Mickey Cooper, Gasyard Trust with assistance from Lincoln Courts Youth Club, Pilot’s Row Youth Club, Newbuildings Youth Club and Youth First - facilitated by Billy Hutchinson European Union
European Regional Development Fund Investing in your future
A project supported by the PEACE III Programme, managed by the Special EU Programmes Body and delivered by the North West PEACE III Cluster.
Mickey Cooper, Gasyard Trust with assistance from Lincoln Courts Youth Club, Pilot’s Row Youth Club, Newbuildings Youth Club and Youth First - facilitated by Mitchel McLaughlin European Union
European Regional Development Fund Investing in your future
A project supported by the PEACE III Programme, managed by the Special EU Programmes Body and delivered by the North West PEACE III Cluster.
D
uring the early years of the Troubles there had been two IRA ceasefires in 1972 and 1975. Both of these had ended in a return to conflict with republicans accusing the British of bad faith and dirty tricks. These failed initiatives meant the IRA was reluctant for many years to consider another peace initiative. The circumstances which led to the modern peace process began to form in the early 1980’s although few realised it at the time. By 1981, the IRA campaign had been ongoing for more than ten years. Since the late 1970’s the IRA had adopted the ‘Long War’ strategy which recognised that there would be no short term British withdrawal; instead a war of attrition would be required to ‘sicken the British’ into eventually disengaging from the north. In 1981, ten republican prisoners died on Hunger Strike seeking political status. When the Hunger Striker Bobby Sands was elected as an MP in the Fermanagh South Tyrone by-election, many republicans argued that the republican movement should contest elections on a regular basis.
This dual approach of waging war and involvement in electoral politics was known as the armalite and ballot box strategy. Although most republicans still supported a continuation of the IRA campaign, there was a realisation that having a political wing would prove to the world that republicans had electoral support. Having a political party would also allow republicans to help local residents with their day-to-day problems. In 1982, Sinn Fein officially contested elections for the first time in the north during the modern conflict. Five Sinn Fein members (Gerry Adams, Owen Carron, Danny Morrison, Jim McAllister and Martin McGuinness) were elected to the Prior assembly, a short lived British government initiative. More importantly, Sinn Fein felt they could now sustain electoral support on a sustained basis. In 1983, Gerry Adams was elected as MP for west Belfast and Alex Maskey was also elected to Belfast City Council. What was also clear to the British government was that Sinn Fein’s electoral rise had to be stopped. In October 1984 the IRA almost killed the British Prime Minister Maggie Thatcher when they bombed her hotel in Brighton during the Conservative Party Conference. Despite claiming that the bomb had no affect on her policy, it undoubtedly focussed her mind on the Irish problem.
The armalite and ballot box strategy.
Gerry Adams elected MP for West Belfast.
Aftermath of the Brighton bombing.
Taoiseach Garret Fitzgerald and British PM Margaret Thatcher signing the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985.
In 1985 Margaret Thatcher signed the Anglo-Irish Agreement which gave the Dublin government a formal consultative role in the running of the north. It was recognition by the British that the conflict in the north could not be solved internally. The agreement was also seen by both governments as a way of bolstering support for the SDLP at the expense of Sinn Fein. 1986 signalled a further move into electoral politics when Sinn Fein voted to change their policy on abstentionism from the Dail, the parliament for the 26 counties. This was done on the expectation that Sinn Fein could secure at least one or two seats in the Dail and potentially hold the balance of power in the Dail and influence government policy on the north. A major military offensive planned by the IRA in 1986/7 never fully materialised due to a large number of arms finds by security agencies on both sides of the border. In addition 1987 also saw the single biggest loss of IRA personnel in one operation when eight volunteers were killed by the SAS at Loughall. 1987 also saw Gerry Adams re-elected as MP for west Belfast. Despite this it was clear that Sinn Feins vote had significantly decreased due to the effects of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. 1987 also saw Sinn Fein publish a document called ‘Scenario for Peace’. Although the SDLP leader John Hume was not in agreement with Sinn Fein about the content of ‘Scenario for Peace’, he was aware that there was a gradual change of attitude taking place within the republican movement towards the idea of seeking a negotiated settlement which may not include an immediate British commitment to withdraw. SDLP leader John Hume.
This led to the start of a series of discussions in 1988 between Hume and Adams which sought to establish a common position between the two parties. In the talks Hume argued that Britain was no longer interested in the north and the primary task was for nationalist to agree structures with the unionist population. Adams argued that Britain still had selfish political, strategic and economic interests in the north. At the same time Gerry Adams was also engaged in secret contacts with the Irish government through Fr Alec Reid. intermediary Father Alec Reid. Adams was aiming to establish a common position amongst the nationalist parties and Irish government on the issue of self-determination. In 1989 the new British Secretary of State Peter Brooke stated that the British government were neutral on whether the north should remain under British rule or join a united Ireland in the future. This encouraged intense debate amongst republicans. In 1989 poor election results in the 26 counties also led to a further questioning of the ballot box and armalite strategy amongst some within the republican movement. Martin McGuinness In 1990 Martin McGuinness and Gerry Kelly met British secret service operative Michael Oatley in secret talks. Oatley repeated that Britain no longer had interests in the north and that they would only remain whilst a majority of its inhabitants wished that to remain the case. He also stated that Britain would encourage talks between all parties to reach an agreed settlement but only in the event of an IRA ceasefire. A few weeks after the private talks Brooke made a public speech repeating the same points. Gerry Kelly By 1991 Sinn Fein began to develop proposals for interim arrangements. These ideas were based on the assumption that there could be a temporary period before a complete British government withdrawal where a new set of governance structures could be put in place.
