1. 0 INTRODUCTION Since late 1999, barely 6 months from the inauguration of the 3rd Republic, the nation has been under the grip of a wide range of security challenges . In November 1999, the Nigerian military leveled the normally peaceful riverside town of Odi, as reprisal for the killing of 12 policemen by unknown persons, presumed to be Niger Delta militants, who had gone there to hold a meeting.
Since then, the cycle of violence has worsened in intensity, geographic spread, and complexity to a point where, even the staging of national events in an open unrestricted environment is no longer a given. The same goes for religious activities, which now require heavy security protection, even for regular worship on appointed days.
The cumulative loss of lives is now counted in the thousands, which in itself, signifies the colossal wastage of valuable human capital. This is compounded by economic loss, of huge proportions, both actual and in opportunity terms.
Even more regrettable, some would say disturbing, is the loss of mutual trust, mutual acceptance, and brotherliness across geo-cultural, geo-political and inter-faith demarcations, which Nigerians once enjoyed. The result is an Page 1 of 66
ominous intimation, so far only muted, that the national unity which we once took for granted, now calls for major intervention to stay that way.
It was such solemn sentiments of patriotism that informed the 5th meeting of the National Council of Traditional Rulers (NCTR) in Oshogbo, under the CoChairmanship of His Eminence the Sultan of Sokoto, and His Imperial Majesty the Ooni of Ife to set up this Committee to undertake a systematic analysis of the security challenges facing the nation, and make recommendations as appropriate, to the search for solutions by Government and the polity at large.
Although, the subject of national security had been central to the NCTR discussions at earlier meetings, and while the then NSA, General Andrew Owoye Azazi(now late) had also addressed the NCTR twice on the subject, there remained a shared feeling within the body that there was need to look deeper, since the situation did not appear to be improving.
1.2 COMPOSITION OF THE COMMITTEE The ad-hoc Committee was constituted under the Chairmanship of His Majesty King Dr. Edmund M. Daukoru FIC, CON, Mingi XII, Amanyanabo of Nembe, with the following as Members: Page 2 of 66
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
HRH Alh Kyari Umar El kanemi - Shehu of Bama (North East) HRM Da Buba Gyang CON - Gbong Gwom Jos (North Central) HRH Maj Gen Sami Sani (Rtd) - Emir of Zuru (North West) HRM Eze John O. Akaliro – Chair, Abia State Council (South East) HRM Alh Aliyu K Danesi - Aidonogie of S. Ibie (South - South) HRM Oba Dr Victor Kiladejo - Osemawe of Ondo (South - West)
1.3 TERMS OF REFERENCE The Committee was formally inaugurated by the Chairman of the Coordinating Committee of NCTR, HRH Alhaji (Dr) Yahaya Abubakar CFR, Etsu Nupe, on Wednesday, 12th September, 2012 in Abuja with the following mandate and Terms of Reference: a. Look into the growing insecurity in the country, with emphasis on the activities of Boko Haram, Kidnappers, Oil Bunkerers and Assassins, in different parts of the country, and any other issues relating to security challenges; b. Submit report through the Coordinating Committee before the next meeting of the Council; The National Security Adviser was represented at the inauguration by Ambassador Haruna.
The first of the formal Committee meetings took place at the same venue on ………………………. The methodology, and general outline of the report were discussed and adopted, being guided by the following considerations:
- That our views would be of greater value to government, if they Page 3 of 66
reflected an independent perspective of the traditional institution, uninfluenced by the views of the statutory agencies responsible for national security. - Not being a commission of enquiry, we lacked formal mandate to request information from the various security agencies, an effort that would certainly have met with administrative delays, anyway. - The need to steer clear of any perception that we might be trying to take over the work of the agencies that are vested with the statutory and constitutional responsibility for national security.
