than one-third of the Indian territory is in the grip of Maoist terrorism. The jihadi terrorism has spared no part of India. The growing jihadi and Maoist terror is not due to natural internal momentum, but due to massive external impetus. The distinction between internal and external security threats is getting increasingly blurred. This article takes a fresh look at our Internal Security Scenario.

ith the current personnel strength of approximately 13 lakh, the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) in terms of numbers have outstripped the 11 lakh strong Indian Army. This is unparalleled in genuine democracies. Parallel forces however are unexceptional feature of illiberal regimes or sham democracies in West Asia like Iran, Saudi Arabia, Gulf states, most African countries and Central Asian Republics; the basic reason for this phenomenon being distrust of the rulers of their country’s military. It may be recalled that even in Pakistan the late prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had raised the Federal Security Force, ostensibly to obviate the use of military for internal security and to help civil authority. The Pakistan Army construed the move a ploy to create a personal force as its counterpoise. Bhutto’s attempts to circumscribe the army were defeated when the situation in Balochistan by 1973 became precarious, beyond the capability of police

November 2012 Defence AND security alert

and then the 18,000 personnel Federal Security Force. To save the country from imploding the Pakistan Army had to be deployed. This was a period, wherein the Pakistan Army was still recovering from the defeat by the Indian Army in 1971 war and was paranoid about further vivisection of the country. It had become the whipping post of politicians, particularly Bhutto and certain segments of the population. The deployment in Balochistan, when threat to the integrity of Pakistan became acute, gave an opportunity for the Pakistan Army to salvage its prestige and institutional status. In the Indian context the surpassing of the Indian Army by Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) in terms of numbers is not by conscious design. It is certainly not a deliberate policy to circumscribe or negate the Indian Army. Rather the unbridled expansion of the CAPFs has been a consequence of thoughtless knee-jerk reactions to attacks on security by inimical elements within and outside. Since the increasing numbers have failed to make difference, the paramilitary

THE INTERNAL FRONT

forces are now clamouring for arms and equipment, intrinsic to the professional nature and operational imperatives of the army of any nation. Artillery and air power can never amalgamate with the role and character of the internal security forces, yet there is a persistent demand being placed on the Home Ministry to acquire and equip them with, what they consider as ‘trappings’ of the military. They do not realise that increase in lethality imposes corresponding emphasis on youth, training, organisational structure, operational philosophy, morale and above all leadership. The unbridled accretion in the size of the paramilitary forces nevertheless signifies one truism: internal security threat has become more acute than ‘classical’ or ‘conventional’ external threat. Despite the seemingly inexorable expansion of the internal security forces which includes

the police, the internal security environment continues to get vitiated.

We must remember that Central Armed Police Forces and paramilitary forces are not structured, officered, organised, trained and motivated to take on the proxy soldiers. The failure to accept this truism will continue to claim lives of CAPFs, police and paramilitary personnel

Condemned to suffer? This writer was part of a study team constituted by the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) to make a ground assessment of the Maoist insurgency in India. During the visit to various affected states like Bihar, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, there were extensive interactions with the administration and senior and junior police officers. Each one of

them invariably spoke of the massive ongoing expansion of the police forces, but when posed the pointed question about the time frame within which the Maoist insurgency could be overcome, they were not sanguine that it was possible within a decade. In the north-east and Kashmir, notwithstanding the ‘peace’ that is rigged from time to time, the existence of insurgency and terrorism has come to be accepted as fait accompli. There is the attitude of diffidence that these areas will continue to be a drag on the Indian economy as the security environment will only oscilliate between low and high, but cannot be favourably altered on an enduring basis. There has never been a decisive, no-nonsense and multi-pronged approach to ‘kill’ the problems. This prevarication is now costing the Indian heartland. More than one-third of the Indian territory is in the grip of Maoist terrorism.

November 2012 Defence AND security alert

security threat and challenges The jihadi terrorism has spared no part of India. The growing jihadi and Maoist terror is not due to natural internal momentum, but due to massive external impetus, getting increasingly sophisticated by the day. This impetus, though primarily from Pakistan and China has now attracted other global state and non-state players. Apart from China, there are many other European forces feeding on Maoist terror and the jihadi terror though orchestrated by Pakistan has now in its network other global jihadi organisations. The reverberations of the Rohingya issue on Assam and the linkages of violence in Bombay to the riots in Assam and the implied violence and intimidation on Indian citizens from north-east residing in the heartland of India – are all manifestations of the elaborate jihadi structure created by Pakistan and the global jihadi organisations.

The new war The overwhelming reason for India turning increasingly insecure is our inability to grasp the threat to the country in a comprehensive manner. All countries in the world are endowed with their unique geostrategic and geopolitical setting. This in turn bears on their threat perception, both internal and external. The study and appraisal of security establishments can only be rewarding if it is done in the context of their respective threat perceptions. The security establishment template of USA, which has a benign neighbourhood; or Singapore, a city size island country but situated astride one of the most critical SLOCs ie Malacca Strait cannot be applied

PERNICIOUS PREVARICATION

on India. Nevertheless the response to threats by various countries or their response mechanism should be carefully studied. A timely and bold response will invariably entail few casualties but in the long run it does save many lives and consequently physical and psychological well-being of a country. Some of the responses, worthy of emulation, of various countries on various threats that resonate with Indian experience are being discussed. In the 70s an ultra-leftist group Brigate Rosse in Italy, very much like the Indian Maoists became notorious for kidnappings and assassinations for furtherance of their agenda. In a kidnapping similar to that of the Collector of Sukma in Chhattisgarh, Alex Menon; and earlier of Vineel Krishna, the Collector of Malkangiri in Orissa; the cadres of the Italian outfit kidnapped the former Prime Minister of Italy Aldo Moro and demanded the release of their top leader Renato Curcio. The Italian authorities refused to be blackmailed and Aldo Moro was killed. This killing however robbed the Reds of their mass appeal, bereft of which they were destroyed without much difficulty. Confronted with a situation like the hijacking of IC 814 in December 1999, in 1977 the then West German government, did not yield to the demand of the notorious Baader-Meinhof gang, to release some of its members from jails in exchange for hapless passengers held hostage on-board a Lufthansa Boeing 737 which they had hijacked to Mogadishu. The German response was to launch its anti-terrorist squad GSG9. The passengers were rescued without any civilian casualties. Subsequently the members of the gang were specifically targeted and killed one by one. The American response to 9/11 was Operation Enduring Freedom, to hit the epicentre of jihadi terrorism ie Af-Pak region. With regard to its degree of success there can be any number of opinions but the fact that American homeland territory has since not been successfully targeted by jihadi elements is also a fact. The Americans construed 9/11 as war waged on the US even

November 2012 Defence AND security alert

though there were no state actors directly involved. It went hammer and tongs on indirect facilitators. Pakistan’s airspace was breached and Osama bin Laden finally hunted down and killed. Contrast this to 26/11 attack on Mumbai. At the very outset it was clear that the sponsor was Pakistan state. The responses as cited succeeded because they were military oriented. Israel continues to persist with similar response mechanism.

