In Transit Visibility

A Tool to Enhancing the Military Decision-making Process

By Jacob L. Hall II, Sustainment & Distribution Specialist, HQ United States European Command Directorate of Logistics, Deployment and Distribution Operations Center (DDOC) and Major Christopher Buckham, Logistics Officer, Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF), HQ United States European Command, Directorate of Logistics

For as long as wars have been fought, commanders have struggled with sustaining their troops and ensuring that goods needed to meet their objectives were readily available when required. Countless military thinkers and historians have highlighted the importance of logistics in an effective military strategy. Prussian General and military thinker Carl Von Clausewitz defined military strategy as the linking together (Verbindung) of separate battle engagements into a single whole, for the final object of war. 1 These engagements, or functional areas, can best be described as infantry assaults, artillery barrages, or logistical functions during the life-cycle of a specified campaign. While many areas exist, and are critical elements to achieving success during the campaign, one can argue that logistics is one of the most important. Logistics in essence is the management, transportation, storage, and distribution of resources from one point to another to meet a requirement. However, an integral part of the logistical process that usually takes a back seat is what happens in between, and how the movement and future availability of these assets affects command decisions in the fog of war. 2 Early in the Napoleonic wars (1803- 1815), Napoleon Bonaparte established the first train regiments solely dedicated to moving supplies and equipment where commanders needed them the most. 3 While this strategy enhanced the overall distribution of supplies, the problem of monitoring the transit of cargo was still lagging behind. During the late 18th and majority of the 19th Centuries commanders had to rely heavily upon horseback riders, hand-written letters, and couriers to know the whereabouts of in-transit supplies. The Information Age has provided modern military forces with tools that were unimaginable during Clausewitz’s time. One tool in particular is the ability to monitor the In-Transit Visibility (ITV) of essential supplies and equipment needed on the battlefield. On today’s battlefield, commanders have the ability to locate personnel, supplies and equipment as fast as a computer server can process a request. With the easy access to the internet and logistic platforms such as Single Mobility System (SMS), the national Radio Frequency In-Transit Visibility (RF-ITV) server, IGC/GTN (Integrated Development Environment/ Global Transportation Network), and a host of other systems, commanders now have more flexibility when developing the logistical framework of a military operation.

What is ITV? The uniformed definition for ITV, according to US Army Field Manual 55-1, is the capability to identify the location of resources at any moment in the distribution pipeline. 4 Simply stated, ITV is an

1 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, translated and edited by M. Howard & P. Paret, Princeton University Press (1976). 2 Ibid 3 A. Millett & P. Maslowski, For the Common Defense, Free Press (1994). 4 Army Field Manual 55-1, Transportation Operations (1998).

automated system used by both the military and commercial industry to monitor items moving in various conveyances from the point of origin to the point of need. A classic example would be that 15 critical repair parts were ordered by 2/58 INF at Fort Benning Georgia, but these parts are made by a government vendor in San Francisco, California. Hypothetically, when a Materiel Release Order is dropped, it can be tracked from California to Georgia with a certain amount of accuracy. Although during the transportation phase, for some reason the cargo destined for Georgia that was already enroute was diverted to Fort Bragg, North Carolina. ITV and the capability it possesses today would allow a commander and his or her staff to precisely locate where the cargo is and divert that cargo to the new point of need. ibility, especially diverting much needed equipment enroute to another destination, could serve as the turning point in achieving a stated objective. Furthermore, ITV provides commanders and their staff with value-rich data that can be used during the planning process.

While ITV has its benefits and is a proven logistical tool, over the past 25 years the same tune has often been heard regarding how ITV can best be used. In 1990-91, during Operation Desert not keep track of containers in transit on commercial carriers. 6 The key to accurate ITV information, especially during unit moves, starts at the tactical level. ITV information used by commanders is only as good as the data entered into the system, garbage in, garbage out (GIGO). After observing tactical and operational level units “build” their deployment data into various AIS such as the Transportation Coordinators’ Automated Information for

Is ITV a va lue-add ed proc ess? Today, the data used to provide commanders with reliable ITV is gathered from a cornucopia of automated systems. Rather than having to rely on day- or possibly week-old information as was the case during the Napoleonic Wars, commanders have real-time data. For the most part, this data is accurate and can be used to help commanders “size-up” the logistical picture; nonetheless, issues do exist. Over the last 20 years, both government and industry have invested vast amounts of time, money and manpower in the development and accuracy of ITV systems. According to the US Army Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM), the benefit of employing ITV provides decision makers at all levels of command and throughout the logistics pipeline with accurate, near real-time data to collaboratively plan, prioritize and redirect logistics operations. Additionally, CASCOM notes that ITV provides the means to track and re-allocate units, equipment, and supplies that are en route to a certain location. 5 In itself, this capability as aforementioned would provide a critical opportunity to shift resources allowing commanders to adapt to ever-changing situations common to the battlefield. This flex

5 In-Transit Visibility (ITV), US Army Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM), Retrieved from http://www.cascom.army. mil/g_staff/cdi/esd/itv/

Army Maj. Tony Miller of the Tennessee National Guard explains shipping labels on outbound cargo during a training event. Africa Deployment Assistance Partnership Teams traveled to Uganda from Feb. 20 to Feb. 24, 2012, to train Ugandan soldiers in logistics requirements for deployments. Courtesy photo www.defense.gov.

