Propaganda appeals to the collective identity of Russians

The research supervisor of Russia’s only major independent pollster Levada Center explained in a DW interview why the majority of Russians support the invasion in Ukraine and do not resist propaganda narratives.

Interview Anton Sorokin, DW editor

A public opinion poll conducted by Levada Center at the end of March showed that 81 percent of Russians support the invasion in Ukraine. How can you explain such a high level of support?

One reason is strict censorship and the almost of alternative and independent information channels. Some, of course, find the way to bypass the blocking, but only very few people do. The vast majority of the population watches state television, which turned into a powerful propaganda tool. And since people can’t assess the accuracy of this information, they believe everything they see on TV. A smaller part of the population mostly gets information from social media — primarily from Telegram channels. They have a different picture of reality, a different understanding of the situation.

There is a direct connection between the respondents’ age and the way they answer the questions. The younger the respondents, the more they view the war in Ukraine negatively. There is the same connection between people’s place of residence and their political beliefs. Moscow residents tend to react with greater indignation, anxiety and depression to Russia’s military actions in Ukraine. It’s just that Moscow has a more diverse information background (than do other regions). Previously there were 15 to 17 sources of information for every Muscovite, whereas in the provinces — in small and partly even in medium-sized towns — there are only two to three sources.

So a very primitive ideology is being instilled in the population: Putin has to preventively order troops into Ukraine to rid it of Nazism and weaken the threat of NATO getting closer. It’s an old demagogy that dates back to Soviet times. But since 2014, it has been largely accepted by the population, especially in the provinces, with the elderly and the less-educated.

But despite censorship and the blocking of independent media and social networks, there is no total information blockade in Russia. If one wishes to get access to alternative sources of information, it is possible. Why do people still believe propaganda?

About half of them believe it. The rest conform, motivated by pure opportunism,to avoid coming into into conflict with the authorities. Because propaganda, of course, is the voice of the state.

It is very important to understand what arguments the Russian state propaganda puts forward. Russia is violating international law by invading Ukraine, but most people say that is the right thing to do because they believe Putin is protecting his own population, and saving Russians from a genocide allegedly perpetrated by Ukrainian Nazis and fascists. This thesis is extremely important, because it appeals to the core elements of the collective identity of Russians. This is the language of the Second World War, of the fight against fascism. Therefore, all these militarist symbols — the cult of victory and the rhetoric of victors — kick in and displace more rational, and factual considerations, and arguments and, in general, hinder the ability to analyze.

In order for the Russian society to wake up, political and public organizations are needed, as well as public discussions. All this is blocked now.

At the same time, propaganda works constantly. It is not so much the presentation of any convincing evidence, but continuous brainwashing. It is extremely difficult to protect oneself from it or to argue with it.

Very few people are able to resist such informational aggression, such demagogy. To do this, one must have very clear views and beliefs, which people basically do not have. For them, it’s a virtual reality, which is not related to their daily lives.

Does that mean that the results of public opinion polls on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine are accurate? Or are people just afraid to tell the truth considering that any dissidence in Russia is being persecuted?

It’s a myth that people are afraid to tell the truth. For them to be afraid, they must have other beliefs. And where can these beliefs come from if people have been brainwashed for 20 years? If totalitarian institutions are being restored in the country and a very powerful propaganda system is working?

The size of audience for independent media, including social networks and Telegram channels, amounts to 10 to 12 percent of the population at best. The majority of people watch television and consider it the most reliable source of information and interpretation of what is happening. In addition, the entire education system is subordinated to the current state ideology. If people are afraid to answer questions, it is those who are against Putin, and this is still a minority.

How has public sentiment changed since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine?

We don’t see euphoria like in 2014 after the annexation of the Crimea. People reluctantly approve of what is going on, but they don’t feel joy about it. Despite declarative support, people do not want this war. They support the actions to protect Russians, but they don’t support or approve of the war as such. Moreover, it scares them. They are scared that it will turn into a great world war, into a clash with NATO. And they want the fighting to end more than anything.

On March 15, 2022 Marina Ovsyannikova, an employee of the main Russian news channel, Channel 1 ran onto the stage with a sign reading ”No War”and “They’re lying to you here”.

Is there any chance that the Russian society will wake up at some point and start asking critical questions about the deaths in Ukraine and the actions of the Russian authorities?

In order for the Russian society to wake up, political and public organizations are needed, as well as public discussions. All of this is blocked now. People face great risks. The destruction of open discussion platforms, persecution by the police — all that drives people into fragmented zones of private living, depriving them of any chance for public discussion and public action. We are seeing that protest sentiment has declined sharply over the last year.

The more or less liberal-minded class in Russia has shrunk significantly. Emigration has increased extremely. These are mostly well-educated, more energetic, younger and more adventurous people, who feel their civilizational and political incompatibility with the current regime. Of course, they will discuss this; they will be horrified by what is happening in Ukraine. But in Russia it is becoming more and more difficult to do this.

I am not talking about the majority of Russians who have no compassion towards Ukrainians or an understanding of what is going on. The situation is very difficult. And I don’t think that Russia will be able to get out of this situation very soon.

What will this depend on?

I think that economic consequences will be the first impetus. They will be felt by the middle of summer, not earlier. The second thing — and it’s a very important moment — is spreading the information about the real losses of the Russian troops, despite military censorship and the blocking of mass media. The third moment, if this happens, would be Russia actually losing the war. These are the factors that will likely play a role. But it is still too early to tell.

Lev Gudkov

is a prominent Russian sociologist and the research supervisor at the Levada Center, the country’s only major independent pollster. In 2016, the Russian Ministry of Justice put the Levada Center on the list of non-government organizations designated as “foreign agents”. In November 2017, Lev Gudkov was awarded the Lev Kopelev Prize for peace and human rights in Cologne.