Apart from aiding Indian Maoists directly and indirectly, China has been using the Maoists in Nepal for securing their geopolitical objectives vis-à-vis India. Following the ostensible split in the Maoist ranks recently, the leader of the break-away group (Nepal Communist Party, Maoist), Mohan Vaidya Kiran visited Beijing. On his return he spoke to the media about the Chinese position on the contentious issue of ‘federalism’ in Nepal. He said ‘’China is not against federalism but is opposed to foreign interference (read India) on issue of federalism.” Subsequently, Vaidya’s party issued a ban order on plying of vehicles with Indian registration numbers and screening of Hindi movies For a very long time the Indian establishment tried to fool its own people by labelling 26/11 as an act of terrorism. It was indeed a war declared on India and did not finish with the neutralisation of the attackers and capture of Ajmal Kasab. The war has not been repudiated or even abated. If it had, Pakistan’s jihadi infrastructure would have been dismantled. Its jihadi tentacles and support structure in India would have collapsed. The Indian sympathisers of jihadi terrorists would have had some sense of remorse and jihadi terrorism would have been on rapid retreat in India. There appears to be however no change in the fundamentalist discourse, in fact it has only become more strident. It was seen in Kokrajhar, it was visible in all its nakedness recently in Mumbai, and it was the acute palpability of the jihadi threat that drove out thousands of our north-east citizens from Pune, Hyedrabad, Bengaluru and Chennai.

The Indian establishment is confounded and does not know how to cope with the situation. It is because the new ‘proxy war’ or ‘asymmetrical warfare’ is designed exactly to paralyse ‘decision-making’ and the security structure of the target country. Depending on the constantly shifting imperatives and strategic compulsions of the aggressor, it is calibrated, ranging from Mumbai type attack on the high-end, Parliament type attack at mid-level and simmering terrorism at the low-end. The Indian response to the attack on Parliament which stopped on the threshold of Operation Parakram is classic example of ‘threshold paralysis’ that ‘proxy war’ can inflict.

These ultra-leftist groups have been conducting meets in Europe in support of Peoples War in India being waged by the Indian Maoists. These are attended by the Maoists leaders, sympathisers and benefactors of the Indian Maoists It should be remembered the proxy soldiers of Pakistan and China in India have military underpinnings as they are trained, indoctrinated, equipped and orchestrated by the indulgence of the respective Military-Intelligence establishment of the two countries wherein the emphasis is on ‘war’, ‘destruction’ and ‘martyrdom’. This begs military rather than paramilitary response.

but physical as well. The crying imperative now is that this war within the Indian territory is snuffed, something which the military is best trained and equipped for. The military can no longer afford to be just prisoners of ‘frontier mentality’ and shy away from this war. In this new kind of war reality it must perform the lead role in dealing with both the internal and external facets, all other agencies should be in the support. The new war is beginning to dawn on the military establishment and indeed there is now some appreciation of the genuine possibility of ‘three front situation’ ie China, Pakistan and the internal front – all being activated simultaneously. This threat is a reality, but, is yet to be realised by the wider security establishment and the decision-makers.

Threat to India The threat map in respect of India portrays the overall internal and external security situation obtaining in

the country. India straddles between two belligerent nuclear states, ie a failed or failing or ‘terrorist state’ Pakistan and ruthlessly ambitious and paranoid China in the north-west and north-east respectively. Both the inimical states have significant conventional military capability as well as strategic weapons in form of nuclear assets and missiles. With the robust and strategically ruthless pursuit of infrastructure development in Tibet, which includes the Tibet Railway, highways, airports; there is a corresponding military build-up, in real terms as well as in capability. The recent military exercises conducted in Tibet by the PLA and PLAAF betray an unprecedented military accent.

There are also reports about emerging links between the Indian Maoists and Dawood gang at the behest of the ISI. Reportedly Dawood Ibrahim has solicited Maoist indulgence for making in-roads into the illegal mining industry areas in India

This calibrated war, which seeks to restrict the Indian strategic manoeuvre space by nuclear and conventional military muscle flexing or perceived deterrence, has external and internal facets, but with rapidly increasing overlap. There is rather heavy reliance on creating and using internal leverages or fifth columnists in this war. These internal leverages are in form of Maoists, jihadis, organisations like SIMI and Popular Front of India, politicians, journalists, media, NGOs, political parties and lawyers. The grant of ‘political prisoner’ status by one of the courts of the country to Maoist terrorists, many of them hardened criminals, has pernicious security portends. The internal facets and the enemies within are now posing serious threat to the very idea of India not only in ideological terms

November 2012 Defence AND security alert

security threat and challenges It is in the shadow and comfort of conventional military strength and nuclear weapons that China has been aiding and abetting the Indian Maoists and insurgent groups in the north-east and Pakistan, depending on the international environment, has been unleashing the Jihadis from its territory, or activating them in India, or both. It is rather China, which by conscious anti-India strategic design, invested in upgrading Pakistan’s current proxy war capability by surreptitious supply of missile and military nuclear capability. As a result the proxy war recruits of the two countries, who were limited to some geographical areas, have now spread to the extent that some observers have begun to express deep concerns beyond just the psychological integrity of India.

Antony Shimray, the nephew of NSCN-IM General Secretary T Muivah, who was apprehended by the security authorities in October 2010, revealed the extensive linkages between China and NSCN-IM and other insurgent and terrorist groups in India including the Maoists Gen Shankar Roy Chowdhury, the former Chief of Army Staff says that Nepal Maoist party has become the proxy for China and there are possibilities of Indian Maoists becoming the proxy for external forces. “Left Wing Extremism offers the most attractive high-value low-cost strategic option for external exploitation. Rest assured: Pakistan, Bangladesh and perhaps even ‘Maobadi Nepal’ – as a proxy for the People’s Republic of China – are eyeing it very closely indeed.” 1 Mr P Chidambaram, as Union Home Minister, probably due to diplomatic reasons did not want to name China directly but did concede in the Parliament that Maoists and ULFA are purchasing weapons from Chinese smugglers based in Yunan province of China. He commented: “Most of the weapons, seized from the insurgents carry Chinese mark”. Antony Shimray, the nephew of NSCN-IM General Secretary T Muivah, who was apprehended by the security authorities in

PERNICIOUS PREVARICATION

October 2010, revealed the extensive linkages between China and NSCN-IM and other insurgent and terrorist groups in India including the Maoists.