Storm, commanders often found that equipment supposedly packed and deployed to Southwest Asia was in fact missing. To make matters worse, upon redeployment the same occurred. In 1992, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that the Army did not have oversight and control over its materiel during deployment and redeployment due to improper container documentation, slowness in transportation system processing in Southwest Asia, and materiel never reaching its proper destination; during the rapid redeployment at the end of Operation Desert Storm, existing problems were compounded by the failure to do inventories and documentation before shipping materiel back, causing delays and backlogs at receiving ports, and difficulty in determining specifically what was missing; and finally the Army could Movement System II (TC-AIMS II), the Automated Air Load Planning System (AALPS), the Global Air Transportation Execution System (GATES), the Integrated Computerized Deployment System (ICODES), and many other AIS, it has become clear that while the majority of the data entered is correct, mistakes do occur resulting in skewed or missing data. Over the last few years, emphasis has been placed on the necessity of Level 4 & 6 content data to accurately track movements. However, a common theme in the Department of Defense is that level 4 & 6 content data is too time consuming and not that beneficial. If accu

6 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Operation Desert Storm: Lack of Accountability Over Materiel During Redeployment (1992).

rate ITV information is to be obtained, users must ensure that both level 4 & 6 content data is entered accurately.

On the other hand, human error is not the only factor that may flaw the accuracy of ITV data. As previously noted, to obtain effective and reliable ITV data, information is pulled from a host of automated systems, therefore creating a possible technological communication failure. While for the most part the systems in place perform as expected, occasionally a glitch may occur that causes anomalies in data. Obviously this is a fact taken into consideration when using ITV data. of technology has resulted in an exponential increase in the potential capability of logistics to become ever more effective. However, what is of great interest is the negative impact of the advancement of technology on the oversight and execution of operations.

Expectat ion s From a historical context, it is fascinating to read about the pace of operations being driven by the speed of the support that may be coordinated to support operations. It is a widely understood fact that ity of their logistics system to get what they needed where they needed it and when they required it. 8 Thus, despite the fact that they were infinitely more technologically advanced in terms of mobility and firepower than the Gauls, they were actually more restricted in their ability to move because their primary requirements for operations (panzers and mobile infantry) were unable to move due to lack of fuel.

Modern strategists and operational planners have learned from history and have made concerted efforts to not repeat

The St rat egic stanc e on ITV Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, United States Navy once said that “a sound logistics plan is the foundation upon which a war operation should be based.” From the perspective of the strategic level, Combatant Command (COCOM) Deployment and Distribution Operations Centers (DDOC) utilizing ITV to monitor movements in and through a given theater is a key ingredient to the sound logistics plan. If each system of record is compatible and can communicate across each service, we’ve achieved a major win in sustainment and distribution operations. ITV is used at the strategic level to monitor a myriad of movements from Inter/Intra Theater channel utilization, to highly sensitive or classified moments, and almost anything that can be identified between. Senior leaders within the Department of Defense rely upon these tools to better gauge how forces are performing, whether during exercise or operations. While there are proponents against ITV, given that we are currently living in the information age, it is obvious that tools such as these will continue to enable senior leaders to make well rounded decisions based on how said leader determines to sustain his or her troops.

ITV t he Hidd en Cost With the advent of technology allowing users to track and monitor in real-time the transit of goods throughout the world by whatever means, much that was unforeseen and remains, for the most part, unresolved has changed relating to the impact that this has had on the oversight and execution of operations themselves. It is an irrefutable fact that the advancement

Pallets and containers of equipment sit in a logistics support area during Operation Desert Shield. US Army photo by Staff Sgt. F. Lee Cockran

as equipment and armies became larger and more complex, the challenges of supporting them became manifestly more difficult. Thus, it was that a Gaulish army of 250,000 could advance on Rome during the period of Marius at a steady pace of what the average member could cover on foot in a given day. 7 Their limiting factors were speed of movement, and access to food and materials for cooking. Fast forward to German operations outside of Moscow during Operation Typhoon (the advance on Moscow in October 1941) and it is clear that the critical point of failure for the Wehrmacht was the inabilthe failures of the past. The technological revolution that has seen the emergence of the computer and its apparent limitless capacity to track and monitor, has provided planners with the tools to engage and oversee planning and execution with unprecedented access. While on the surface this may appear to be a good thing, after all, this would allow for adjustment and intervention if the situation, assumptions, commander’s intent or requirements of the users changed, it also is, as the saying goes, “a double-edged sword”.

