Vol. VII, May 1996 by Episteme: Denison's Undergraduate Journal of Philosophy

BPISTBMB

A Journal of Undergraduate Philosophy Volume VII

May 1996

Contents You JUST CAN'T CRISPIN BRAINS IN A VAT ............................................. 1 David Miguel Gray; Columbia University KANT AND THE NOUMENAL AGENT ............................................ l...........

Heather M. Kendrick; Earlham College THE THESIS THAT MATHEMATICS IS LOGIC ............................................

Anthony S. Gillies; Westminster College AND LEVINAS CREATED A CONTROVERSY ABOUT WOMEN ....................

Shulamit M. Shapiro; Swarthmore College A QUESTION OF ETHICS ..........................................................................

Joe Landau; Duke University INCHOATE FEMINISM IN PLATo'S REPUBLIC V ........................................

Amy Coplan;

Uni~ersity

of Kansas

The editors express sincere appreciation to the Denison University Research Foundation, the Denison Office of Admissions, the Denison Honors Program, Pat Davis and Faculty Advis01' Barbara Fultner for their assistance in making the publication of this journal possible. We also extend special gratitude to the Philosophy Department faculty: Barbara Fultner, David Goldblatt, Tony Lisska, Mark Moller, Ronald E. Santoni and Steven Vogel for their constant enthusiasm, support and creative input.

You JUST CAN'T CRISPIN BRAINS IN A VAT David Miguel Gray

Columbia University

P.F. Strawson once wrote, "One of the marks, though not a necessary mark, of a really great philosopher isto make a really great mistake." On first reading of Hilary Puh1am' s "Brains in a Vat" many people think that's exactly what he did, "make a really great mis足 take." I hope to arrive at a defense of Putnam's argument in light of recent criticism by Crispin Wright. I will begin by examining both the examples Puh1am creates and their presentation. Second, I will take a look at the conclusion Puh1am draws from his proof. Next, a brief digression will lead us into a discussion of two different types of skepticism and which one applies to Putnam's proof. I will then focus on the problem of the metaphysical realist and the applicability of the brain in a vat example to its plight. Finally I will discuss Wright's criticisms of Putnam's proof and what we may learn from it. In Putnam's refutation of the brain-in-vat skl~ptic, he uses his second scenario of how the 'brains in a vat' picture works. In this case, the external world consists of living and functioning brains and their nervous systems. These are all contained in a large vat. The brains' individual nerve endings are hooked up to a fantastic com足 puter. This computer, the automatic machinery, exists as the brains and the vat do, because it just happens to be the actual world, that is, no one made the computer. So what happens? Being that all the individuals are hooked up to the same

Gray is 17 jUlIior at Colul1l/Jia University. Origilllllly from MeAlIell, Texas, Gray hopes to pursue doctoml work in philosophy.

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DAVID MIGUEL GRAY

computer, they all suffer from a collective hallucination as Putnam calls it. This means that they all see computer-induced images and that

none of them have privileged access to the external world; they are all being deceived. If you and I were two of these brains, let us pretend just for a moment, both of us would receive all the sensory inputs required to be able to lisee trees", "touch trees", and "throw rocks". The computer is very powerful and allows us to have the impression of interacting with the objects that we see; it also allows us to rearrange them in our environment. Similarly it allows me to communicate with the other brains in the vat. When I come up with thoughts, the computer processes them so that I am deceived into thinking that I hear myself speaking and feel my lips moving and feel sounds coming through my throat. Likewise.. the brains listening to me are deceived into thinking that they are hearing my voice instead of just receiving my thoughts, via the computer, and may respond to me as adequately as I spoke to them.

This is merely a more

roundabout process than what we think is actually going on. It is clear that the brains may refer to images in their sensual 'World, but can they, as Putnam asks in the first chapter of Reason, Truth and History, "refer to external objects at all? (As opposed to, for example, objects in the image produced by the automatic machinery)" (12). By 'sensual world' I mean the world of sensory perceptions that is created by the machine sending the brains electrical impulses and not the reality of their external world, which they do not know. When I refer to people's sensual world, assuming of course that we are not being decei ved/ I mean the world of sensory perceptions that has a corresponding external reality. For instance a brain in a vat's hnage of a coffee cup is actually induced by a computer where a person's image of a coffee cup corresponds to an actual coffee cup. It is important to try to realize what the brains are doing

You JUST CAN'T CRISPIN BRAINS IN A VAT

when they are speaking or thinking about things. A brain's external world consists of itself and other brains, a vat filled with nutritive fluids, and a fantastic computer, none of which it can see nor can it know that it exists as such. In addition to this, the brains have always been in this envir0IU11ent and have no more of a reason to think that they are brains in a vat than we do. What the brains do see is their sensual world, which resembles the external world we live in (we are no longer pretending to be brains in a vat). They can only make references to things they see in their world. For instance, if a brain in a vat says, "There is a lamp in front of me" what it is really saying is, "There is an image of a lamp in front of me." I would like to expand upon Putnam's ideas concerning the

mental images of brains in a vat. For example, the context of the brains' dreams would be mental images based on images presented to them by the computer, and, likewise, when they imagine things not in their sensual world, this is simply done by manipulating a collection of the images that they have seen. For instance, they woukl obtain the mental image of a brain in a vat hooked up to a com puler because they have seen a brain, a vat, and a computer. Like I.hdr language, their mental images also center arollnd their sensunl world. This means that they cannot possess what I will call n

transcendental imagination, that is, they cam10t cross the boundaries of their sensual world and refer to or accurately contemplate things in their external world. Even if the brains could correctly imagine what their situation is, this would be a fluke. (For instance, they would have no way of knowing whether they were brains in a vat 01' bnlim; in a swimming pool, and the proper guess would n't dCm(mH~I'atl~ actual knowledge of the situation.) Furthermore, since they don't have a h'anscendental imagination, their imaginations couicin' t even mistakenly refer to their situation in the external wo1'ld because I:hcir

DAVID MIGUEL GRAY

referential capabilities are limited to the sensual world. I will briefly digress to discuss why Putnam doesn't use his first scenario, the original scenario, of the brain in a vat for his argument. The first case consists of a brain in a vat filled with nutrient fluids which is hooked up to a computer built by an evil scientist. With this first case, an externalist conception is possible. One may say that the images that the brain perceives are not non-referential images. The image of a lamp may be given to the brain by the computer, but the evil scientist, who has actually interacted with a lamp, programmed the computer to give such an image. Therefore, the brain.5 are justperceivin.g a lamp in a round-about way, and to say that this is not an actual perception is just a prejudice towards computer received perceptions. And while the brairts don't perceive these objects that we perceive in the correct 'order', so to speak, as they are in the world external to the vats, the objects were per~eived by the scientist and then fed into the computer, and so much of the brains knowledge of the external world is both referential and true. This is a very important point.

Crispin Wright, in his lecture

"Putnam's Proof that We Are Not Brains in a Vat," elaborates on this by suggesting that, "The standard brain-in-a-vat fantasy is, whereas Putnam's is not, consistent with the truth of most of my beliefs about the material world" (Reading Putnam, 218). Wright continues:

The difference, in other words, is this: a skeptical argument which works with Putnam's fantasy can directly transmit our (putative) lack of warranted assurance that the fantasy is false into lack of war足 ranted assurance that most of our ordinary beliefs about the material world are true. But no such direct transmission is possible if the argument works with the standard fantasy (219).

You JUST CAN'T CRISPIN BRAlNS IN A VAT

It is most likely because of these easy refutations that Putnam created the second case to avoid the possible criticisms that the evil scientist allows brains to make indirect causal references to external objects. But to solely address the first case and treat it as a way out of the skeptic's conception of the mind is to avoid the full strength of Putnam's article. One of the points Putnam is able to demonstrate with the second case is that the brains' language is only referring to images and not actual things. By holding this position, we may not develop any externalist conception of the brains' sensual world. There is no causal COlmection between the images that the brains'see' in their sensual world and real objects. If one of the brains thinks it sees an image of a lamp, there is not an actual lamp because only electrical impulses that the computer sends allow the brain to create an image of a lamp. The electrical impulses given by the computer which allow the brain to create this picture are simply part of the computer's nature. There is no achmllamp, just a program that allows the brain to create an image of it. The question Putnam raised earlier of whether 01' not brains can refer to externa1 objects at all allows him to come to the conclu足 sion that it is impossible to say or think that we are brains in a vat. Putnam's self-refuting argument, as he calls it, is basically this:

although the people in that possible world [the brains] can think and'say' any words we can think and say, they cannot (I claim) refer to what we can refer to. In particular, they cannot think or say that they are brains in a vat (evenby thinking I we m'e brains ill a vat') (Reason, 8). Putnam's idea of a self-refuting argument differs slightly from

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traditional conceptions of self-refuting arguments in that the conclu sion is a little harder to reach because of implicit meanings. How ever, like all self-refuting arguments, Putnam's argument is one in which a part of the hypothesis is contradicted. Putnam argues that, "part of the hypothesis that we are brains in a vat is that we aren't brains in a vat in the image" (IS). This may be simplified by saying that it is implicit within the concept of being brains in a vat that we can not think of ourselves as brains in a vat in the image, that is, we do not see ourselves as brains in a vat. However, whenever supposedly envatted brains refer to something, they are referring to that some thing in the image, for example, there is an image of a lamp in front of us. Following from this, whenever an individual brain would say 'I am a brain in a vat' it is actually saying 'I am a brain in a vat in the image/. This contradicts the part of the hypothesiS that says that if we are brains in a vat, we cannot be brains in a vat in the image. Because of this/ the statement /we are brains in a vat' made by the brains is necessarily false. It should also be said that all of this also holds for a brain thinking that it is a brain in a vat, though this is a minor point. Much like the language the brain uses to refer to its sensual world, its 'linguistic thoughts', or thoughts in the form of words/ refer to the sensual world as well. Furthermore, as I stated earlier in the paper, thebrain gets its mental images, and hence many of its thoughts from the sensual world. Perhaps it is most easily stated by saying that regardless of whether a brain says or thinks /we are brains in a vat', it still contradicts the hypothesis.

The major question still remains: how does Putnam's objec tion to the brain-in-a-vat skeptic help us with the problem of skepti cism. The answer to this question actually lies in the previous sentence and is perhaps the greatest misinterpretation of Putnam/s article. The brain-in-a-vat skeptic is not what we might think it to be.