Sinn Fein’s preferred option was for joint authority whereby the British government would appoint ministers who would act as guarantors of unionist rights whilst the Irish government would appoint ministers who would protect the rights of the nationalist population. Both Hume and Adams also recognised that unionist consent for any new government structures was desirable. At the same time Adams argued that unionists should not be allowed to block progress on new structures if they were not in agreement with all the other parties. Therefore Sinn Fein argued that any agreement on new governance structures should involve ‘maximum consent’ from as many parties as possible but that the agreement should not be held back because certain elements of unionism were not in favour of a deal – this became known as the ‘unionist veto’. Adams also argued that Britain should work to persuade unionists of the merits of a united Ireland. 1992 saw Sinn Fein publish ‘Towards a Lasting Peace’ which incorporated a lot of the ideas coming from the Hume-Adams talks. Throughout the conflict republicans had been reliant on Irish-America for financial support. Now Gerry Adams wanted to get Irish-Americans to persuade the US government to get involved in the emerging peace process. Sinn Fein hoped that the American government would put pressure on the British government to ensure all-party talks would take place to resolve the conflict. During the 1992 presidential campaign Bill Clinton made a pledge to some Irish Americans that he would give Gerry Adams a visa to enter the US and would appoint a peace envoy to the north. When he got elected with a large Irish-American vote Adams hoped he would stick to his promises. By 1993 the secret talks between the British and republicans (ongoing since 1990) were revealed publicly. Gerry Adams and John Hume also continued to push both governments to support their initiative which would have seen the British government acting as persuaders of unionists to support a united Ireland. Instead the British and Irish governments decided to embark on a joint-initiative which was much more neutral in its approach. This joint initiative became known as the Downing Street Declaration.
British Prime Minister John Major and Taoiseach Albert Reynolds initiated the Downing Street Declaration.
The Declaration recognised that a United Ireland was just as valid as the current partition arrangements. It also recognised that the north needed to be run in a way which was acceptable to both populations. It differed from the Hume-Adams approach by supporting the concept that there would be no change in the status of the north without the consent of a majority of the population. 1994 began with continuing public and private arguments between republicans and the British government. Sinn Fein had a major problem with the consent issue, feeling that unionists would use it as veto to stop any potential deal to either be negotiated or implemented. Despite scepticism about the consent issue republicans still remained hopeful of progress. In early 1994 Gerry Adams was crucially granted a visa to enter the USA by Bill Clinton so he could sell the idea of a peace process to the republican base in Irish-America. Prominent Irish-Americans also told Adams that Clinton was clear on the need to pressurise the British for all party talks once a ceasefire was called. These assurances helped to tip the balance in favour of a ceasefire which was declared on the 31st August President Bill Clinton 1994. The reaction of many unionist politicians to the prospect of now having to negotiate a change to the status quo was one of horror. Ulster Unionist leader Jim Molyneaux actually commented that the ceasefire was the most destabilising political event in the north since partition. They would clearly do whatever they could to delay the possibility of having to deal with republicans. In the weeks following the cessation, Sinn Fein waited in vein for the announcement of a start date for the all-party negotiations. Instead the Tory government, being kept in power with the support of nine Ulster Unionist M.P.’s , introduced the precondition that the talks would only begin after the IRA had decommissioned their arsenal. To republicans, this demand was clearly a British government attempt to retain unionist votes in Westminster despite the risk of destabilising the process. To the IRA in particular, the suggestion that an organisation which had not been defeated militarily would surrender its weapons in advance of a political settlement was unacceptable. In December 1994 a Sinn Fein delegation met British officials. By the following March Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness had met British ministers Patrick Mayhew and Michael Ancram.
US President Bill Clinton visited Derry in 1995.
A few weeks before the meeting with British ministers, the Frameworks document was launched by the two governments. It laid out the broad parameters of what a comprehensive settlement might look like, including a northern power sharing assembly, reform of policing, justice and equality structures and cross-border bodies which would allow co-operation between the proposed administration in Belfast and the Dublin government. Many elements of the Frameworks document were seen as positive to republicans. Nevertheless, it was clear that all-party talks were still as far away as ever due to the ongoing decommissioning issue. George In an attempt to reinvigorate the process the Mitchell US president Bill Clinton visited in November 1995. On the eve of the visit the two governments announced that an independent body chaired by US senator George Mitchell would consult with all the parties to produce proposals on resolving the arms issue. In January 1996 George Mitchell produced his report. It recommended that the all-party talks should begin immediately with the arms issue dealt with in parallel to, instead of before, the negotiations. In response British Prime Minister John Major, still relying on Ulster Unionist support in Westminster, announced that elections would be held for a new Forum from which negotiators to the all-party talks would be appointed. Republicans were enraged at what they saw as another stalling tactic by the British government. On the 9th February 1996 the ceasefire finally collapsed with a massive explosion at Canary Wharf in London, resulting in the deaths of two people. In March 1996 multi-party talks began under the chairmanship of George Mitchell with Sinn Fein excluded due to the IRA’s ongoing campaign.
