Vol. XIV, Sept. 2003

EPISTEME

Volume XIV • September 2003

Episteme is published under the

auspices of the Denison University

Department of Philosophy

Granville, Ohio

ISSN 1542-7072

Edi tor-in-Chief Charles Shonk Assistant Editors Andrew Hupp ~latthew Tipping Editorial Board Brooke Bluestein Tamara Carty Ke\"in Connor Justin Jones NOall Lauricella Robert Wyllie Faculty Advisor Mark Moller

Episteme is published annually by a staff of u n d erg r a d u ate philosophy students at Denison University.

Please send all inquiries to: The Editors, Episteme, Deyartment ~f PhIlosophy, BlaH Kn~pp ,Hall, Del1i~on Uruverslty, Granville, Ohio 43023.

Episteml! aims to recognize and encourage excellence in undergraduate philosophy by providing examples of some of the best work currently being done in undergraduate philosophy programs around the world. Episteme intends to offer undergraduates their first opportunity to publish philosophical work. It is our hope that the journal will help stimulate philosophical dialogue and inquiry among students and faculty at colleges and universities.

Episteme ,>"ill consider papers written by undergraduate students in any area of philosophy; throughout our history we have published papers on a wide array of thinkers and topics, ranging from Ancient to Contemporary and philosophical traditions including Analvtic, Continental, and Eastern.

Subntissions should not exceed 4,000 路words. All papers undergo a process of blind revie'>v by the editorial staff and are evaluated according to the following criteria: quality of research, depth of philosophical inquiry, creativity, original insight, and clarity. Final selections are made by consensus of the editors and the editorial board. Please provide three double-spaced paper copies of each submission and a cover sheet including: author's name, mailing address (culTent and permanent), email address, telephone number, college or university name, and title of submission, as well as one (elecb"onic) copy formatted for Microsoft Word for Windows OIl a 3.5" disk. The deadline for submissions for Volume XIV is 15 February 2003.

EPISTEME

A Journal of Undergraduate Philosophy Volume XIV

September 2003

CONTENTS

Statement of Purpose and Editorial Board

4

Table of Contents

5

A Defense of Scientific Phenomenalism from the Perspective of Contemporary Physics John Lee, Taylor UniversihJ

6

Desertification and Metaphysics in Nietzsche and Abbey David Allen Chenault, Grinnell College

19

What is "NaturaY' About Natural Science?: Philosophical Naturalism in the Evolution Debate llya P. Winllilll!, Macalester College

31

ReJigious Experience, Pluralistic Knowledge and William James Brittany G. Trice, University ofMissouri-St. Louis

45

Behavior and Other Minds: A Response to Functionalists Mike Loclclmrt, Univel'sittJ ofRegina

62

The editors express sincere appreciation to the Denison University Research Foundation, the Denison Honors Program/ Pat Davis/ and Faculty Advisor Mark Moller for their assistance in making the publication of this jomnal possible.

We extend special gratitude to the Philosophy Department Faculty: Barbara Fultnef, David Goldblatt, Tony Lisska/ Jonathan Maskit, Mark Moller, Ronald E. Santoni, and Steven Vogel for their support.

A Defense of Scientific Phenomenalism from the

Perspective of Contemporary Physics JOHN LEE

odern science, particularly physics, is cur­ rently making claims about the existence of all kinds of fascinating entities. These range from quarks, superstrings, and gravitinos to singularities, warped spacetime, and gravitational waves.

While these entities inspire awe and amazement, it is possi­ ble that their positing is premature and perhaps entirely unfounded. In this essay, I will argue that this is indeed the case. Any ontological claims about the aforementioned enti­ ties rest on a form of realism that I believe is unwarranted.

Rather, anti-realism, particularly scientific phenomenalism is the view that seems to be most reasonable. In this essay, I will first explain a version of scientific phenomenalism (SP) defended by W.T. Stace. After addressing some standard objections, I will propose some advantages that SP holds over scientific realism, particularly in the realm of physicS. Scientific phenomenalism belongs to the larger cate­ gory of anti-realism. Anti-realism denies the main claims of realism, namely, that scientific theories have truth values, theoretical entities really exist, and the aim of science is to give a literally true account of the world.i SF denies these claims and holds that science tells us simply how things ap­ pear. All that can be known to exist, at least scientifically, are the sensations of the world that we experience and how they are ordered. Any claims about the existence of theo­ retical entities (like forces, curved spacetime, elech'ons, po­ tential energy, and electromagnetic fields) that underlie these sensations are unfounded.

SP holds that no amount of sense data can justify be­ lief in something outside of perception. For no matter how many observations you have, it is invalid to then logically infer the existence of something beyond those observations.

Stace argues that all causal relationships that are observed

7

DEFENSE OF SCIENTIFIC PHENOMENALISM

are in the world of perception. He writes, If you admit that we never observe anything except sensed objects and their relations, regularities, and sequences, then it is obvious that we are completely shut in by our sensations and can never get outside them. Not only causal relations, but all other ob­ served relations, upon which any kind of inferences might be founded, will lead only to further sensible objects and their relations. No inference, therefore, can pass from what is sensible to what is not sensi­ ble. ii

I believe Stace is right insofar as we are unable to infer the existence of theoretical entities based on sensible objects and relations. I do think that some inference from observ­ abIes to unobservables is appropriate, just not in the prac­ tice of science.

Put another way, science, by its own standards, in­ volves the study of the observable world. A theory that is produced can only mean something scientifically if there is some observation that can be done to confirm or falsify the theory. And so, if a scientific claim involves the existence of an object that by definil:ion cannot be observed, this claim ceases to be scientific. This is what happens when theoreti­ cal entities are posited to exist. They themselves can never be observed, only their supposed effects. Thus, claims about the existence of these entities are not in the realm of science. That is not to say that such claims are meaningless.

Rather, they are metaphysical claims which I believe hap­ pen to have significant problems (I will not go into those problems here). But for scientists to make claims about the existence of theoretical entities is for scientists to go beyond the bounds of their discipline. As Chalmers puts it, a moti­ vation underlying anti-realism seems to be the desire to re­ strict science to those claims that can be justified by scien­ tific means, and so avoid unjustifiable speculation."iii It seems quite inappropriate to posit and defend, in the name 1/

JOHN LEE

of science, the existence of entities that can, in principle, never be measured by the very tools of science, or any other tools for that matter.

However, this is not at all to say that theoretical enti­ ties are worthless and completely untrue. They are untrue in the sense that they do not correspond to any real, mind­ independent existence in the physical world. However, they can be true in the sense that they are able to predict certain sensations (both in the future, and past recorded ones)}v For forces, curved spacetime, electrons, potential energy, and electromagnetic fields have proved to be very effective in predicting certain phenomena. Stace writes, It is a matter of no importance to the scientific man

whether the forces exist or not. That may be said to be a purely philosophical question. And I think the philosopher should pronounce them fictions. But that would not make the law useless or untrue. If it could still be used to predict phenomena, it would be just as true as it wasY While exploring this issue it is important to add.ress a point more fundamental to the discussion. This is whether science explains anything, or if it just describes and predicts phenomena. Stace holds that it does the latter, and that beliefs in the former are what cause confusions over theoretical entities. For if one believes that science ex­ plains things, then it is quite natural to look for underlying entities that are "causing" the observed phenomena. I-Iow­ ever, what really seems to be going on is the more detailed description of what is happening. For example, a tElble feels hard to the touch because of the repulsion of the electron shells of the atoms involved, which is attributed tol:he elec­ tromagnetic force, which is ultimately a m,ani£estation of the combined electroweak force.

While these explanations" are couched in explanatory language, it is clear that they are just further descriptions, at some point, leaving the realm of perception and entering the realm of 1/

DEFENSE OF SCIENTIFIC PHENOMENALISM

theoretical entities. Niels Bohr wrote, "It is wrong to think that the task of physics is to find out how nature is. Physics concerns only what we can say about nature."vi For example, when the question about why things fall was posed, the force of gravity was offered. And when this proved inadequate, curved spacetime was offered.vii .

However, in reality, these forces and spacetime curves are simply mathematical tools to predict sensations. As Stace points out, "And anyone who takes them for 'existences' gets asked awkward questions as to what 'curved space' is curved 'in. "'viii I will now address some standard objections to SP. First, it is argued that scientific theories (like quantum me­ chanics) have been so amazingly successful in making pre­ dictions, how could they at least not in some way be true?

SP acknowledges that theories can be very successful in predicting phenomena; that is why theoretical entities are not worthless. However, just because a theory makes suc­ cessful predictions, it does 1I.ot follow that it must be true or nearly true. On the contrary, the ability of a theory to make predictions with related theoretical entities not actually ex­ isting has allowed. the continuation of some past theories (an example is Fresnel's theory of light as waves in an elas­ tic ether)ix. Furthermore, because of the metaphysical na­ ture of claims about theoretical entities, it is not necessary for the entities to exist for a prediction to be correct. In fact, theoretical entities by definition could never be observed, only their supposed effects.

Another objection involves the supposed vindication of atomic theory in the early twentieth century. Near the end of the nineteenth century, several anti-realists (including Duhem, Mach, and Ostwald) would not accept the atomic theory as true. The supposed atOIns were not real, but rather "useful fictions." However, by 1910, the supposed vindication of this theory was thought to have put anti-realism to rest.x According to Chalmers, the anti­ realists have a response:

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JOHN LEE

They demand that only that part of science that is subject to confirmation by observation and experi­ ment should be treated as candidates for truth or falsity. However they can acknowledge that as sci­ ence progresses, and as more probing instruments and experimental techniques are devised, the range of claims that can be subject to experimental confir­ mation is extended. xi l

Another reply is that, to use the objector's own language, it is still not clear that the atom has ever been observed. An atom can never be seen. The wavelength of visible light is not small enough to resolve the distances at the atomic scale. All that is "seen" are pictorial representations of some other probing technique. "Experiences" of atoms (or any other merely theoretical entities) are ultimately sensations which are quite compatible with scientific phenomenalism.

One may further object that scientific theories imply the existence of theoretical entities. However, this cannot be so. As Beebee puts it, A theory employing theoretical terms is really only 'about' the observable world: what makes the the­ ory true is the obseruable facts being the way the the­ ory says they are. Theoretical terms are introduced into a theory only to make it simpler or more ele­ gant. Their presence does not indicate any ontologi­ cal commitment to unobservable entities 'referred' to by the terms, since the terms don't, despite initial appearances, refer to such entities. xii

A good example of this is presented by Stace. He discusses the nature of potential energy. Classical physics includes the idea of potential energy in order to support the law of conservation of energy. In order to preserve conservation of energy, sometimes when energy seems to disappear, it really is being transferred into potential energy. "Now /', as Stace writes, Jlwhat does this blessed world 'potential'­ which is thus brought in to save the situation-mean as ap­

DEFENSE OF SCIENTIFIC PHENOMENALISM

plied to energy? .. What positive meanin.g has the term?

Strictly speaking, none whatever. Either the energy exists or it does not exist. There is no realm of the 'potential' half­ way between .existence and non-existence."xiii Rather, the concept of potential energy is introduced to simplify the equations. However, it is a subtle and easy step to Inake the claim that this potential energy actually exists: "There will always be temptation to hypostatize the potential energy as an 'existence,' and to believe that it is a 'cause' which 'explains' the phenomena."xiv It is natural for humans to try to create a mental picture of a physical process. However, it seems that this inclination is naIve, and cannot be the aim of scientific theories. Paul Dirac writes, "The main object of physical science is not the provision of pictures, but is the formulation of laws governing phenomena and the applica­ tion of these laws to the discovery of new phenomena. If a picture exists, so much the better; but whether a picture ex­ ists or not is a matter of only secondary importance."xv I will now present some of the advantages of adopt­ ing SP as opposed to scientific realism. One favorab1e result of scientific phenomenalism. is that it accounts quite nicely for the rejection of theoretical entities in the past, but the retention of their corresponding observations. It is easy to forget that in the past, light <;:orpuscles and the ether were believed in strongly, perhaps as strongly as electrons are believed in now. However, these entities were rejected be­ cause their corresponding theories were rejected. The ob­ servations, that initially supported and then disproved their existences, remained. Chalmers writes,

a

Anti-realists can point to the history of science to substantiate their claim that the theoretical part of science does not qualify as securely established.

Not only have theories of the past been rejected as false, but many of the entities postulated by them are no longer believed to exist. .. However, the anti­ realist will insist that, although these theories proved to be untrue, there is no denying the posi­

11

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JOHN LEE

tive role they played in helping to order, and in­ deed to discover, observable phenomena... In the light of tlus, it seems plausible to evaluate theories solely in terms of their ability to order and predict observable phenomena. xvi

I will now discuss a few cases in which SP presents a. great advantage in interpreting some rather paradoxical sci­ entific findings. Usually, it is inevitable that in the first year or two of university education, physics students will en­ counter the first of many paradoxes within the realm of modern physics. Here, the nature of everyday light comes under great scrutiny. Two famous experiments suggest two totally opposite natures of light. First, the photoelectric ef­ fect revealed that light seemed to come in tiny bundles, or quanta. These quanta were called photons and appeared to behave like particles. However, the two-slit diffraction ex­ periment revealed that light had a very wave-like nature.

For when light was shone through a slide with two narrow slits close to each other, the effect on the screen behind was that of interference. This could only result from the con­ structive and destructive interference between waves of light. However, if individual photons were fired at this slide at half hour intervals, the same interference pattern would gradually emerge on the screen (one dot at a time).

Somehow, it seems that each individual photon would con­ spire with all the rest (temporally separated) to interfere with one another and make the corresponding interference pattern. xvii But that is a nonsensical interpretation. Even though each photon acts like a particle, it has a distinct wave nature. But it itself is not purely a wave or else it would interfere with itself. Thus, light seemed to have both wave-like and particle-like properties, depending on which nature was being investigated. The problem w'as compli­ cated further when this effect was observed using electrons.

Not only radiation, but matter, appeared to have a dual na­ ture. This, however, presents a Significant problem. How could an electron be both a particle and also a wave spread

DEFENSE OF SCIENTIFIC PHENOMENALISM

out over vast amounts of space?xviii Both could not be tl'ue at the same time. And so a serious paradox arises. How­ ever, the young physicist encountering this problem for the first time simply accepts this paradox and moves on to her next class assignment. Later, she will probably take a course or two in quantum mechanics and leal'll. about the existence of probability waves (or wave functions) which represent the electron and predict the results of the two-slit diffraction experiment. However, this just substitutes one hard to understand concept for an even more difficult one.