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2.0 HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 2.1 GENERAL Given the common national tendency to easily lose sight of the past, and to always start again searching for solutions to recurring problems that had previously been effectively addressed, the Committee decided to go back in memory, with the purpose of extracting relevant lessons for the task with which we are now vested. Starting from independence in 1960 to the present day, the nation has been through a bitter civil war, and at least a dozen major challenges to national security. Ordinarily, these should have made us mature, and wise enough by now to handle our differences as a united people. Rather, we can see from experience that there is general capacity deficit in the polity in this regard, which is why the Committee has taken the opportunity to outline the evolution of our security challenges, mentioning where appropriate, such specific major crises as: Tiv/Jukun (1990-92); Zango/Kataf (1992); Ife/Modakeke (1980s, 1990s, 2000-2); Maitatsine (1980), Ijaw/Itsekiri (1997 – 99); Egbesu Boys, OPC, APC and Bakassi Boys (1999 – 2009). The narrative is intended to help us extract the lessons that we should have, but appear not to have learnt and then apply those lessons to our present national conundrum. 2.2 MAJOR SECURITY CRISES (1970-1999) Page 5 of 66
During the first decade after the civil war (i.e from 1970 to 1980), there were frequent instances of armed robbery, because of the relatively easy access to firearms. These were dealt with by subjecting the convicts to execution by public firing squads, which though morally questionable to some members of society, did at least serve as an effective check on all but the most reprobate criminals. From 1979 to 1983, the excesses of some Second Republic politicians gave rise to widespread social discontent, manifested largely in the student campuses and within the ranks of the Nigeria Labour Congress,( NLC), but this did not result in sustained challenge to the authority of the Nigerian State (Chizea & Oarhe: Emerging religious domestic threats and challenges facing Nigeria: What roles fro Traditional Rulers) There was only one exception, the rise of the Maitatsine sect in 1980 which resulted in hundreds of deaths and extensive destruction of property. The multiplicity of other security incidents in the Northern parts of the country from 1980 to the start of the 3rd Republic in 1999 is summarized in Table 1.
An equally serious crisis in the 1980’s was the Ife/ Modakeke inter communal confrontation, which recorded over a thousand deaths, and lasted on and off until about 2002. This crisis is as good an example as any, of how subsisting historical tensions erupt into uncontrolled mayhem under trigger of one government decision or the other: Local Government creation, designation of Local Government headquarters, unfair endorsement of a Page 6 of 66
political candidate etc.
During the short lived Buhari/Idiagbon regime (1984 - 1985), there was iron fist discipline, which left no room at all for open show of social discontent. Nevertheless, in the south, there was widespread illegal oil products bunkering, carried over from previous administrations, which in any case, the Buhari regime was able to curtail fairly effectively.
In 1985, the public breathed a general sigh of relief when the IBB administration took over, and relaxed many of the socio economic measures of the Buhari regime that were widely viewed as too draconian. However, before too long, the political experimentation of the IBB regime and the perception of its
anti–intellectual content in some quaters also proved
unacceptable at large, thus sparking a well-coordinated wave of student riots across the entire nation. The response was typically military, which resulted in many deaths.
The riots nevertheless, achieved their purpose of forcing IBB to announce a political transition programme which, with all its swings and round–abouts only managed to deliver more trouble and social unrest, following the cancellation of the June 12 1992 elections, presumed to have been won by Page 7 of 66
Bashorun MKO Abiola.
The June 12 misjudgement by IBB, and its threat to national unity did not abate, even with Chief Ernest Shonekan, a Yoruba man as head of the Interim National Government (ING). The rancour continued after General Sani Abacha finally ousted Shonekan in November, 1993. Following this, the Labour Unions under Comrade Frank Kokori, galvanized a demoralized and dispirited nation to mount one of the most comprehensive strikes the country had ever known.
However, rather than tackle the political injustice he inherited from IBB, and thus to heal the nation, the problem was further complicated by a wave of assassinations and bomb blasts, suspected to have been State sponsored to extend Abacha’s stay in power. The sense of insecurity was palpable across the nation, as Abiola continued to insist on consummating his mandate, even from the prison cell of General Abacha.
The nation breathed the first sigh of relief when Gen. Abdulsalami Abubakar took over power, after Abacha’s sudden demise in 1998. Shortly afterwards, Abiola himself passed away, giving Gen Abubakar the needed window of opportunity to craft a new Constitution, and to conduct General Elections Page 8 of 66
from which Chief Olusegun Obasanjo emerged as civilian President in May, 1999. Throughout the 1990s, the direct politically generated security problems were punctuated by the Ife/ Modakeke type flair up of inter ethnic or inter communal crises with deep historical roots. These were the Tiv/ Jukun (1990 -92); Zango / Kataf (1992); and Ijaw Itsekiri (1997 – 99), with features remarkably similar to each other.
2.3 MAJOR SECURITY CRISES 1999 – 2010 With the emergence of Obasanjo, a Yoruba man again as elected president, it was assumed that expiation had been made and that the June 12 issue would be finally resolved. Events however proved everybody wrong.