The summer of 1996 also saw major street trouble after the RUC forced an Orange Order parade through the nationalist Garvaghy Road area of Portadown despite the objections of local residents who argued that the march was triumphalist and could have returned to the centre of Portadown by an alternative route. Republicans also saw the marching issue as a potential vehicle to force unionists to negotiate with them on an issue of political concern. If this was achieved then unionists would find it more difficult to refuse to engage in the wider political arena which they had been refusing to do thus far. For this reason the residents groups in areas where marches were being opposed deliberately included spokespersons of republican background. Further IRA attacks continued in England into 1997 including the destruction of a large area of Manchester city centre. There were also a number of attacks in the north including an attack on Thiepval barracks, the British army’s main base in the six counties. At the same time the talks were making little progress. In May 1997 the situation changed rapidly with the election of a new Labour government with a massive parliamentary majority which meant new PM Tony Blair was not dependent on keeping unionist MP’s appeased. Instead Blair told republicans that if the IRA declared another ceasefire that Sinn Fein could be admitted into the talks after six weeks. The first week of July 1997 also saw another attempt by the Orange Order to march down the nationalist Garvaghy Road in Portadown. After another stand-off, the new British secretary of state Mo Mowlam permitted the RUC to force the march through, leading to major rioting in nationalist areas. In the week after these protests the Orange Order were due to march in their annual 12th July demonstrations, including seven contested routes, most notably the Ormeau Road in Belfast. Had the marches gone ahead the potential confrontations between republicans, loyalists and the crown forces could have been unprecedented. A nationalist street protest in Derry, in support of the Garvaghy Road residents.
An anti-Orange Order Parade mural in Derry’s Bogside.
At the last minute the Orange Order decided to re-route from the contested areas. This removed the last short-term obstacle for republicans to a new cessation. On 19th July the new ceasefire was announced. Republicans now waited for the talks to resume in September by which time they would be eligible to take part. On Tuesday 9 September 1997 Sinn Féin’s talks delegates entered Stormont and signed a pledge that the party would abide by the Mitchell Principles, a list of commitments to totally peaceful means that all talks participants were obliged to accept. Two days later The IRA said that they “would have problems with sections of the Mitchell Principles”, but that what Sinn Féin decided to do “was a matter for them”. On Monday 15 September 1997 the talks resumed. The Ulster Unionist Party, the Progressive Unionist Party, and the Ulster Democratic Party re-entered the talks two days later. The decision of the three parties to stay in the negotiations despite Sinn Fein’s presence was a crucial point in the process. Up to this point republicans were of the mind that a majority of unionists would possibly stay out of the talks which would clear the way for Sinn Fein to negotiate a deal directly with the British and Irish governments. Instead, the continued presence of the UUP, PUP and UDP meant that for the first time Sinn Fein may have to consider doing a deal which was based on the principle of consent. On the 24 September 1997 the proceduresfor the talks and the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning was formally launched to deal with the weapons issue in parallel with the talks. The substantive talks began in earnest on the 7th October though there would be little progress for the rest of 1997. October also saw an IRA convention take place. IRA conventions were rare occasions when delegates from all over Ireland would gather in secret to decide on key
issues. This convention saw a number of delegates resign in protest at Sinn Fein’s acceptance of the Mitchell principles. A number of those who resigned formed a new group styled as the Real IRA with a pledge that they would continue an armed campaign. In November some Sinn Fein members also resigned on the same grounds with many aligning themselves to the Real IRA- linked 32 County Sovereignty Committee. By the end of 1997 the talks saw little progress. Problems were compounded following the assassination of LVF leader Billy Wright in Long Kesh prison. A series of LVF and UDA killings continued across the north into February 1998 which saw the IRA retaliate by killing a UDA member on 10th February. As a result both the UDP and Sinn Fein were suspended from the talks for a short period. On Thursday 29 January 1998 Tony Blair announced that the Saville Inquiry would reinvestigate the events of Bloody Sunday. This was seen as a major victory for the families who had campaigned for 26 years for the repudiation of the original Widgery Inquiry. The Inquiry began on 3rd April in Derry’s Guildhall. On Monday 23rd March 1998 Sinn Féin agreed to rejoin the talks, following the expiry of their exclusion a fortnight before. Two days later talks chair Senator George Mitchell, set a two week deadline for an agreement. For Sinn Fein, the continuing presence of the unionist in the talks meant that a deal which included the consent principle was becoming more likely. Thereforefor Sinn Fein it was absolutely key that the Act of Union was hollowed out as much as possible. This led to the British government agreeing to revoke the Government of Ireland Act which had been the legislative basis of partition in 1922. Sinn Fein also sought the creation of multiple cross-border bodies. These would ensure co-operation between the Dublin government and the potential new administration in Belfast. From the republican perspective, these bodies would increase co-operation on issues such as tourism, agriculture and business to create an organic link between the administrations on both sides of the border. This would negate the structural effects of partition and also allow the two jurisdictions to merge much more easily when partition eventually ended. In addition republicans argued for a north-south ministerial council. This would see ministers from north and south meet regularly on common policy issues which would both strengthen the operation of the cross-border bodies and tie unionist government ministers into an all-Ireland governance structure. Republicans also sought assurances on a number of confidence building measures including the reform of the policing and judicial systems, strengthened fair employment and equality laws, British demilitarisation and the early release of republican prisoners. The final component that had to be agreed was how the north itself would be
British PM Tony Blair and Taoiseach Bertie Ahern signing the Good Friday Agreement in 1997.