For how could a probability wave ever exist? What is its fundamental nature? Is it just a mere mathematical con­ struct? Bruce Gregory writes "The wave function [probability wave] that forms the solution to Schroedinger's equation does not picture something in nature."xix And so, the ontological statuses of light, electrons, and probability waves become very troublesome, and can exist as a "thorn in one's mind."xx However, I suggest that the mental quandary that can occur when b'ying to grasp these entities is entirely unnecessary. Its elimination not only provides some mental relief, but a deeper understand­ ing of reality. According to scientific phenomenalism, these troublesome entities are only troublesome because they are complex mathematical entities that are h'Jing to be squeezed into an existential box. They do not exist in the physical world; they are simply mathematical consb'ucts used to describe and predict phenomena that do actually exist. Once this is realized, the tension is relieved because we no longer have to reconcile there actually existing an object that has apparently contradictory properties. Rather, we simply acknowledge what does exist and thus what should be used in scientific reasoning: the observed phe­ nomena and their mathematical description. Bruce Greg­ ory, on Warner Heisenberg's take on this issue, writes: The problem with trying to understand the behav­ ior of electrons arises, Heisenberg said, because we persist in thinking of electrons as tiny marbles; we

13

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JOHN

persist in talking as if there were subatonu,c objects" that physical theories somehow describe.

But elech'ons are not objects in this sense at all, ..

Asking what the behavior of electrons is really" like arises out of the marble fallacy. Such question­ ing is futile. At best any answer is simply a matter of taste. Discussions that do not lead to any new predictions have no impact on science; discussions that lead to new predictions are challenges to be met by experiments in the laboratory.xxi H

II

Another example might serve to illuminate this point further. In the field of particle physics, there exists the Standard Model (SM), a theory that has proved spectacular in making accurate predictions. However, there was a pos­ sible problem with the SM, one that at first glance could ap­ pear fatal. In order for the theory to work, all particles must be massless. This is obviously not the case, but a clever trick has been developed to circumvent this problem. This trick is the Higgs mechanism. The Higgs mechanism involves a field which gives mass to all the particles (that have rnass) and as a result produces another particle, the I-:Tiggs boson.

(Incidentally, this boson has not been" discovered" yet and is crucial to the survival of the SM.) This Higgs field. is in­ teresting because it supposedly couples to all massive parti­ cles. I have heard several analogies to try to explain how this happens. One explanation is that somehow, wherever a massive particle is present, it is present with the Higgs field which gives it its mass. Another more crude analogy refers to particles, when they move through space, as lTIoving through a sort of molasses which is the Higgs field. The more they are slowed down by the molasses, the lTIOre mass they obtain. While these analogies have SOl1le intuitive ap­ peal, they are really attempting to solve an unnecessary problem, namely, the problem of u.nderstanding what this Higgs field really is and how it behaves in the physical world. It seems to be more accurate to say that we observe that particles have mass, and the mathematical expression

DEFENSE OF SCIENTIFIC PHENOMENALISM

;

r

t

)

L.

11

a j

s

g

e s

y s

e n

of this mass is the Higgs mechanism. But we do not have to say that the Higgs field really exists.

One last example from physics. According to Max­ well's equations, electromagnetic (EM) interactions occur via electromagnetic waves. These waves were initially thought to propagate through an ether. However, this ether was found not to exist but the EM waves were still meas­ ured. xxii So, the natural question arises: What do these EM waves trav.el in? What do the waves wave in? The answer is nothing. It gets even more conceptually difficult when try­ ing to understand how an EM wave moves. One way to think about it would be that at any given location, the elec­ tric (E)-field and magnetic (B)-field oscillate up and down at perpendicular directions as the EM wave passes through.

But this only passes the problem off to E-fields and B-fields.

What are they? WelL they can be measured by placing a test charge in the region and seeing how it moves. Now we are in the realm of observation. But until we move into this realm, the concepts of EM waves, E-fielcls, and B-fields are extremely difficult to grasp. Richard Feynman echoes this frustration: "I have no picture of the electromagnetic field that is in any sense accurate .. .It requires a much higher de­ gree of imagination to understand the electromagnetic field than to understand invisible angels ... "xxiii Perhaps these fields are just useful mathematical tools that help to predict where a test charge will move, or whether you will hear grunge rock or NPR coming from your radio.

Not only does scientific phenomenalism provide a more concise and mentally peaceful understanding of the physical world, it also can provide a better context for the­ ory development. One of the supposed. advantages of Pop­ perian falsification ism is that it encourages the develop­ ment of bold, risky hypotheses that are easy to falsify. By the invention of bold theories, science can move along be­ cause as each new theory is falsified, something new is learned which can be incorporated into the next theory.xxiv Thus, it is argued that falsificationism provides a cleaner, quicker, and more accurate development of science.

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JOHN LEE

Whether or not this is the case, I believe that scientific phe­ nomenalism can provide this same benefit. On the other hand, I believe that scientific realism can bog down scien­ tific processes with unnecessary metaphysical problems.

The following is, I think, a good example. In particle phys­ there is a several decade old theory called supersym­ metry (SUSY). According to this theory, every particle cur­ rently known to exist" has a supersymmetric partner, which is usually much more massive. SUSY is theoretically attractive because it avoids the undesirable problem of large canceling infinities in the Standard Model. However, one alleged drawback to this theory is that in one simple act, the number of elementary particles currently thought to exist doubles. Some physicists find this troublesome, not only because it provides many more particles that have to be looked for and found, but because, to begin with, there were already too many elementary particles in the SM. However, this kind of theory, whether or not it is success­ ful, is exactly the kind of theory that needs to be presented and rigorously explored just because of the fact that it is bold, The belief in scientific realism can produ.ce a kind of reluctance to seriously explore more unconventional theo­ ries. This is because, according to this view, these more ex­ travagant theories may contain many more theoretical enti­ ties tllat must be discovered and incorporated into an al­ ready burgeoning metaphysical schema, However, the sci­ entific phenomenalist can welcome these theories as bold ways to advance the course of science. There is no need to try to make metaphysical sense of the new mathematical entities.

In the end, it seems that the more philosophically appropriate and practically useful philosophy of science is scientific phenomenalism. Not only does it check meta­ physical claims that are cloaked in scientific terms, but it provides a more natural way of understanding some sup­ posed paradoxes in physics. Some may say that SP elimi­ nates the awe and wonder that have been inspired by these alleged theoretical entities. However, the awe and wonder /I

DEFENSE OF SCIENTIFIC PHENOMENALISM

remain; perhaps they have just been misdirected.

Notes Lecture notes from Dr. Jim Spiegel

Stace, W.T. "Science and the Physical World: A Defense of

Phenomenalism," from The Theory of Knowledge: Classical and

Contemporary Readings, ed. Louis Pojman. Stamford, CT: Wadsworth/

Thomson Learning, 2003, 97.

iii Chalmers, AF. What is this thing called Science? 3 rd Ed., Indianapolis:

Hackett Publishing, 1999, Pg 232.

iv Stace, W.T. "Science and the Physical World: A Defense of

Phenomenalism," from The Theory of Knowledge: Classical and

ContemporaI'Y Readings, ed. Louis Pojman. Stamford, CT: Wadsworth/

Thomson Learning, 2003, Pg 98.

v Ibid. vi Niels Bohr, quoted in Aage Peterson, "The Philosophy of Niels Bohr,"

in Niels Bohr: A Centenary Volume, eds. A. French and P. Kennedy. Cam足

bridge: Harvard University Press, 1985, 305.

vii Stace, W.T. "Science and the Physical World: A Defense of

Phenomenalism," from The Theory of Knowledge: Classical and

Contemporary Readings, ed. Louis Pojman. Stamford, CT: Wadsworth/

Thomson Learning, 2003, Pg 98.

i

ii

viii

ibid.

Chalmers, AF. What is this thing called Science? 3"" Ed., Indianapolis:

Hackett Publishing, 1999, Pg 235.

x Ibid, Pg 237.

ix

xi

Ibid.

Beebee, H. Scientific Realism & Anti-Realism, http:/ /

www.anu.edu.au/physics/courses/ A07/notes/Beebee3.pdf

xiii Stace, W.T. "Science and the Physical World: A Defense of

Phenomenalism," from The Theory of Knowledge: Classical and

Contemporary Readings, ed. Louis Pojman. Stamford, CT: Wadsworth/

Thomson Learning, 2003, Pg 99.

xii

xiv

Ibid.

P.AM. Dirac, The Principles (!fQUl1IltulII Mec/lnllics, 2d ed., Oxford:

Clarendon Press, 1935, 10.

xvi Chalmers, AF. What is this thing called Science? 3 r<i Ed.,

Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, :1.999, Pgs 232-33.

xvii Greene, Brian. The Elegant Universe: Superstrings, Hidden

Dimensions, and the Quest for the Ultimate Theory, New York: Norton,

1999, Pgs 101-102.

xviii Smith, Wolfgang. The Quantum Enigma: Finding the Hidden Key,

Peru, Illinois: Sherwood, Sugden, & Company, 1995, Pg 117.

xv

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JOHN LEE xh Gregory, Bmce. Inventing Reality: Physics as Language, New York:

John Wiley & Sons, 1990, Pg 95.

xx Spoken by Morpheus in the film, The Matrix

,,-xi Gregory, Bmce. Inventing Reality: Physics as Language, New York:

John Wiley & Sons, 1990, Pg 93.

xxii Chalmers, AF. What is this thing called Science? 3rd Ed.,

Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1999, Pgs233.

xxiii Richard Feyrunan, Robert Leighton, and Matthew Sands, The

Feynman Lectures 011 Physics, vol. 2 Reading, Mass.: Addison Wesley,

1963,20-29.

xxiv Chalmers, AF. What is this thing called Science? 3rd Ed.,

Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1999.

Bibliography Beebee, H. Scientific Realism & Anti-Realism, http://www.anu.edu.au/ physics/courses/ A07/ notes/Beebee3.pdf Chalmers, AF. Wiuzt is this thing called Science? 3rd Ed.! Indianapolis: HackettPublishin& 1999.

Dirac, P.A.M. The Principles of Quantum Mecl1anics! 2d ed.! Oxford: Clar足 endon Press, 1935.

Feyrunan, Richard! Robert Leighton, and Matthew Sands, The Feyml1an Lectlll'es 011 Physics! voL 2 Reading! Mass.: Addison Wesley!

1963.

Greene, Brian. The Elegant Universe: Superstrings! Hidden Dimensions, tlHd the Quest for tile Ultimate Theory, New York: Norton, 1999.

Gregory, Bruce. Inventing Realih): Physics as Language! New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1990.

Peterson! Aage. liThe Philosophy of Niels Bohr/ in Niels Bohr: A Celltenal1) Volume, eds. A. French and P. Kennedy'. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985.

Smith! Wolfgang. The Quantum Enigma: Finding the Hidden Key, Peru, Illinois: Sherwood, Sugden, & Company, 1995.

Stace, W.T. "Science and the Physical World: A Defense of Phenomenalism/' from The Theory of Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Readings! ed. Louis Pojman. Stamford, CT: Wadsworth/Thomson Learnin& 2003.

Desertification and Metaphysics in Nietzsche and

Abbey DAVID ALLEN CHENAULT

he thought of Friedrich Nietzsche has been called anti-anti-naturalistic. It is not mere naturalism, nor is Nietzsche's body of work simply aligned with the reaction against naturalism. While a tacit admiration for such figures, such "strong, independent spir­ its" as Plato and Kant (Kant the paradigmatic anti­ naturalist, Plato a more difficult case) is surely present, Nietzsche's desire to make something new in and of the his­ tory of philosophy led him to roundly criticize their ilk. A conscious rhetorical distancing, from either of two given forces within history, and central to Nietzsche. The problem of nature and naturalism is the paradox of a dual imma­ nence, of culture in nature and nature in culture. The 'sourcing' of the one into the other is, alternately, natural­ ism and antinaturalism; nature as giving the rule to culture, or culture apart from nature and in many ways governing it indeed. Nietzsche is inclined to read a false antinomy into this distinction thus revealing in his reading of nature his prototypical methodology.

Edward Abbey, 20th century heir to Thoreau, enjoys a Nietzschean encounter with the two "natures II aforemen­ tioned in his Desert Solitaire. The book's lyricism and read­ ability has rendered it ripe for cooption by those disinclined to read the philosophy out of the prose, establishing a firm bond with both Thoreau and Nietzsche. For these writers style is substance, in this they stand out in the history of philosophy. Both Nietzsche and Abbey, on whom I will focus always mean what they say, though deciding exactly what it is they are saying is a task of great difficulty, and of a very different kind from that found in the case of Kant or Hegel. The Nietzschean methodological move mentioned above is one I wish to read into Abbey, and its implications, one I see as arising explicitly out of the anti-anti-naturalistic

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DAVID ALLEN CHENAULT

stance.

Early in Desert Solitaire, Abbey states his anti-anti足 naturalistic intentions: Like a god, like an ogre? The personification of the natural is exactly the tendency I wish to suppress in myself, to eliminate for good. I am here not only to evade for a while the clamor and filth and confu足 sion of the cultural apparatus but also to confront, immediately and directly if it's possible, the bare bones of existence, the elemental and fundamental, the bedrock which sustains us. I want to be able to look at and into a juniper tree, a piece of quartz, a vulture, a spider, and see it as it is in itself, devoid of all humanly ascribed qualities, anti-Kantian, even the categories of scientific description. To meet God or Medusa face to face, even if it means risking everything human in myself. I dream of a hard and brutal mysticism in which the naked self merges with a nonhuman world and yet somehow survives intact, individual, separate. Paradox and bedrock. iii The Nietzschean tension of the dual immanence of nature is here palpablei the desire of the subject to merge with nature (the world, Other) and still maintain itE? own integrity, its self-intelligability. Is this, though a paradox, possible? The advantages of both are obvious, and Nietzsche (and Abbey after him) seems to be asking, in his particular way, can we not have both?

Nietzsche's method would seem to say, 'perhaps.'

Not in a concrete manner, however, for part and parcel of Nietzsche's method is the critique of "the doer behind the deed," ensuring that I'The form is fluid, but the 'meaning' is even more SO."iv This conjoined with his assertion that ...purposes or utilities are only signs that a will to power has become master of something less power足 ful and imposed upon it the character of a functioni and the entire history of a "thing/' an organ, a cus足

DESERTIFICATION AND METAPHYSICS

tom can in this way be a continuous sign-chain of ever new interpretations and adaptations whose causes do not even have to be related to one an­ other but, on the contrary, in some cases succeed and alternate with one another in a purely chance fashion. v

results in a picture of understanding (and meaning)-in-the­ world. This 'resolution' of the anti-anti-naturalistic paradox seems to create another antinomy that unlike the dialectical Kantian antinomy, is held up vibrating with conflict into . the air, a sort of totem. The problem of nature's dual imma­ nence becomes analogous to, if not largely equivalent with, the problem of meaning, interpretation, and truth. Truth in the old sense, a static 'form' behind the world (whether that be nature or culture) is something Nietzsche, as is obvious, discards. He still speaks of 'truth,' though in a manner similar to his use of the word meaning.