You JUST CAN'T CRISPIN BRAINS IN A VAT

In order to explain this I would like to describe two skeptical positions Putnam describes as Infinitely Regressive and InternaL An infinitely regressive skeptic is of the type that no matter what premises you present the individ ual with, you will most likely get the response"And how do you know that?" or "Can you prove it?". This sort of skeptic is virtually impossible to please unless

presented with the simplest of arguments such as whether or not we exist. Putnam had no intentions of refuting infinitely regressive skepticism. Putnam states in his "Comments and Replies to Crispin Wright" that, lithe aim of the internal skeptic is to convince us, on the basis of assumptions we ourselves hold, that all or a large part of our claims about the empirical world cannot amount to knowledge"(Reading, 284). Putnam's brain in a vat argument was geared towards disproving this lype of skepticism. Let's go back to infinitely regressive skepticism for a mo足 ment. Let us imagine the following scenario: You are on a spaceship exploring the outer limits of the galaxy when you and your crew happen upon a space station which wasn't made by human beings. Let us, for tiLe sake of the example, suppose that no one made it, the station just happens to be another world of sorts. Upon entering the space station you see a large vat filled with billions of brains and an enormous computer that appears to be cOlmected to each one. After examining the brains and running some tests on them, they appear to be isomorphic to humanbrains. Also at the computer is a terminal with a video screen and a video camera and microphone that allows you to view the brains world. The computer also takes images of you on the outside world and transforms the image of you into an image of a regular individual in the world of the envatted brains. After using this terminal to talk to other brains and explore their world,

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you find that it is identical to earth, a twin-earth of sorts. Evenhtally you happen upon a brain who happens to be a philosophy shldent and is familiar with Putnam's article (even Putnam has a brain cOlUlterpart on this space station). After trying to inform the student of its situation the brain presents you with Putnam's argument, thereby proving that it is not a brain in a vat. After repeatedly trying to convince the brain that it is in fact a brain in a vat you give up and return to your home planet. This scenario is the product of an infinitely regressive skep足 tical position. Putnam's argument keeps us from saying md think足 ing'wearebrainsinvats'inresponsetothehypothesis. Thus we may not speak or think of the issue. Nevertheless, the possibility remains

that we are brains in a vat, even though we may not speak or think on the matter and come to the conclusion that this is true. Although we may not speak of i t, we could possibly accept such a position since we have not been convinced that such a position is impossible. My reply to this scenario, and I imagine Pu111am would take a similar stance, is that of course this example can't be refuted: it has already been verified that the possibility is true, that is, the envaUed brains do exist, md there is nothing we can do to argue against this. This is what infinitely regressive skepticism is capable of: presenting a possibility that no matter what argument is used against it, it can always answer with, "What if?" We may conclude that Putnam's argument doesn't even entirely rule out the brain-in-a-vat skeptic, it merely shuts it up. While Putnam's essay does make some very good points and does present a useful skeptical scenario in a materialist framework, his solution to the brain in the vat problem may only be considered a small contribution to the battle against skepticism.

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IN A VAT

While most of the things the infinitely regressive skeptic claims are correct, none of it matters! As said earlier, Putnam had no intention of refuting infinitely regressive skepticism. Furthermore, his goal was not to deliver a crushing blow to epistemological skepticism. Rather, as Crispin Wright correctly claims, "Putnam's real project is, as so often, to embarrass the metaphysical realist" (Reading, 217). And what is this metaphysical realist? To put it vaguely, since I've never seen it put otherwise, the metaphysical realist sees the world as set, a place where things exist objectively apartfrom our conception ofthem. The metaphysical realist believes that we can only hope to develop a view of the world that actually corresponds, at least in its basic suppositions, with the way the world really is. This barrier between our thoughts of the world and how the world really exists is what prevents us from developing an indubi~ table picture of reality. As Wright adds in his concluding remarks concerning metaphysical realism, IIThis is what commits the meta足 physical realist to the possibility that even an ideal theory might be false or seriously incomplete"(Rendin.g, 238). Wright continues:

Once one thinks of the world in that way, one is presumably committed to the bare possibility of con足 ceptual creatures naturally so constituted as not to be prone to form concepts which reflect the real kinds that there are. The real character of the world and its constituents would thus elude both the cognition and comprehension of such creatures (238). These metaphysical realists are exactly the types of creatures Putnam intended the brains in a vat to be. They, like the envatted thinkers, have no actual link with their external reality that they can be sure of. However, they do believe in semantic externalism, which

DAVID MIGUEL GRAY

Putnam describes as currentphilosophy-of-Ianguage jargon for the IJ

idea that meaning and reference are subject to causal constraints"

(Reading, 285). The metaphysical realists must believe this, for how would they even attempt to describe the world if they didn't believe that they were somehow causally related to it? This is the strength of the argument from the position of internal skepticism. The internal skeptic is taking the possibilities that the metaphysical realist believes in as premises: First, that we may be brains in a vat, and second, that we have some sort of causal relations to the world. As we have already seen, the belief that they are brains in a vat and the belief that they can refer to brains in a vat is what got them into trouble. Crispin Wright feels that in addition to being of little episte足 mological significance, Putnam's proof misses the mark, or marks, when dealing with metaphysical realism. The central problem Wright has with Putnam's proof is that it seems to answer specific types of metaphysical realism that can be discussed instead of meta足 physical realism in general. Wright clarifies this position by saying th.at we "convict metaphysical realism" of something similar to the idea of O-inconsistency:

An Q-inconsistent system of arithmetic, recalt is one which, for some arithmetic predicate F, both contains a proof that there is an x such that not Fx and proofs of each statement of the form, Fn, "n" being a nu足 meral. Simple inconsistency is avoided only because the recognition that each Fn is provable cannot be accomplished via means formalizable within the sys足 tem (239).

You JUST CAN'T CRISPIN BRAINS IN A VAT

This means that metaphysical realists must accept that they are in a general sort of condition, like Fn, which is impossible to refute. To flesh this out a bit more, we may be in a general state, a cognitive II

predicament of a certain very general sort" as Wright states. How ever, when presented with a specific example of what that state might be, like Fx, we find that such specific sihlations are often refutable. Wright claims thatthis is the case with Puhlam's example. Wright defends this position by clarifying the predicament of the metaphysical realist. In reference to Putnam's conclusion con cerning the unthinkability of the brain in a vat scenario:

... the sort of dislocation whose possibility is argu ably implicit in metaphysical realism does not in volve that its victims can concephlalize their predica ment; quite to the contrary - their predicament con sists in part precisely in the fact that they are debarred from arriving at the concepts necessary to capture the most fundamental feahtres of their world and their place in it (Reading, 239). This provides support for Wright's claim that "Putnam's pl:oof does not represent a general method. of disproving any specific version of the relevant kind of possibilitYi at best, it represents a general method for disproving any specific version which we can understand" (ReadingJ 239).

An obvious problem just presented itself. The treatment of

the metaphysical realist In Crispin Wright does something Puhlam never intended. Postulating that we still may be brains in a vat or somethingelse which we cannotunderstand, is to expect our thoughts to transcend the reality that they must subscribe to. We would have to have a transcendental imagination. For metaphysical realists to transcend their linguistic constraints would be nothing short of

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divine and to claim that doing this is a possibility would be to leave the realm of internal skepticism and enter into infinitely regressive skepticism. Putnam never intended to defend against this line of argument. Puhlam sums this up by saying, in his reply to Wright, "Wright's paper ... seems to waver between pointing out that infinitely regressive skepticism has still not been refuted, and at足 tempting a reply on behalf of an internal skeptic. But if the latter is Wright's intention, it is not clear what the reply is" (Reading, 285). The only question left then is, "What may we salvage from Crispin Wright's argument?" Is there any way to Crispin brains in a vat? It seems from what we have seen that Wright's argument does not apply to brains in a vat. What I believe Wl'ight does do is present an important aspect of the metaphysical realist. I don't believe that the brain-in-a-vat argument applies to all metaphysical realists, as I believe Putnam would also hold. What Wright has introduced is that complete satisfaction for some metaphysical realist would involve something that is perhaps unattainable. Certain metaphysical real足 ists might hold that they must answer the doubts of infinitely regressive skeptics in addition to internal skeptics. This shows us that whether or not such a conception of reality could be true, large portions of this conception are unthinkable. So while we may be able to Crispin the metaphysiral realist, we just can't Crispin brains in a vat.

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WORKS CITED

1 Putnam, Hilary. "Comments and Replies." Reading Putnam. Cambridge: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1994. 242-95. 2 Putnam, Hilary. Reason, Truth and History. New York:

Cambridge University Press, 1981. 3 Wright, Crispin. "On Putnam's Proof that We Are Not Brains in a Vat." Reading Putnam. Cambridge: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1994. 216-41.

14 KANT AND THE NOUMENAL AGENT

Heather M. Kendrick

Earlham College

Immanuel Kant's position on free will is creative but contro versiaL It gives empirical science its due by asserting that everything in nature is bound by the law of causation - thus, it posits determin ism; yet it also allows us to think of ourselves as moral agents, capable of acting autonomously - thus, it also posits freedom. It allows us the best of both worlds; however, it poses many difficult problems. The idea of an agent outside space and time - a noumenal agent is an element that can be particularly difficult to tangle with. Just how does the noumenal agent work outside - or within - the law of causation? How does the noumenal agent relate to the phenom enal being? These questions must be dealt with in order to assess the viability of Kant's doctrine. According to Kant, we can be both free and causally deter mined. He esc apes contradiction by saying tha t we are not free in the same sense in which we are determined; we are transcendentally free, and empirically determined:

II •

••

natural necessity is referred

merely to appearances and freedom merely to things in themselves" \nQ!S:gQw~

343-44). As rational beings, we have a sensible char

acter that is determined by the laws of causation, but we also have an intelligible character underlying it, which Kant says is a thing in itself, a noumenon \-,=~~~B 569). Things in themselves are not in time, since time is just our own form of sensible intuition; thus, they cannot be bound in the chain of causal events, which always occur in time. Kendrick is a senior philosophy major at Earlham College. She plans school in tIle fall of 1996.