governed. The parties agreed on the creation of a new 108 member assembly. This assembly would only be able to pass key legislation if there was a weighted majority of support from both unionist and nationalist members. This would remove the prospect of unionists trying to force through laws which were unacceptable to the nationalist population akin to the original governance structures in the north. The assembly were also empowered to elect an executive based on the D’Hondt system. This system allowed parties to elect ministers based on their party’s strength in the assembly. As the fourth largest party in the north at the time, it would be inevitable that Sinn Fein would have ministerial positions in this new structure. This executive would be headed by a unionist First and nationalist Deputy First Minister who would crucially have the same legislative powers and status thus embedding the concept of equality at the heart of the proposed new administration. Although Sinn Fein still had major difficulties with the acceptance of the principle of consent and the non-executive nature of the cross-border bodies, they agreed to accept the agreement as a stepping stone to a united Ireland, especially due to the fact that the agreement included a clause that the British would withdraw from the north if a majority voted by referendum for this outcome. On 22nd May the referendum on the agreement saw a large majority of nationalists vote in favour. Unionist support was much less evident, a problem compounded by the fact that Ian Paisley’s DUP were arguing for a No vote. A separate poll in the 26 counties saw support for a change in Articles 2 & 3 of the constitution, leading to the Irish government dropping their territorial claim to the six counties For Sinn Fein the key short term task post-agreement was ensuring its implementation. This was made
difficult by the fact that David Trimble’s Ulster Unionist party were under pressure from Paisley’s anti-agreement DUP. Instead of attempting to sell the benefits of the agreement, Trimble now concentrated on the single issue of IRA weapons in an attempt to thwart Paisley’s attempts to portray him as a weak leader who was selling out unionism. Although all the parties had pledged through the agreement to work towards the full decommissioning of all weaponry by May 2000, it was extremely difficult for the IRA to consider any movement on weapons without the existence of a fully functioning executive and assembly. Given David Trimble’s demand that decommissioning occur before he agreed to enter government, it was clear that the process was in stalemate. As the summer of 1998 wore on there was still no sign of an assembly being formed. During this period the Real IRA exploded several bombs in towns across the north in an attempt to derail the agreement. These explosions had caused mainly commercial damage with little injuries caused. Then, on Saturday 15 August 1998 a Real IRA car bomb detonated in the centre of Omagh. Due to an inaccurate warning about the bombs location, shoppers were evacuated into the street where the car bomb was located, leading to the deaths of 29 people and two unborn children as well as hundreds of injuries. In one fell swoop, a large amount of the support which the Real IRA was beginning to attract from republicans disillusioned with the lack of progress in the peace process evaporated. New legislation was also passed by the Irish government allowing extra Gardai powers to target dissident republicans. A memorial garden and dedication in remembrance of the Omagh dead.
The contentious issue of IRA decommissioning came to a head in 2001.
The new Assembly first met on 1 July 1998 but only existed in “shadow” form until 2 December 1999 due to Trimble’s refusal to formally share power with Sinn Fein. Eventually in the autumn of 1999 Trimble agreed to share power on the condition that the IRA begin the decommissioning process straight away. On 2nd December 1999 full powers were transferred to the Assembly which in turn allowed the executive to meet for the first time. This first attempt at power sharing was short lived. On 12th February 2000 David Trimble announced his party would withdraw from the executive due to General De Chastelain the lack of IRA movement on decommissioning. This was despite the fact that the IRA had engaged with Canadian General John De Chastelain, the head of the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning in advance of the suspension. Although the assembly was reinstated in May 2000, the pattern of the Ulster Unionists withdrawing from the assembly and executive over the weapons issue repeated itself on two further occasions, leading to suspensions in August 2001 and September 2001. In October 2001 the IRA finally agreed to an act of decommissioning. This allowed the executive to be reactivated. A few weeks later the RUC was replaced by the PSNI. For Sinn Fein a lot of the changes which they had proposed to the Pattern com-
mission on policing had been abandoned by the British government to retain unionist involvement in the process. As a result the party refused to support the new service. This would remain the case until 2007 when a number of further reforms were implemented, including the removal of the Special Branch, seen by republicans as a ‘force within a force’ heavily involved in collusion with loyalists and attempts to derail the peace process. The malign influence of Special Branch was most clearly demonstrated on 15th October 2002 when Sinn Fein’s offices at Stormont were raided by the PSNI with the accusation that they were investigating an IRA spy ring operating within the new administration. This led to the unionists again withdrawing from government with Sinn PSNI Stormont raid, 2002. Fein. In reality, it later emerged that the raid had gathered no evidence. In fact, as a result of the investigations into the raid carried out by Sinn Fein it was discovered that Denis Donaldson, a senior Sinn Fein official, had been acting as a British agent since the 1980’s. The suspension of the government institutions would continue until May 2007. In the interim Ian Paisleys DUP overtook David Trimble’s Ulster Unionists as the most popular unionist party. Sinn Fein also overtook the SDLP as the largest nationalist party. Despite Paisley’s history of animosity towards the nationalist population and his anti-agreement stance, Sinn Fein decided to explore the possibility of the DUP doing a deal with Sinn Fein to allow a return to power-sharing. Sinn Fein were aware that Paisley had recovered from serious illness and was interested in finally entering government as the leader of unionism. Paisley and his younger colleagues including Peter Robinson were more than aware that they would have to share power with Sinn Fein to allow them to achieve this. Sinn Fein were also aware that Paisley would not enter government without a significant gesture by the IRA on the weapons issue. As a result, Sinn Fein Ian Paisley with successor Peter Robinson.