The new war is beginning to dawn on the military establishment and indeed there is now some appreciation of the genuine possibility of ‘three front situation’ ie China, Pakistan and the internal front – all being activated simultaneously There are number of evidences regarding the coalescence of the proxy wars being waged by China and Pakistan respectively. As per The Asian Age dated 01 March 2012 (Intelligence reveals ISI-Naxal link) the ISI was using Bangladesh based operatives to establish links with the Indian Maoists and ULFA leader Paresh Barua had played the key role in bringing them into direct contact. For sophisticated arms, the Maoists, as per Intelligence agencies, are heavily dependent on the ULFA’s international procurement network. The report further states that the ISI has urged the Maoists to target infrastructure projects and industrial units in the Indian hinterland. The Maoists on their part had pleaded for supply of sophisticated arms and explosives particularly RDX. Two important leaders of the Manipur based People's Liberation Army (PLA) N Dilip Singh and Arun Kumar Singh Salam were apprehended in October 2011. During their interrogation, they revealed that the plans to form a ‘Strategic United Front’, comprising the various militant outfits in Jammu and Kashmir and the north-east and the Maoists. Such a front is not possible without collaboration between the Chinese Intelligence and Pak ISI. The recent capture of arms in September this year, ie 98 pistols, 10 AK-47 and 2 assault rifles (all of Chinese make), by the Indian Army in Keran sector of Jammu and Kashmir establishes China-Pakistan link in the ongoing proxy war against India. There are also reports about emerging links between the

Indian Maoists and Dawood gang at the behest of the ISI. Reportedly Dawood Ibrahim has solicited Maoist indulgence for making in-roads into the illegal mining industry areas in India. The arrows and dots of concern ie Maoist terror, Jihadi terror, insurgencies in Kashmir and the north-east and fundamentalist threat emanating from Bangladesh (see ‘threat map’) are rushing to ride on each other, thus generating an unprecedented destabilising churning force. It is evident that the threat from internal and external inimical forces is becoming seamless. The so far acceptable line between ‘law and order’ and ‘internal security’ and ‘external threat’ has almost disappeared.

It should be remembered the proxy soldiers of Pakistan and China in India have military underpinnings as they are trained, indoctrinated, equipped and orchestrated by the indulgence of the respective Military-Intelligence establishment of the two countries wherein the emphasis is on ‘war’, ‘destruction’ and ‘martyrdom’. This begs military rather than paramilitary response

Tapping into proxy war Maoist terror has regional and international linkages. The regional activities and support structure is coordinated by the organisations Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties of South Asia (CCOMPOSA), which as the name suggests, comprises Maoist outfits in Asian countries, ie India, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. The Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (RIM) whose Headquarter is based in Chicago, in the US is one of the major benefactors of ultra-leftist groups active in Asia which significantly includes Nepal, India, Afghanistan and Iran. Possibly the US authorities view this organisation as a tool to influence regimes or carry out regime changes in target countries. This should partly explain the frequent visits of otherwise rabid anti-US Indian Maoist sympathisers to that country.

1. Gen Shankar Roy Chowdhury (retd), “To combat Red Terror, Tackle its Root Causes”, The Asian Age, April 21, 2009.

November 2012 Defence AND security alert

While the regional support frame work of the Maoists is well known, its European support structure has either been dismissed or ignored. The Maoists Communist Party, Manipur in a press release on 09 December 2011 revealed the support by various ultra-leftist outfits based in Philippines, Malaysia, European countries and Canada. The various ultra-leftist outfits aiding and abetting the Maoists in India are Association for Proletarian Solidarity, Italy (ASP), Communist Party of Philippines (CPP), Maoists Communist Party of France (MCPF), Partito Comunista maoista (PCm) Italia, Party of the Committees to Support Resistance for Communism (CARC), Revolutionary Communist Party, Canada (PCR-RCP), and Struggling Socialist Union, Italy (SLL). This explains the visit of a delegation from the European Commission to witness the trial of Binayak Sen. This also explains the kidnappings (allegedly staged) of two Italians Paolo Bousco (58) and Claudio Colangelo (61). Paolo has been trekking in Orissa for many years. Both the Italians had gone to Orissa jungles despite travel advisory by their government. Both were abducted from the Kandhamal area where most Maoist terrorists are Panna caste Christians and the Maoist discourse in the region has strong Church and anti-Hindu elements. In April 2012 nine French tourists were deported from Bihar as their activities in the interior of the state betrayed Maoist links. These ultra-leftist groups have been conducting meets in Europe in support of Peoples War in India being waged by the Indian Maoists. These are attended by the Maoists leaders, sympathisers and benefactors of the Indian Maoists. The circular / invitation for the latest meet to be held in Germany is given on the next page. Apart from aiding Indian Maoists directly and indirectly, China has been using the Maoists in Nepal for securing their geopolitical objectives vis-à-vis India. Following the ostensible split in the Maoist ranks recently, the leader of the breakaway group (Nepal Communist

Party, Maoist), Mohan Vaidya Kiran visited Beijing. On his return he spoke to the media about the Chinese position on the contentious issue of ‘federalism’ in Nepal. He said ‘’China is not against federalism but is opposed to foreign interference (read India) on issue of federalism.” Subsequently, Vaidya’s party issued a ban order on plying of vehicles with Indian registration numbers and screening of Hindi movies. Fuelling and feeding on the ISI sponsored proxy war jihadi terror are fundamentalist groups in Bangladesh and Wahabi groups drawing sustenance from Saudi Arabia. The Saudi Arabian footprints were quite conspicuous in the violence by Rohingyas in Myanmar. The Wahabi discourse emanating from Saudi Arabia and its concomitant jihadi factor owing allegiance to groups based in Bangladesh and Pakistan was quite pronounced in Kokrajhar and then in Mumbai, Pune, Hyderabad and Bengaluru. The jihadi frenzy witnessed in India travelled to Bangladesh and recently consumed nearly a dozen Buddhist temples in the Cox’s Bazar area. It was allegedly an act of religious vendetta by Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. A large number of Indian Muslims going to the Gulf for work return indoctrinated and imbued in Jihad. Global jihad has indeed engulfed the entire Indian subcontinent.