That is, the fluid sign-chain of interpretation that is a given subject'S moment in history can be adapted in ways that are not all created equal. I-Ie condemns a tendency he sees in II modern historiographYi" 1I ... it rejects all teleology; it no longer wishes to 'prove' anything; it disdains to play the judge and considers this a sign of good taste ... "vi All this would seem to arise necessarily out of the aforementioned, and Nietzsche admits to this in the same breath he critiques it. Nietzsche writes that the will to power in man "would rather will nothingness than not will. "vii AIld concludes the Genealogy with an assertion that "Man, the bravest of ani­ mals and the one most accustomed to suffering, does not repudiate suffering as such; he desires it, he even seeks it out, provided he is shown a l1/eaning for it- a purpose of suf­ fering,"viii Thus a necessity of meaning is, paradoxically, injected into the picture of an always already interpreted, lirelativistic," world. What demands this meaning (Den'ida: "coherence in contradiction expresses the force of a de­ sire."ix) is the will, and it is the will to power by which it can be measured, evaluated, interpreted.

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The discussion of suffering above arises in the con­ text of remarks on the adoption of ascetic ideals as man's best option to date, this after sixty pages of criticism.

Adoption of the ascetic ideal is a case of willing nothing­ ness, rather than facing the alternative. There is, for Nietzsche, a better option. In Beyond Good and Evil he writes: To translate man back into nature; to become mas­ ter over the many vain and overly enthusiastic in­ terpretations and connotations that have so far been scrawled and painted over that eternal basic text of homo natura; to see to it that man henceforth stands before man as even today, hardened in the discip line of science, he stands before the rest of nature, with intrepid Oedipus eyes and sealed Odysseus ears, deaf to the siren songs of old meta­ physical bird catchers who have been piping at him all too long, 'you are more, you are higher, you are of a different origin!' - that may a strange and insane task, but it is a task - who would deny that?

Why did we choose this insane task? Or, putting it differently: 'why have knowledge at all?'x It, the interpretation for meaning, becomes at once the as­ sumption of the most (best?) insane question a'nd its most rigorous and conunitted actualization. Committed, again in the sense that "there is no 'being' behind doing, effecting, becoming... /,xi gives a dynamic picture of interpretation.

Perhaps to reach the ideal of the elimination of the doer, and to in turn embody that ideal to the point that it drops away, one must suffer through this insane task. Here the desert may be necessary.

All this is inextricably bound up with the paradoxi­ cal II nature II of nature, as described by Abbey. It arises out of the problematic situation that is being-in-the-world.

Nietzsche and Abbey share a proclivity, a desire, to point out that the task of "translatin.g man back into nahne" is as necessary as it is insane. Abbey writes "A civilization which

DESERTIFICATION AND METAPHYSICS

destroys what little remains of the wild, the spare, the origi­ nal, is cutting itself off from its origins and betraying the principle of civilization itself."xii It moves to eliminate suf­ fering, and the desert. What this principle is, I will come to momentarily and it will surely and again be shot through with paradox. Perhaps this, this problem of the dual imma­ nence of nature, this source of paradox, is the original "riddle of the sphinx."

The desire for' coherence in contradiction,' for mean­ ing in interpretation, for b:uth in becoming, is pulled out of the dual immanence of nature. Humans are in nature, "in all her ·prodigal and indifferent magnificence which is out­ rageous but noble."xiii That is, in something vast and with­ out purpose. It is human desire, will to power, the IInature" in man that obliges, forces with violence the interpretation with an intent that results in coherence, both within a sub­ ject and between subjects. This invariably does violence to the unordered 'order,' what Nietzsche called 'the primor­ dial unity,' that is mere being-in-the-world. However, this "mere II is not sufficient, it does not satisfy the demand of the will to power, does not allow for the meaningful, mean­ ing creating discharge of the will to power.xiv This violence is inevitable. Nietzsche writes: Consider any morality with this in mind: what there is in it of 'nature' teaches hatred of the laisser aller, of any all-to-great freedom, and implants the need for limited horizons and the nearest task­ teaching the narrowing of our perspective, and thus in a certain sense stupidity, as a condition of life and growth. xv This self-limiting, self-imposed adoption of 'morality/ of an ideal, is the necessary and agonistic resolu­ tion of the dual immanence of nature. The violence it does to the subject'S relation to the world is an inevitability, the concern only that it is taken through fully and with com­ mitment. Nietzsche writes:

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"You shall obey - someone and for a long time: else you will perish and lose the last respect for your­ self" this appears to me to be the moral impera­ tive of nature which, to be sure, is neither "categorical" as the old Kant would have it (hence the "else") nor addressed to the individual (what do indivduals matter to her?), but to peoples, races, ages, classes - but above all to the whole human animal, to man.xvi This demand, instantiated by nature through culture (and nature's immanence in culture), creates in the conditions of the meaningful existence of humanity, and therefore hu­ man existence as such, a paradox. One that cannot be es­ caped.

This paradox is inherent in existence as such because it gives man the power to interpret, to create meaning; it gives the will to power. As Nietzsche writes: In man creature and creator are united: in man there is material, fragment, excess, clay, dirt, nonsense, chaos; but in man there is also creator, formgiver, hammer hardness, spectator divinity, and seventh day: do you understand this contrast?xvli If the creative potential in man is the only way of defining himself, the only interpreter, and this only comes out of a conscious turning away from his immanence in nature, then the paradoxical circle is complete. Humanity's Inean­ ing, existence, is founded on a turning away from that is at the same time a turning towards. The promise of meaning that is the primordial unity is merely a promise; humanity must, in this case, create their own promises in action. TILey must desertify, go into the desert that is heartless, that is a brick-walled riddle, thereby escaping a society which in­ variably enforces the old modes of meaning-creation. Enl­ bracing suffering as meaning, either physically or in. the ll1ind, is the desert. It is only subsumed in paradox, within

DESERTIFICATION AND METAPHYSICS

the desert, that meaning and interpretation, a new meta­ physics, begins. Though the desert is always something to be eventually left, or forgotten.

When, in the Genealogy, Nietzsche mentions desert, it is briefly. A quarter of the way through his treatment of ascetic ideals in the Third Essay, he writes of the value of ascetic ideals for the IIfree spirit," that they provide motiva­ tion to" ...all those resolute men who one day said No to all servitude and went into some desert: even supposing they were merely strong asses and quite the reverse of a strong spirit./l xv iii Nietzsche does not deny that this strength of mind, of will, is valuable and something to be admired, even if the direction of that will, its reason, is misguided.

This relates strongly to Nietzsche's stance on ascetic idealsi he does not condemn them as such, they represent what to date has been the best option for humanity, the best method for the 'insane task.' The deselt, as mentioned in the epi­ graph, need not even be a place. It is in Nietzsche a place £01' and of the consciousness, 'heartless,' where "no actor of the spirit could possibly endure li£e./I xix Abbey has certainly been painted as just such a strong ass. His book illustrates that the difference between being an ass and a spirit is exceedingly fine. As Abbey writes, "there is a way of being wrong which is also neces­ sarily right."xx What this is for Nietzsche, as regards ascetic ideals, is that the cooption of such ideals is as aforemen­ tioned not necessarily negative, though the dominant ideals of the modern age most certainly are. It is the purity and strength of these ideals' initial presentation, such as in the Old Testament where the desert looms large, that Nietzsche finds so appealing. It is the perversion of these ideals that he finds so odious, and therein lies his condemnation of Plato, Christianity, and lithe Germans." It is echoed in Ab­ bey's condemnation of contemporary industrialism: "This is a courageous view, admirable in its simplicity and power, and with the weight of all modern history behind it. It is also quite insane. I cannot attempt to deal with it here."xxi Indeed. And in much the same way as Nietzsche

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does not critique Kant on Kantls own terms, impenetrable task that it was constructed to be, Abbey does not engage with his object of ire in its own realm. He retreats, literally, to the desert, using it like Thoreau did as a symbolic cata­ lyst towards the state Nietzsche described as a desert. Ab­ bey's "isolation" was as profound as Thoreauls; the latter was often seen galumphing across the fields to the Emer­ sonls on hearing the dinner bell. However, Abbey's reflec­ tions on the desert parallel Nietzschels, in a way that re­ flects the latter's ultimate criticism of ascetic ideals. Just as Abbey's conclusion that the desert has no heart, that "its surface is also the essence"xxii results in a different view of truth implicit in the ceasing to be of any quest,so too does Nietzsche see in the externalizing tendencies of the ascetic ideal a violation, a tacit Idoerl tacked onto the deed.

Nietzsche writes "All honor to the ascetic ideal insofar as it is honest! so long as it believes in itself and does not play tricks on us!" Abbey calls the industrial ideal !courageous l for this reason; it has a profound faith in itself and the ends it pursues. Despite this, there are reasons to reject it. Simi­ larly with Abbey's quest to 'understand the desert;' as long as he looks for a 'meaning' or 'truth' behind what he is standing in, Abbey fails to 'see' the meaning of most value: the one that views each moment as itself the meaning. This in turn reveals the infinite chain of meaningsj interpretations present in-the-world.

Nietzsche sees an ascetic journey, whether actual or psychic, as at base false. It extrapolates an exterior 'meaning' from being-in-the-world, which is invariably a kind of trick. Just as Abbey!s creation of a desert in his mind distracted him and alienated him from the desert he was standing in, so too do ascetic ideals isolates m.an from his own life. In this way, Abbey's initial asceticism in Desert Solitaire can be seen as similar to that of industrialism. The ascetic move must be overcome, and perhaps the desertify­ ing move through asceticism is the only way to found such a new metaphysics of immediacy.

But can this occur? Can this return to bedrock really,

DESERTIFICATION AND METAPHYSICS

as Abbey dreams, resolve the paradox of the dual inlma­ nence of nature? Will it allow the subject to become self­ identical with the world at large? This last bit of rhetoric demonstrates how quickly absurdity is here reached. It must be remembered that, as Abbey writes, lithe desert is also a-tonal, cruel, clear, inhuman, neither romantic nor classical, motionless and emotionless, at one and the same time - another paradox - both agonized and deeply still."xxiii The desert is irreducible and irresolvable, a paradigm of nature as it is faced by culture, by man. It may be that in Nietzsche the origin of the nature/ culture bifurcation, which for Derridaxxiv among others is foundational to phi­ losophy as we have known it, begins when this base para­ dox is denied, when simplification and unneeded consoli­ dation occur- in one direction or another. This casts.

Nietzsche's moral critique in a very foundational light, one which (paradoxically) admits that at the deepest level of critique is the simplest of maxims. Not mere laisser aller, but a self-ordered relevance within the world that is sim­ pler because it is sensical, sensible in the generic valence.

Philosophy, after all, can be simpJe, and. never easy. Like the desert. .

This is reflected in the works under considera tion.

Both Nietzsche and Abbey were brilliant stylists, and Be­ yond Good and Evil, On the Genealogy of Morals, and Desert Solitaire represent the apex of their mutual attempts to em­ body their philosophies within their literary efforts. Much has been made of how both authors contradict themselves often, and how this lends itself to oversimplified misinter­ pretation by those readers not as exacting as Nietzsche him­ self called for. There are profound differences between the two, Nietzsche far outreaches Abbey as a thinker (or mis­ sionary), while the genres in which they were working makes a literary comparison facile and pointless. Most im­ portant are tl1e intersections, their stances concerning na­ ture as detailed above, and the variegated paradox it dic­ tated, as one commentator has noted, applies to Nietzsche as much as Abbey:

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The polyphonic voice of Desert Solitaire makes it difficult for opponents to identify and attack the center out of which Abbey's discourse flows; the multiple voices help defuse the resistance of the. skeptical reader...Because Abbey's celebratory tone bonds...to an ironic one which acknowledges the problematic status of a reverent attitude in the postmodern world, the book becomes an alloy of distin.ctive strength. xxv The so-called 'multiple voices' of both Abbey and Nietzsche are not separate devices after the fashion of Kierkegaard, but rather a manifestation of the enormous breadth of these two writers. They are, to paraphrase Whit­ man, 'vast, and contain multitudes.' This, the enormous, contradictory nature of which both Abbey and Nietzsche sees themselves as immanent in, is the source of this "postmodern," decentered method of speaking so central to both. Morris is correct in seeing this as a great strength.

This is what is most 'basic' to Nietzschean metaphys­ ics, a critiqued metaphysics etched by blown sand, from the desert that is man's strength, his move through suffering to meaning-in-the.-world. The ability to see, to move as Abbey did outside the culture that created him and take up some­ thing that, while it is likely harder, is also surely better. As Nietzsche wrote in the Nachlass, "I also speak of a 'return to nature' although it is not actually a 'return back,' but an 'advance towards' the strong, bright, frightful nature and naturalness of men who can play with great tasks, because they would become tired with small ones and feel dis­ gusted."xxvi The conscious move into the desert is, as it was for Abbey, a move chasing an abstract and therefore false ideal which in the end brings about the dissolution of such ideals by virtue of the sheer harsh force brought to bear on the subject. The desert, in Abbey and Nietzsche, is a purify­ ing place, cutting being-in-the-world down to just that, for its own sake.

DAVID ALLEN CHENAULT Notes i Friedrich Nietzsche. On the, GenealogtJ ofMorals in Basic Writings of Nietzsche trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: The Modern Library, 2000); 545. ii Edward Abbey. Desert Solitaire: A Season in the Wilderness (New York: Touchstone, 1990); 243. iilAbbey; 6. ivOGM;514. v OGM;513. viOGM;593. "ii OGM; 533. viii OGM; 598. ix Jacques Derrida. "Sh'ucture, Sign and Play in the discourse of the Human Sciences" in Writing and Difference. h<ans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1978); 279. x Nietzsche. Beyond Good and Evil in Basic Writings; 351-2 xiOGM; 481. xii Abbey; 169. xiii BGE; 291. xiv BGE; 291. xv BGE; 291-2. wi 8GE; 292. xvii BGE; 344. xviii OGM; 543. xix OGM; 545. xX Abbey; xii. xxi Abbey; 47 xxii Abbey; 27. xxiii Abbey; 255. xxiv see Derrida. "Structure ... "; 283-4. xxv David Copland Morris. "Celebration and Irony: The Polyphonic Voice of Edward Abbey's Desert Solitaire" in Western AlIll'l"iClll1 Literature; 25. xxvi quoted in Wayne Klein's Nietzsche and the Pr()//lil:w (~rpllil(lH(l/'f/.'1 (Albany: State UniversiLy of New York Press, 19(7); '177, Bibliography Abbey, Edward, Desert Solitaire: A Seaso/l if! !:Ill' Wild/'I"/wl-is . N(~w YOJ'k: Touchstone, 1990.