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One peril of this position (as suggested, in conversation, by Len Clark) is that if one isn't careful, one might begin talking about our phenomenal versus noumenal selves. It is easy shorthand, butis dangerous, because to talk of two selves smacks of Cartesian dual足 ism. It leads to the obvious objection that Kant's rational being is not a unified subject, but is really two separate entities altogether. This is bad exegesis as well as bad metaphysics. First, Kant certainly didn't intend to posit two separate selves in this manner. The rational being is a unified subject that "can be regarded from two points of view" (Critique B 566). There is a sense in which we are phenomena, belonging to the wodd of appearance, and a sense in which we are noumena, belonging to the world of things in them足 selves. Second, to misinterpret Kant this way opens him to unde足 served criticism over the supposed lack of unity inhis view of the self. Allen W. Wood suggests that this "two-worlds" view does not allow us to think of ourselves as unified (Wood 75). He notes tha t "Norman Kretzmann has commented ... that this may be likened to saying lha t a married couple is compatible, but only as long as they live in separate houses" (Wood 75). When looked at in this way, it seems as though Kant is cheating, but I disagree with Wood and Kretzmunll. Kant wants to say that our phenomenal and noumenal characters belong to different worlds (which are really not so much different worlds as different ways of regarding the world), but are indeed unified. They are not two entities linked by some mystical silver cord; they are two aspects of the same entity, two ways of regarding the subject. I refer throughout this essay to the intelligible character of which Kant speaks as the "noumenal agent." This language is not Kant's. However, I think it is justifiable. Kant does refer to the intelligible character as a nomnenon (469). And it is this intelligible

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character which can be considered free in action. Kant refers to it as the intelligible aspect of an "acting subject" (Critique B 567). There足 fore, it is fair to call it an agent. Keep in mind, however, that I mean

lithe aspect of an agent which is noumenal." I don't mean that all people are made up of two agents, a noumenal and a phenomenal agent. For this would be like the dualism which I rejected earlier. What is it, then, about this subject that permits it to be free even though causation is necessary and universal? Causation is always in time, according to the Second Analogy. But our intelligible character is not in time, since time is a form of our sensible intuition. Therefore, our intelligible cilaracter stands apart from the chain of causation that determines our sensible character; in the respect that we are intelligible, we are free. But what does the intelligible character have freedom to do? If the noumenal aspect of the self can only be free in the noumenal world, completely apart from anything that happens to the phenom足 enal aspect, then wha L is the point of discussing it at all? Ifthere were no interaction betwp-en the noumenal agent and the phenomenal world, then we could not describe any of our phenomenal actions as free. Since the phenomenal world is the world in which we live, it is there that we want to be able to talk of our actions as being free. Thus, we must say that somehow our noumenal freedom is expressed in the phenomenal world. In fact, that is what Kant says.

writes, lithe active being

[i.e. the noumenal agent] of itself begins its effects in the sensible world" (Critique B 569). There is an interaction, although the exact mechanics of this are obscure -

as is reasonable, since we are

discussing noumena, about which we have to be very careful what we say. Time is an a priori form of all our sensible intuition. It

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applies, therefore, only to things in the phenomenal world. So the noumenal agent must be outside time. Yet the sensible world is always in time. So the agent outside time must be having an effect on things which are in time. The idea of the noumenal agent outside of time having an effect on events in time carries several problems with it. First, just how can it "cut in" to the chain of causal events, since these causal events will always follow uniÂ versal rules? If I can follow a chain of events backward in time all the way to my birth and explain everyone of my actions by pointing to something that happened in the phenomenal world, then how can I claim that my intelligible character had any choice in the matter at all? Since noumena somehow - although we cannot know how - underlie phenomena, one wa y to explain this is to take the posi tion that our intelligible character creates a complete causal history that enables us to make the decisions that we make in our lives (Wood 91Â 92).

Let's consider a woman named Jennifer for example. Jennifer makes a moral decision which involves donating a sum of money to an organization which fights against racism. Now, insofar as she is intelligible, }em1ifer made this decision freely. However/ insofar as she is sensible, we must be able to explain her action causally. So we discover that Jennifer is very tolerant of other races and very much against racism. We can explain this causally/ too: Jennifer was raised by her parents to be very tolerant. Jâ&#x201A;Źlmifer' s parents raised her that way because they were strongly affected by the Holocaust. Now/ since we can explain Jennifer's decision completely through causation in the sensible world/ how can we explain the connection that her intelligible freedom has to her decision? One way is to say that her noumenal aspect ordered the phenomenal

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world in such a way that allowed her to make the decisions which she made. She created a world in which she was able to have the beliefs she had and perform the actions she performed according to the laws of causation. The trouble with this is readily apparent. The Holocaust seems to be an essential part ofthe causal history leading to Jennifer's decision. Does that mean that Jennifer created the Holocaust, and is responsible for it? Critics of Kant contend just that, and say this model has disastrous consequences. Jonathan Bennett holds that in this way we could possibly be responsible for such things as the Holocaust, although we don't realize it, because our noumenal aspects made a choice about our life which has the Holocaust as an indIrect but necessary causal condition. If true, this would undermine Kant's theory considerably,

he is trying to construct a model in which

we could think of ourselves as being responsible for our own actions. If we never knew what actions and events we were or were not

responsible for, the theory would he relatively useless. Since the Holocaust involved the moral choices of other noumenal agents, who are free and autonomous, it does not seem possible that they could have been determined by a differentnoumenal agent in this manner. If I personally were responsible for the Holocaust, that would mean that the moral decisions of a lot of Nazis would have been caused by me. But the noumenal agent "begins its effects in the sensible world," not the intelligible world

569). Kant would not allow us to say that we determined the noumenal choices of other subjects. It is less clear how Kant could respond to the idea that I

caused, for example, an earthquake due to my noumenal choices. Let's say this time that Jennifer is a very stingy person and will not

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give money to charity. That's because when Jennifer was growing up, her family was impoverished and needed to save whatever it had. Her family's impoverishment was due to an earthquake which destroyed their home. So, in deciding not to give money to charity, is Jennifer responsible for the earthquake that allowed the causal series necessary for her to make that decision? Since it involves a sensible object that has a noumenal character but no noumenal agency, it is not contradictory like the Nazi example. However, Kant still would not want us to be held responsible for destructive forces of nature. He only wants us to be responsible for our own actions. This is a problem for Kant, but only so long as we continue to speculate about how noumena underlie phenomena. But Kant intended us to do no such speculation. After ali, noumena are things which are not an object of sensible intuition. Since we have no intuition other than sensible, we cannot learn of them through intuition. We are allowed to make certain assumptions about them, but only when practical reason is at stake. We need to leave the door open to freedom .in order to permit morality in any reasonable form. We do not need to know the exact mechanics of that freedom. Our difficulty comes from asking questions which should not rightly be asked. Things in themselves are l.mknowablei we can speak nega足 tively of them (they are not determined in time), but we should be wary of saying anything strongly positive about them (they cause phenomenal events). Kant does assert the latter (Critique B 569), but in a mild way. We must have some idea that they have effects in the sensib Ie world, or else the theory o.f freedom is useless, as mentioned previously. However, we should not even try to map out just how they accomplish these effects. That would be ont of bounds; we would be going beyond the practical interest of reason. One may rightly question the fairness of building a theory on

HEATHER M. KENDRICK

a cornerstone that one is not allowed to ask certain questions about. However, if one accepts the distinction behveen noumena and phenomena - and I am not in a position to argue for this distinction in this paper - then one should recognize the validity of what Peter Suber (in conversation) has called the "shut up!" defense. Kant is only trying to show that the ideas of free will and natural necessity are not automatically contradictory: he writes, "What we have been able to show, and what we have alone been concerned to show, is that ... causality through freedom is at least not incompatible with nature" (Critique B 586). The question of whether we can be held responsible for the Holocaust does not disprove Kant's assertion that freedom and nahl ~al necessity are noncontradictory. It poses a question that involves the working of noumena, something about which we can足 not know. Wood uses an analogy that I find very appropriate to describe what Kant is doing (Wood 83). Just as, in our court system, a man is innocent until proven guilty, free will should be assumed to exist unless it is proven otherwise. Why should we assume the existence of

f"~e

will? We have a couple of good reasons. The first, as

mentioned by Wood, is that morality presupposes freedom, and so maintaining the plaUSibility of freedom is essential for explaining how we can talk about morality jn rational beings. The second, which Wood did not mention but which is equally important, is that we are always assuming that we have freedom. We always act under that presupposition. It is so integral to our thinking that if we deny it, we had better have an extremely strong argument for doing so. As in the courtroom the burden of proof is on the prosecution, in this case, the burden of proof is on those who would deny free will. Kant needs only inh'oduce a reasonable doubt (Wood 84). If freedom contradicted the fact of necessary causation, then we would prob足

KANT AND THE NOUMENAL AGENT

ably be justified in denying freedom. However, although there are things left unaccounted for (and rightfully so, as they are noumenal issues), Kant shows that we are at least not being contradictory to assert the existence of both. This lack of contradiction is enough to introduce the "reasonable doubt." The noumenal subject as timeless agent brings with it more problems than just the question of how noumenal events determine the phenomenaL As Wood points out, since our noumenal aspect is not in time, as noumenal agents, one might say that we must make all of our decisions at once - "all in a lump." This leaves us floundering when we try to account for change in moral character. Our noumenal decisions are not made through time; so they must be made all at once (or so the criticism goes). Noumena are not in time, and thus are unchanging. This makes it puzzling to consider how some people start out as decent people and end up becoming immoral, or how some people are crooked but through some effort manage to better themselves. Somehow, such people mllst make a nOll menal choice to be strangely morally incon足 sistent, and that is difficult to understand. Closely related to tha t is the idea tha tit is useless for one to try to improve himself (Wood 97). All our choices are presumably made in a lump, so the idea of striving to become a better person over time

seems worthless. But I believe Kant would have wanted people to try to become more Illoral over time. This seems like a flaw in Kant's theory. I bel ieve that these two problems are based on an inaccurate premise, i.e. if choices are not made through time, then they must be made "all at once." We cannot talk about things happening "all at once" in the noumenal world - there is no such thing as coexistence in the noumenal world. So how do we make our choices in the

HEATHER M. KENDRICK

noumenal world, if they are neither through time nor simultaneous? Well, thatis a dangerous question, as it ventures into territory that we can't say a whole lot about. The question asks us to discuss some足 thing of which we have no conception - timelessness. Perhaps the most damning is the idea that, since we have already made all of our noumenal choices, we are not really free anymore, having been determined already by our own noumenal choices (Wood 96). The criticism holds that if we could examine all the factors involved, we could predict with certainty that we would, e.g., tell a lie on November 2. It implies a rather disturbing fatalism. Again, my criticism of the all at once" idea stands, because it implies 1/

some sort of phenomenal relation. It doesn't make a lot of sense to say that one has "already" made noumenal choices since "already" implies a time relation that does not exist in the noumenal world. But I have a more specific answer to this position: even if we are determined in this way, we are determined by our own choices, which is a sort of freedom - autonomy. If we determine ourselves, then it means we are not being determined by outside, or heterono足 mous, influences.