First, Obasanjo was, in the eyes of the Odu’a Peoples Congress OPC, (led by Dr Frederick Fasehun and Ganiyu Adams) too nationalistic in outlook to support a purely ethnic agenda, hence not the right substitute for MKO Abiola. Accordingly, agitation for Yoruba nationalism resurfaced within a few months of Obasanjo’s inauguration,
seeming mostly directed at the
Hausa/Fulani communities in the South West.
Second, extremist supporters of Sharia Law in the North perceived Obasanjo as unlikely to support their own agenda, as he was in truth a non Muslim, Page 9 of 66
regardless of his non-tribal credentials. This was a sad turn of events, as Obasanjo’s commendable credentials for a united Nigeria, quite ironically condemned him to have to battle, douse, or manage a faceoff between Arewa Peoples Congress, (APC) and the OPC with all manner of security ramifications on a national scale, for a significant part of his first term in office.
A sample of security breaches arising largely from such sentiments of intolerance are summarized in the table below:
S/NO 1. 2. 3.
4. 5. 6. 7. 8.
9.
10.
11.
Selected Cases of Ethno-religious Crises in Northern Nigeria DATE LOCATION PRINCIPAL ACTORS Thursday May 01, 1980 Zaria (Kaduna State) Disturbances in Zaria during which property belonging to mainly Christians were destroyed. December, 18-29, 1980 Yan-Awaki Ward in Riots by Maitatsine Sect. 4,177 people died. Kano (Kano State) Extensive destruction of property. October 29-30, 1982 Bullumkutu, Kala-kalo and Maitatsine sects. 18 people died. Maiduguri (Bornu Extensive damage to property. State) October 29 – 30, 1982 Kano (Kano State) Muslim demonstrators burnt down churches February 27-March 5, Dobeli Ward Maitatsine Sect. 568 died. Wanton destruction of 1984 property. April 26 – 28, 1985 Pantami Ward, Maitatsine Sect. 105 died. Extensive destruction of Gombe (Bauchi State) property. March, 1986 Ilorin (Kwara State) Muslims and Christians clashed during a Christian procession at Easter. March, 1987 Kafanchan (Kaduna Clash between Muslims and Christians at the State) College of Education, Kafanchan. Loss of some lives and the burning of some mosques by Christian and native Kajes. March, 1987 Katstina, Funtua, Wave of religion riots in which Muslims burnt Zaria, Gusau and down numerous churches building and damaged Kaduna (Kaduna properties belonging to Christians. Many lives State) were lost. February, 1988 Kaduna, Kaduna Religion riots, ostensibly among students, Polytechnic (Kaduna destroyed the foundation walls of the Christian State) chapel. April, 1991 Kastina (Kastina Religious violence spear headed by Malam Yahaya
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State)
12.
April, 1991
Tafawa Balewa (Bauchi State)
13.
October, 1991
Kano (Kano State)
14.
May, 1992
Zango Kataf, (Kaduna State)
15.
January, 1993
Funtua, State)
16.
December, 1994
Kano (Kano State)
17.
May, 1995
Kano (Kano State)
18
Thur, July 22, 1999
Kano Reprisal Killing
19.
February, 28, 2009
Kaduna Mayhem (Kaduna State)
20.
Friday, April 14, 2000
Agyragu Crisis (Nasarawa State)
21.
July, 2000
22.
September 8, 2000
23.
October 17, 2000
Tsagari Crisis (Kwara) Kaltungo religious (Gombe State) OPCHausa/Fulani(Kwara
24.
Sat, Oct., 21, 2001
Minna reprisal (Niger)
25.