One of the most interesting changes to come out of the advent of the develop

ment of technology such as ITV has been a marked increase in the expectations of the operators on the level of support provided by the logisticians. There has always been frustration when items have gone astray; however, in a paper world with telephone communications, it was understood and accepted that there would always be a delta between demand and execution. This delta has significantly diminished in size with the advent of technology as operators view civilian industry such as FedEx or DHL with tracking systems allowing for immediate identification and location tracking of goods.

This level of expectation has been transferred to military logisticians with the result that logisticians are given far tighter timelines within which to plan and execute than has been the case, failure to meet requirements is met with a far lower level of tolerance, and professional military logistics advice may be dismissed or challenged due to the commanders exposure or experience to civilian capability.

Lac k of Lo gist ics Sp ecia lizat ion It is of some importance that militaries strive to become as efficient as possible. Notwithstanding the fact that they do not operate under the same financial baseline operating model as civilian industry, they are still beholden ultimately to the taxpayers of their nation states. That being the case, leadership is under consistent pressure to streamline capabilities. The panacea for this has been the advent of technology and the development of a paradigm which promotes the replacement of traditional methods with computers. What has transpired has been a consolidation of traditionally mutually supportive but operationally unique trades and classifications. This effort, driven by the perception of capabilities such as ITV, has driven down the level of institutional expertise while concurrently driving down personnel numbers. 9 While this has resulted in a short term reduction in cost, the medium- to long-term effects have proven to undermine much of the efficiencies that were initially recognized.

9 Tarnished Brass: Is the US Military Profession in Decline?, Retrieved from http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/ tarnished-brass-us-military-professiondecline Ultimately, demands of the system have forced a re-evaluation of this all-singing/ all-dancing logistics capability.

Micromana gement Technology, providing as it does, the ability to deliver information in real time covering vast distances and prodigious amounts of information, has, in many cases, become the driving force behind the insidious collapse of traditional doctrinal command and control. Doctrine, as defined by western militaries, has been identified as having control at three unique levels: strategic, operational, and tactical. Commanders want and need information to make decisions. The advancement of technology has provided unprecedented access to data/information right down to the tactical level for the strategic planner or commander. This situation has created an environment wherein commanders regularly interject into and seek to influence decision making from a distance formerly impossible to contemplate. This in turn has led to a disruption in the efficient command flow as the provision of data has begun to override execution of the mission. Case in point is the fact that US Transportation Command Tanker Airlift Control Center (USTRANSCOM TACC) regularly contacts C-17 aircrew directly via cellphone to determine status of delivery; this despite the fact that the C-17 is equipped with a ‘weight on wheels’ system that automatically sends information to TACC regarding the location of the cargo upon landing. 10 This ITV system, providing as it does, real-time data, has become a critical facet in the efficient maintenance of transit visibility. However, what has not occurred has been a consistent maintenance of doctrinal discipline.

What we mean by this is that commanders and their staffs are being empowered by technology to over-ride trust and confidence in the command system. This has always been an issue that has been worked against; one of the basic tenants of our command system is the enabling of subordinates. The “double-edged sword” analogy has proven that while accessibility to information has made logistics more effective, it has also resulted in greater

10 Interview with C-17 pilot, 3 April, 2014. interference by each level of oversight, thereby precluding efficiency.

This issue speaks to the challenge embedded in the human oversight of increased technological access. Whereas historically technological limitations provided for a check on micromanagement, technology now facilitates it. It has now become all the more incumbent upon the human element of command and control to manage this temptation. In these authors’ opinions this situation is not getting better but worse, and sheds light upon the challenge of technology. This is not unrecognized by commanders, but is often ignored to the detriment of the overall system.

Conc lusion Commercial industry has become a pioneer in the field of accurate ITV. It often seems that our commercial partners have higher success rates pertaining to ITV usage. As noted by American businessman and best-selling author Tom Peters, “Leaders win through logistics”. Therefore, leaders and their staffs should be aware of the various aspects of logistics and the tools that he or she has at their disposal to enhance logistical efforts within their AOR’s. DTJ

Jacob L. Hall II is a traffic management specialist with the Headquarters United States European Command, Directorate of Logistics, Deployment and Distribution Operations Center (DDOC) and serves as the primary sustainment and distribution specialist therein. He holds a Bachelor of Science in Management and a Master of Arts in Business Management. He has been a Department of the Army civilian, specifically in the logistics arena, since 2006 and is a former US Army Infantry Non-Commissioned Officer.

Major Chris Buckham is a Logistics Officer in the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF). He has an extensive background in all elements of logistical operations including SOF. A graduate of the Royal Military College of Canada, he holds a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and a Master of Arts in International Relations. He is presently employed as an ILOC Officer with the multinational branch of EUCOM J4 in Stuttgart, Germany. He maintains a blog of his reviews at: www.themilitaryreviewer.blogspot.com