In the Indian context the surpassing of the Indian Army by Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) in terms of numbers is not by conscious design. It is certainly not a deliberate policy to circumscribe or negate the Indian Army. Rather the unbridled expansion of the CAPFs has been a consequence of thoughtless knee-jerk reactions to attacks on security by inimical elements within and outside. Since the increasing numbers have failed to make difference, the paramilitary forces are now clamouring for arms and equipment, intrinsic to the professional nature and operational imperatives of the army of any nation

Feeding on the Maoist terror are also elements pretending to be part of the electoral politics of India. In reality these are different routes to the same objective of capturing state power. This explains the deafening silence or ambivalence of CPM and CPM (ML) whenever there are terrorist attacks by the Maoists. Their common controller and benefactor China is not averse to the internecine struggle between the three because in its reckoning while all the routes complement, the route which circumstances favour, will assume the lead role and succeed. It is for this reason that there is never a hint of condemnation by the CPM, or CPI (ML) or the Maoists even in the face of most blatant inimical posturing by China against India. For Capitalist China, communism only remains a strategic tool for proxy war! There are also political outfits tapping into Jihadi terror as well as Maoist terror. At least leaders of two political parties campaigned with Osama bin Laden look-alike during elections in Bihar, thus fanning the Jihadi discourse. In Jharkhand one segment of the ruling segment owes half its seats to the Maoists. Proxy War therefore is subverting Indian democracy.

Conclusion The ‘secure’ space in India is shrinking at a frightening pace. Little economic development is possible in insecure environment. The leaders however fail to conflate security and overall development. Indian decision-makers must realise that today’s wars are not about territory. It is about influence, political manipulations, effecting regime changes, engineering social and economic instability by terror, insurgency and ideological subversion and eventually causing internal collapse of the target country and making it untenable in its existing form. This method of war called ‘proxy war’ or ‘asymmetrical war’ has the advantage of being calibrated by diplomacy, is cost effective and does not invite international opprobrium and sanctions. It is not limited by frontiers and geography. Most vitally, it affords ‘deniability’.

November 2012 Defence AND security alert

security threat and challenges

PERNICIOUS PREVARICATION

The proxy soldiers are liberally funded, supplied with sophisticated arsenal and trained in a progressive military manner. The Internal Security Forces of the targeted country will always be outdone by the proxy soldiers in these aspects. Since the level of proxy war emanates from degree of conventional capability and perceived nuclear deterrence, it is the military of the targeted country which has to provide the leadership in the armed response of the state to the internal facet of the war as well. We must remember that Central Armed Police Forces and paramilitary forces are not structured, officered, organised, trained and motivated to take on the proxy soldiers. The failure to accept this truism will continue to claim lives of CAPFs, police and paramilitary personnel. In the ultimate analysis terror and instability will grow till it creates the situation of implosion of the state. The Military was employed soon after Independence to crush the violent communist uprising in the Telangana region, to assimilate some recalcitrant princely states and to liberate Goa. If the Military was the chief instrument for building the Independent Indian nation state why is there such heavy reluctance to use it for its preservation when the fissiparous forces are shrinking the secure space in the country at such a rapid pace and the Internal Security Forces are unable to arrest the momentum?

November 2012 Defence AND security alert

security threat and challenges

URBAN SECURITY

Nitin Gokhale The writer, a journalist with 28 years of experience behind him in various conflict theatres, is currently NDTV's Security and Strategic Affairs Editor.

WHY INDIA’S MEGA CITIES NEED TO BE PROTECTED "The police stations in the country are, today, virtually unconnected islands. Thanks to telephones and wireless and especially thanks to mobile telephones, there is voice connectivity between the police station and senior police officers, but that is about all. There is no system of data storage, data sharing and accessing data. There is no system under which one police station can talk to another directly. There is no record of crimes or criminals that can be accessed by a Station House Officer, except the manual records relating to that police station. – Home Minister P Chidambaram in 2009.

ndia’s homeland security agencies, which primarily consist of the paramilitary forces, state and central police forces and the intelligence agencies, are likely to spend over US$ 7.5 billion and state governments close to US$ 2 billion on the modernisation of their police and paramilitary organisations in the next 3-5 years. A huge market exists but unless a proper road map and strict deadlines to implement the plans evolve, no amount of good intention is likely to make India secure.

A correct mix of Tech-int (technology-based intelligence) and Hum-int (human intelligence) is required to prevent terrorist attacks anywhere. Indian agencies have so far been pre-dominantly dependent on human intelligence but slowly, technical intelligence is being given equal if not more importance. According to the South Asian Terrorism Portal between 1994 and May 2012, over 61,000 people including civilians, security personnel and terrorists, have died in violence in India. That’s on an average 5,000 people dying violently in a year! Apart from the human lives lost, terrorism takes a heavy toll on the burgeoning Indian economy

Proliferation of slums, gridlocked roads, creaking infrastructure for civic services, all combine to create a nightmarish situation for security managers. When cities grow, crimes increase exponentially since governments normally take time to rise to the challenge

November 2012 Defence AND security alert

security threat and challenges

ven the voice connectivity that the Home Minister spoke about collapsed when three bombs went off in a matter of 30 minutes in crowded areas of Mumbai in July 2011. Telephone and mobile lines, overloaded with panicky calls, froze. So much so that key decision-makers in the Mumbai metropolitan area, from the Chief Minister downwards, could not communicate with each other for over 15 minutes (http://www.firstpost. com/fwire/could-not-reach-topofficers-for-15-mins-after-blastchavan-42236.html) in the immediate aftermath of the blasts. This incident brought home, starkly, the shortcomings in India’s policing infrastructure: Communication equipment remains outdated; mobility is severely hampered; preventive and pre-emptive measures against a terrorist attack are virtually non-existent. That there are massive challenges to India’s internal security – aided by external factors – is now a well-known fact. What is not common knowledge however is that the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) has been making deliberate and concerted efforts to plug the very obvious gaps in the security architecture of the country. However given the size, diversity and myriad nature of threats that exist in India, the MHA and various organisations under it have a mammoth task ahead to secure the country. So what are the main challenges that MHA faces? Consider this: India is confronted by Externally-sponsored jihad Internal armed campaign (Maoist activities) Secessionist movements

and

ethnic

Growing economic power and rapid urbanisation Clashes brought about by climate change, water shortage While India has had reasonable success in confronting the

URBAN SECURITY

secessionist, ethnic movements in the north-east and in Kashmir, the externally-sponsored jihadi threat in India’s biggest cities is emerging as the greatest challenge for the security managers. The jihadi elements are a more potent threat for two reasons: One, they have linkages across continents and certainly across Asia, are technology-savvy, are well-funded and their target is India’s big metropolises.