informed the British that they would seek a major act of decommissioning from the IRA as part of a sequence of events which would include the re-establishment of the executive. In December 2004, just as the IRA were about to make a gesture on decommissioning, the deal collapsed, mainly due to a demand from the DUP that the decommissioning act be photographed. The IRA had been wary of any photos being used as trophies of victory by the DUP and refused their request. Following the collapse of the deal a major bank robbery took place in Belfast which was blamed on the IRA by the PSNI. A few weeks later, Belfast man Robert McCartney was killed in a bar brawl involving IRA members in a city centre bar. These events led to a hardening of attitudes by the two governments and unionists towards republicans amid growing pessimism that any deal could be done. By the spring of 2005, the republican movement judged that the only way that the peace process could be resurrected was if the IRA acted uniliaterally to break the impasse. In April 2005, Gerry Adams called for the IRA to formally end their campaign and to remove the arms issue from the process. On 28 July 2005, the IRA announced the end of its campaign, and promised the putting beyond use of all its weapons, to be witnessed by clergymen from Catholic and Protestant Fr Alex Reid and Minister Harold Goode. churches. This took place during the summer of 2005 in the presence of Father Alec Reid (who had played a major role in the early days of the process) and Methodist minister Harold Goode. When they announced publicly on 26th September that they were satisfied that all IRA weapons and explosives had been put beyond use the onus for moving the process forward fell back to the two governments. By the spring of 2006 it was clear that the DUP were in no great rush to a deal with Sinn Fein. On 6th April Tony Blair announced that the 24th November would be the deadline for the re-establishment of the executive. The venue for the negotiations to complete the deal was Saint Andrew’s golf resort in Scotland. The Saint Andrew’s agreement saw the DUP accept that a First and Deputy minister could be symbolically appointed by the 24th November but that the executive would not be formally initiated until Sinn Fein finally endorsed the PSNI. Sinn Fein, aware that the unionists could use policing as a pre-condition similar to decommissioning, decided to tackle the issue head on.
Martin McGuinness took on the task of negotiating a new package on policing with the British government. As a result of these negotiations on 28 January 2007 a special Sinn Féin Ard Fheis approved a motion calling for the transfer of policing and justice powers to the Assembly, and support for the police services. For republicans the crucial point was the call for the transfer of policing powers to the assembly. The Good Friday Agreement had allowed policing powers to rest with the British Secretary of State. Sinn Fein agreed to support the PSNI on the basis that a new Ministry of Justice would be created under a new assembly. By April 2007 Sinn Fein were still waiting for a firm commitment from the DUP that they would commit to the establishment of a new executive. As an Irish general election loomed, the DUP were concerned that Sinn Fein could hold the balance of power or even enter coalition government in the Dail post-election. The DUP were well aware that refusal to share power in the north with Sinn Fein could see the two governments introduce joint authority of the north. Clearly if Sinn Fein were involved in the Dublin government they would have a clear influence on the governance of the north under joint authority. For the DUP this was a risk not worth taking. In May 2007 they agreed to enter government with Sinn Fein and the other parties. Once established, the executive ran quite smoothly to begin with. People were also surprised by the warm relationship between Martin McGuinness and Ian Paisley. Paisley was replaced by Peter Robinson in April 2008 as First Minister. In March 2009 dissident republicans killed two British soldiers and a PSNI member within one week. It was widely viewed as an attempt to destabilise the executive. In response Martin McGuinness stated that the executive would continue to operate regardless of dissident actions. In January 2010, the issue of the transfer of policing and justice came to the fore. When Sinn Fein had agreed to share power with the DUP it was on the basis that a ministry for Justice would be created during the first term of the assembly. The DUP, reluctant to create a scenario where Sinn Fein could have a minister in charge of the PSNI and justice system, had refused to engage on the issue. Thus Sinn Fein stated they would pull out of the executive if the issue was not resolved. Eventually, after a week of marathon talks, the parties agreed that a ministry of Justice would be created but that the minister would come from the smaller Alliance Party. Despite continuing sporadic dissident attacks, the executive has continued to operate up to the present day. For Sinn Fein, the next stage of the process is a proposal for a border poll to ascertain the levels of support within the north for a united Ireland in advance of the referendum on whether the north should stay under British government jurisdiction.
