The new Ukrainian reality

Text Yevhen Hlibovytsky

More than 8 million Ukrainians found themselves abroad, mostly in the EU in 2022, according to the UN. A similar number of Ukrainians have been displaced internally. As the war continues, how many of them will be able and willing to go back? What kind of life awaits them?

On the surface it would seem simple and logical: people flee the war and the destruction of their homes. Once the war will be over most of them should plan to go back to restore their lives in a familiar environment, some mostly those, whose towns and homes were destroyed would seek either to move elsewhere in Ukraine or stay where they found refuge.

Reality is more complicated. Many Ukrainian refugees perceive going back home not literally going back where they came from, but also going back to the old time and old lifestyles they enjoyed. Some, who tried to come back, or visit have learned that returning now is not possible. The war has destroyed not only the buildings and infrastructure. It has also changed the ways people went about their lives. For many of them there is no way back, only forward.

The war has catalyzed the already ongoing political and social transformation. Over the years people, who were favorable of Russia, have moved through a period of ambivalence, and eventually incrementally joined the motion towards Western values and the EU. Now that choice has become almost unanimous from grassroots up. A change of political orientations goes beyond language, religion, ethnicity or place of birth. Ukraine that was tilting towards greater unity for some time has decisively become a country divided no more.

Rebuilding begins as soon as Russian forces retreat.

Most Ukrainians have come to the painful realization that Russians of different political affiliations share a similar colonial sentiment that drives the war against Ukraine. Sociologically, Russia has gone from being viewed as a friend by most Ukrainians to being viewed as a foe by almost all. And where the fault lines still exist, they went through families, friendships, business partnerships, consumer loyalties and ruptured relations with little hope for healing them fast, or ever. Social media multiply the stories of relatives being disowned striking cases for the society where family is usually the last bastion of unconditional acceptance against any kind of hostile challenges.

Economy has transformed, too. The fate of many Soviet heavy industry giants, mostly in the occupied East of Ukraine, was sealed by advancing Russian army. The demise weakens industrial oligarchy, whose seats at the political decision-making table are no longer granted. While loss of heavy industry is a painful economic shock, it also opens new development paths. The younger and more educated Ukrainians dispersed across Ukraine and abroad in search of security and new opportunities. However, the shock unproportionately hit the oldest and least adaptive Ukrainians, full of paternalistic expectations. They are the

ones most likely to stay where they are, despite the frontline changes, and try to survive clinging to their windowless flats, smashed furniture and hoping that somehow life will come back to normal. That hope is rather irrational and represents the legacy of the world these people once lived in, where the state cares for people who give up their agency.

The demography of Ukrainian refugees is diverse, but not really representative of Ukraine. At the beginning of the war the two biggest cities in Ukraine the capital Kyiv and its former early Soviet capital Kharkiv were under fire and risk of capture. Their residents made up a great part of those who left. Not aware how the events on the ground would play out, many people decided that it was safer to stay in the suburbs of Kyiv than inside the city, where service or supply disruption could be disastrous. Those who moved to Bucha or other nearby towns often went through hell. Others went further West or even abroad to a safer uncertainty.

The lack of jobs, constant air raids and severe electricity shortages forced many to leave again.

Many fleeing residents had much to lose. Among refugees both in Ukraine and outside the number of skilled, experienced, university-educated, multilingual people, and those with accessible savings was greater than national average. Some were more prepared for the war than the others, but a significant number had a safety net to sustain them at least several months. The larger Ukrainian cities away from the war zone were flooded with people. Hotels were overbooked, flat rents skyrocketed, local authorities organized makeshift shelters in gyms and schools. Lots of Ukrainians moved in with their relatives and friends. Eventually, the waves reached smaller towns. In some places the number of residents doubled, compensating for many years of population decline, bringing long abandoned realty back in service, improving consumer economy, supplying rare skills and talent to the suffocating local job market. Often the entrepreneurs would run crowdfunding campaigns to restart their businesses in the new places. It took about half a year for things to become clear again: some businesses closed, others were looking to replace their conscripted employees, a few were trying to seek new opportunities. In general, the small business economy has become more resilient than expected, often offering lifelines to those in dire need.

A great number of people took volunteering tasks, forming unprecedented networks, supplying the army with drones, night-vision sets, importing second-hand SUVs for the frontline or sending money to professional foundations that managed to buy a satellite already in space or import sophisticated technology. Volunteering became an ultimate manifestation of empathy, a bonding process in a torn society, helping people to cope, get a sense of belonging, reaffirm their dignity. Many refugees would volunteer in kind, offering their skills to the community.

As Russian troops were pushed back in the North of Ukraine, residents started returning to Kyiv and other cities. However, the lack of jobs, constant air raids and severe electricity shortages forced many to leave again. Others stayed, trying to adjust their lifestyles to always being under a vivid threat.

The nonprofit organization ”We repair all together” is committed to helping people rebuild their own homes.

It was not until early summer of 2022, when the Ukrainian border service witnessed for the first time that more Ukrainians crossed the border into Ukraine, than out. The Ukrainian government prohibited most men aged 18-60 (except those with three or more underage children, or single caretakers, or those with a special government-issued permission) from leaving the country, so the majority of international refugees are women with underage children. Giving their children the best education possible has become a key priority for Ukrainians abroad. Many will likely prefer to stay until the children end their school, but some keep their children in the Ukrainian online classes as well, signaling that they would like to return as soon as it becomes feasible.

The Ukrainian migration of 2022 is in many ways an untypical one. Studies show that the migrants stay very attached to Ukraine. They go an extra mile to protect their identity and, unlike the previous wave of Ukrainian migration in the 1990s, are determined to pass it on to the next generation. They are driven to start or expand existing Ukrainian institutions and are searching for ways to build up political influence. Despite the initial shocks, this wave of Ukrainian migration is more self-aware, has clear goals, is looking to become instrumental in a greater cause of saving Ukraine and persuading the outside world of the danger of leaving the business of defending Ukraine half-done. The fear of a deceitful truce that would allow Russia to regroup and attack again is a strong motivating force for majority of active Ukrainians.

How many of the displaced people will be able to go home very much depends on how the war ends. Will Putin be defeated? Will Russian colonialism come to an end? Will China or Iran throw a lifeline to Russia that would allow the war of attrition to last indefinitely? The answers to these and many other questions will define personal strategies of the people affected by the war. Rebuilding will be often delayed by the need of demining. Even in the best-case scenario this war has and will continue to produce major economic, demographic, social shifts inside Ukraine that may last for generations. But the new Ukraine is filled with a new sense of agency and eager to become a success story.

Yevhen Hlibovytsky runs a boutique think tank researching Ukraine’s social transformation. He is also a lecturer at Ukrainian Catholic University in Lviv.