India has had reasonable success in confronting the secessionist, ethnic movements in the north-east and in Kashmir, the externally-sponsored jihadi threat in India’s biggest cities is emerging as the greatest challenge for the security managers. The jihadi elements are a more potent threat for two reasons: One, they have linkages across continents and certainly across Asia, are technology-savvy, are well-funded and their target is India’s big metropolises Rapid, unplanned and un-regulated urbanisation across India has led to haphazard, clumsy growth of urban centres. At the same time, the big cities are engines of growth for the country’s economy. Several studies, surveys and analyses have confirmed this trend. A World Bank study on India’s Urbanisation said: “India’s towns and cities make a major contribution to the country’s economy. With less than 1/3 of India’s people, its urban areas generate over 2/3 of the country’s GDP and account for 90 per cent of government revenues.” Another report in 2008 by the Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India had predicted: “The contribution of urban population to national GDP is likely to register a growth of 16 per cent and touch 70 per cent by 2012.” The Planning Commission too estimates that over 590 million people will be living in urban areas by 2030. With at least half a dozen cities – Mumbai, Kolkata, Delhi, Chennai, Hyderabad and Bangalore – set to have population in excess of 10 million. Very impressive numbers by any standard. However,

November 2012 Defence AND security alert

there is a downside to this rapid growth.

Given the size, diversity and myriad nature of threats that exist in India, the MHA and various organisations under it have a mammoth task ahead to secure the country City planners have estimated that over a quarter of the population in the mega cities will live in slums and will be deprived of basic amenities like potable water, proper sewage system, roads and electricity. Add to this un-checked growth of private vehicles, leading to gridlocked roads in peak hours. Transport experts have predicted that India’s rapid urban growth will lead to a situation where commuters using the roads might take up to 3 hours to reach their destinations during peak traffic hours. Proliferation of slums, gridlocked roads, creaking infrastructure for civic services, all combine to create a nightmarish situation for security managers. When cities grow, crimes increase exponentially since governments normally take time to rise to the challenge. So what are the vulnerabilities in big cities? And how do governments hope to tackle them?

to India introduced a paradigm shift in terror tactic that has been bleeding India time and again for the past two decades.

In fact funds are not a problem. An effective road map for strengthening internal security is Jaipur, Surat, Bangalore, Ahmedabad, Pune, Mumbai, Delhi … the list reads like a who’s who of Indian cities. The figures are staggering. According to the South Asian Terrorism Portal (satp.org) between 1994 and May 2012, over 61,000 people including civilians, security personnel and terrorists, have died in violence in India. That’s on an average 5,000 people dying violently in a year! Apart from the human lives lost, terrorism takes a heavy toll on the burgeoning Indian economy.

Terrorism is therefore clear and present danger for an India that is economically growing faster than most of the world and is poised to become a regional power in the next decade. Thus the government’s first priority is to evolve a meaningful, effective counter-terrorism strategy. At the centre of this strategy is the security of 10 big cities. So what constitutes protection of cities and mega cities? Ever since the 9/11 incident forced a paradigm shift in the concept of securing urban areas, security mandarins have grappled with conflicting ideas to evolve a workable counter-terrorism model.

For example an estimate by Asian Economy Institute in the immediate aftermath of the Mumbai attack of November 2008 said, the

In 2006-07, MHA designated seven urban areas – Mumbai, Kolkata, Delhi, Chennai, Hyderabad and Bangalore and Ahmedabad – as mega cities in need of a special security grid. Thus Mega City Policing is built around four major components as illustrated below.

Indian Economy took a hit of over US$ 100 billion during the three days that the Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorists held the city and indeed India to ransom.

A correct mix of Tech-int (technology-based intelligence) and Hum-int (human intelligence) is required to prevent terrorist attacks anywhere. Indian agencies have so

far been pre-dominantly dependent on human intelligence but slowly, technical intelligence is being given equal if not more importance. Under the MHA’s Mega City Policing scheme coupled with city-specific plans, new technical gadgets and schemes are being included in the plans. Financial assistance is given to mega cities for procurement of modern and innovative equipment like Night Vision Devices, GPS / GIS for dial 100 system and patrol cars, surveillance camera systems, CCTV systems, security equipment like portable X-ray machines, vehicle scanner, vehicle number plate identification system, cyber patrol and communication monitoring system, integrated GIS based automated vehicle tracking and management system etc. The Mega Cities are asked to prepare individual, city-specific plans for consideration of the government every year. The Plan should be based

Till two decades ago, the biggest threat in Indian cities was limited to ethnic or communal flare ups. Riots of the kind that happened in Ahmedabad, Meerut, Kolkata, Bhiwandi between Hindus and Muslims and in Delhi between Sikhs and Hindus were the main law and order challenges faced by Indian policemen.

Turning point The serial bomb blasts in Mumbai in March 1993 and the subsequent riots thereafter completely transformed the security landscape in India. Terror had arrived big time in India. The modus operandi adopted by the new perpetrators of violence was something that was unknown to the Indian security apparatus. RDX was used for the first time. The well-entrenched local mafia network actively supported, funded and armed by an external agency inimical

on a study on specific problem areas of Mega City Policing including details of demographic growth pattern, special problems faced in policing in large urban areas and crime

November 2012 Defence AND security alert

security threat and challenges investigation, traffic management, infrastructure available in terms of modern control rooms, digital radio trunking, communication system, PCR van network etc.

integration also needs to extend to back-end applications such as e-governance systems and other online and IT systems.

Therefore, the crucial equipment that the government is looking for is in two areas: Pre-event and post-event.

The Home Ministry has, since 2009 consistently increased the budget for internal security and specifically for modernisation of police forces. However tardy and sometimes indifferent implementation by state governments has created gaps in India’s preparedness for internal security.