Autonomy of the will is that property of it by

which it is a law to itself [emphasis mine] .. ," (Foundations 440) It's a rather counterintuitive explanation, since the idea of acting under rules

even if they are our own rules -. seems to go against the

conception of freedom that some people have, but it still allows for the core of morality, which is that we are responsible for our own actions. Even if it were true that at a certain point I could analyze every relevant cause and discover that at a certain point I would tell a lie, I don't think that would be grounds to reject Kan.t' s position.

rill

willing to accept that brand of autonomy. Admittedly, it would be an unpleasant and strange situation if I really did know I was going to tell a lie on Nov. 2, but fortunately we do not have the ability to take

KANT AND THE NOUMENAL AGENT

into account everything we would need to in order to discover that outcome. SO, to me, it is irrelevant whether itis theoretically possibIe or not. Kant's doctrine of freedom can be difficult to deal with, particularly the idea of the noumenal, timeless agent. It is an unusual way of looking at our place in the world, but it still allows us to hold common-sense beliefs about morality, while it also takes empirical science into account. The trouble that people run into when criticiz足 ing Kant's position is due to their attempting to ask questions about noumena that should not be asked, and trying to attribute phenom足 enal qualities to noumena.

WORKS CITED

1 Bennett, Jonathan. "Commentary: Kant's Theory of Freedom. IN Self and Nature in Kant's Philosoph;>::.. Ed.. A It e 11 W. Wood. Cornell University, London: 1984. 2 Kant, Immanuel. .critique of Pure Reason. Trans. N01'man Kemp Smith. St. Martin's Press, New York: 1965. 3 Kant, ImmanueL Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics. Trans. Lewis White Beck. Macmillan, New York: 1950. 4 Wood, Allen W. "Kant's CompatibilLsl11." IN Self and Nah1l'e in Kant's Philosophy. Ed. Allen W. Wood. COl'l1l'I1 University, London: 1984.

ANn LEVINAS

CREATED A CONTROVERSY ABOUT WOMEN

Shulamit M. Shapiro

Swarthmore College

Feminist scholars such as LuceIrigaray and Catherine Chalier have criticized Emmanuel Levinas for his ideas about women and femininity. They maintain that Levinas essentializes female characÂ teristics and subordinates the feminine role to the private domain, while granting the masculine dominion over the public realm. A feminist reading of these role distinctions evidences a problematic level of sexual inequality. Irigaray's primary assertion is that Levinas delegitimates the importance of female sexual pleasure. Chalier believes that Levinas confines the ethical responsibility of women to childbearing. Given Levinas' contextual understanding of female roles, which is grounded primarily in the Bibk I find myself unconvinced by Irigaray's and Chalier's arguments. In "Judaism and the Feminine," Levinas illustrates his belief inhis concept of the home through an explanation of the crucial roles played by female characters in the Bible. In Totality and Infinity, Levinas describes the word home as referring to a concept, in . addition to a physical place. One needs food/warmth and physical protection that a residential structure provides. These are the prereqÂ uisites that enable one to cultivate "the warmth of intimacy" and lithe primordial phenomenon of gentleness" (Levinas, Totality and

Infinity, p. 150) and thus relate to a transcendental and finite other. Feminine existence resides in this realm. In order for the harshness of the outside world to "return to the peace and ease of being athome, Shapiro is ajunior at Swarthmore College. She is majoring ill religion and hopes to pursue a career in legal journalism or attend graduate school in philosophy of religion.

Episteme â&#x20AC;˘ Volume VII- May 1996

AND LEVINAS CREATED A CONTROVERSY ABOUT WOMEN

the strange gentleness must enter into the geometry of infinite and cold space." Women create this strange gentleness. For example, the progression of numerous biblical events occurred as a result of female figures' "watchful lucidity, the firmness of their determina足 tion, and their cunning and spirit of sacrifice" (Levinas, Difficult

Freedom, p.31). The deeds of these women were great because they acted out of sheer righteousness, through a "secret presence, on the edge of invisibility" (Levin as, DF p. 31). They did not seek to showcase their strength for the sake of gaining public recognition. As a result, these figures were able to penetrate "the depths and opacity of reality, [draw] the very dimensions of interiority and mak[e] the worlds precisely inhabitable" (Levin as, DF p.31). Levinas interprets the Talmudic phrase, "The house is woman/' (Levinas, DF p. 31) to mean that women and men occupy different spiritual and social roles. A woman "makes the public life ofman possible" by creating a particular "moral paradigm" (Levinas, DF p.32) within the home.

The paradigm in response to the one

created by men. The male realm, which exists outside of the home, is one of "hard and cold" reason. (Levinas, OF p.32). It "offers ...

no inner refuge. " is disoriented, solitary and wandering, and even as such is already alienated by the products it had helped to create" (Levinas, DF p. 33). While this masculine essence, or "virility," (Levinas, DF p. 33) is necessary for society to develop, it alone cannot sustain civilization. It needs to be able to find solace in a home.

would maintahl that his placement of the feminine role in the realm of home does not suggest a subjugation of the feminine. Levinas emphasizes the total interdependency of male and female roles upon each other. His explanation that men and women complete each other not "as a part completes another into a whole, but, as it were, as two totalities complete one another" (Levinas, OF

SHULAlvUT

p. 35) is biblically based, as he

M. SHAPIRO

to the Talmudic discussion

between Ra v and Shmuel over Eve's creation from Adam's rib. The essential idea that Levinas draws out from their discussion is that the "identity of nature between man and woman, an identity of destiny and dignity, and also a subordination of sexual life to the personal relation" (Levinas, DF p.35). He believes, as the Bible instructs, that ethical behavior is more important than sexuality and, even mater nity. Luce Irigaray finds Levinas' lack of concern with sexual pleasure velY problematic. She maintains that Levinas defines women's sexuality only in accordance with modesty, in that it "sustains desire, ... rekindles pleasure" (Irigaray, p.llD). In so doing, he denies the importance of erotic satisfaction and pleas;.:tre of women. She claims that Levinas' understanding is clouded by his ownmale paradigm, which causes him to dictate female sexuality on the basis ofjouissance, or "masculine pleasure" (Irigaray, p.109). She laments the change from the goddess tradition, when"female sexual organs always appear in the representations of the bodies o£women, particularly goddesses" (Irigaray, p. 109). She suggests that as the masculine hegemony of SOciety developed, these images, and the acceptance of female sexuality that they represented, were sup pressed. She implies that Levinas shares the ideas of those patriar chal figures who support repressing female sexuality. She also celebrates an eroticism which results in II the loss of boundaries which takes place for both lovers when they cross the boundary of the skin into the mucous membranes of the body, leaving the circle which encloses my solitude to meet in a shared space" (Irigaray, p. 111) and criticizes Levinas for not understanding the importance of such relations. Irigaray's emphaSiS on sexuality does not seem to be mir

AND LEVIN AS CREATED A CONTROVERSY ABOUT WOMEN

rored in Levinas' discussions. While Levinas does address sexual issues, he clearly voices the biblical view that they should be subor足 dinated to ethical ones. In his essay"And God Created Woman," Levinas analyzes the significance of the seemingly unnecessary repetition of the letter yod in the word vayetzer, or made. One of the many reasons the Talmud gives for the unusual spelling is that it represents the conflict within human nahlre between instinctual desires and obligations towards the Torah, or towards law in gen足 eral. Humans are constantly forced to choose between fulfilling "the healthy desires of a creature that hungers, what Pascal called concupiscence, what we might call the erotic" (Levinas, NTR p.166) and the Law. What distinguishes humans from animals, according to the Talmud, is that they can choose to obey laws and a Creator. It is man's obedience which defines him" (Levinas, NTR p.166) as well /I

as the quality and sense of order that exists in his life. Levinas does not deny the importance of sexual desire. He maintains, however, that human beings, as opposed to animals, cmmot succumb to evelY desire absolutely. His assertions are based directly on passages from Tractate Berachot . Levinas also analyzes the Talmudic discussion on the ambi足 guity of Eve's creation. The events surrounding Eve's creation have proven to be quite problematic for feminists who believe that the subjugation of women throughout history began with this story. Levinas is acutely aware of this difficulty. He fashions his reading of the Talmud around discrediting the notion that women were created with an inherently inferior status. His justification is entirely Talmu足 dic. While the Bible states th,at Eve was formed from Adam's rib, Talmudic rabbis argue about whether sllch an image is literal, or whether it refers to Adam's face or taiL n1e literal translation suggests that since woman was created from a body part that is

SHULAMIT

M. SHAPIRO

necessary for both sexes, she "is not merely the female of man," but "she belongs to the human" (Levinas, NTR p.169). The Talmudic rabbis who support the translation of rib as a face can be understood as "[positing] a perfect equality between the feminine and the masculine" that infuses within male I female relationships a sense of "equal dignity" (Levin as, NTR p.169). The rabbis in the Talmud who understand that rib refers to the tail imply that the creation of woman was a deliberate act on the part of the Creator. G-d did not simply allow woman to emerge through natural evolution, from a lost bone /I

of man," but rather, He changed a part of man to create woman. G足 d wanted woman to exist and therefore "she came forth from a real act of creation" (Levinas, NTR p.169). Levinas believes that indicates that "it is not woman who is secondary; it is the relationship with woman that. is secondary; it is the relationship with woman as woman that does not belong to what is fundamentally human" (Levinas, NTR, p.169). It is not G-d or the Bible which creates society's negative attitude towards women, but the actions of the people within SOciety. Levinas' failure to discuss the intricacies of either male or female erotic experiences is not because Levinas "knows nothing of communion in pleasure" nor because he has never experienced the II

transcendence of the other which becomes im-mediate ecstasy in me and with him - or her," (h'igaray, p. 110) as Irigaray so boldly suggests. It is because, as he states explicitlYI that "the sexual is only an accessory of the human" (Levinas, Nine Talmudic Readings, p. 170). Humanity is "responsible for the universe" (Levinas, NTR p. 170) and Levinas is much more concerned with the spiritual ramifi足 cations for both men and women in fulfilling this responsibili ty than he is about either gender fulfilling sexual desires. Levinas asserts that man is responsible for his actions towards others, towards

AND LEVINAS CREATED A CONTROVERSY ABOUT

W m,fEN

women. Levinas believes that it is much more productive to study how man treats this responsibility through his behavior in society, than it is to use his sexual behavior as a barometer for his general attitudes. Levinas, much to the dismay ofIrigaray, clearly states that "it is not the acuteness of libidinous desire that, in itself, would explain the soul" (Levinas, NTR p.170). He endeavors to "challenge ... the revolution which thinks it has achieved the ultimate by destroying the family so as to liberate imprisoned sexuality" (Levinas, NTR p. 170). He explicitly rejects "'the claim of accomplishing on the sexual plane the real liberation of man" (Levinas, NTR p.170). Levinas believes that the exploration of one's ethical responsibility is a more appropriate method of probing the human psyche. lrigaray further chides Levinas for emphasizing the "expe足 rience of love" (Irigaray, p.111) rather than the erotic pleasure that results when two lovers"enter a fluid universe where the perception of being two persons becomes indistinct" (Irigaray, p.111). For Levinas, such an effacement of the alterity between two persons represents a type of violence. Throughout his works, he expresses his objection to viewing others of extensions of ourselves, as alien /I

objects to be manipulated for the advantage of the individual or .social self," (Levinas, TI p. 12) or as an"object to be subsumed under one of my categories and given a place in my world" (Levinas, TI p. 13). He rejects this totalizing, Hegelian merging of self and other that characterizes lrigaray's ultimate sexual experience. Catherine Chalier contends that Levinas' distinction between the masculine and the feminine - viriIi ty and the home - is demeaning towards women.