Sinn Fein’s Martin McGuinness addresses the audience at an Ard Feis in the 1990s.
Martin McGuinness, Deputy First Minister with Peter Robinson, First Minister in talks with US President Barack Obama in 2013.
The history of the loyalist political parties goes back to the early 1970’s when loyalists began to develop, radical proposals to resolve the conflict that involved what they called “sharing responsibility” and the creation of a “shared” society. Many of the proposals which these parties developed eventually found their way into the Good Friday Agreement. In fact, the GFA would not have been possible without the influence of the UDP and PUP. These parties played a vital role in persuading the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) and Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) to call their ceasefires, which, combined with the IRA cessation, provided the space for the negotiations to take place. In 1974 elements within the UVF created the Volunteer Political Party. Despite its brief existence the party published a document focusing on a compromise political settlement and which contained many elements that later appeared in the Good Friday Agreement. A similar but more comprehensive document, “Within the Context of Northern Ireland,” was also produced by the Red Hand Commando (RHC) and members of the UVF. A key figure within the cages of Long Kesh prison at this time was Gusty Spence of the UVF. He questioned the approach of the unionist establishment which opposed the idea of power sharing. Whilst they wanted a return to majoritarian rule, Spence argued that sharing responsibility was the most realistic way of resolving the conflict. He also ensured that education was a key element in the prison regime. Spence created educational opportunities for the prisoners and also brought academics in to deliver lectures. Eventually he secured Open University courses which led to the politicisation of many prisoners including David Ervine, Billy Hutchinson and Eddie Kinner. These men became sceptical of following mainstream unionism which was opposed, to a compromise with nationalists. This approach was typified by Ian Paisley and his Democratic Unionist Party. Throughout the conflict, Paisley would align himself to both the UDA and UVF to advance
his own political agenda e.g. during mass protests in 1974 (against the Sunningdale power sharing agreement) and 1985/6 (against the Anglo-Irish Agreement). The UDA distanced itself from Paisley after 1977 whilst the UVF were always wary of any serious links with Paisley and his party. Any alignments that did exist would end in the 1990’s with the onset of the peace process. In 1977 politically minded UVF ex-prisoners and their supporters, adopting a strong working class agenda, formed the Independent Unionist Group which later developed into the Progressive Unionist Group. These initiatives led to the founding of the Progressive Unionist Party in 1979. In 1979 the UDA-aligned Ulster Political Research group, which included key figures such as Andy Tyrie, published ‘Beyond the Religious Divide’. This document also broke from the mainstream unionist parties in its approach to class issues and the rights of the nationalist population. To advance their own political agenda and to counter the emergence of Sinn Fein as an electoral wing of the republican movement, UDA leader John McMichael contested a by-election in 1982. When he achieved less than 1% of the vote further UDA electoral involvement remained limited until the late 1980’s when two councillors were elected in Lisburn and Derry. In December 1984, Gusty Spence was released from prison. He was accused by some unionists and loyalists of having become a pacifist because of his emphasis on the need for a political solution to the conflict. His release, combined with support from David Ervine on the outside and Billy Hutchinson within the cages of Long Kesh, invigorated the PUP. During the 1980’s, eight representatives of the PUP would get elected in the greater Belfast area including Hugh Smyth, who would later become Lord Mayor of Belfast. In 1985 the PUP launched the ‘Sharing Responsibility’ document which was very close to elements of the Good Friday Agreement. In the same year, David
Ervine contested his first election. Although he failed to get elected, his strong showing was a sign of his and the PUP’s growing popularity. Later in 1985, the British and Irish governments signed the Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA), which gave the Dublin government a consultative role in the north. Mass unionist protests followed which distracted the PUP from building their party. Despite this, the PUP published a document called ‘War or Peace? Conflict or Conference?’ as a direct response to the AIA. In anticipation of what was to happen in 1998 and 2007, the PUP argued in the document that only the people of Northern Ireland could resolve the issues that affected them.