Sat, Dec., 02, 2000
Hadeja crisis (Jigawa)
(Kastina
Yakubu, leader of the Fundamental Shite sect in Kastina. It was protest over a blasphemous publication fun times. Several lives were lost and property destroyed. Started as a quarrel between a Fulani man and a Sayawa meat seller in Tafawa Balewa Escalated into full blown violence and later took the colouring of a religious war in Bauchi. Several lives lost and property valued over hundered of million naira were destroyed. A peaceful procession initiated by the Izala sect to halt Rev. Reinhard Bonnke from having a crusade in Kano later degenerated into a very violent and bloody religious confrontation. Thousands of lives were lost and properties valued in millions of naira were destroyed. A communal feud between the Katafs and the Hausas later took the dimension of inter-religious war between Muslims and Christians in other major cities of Kaduna State. Several live were lost and properties were destroyed. The Kalakato religious sect assaulted the village head and burnt down the police vehicle. Lives and property were also lost. Communal violence trigged off by the beheading of a Christian who had allegedly desecrated the Quoran. Communal violence triggered off by quarrel between Hausa and Ibo led to the burning of houses, churches and shops and killing of innocent people. Hausa/Fulani youth took vengeance on the killing of their Kith and Kin in Sagamu. Their target was the Yoruba Community. Kaduna city exploded as Muslim and Christian extremists and other hoodlums clashed over the proposal to introduce Sharia. Communal clash that started with a protest against the location of Local Government Headquarters. The militant youth group started the riot and later took to the streets, killing and destroying. Clash between Tsagari and Share communities of Kwara State which claimed several lives. A religious that was sparked off by the presence of the states Sharia implementation committee. A face off between the militant members of OPC and Hausa/Fulani community over supremacy of Emirate system in the state. Violent ethnic crisis erupted after the OPC assaults in Kwara and Lagos States. A sectarian disturbance that was caused by a debate between Muslims and Christians in Hadeja (Jigawa). There was wanton destruction of worship
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26.
Thur, June, 28, 2001
27.
Friday, Sep., 07, 2001
28.
October 12, 2001
29.
Monday, Oct., 29, 2001
30.
Friday, Nov., 01, 2001
31.
Sunday, Dec., 30, 2001
32.
January, 18, 2002
33.
May 2, 2000
34.
Mon, May, 27, 2002
35.
Sat. June 01, 2002
36. 37.
Monday, July 01, 2002 Tuesday, July 01, 2003
38.
Thur, Jan., 01, 2004
39.
Thur, Jan,, 01, 2004
places. crisis An ethnic conflict between the Tiv and the Azara indigenes. It started with gruesome killing of an Azara traditional leader, and later spread to the Tiv village, with the Tiv community on the defense. Jos Crisis A violent ethnic/religious crisis between the Muslim/Hausa Fulani and Christian/Indigenes. The subject of discord between the Jasawa Development Association and Plateau Youth council was over political appointment in JosNorth. Kano Riot A peaceful anti-American protest over the bombing of Afghanistan turned violent, taking ethnic and religious dimension, it degenerated into uncontrollable violence which claimed lives and damaged properties and place of worship. Tiv-Jukun/Fulani An ethnic clash between Tivs and Jukun/Fulani Conflict which was an extension of the May 2001 clash and could be linked to the protracted dispute between both sides. Newswatch reported that 16 soldiers were killed which later led to the gruesome revenge on the Tivs, by the Nigerian Army. Gwantu Crisis A clash that started on a political ground (over the relocation of LG Headquarters) later took an ethnoreligious dimension in which places of worship were destroyed. Vwag Crisis A violent communal conflict in Vwag district between the indigenes and non-indigenes exploded in the backdrop of the September 7 Jos crisis. It started when an illegal group of 40 men attacked the District Head of Vwag. It also had religious colouring. Awe Crisis A renewed communal clash between two indigenes communities in Awe Local Government of Nasarawa State. The cause was not certain but two people were killed and several other injured. Jos Mayhem Another mayhem that followed PDP congress but later took an ethno-religious colour. Fulani-Irigwe crisis An ethnic clash between the Hausa/Fulani and the Irigwe indigenes in Basa, Plateau which was said to be a reprisal attack. Yelwa-Shendam A religious-cum ethnic fracas between the native Mayhem (Plateau) people (predominantly Christians) and Hausa settlers (predominantly Muslims). This violence extended to about four Local Government Councils in Southern Plateau. Wasa (Plateau) The Yelwa-Shendam roits spilled over to Wase Edo/Kogi Communal clashes between border communities in Edo and Kogi States Ekepedo and Ogori over land ownership. Ganye, Adamawa Clash between Fulani herdsman and farmers over gazing lands. Yobe Militant Islamic group operating under the name Azara (Nasarawa)
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40
Sunday Feb., 01, 2004
41.
Sat, Feb., 01, 2004
42.
Sat, April 03, 2004
43.
Sunday, April 11, 2004
44.
Mon, April 26, 2004
45.
Sat. May, 01, 2004
46.
Wed, May 12, 2004
47.
Sat. June 08, 2004
48.
Tuesday, June 08, 2004
49.
Tuesday, Aug., 03 2004
50.