She explores the ramifications of Levinas'

prioritization of ethics over ontology..For Levinas, "the endeavor that each being makes to persevere in his own being" (Chalier, p. 120) or conatus is an active, difficult struggle. Engaging in such a struggle

SHULAMIT

M. SHAPIRO

towards the unfolding of our being is quite necessary and "we must find in this strength'the very virility of the universal and conquering logos'" (Chalier, p.121). The unfolding

a woman's being exists in

her ability to combat the alienation that results from conatus, to /I

answer to a solitude inside this privation and ... to a solitude that

subsists in spite of the presence of G-d; to a solitude in the universal, to the inhumanwhich continues to well up even when the human has mastered nature and raised itto thought" (Levinas, DF p.33). Chalier's difficulty vvith such an interpretation is that it essentializes feminine characteristics as being nurturing and passive: "the feminine func足 tionis not to create/ (Chalier, p.123) but rather to simply to respond to masculine behavior. Since the feminine bears the responsibility of restoring the moral state of being of the universe, feminine action becomes "both an ontological category and an ethical paradigm" (Chalier, p. 123). Chalier interprets this to mean that the feminine is only "a condition of ethics" that is excluded from lithe highest destiny of human being" (Chalier, p.123). This destiny "would be reserved for the masculine once it has been converted to ethics thanks to the feminine," (Chalier, p. 123) while women would have to content themselves with "being a mother and nothing else" (Chalier, p.127). I do not understand why Chalier assumes that masculine virility is inherently better than the feminine. Levinas does not seem to make these value judgments nor does he prioritize one realm above another. It seems to me that the only reason virility is seen as superior is because it is attributed to the masculine realm. Wouldn't it be just as great an injustice towards womenhad the feminine realm

been described as

overpowerin~

solitary and alienating, one from

which they needed to find shelter from within the male realm? Furthermore, Chalier's assertion that Levinas conflates female ethi足

AND LEVINAS CREATED A CONTROVERSY ABOUT WOMEN

cal responsibility and ontological destiny seems misplaced. Levinas describes one's unfulfillable obligation towards the other as pretemporal, and more importantly, as universal. Noone is exempt from their responsibility towards the other and women do not get off the hook by having children. Chalier's discussion of the matriarch Rebecca as a biblical figure of the feminine" (Chalier, p.127) testifies U

to this and I would think that Levinas would completely agree with her example. Rebecca tends to Abraham's servant, Eliezer, and to his camels when he stops at her well in search of a suitable wife for Isaac. In her kindness, Rebecca demonstrates the importance of fulfilling her "responsibility for this stranger" (Chalier, p. 127) and is thus chosen to wed Isaac. She adds to the fulfillment of her ethical duty through this act, even though it does not involve bearing children. Irigaray and Chalier discuss several important issues within Levinas' work. lrigaray finds Levinas lacking in sensitivity towards female sexuality. She accuses him of contributing to a masculine paradigm that prevents erotic pleasure for women, while preserving it for men. Chalier believes that Levinas' concept of the feminine

prevents women from attaining the same ethical destiny as he affords to men. Levinas' own arguments seem to stem not from a desire to oppress women, nor from a belief in the inherent superior足 ity of men. Rather, Levinas grounds his arguments in biblical exegesis. His understanding of social and sexual gender roles through'the lens of Talmudic discussions and decisions results in a less politically acceptable, but in my opinion, a more insightful philosophy.

SHULAMIT

M. SHAPIRO

WORKS CITED

1 Catherine Chalier. IJEthlcs and the Feminine./I in .Re足 Reading Levinas. eds. Robert Bemasconi and Simon Critchley. 2 Luce Irigaray. "Questions to Emmanuel Levinas." in Reading Levinasf ed. Bernasconi and Critchley. 3 Levinas, Emmanuel. Totality and Infinity. 4 _ _ ."Judaism and the Feminine/' in Difficult Freedom. 5 . (above)" And God Created Woman/' in Talmudic Readings.

QUESTION OF ETHICS

Joe Landau

Duke University

How do we begin an authentic ethical search? Where do we look for answers? Who will help us in our search? There does not appear to be any way of finding answers to such questions. And yet, when faced with ethical crises, we often look for answers in the form of prefabricated solutions. We rely on the teaching of others, usually from the past, to inform us with their own wisdom. We look to the great moral philosophers like Plato and Kant, or refer our questions to the teaching of a higher Being. We examine the past decisions of political leaders, or perhaps even those of our own parents and grandparents. Referring our own dilemmas to the teaching and wisdom of others, although certainly understandable, never proves to be ad足 equate. Despite a wealth of resources surrounding the issues of ethica 1and moral life, our current age is one that has experienced not a decline, but a resu~gence of ethical crises. Although it is beyond the scope of this essay to provide solutions for all of these, what I hope to do here is redirect our inquiry of ethical life toward a new path that will take a fresh approach to some of our most critical ethical dilemmas, particularly those surrounding questions of difference in culture and identity in the modern world. My approach, while certainly theoretical, is intended to inform our practical concerns. The encounter with ethics that I propose presents enormous risk and many challenges. Yet it is only through engaging such a question Lalldau is a 1995 graduate of Duke llniversity; wl1e1'e he majored ill political scicnce and french, He is currently a reSeate/ler ill Washington nc. This essay was prelliously published ill Eruditio, Duke University's u1ldergraduate joumal of social and political science.

Episteme - Volume VII- May 1996

JOE LANDAU

that we can fashion a truly creative and authentic ethical life. Nietzsche and the danger of the abyss "God is dead/' wrote the philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche. 1 What did Nietzsche mean by this? Nietzsche certainly knew that the Christian religion was still a thriving order, so the notion that"God is dead" was not a comment on the state of organized religion. Nietzsche posited a philosophy that was "beyond good and evil/' and consequently his theories presented a certain danger. They couldbe manipulated in order to support all kinds of horrific actions, as in the case of Nazism. At the same time, however, Nietzsche's teaching influenced a number of 20th century philosophers, most of whom have embraced liberal political philosophies and have es足 chewed any alignment with fascist regimes. These thinkers include Sartre, Foucault, and Denida. With their turn away from fascism, these thinkers have defended Nietzsche's philosophy as the first attempt to create spaces for an understanding of human difference, one that is more inclusive of the needs ofthose people who have fallen outside of the privileged majority in liberal political systems. Indeed, Nietzsche can even serve as a point of departure for an ethical search, as his belief in the death of God places us squarely before our task. If "God is dead" and His rules and commandments are null, then we become the sale bearers of both legislating and following a new system of ethical behavior. The dictates of the Old and New Testa足 ments lose their place as holy signifies of the divine order and become relegated to the status of "text/' in which their value is measured as any other work of literature, The death of God poses an end to Judea-Christian morality, and with it the decay of nalurallaw, human rights, and eventually politics itself. At the same time,

A QUESTION OF ETHICS

however, the absence of God amplifies each person's unique respon足 sibility to cultivate his or her own ethical life, one that can be made with true conviction and dedication. We may try to convince ourselves that we can live in a world in which the contours of ethics have been established by God, nature,

or History, but this is only a form of self-deception. Although it might be more comforting to believe tha t the ethical path has already been carved out for us, and that our role is merely to follow that path, such a view would belie the most fundamental aspect of authentic ethical decision making. It would preclude our own engagement in ethics, and would relegate ethical questions to an abstract, disinter足 ested level. Ethical life, once abstracted from daily existence, would become a type ofluxury item affordable only to the most "righteous." When ethical issues are seen as removed from daily experience, then we are in serious danger, because we have forgotten that ethics is an everyday issue, not one that is reserved merely for theologians and philosophers. ~e

are, through the death of God, left without any guiding

light to lead us toward solving our own ethical dilemmas. We are confronted with the possibility that the whole notion of ethics is a mere projection of the human will. The security of natural law, which accorded each individual his or her own inherent dignity, is no longer a veritable premise. The liberal political doctrines posited by Hobbes and Locke become questionable insofar as they rely on a faulty assertion tha t such "natural rights" could ever exist at all. The safety net of "inherent human dignity" is stripped away. We are brought to the dark, unfathomable abyss of human existence. Per足 haps nothing is true. And in the final moment, we experience the most complete feeling of nihilism: the world is one large chaotic mass of disorder with no meaning and no answers. Everything is false,

JOE LANDAU

and we are alone, without guidance in the world. This dark moment, this abysmal hour, is not necessarily the moment of doom. On the contrary, it is the point from which we begin a process of authentic ethical decision making. It is the point where we realize that ethical life is an issue that transcends the prefabricated (and illusive) answers provided by God, nature, His足 tory, etc. Ethics can no longer be resolved through these exterior and abstract sources, and is left standing as a question whose answer 'We must determine. This condition propels us toward engaging the issue of ethics for ourselves. We are brought to a new awareness, through the teaching of Nietzsche, that we cannot deny our ethical existence and our own role in forming ethical life. We are brought to the realization tha t we are in charge, and must take full responsibility for the future and implementation of ethics. Responsibility and agency and the issues of identity and

culture If we look around us, there is no doubt that the question of

ethics is currently more complex than it has ever been. Questions of ethical life have become inextricably bound with the practical con足 cerns over culture, identity, and difference. These issues, I would argue, contribute to our most intense debates over ethics, and often prove to be insoluble. Considerations of right and legitimacy are mediated not through conversation and negotiation, but rather through subordination to whomever holds the most power. The political and ethical resolution to this absence of mutual respect implies a return to the war of all against all- Hobbes' primordial state of nature. Amidst all of the uncertainty surrounding conflicts among different cultures and identities, is it possible to think again