In 1986 Ian Paisley organised a ‘Day of Action’ against the Anglo-Irish Agreement. These protests failed to bring an end to the agreement. Nevertheless, the loyalist parties continued to suggest alternatives which would involve agreement between the local political parties and populations. For example, in 1987 the Ulster Political Research group launched their ‘Common Sense’ document which bore similarities to the PUP ‘Sharing Responsibility’ document and advocated a form of power sharing. By 1988 the conflict was entering its third decade. David Ervine argued that republicans were looking at ways of fully entering the political arena and moving away from armed struggle. He argued that loyalists should follow suit. Ervine and some fellow loyalists, known as the “Kitchen Cabinet” analysed the changes emerging in the IRA’s strategy and advised the UVF/RHC on how to respond. The late 80’s and early 90’s also saw a more militant UDA leadership emerge. At the same time, politically minded UDA figures including Davy Adams, Ray
Smallwoods and later Gary McMichael increased the activities of the UDA’s political wing, by now known as the Ulster Democratic Party. 9 November 1990: Peter Brooke stated that the British government was neutral on the future of Northern Ireland but that it would abide by the principle of consent. Loyalists also noted the launch of all-party talks in 1991 involving both governments and all local parties with the exception of the PUP/UDP and Sinn Fein. In 1991 Loyalists formed the Combined Loyalist Military Command to ensure that the UDA and UVF/RHC took a co-ordinated approach in their reaction to the talks as they progressed. 29 April 1991: The CLMC announced a six week ceasefire. The ceasefire had three purposes: 1. To give the mainstream political parties the breathing space to talk and come to an inclusive agreement. 2. To show loyalist support for an inclusive settlement 3. To show republicans and the established unionist parties that loyalists could act politically on their own initiative. The ceasefire ended on midnight on the 4 July due to a breakdown in the talks and the failure of the IRA to reciprocate. Nevertheless the ceasefire allowed David Ervine to argue that loyalists were capable of influencing the political agenda. What emerged for loyalism was the realization that unionism had ignored them and the potential of building on the ceasefire. The loyalist paramilitaries resolved that in future they would act on their own initiative to ensure their own involvement in any peace talks and not simply let the unionist parties represent them. Also in 1991 the Combined Loyalist Political Alliance, a political version of the CLMC, was formed. In many ways the loyalists were trying to mirror the Hume Adams initiative by encouraging an agreed loyalist approach to the emerging political peace process and its aim of ending conflict.
During 1992 and 1993 David Ervine travelled south to promote the ‘Sharing Responsibility’ document to Irish trade unionists and T.D.’s. He also developed contacts with Chris Hudson, a trade unionist who put Ervine in contact with the Irish government. Hudson also met the UVF and agreed to act as a link for the CLMC to the Irish government. After the Shankill bomb in October 1993 loyalist violence intensified and included the Greysteel massacre. Nevertheless David Ervine, through his dialogue with Chris Hudson, relayed six key themes to the Dublin government which loyalists saw as vital for consideration in the emerging process. This was done in the knowledge that both the British and Irish governments were working on a proposal on the political future of Northern Ireland. Further contacts between the CLMC and the Irish government were facilitated by the Church of Ireland leader Robin Eames and the Presbyterian minister Roy Magee. As a result of this work and the UVF’s contacts with the Irish government, the ‘Downing Street Declaration’ explicitly stated that the Irish government would recognise the principle of consent. For loyalists the acceptance of the consent principle by the Irish government was vital. The principle stated that there would be no change in the status of Northern Ireland until a majority of the population voted otherwise. In January 1994 a conference to discuss the loyalist response to the Downing Street Declaration is held at the Park Avenue Hotel in east Belfast. Whilst the PUP backed it, the UVF and UDA were more cautious especially on the Irish governments assurances on the consent issue. After the event the CLMC issued a statement stating that they accepted the legitimacy of a united Ireland if secured only by peaceful means. After the declaration was published David Ervine argued that an IRA ceasefire was now inevitable. The PUP intensified indirect contacts with republicans (which had been ongoing for many years especially in Long Kesh prison) through gobetweens such as the Clonard monastery. Contacts also continued with the Irish government. The IRA and INLA also killed a number of leading loyalists including Trevor King, Ray Smallwoods, Joe Bratty and Raymond Elder during the summer of 1994. The UVF also continued their violent campaign including the killing of
six people at the Heights Bar in Loughinisland. These events, combined with a continuing reluctance by the IRA to support the Downing Street Declaration, saw many doubt whether ceasefires were imminent. When the IRA called a cessation on 31st August loyalists came under pressure to follow suit. Key to this was the securing of a guarantee from the Irish government that they would totally accept the consent principle. The CLMC announced a ceasefire on 13th October on the basis that the assurances they had received on consent from the Irish government were genuine. Further contacts with Dublin after the announcement gave them further confidence. In October 1994 loyalists travelled to the US to spread the loyalist message. This was swiftly followed by their first meeting with the British government in December 1994. 1995 started with the publishing of the Frameworks Document which worried the loyalist parties owing to its concentration on north-south institutions and an inter-parliamentary forum. This added to loyalist frustration that the process was being stalled over the British government demand for the decommissioning of weapons by republicans and loyalists before full peace talks could begin. When the IRA ceasefire collapsed in February 1996 the PUP and UDP argued that loyalists should continue to focus on the political process. They also argued that a peaceful approach would increase loyalist votes in the forthcoming Forum elections. Those elected to the forum would have a direct role in the all-party talks. It was key that loyalists were represented. The poll saw Hugh Smyth, David Ervine, John White and Gary McMichael all elected through a list system. The talks began in June just as the traditional controversies over Orange marches going past nationalist areas began to re-emerge. In July 1996 the Orange Order were banned from walking down the nationalist Garvaghy road in Portadown. A stand off developed between Orangemen and British security forces to pressurise the British into reversing their decision. During the stand-off anti-peace process UVF leader Billy Wright defied orders from the UVF leadership in Belfast to keep out of the protests. When his men killed a catholic taxi driver in Portadown the UVF expelled Wright. He then formed his own organisation the Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF) who would continue their killing campaign for a number of years thereafter to put pressure on the peace process. In addition individual UVF and UDA members did take part in the protests at Drumcree. The RUC did eventually force the march through the Garvaghy road. It was also forced through the following year but has been barred from the Garvaghy road since 1998.