For surveillance needs Sensor technologies Dedicated communication network for all stakeholders Wired and wireless IP video Mega pixel cameras, IR cameras, thermal cameras Access control, induction loop sensors Video wall, video analytics Fire detectors, movement detectors, vibration detectors IR barrier, RF barrier etc. Each of these sensors provides unique data / images that can be combined in different ways to get a comprehensive image / data source of the situation or area being surveyed.

For post-disaster contingency Bomb detection and disposal equipment, explosives detectors, deep search metal detectors Protection equipment Disaster management equipment Sub-surface imaging systems, blast guard barrier systems Bomb resistant trash receptacles and bulletproof vehicles Under solutions.

vehicle

surveillance

MHA has recognised that seamless integration of the different components of a security system is essential to obtain maximum efficiency and effectiveness. The

security threat and challenges

URBAN SECURITY

Under the MHA’s Mega City Policing scheme coupled with city-specific plans, new technical gadgets and schemes are being included in the plans. Financial assistance is given to mega cities for procurement of modern and innovative equipment like Night Vision Devices, GPS / GIS for dial 100 system and patrol cars, surveillance camera systems, CCTV systems, security equipments like portable X-ray machines, vehicle scanner, vehicle number plate identification system, cyber patrol and communication monitoring system, integrated GIS based automated vehicle tracking and management system etc In April 2012, then Home Minister P Chidambaram told a Chief Ministers conference: “Modernisation of Police Force (MPF) scheme was allotted Rs 1,111 crore in 2011-12, but we had to surrender Rs 311 crore because some states had large unspent balances. For the current year, we have been able to secure Rs 900 crore and I would urge state governments to address the deficiencies in the implementation of the scheme to help me request the Finance Minister for more funds.” In fact funds are not a problem. An effective road map for strengthening internal security is. Some elements are in place. For example, the Multi Agency Centre (MAC) and the Subsidiary MACs at the state capitals. NATGRID is

November 2012 Defence AND security alert

WEAPONRY UPGRADATION

Rohit Singh The writer is an Associate Fellow at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi.

work in progress. CCTNS (Crime and Criminal Tracking Network and Systems), under implementation since 2010, has reached the crucial milestone of selection of System Integrator, but only 16 out of 35 States / UTs have completed the task. On the other hand, the development of Core Application Software (CAS) has been completed, field testing is underway and agreements have been signed to establish nation-wide connectivity. The Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), India’s highest decision-making body for security-related matters had approved a Rs 8,500 crore plan to revamp the country’s maritime security architecture. It had identified that for effective coastal security, India requires maritime patrol boats, ferries, fast attack vessels, maritime surveillance systems and equipment, access control systems, biometric systems, CCTV equipment, thermal imaging system, explosives detection equipment, radar systems, screening technologies, cameras, X-ray body scanners and baggage scanners, early warning systems, identification systems, transponders etc. In short, India’s homeland security agencies, which primarily consist of the paramilitary forces, state and central police forces and the intelligence agencies, are likely to spend over US$ 7.5 billion and state governments close to US$ 2 billion on the modernisation of their police and paramilitary organisations in the next 3-5 years. A huge market exists but unless a proper road map and strict deadlines to implement the plans evolve, no amount of good intention is likely to make India secure.

Central Armed Police Force Modernisation

he government of India is poised to invest approximately US$ 30 billion in the period upto 2016-17. This money is being pumped into the modernisation of Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) and the state police. The CAPFs should aim towards achieving a younger and more agile human resource which is able to optimally utilise new weaponry among its ranks. At the same time, the CAPFs should avoid blindly aping each other in weapons procurement. Each force should streamline its role and tasks and procure weapons and equipment required for that specific task only. The desire should not be to procure a particular weapon just because another force has it. As thousands of crores will be spent on modernisation of CAPFs in the coming years, the Ministry of Home Affairs could consider establishing a centralised procurement directorate for all CAPFs to streamline the procurement process. This would ensure that the forces get only those weapons which they can best utilise for their operations and avoid duplication. A case in point is the Tavor assault rifle. With most forces firing just 20 rounds a year as practice ammunition, such high rate automatic firing rifles will only result in wastage of ammunition.

While it is an imperative for security forces to keep pace with the fast-paced revolution in military affairs to remain relevant in the modern-day battlefield, over-reliance on technology could prove counter-productive. The man behind the machine is more important. Therefore, it is necessary that the training modules of the CAPFs are designed to embrace new weapons and technology. The CAPFs should aim towards achieving a younger and more agile human resource which is able to optimally utilise new weaponry among its ranks. At the same time, the CAPFs should avoid blindly aping each other in weapons procurement. Each force should streamline its role and tasks and procure weapons and equipment required for that specific task only. The desire should not be to procure a particular weapon just because another force has it. As thousands of crores will be spent on modernisation of CAPFs in the coming years, the Ministry of Home Affairs could consider establishing a centralised procurement directorate for all CAPFs to streamline the procurement process

November 2012 Defence AND security alert

security threat and challenges

ue to the fragile internal security scenario obtaining in India with ongoing i n s u r g e n c i e s / terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir, the north-east and the Maoist insurgency in huge chunks of the Indian heartland, the government of India is poised to invest approximately US$ 30 billion in the period upto 2016-17. This money is being pumped into shoring up security equipment to harden vulnerable areas and points but the major chunk of this expenditure will target the modernisation of Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) and the state police. Already for the current fiscal a whopping Rs 4,600 crore was released for CAPFs modernisation to include Rs 2,485 crore for purchase of arms and ammunition and equipment and Rs 2,128 crore for land acquisition and building Border Outposts (Posts) of the CAPFs. The list is wide-ranging and panders to the requirement of the complete spectrum of Central Armed Police Forces. If the NSG has been sanctioned money to purchase modern armour, thermal imaging, light-weight bulletproof jackets, fire-resistant overalls, night vision device, body-wearable computers, modern communications system including GPS, high-precision and light weight weapons for varying ranges including guns that can shoot across corners for 1,600 (to be raised) ultra-modern commandos, then the CRPF is scouting for advanced versions of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The BSF, in turn, is surveying the market to purchase utility helicopters for logistic and operational sustenance as the entire Dhruv fleet was grounded after several mishaps. Various users have learnt it the hard way. If the NSG found the communications system it used in 26/11 cumbersome, in which commandos used equipment such as hand-held radios for communication which meant one of their hands was pre-occupied, the CRPF found the Netra UAVs unable to penetrate the dense jungle foliage. The CRPF, therefore, is engaged, currently, in raising an air surveillance unit with UAV; to function in windy and rainy conditions; have capacity to be deployed within an hour of an operation being planned; a system which cannot be hacked with low

WEAPONRY UPGRADATION

heat and noise and radar signatures to avoid detection and engagement. But, in essence, irrespective of some peculiar needs all police organisations are looking to bolster their Intelligence acquisition, surveillance, communication and fire power capabilities.

effectively in Built-up Areas as also jungles. Generally having effective ranges upto 1100 m, the Northrop Grumman AN/PVS-10 day/night long range sniper rifle is available both in 8.5 magnification model for 7.62 mm rifles and a 12.2 x variant for 12.7 mm weapons.