Monday, Sep., 27, 2004
of Muhajiran launched a Taliban-like attack on police. Men of the Nigerian Army killed five and arrested several others. Wase/Kanam Violent clash between Mavo and Taroh (Plateau) communities, which claimed 11 lives suspected Taroh youth were alleged to have raided Mavo villages. Wase/Kanam Communal clash over land ownership between (Plateau) Minda and Kparev groups. Several lives were lost. Makarfi, Kaduna Religious protest in Makarfi town over the desecration of the Quran by a Christian teenager. Lantang South, Continued clashes that led to the sacking of Taroh Plateau villages in Lantang South LGC by suspected Hausa-Fulani insurgents. Bakin Chiyawa Renewed hostilities launched by suspected Plateau displaced Fulani herdsmen. The conflict was believed to be spill over the ethno-religious crisis that has been bedeviling Southern Pleteau Local Governments of Lantang South and North, Wase, Kanam and Shendam. Yelwa Shendam, A fresh ethno-religious mayhem that claimed over Plateau State 650 lives and over 250 women abducted by suspected Taroh militant. Kano Kano mayhem following the Yelwa Shendam ethno-religious crisis in Plateau. Non Muslims were attacked in reprisal of the Plateau crisis. Over 200 lives were lost and the traditional ruler of the area deposed. Konshisha/Gwer, Boundary disputes between neighboring Konshisha Benue and Gwer communities. Thirteen lives were lost. Numan, Adamawa Ethno-religious crisis in Numan over the construction of a mosques minaret over the Humma Bachamas palace. Over 50 people were feared killed and the traditional ruler of the area disposed. Quanpan, Plateau Fresh outbreak of violence in Lankaka village. Suspected armed militant from neighboring state allegedly stormed the village community killing two and razing twenty houses. Limankara, Borno A self-styled Taliban group hiding on the Goza hills and Madara mountains on the north-eastern border with Cameroon raid police station killing officers and stealing ammunition
Source: Chizea & Osarhe Copy-cat counterparts of APC and OPC sprang up or became stronger in the South – south and southeast to equally champion the nationalism of their respective geo ethnic areas: MOSOP for the Ogonis (Rivers State, South – Page 13 of 66
South Nigeria), MASSOB and Bakassi Boys for the Igbos (South East), and Egbesu Boys/MEND for the Ijaws (South – South). Within the South - South, the Ijaw/Itsekiri conflict of 1997/1999 kept the nation fixated while it lasted, causing many oil related businesses to relocate to either Port Harcourt or Lagos. This however, was only the first phase, as it was soon followed by the proliferation of independent militia commands within the Niger Delta, with a variety of acronyms and ‘war lords’: Asari Dokubo, Ateke Tom, Soboma George, Government Tompolo, General Boyloaf etc.
With the light arms that became initially available, following the settlement of the Ijaw/Itsekiri conflict by the Gen Danjuma Committee, and the easy access to funds from illegal crude oil and refined products bunkering, these groups grew fast and strong enough to challenge the authority of the nation’s military.
Militia camps proliferated across the Niger Delta, providing a haven not only to those genuinely advocating for the political/economic rights of the region, but also to a raft of miscreants and socially displaced youths in search of any cause to fight for, so long as they were fed and sheltered. They got their cause under the banner of ‘Resource Control’ . Page 14 of 66
Hundreds of millions of Dollars that were lost to the nation’s economy became the gain for some of the militant units operating at the fringe of the genuine Niger Delta empowerment movement, as oil facilities were relentlessly attacked and vandalized. For them the reward from bunkering was so lucrative, that they openly shunned legitimate employment offers as just not good enough. Unpopular politicians who needed the services of thugs to gain and stay in power also turned to such militants’, with huge amounts of free money. Much of this was not cycled into the ‘Cause’, but used to acquire flashy cars and lavish mansions in stark contrast to the endemic poverty of the region.
The less fortunate, lower rank ‘Militants’ who could not attain to the big money bracket, turned to kidnapping, armed robbery, and car snatching and were ever ready to augment their precarious cash resources by carrying out hit jobs as political assassins.
In the South East geopolitical zone, (and now also in the SW) products pipelines became the direct target for vandalisation and easy access to cash by criminal gangs, resulting in avoidable fuel scarcity and untold financial loss to the NNPC and the nation. Page 15 of 66
Such incidents as outlined above persisted throughout the Obasanjo admistration until H.E Alh Umaru Musa Yar Adua’s Presidential Amnesty of 25th June, 2009. It is interesting to note that the amnesty only worked because, Alh Yar’ Adua had first carried out a ‘no nonsense’ crackdown on the free-for-all that the genuine economic and their empowerment movement had been turned into by some of its off-shoots. Without this softening up and reassertion of State authority, the amnesty offer may well have been spurned. We shall return to this point later.