Derrida, Jacques. "Structure, Sign and Play in L路he DiHCOlll'HV uf Lhl! [ Ill路路 ~nan Sciences" in Writing and Difference tnll1H, Chicago: Uniwl'颅 sity of Chicago, 1978).

Klein, Wayne. Nietzsche and tlle Promise of Philosophy, Albany: State University of NewYork Press, 1997.

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Morris, David Copland. "Celebration and Irony: The Polyphonic Voice of EdwardAbbey's Desert Solitaire" in Western American Litera足 ture 3:12.

Nietzsche, Friedrich. Basic Writings a/Nietzsche trans. Walter Kauf足 mann. New York: The Modern Library, 2000.

What is "Natural" About Natural Science?:

Philosophical Naturalism in the Evolution Debate

ILYA

T

P. WINHAM

he theory of evolution is a remarkable scientific accomplishment. The empirical evidence behind the theory is overwhelming. The fact of evolution, that the present species of organisms have come into being over millions of years as a result of gradual changes, is difficult, if not impossible, to gainsay. The the­ ory has been confirmed by the combined efforts of scientists all over the world. The theory is so well tested that those people who criticize it are usually dismissed as Bible­ beating religious fanatics, or as unscientific, ignorant, stu­ pid and insane - maybe even wicked. Harvard biologist Dr. Ernst Mayr, an expert on evolution, goes so far as to say that those people who do not believe in the truth of evolu­ tion have not received a good education, and the number of unbelievers "casts a lot of poor light on American educa­ tion." l Today, a robust and refined version of Darwin's the­ ory of evolution (neo-Darwinism) takes pride of place in science and philosophy classrooms in America. On the whole, the controversy between science and religion is over and done with. Theology is no longer threatened by the theory of evolution or scared of science finding out truths of the world.

Nevertheless, the so-called Creation scientists con­ tinue to argue against the theory of evolution. In good Dar­ winian fashion, the Creation scientists have had to craft bet­ ter arguments in order to survive. A new species of Crea­ tionists has appeared-the neo-Creationists (neo-creos).

They claim that mere evolution is false because there are signs of extra-natural (intelligent) forces at play. They argue that design exists in nature that is not a product of natural processes. What distinguishes the new creationists from the old creationists is that they have learned that the only ap­ proach to the question of origins and evolution is the scien­ tific approach. As a result of more than a century of relent­

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less accusations of being unscientific and religious, along with failed attempts to push their view in the courtroom, the neo-creos have focused their efforts at unseating the philosophical. assumptions of science. They admit that the fossil and molecular data in particular, and the empirical data in general, support the theory of evolution, but they do not admit defeat.

Their new tactic is to turn the tables on the scientific method. They claim that they are not practicing pseudo­ science, but rather that it is the Darwinists who are endan­ gering scientific scholarship. The scientific method, they claim, must not rule out the possibility detecting further reality beyond the causal order of nature. Their main argu­ ment which is not new but has come back with renewed vigor - is that the naturalistic interpretation of the Descent of Life is not science, but a philosophical worldview. If methodological naturalism is expunged from science, as the Creationist reasoning goes, then pure scientific light shall be free to shine on the world as it is, in all of God's glory.

In this paper, I shall argue that naturalism is not a philosophical bias, but an essential foundation of science.

The first section of this paper explicates the neo-creo argu­ ment against naturalism. The second section is a defense of naturalism against anti- or super-naturalism. The third sec­ tion is a critique of arguments from design. We shall see why the approach of the neo-creos is unscientific, and that the exclusion of super-naturalism from an explanation of origins is warranted and desirable on both philosophical and scientific grounds.

I. NATURALISM AND ITS CREATION CRITICS

The theory of evolution is usually taken to include Darwin and Wallace IS idea of natural selection as the cen­ tral mechanism of evolution. The theory says that all organ­ isms originated from an undirected, natural, law-bound process of generation, development, mutation and natural selection - what Darwin called "survival of the fittest. II

WHAT IS IINATURAL" ABOUT NATURAL SCIENCE?

While the details of evolution are complex, a key part of the theory is that evolution happens without any purposeful input - no Creator, no Intelligent Designer. According to Darwin, nature is self-contained; chance and nature deter­ mine everything.

Few would deny that organisms have changed over time. The Creationist case against naturalistic evolution is almost exclusively focused on arguing that the theory of evolution is on its own terms a failure. Neo-Creationists op­ pose the theory that lithe full panoply of life has evolved through purposeless naturalistic processes. 1I2 The neo-creos point to many mysteries of biology, like the unknown ori­ gin of life, sexuality and the genetic code, to argue against the theory of evolution. However, the argument I am pri­ marily interested in for the present purposes is the argu­ ment attributed to professor of law and father of neo­ Creationism, Phillip E. Johnson, 'who says that Darwinism is not so much a scientific theory, but a philosophical enter­ prise whose goal is to explain the world in a strictly natu­ ralistic way that forecloses any role for a Creator or Intelli­ gent Designer. Johnson has made his name by arguing that what has been sold to us in the authoritative name of sci­ ence is actually a philosophical understanding of reality. As long as we take the fWldam.ental assumption of Darwinism for granted - that naturalistic processes can explain every­ thing - Darwinism, he claims, becomes an absolute theory, seen as necessarily true, because the alternative, Intelligent Design, is automatically vetoed. Therefore, in Johnson's words, 'The first step for a twenty-first century science of origins is to separate materialist philosophy from empirical science. 1I3 This means that at the end of the day, scientists are supposed to come back from the field and look at what the evidence shows without a materialist bias and ask if natural forces explain what they see. For example, an an.., thropologist is supposed to ask herself: Does the fossil record fit when you look at it objec­ tively and without a Darwinian bias? We know the

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answer to that is no. We ask, 'Does finch beak variation really show how you can get finches in the first place?" No, of course not. Neo-Darwinism is a failed project - give it up! "Not yet!" you say.

"We're still trying to succeed."4 The anatomy of the problem, according to the neD-creos is, in short, that empirical science has become confused and cmlflated with materialist or naturalist philosophy, creating a conflict of interest. Evolutionary scientists, Johnson ar­ gues, have an obligation lito separate materialist philosophy from scientific investigation"5 and to accept what biologists know as biologists and what archeologists know as arche­ ologists, but not their claims about philosophical issues like naturalism. Johnson appeals to the tide of history by point­ ing out that lIone by one the great prophets of materialism have been shown to be false prophets and have fallen aside.

Marx and Freud have lost their scientific standing. Now Darwin is on the block."6 Johnson'S argument was evidently so convincing, that historian and philosopher Michael Ruse - the philoso­ pher who in 1981 testified in an Arkansas courtroon1 that creation science has none of the essential features of science and is actually dogmatic religious fundmnentalism ­ changed his opinion on the matter after being asked to comment on Johnson1s book Darwin on Trial. Ruse, speak­ ing at a 1993 Annual Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, said: Alld it seems to me very clear that at some very ba­ sic level, evolution as a scientific theory makes a commitment to a kind of naturalism, namely, that .at some level one is going to exclude miracles and these sorts of things, come what may. Now, you might say, does this mean it's just a religious as­ sumption, does this mean it's irrational to do some­ thing like this. I would argue very strongly that it's not. At a certain pragmatic level, the proof of the pudding is in the eating. And that if certain things

WHAT IS "NATURAL" ABOUT NATURAL SCIENCE?

do work, you keep going with this, and that you donlt change in midstream, and so on and so forth.

I think that one can in fact defend a scientific and naturalistic approach, even if one recognizes that this does include a metaphysical assumption to the regularity of nature, or something of this nature ...

evolution, akin to religion, involves making certain a priori or metaphysical assumptions, which at some level cannot be proven empirically?

In these words, Ruse is confessing that he has recently come to realize that the theory of evolution is based on unproven philosophical assumptions. Assuring the audience that he is "no less of an evolutionist now than I ever was,l! Ruse went on to say that "an evolutionist, is metaphysically based at some level, just as much as ... some creationist .. .! must say that live been coming to this kind of position my­ self." B Ruse in the early 1980s was of the clear-cut opinion that evolutionism is science and creationism is not. "Now," he says, "I'm starting to feeL ..that we should move our de­ bate now onto another level. .. l think that we should recog­ nize, both historically and perhaps philosophically, cel'-. tainly that the science side has certain metaphysical as­ sumptions built into doing science ... 119 It obvious that Johl1son 's interest in framing the problem in terms of naturalism versus empirical science leaves the door open to the possibility of scientific evidence for design by refuting the naturalist worldview and its con­ sequences. The logic of this strategy is to agree with the evolutionists that science, not philosophy or theology, is the only way to detect intelligent design and intelligent causes, and then to claim that the only epistemically acceptable sci­ ence is that which is unencumbered by naturalistic philoso­ phy. An acceptable science, suggests creationist William Dembski, is one that rejects "methodological naturalism."IO This type of call to weed the naturalistic philosophical bias (methodological naturalism) out of the biological sciences is not new. Creationist Duane T. Gish in 1973 says that he:

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Strongly suspects that the dogmatic acceptance of evolution is not due, primarily, to the nature of the evidence but the philosophic bias peculiar to our times .... That this is the philosophy held by most biologists has been recently emphasized by Dobzhansky. In his review of Monod's book Chance and Necessity Dobzhansky (1972) says, IlHe has stated with admirable clarity, and eloquence often verging on pathos, the mechanistic materialist phi­ losophy shared by most of the present 'establishment' in the biological sciences)1

In sum, neo-Creationists believe that many aspects of life are too complex to be explained except by reference to an intelligent designer, God. They say that scientists have overlooked evidence of design in nature because of a natu­ ralist philosophical bias. Supporters of this view argue that evolutionary science is thus more metaphysical than an em­ pirical undertaking, because naturalists are necessarily evo­ lutionists and therefore not open to other explanations. In the follownlg sections, we shall see that this is not entn'ely true. Science does rely on methodological naturalism the study of matter, energy, and their interaction - in seeking logical explanations and empirical evidence for natural phenomena. However, the theory of evolution is not merely a philosophical worldview. Nor does it have an opinion on the intervention of supernatural powers in the natural world, except that there is no testable way to use this as an operative explanation.

II. TAKING NATURALISM SERIOUSLY

Framing the problem as one between philosophy and science is at best playing cat and mouse with the issue, and at worst unproductive, because it relies on a mistaken division. Taking science out of empirical philosophy is ob­ viously a bad idea. In the words of John Dewey, "For ac­ cording to empirical philosophy, science provides the only means we have for learning about man and. the world in

WHAT IS "NATURAL" ABOUT NATURAL SCIENCE?

which he lives. 1I12 EmpiTical materialist philosophy has no quarrel with science, and neither do the nea-creos. What they want to do is take the philosophy out of empirical evo­ lutionary science to arrive at a science that is free from pre­ supposition, or at least those presuppositions that they do not like. They have supposed that since science is supreme in the field of knowledge, philosophy is therefore unneces­ sary and should not contaminate science.

First, I must say that these comments lack any in­ sight into the nature of science. In the words of Max Weber in an essay titled "Science as a Vocation/ "No science is ab­ solutely free from presuppositions, and no science can prove its fundamental value to the man who rejects these presuppositions. lIl3 For instance, he notes that "All scien­ tific work presupposes that the rules of logic and method are valid.1!14 In addition, all scientific work also presupposes naturalism, conceived as the absence of supernatural inter­ vention. Ronald N. Giere defines naturalism as follows: Ontologically, naturalism hnplies the rejection of supernaturalism. Traditionally this has meant pri~ madly the rejection of any deity, such as the Jlldco~ Christian God, which stands outside nature as crea~ tor or actor. Positively, naturalists hold that reality, including human life and society, is exhausted by what exists in the causal order of nature. 15

Naturalism is indeed a philosophical worldview, empirical in method, that regards everything that exists or occurs as belonging to one all-encompassing system of nature, how­ ever intelligent, spiritual or purposeful nature may appear.

TIle all-encompassing part of naturalism serves mainly negative purposes. It rejects supel1latural things and expla­ nations and Cartesian dualisms that can make the existence of the external world a matter of doubt or of God's wilL It also rejects arguments from ignorance. Lack of knowledge about something never provides sufficient reason for alleg­ ing a non-natural explanation. Moreover, naturalism is not

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concerned to disprove the existence of God. "Until and uIuess the existence of God is shown by empirical evi­ dence," writes Sterling P. Lamprecht in The Metaphysics oj Naturalism, lIit is not an article by which human values and human ideals may be significantly determined or advanced or enforced."16 It is the task of Philosophy to describe what we have to assume in order to do science, namely, that nature is uni­ form, self-contained and law-bound. Science must presup­ pose naturalism for many reasons. For starters, the empiri­ cal nature of science must eliminate supernatural interven­ tions as causal factors. The word science," almost by defi­ nition II

means that principally there are no mysterious in­ calculable forces that corne into play, but rather that one can, in principle, master all things by cal­ culation. This means that the world is disen­ chanted. One need no longer have recourse to magical means in order to master or implore the spirits, as did the savage, for whom such mysteri­ ous powers existedP

Given this worldview, the naturalist is someone who neces­ sarily respects the conclusions of natural science. Both natu­ ralism and the scientific method belong together in theory as they exist together in fact.