Purchases made must not be mindless and must be dictated by peculiar geographical / terrain / threat based considerations. While the list is exhaustive, some planning considerations and choice of weapon / equipment are enumerated below.

Automatic Grenade Launcher-30: It can neutralise a terrorist upto 800 meters.

Unrestricted modernisation of these forces should not lead to a situation where they resemble the army in weapons and equipment holding. This would not only erode the elite value of the army but also lead to a situation where the CAPFs end up possessing weapons which they are unable to handle or are not required for their tasks. A case in point is the increasing tendency among some of the CAPFs, especially the CRPF and BSF to procure the Tavor-21 Assault Rifle currently in use by the Indian Special Forces for selectively equipping some of their units. It remains to be seen whether specialised units such as the CoBRA battalions of the CRPF have yet fully blooded themselves in extreme close-quarter combat situations and special operations

Fire power Counter Insurgency and Counter Terrorism Operations must be dictated by minimum collateral damage and minimum use of force. Some of the weapons of choice are: Under Barrel Grenade Launcher (UBGL): It can be attached to AK-47 series of weapons to be used effectively in jungles and built-up areas. Multi Grenade Launcher (MGL): Engaging targets at 400 m in a killing area of the type of ammunition fired by it includes HE, HEAT, incendiary riot control, smoke and target markers. Sniper

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Rifle:

Can

used

Pump Action Shot Gun: To cause casualties to fleeing terrorists, these are very handy weapons and prevent collateral damage especially in a Built-up Area environment. Having an effective range of 100 meters, these can be used from the hip carrying position and cover larger areas. Uses of weapon lasers, tracer bullets, searchlights, smoke grenades are useful in Built-up Areas to prevent civilian casualties. There may be a case to replace the current INSAS series of assault rifles. Following systems of Small Arms may be studied: Heckler & Koch

Germany

Beretta

Italy

Colt

USA

Swiss Arms

Switzerland

IWI

Israel

Steyr

Austria

Barrett

USA

US Ordnance

USA

Non-lethal weapons Particularly useful in Built-up Areas and as seen during the stone-pelting seasons in Jammu and Kashmir, some of the non-lethal weapons of choice are: Rubberised Bullets: Can be fired from almost all calibres of small arms for crowd control without causing fatalities. Stun Grenade MK-III Naoqposh: Acts as an early warning device to guard against sneak attacks by terrorists. On being initiated, this device explodes with a resounding bang and blinding flash, temporarily immobilising the attacker and

providing early warning to the Security Forces. Stun Munitions: Fired from a conventional gas gun from a distance of 100 metres, these munitions are non-fragment, non-concussion exploding with a flash and bang non-plussing the attacker. Useful in 26/11 type situations. Tear Smoke Munitions: CS (Ortho Chlorobenzylidene Milano Nitride) filled munitions are many times more effective than the present times CN (Chloro Acetophenone) munition causing temporary blindness, useful for crowd control.

NSG has been sanctioned money to purchase modern armour, thermal imaging, light-weight bulletproof jackets, fire-resistant overalls, night vision device, body-wearable computers, modern communications system including GPS, high-precision and light-weight weapons for varying ranges including guns that can shoot across corners for 1,600 (to be raised) ultra-modern commandos, then the CRPF is scouting for advanced versions of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The BSF, in turn, is surveying the market to purchase utility helicopters for logistic and operational sustenance as the entire Dhruv fleet was grounded after several mishaps

UAVs Man portable (by 2-3 persons) mini and micro UAVs ought to be the weapon of choice. Whereas the mini UAV has a range of 60 km, weighing 40 kg, 4 hours endurance and ceiling height of 25,300 feet, the micro UAV has a range of 15 km, weighing 20 kg, 2 hours endurance and ceiling height of 25,000 feet. These can not only detect, recognise and identify human targets but also carry out post strike damage assessment, communication and intelligence missions and detect NBC attacks, live images lifted by the UAVs may be viewed on laptops and palm-tops. ASN 105 in the short range UAV series is a useful UAV operating with CCD camera, minipan camera, laser designator etc.

Detection sensors Unattended ground sensors like the UK (Classic), the US (Eagle), the US (Omni Sense) comprising a set of sensors are useful in detecting movement of terrorists on jungle approaches etc.

Detection sights

range of 4 times and field of view of 10.7 degrees. Periscope: May be used for surveillance of areas from defiladed position. They have ranges of 1.5 km and a five time magnification. Its usefulness lies in that the observer is protected from terrorist view.

Hand Held Thermal Imager (HHTI): Sights like the Sophie (France, INT (Israel) and Mikcam (US) with detection ranges from 2.5 to 3.5 km are useful HHTIs.

Counter IED

Passive Night Vision Device (PNVDs): Authorised as crew served weapon sights / hand held devices, these sustain night operations. These work on the principle of image intensification with a range of 500 m, particularly useful for patrol and ambush parties. Some of these are night vision Goggles (UK – rg 80-100 m), Binocular Telescope (France – rg 200-300 m); Passive Mini Sight (Holland – rg 300 m (Moon light); Bharat Electronics (BHEL) Passive Night Vision Goggles for surveillance driving at night; BHEL PNS MK-1, compact sight for small arms; BHEL BEN WS 9701, light sight for small arms; BHEL RNOS for remote night observation system for security and surveillance ; BHEL BELP 9203, laser target pointer for close range night combat. The US AN/PVS-2 is one of the best military weapon sight with a magnification

Deep Search Mine Detectors: Useful in clearing culverts etc.

Jammers: These are used to neutralise remote controlled improvised explosive devises (IEDs).

Hand Held Mine Detectors: Useful for Road Opening Parties, patrols and traffic frisking parties, VAs / VPs etc. Vehicle Mounted Jammers: These can sanitise 5 to 6 km radius by transmitting heavy bands of frequency.