From July 1996 to July 1997 the talks made little progress apart from agreement on procedures and structures. Things began to change when Tony Blair was elected as British Prime minister in May 1997. The UDP and PUP also polled strongly in the same election. On 25th June 1997 Tony Blair announced a deadline of April 1998 for an agreement to be reached. He also said that decommissioning could happen in parallel with the talks instead of being required before the negotiations could continue. This announcement saw the IRA renew their ceasefire in July 1997. The renewed ceasefire meant unionists had a choice. Either they could walk away from the talks and allow the nationalist parties to deal with the two governments directly or they could stay in the talks and face Sinn Fein. Unionists split on the issue. Ian Paisley’s DUP and the UK unionists walked out in September 1997. However David Trimble kept the Ulster Unionist Party in the talks. The PUP and UDP also decided to stay. This decision meant that Sinn Fein would have to consider the possibility of doing a deal with unionists which would recognise the consent issue. By the end of 1997 the talks had seen no agreement on decommissioning. Loyalists were also concerned about the Dublin governments push for strong north-south structures with executive powers. A number of republican prisoners were also given early release without loyalists being informed.
With the process stalling things got worse when the INLA assassinated LVF leader Billy Wright in Long Kesh prison. The killing saw the UDA and LVF react with a number of killings. In January 1998 Loyalist prisoners withdrew support for the peace process over fears the Dublin government was aligning itself too closely to the Sinn Fein position. The British secretary of state Mo Mowlam decided to go into the H-Blocks to talk to UVF, UDA and republican prisoners. She told them that the British were committed to an inclusive settlement but that if the prisoners withheld their support the British would still continue to talk to Sinn Fein. The prisoners revised their decision as a result of the visit. January 1998 also saw the UDP suspended from the talks due to recent UDA killings. When they were reinstated both they and the PUP pushed the two goverments on a variety of issues, with a particular focus on the the early release of prisoners and the issue of north-south bodies. North-south bodies were structures which would involve representatives from the Dublin government and the proposed new northern administration. They would cooperate on areas of mutual concern such as tourism and agriculture. Loyalists wanted the bodies to be linked to the new northern government instead of being stand-alone. Their fear was that if these bodies had their own powers then they could continue to develop links between north and south if any executive created through the agreement ceased to function. This could see so much cooperation between the two jurisdictions that a united Ireland would be the logical next step. Loyalists were dismayed at the last week of the talks when the list of proposed north-south bodies proposed by the two governments was produced. For them the list was much too extensive.
At the last minute the nationalist negotiators agreed to reduce the number of proposed bodies and agreed to link their existence to the new northern assembly and executive. This, as well as explicit support from the Irish government for the consent principle and a pledge to release prisoners inside two years, saw both the UDP and PUP support the agreement. In the elections to the new power-sharing assembly created by the agreement, both Billy Hutchinson and David Ervine were elected for the PUP, although the UDP were unsuccessful in winning any seats. These results revealed a key concern for loyalism. Despite playing a key role in the talks, the two loyalist parties did not benefit electorally from the agreement to the same extent as Sinn Fein on the republican side despite the similar role they had played in persuading the loyalist groups to call cessations and engage in the peace process. There were several reasons for this. Firstly, the decommissioning issue continued to dog the process. Since the loyalist parties were linked to armed groups other unionist politicians used this as a way of criticising them and reducing their electoral support amongst unionist voters. Ian Paisley’s DUP criticised both the Ulster Unionist Party and the loyalist parties for doing a deal with Sinn Fein. A large number of unionist voters were receptive to Paisley’s claims and withdrew their support for pro-agreement unionists. Also tensions between the UVF and UDA erupted into a feud on the Shankill Road in 2001 with a number of UVF and UDA members killed. A key figure in this feud was the UDA’s Johnny Adair who was advocating an anti-agreement alliance with the LVF. This alliance also saw a number of attacks on nationalists and PSNI members. The result of all of this activity was the demise of the UDP. The replacement UPRG fared no better electorally due to UDA-linked violence. By the time the power sharing executive was reinstated in 2007 the PUP had one seat in the assembly. This was held by Dawn Purvis, who had replaced David Ervine in the previous assembly when he had tragically died of a heart attack in January 2007. Ironically the DUP’s Ian Paisley, who had inspired many loyalists to join the modern UVF in the 1960’s, was now in power with Sinn Fein. Loyalist decomissioning began in 1998 with the LVF putting some of their arsenal beyond use. The main Loyalist groups, witnessed by Lord Eames and Sir George Quigley, followed suit in 2009 (UVF/RHC) and 2010 (UDA). Although the PUP does not currently have representation in the assembly, it continues to fight elections. Both it and the UDP can claim a great deal of credit
in persuading the loyalist armed groups to call cessations which allowed space for the multi-party talks which led to the Belfast agreement. It could also point to the fact that Paisley had finally agreed to participate in government structures that shared responsibility which the loyalist parties had been advocating for many years.