Pragmatism is another reason that science presup­ poses naturalism. John Dewey, who grounded his philoso­ phy in Darwin's philosophical and biological naturalism, writes that liThe naturalist...sees how anti-naturalism has operated to prevent the application of scientific methods in the whole field of human and social subject matter.l1lH Dewey's defense of natmalism is pragmatic - naturalism is pragmatic, anti-naturalism is not. He argues that anti­ naturalism tends to discount the actual resources available for the betterment of humanity. The outcome of science un­ der the "handicap" of anti-natmalism is the systematic dis­ regard by anti-naturalists (neo-creos) of scientific method

WHAT IS "NATURAe' ABOUT NATURAL SCIENCE?

and its consequences.19 The anti-naturalism of the neo-creos tends to "dull their sense of the importance of evidence, to blunt their sensitivity to the need of accuracy of statement, to encourage emotional rhetoric at the expense of analysis and discrimination."2o Furthermore, the impossibility of a scientific anti­ naturalism is made explicit by Dewey. For IIIf they [anti­ naturalists] presented the naturalistic position in its own terms, they would have to take serious account of scientific method and its conclusions. But if they should do that, they would inevitably be imbued with some of the ideas of the· very philosophy they are attacking."21 Dewey is striking a Humean note here by pointing out that arguments against naturalism are self-defeating. Hume's lesson in An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding is that arguments from experience (induction) cannot prove that nature is uniform since these arguments are founded on the supposition of that uniformity. In other words, to decry science for sup­ posing as its foundation the view that principally only cal­ culable, na~ural forces exist, is to demand that science prove what it cannot logically prove, namely, the foundational principle by which science is possible.

III. CRITIQUE OF ARGUMENTS FROM DESIGN

Intelligent Design is, in part, an argument from anal­ ogy. Creation science is alleged to be analogous to what ar­ cheologists do when they come across a piece of stone. Cer­ tain shapes of stones and patterns knapped on them indi­ cate the intelligent work of prehistoric man. Archeologists infer from an arrowhead or shard of pottery that it was made by some prehistoric person, and not by wind, water or any other natural force. Indeed, intelligent design is something we encounter every day. Entire vocations, like archeology, anthropology, cryptography, even insurance fraud investigation and the criminal justice system, exist on the basis of discriminating design from accident. We com­ monly recognize design in objects or events that are just too

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P. WINHAM

improbable to have occurred by chance.

Where the Creation scientists fall into error is in ex­ trapolating this analogy to the world as a whole. It is one thing for humans to be able to detect design within the world they inhabit and construct. It is quite another for hu­ mans to detect design in the very 111.akeup of the world itself.

Detecting design as a result of supernatural forces is not analogous to detecting design as a result of natural forces.

We know how human beings design things and what these things look like, but we do not know how God designs things and what these things would look like. Hume makes this point in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Since all om' knowledge comes from experience, we can go from causes to effects, but only insofar as they are specific causes and effects within the world. Hume says that we have no idea what it means to say that the whole world is itself an effect, and therefore we cannot go from this premise - that the world as a whole is an effect - to some alleged cause that lies beyond or behind the world.22 Design reflects more of the maIU1er in which neo­ creos approach the world than of the manner in which the world, independent of the human mind, is constituted.

Neo-Creationists say that they should be taken seriously because they do not presuppose anything about the world, unlike Darwinists, who view the world through the phi­ losophical lens of naturalism. I need only appeal to Ruse and Weber to point up the flaw in their thinking - no worldview is free of philosophical presuppositions. Crea­ tionists proceed from the presupposition that "works of God exist," and then ask IIHow is their existence detectable in the struggle of life?" Neo-Darwinists, on the other hand, presuppose that God is absent and unnecessary. They pro­ ceed from the presupposition that "nature is all there iS,ll and then ask, "How are favored organisms preserved in the struggle for life?" No matter how strong a will, neo­ Creationism necessarily presupposes the possibility that God is not absent in the struggle of life and thus nature is not uniform or self-contained - even though this is not how

WHAT IS "NATURAL" ABOUT NATURAL SCIENCE?

neo-creos would see their methodology. This is all one with saying that apart from philosophical super-naturalism or theism or something of the sort creationism is absurd and meaningless. According to Johnson's standards of scientific acceptability, then, neo-Creationism should not be taken seriously because it presupposes that design exists in na­ ture.

Arguments from design are also based on Cartesian reasoning. Descartes argues in the Meditations that an effect carmot contain more perfection than its cause. This argu­ ment translates into the proposition that any design is an effect or manifestation of an intelligent cause, a mind. Neo­ Creationists see design in nature and infer causality by something with intelligence. This inference, however, is du­ bious. When Creationists purport, to see design or "information-rich structures of biologi'23 in nature, there is no process of reasoning that can secure them against the contrary supposition that the design they perceive is not really out there in nature, existing even when unperceived, but rather imposed on nature from without. What a Crea­ tionist takes to be a sign of intelligent design, the naturalist sees only a product of. nature. John Rowland makes this same point by quoting Voltaire, who said that it was obvious that the nose was de­ signed to bear spectacles, because it fitted them so well. In other words, the evolutionists say that the person who sees some sense of design in the eye or the ear or any other organ of the living creature, sees it because he himself puts it there. 24 In short, design is not a basic h'ait of nature but an illusion which nature easily arouses in human beings.

Finally, a consequence of the different philosophical foundations of the theory of evolution on the one hand, and of creation science on the other, is that a scientist cam10t have an honest conversation with a creationist. What each has to say has no persuasive meaning for the other insofar

41

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42

ILYA P. WI:\HA~·f

as they are not vdlling to question the most basic presuppo­ sitions of their respective positions. This is why the contro­ \'ersv and debate between nee-Creationists and nee­ Darwinists will in all likelihood never be resolved. A Dar­ winist calIDot approve or go along "with those lv-hose beliefs "weaken dependence upon the scientific method, As much as Phillip Johnson might argue otherwise, the sacred and supernatural dimension of life witnessed by neo­ Creationists simply cannot be seen from the perspective of the scientific attitude.

In conclusion, arguing that evolutionary science is merely a philosophy is utter nonsense. The attempt to sepa­ rate scientific claims from philosophical claims is na'ive be­ cause science has to make philosophical assumptions in or­ der to 'work, as do we in order to live an orderly life. The philosophical assumptions of science are neither ilTational nor prejudiciaL Rather, naturalistic assumptions and expla­ nations are necessary for doing science. In other words, phi­ losophy is what makes science as a vocation possible and its applications useful and meaningful (pragmatic). We can­ not believe the nee-creos when they maintain that they have observed the data objectively, that evolution cannot explain what they observe, and that, therefore, a supernatu­ ral intelligent designer is involved by default. Creation sci­ ence and the theory of evolution both presuppose philoso­ phical, methodological, and metaphysical views. The differ­ ence is that the presuppositions of the theory of evolution are continuous with science, while those of Creation science are not.

Notes Mayr, "An Insatiably Curious Observer Looks Back on a Life in,

Evolution," The Nt'U) York Times, April 16, 2002, p. D2.

:2 William A. Dembski, "Introduction: Mere Creation," in Mere Creation:

Science, Faitll & Intelligent Design, edited by William A. Dembski

(Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 1998), p. 24.

3 Phillip E. Johnson, "How to Sink a Battleship/' in Mere Creation:

Science, Faitil & Intelligent Design, edited by William A. Dembski

(Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 1998), p. 449.

4 Ibid., p. 450.

1

WHAT IS "NATURAL" ABOUT NATURAL SCIENCE? 5 Ibid.,

p. 451.

Ibid., p. 453.

7 Michael Ruse, "The New Antievolutionisnl," Speech at a AAAS

Symposium, February 13, 1993, http://www.arn.org/ docs/ol'pages/

or151/mr93h路an.htm. my emphasis.

8 Ibid.

6

9 Ibid.

Dembski, p. 28.

Duane T. Gish, "Creation, Evolution, and the Historical Evidence,lI in

But Is It Science?, edited by Michael Ruse. New York: PrometheLls

Books, 1988. p. 270.

12 John Dewey, "The Relation of Science and Philosophy ns the BaHiH of

Education," in John Dewey on Education, edited by Reginnld D.

Archambault. University of Chicago Press, 1964. p. 15.

13 Max Weber, "Science as a Vocation," Originally a speech at Munich

University, 1918, http://tiunet.tiu.edu/acadinfo/ cas/ socsci/ psych/

SOC410/Readings/ Weber/Works/ science.htm

14 Ibid.

15 Ronald N. Giere, 'Naturalism/' in A Companion to 'lie Pililosophy of Science, edited by W.H Newton-Smith. Massachusetts: BlClCkwcll, 20()O. p.308.

16 Sterling P. Lamprecht, The Metaphysics of No Iurali:-<lI1. New York:

Meredith Publishing, 1967. p. 180.

17 Weber, p. online.

16 John Dewey, "Anti-Naturalism in Extremh;," in 'I'll/' 1.:";"11'11111111>/'1111',1/,

Vol, 1: Pmgll1atis1Il, Education, Democracy, edited by r ,(lI'l'Y llivkmllil tllld

Thomas M. Alexander. Indiana University PreHs,.199H. p.l (J:l.

19 Ibid., p. 167.

20 Ibid, 21 Ibid., p. 168.

22 Lamprecht, p. 178.

23 Dembski, p. 17.

24 John Rowland, Mysteries oj Science: A Study of tlw Umi/Il/iollfl (!{ thi'

Scientific Metl1Od, New York: Philosophical Library, J 957. p. li9.

10

11

Bibliography Dembski, William A. "Introduction: Mere Cl'l:ation," in Mt'J'I' ('r1'l1/ioll: Science, Faith & Intelligent Design, ed. William A. [)(路Inb~ki. 1111" nois: InterVarsity Press, 1998.

DeweYI John. "The Relation of Science and PhiloHophy HI'! I.lw BtlHlH of Education," in John Dewey on Educatioll, l~d. ReAimlJd D. /\T颅 chambault. Chicago: University of Chicago PI'{!BH, '1064.

Dewey, John. Anti-Naturalism in Extremis," in T11{' r;:;:;(,lllial r)(~7{JCI/, Vol. 1: Pragmatism, Education, Democracy, eel. Larry fJickm~n /I

43

44

ILYA P. WINHAM and Thomas M. Alexander. Indiana University Press, 1998.

Giere, Ronald N. "Naturalism," in A Companion to the Philosophy of Sci­ ence, ed. W. H. Newton-Smith. Massachusetts: Blackwell, 2000.

Gish, Duane T. "Creation, Evolution, and the Historical Evi dence," in But is it Science?, ed. Michael Ruse. New York: Prometheus Books, 1998.

Jolu1Son, Phillip E. "How to Sink a Battleship," in Mere Creation: Sci ­ ence, Faith & Intelligent Design, ed. William A. Dembski. Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 1998.

Lamprecht, Sterling P. The Metaphysics ofNaturalism. New York: Mere­ dith Publishing, 1967.

Mayr, Ernst. "An Insatiably Curious Observer Looks Back on a Life in Evolution," in The New York Times, April 16: 02. 2002.

Rowland, John, Mysteries of Science: A Study of the Limitations of the Sci­ entific Method. New York: Philosophical Library, 1957.

Ruse, Michael. "The New Antievolutionism," Speech at an AAAS Sym­ posium, February 13, 1993. <www.arn.org/docs/orpages/ or151 / rnr93tran,htm>.

Weber, Max. "Science as a Vocation," Originally a speech at Munich University, 1918. <http://tiunet.tiu.edu/acadinfo/cas/ socsei/ psych/SOC410/Readil1gs/Weber/Works/seience,htm>,

Religious Experience, Pluralistic Knowledge and William Jalnes BRITTANY G. TRICE

If one claims to have knowledge based upon a reli­ gious experience, must they belong to a specific religion to have that experience? More importantly, must they have participated directly in that experience? These experiences may be an entirely normal human phenomenon, given that most have an understanding of a divine presence" or even "participation" in such an event) However, something so widely understood as religious experience" falls short when a definition must be ascribed to it. Some may contend that a "religious" experience does not imply its origin in doctrinal or institutional religion.ii On the other hand, those that cling to religion often find that religion would be de­ prived (in most cases) of its most basic element if it did not at one time, or presently include what we call "religious ex­ perience". Arguably, in one degree or another, all experi­ ences that support the basis of religion are considered onto­ logically to be of rnystical quality.iii It is the personal quality of mystical experiences that will be explored in the pages that follow.

The American philosopher and pragmatist, William James, had significant thIngs to say regarding mystical ex­ perience in his work TIle Varieties of Religious Experience (VRE). In reference to the above discussion, he felt that the moving force behind religion was not found in the creeds, dogmas or elaborate descriptions of religions, but: /I

II

What keeps religion going is something [... ] [other] than abstract definitions and systems of concate­ nated adjectives, and something different from fac- . ulties of theology [... ]. These things are the after­ effects, secondary accretions upon those phenom­ ena of vital conversation with the unseen divine 1...] renewing themselves [... J in the lives of hurn­ bIe private men (VRE 487).

46

BRITTANY G. TRICE

What he means here is that these "secondary things" are dependent upon this dialogical connection that, as he defines it, happens in a mystical experience.

Looking at his epistemology in general will be im­ portant to gain the proper understanding of mystical ex­ perience in Varieties. In this essay, I first trace this epistemo­ logical development in the later works of Pragmatism (P) and the posthumously published Essays of Radical Empiri­ cism (ERE). Then, I examine whether he remains consistent after applying the findings from his epistelTIology to the metaphysical dimension he holds of religious experience.

Finally, after leaving behind James's idea that religious ex­ perience remains only authoritative for the individual, I will defend my position that this does not entail mystical experience is less verifiable and applicable to a collective whole. From comparisons of our own and others' religious experiences and th.e role of cognitive feeling within them, this may be a case of what I term "pluralistic knowledge"­ an intersubjective knowledge that makes a practical differ­ ence to more than one individual's life. SOlne ideas from contemporary philosophers Richard Rorty and Bruce Wil­ shire will help illuminate the details of cognitive feeling, and the social community that this pluralism depends on.

I: An Inherited Religious Tendency

Who was !:his man William James, and why as a pragmatist, was he concerned with religion? Th.e innova­ tion he brought regarding pragmatism was to see it as a method applied to moral, metaphYSical and religiousprob­ lems regarding uses of truth and value, rather than just a method of scientific inquiry into the meaning of ideas. The first American pragmatist, Charles Sanders Peirce, embod­ ied the latter idea in his pragmatism, and became put off by the ideas of James, and henceforth diverged from James calling his own pragmatism, "pragmaticism" - a name he said was ugly enough [... ] to be safe from kidnap­ /I

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RELIGIOUS EXPERlENCE

pers" (Thayer 88). In James's work Pragmatism, he describes the results of this wider inquiry as freeing us from abstrac­ tion and insufficiency, from fixed principles, closed sys­ tems, and pretended absolutes and origins" (51).

Throughout James's early life, he struggled with the notion that human thought and action was determined, and humans might be thus forced to act mechanically in a closed universe (Thayer 133). His father, Henry James was a religious man, having studied extensively at Princeton Theological Seminary, and he instilled in James a democ­ ratic way of viewing religious impulses (VRE v). Later in life, James fulfilled a promise to his father that someday he would deal critically with the issue of religion by writing the comprehensive work The Varieties ofReligious Experience, where the focus of religion would be placed not on the ob­ ject (Le., God), but on the subject as an experiencing, believ­ ing, doubting, and praying person (VRE vii).