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3.0 CHALLENGES TO STATE SECURITY SINCE 2010 In early 2010, HE President Yar’adua’s health condition deteriorated, with the then Vice President H.E Goodluck. E. Jonathan assuming provisional national stewardship, until 10th May, 2010, when he was sworn in as President, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Nigeria.
The new President inherited not only the ongoing administration of the Amnesty Programme in the Niger Delta, but also the first stirring of Boko Haram insurgency, together with a host of other security challenges, such as:
- Resurgence of the long simmering Crisis in Plateau State. - Kidnapping (mainly for ransom). - Armed Robbery, (especially of banks) - Easy recourse to assassinations (to settle power tussles, either political or traditional). - Cultism on University campuses - Violent confrontations between farmers and migrant cattle grazers.
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- Political violence (occasioned by inbalance in ethnic /religious representation at State and local council level, and many other inequities) - Illegal crude oil bunkering (specifically in the Niger Delta), and illegal products trucking across our land borders, especially in the (north and west).
From 2010 to the present, it is fair to say that these problems have not abated, rather some of them have worsened in intensity and geographic spread. A culture of impunity has been developing fast, where groups of citizens or individuals who feel they have a cause, can simply take the law into their own hands, truely believing they can get away with it. This issue of culture of impunity was already well treated in an earlier NCTR memo to Government.
On a case by case basis, we could characterise the present situation as follows: a. The Boko Haram uprising currently making daily headlines came to prominence in July, 2009 when sectarian violence initiated by them left about 1, 000 people dead. It was however, actually founded in Page 18 of 66
2001 by Mohammed Yusuf, with the objective according to sources, of establishing Sharia law in the country, starting of course, with the already mainly Islamic North. Killings attributed to Boko haram by external sources were 450 in 2011, over 620 in the first half of 2012and altogether between 3,000 and 10,000 since their inception in 2001. By all indications, they are jihadist in outlook, following in the tradition of Maitsatsine, and have been absolutely ruthless against all those who have shown the courage to criticize them. Nevertheless, they have been criticized and even disowned by top Muslim political leaders as well as the Islamic leadership in Nigeria, including the Coalition of Muslim Clerics in Nigeria, CMCN. Their origins are obscure, but appear to date back to 1995 under the name Shabaab Muslim Youth Organisation. From such quiet beginnings, they developed a political outlook in 2002 under their leader, Mohammed Yusuf (now late). With the recruitment and training under this political cover, they grew stronger to emerge eventually as the deadly uncompromising organization we know today. b. Plateau Crisis, occasioned by issues of political representation, triggering an explosion of violence from pent-up ethno-religious Page 19 of 66
intolerance, and land –use confrontation between cattle grazers (mainly Fulani) and farmers(mainly indigenous non-Fulani).
However, this appears to be only on the surface. Deeper down, there appears to be issues to do with the self identity of the indigenous tribes of the Jos Plateau,
the Birom and others, with regard to the nature and
penetration of Islamic influence and administration in the area, in the days of empire in Nigeria.
Because of these deep tensions, inter-
religious and inter-cultural mistrust is high
between
and the indigenous farmers in the rural areas, and
Fulani
between
grazers Muslims
and Christians in high population centres, which boils over into violence at the slightest provocation.