QUESTION OF ETHICS

about a new ethic which would integrate rather than separate our diverse communities? Furthermore, could this ethical plan be one that eschews both the false assumption in exterior and prefabricated solutions to the meaning of life as well as the abusive, authoritarian resolution based on power alone? It is atthis hazy point, this moment of anxiety, that a new, authentic view of ethics begins to arise. Such a new ethics begins when we attempt to advance an ethical position out of this abysmal encounter with the possibility that consensus, community, and mutual understanding may be impossible. Although we have come to the point where we realize thatthe hope for an 11 objective" or complete knowledge of human beings is impossible, there are still great strides to be made in coming to a greater understanding of the diverse perspectives which comprise both our national polity as well as our global community. The first step toward crafting a new ethics requires a recognition that these diverse views do exist, and that there is consequently no single view which holds a monopoly on morality. Contrary to the Enlighten足 ment view that we could discover a perfect and ordered knowledge of human beings, our age is one that recognizes our own shortsight足 edness when it comes to understanding the diverse body of human beings. This recognition of our own ignorance is a crucial step in crafting our ethics. Once we realize that there might not be a clear cut answer to our ethical dilemmas, we incorporate a new self-criticism into our assessment of the decisions that we make. We open ourselves to engaging new values posited by new speakers, and we carve an ethics through consensus and coalition-building as op足 posed to dogmatic assertions and pedantic, authoritarian dichmls. Furthermore, we continue to see ethics as a question, which reminds us that in order to continue to live ethically, we must reawaken the question in order to maintain our commitment to deriving an ethics

JOE LANDAU

from our own responsibility. This responsibility implies not only a commitment to the question of ethics, but also a care for those who journey with us down the new paths we create.

Care - what makes a truly dialogical ethic possible Given the new approach toward ethics that Ihave delineated, there is still a vital question that remains to be addressed. How shall we comport ourselves toward the new question of ethics? How do we begin to build a new road toward ethics? Although the solutions vary according to the particular conflicts which arise, they have one common theme: the new road toward ethics must be a dialogical one in which diverse members of different communities give proper estimation for the importance of conversation. Ethics, as I have already argued, is not simply about creating various ideals that dictate what it means to display "good" and "moral" behavior. Although this can be an important aspect of ethical 1i fe, it should not be its primary condition, because ethics is an everyday question that concerns our practical encounters. Consequently, it is paramount that we begin with these experiences and craft our ethic accordingly, as opposed to creating a moral code that appears perfect but is seldom achieved inhuman practice. Keeping in mind the need for an ethic of dialogue, one which begins with our daily experiences and therefore views ethics as a matter not only for philosophers and theologians, but rather for all human beings, I would like to turn more specifically to the questions of culture and identity. No longer do we think of cultures - American, French, South African, etc. - as univocal entities, but rather as phenomena replete with internal differences and complexities.

We speak of

multiculturalism, or an attempt to show greater esteem for the

QUESTION OF ETHICS

different traditions of human beings living in the same locale. Our new-founded esteem for different cultures is representative of an effort to make a greater space for the voices of different perspectives and views that contribute to a pluralisticsodety. Theetrucal position that I advance is an integration of this multiculturalist perspective into an ethics that we create for ourselves. Such a new path toward the pursuit of ethics requires first that we understand all human beings as interdependent, who through participation in different cultures give rise to the identity of not only their particular culture, but the culture of others as well. The importance of recognizing the role played by others in our own self-formation takes on special importance with the absence of God outlined earlier. If, as I have argued, we are left on our own to derive our system of etrucs apart from the ones handed downby previous religious, philosophies, and historical figures, then. our own ethics must include a proper estinla足 tion of the vital role that others play in our own formation. I-Iuman differences in culture and identity take on meaning only insofar as they can be measured against one another; no single perspective has significance in a vacuum. Thus, diverse perspectives participate in a kind of dialectic, in which each perspective is contin足

gent on the pel'spective of others, taking on meaning only within a marketplace of ideas. Each identity participates in a two-way relationship of giving to and receiving from others. It is through this notion of a dialectical or interrelated identity that a certain responsi足 bilityarises. We can build a new path for ethical life only through a continual display of care for the differences and distinctions that surround us. The question of cultural difference no longer becomes a matter thatinvalves merely other people, but ourselves as well. We are both constructed by the identities of others as well as important agents in affecting the formation of their own identity. In summa足

JOE LANDAU

tion, the relationship between different cultures amounts to a dialec tical phenomenon in which each identity reinforces the identities of

others. The ethicetl implication of such a phenomenon is a sincere commitment to a conversation among diverse selves. This conversa tion represents in my view the most compelling path toward an ethically progressive stance that makes possible better understand ing and appreciation of difference in relation to both identity and culhlre. Ra ther than to imagine that we create our identities s h'ictly by ourselves, we must recognize the importance that others play in our own self-formation. Others make us aware of our own distinctive ness through presenting alternative perspectives, values, and ideals. In understanding the vital role that others play in our own identity, we take awareness of our fundamental interdependence. We realize that it would be impossible to sever ourselves from others, because our own identity has meaning only in context to the way others have both defined us and set themselves apartfrom us. Consequently, our own identity is a manifestation of the different identities that we see in others. We are, at base, not alienated, but connected with others. Each individual self does not positthe world through the rubric ofms or her own consciousness alone, but rather reaches an understanding of the world through the differences presented by others. Having enumerated the dialectical relations between distinct peoples, I will illustrate this phenomenon in the context of both African-American and Jewish cultures as well as gay and straight identities. First I will turn to the struggle between the African American and Jewish communities. Amidst all of the finger-point ing and name calling exerted by leaders of both communities, as well as the proliferation of stereotypes and stigmas assigned by each community against the other, an important unity between the two

QUESTION OF ETHICS

groups has been forgotten. This unity is not only what the groups share in terms of parallel histories, but also their interdependence and need for each otherin their own forma tion. This interrelatedness has been forgotten in two groups' lmyielding efforts to set them足 selves apart from one another, refusing to see their cultures as interdependent in any way. Despite the often antagonistic terms upon which the debate between African-Americans and Jews has been presented, the two possess an important connection. They have, in many ways, strength足 ened each other's identity despite their insistence on being radically different. Each culture has learned from and been affected by the other, and has used this knowledge in fashiOning its own identity. Although each group has often referred to the other as a group of conspirators out to destroy their own development, they have failed to recognize that this antagonism has taken place only tlu'ough a dialogue that has reinforced and affected their apparently different identities. They have referred to each other in various cultural, political, and economic contexts without recognizing thatboth groups participate in the same economic and political system, one that has presented them with similar conflicts and experiences. Their appar足 ent antagonism, though it has centered on their differences, has taken place only through their shared engagement in dialogue. This crucial dialogue, however hidden from everyday discourse, has played a vital role not only in shaping the identity of each group, but aJso in reinforcing their fundamental intercoIDlectedness. Their particular conflict, like many others, has resulted not from their radical differ足 ences, but rather from their contingency on one another in forming their own identity. African-Americans and Jews, rather than being adversaries or enemies, are more importantly interlocutors, who parti.cipate in a

JOE LANDAU

dialogue in which identity and culture are constantly being refash ioned and refigured. Recognizing such interdependence would be an enormous aid in bringing the groups to a clearer and more informed understanding of their own situation as well as a greater respect for others. The importance of an ethic of dialogue has significance not only in context to this phenomenon, but in others as well, for instance in the more recent dialogues over sexual identity. With the growing political strength of gay and lesbian groups, our age has wihlessed akind ofbalkanjzation, in which both groups have a ttempted to understand their sexualities as fundamentally distinct. Debates have arisen over the questions of gender consh'uetion, with some arguing that sexual identity is biologically determined (essen tialism), while others believing it to be a result of cultural and environmental factors (social constructivism). People have become so ideologically fixed to their particular view that they have lost sight of the more crucial principles around which they were originally organized. Groups of homosexual and heterosexual people have begun to think of all human differences as subordinate to the ques tion of sexual identity. They have used the issue of sexual identity to separate people rather than to bring them together. What has been lost in this debate has been recognition of the faet that sexual identity, like questions of race and ethnicity, partici pate in a crucial dynamic that ultimately unites diverse groups as opposed to dividing them. The questions of sexual identity serve as a link between different people who are brought together in the conversation, even though they may speak from different experi ences and viewpoints. Although their conversation often carries with it a rhetoric in which they view themselves as fundamentally distinct beings, their discourse overlooks the fact that stich apparent differences actually participate in a common ethical struggle that

QUESTION OF ETHICS

brings them together. They lose sight of the importance of the dialogue, and become preoccupied with secondary matters that overlook this vital cOlmection. What is needed, then, is a new recognition of this fundamental connection between interlocutors. Given the fact that we can only come to an understanding of our足 selves through being presented with the differences found in others, we must give greater estimation for our interrelatedness. If we can place more importance on tl"le role that dialogue plays in ethical life, we will be able to work toward stronger and more informed under足 standings of one another. We will be able to gain better perspectives on ourselves and our lives in context to the lives of others. We will be able to count on one another for guidance in reclaiming ethical life as a daily affair, one for which we bear sole responsibility. This awareness, however, can be achieved only when we once again show esteem for our interdependence, which requires care for our most fundamental connectedness. Only when we view this care as central to our ethical life will we be able to truly build and traverse our new ethical path. Authenticity and a new ethical path Ethics, I have argued, in order to remain authentic, must be treated as a question and not as an answer. Just as the conversation among different participants must be kept open, so must the various

801u Hon.s to particular ethical dilemmas be h'eated as negotiations and not eternal solutions. As new identities emerge, presenting new and different perspectives, the debate must accommodate these voices and not withdraw from the responsibility to entertain new con nicts. By treating ethics as a question, we will be able to maintain our self-critical edge as opposed to dogmatically excluding new

JOE LANDAU

possibilities. Our inability to uncover any etemal Truth that will direct the rest of history requires that we remain open to these possibilities, and hence that we return to the primacy of care for the conversation and dialogue among diverse selves. Despite our vast and varied resources, the question of ethical life continues to puzzle us. The various answers handed down by our predecessors have not adequately enabled us to do away" with 1/

ethical questions and concems. At the end of the day, we are still left on our own, forced to answer the labyrinthian questions concerning ethical life by ourselves. We are, in the words ofSartre, "abandoned" to solve the mysteries and questions of our time with neither the help of our forebears nor the promise that the choices we make can be verified by any objective standard. We are left, ultimately, with only ourselves as the judge of our own acts. Rather than neglect this vital responsibility, we .must adhere to it seriously. We must confront the differences tltat so much make up the current strifes among cultures and identities, in recognizing the vital role that different members playas interlocutors in a cmcial dialogue. This dialogue must lead us to fashion a new ethic of conversation, in which. we keep the question of ethics open in order to accommodate new voices. Finally, we must esteem ourselves as the ones who will both take on the arduous task of deriving a new path for pursuing ethics as well as traverse that path, in forming a new ethics that caters to the conflicts of our own age. It is along this path that we begin a more authentic journey toward an ethics that calls upon our utmost human possibili足 ties.