Although James did not consider himself to be a di­ reet participant in mystical experience,lv he says in a letter to a friend that his purpose in writing the Varieties was to show the glue holding the world's religious life together.

Furthermore, he wanted to show that the function of the life (Le., those things found within the religious experiences) of religion was mankind's most important oneY So how did James define mystical experience, and what did experience mean to him in general? These two components of his epis­ temology must be explored.

1/

II: Experience: Mystical and Mundane For James l there are four qualities that accompany mystical experiencevi and the resulting conditions he placed on these experiences. The first quality is ineffability; that is, it "defies expression" and a wholly adequate articulation is impossible. Second, it is noetic, or a state of knowledge, and we gain things from this experience. A third is transiency­ the experience does not last long, but passes away quickly.

FinallYI it is passive, or the feeling of union where one is ac­

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BRITTANY

TRICE

tually "grasped" or "held" by a superior power. The condi­ tion James places on mystical experience is its authority for only those individuals who have it (VRE 414-15).

In SOlne of James's later works, the mindset he used to view experience and what he termed" experiences" un­ folds for us. In radical empiricism, James explainS experi­ ences within the flux of time as being within "a world of pure experience./I This world of pure experience is a world of "pure objects" in which things can only be identified as a that" or a " datum, fact, phenomenon, or con­ tent" (McDermott 227). In order for an object (say, a book) to be classified as more than a "that," but also as "physical" or a percept" of something else it must have a function (i.e., it can be read). When a particular object (the book) within experience is seen with and then obscured from the eyes, it can be thought of as "having been," or existing in past experiences and is thus a percept. In addition to this, taken in totality, my experiencing the book is what it is "to be conscious of something" .vii Thus, James shows us in the world of pure experi­ ence, objects have three ontological states. First, they have their pure" form, or "as they are" and can be referred to only as a "that" and without content. Secondly, as things move within space and time, they become divided into what they have been, are, and will be.vii Finally, these rela­ tions are conscious, given they are inseparable from the cog­ nitive element of experience, and that acquisition of a con­ scious quality depends upon its having a context.

Given these examples and analyses, the tendency for Jmnes to emphasize the cognitive relation connecting things within experience should be evident, and that in cases where there are cognitive relations, these are as much ex­ periences as the objects that they connect.i X Carrying the cognitive aspect of radical empiricism further, one may claim the importance of the personal feeling that gives mys­ tical experience its individual quality.x In any event, the is­ sue raised here by James's radical empiricism concerns the subjectivity of experience. This arises because the subjective /I

1/

11

RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

qualities of these experiences are inevitably determined by the limitations of that particular person's perceptions and sensations.

Similarly, James mentions repeatedly the importance of cognitive states in his Pragmatism lectures. The cognitive function of feeling arises when things are evaluated by their cash-value", or by the practical difference they make.

Things are useful to us insofar as we value them. This use­ ful value is determined by what our belief (i.e., the response to our feelings) about these things may entail.xi Cognition is defined as the action or faculty of knowing taken in its wid­ est sense, including sensation, perception, memory and judgment. In Pragmatism, James uses an example of being lost and starving in the woods, and seeing a cow-path. It is reasonable, he says, to believe that there may be some hu­ man habitation beyond the path, for this may mean saving oneself from starvation. Thus, the inclinations given to this experience by sensations with the eyes had great implica­ tions for one's life and future well being: namely, the practi­ cal relevance of believing there is a human habitation be­ yond that path (P 93-5). We can see for ourselves that this feeling, or impulse to act on our belief would have implica­ tions important to our life, even though we would only be acting on the probability that there was something beyond that path. James elaborates on implications of individual belief somewhat further: 1/

If there be any life better we should lead, and if

there be any idea which, if believed in, would help us to lead that life, then it would be really better for us to believe in that idea, unless indeed, belief in it incidentally clashed with other greater vital bene­ fits (37).

Thus, the significance placed on individual belief, es­ pecially in religious tone, cannot be separated from the cog­ nition of sensuous experience. It is therefore not unruly for James to say that "pragmatism, so far from keeping her

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BRITTANY

G. TRICE

eyes bent on the immediate practical foreground, [... ] dwells just as much upon the world's remotest perspec­ tives" (56).

Note he is willing to include religious experience, yet in a tone that is not monistic in quality. xii The religious plural­ ism he wants to account for is an open-ended system; one guided by empirically verified hypotheses (73-4). Even more so, in reli­ gious life the notion holds true that: We can and we may, as it were, jump with both feet off the ground into or towards a world of which we trust the other parts to meet our jump - and only so can the making of a perfected world of the plural­ istic pattern ever take place (McDermott 740).

Thus, the full experience for James consists in intri­ cate cognitive connections that present the world as mostly unified or held together by the plurality of experiences of others, as well as our own.

III: Empirical Verification Applied to Mystical Experience With these things in mind, I would like to sugges t the'lt James's epistemological development seems to sh.ow, prima jacie, a consistent residue from his earlier account of religious experience in Varieties. xiii However, he fails to re­ main consistent when holding that the metaphysics of mys­ tical experience are only possibly verifiable by scientific methods because this assumption goes beyond his praglna­ tism, given he holds the practical benefits of mystical ex­ perience are private, and carmot be shared to a community.

I would like to show that his view of religion has more similarities to radical empiricism by looking into his con­ cept of quasi-chaos" and then seeing the working cogni­ tive aspect within experience which allows us to know and identify mystical experiences of others. These are isstles I . will return to later in my discussion of pluralistic knowl­ edge.

II

51

RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

In both Pragmatism and Varieties James insists that the value placed upon religious mystical experience is not only real but also true for those who have them, and are a possi~ bility for greater truths beyond current scientifically verified empirical data. Regarding scientific knowledge, he asks us, why not think that perhaps our own, or others' mystical ex­ periences are not the beginning of a transition" in the total human experience? It is likely that what James really meant by saying mystical experience was potentially scientifically verifiable, was that it could be evidence providing insight into new knowledge thafs becoming more scientifically verifiable", but not necessarily "verified" at this point in time.

Where I diverge from James is the point at which he discusses another problem with the scientific verification of mystical experiences, saying that science tends to focus more on creating "entities" or universal laws" that will work regardless of situation, or personal feeling. James rnight be trying to a void an appeal to the monism of scien­ tific rationalism here, or that a particular religious union with a greater power will make an immediate practical dif­ ference in more than one person s life. The latter conception is impossible, because mystical experiences for James are fundamentally subjective, and authoritative only for that individuaL My disagreement is that two or more person's "knowledge" about mystical experiences of others might not require their being verifiable and arguable-and this is contrary to science.

He seems unaware of having set up the case here, by his naming it the "science of religions", for a knowledge one can immediately obtain from such experiences that should not be ignored since it has a possibility of being even­ tually verified. With this in mind, those who have not had mystical experiences should be able to grant from the ac­ counts of oth.ers their possible verification; and this at least provides them a general knowledge that such experiences indeed do exist" and are out there to be evaluated as 11

II

If

l

l

1/

II

!

52

BRITTANY

G. TRICE

such. This now brings me to the notion of "pluralistic knowledge".

IV: Pluralistic Knowledge

It has been mentioned early on that, in stepping away from James's position regarding mystical experience, I wished to amplify what I call "pluralistic knowledge". I will begin by first examining, in order, James's concept quasi-chaos", degrees of mystical knowledge, and the in~ separable emotive and cognitive elements of mystical ex~ periencei finally I will discuss the pragmatic value of this knowledge. Although this notion may become clearer by sketching these things throughout the following pages, I continue to hold with James that mystical experience is val~ ued in society, but I think he failed to see this value is not dependent on its scientific verification.xiv The concept involved in quasi-chaos"xv is that an in~ dividual may undergo an experience leading to an event X, while another may have an experience and also be led to X. However, the first individual may have employed meth­ ods, or experienced feelings of A and B to get to X, while the second employed or experienced C and D. So in short, differing paths may sometimes lead people to experience the same event. Hence, given the variety of experiences that are mystical throughout differing cultures and religions, this supports the claim that "there is vastly more [perceptual] discontinuity in the sum total of experience than we commonly suppose" (McDermott 204).

If one claims to know something about an experience, it is assumed they must have knowledge of that experien­ tial content- either from their own experience, or of (m­ other individual's experience. But according to James's "quasi-chaos", we can have different experiences that lead to the same event. In mystical experience the abstract object (such as God) what my experience "points to". Con­ versely, my cognitive awareness, feel:i:ngs, thoughts, atti­ tude of the object, and sense of self to whom that attitude N

II

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RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

belongs are what my experience consists of (VRE 542-3).

The experiential events termed quasi-chaos" must there­ fore include supersensible or mystical experiences, and by doing so take into account a whole system of experience.

Mystical experiences are real, sensible, and plural according to his notion of quasi-chaos" .

It was mentioned above that in order to know some­ thing, usually one must have knowledge of that subject's content.xvi The noetic quality in mystical experience th.ere­ fore is the awareness of the content of that experience.

However, if we recall a principle from radical empiricism, an object has no content unless we are made conscious" by our recognition of it in continuous transition. In order for pluralistic knowledge to work here, the content must be made intersubjectively explicit to a group of individuals.

From the concept of "quasi-chaos", we can have different experiences leading to the same event, so it's plausible to claim that our individual mystical experiences can differ, but not necessarily the object to which they refer (and they won't differ greatly, assuming the object(s) in mystical ex­ perience are all supersensible).

Now, it seems obvious that if I have had a mystical experience, I needn't argue with myself whether J know the content of that experience. However, the problem for plu­ ralistic knowledge is how I can identify another as having had a valid mystical experience. How can t without being aware of the content they alone have, identify it as mysti­ cal? I would like to suggest that the solution to this problem. lies in the inherent cognitive feeling within mystical experi­ ence. We all know what it is to be conscious of something, and moreover, we know what it is to have a sensation, or emotional feeling for something, or for some object. It seems that the only condition for identifying what another knows; is to have knowledge of the content. But thejullnl!ss of that content one must have is not generally made an is­ sue. xvii With this point the definition of IImystical" can be broadened to relate to knowledge, of any degree, of what may be mystical, as a criterion for identifying whether an­ /I

Ii

IJ

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BRITIA~'Y G. TRICE

other's experience was a mystical experience. Thus, because a mystical experience involves a cognitive feeling to'wards an object, it is plausible that everyone may possess the abil­ itv to identify \vhether another's experience was mysti­ cal.x\·iii

Hmvever, since I may only have a small degree of the content to identify this experience as mystical, I cannot un­ derstand either the full sensibility of the other's experience or totalll1 understand the ineffability of that mystical experi­ ~nce. In order for mystical experiences to be called "scientific" they would need to be fully describable, meas­ urable, and also repeatable (much as an experiment-Le., not transient). This is where I think James missed a funda­ mental point underlying mystical experiences: If they are currently not scientific, this doesn't imply that they can't be an intersubjectively knowable experience at least to a cer­ tain degree. Gathering from what we have seen above, an experience needn't be fully explicit to everyone to be known to others, and these religious experiences can still exist in a community in which they are known. The plural­ istic knowledge here is an intersubjective understanding of each other's possession of differing ways or paths of experi­ ence to a supersensible object.

Pluralistic knowledge can also be understood by its similarities to the inseparable emotive and cognitive func­ tions from common phenomena in daily life that are inar­ guable in much the same way as I am claiming mystical ex­ periences can be. For example, one may not be able to de­ scribe or provide inferential reasons of their love for a hus­ band, wife, or family, but this does not mean that those ac­ quainted with them would deny the existence of this love.

The concept of "being in love" in general (with God, a per­ son, etc.) may be incapable of description in terms of the character or actions of the beloved people or objects. Even more so, one would not undermine a child's love for their pet dog, an unconditional love for an imperfect person, or philanthropic desire to help others as unwarranted because of its ineffability. An insightful philosopher regarding this,

RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

Richard Rorty, writes: It does not greatly matter whether we state our rea­

son to believe-our insistence that some or all finite mortal humans can be far more than they have yet become - -in religious, political, philosophical, liter­ ary, sexual, or familial terms. What matters [most] is [ ... ] the ability to experience overpowering hope Dr faith Dr love (Cambridge 97, italics mine).

What Rorty is trying to suggest is that experiences we have may go beyond argument. He says later this may be because we presently have no way of describing them. This doesn't imply however, that they are not real to us or know­ able to others. More importantly, he stresses the insistence we have to believe our experiences are real that allows us to move forward in the flux of experience- to become what we are not yet-and, on my view, mystical experience is not excluded from this.

Some pragmatic implications for such an acceptance of mystical experience are found in the possibility of hope and improvement of the quality of life, and the source of sllch possibilities for James is a supersensible realm of new experience. Although participating in someone else's mysti­ cal experience is impossible, sharing notes" with others about our own experiences cannot provide but a pluralistic way to help us understand better the supersensible reality we ourselves may have hope in. This interaction with oth­ ers in a community is vital to the sharing and growing of religious hope and a faith in what lies beyond this life.

Pragmatically considered, here we find the heart of plural­ istic knowledge as applied to mystical experience. In an­ other place, Rorty says: /J

A religious faith which seems to lie behind the at­ tractions of both utilitarianism and pragmatism is, instead, a faith in the future possibilities of mortal humans, a faith which is hard to distinguish from love for, and hope for, the human community (96).

55

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BRITIA~Y

G. TRICE

This love, hope, and faith in the efforts of the human community . are what Rortv . terms "romance" -a romance underlining the notion that a pluralistic knowledge among individuals may crystallize around a congregation, around a novel as easily as around a sacrament, around a God as easily as around a child (96).

50 in essence a romantic attitude" can help us un­ derstand the importance of a kno'wledge that is pluralistic in nature, yet binds humanity by the fact that our individ­ ual experiences have value applicable to the whole human enterprise. A social quality like this is, after alt the primary benefit of an anti-foundationalist epistemology that rejects all ready-made absolutes. This is further supported by an observation of James scholar Bruce Wilshire. He writes that 1/[ ••. ] our experiencing is not completely private. To a great extent it is experienceable by others, and their experiencing infiltrates (sometimes floods) ours" (Cambridge 120). fI [ • • • ]

It

Moreover, in reminiscence of James's lifelong sh'ug­ gles with determinism, I think he would have agreed with '\Nilshire here that there is a need for recognition of the role of pluralistic or publicly attained knowledgei and also 'when Wilshire continues to say that human viewpoints of the world are determined largely because as social crea­ tures, "[... ] thinking beings that get constituted within an experienceable world [... ] experience others experiencing them as experienced and experienceable (10). Perhaps it is not James's intelligence, but rather his human temporality that prevented him from furthering his philosophical per­ spectives to rest upon a view of pluralistic knowledge.