c. Kidnapping and Robbery gangs have added their own dimension to the state of insecurity in the country. Major cities, especially in the south-south and south-east have been the main targets, although the scourge is nationwide. Nobody at all is spared: Politicians and their family members, Community leaders, royal fathers, children , the aged, journalists and actors, just about anybody. A few victims have died in the hands of their captors, but the majority regain their freedom upon payment of onerous ransom. Ransom and bank robbery money often go to finance reckless lifestyles, Page 20 of 66
including drugs and purchase of fire-arms, but is sometimes cycled into larger causes such as Boko Haram. The brazenness of these activities is graphically illustrated by the raid late November 2012 on Auchi, in which a major town as this, was sealed off completely from all directions, while banks were systematically raided with total impunity. To our knowledge, no arrests have been made so far. d. Cultism in University campuses and secondary institutions and political assassinations are common occurencies, which require no elaborate comment. e. Political violence is also on the rise, and is getting more with each electoral cycle. Politically triggered violence however, can sometimes be averted, through objective, fair, unselfish and mature leadership by the political class. Many are the instances where State chief executives defiantly abuse their trust in the allocation of appointments, or dispensation of other administrative provisions, unmindful of the volatility of subsisting tensions. Thus, it is fair to conclude that widespread political injustice is at the root not only of direct political violence, but also of many instances of inter and intra communal as well as inter sectarian violence. f. Illegal crude oil bunkering has assumed a dimension that is fast becoming a national embarrassment. A figure of 450,000 barrels per day is being stolen, according to various local and international sources, which is Page 21 of 66
equivalent to $49.5m daily or $1.485 billion monthly at a crude oil price of $110/barrel. This is more than half of the current national budget. If a foreign country were to occupy some of our oil fields with production potential of this magnitude or even much less, we know that the nation would declare war on such an entity, as Kuwait did when big neighbour Saddam annexed their oil field. But this stealing by our own citizens, who even refine some of it in home-made make-shift refinery outfits and sell back to us,
is truely a scandal of moumental proportions, and a big
challenge to our security forces. Closely associated with crude oil theft is the theft of refined oil products from pipeline vandalisation, which in 2011 alone cost the NNPC a value loss of some N12.0 Billion. The frequency of vandalisation is highest in the South West followed by the South – South and North Central geo political zones
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4.0 GENERAL LESSONS FROM PAST SECURITY CRISES From the foregoing broad survey, the following general lessons may be distilled:
4.1 SILO THINKING Many security problems are perceived, analysed and remedied almost always in the local context in which they occur. Linkages to and similarities with occurences elsewhere or at other times, are often not given adequate attention. This has robbed us of the general policies and legislation required to pre-empt recurrence or timely response to similar events anywhere any time... 4.2
CAPACITY DEFICIENCY AND LACK OF RIGHT CULTURE FOR
IMPLEMENTATION
OF
INVESTIGATIVE
COMMITTEE
RECOMMENDATIONS Some of the above crises surveyed were simply put down by force and nothing more was heard at least on the surface. The Ijaw/Itsekiri war and
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the Plateau Crisis, however, like some others before them, had the benefit of official mediation by government constituted committees. In the case of Plateau however, the findings of three earlier judicial panels by Justices Fiberesima(1994), Niki Tobi (2001) and Bola Ajibola (2008) were yet to be implemented before new crises struck. The General Emmanuel Abisoye and Solomon Lar administrative panel reports which addressed the most recent eruptions of violence, are we believe, still awaiting systematic implementation. Sadly, this is becoming the pattern, and we have to urge the responsible organs in the bureaucracy to revisit all major outstanding crisis reports, come up with a clear unbiased position, and follow up with prioritised implementation. 4.3 COMPOUNDED INJUSTICE IN THE POLITY
There is no society where there is 100% equity vertically and horizontally. So it is in Nigeria. We face a unique challenge however, in the almost overwhelming interplay of inequity, injustice, deprivation, oppression and repression across all niches of society in recent years, spaning several administrations. There is economic inequity, and a widenning gap in opportunity and quality of life between the rich and the poor. Good education is getting beyond the Page 24 of 66
reach of many , and only those who can afford the high fees in private schools can have it. All other pass out students are only “educated” illiterates. With such rising level of official and circumstancial illiteracy, how can government communicate to the grassroots the nation-building concepts of good neighbourliness, respect for the law, inter-faith/intercultural respect, the benefits of peaceful conflict resolution, due process, use of lawful avenues for venting grievance, etc. At the end of the day, not only do the poorly educated swell the ranks of the frustrated jobless, they are also beyond reason, because they can’t
understand, or are too
frustrated to care. Even the time honoured creed of peace, and sanctity of life enshrined in the holy books that have shaped global modern ethics globally is beyond their comprehension. It is these kinds of economically and educationally deprived citizens that make ready recruits for thuggery and violence of all kinds. It is also these that take to illegal means of getting by, and even becoming top dogs of the kidnapping and bunkering cabals, and hit squads. At the communal level, those in political leadership create all kinds of administrative chaos, without regard to the history and culture of the various tribes and clans under their authority. Local government councils are created arbitrarily, and chairmen ‘appointed’ without regard to
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potentially explosive inter-clan or tribal tensions, often out of undisguised bias. Corruption, graft, and economic rent-seeking have become the order of the day, warping our moral values and breeding a whole generation of young people, for whom hard work is no longer the means to rise in society. It is who you know, and what you can get away with that now matters. Thus, inequity, injustice, and deprivation, social, economic and political are at the root of many security crises in recent years. This is also why many crises in the past were directed at non-government targets, whereas most crises now are directed against Government in one form or the other, in the erroneous belief that government alone can solve all our problems. (Compare annexures 3.1 and 3.2.) 4.4 NON-INVOLVMENT OF THE TRADITIONAL INSTITUTION IN CRISIS RESOLUTION/PREVENTION There have been many reports on various crises and prescriptions abound of what the state should do. We have reviewed some of them, including some on the Jos crisis. Invariably, the recommendations include: poverty alleviation,
better
education,
employment
creation,
information
management, crime detection and prosecution, good governance, political class to play by the rules etc, but no mention of a role for the traditional institution.