A QUESTION OF

ENDNOTES

The notion that "God is dead" is found throughout Nietzsche's work. Consequently, there is no single source which exemplifies Nietzsche's conviction in the death of God. The death of God is a recurrent theme in Nietzsche's Thus Spoke Zarathustra, and is found as early as the second aphorism of the prologue. See Kaufmann, The Portable Nietzsche (New York: Viking Press, 1980), 124.

AMY

COPLAN

INCHOATE FEMINISM IN PLATO'S REPUBLIC

Amy Coplan

University of Kansas

By the last part of the fifth century in classical Greece, the question offemale status was finally being addressed. The Trachiniae, the Medea, and the Alcestis all explored issues concerning the treat ment of women, while the Lysistrata and Ecclesiazusae explicitly addressed the question of the female role. Plato, perhaps the most vehement critic of Athens, thoroughly explored this issue in his most famous work, the Republic. In this work, Plato exhibits his strong contempt for the Athenian state. Convinced that the state has a profound effect on the virtue of its citizens, Plato makes his primary function in this dia logue the construction of a utopian state that achieves the greatest possible happiness and virtue for the entire community. For Plato, this notion of community happiness entails neither liberty, eguality orjustice ns they are understood today, but instead values hmmony, efficiency and most importantly, moral goodness. Furthermore, the utilitarian good will always take precedence over any individual's good. Plato's utopia is imbued with his unique socialism as well as his culture's elitism. Thus, Plato was concerned with neither libera tion for anyone nor with righting the sexist wrongs of his society; his only goal was to attempt to create an ideal state that produced excellence on all levels. Smith argues that none of Plato's arguments or proposals stand alone, but that all are made "in the service of his larger aim,-to arrange hierarchy, social power, and control, so that Copll1ll is II sellior at the University of Kansas" majoring in philosophy and classicnl lal!gul7ges. Sire plalls to attend gl-adunte school in tlJe fall of 1996, where slJe wishes to concentrate 011 anciellt philosophy.

Episteme • Volume VII- May 1996

INCHOATE FEMINISM IN PLATO'S REPUBLIC

'the best' rules over the worst, with reason, according to nature" (27). The status of women in Republic V, therefore, must be understood in terms of this higher goal. Plato's only intent in making his proposal for women is to achieve what is best for the state, and he does not frame his proposals with terms such as equality, fairness or feminism. The post-Enlightenment notion of sex-equality is in fact incompatible with Plato's aristocratic program which stratifies a society into permanent classes. Nevertheless, Plato's treatment of the position of women in his ideal state, and in the guardian class in particular, is extremely important. Smith explains that

Plato was the first Western philosopher to work out a philosophical thesis which takes a cenh'al place in many contemporary investigations in feminist theory . (27)

The focal point of many ofthm.;e invcHtigalioJlS iH Book V

of the Repub

lic (Republic V) in which he carefullyoutlines1 the role

of women in the guardian class. Socrates begins his treatment of the position of women at 451d as he questions whether women should perform the same functions as men. Using the metaphor of female watchdogs, he pushes Polemarchus, Ademaintus, and Glaucon to re-consider the traditional view of the female role. 2

Soc.: Do we think that the wives of our guardian watchdogs should guard what the males guard, hunt with them, and do everything else in common with them? Or should we keep the women at home, as incapable of doing this, since th.ey must bear and rear the puppies, while the males work and have the entire

AMY COPLAN

care of the flock? (451d, trans. G.M.A. Grube)

Using this metaphor, Socrates forces the interlocutors to agree that women and men should perform the same tasks and they all agree that if the state uses lithe women for the same things as the men, they must also be taught the same things" (452a). Because Socrates appreciates the radical nature of his pro足 posal and expects that the education of women will be met with incredulity, he takes time to address the importance of reason over sccial convention.

Soc.: And now that we've begun to speak about this, we must move on to the tougher part of the law, begging these people not to be silly but to take the matter seriously. They should remember that it wasn't very long ago that the Greeks themselves thought it shameful and ridiculous (as the majority of the bar足 barians still do) for even men to be seen naked and that when the Cretans and then the Lacedaemonians began the gymnasiums, the wits of those times could also have ridiculed it alL (452c-d)

In this argument, Socrates illustrates his willingness to reject the social and cultural mores of his time in the interest of excellence. His appeal to rationality over accepted cultural norms is important for feminist methodology, which must combat a history permeated by sexist tradition. After confirming the logic of his initial proposal, Socrates then turns to the question of whether or not"female nature can share all the tasks of that of the male, or none of them, or some of them" (453a). The interlocutors must examine their now paradoxical posi足

INCHOATE FEMINISM IN PLATO'S REpUBLIC

tion: they claim that though men and women have different natures, they should nevertheless perform the same tasks. This raises prob足 lems because they have already agreed that different natures must II

follow different ways of life ..." (453e). Determined to pursue the initial position, Socrates decides to scrutinize more closely the issue of nature. He argues that their problem originates with their failure to "examine the form of natural difference and sameness"(454b). Thus, he begins to investigate the relevance of the differences between men and women. Though he does not deny that there is a difference, he reminds the interlocutors that the discussion of differ足 ence has focused on the one form of sameness and difference that Ii

was relevant to the particular ways of lives themselves" (454c). Framing the notion of difference in this way, he then asserts one of the most heretical views of his time: the biological differences that exist between men and women do not entail intellectual and moral differences and, therefore, are without social significance:

Soc.: if the male sex is seen to be different from the female with regard to particular craft or way of life, we'll say that relevant one must be assigned to it. But if it's apparent thatthey differ only in this respect, that the females bear children while the males beget them, we'll say that there has been no kind of proof that women are different from men with respect to what we're talking about, and we'll continue to believe that our guardians and their wives mllst have the same way of life. (454e)

Socrates then pushes the argument further, claiming that the burden of proof to show how men and women differ other than biologically lies with the individual who would bar women from

AMY COPLAN

equal education. He never denies that there might be fundamental differences between the sexes but claims that the obvious difference in biology has no social implications.

Smith gives the following

account of Socrates position on the possibility of other differences between the sexes:

he takes a position in which a neutral or open scien足 tific question on the differences between the sexes yields to a social and moral imperative. The evidence on sex differences is not all in. If there is a lack of definitive evidence, why suppose unequal status or training is preferable to equal training? Give the benefit of the open question to those who might excel under the more generous proposal of equal educa足 tion. The burden of proof lies with those who would deny equal status. (31)

Though the arguments in Republic V thus far demonstrate a radical departure from the prevailing attitudes and assumptions concerning women in classical Greece, Socrates does qualify this emancipated role for women: lithe various natures are distlibuted in the same way in both creatures3. Women share by nature in every way of life just as men do, but in all of them women are weaker than men" (455e). This qualification leads Glaucon to raise the question of the type of education for the male and female guardians: "should we have one kind of education to produce women guardians, then, and another to produce men, especially as they have the same natures to begin with" (456d)? Socrates, again in the interest of the highest good for the state, argues against this, asking if" there is anything better for a city than having the best possible men and women as its

INCHOATE FEMINISM IN PLATO'S REPUBLIC

citizens" (456e)? Because the answer to his question is obviously no, and, because they have determined that music, poetry and physical training are those things which will produce the best male guardians, the interlocutors establish identical curricula for the female and male guardians. Socrates' next move in Republic V is to abolish the nuclear family of the guardian class. Recognizing the tension between the oikos and the polis, Socrates .substitutes the nuclear family with communal coupling. This coupling will be the basis for a eugenic program that will ensure the proliferation ofexcellence in the society. Throughout this proposal, though the language is arsenocentric 足 "community of children and wives for the guardians" - Socrates proposes the same conditions and practices for men and women. Okin has argued that, despite Socrates imposition of the same i

restrictions on both men and women, the language suggests that female guardians are to be the property of the male ones. She claims that Jlwomen are classified by Plato, as they were by the culture in which he lived, as an important subsection of pl'opcrty(34). Vlastos, however, refutes this view, explaining how this conclusion is not entailed by the specific conditions discussed in the text: 4

in any given marriage-group every woman belongs to all the men in. the peculiar, but precise, sense that, make anyone of them the father of her child. Mutatis mutandis every man belongs to every woman in his group in exact1y the same sense. And there is no other relevant sense of "belonging." So the relation cannot be ownership. It would make no sense to say that x is t s property when y is also XiS property.(15)

Because Vlastos shows how the textual evidence is contrary to

AMY COPLAN

Okin's reading, it is implausible to view Plato as having classified women in their traditional role as the subordinate charge of the male.S His language is problematic, but it is possible that customary language habits outlasted the prejudices that created them. 6 Within his proposal for the abolition of the nuclear fanuly, which clearly rejects the contempormy norms of classical Greece, Socrates makes unprecedented provisions for the sexual status of those men and women who have surpassed the age of child-bear ing7; I think that when women and men have passed the age of having children, we'll leave them free to have sex with whomever they wish.(461c) With the elimination of private property in the guardian class, strict sexual restrictions are no longer necessary; the proper inherit ance of private proper'.y was the primaly function of regulating the sex lives of women8. Thus, a sexual liberty, which was always available to Athenian men, is granted to women. Vlastos comments that "the double stanuard of sexual morality is wiped out"( 14). Socrates' description of the sexual staWs of the guardian women is his last specific treatment of women in the Republic. He does continue, however, to make disparaging remarks about "wom anish" behavior. Furthermore, he fails to create an emancipatOlY program for the majority of the free women in the ideal society. Commenting nowhere at length on their status, he implicitly sug gests that the typical status quo position of Athenim1. women will apply to the women of the lower strata. In analyzing this unambigu ouslyanti-feminist attitude toward the auxiliary and guardian classes, it should be noted, however, that the status of men in these classes is

also oppressive. Plato's elitism, and not his putative misogyny, is the

INCHOATE FEMINISM IN PLATO/S REpUBLIC

overarching oppressor of these lower strata. Having outlined the arguments evinced in Republic V, we can now begin to address the question of their significance for women. The status of women in fourth century Athens was in general one of oppression. Geddes provides a more specific account of their position:

women had no political power, no real control over wealth, were considered in the eyes of the law as . adjuncts to their men folk rather than as people in their own right/ were not educated to enjoy the artistic and scientific pleasures that their culture offered/ and by convention were deprived of the society and con足 versation of the privileged citizens of that culture. They were denied the satisfactions of political, com足 merciat intellechlal, and social engagement in the life of their times.(36)