V: Conclusion In tracing James's radical empiricist and pragmatist views in the course of this paper, I have tried to show the implications of these views when applied to mystical ex­ perience in Varieties. These implications have proven not so

57

RELIGIOGS EXPERIENCE

clear-cut! however, given the complexities of James!s mean­ ing of experience. Nonetheless! I have maintained that al­ though James holds mystical experience compatible vdth eventual verification on scientific grounds, he did not see clearly enough that our knowledge from mystical states can currently be widened by dependence on humanity's collec­ tive effort of sharing knowledge and constant deliberation.

IIPluralistic knowledge is the term I have used to represent this collective effort of experiencing and intersub­ jectively identifying to one another the mutual relations of cognitive feeling inherent in all mystical experiences. In do­ ing this! we can pragmatically benefit by increasing our own knowledge of the supersensible by becoming con­ scious of that of other's.

Moreover, with both a Jamesian-eye view, and from Rortis clever suggestion! the undertaking of a romantic attitude towards pluralism allows us to see that mystical experience is valuable to humanity as a whole. I have hoped to show this as the result of acknowledging plural­ istic knowledge. Finally, with the suggestions of Wilshire, and James! s concern to incorporate his own strong reserva­ tions about determinism into his philosophy, we can see clearly that the pragmatic value and meaning of James!s reflections are worth bearing in mind. ll

/I

II

Notes

Contributor to this topic, Professor Ellen Kappy Suckiel of Notre Dame writes "r [... J begin with the modest and uncontroversial claim that a great many human beings have experienced feelings such as religious awe and wonder, and that having such feelings is an entirely normal mode of response. 1I from "The Cognitive Value of Feelings", in Heavens

i

Champion William James's Philosophy afReligion, p.73.

I am borrowing the Deweyan distinction between "religion" and the "religious". According to Dewey, "Religion always signifies a special body of beliefs and practices having some kind of institutional organization, loose or tight. The adjective religious denotes nothing ill the way of a specifiable entity, either institutional or as a system of beliefs. [Furthermore, this adjective] does not denote anything that can exist by itself or that can be organized into a particular or distinctive foml of existence", from "Religion Versus the ii

58

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G. TRICE

Religious", in A Common Faith. John Dewey (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1933), pp. 9-10, italics mine. iii In this paper, I will assume the most basic function underlying all religions is mystical states. Therefore, when I say something is a mystical experience, it should be kept in mind that this function is common to religious experience in a variety of religions. Thus, combining this with the aforementioned definition of 11 mystical" - a religious experience can indeed be "mystical", but at the same time, it does not hold to say all mystical experiences are of a religion. iv "Whether my treahnent of mystical states will shed more light or darkness, I do not know, for my own constitution shuts me out from their enjoyment almost entirely, and I can speak of them only at second hand" (VRE 413). v "[In preparing the Varieties], the problem I have set myself is a hard one: first, to defend (against all prejudices of my c1asstexperience" and "philosophy" as being the real backbone of the world's religious life - I mean prayer, guidance, and all that sort of thing immediately and privately felt, as against high and noble general views of our destiny and the world's meaning; and second, to make the hearer or reader believe, as I myself do invincibly believe, that, although all the special manifestations of religion may have been absurd (I mean its creeds and theories), [... ] the life of it as a whole is mankind's most important function. A task well-nigh impossible, [... ] but to attempt it is tny religious act." From Lellers ofWilliam James, Vol II, p. 127. To Miss Frances R. Morse. vi I should like to distinguish for purposes of this essay that there) llre two lJ{lsic types of mystical religious experience. First is the COllll1IU/Ull type, a form common in Christianity. In this experience we reel there if; a providential God about us that hears our prnyers, and works with tiS continually in our life. Second, and the type which will be discussed in this essay, there is the kind that involves a union with the divine, and is perhaps so powerful that one loses all self-identity. This latter type is the one that James focuses on most in his Varieties. For a more elaborate expansion on this distinction of "communal" and "union" mystical experience, see David Stewart's "Mystical Experience", in Exploring the Philosophy afReligion. (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1992) pp.S-9. vii This conscious relation is further advanced by his idea that" the relations of continuous transition experienced are what make Ollt' experiences cognitive" (WJ 213, italics mine). viii Perhaps James draws this description of reality from influences by Peirce and his theory of probability that deals with the pragmatic maxim and its applications to hardness, weight, force, and reality in his essay "How to Make Our Ideas Clear." More specifically, Peirce writes: "the will be's, the actually is's, and the have beens are not the sun, of the reals. They only cover actuality. They me besides would be's and can be's that are real", in H.S. Thayer's Meaning and Action: A Critical History of

RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

Pragmatism (Babbs-Merrill: Indianapo~is and New York, 1968) p.114.

"The relations that connect experiences must themselves be experienced relations, and any kind of relation must be accounted as 'real' as anything else in the system." From A World of Pure Experience (WJ195). Also in another place, "Experience as a whole is a process in time, whereby innumerable particular terms lapse and are superseded by others that follow upon them by transitions which, whether disjunctive or conjunctive in content, are themselves experiences, and must in general be accounted at least as real as the terms which they relate" (McDermott 202). x As a rule, mystical states merely add a supersensLlous meaning to the ordinary outward data of consciousness. They are excitements like the emotions of love or ambition, gifts to our spirit by means of which facts already objectively before us fall into a new expressiveness and make a new connection with our active life." (VRE 466) ,i A similar passage in Varieties reads: "Both thought and feeling are determinants of conduct, and the same may be determined either by feeling or by thought" (VRE 548). xii Although in Varieties he that mystical states of religious experience encourage monistic tendencies, James thinks that this is unfortunate. The probl~m he sees with monism is its "fixed" and "static" nature that will not accept a "cholera-germ" of imperfection in its water-tank. However, because the idea of monism encourages the notion that we have already "reached the end" of inquiry, it cannot provide a sufficient account of experience in totality, given thl! "flux" Df knowledge is in constant transition.

Thus, pragmatism rejects absolute monism (1' 74), and openly embracml pluralism, because "for men in practical life, perfection is still something far off and in the process of achievement" (P 16) We mllst take (l mdioristic approach to knowledge; that is, accepting that our current beliefs are open to falsification, and that reformulation of them inevitably results in new ideas intertwined and tainted with hints of the old. xiii It should be noted that James held Pragmatism and Radical Empiri足 cism to be separate doctrines (McDern1ott 314). But I am emphasizing the most pertinent threads in both so as to give light to discussion of what he meant by mystical experience, and set ttp the case for amplify足 ing his views in what I am going to call "pluralistic knowledge", xlv The subjective and pluralistic characteristics inherent to mystical experience may be reason too, why Peirce (who wasmnthematically and scientifically inclined) chose to leave the psychological find emotional elements out of his pragmatism, and perhaps why he responded to James negatively. xv "111e whole system of experience as they are immediately given presents itself as a quasi-chaos thmugh which one can pass out of an inilial tenn in many directions and yet end in the same terminus, moving from next to next by a gl'eat many possible paths" (McDermott 204). ix

/I

59

60

BRITTANY G. TRICE

There is also an interesting and rather long example of this type of pluralism in the New Testament regarding the church body: "TI1e body is a unit, though it is made up of many parts; and though all its parts are many, they form one body. [... J lithe foot should say, because I am not a hand, I do not belong to the body, it would not for that reason cease to be a part of the body. If the whole body were an eye, where would the sense of hearing be? If the whole body were an ear, where would the sense of smell be? But in fact God has arranged the parts in the body, everyone of them, just as he wanted them to be." I Corinthians 12:12-20 (NIV).

On another note, in Hindu scripture an interesting pluralism is found with the creation of the caste system and where the making of humanity is presented. The particular passage that follows formed the basis and foundational authority for the Hindu caste system: "When they [the gods] divided the Man, into how many parts did they apportion him? What do they call his two arms and thighs and feet?

His mouth became the Brahmin; his arms were made into the Warrior, his thighs the People, and from his feet the Servants were born": Rig足 Veda 10.90. xvi Although how we ever became aware of the content of a subject in the first place has been problematic from the beginning of western philosophy. In Plato's Mella this paradox states that we cannot seek what we know because we already know it, and thus do not need to seek for it; and we cannot search for what we do not know without some criterion to identify the thing with. I do not wish to solve this dilemma in my essay however, but assume that we are able to get past this stage somehow in knowledge, and I think this claim is inductively plausible. Ed. John M. Cooper, from Meno, in Plato's Complete Works (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett, 1997) 80D-E. xvii The problem of whether one can know that either they or another possess knowledge of something with only second order knowledge (Le., knowledge-of-knowledge, as opposed to first order, or knowledge of the content) is dealt with extensively by Plato in his Channides. I agree with Plato scholar Charles H. Kahn, that having "knowledge-of" something implies we have a degree of the content, and hence, second order knowledge is a degree of first order knowledge. He argues, "Without knowing quantum mechanics I can know enough about quantum mechanics to know that I am ignorant of it. Of course I must know something about it besides the name, or I could not be sure of my ignorance; I cannot be wholly ignorant of the subject./I From "Charmides ffil.d The Search for Beneficial Knowledge", in Plato and The Socratic Dialogue (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1996) pp.198-99. xviii I am broadening James's definition of "mystical" a bit, but my goal is to try and show the similarities of feelings to any object, to feelings towards a supersensible object. This is something I feel James

RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE unwarrantedly neglected. In doing so, I hope to show that even if one claims to not have had an experience called mystical- they may avoid a horn in the dilemma of Meno's paradox because they do already know how to identify another's mystical experience because they already have a small degree of the content of it.

Bibliography

Bixler, Julius Seelye. Religion in TIle Philosophy of William James. Boston: Marshall Jones Company, 1926.

Dewey, John. A Common Faith. New Haven and London: Yale Univer­ sity Press, 1933).

Kalm, Charles H Plato and The Socratic Dialogue. United Kingdom: Cam­ bridge University Press, 1996.

James,William. McDermott, John J. Ed. The Writings of Wi/limn James -­ A Comprehensive Edition. Chicago and London: Chicago Univer­ sity Press, 1977.

James, William. Essays in Radical Empiricism. Cambddge and London: 1976.

James, William. Pragmatism. Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett, 1981.

James, WiHiam. The Varieties of Religious Experience. NewYark: Modern Library, 1994.

James, William. Tile Will to Believe (/lid Other Essays in PopuloI' Philww­ 17/7)1. Cambridge and London: l~lal'val'cl University pJ'(~ss, :J 979.

Leamcm, Oliver. Ed. Tlte Future of Philosopll!/ Towards flit! 2'1.,1 Cel/fllry.

London and New York: Routledge, 1998.

MacKinnon, Barbam, Ed. American P/lilosopily - A Historical Allllwlog!l' Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985.

Menand, Louis. TIle Metapllysical Clul1. New York: Fenal' Straus and Giroux, 2001.

Peirce, Charles Sanders. The Collected Papers of Charles Scmders Peirce­ Volume 8.

Pojman, Louis P. Philosophy of Religion. Mountain View, London and Toronto: Mayfield Publishing Company, 2001.

Puhlam, Ruth Anna. Ed. The Cambridge Companion llJWiIlil1l11 James.

United Kingdom: Cmnbl'idge University Pressl 1997.

Stewart, David. Exploring 17fe Philosophy (if' Rdigicm. New Jersey: Pren­ tice Hall, 1992.

Suckiel, Ellen Kappy. Heaven's Cfmllipion - Willialll Jt1IlIes's Philosophy of Religion. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996.

Thayer, H.S. Meaning and Action - -A Critical History (~f Pragmatism. Indi­ anapolis and New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1968.

West, Cornel. The American EZ!(lsion of Pllilosophy-A Genealogy of Prag­ rnatiam. London and Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989.

61

Behavior and Other Minds: A Response to

Functionalists

MIKE LOCKHART

unctionalists argue that the "problem of other minds" has a simple solution, namely, that one can ath'ibute mentality to an object iff an object func­ tions in a particular mamler: given certain inputs, certain outputs will occur. For human beings, we simply need to observe their behavior and we can safely attribute mentality to them since, according to functionalism, mental states just are functional states. If we accept the functional­ ist account of the mind, we certainly have no problem of other minds. In fact, it recently has been argued1 that since functionalism does solve the "problem of other minds," we should accept it as the best theory of mind. I will argue, however, that the ability to solve the problem of other minds is not a sufficient reason to accept functionalism.

Moreover, I will argue that functionalism is an incomplete theory of mind, that behavior is not the solution to the problem of other minds, and finally, that we need not re­ vert to radical skepticism concerning the problem of other minds.

Elliot Reed has recently argued that because a func­ tional account of the mind solves the problem of other minds, it is surely the best account of mind. If mental states just are functional states then there should be no worries about whether or not the people we see every day have conscious mental experiences. However, is this a sufficient reason for accepting a functional account of the mind? I think it is not. I find it odd that we should accept any the­ ory of mind because of its pragmatic value alone. In other words, it seems to me that just because functionalism gives us an apparent solution to the problem of other minds we should not assume it is the correct theory, especially if there are sufficient reasons for rejecting functionalism, which I

F

BERAVIOR AND OTHER MINDS

think there are. First, then, I want to show how functional­ ism does not follow from its ability to solve the problem of other minds.

It is worth noticing something about the nature of the problem of other minds, namely, that it is an epistemo­ logical problem, which is to say that we want to know whether others have minds. Our concern with ascribing mentality to others is an epistemological one. Now, if we consider the philosophy of mind, we quickly realize that we are -not concerned so much with epistemology, but meta­ physics, that is, what the mind really is. Elliot Reed recently argued that because functionalism solves this epistemologi­ cal problem of other minds, we should accept it. However, how does any theory of mind, that is, a metaphysical the­ ory, follow simply from its apparent ability to solve an epis­ temological question? Quite simply, it does not. I am cer­ tain that the correct theory of mind may indeed solve the problem of other minds, and in fact discoveries about real­ ity certainly do help us in answering epistemological con­ cerns. The mere utility of the theory, however, is not a suf­ ficient reason to prove that the theory is correcL Elliot Reed see,ms to start his investigation into the mind by asking how can we know other minds. He con­ cludes that only a functional account of the mind provides us with a solution. Therefore, he concludes, a correct ac­ count of the mind must be a functional account. His argu­ ment looks to me like the following: 1. We have a problem in that we cannot know if others have minds.