Mobility Mobility is of essence in Counter-Terrorist Operations. While deciding on the platform to be used to convey troops on operations and logistic sustenance, one must balance out the pay-offs between fire power and protection requirements. Heavier the protection component, lesser is the mobility. That said,

November 2012 Defence AND security alert

security threat and challenges there is a requirement to transport small, lightly equipped troops in the earliest possible time frame to neutralise a group of terrorists. Still, there may be a requirement of slightly heavier vehicle variants to cater to the pervasive IED threats. Such take the form of Mine Protected Vehicles, which are slow moving due to heavier protection component. Indian manufactures like Mahindra & Mahindra, Tata, Ashok Leyland etc. have come up with useful mobility vehicles.

There is a requirement to transport small, lightly equipped troops in the earliest possible time frame to neutralise a group of terrorists. Still, there may be a requirement of slightly heavier vehicle variants to cater to the pervasive IED threats. Such take the form of Mine Protected Vehicles, which are slow moving due to heavier protection component. Indian manufactures like Mahindra & Mahindra, Tata, Ashok Leyland etc. have come up with useful mobility vehicles The following bulletproof (light) vehicles may be considered to convey commanders, sustain ambush, provide counter ambush capability and to provide cross-country mobility: Flyer

Singapore Kinetics

US Humvee carrier/M 1114 Aligator Mowag RAM 2000

Nyala

Slovakia Switzerland Mahindra in collaboration with Israel South Africa

Communication Hands free communication, enhanced communication through repeater stations, High Frequency Communications (HF) and Very High Frequency (VHF) Communications to allow Army to PMF/CAPFs Communication and state-of-the-art frequency hopping secure communication are the requirements for the present and future CT environment.

WEAPONRY UPGRADATION

In times to come the terrorists may well use NBC weapons, better fire power (Light Air Defence guns, UBGLs, disposable RLs), sophisticated communication systems and remote control devices. The security forces have to remain ahead in modern weapons / systems / devices to neutralise the modern terrorist. 26/11 was a precursor of things to come. I n f o r m a t i o n interception, monitoring and locating the hostile emitters of radio frequencies forms a crucial part of CI/CT operations. Though medium range equipment to detect hostile radio emissions successfully gives approximate location of emissions, there is an additional requirement of a man portable short range device to monitor and home on to the hostile emitter. This will also address the terroristâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s mobile communication.

Conclusion While it is an imperative for security forces to keep pace with the fast-paced revolution in military affairs to remain relevant in the modern-day battlefield, over-reliance on technology could prove counter-productive. The man behind the machine is more important. Therefore, it is necessary that the training modules of the CAPFs are designed to embrace new weapons and technology. The CAPFs should aim towards achieving a younger and more agile human resource which is able to optimally utilise new weaponry among its ranks. At the same time, the CAPFs should avoid blindly aping each other in weapons procurement. Each force should streamline its role and tasks and procure weapons and equipment required for that specific task only. The desire should not be to procure a particular weapon just because another force has it. As thousands of crores will be spent on modernisation of CAPFs in the coming years, the Ministry of Home Affairs could consider establishing a

November 2012 Defence AND security alert

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centralised procurement directorate for all CAPFs to streamline the procurement process. This would ensure that the forces get only those weapons which they can best utilise for their operations and avoid duplication. Finally, though it is true that the CAPFs today are deeply engaged in anti-naxalite and counter-insurgency operations across the country, their organisation, training, role and mandate remain distinctly different from that of the army. This aspect should not be lost sight of and unrestricted modernisation of these forces should not lead to a situation where they resemble the army in weapons and equipment holding. This would not only erode the elite value of the army but also lead to a situation where the CAPFs end up possessing weapons which they are unable to handle or are not required for their tasks. A case in point is the increasing tendency among some of the CAPFs, especially the CRPF and BSF to procure the Tavor-21 Assault Rifle currently in use by the Indian Special Forces for selectively equipping some of their units. It remains to be seen whether specialised units such as the CoBRA battalions of the CRPF have yet fully blooded themselves in extreme close-quarter combat situations and special operations for which the assault rifle is preferred.

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Saab showcases Skeldar: Commander’s Dominant Eye in Sky • Offers India state-of-the-art Unmanned Aerial Vehicle System Saab India Technologies showcased its state-of-the-art Unmanned Aerial Vehicle System, SKELDAR, on offer to India at a workshop organized as a part of the Sweden India Nobel Memorial Week 2012. It completely matches India’s current and projected security requirements for combatting urban terrorism as well as for “eye in the sky” for close quarter battles in mountainous terrain. Skeldar is a new generation, fully autonomous and mobile short-to-medium range VTOL UAS. It is suitable for a wide range of sensor applications to perform missions such as reconnaissance, surveillance and identification. The Skeldar can hover for hours while providing real-time information to a control station or to a remote video terminal. It is fully autonomous, commanded by high-level-commands such as “Point and Fly” and “Point and Look”, and designed for a range of land, maritime and civil applications. The Skeldar system consists of two air vehicles and a mobile UAS Control Station. Based on operational and technical requirements, the system may be integrated into a wide variety of segments and system environments utilising a common control concept and user interface in the context of command, control and payload management. Says Joanna Sjolander, Marketing Director, Saab India Technologies Pvt Ltd, speaking at the Sweden India Nobel Memorial Reception: “The Skeldar system is designed so that it can easily be certified for all airspace classifications. Launch and recovery requires only a minimum of personnel and preparation. Combining a modular design, short turnaround time, built in test functionality and a multiple choice of payloads increases Skeldar’s high availability.” The Skeldar UAS aims to be the ground manoeuvre commander’s primary day/night, reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition (RSTA) system. It provides commanders with a number of benefits, such as enhanced situational awareness, a target acquisition capability, battle damage assessment (BDA), and enhanced battle management. Skeldar is the commander’s “dominant eye”. Skeldar UAS can become a key collection asset in supporting near real-time visualization of the battle space. The agile flight envelope of Skeldar air vehicles provides key characteristics for successful operations and missions, especially in urban areas and difficult terrain. Launch and recovery from easily accessible and small areas, keeping pace on the battlefield, as well as find, hold and maintain optimal aspect to area and point of interest, are all easily performed thanks to the rotary wing design. The Skeldar UAS is a highly capable system and the system can be operated by just 2-4 people, owing to the ease of use, no takeoff and landing equipment, and the low logistical footprint.