Therefore, while the position of the women in the artisan and auxilimy classes doesn't i'cally differ from the stahts quo, the posi~ tion of the guardian women is markedly distinct. Vlastos contends that on the basis of Socrates' description, it follows that the guardian women would enjoy seven sets of rights that are systematically denied to women in Plato's Athens: the right to education, the right to vocational opportunity, the right to unimpeded social intercourse, legal capacity, the right to sexual choice (following the child~bearing years, the right to own and dispose ofproperty,9 and political rights. This set of radical new freedoms put forth in Republic V, therefore, is arguably the boldest rejectio~ of convention ever submitted for the purpose of liberating Athenian women. Interestingly, the program includes even more rigor than the Athenian fantasy of gender

AMy COPLAN

equality manifested in Aristophanes' Ecclesiazousae. How ironic that a philosopher's serious argument for the ideal state is more audacious than a poet's parody of the absurd. Many argue, however, thatthe seemingly progressive nature of Book V belies Plato's true feelings of misogyny. Scholars who makes this argument base their conclusions on both Plato's personal anti-feminist attitude and on the logic of his arguments in Book V. In my view, Plato's personal feelings need not be taken into consider足 ation in the analysis of his philosophy. Even so, there are two possible answers to this claim. Wender holds the view that, though Plato disliked women, his homosexuality rendered their emancipa足 tion non-threatening:

The misogynist homosexual has less to lose than the married man; he does not depend on the little woman at home to boost his ego and provide his comforts. Since he does not like women as they are, he would think it a small loss if they changed: if they should lose their femininity and become more like ll1en, he might actually like them.(87-88)

Wender pushes her argument further as she hypothesizes that "the heterosexual male is more afraid of the power of women" (88). Though unconventional, Wender's argument is relevant in light of Plato's strong sexual preferences and the unique nature of sexuality in classical Greece. Nevertheless, a more cogent answer to the charge can be made on the basis of Plato's metaphysics through which he sought a rational foundation for philosophic truths that were to be logically independent of his cultural milieu. Providing the possibil足 ity of complete transformation, the realm of the Forms commit Plato to admitting the potentiality of all people; those who come to know

INCHOATE FEMINISM IN

PL..no's REpUBLIC V

the Form of the Good will be transformed, experiencing a "turnabout of the soul from a day that is like night to the true day"(52Ic). Other scholars argue that the curriculum ofthe female guard足 ians is simply a logical consequent of Plato's abolition of the family. akin concludes that "If the female guardians were no longer to be defined in relation to particular men, children, and households, it seems that Plato had no alternative but to consider them persons in their own right" (40). There are several problems with this argument. First, the argument requires that the status of the female guardians follow from the proposed abolition of the family. If this is so, then akin cannot assume that there would already be women in the guardian class, since this is only confirmed at the outset of the discussion of their emancipation. Therefore, Plato is in no way committed to allowing women, who were theoretically no longer housewives and mothers, admission into the guardian class. If he believed that women were incapable of the highest excellence, it is doubtful that he would, against his inclinations, willingly place them in the highest class. Socrates is not restricted to one option; he could make a separate class for the female guardians or he could place them in the lower classes. Furthermore, contained in his argument for women guardians are the assertions that I-biological differences do not have social and political implications and that 2-genderis unre足 lated to soul, but, rather, individual souls determine the character of individuals. Both of these iconoclastic beliefs are too strong to have been made purely as subsidiary conditions to the nuclear family'S elimination. Annas, who rejects the characterization of Plato as a feminist, recognizes the independence of the two proposals:

PIa to justifies the aboli tion of the nuclear family solely

AMY COPLAN

on the grolU1ds of eugenics and of the unity of the state and there is seems no reason why these grounds should not hold even if women were not full Guard ians and had a subordinate status; Plato's second proposal is thus in principle independent of his first. (308)

These propositions, however, do not stand alone but are made in order to achieve the highest form of moral goodness for the state. By rejecting the supposed causal link between Plato's two proposals, I am in no way supporting the idea that Plato liberates guardian women in the interest of sex equality, but instead, I am arguing that both ideas follow from Plato's primary goal: utilitarian good. Despite the sincerity of Plato's emancipatory program, there is still the problem with Socrates' claim that women are weaker than men. Smith comments that "if weaker is taken to mean generally inferior including inferior intellechml ability, then the thesis that women should be equally educated falls prey to a series of reductios" (28). Therefore, unless one wants to concede that a.ll of Plato's arguments are undermined by this qualification-which is highly unlikely given Plato's fastidious method- the term weaker here cannot be interpreted to mean generally inferior. Smith sug gests that "we could take the weaker qualification as merely imply ing that women should be excused from certain activities" (28). This interpretation is compatible with Socrates' recognition of some bio logical difference, and therefore seems the most consistent with the rest of Book V. There still remains the problem of the depreciating remarks Socrates makes about women throughout the Republic. Vlastos is careful to point out that though these remarks are indeed sexist, "in the most damning of the disparaging remarks it is clear that he is speaking of women as they are under present, non ideal, condi

INCHOATE FEMINISM IN PLATO'S REpUBLIC

tions" (18). Socrates is criticizing women as they are in contemporary Athens and not all. the basis of their inherent nature. This qualifica足 tion does not excuse the remarks but mitigates their significance as they apply to the common run of women who Plato believed, along with the common run of men, to be perverted and misshapen by their corrupt society and not by their intrinsic natures. Socrates' treatment of the women in the auxiliary and artisan classes, however, is completely assailable forits anti-feminism. This unacceptable position works to mitigate the importance of Plato's radical proposal for the guardian women. Socrates' elitism, which at its worst border on becoming fascism, prohibits anyone from ever making the unqualified claim that Plato is a feminist. Nevertheless, Plato calmot be vilified for his acceptance of the status quo. Never inventing any sexist or prejudice claims, he on the one hand, fulfills the fourth century stereotypes of women, but all. the other hand, makes a startling break from the absoluteness of those conventions. Throughout his work, Plato displays a philo足 sophical integrity that values reason over convention and the ideal over the personal. Demonstrating a remarkable ambivalence, Plato is full of tension and ostensible contradiction. What then, if anything, can be said about Plato and his view of women? Vlastos claims that "Plato's affirmation of feminism within the ruling class of the Republic is the strongest ever made by anyone in the classical period" (12). JJ

Wender argues that Plato

advacated more lib era tion and privilege for them than any man in

history had ever done, so far as we knowl/(82). I,like these scholars, view Plato as having come the closest to a feminist position in the classical period. I would not assert that Plato was a champion of feminism, nor fairness, nor equality of any kind. I do believe, however, that the views espoused in Republic V distinguish him

AMY COPLAN

from his contemporaries and assure us today that even in fourth century Greece, elements of sexism were not always deemed ratio足 nal. Unlike his student Aristotle, who not only accepted the stereo足 typed notions of women, but endorsed and justified them, Plato, in his ideal state, allowed exceptional women to participate in the sacred activity of philosophy. Thus, I am convinced that Republic V, in its rejection of the misogynist norms of Plato's Athens, is some of

his finest philosophy.

WORKS CITED

1 Annas,Julia. "Plato's Republic and Feminism." Philosophy, July, (1976). 307-321. 2 Geddes, AIu1e. liThe Philosophic Notion of Women in Antiquity." Antichthon 9 (1975).35-41.

3 Okin, Susan Moller. "Philosopher Queens and Private Wives: Plato on Women and Family." The Family in Political Thought. V, (1979).31-50. 4 Plato. Republic. Trans. G.M.A. Grube. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1974.

5 Smith, Janet Farrell. "Plato,Irony,andEquality." ""-""'~~ Interpretations of Plato. Ed. Nancy Tuana. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994. 25-48. 6 Vlastos, Gregory. "Was Plato a Feminist?" Feminist Interpretations of Plato. Ed. Nancy Tuana. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994. 11-23.

INCHOATE FEMINISM IN PLATO'S REpUBLIC

7 Wender, Dorothea. "Plato: Misogynist, Paedophile, and Feminist." Arethusa 6 (1973): 75-90.

ENDNOTES

Plato is never the actual speaker in the Republic. There is great scholarly debate over the relationship between Plato and the views espoused by his interlocutors, but this debate does not fall into the scope of this paper. As most of the scholars do, I will attributethe ideas and intentions of Socrates to Plato. I will not, however, attribute the views of any of the other interlocutors to Plato.

2Plato is unclear throughout Book V about whether his proposals are concerned with only the guardians or apply to the auxiliary and artisan classes as welL Scholars disagree about this matter, but I read these proposals as referring to the guardian class only.

:IThe creatures he refers to are men and women. '\ Vlastos, in his article, is actually arguing against Pomeroy's view, but Pomeroy and Okin draw the same conclusion, both citing the language as evidence. Therefore, I feel that Vlastos' refutation of Pomeroy on this specific issue is tantamount to a refutation of Okin on the same issue. "I am only arguing that Okin's view is implausible in the context of the guardian class. I would not take the argument any further, and I believe that she is generally correct about Plato's view of women but not in this instance. I>

Gregory Vlastos, "Was Plato a Feminist?", Feminist Interpretations of Plato. 1994, p.l5.

AMY COPLAN

7The childbearing years in the Republic for women are between the ages of twenty and forty while and men are "from the time that he passes his peak as a numer until he reaches fifty足 five." (460e) B

Am1e Geddes, "The Philosophic N otlon of Women in Antiquity." Antichthon, 9, 1975, p.36 "Under Athenian law only men have this right Among Plato's private property is denied equally to men and to women, public support is denied equally to men and women, public support is assured equally to both." (Vlastos, 14)