2. Traditionally, citing others' behavior has solved the prob­ lem.

3. This solution only works if we accept a functional ac­ count of the mind.

4. Therefore, a correct theory of the mind must be func­ tional.

I think it is obvious that this

a bad argument.

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MIKE LOCKHART

There are at least two problems with it. First, we can have serious doubt as to whether the third premise is true, and second, even if it were true, the conclusion simply does not follow from the premises. Let us assume for now that func­ tionalism is the only theory that uses behavior to solve the problem of other minds. 2 111ere are still two premises that need to be added to the above argument. For the argument to be valid, the argument would need to look like this: 1. We have a problem in that we calIDot know if others have minds.

2. Traditionally, citing others' behavior has solved the prob­ lem.

3. Citing other behavior is the solution to the problem of other minds 4. The correct theory of mind must solve the problem of other minds 5. This solution only works if we accept a functional ac­ count of the mind.

6. Therefore, a correct theory of the mind must be func­ tional.

Now if these added premises are correct, and we as­ sume that what is now the fifth premise is correct, then it seems to me the conclusion does follow. However, why should we accept premises three or four? Let me consider these premises in reverse order. The fourth premise as­ sumes that the correct theory of the mind necessarily solves the problem of other minds. But why? There is simply no good reason to think that the correct account of mind will solve the problem of other minds. Let us assume, however, the correct theory of mind will solve the problell1 of other Ininds. The argument still fails since we can resist the third premise. It seems to me that the validity of the third prem­ ise is assumed and not obvious. I do not know of any argu­ ment that shows behavior is the only possible solution to the problem of other minds. Perhaps what is much more prob­ lematic with this argument is that it begs the question. No­

BEHAVIOR AND OTHER MINDS

tice that the third premise can be stated as a premise iff one knows something about the mind, namely, its ontology.

The third premise can be assumed iff a functional account is assumed, which is circular since it is functionalism that the argument seeks to prove. In other words, why would you accept the third premise if you did not first accept a functional account of the mind? In fact, I do not think any solution to the problem of other minds is possible unless one first has the correct ontology of mind. How could we solve the problem if we do not yet know what the mind is?

If we do not know the ontology of the min.d how can we determine the necessary and sufficient conditions for men­ tality? The very fact that one would accept behavior as the solution to the problem of other minds reveals that one has already assumed at least one necessary feature of mentality, namely, behavior.3 I think the problem is that Reed approaches the phi­ losophy of Inind with the epistemological problem of other minds dictating what theory of mind is correct. The oppo­ site should occur. We should first seek the ontology of mind, then seek to solve the epistemological problem of other minds. If we let the epistem.ological problem drive the ontological project, we are only doing so out of utility. If this occurs, then the philosophy of the mind becomes pri­ marily an epistemological project (which it clearly is not), and we are concerned not with what the mind really is, but only with whether it satisfies our curiosity about the exis­ tence of other Ininds.

In short, functionalism does appear to give an ac­ count of how we can know whether others have minds, but there is no good reason to suppose that such account is suf­ ficient to give us the correct ontology of the mind. If func­ tionalism is correct, it is because it correctly describes the ontology of the mind, not because it satisfies Ollr epistemo­ logical concerns. Surely, if functionalism is correct, it is not because it can solve the problem of other minds, but because mental states are functional states. The utility of any correct theory of mind is a nonessential characteristic of the the~ry,

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MIKE LOCKHART

and not the criterion on which we should accept or dismiss the theory.

So far, I have sought not to show that functionalism is false, but rather to show that a theoretical solution for the problem of other minds is not sufficient to prove any theory of mind. I do not think many functionalists would disagree with what I have argued so far. It seems just plain obvious that a solution to the problem of other minds is not suffi­ cient to prove a theory of mind. If it were sufficient, then on what grounds are we to favor functionalism over other theories that maintain behavior is the solution to the prob­ lem of other minds?4 If functionalism is to be preferred over other theories, such as philosophical behaviorism, then it must be because it correctly describes the ontology of men­ tal phenomena5 • That to say, if functionalism is to be pre­ ferred over philosophical behaviorism, then it must be be­ cause mental states are not wholly translatable into terms of behavior, but rather, mental states just are functional states.

So what about functionalism as a correct theory of mind? I have shown how Reed's initial argument does not prove functionalism to be correct. More importantly, how­ ever, I think it can be shown that there are good reasons to reject functionalism as an incomplete theory of the mind. I will only mention two arguments here.

Reductio ad absurdum If mental states just are functional states, then it seems to me that we could ascribe mentality to virtually everything. Functionalists maintain that something is a mind just in case it functions like a mind. If this is true, it does not take long to notice that we can ascribe mentality to virtually everything since even a pencil falling off a table can be described in purely functional terms. On this ac­ count, we may even ascribe intentionality to the pencil, which it clearly does not have. The error of functionalists here is the failure to distinguish between as-if intentional­ ity" and genuine intentionality (Searle 78--82). If we can as­ cribe mentality to anything, then this is clearly a reductio ad 1/

BEHAVIOR AND OTHER MINDS

absurdum that functionalism cannot avoid.

Reed has responded to this problem by saying that the problem lies not with functionalism, but our notion of consciousness as it is used in language. However, this is unlikely since the fallacy occurs precisely when we use functional language to account for mentality. If mental states just are functional states, then the number of things to which we need to ascribe mentality is ridiculously high.

The problem lies neither in our conception of consciousness nor in linguistic alnbiguity, but in the functional account of mentality.

Absent Qualia Perhaps the best argument against a functional ac­ count of the mind is the'Absent Qualia Argument'. The ar­ gument is as follows:

1. At least some mental phenomena - the sensation of see­ ing red, for example - have qualitative content (qualia); 2. Any correct theory of mind must account for qualia; 3. Functionalism leaves out qualitative content completely; 4. Therefore, functionalism is an incomplete theory of the mind.

I know of no response from any functionalist that ade­ quately addresses this problem. In fact, it seems to me that qualia are usually h"ivialized by functionalists in order to disarm the 'Absent Qualia Argument'. For example, Reed has recently argued that, if we must account for qualia, then the problem of other minds is unsolvable since we could never distinguish between people with qualitative conscious experiences and zombies. This epistemological problem of other minds, as we have seen above, is not a sufficient reason for accepting or rejecting an ontology of mind, and so also it is l~ot a sufficient reason for discarding qualia from an account of mind. Perhaps it is true, though I suspect it is not true, that including qualia makes the prob­ lem of other minds unsolvable, but the correct theory of

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MIKE LOCKHART

mind must account for qualia since we do know that qualia are intrinsic to at least some mental phenomena. If qualia are intrinsic to at least some mental phenomena, then why would we accept an account of the mind that leaves qualia completely out? If it is merely to satisfy the problem of other minds, then that is not an adequate reason. It is im­ portant here to notice that functionalists trivialize qualia as if they were insignificant characteristics of some mental phenomena. Qualia, however, are not theoretical items in folk psychology. We do not postulate qualia; we experience them (59). Qualia are just a plain fact in at least some men­ tal phenomena. We cannot account for mental phenomena without including qualia. If this inclusion means that we cannot solve the problem of other minds, then that is sim­ ply an unfortunate consequence of the nature of minds.

Functionalists like Reed will undoubtedly disagree at this point. How can we ignore the problem of other minds?

He might dig his heel in the ground and insist that this is a crucial question and that including qualia simply makes the problem unsolvable. I think I have shown that he is wrong to approach the philosophy of mind by trying to solve an epistemological problem. Nevertheless, Reed might insist that we need to prove others have minds. The mistake of functionalists and, I think, many philosophers, is to assume that mentality needs to be observable to exist. On the con­ trary, I think it can be shown that behavior does not solve the problem of other minds. Notice that if behavior is not the solution, then functionalism is false since being func­ tionally equivalent does not necessitate ascribing mentality to something.

I think the best argument on this subject is John Searle's Chinese Room Argument? In fact, I think it is a knock-out blow to functionalism altogether. However, I will mention three other thought experiments that Searle uses to show that consciousness is independent of behavior.

Searle asks us to imagine the following. Your brain is deteriorating in such a way that you are losing your eye­ sight. With teclmological and medical expertise" doctors re­

BEHAVIOR AND OTHER MINDS

store your vision perfectly by plugging silicon chips into your visual cortex. Now imagine your entire brain is con­ tinuing to deteriorate so that doctors slowly continue to im­ plant more silicon chips until your whole brain is entirely replace by silicon chips. If this were to happen, at least three outcomes are possible. First, we may imagine that the silicon chips have perfectly duplicated all mental phenom­ ena, including qualia and consciousness.

A second possibility is that the silicon chips have failed to duplicate your conscious experience and that you are losing control of your external behavior. You find that when doctors ask you if you can see the object in front of you, you want to tell them you can see nothing since you are going blind. Still you have no control over your behav­ ior and you find yourself, against your own will, saying that you do see the object. Your conscious experience con­ tinues to diminish while your external behavior remains the same.

Finally, it is possible that the silicon chips have per­ fectly duplicated all conscious experiences, but that your external behavior diminishes to paralysis. You have the ex­ act same mental experiences as before. When the doctor asks you if you see the object he is holding in front of you, you cannot give any sign that you do in fact see it. Because the doctor sees no external behavior to indicate mental ex­ periences, he may conclude that you have no mental life at all, although you know you do (68).

These three thought experiments establish at least the following. First, we may conclude that consciousness is independent of behavior. This is demonstrated by the sec­ ond scenario in which one may act as though one had con­ scious experiences, but in fact did not, and the third sce­ nario in which one may have a full mental life, but not be able to externally demonstrate it through behavior. These thought experiments also demonstrate that the ontology of the mental is essentially a first-person ontology and that epistemically speaking, the first-person point of view is quite different from the third-person point of view." (70) U

69

MIKE LOCKHART

I hope it is clear from the above thought experiments that a functional account of mind, which holds that mental states are to be understood purely in terms of inputs and outputs, is untenable and, moreover, that behavior (the out­ put in functional theory) is not the solution to the problem of other minds. What then of the problem of other minds?

Are we left doomed to be skeptical about whether our fel­ low human beings have minds? We have already seen that consciousness is independent of behavior; does that leave us with an unacceptable problem?

I think the best approach to the problem of other minds currently available to us is common sense. Now notice I am not proposing the best solution, but rather the best approach currently8 available. For example, how do I know my dog has a mind? John Searle insists that we can be sure of a dog's conscious experiences because we can both observe behavior that is appropriate to having mental states and see that the causal basis of the behavior in the dog's physiology is similar to our own (73). Although this may seem uncon­ vincing, we make this sort of inference everyday when we assert the principle that the same causes have the sam.e ef­ fects or that similar causes have similar effects. We can see that the physiology of the dog is similar to ours, and, there­ fore, we can recognize the causal basis for mental states.

Again, we can suppose that other humans have mental states similar to our own both because their physiology is very similar to our own and because their behavior is ap­ propriate to having mental states. I think it is worth adding that the problem of other minds really is not an everyday problem. As Searle points out, it is only a problem for phi­ losophers. We just do not go through our everyday life seri­ ously questioning the existence of conscious experiences in other people simply because we do not observe their con­ sciousness. Why would we, since consciousness is essen­ tially a first-person ontology? We cannot observe the men­ tality of others simply because mental phenOlnena are onto­ logically subjective.

At this point, some philosophers, perhaps Reed, would

BEHAVIOR AND OTHER MINDS

insist that although the problem of other minds is not really a problem in everyday life, philosophers do see this as a problem that needs to be solved. Well, if Searle is correct that consciousness fs caused by the behavior of the mi­ crolevel biology of the brain, then once we have a mature neuroscience, we should be able to identify what neuro­ physiological phenomena are both necessary and sufficient for consciousness (74). If this were to occur, then the prob­ lem of other minds would vanish completely.

I think I have shown that the epistemological problem of other minds is not a sufficient reason for accepting any account of mind, let alone a functional account, and that functionalism itself is an incomplete theory of mind. Fi­ nally, I think it has been shown that behavior is not the so­ lution to the problem of other minds and that denying that behavior is the solution need not lead us into radical skepti­ cism regarding other minds. I think a common sense ap­ proach to the problem of other minds is appropriate until we give neuroscience time to grow out of its infancy. If this is an unsatisfactory approach to the problem of other minds for .functionalists like Reed, then this d.issatisfaction seems to testify only to the pragmatic value of functionalism and not its veracity.

Notes Reed, EHiot. "Functionalism, Qualia, and Other Minds". Epistenle 2002.

2 Both Philosophical Behaviorism and Functionalism maintain behavior is the solution to the "problem of other minds." Therefore, some other criterion is needed to prefer one to the other. This alone demonstrates that solving the "problem of other minds" is not sufficient for a correct theory of mind. I think, however, th.c'lt this argument is overkill since I have already shown that choosing a theory of mind on purely prag­ matic grounds is the wrong way to approach the entire discussion.

3 I think it is just plain obvious that behavior does not solve the problem of other minds and that the only way to maintain that is does is to beg the question of the ontology of mind.

4 I .hope the problems with Reed's argument are clear. His problems are

1 See

71

MIKE LOCKHART

even greater since many theories of mind cite behavior as the solution

to the problem of other minds.

5 I find it eXh'emely odd that any philosopher of mind would start with

an epistemological question concerning other minds. If we start with

this question, we dearly are not concerned with what is, but rather

what theory we can us to address our skepticism.

6See Searle, 1980.

7 I think that this is probably the most convincing argument against

functionalism and I am aware of no response to Searle on this matter. If

ever there were a fatal blow to a theory of mind, this is certainly it.

S II Approach" is not semantically equivalent to "method." By

"approach" I mean something closer to "attitude." If Searle is con-ect­

and I think he is - then we simply do not have a mature enough neuro­

science to solve this problem quite yet. Until then, we can use common

sense not to prove others have minds, but be confident that others experi­

ence mental states similar to our own.

Bibliography Churchland, Paul. Matter and Consciousness. Cambridge, Ma: MIT Press,

1999.

Putnam, Hilary. "The Nature of Mental States." 1967, reprinted in

Rosenthal (1991), pp.197-203.

Reed, Elliot. "Functionalism, Qualia, and Other Minds." EpistL'I11L', voL

13. 2002 PI" 27-37

Rosenthal, David M. TIU! Nature of Mind. Oxford University Press. Ox­

ford, UK, 1991.

Searle, John. Minds, Bmil'ls, and Science. Harvard University Press: Mas­

sachusetts, 1984.

Searle, John. The Rediscovery afthe Mind. Cambridge, Ma: MIT Press,

1992.