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In a UNDP report of 2006 on the way forward for the Niger Delta, we note that a 7-point agenda was recommended, along with suggested stakeholder groups to drive it, such as government, private sector, civil society activists etc.
Again, the traditional institution is left screaming to be
mentioned. In 2011, the Senate President, while receiving an EU delegation, who called on him with strategic plans for security and development in Africa, opined that it would be good for Nigeria to key into it. We are also aware of US-Nigeria joint plans for security on the Gulf of Guinea and the adjoining coastal states. None of these envisage a role for the traditional institution. There is however, much that the traditional institution can do in the fight against violence. This is incorporated in the “Recommendations” 5.0 DETAILED ANATOMY OF THE PRESENT SECURITY CRISIS 5.1. METHODOLOGY For reasons given in section 1.3 of this report, the Committee chose to draw upon the perception and opinion of the membership of the NCTR, as a viable alternative to searching for “hard” statistics in the achives of statutory security agencies. Accordingly, we resorted to a questionaire approach which nevertheless, has obvious disadvantages of which we are not unmindful. These disadvantages may be captured briefly as follows: a. The necessarily concise and compact phrasology of a questionaire leaves room for varied nuances and even varied meanings to be imposed on the questions by the respondents, other than what was intended by the Committee. We made sure therefore that responses
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were not taken in isolation, but in the total context of the respondents’ submissions. b. A detailed questionaire, such as this, calls for considerable amount of time in order to be comprehensively answered, even adequately. However, the pressures on monarchs in modern times, seriously militate against such investment of time, with the result that only about 51% of expected responses were received. We shall revert to this later. c. Even for some respondents who could spare a little time, the negative psychology of “form-filling” may have proved overwhelming, as it often does with most of us. The result was that the usual and more habitual prose style proved unyielding, thus robbing the response of the analytical precision that the questionare was designed to deliver. In such cases, we cheerfully undertook the burden to read through the submitted text carefully to extract the information required for the statistical analysis. d. Some of the questions required respective answers for the nation as a whole, as well as for the geopolitical zones and states. This requirement was not honoured in some of the responses. Thus, in quantifying the responses, some judgment had to be applied, in order to identify what the respondent had intended to convey, e.g. crude oil bunkering is clearly a problem of south-south origin, regardless whether or not the respondent located it at the right position in the column provided in the questionnaire. e. Merged responses such as from the southeast and southsouth geopolitical zones were treated as if each response was from a single state or maybe two, of the component zonal States, e.g if say, eight Page 28 of 66
different types of threat to security were indicated in the South South response, these were not scored as 48 (8 x6) data points in the final analysis, but simply as 8 responses presumed to be actually collated at, the rate of one or two per state in the particular Zone (SS or SE as the case may be). This is logical and also helped to avoid “lumpiness” of the data set in the final analysis. So much for the imperfections of the questionaire methodology and how they were, we believe, effectively mitigated. It is fair, nevertheless to caution that the trends that were derived ultimately from the raw responses be viewed only as broad indications of the perception of the traditional fathers, and by implication their subjects across the nation. A final and compelling defence of the questionaire methodology in our view, is that the perception of the polity, especially the traditional institution is, and should be, a major factor to reckon with in legislation and policy formulation, just as much as “hard statistics”. After all, the majority of our people may not even understand numbers, but they do see and feel, and certainly react according to their perceptions. The value of the questionaire approach is that it has helped to capture and quantify such perceptions, and given them robustness as potential input into the fight against the widespread lawlessness currently prevailing. The recent security summit organized by Vanguard Newspapers bears testimony to the robustness of Public Opinion sampling as a mechanism for contributing to national policy formulation on strategic issues 5.2 GEOGRAPHIC SPREAD OF THE RESPONSES TO THE QUESTIONAIRE
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The design of the questionaire itself (Appendix 1A) is self explanatory and needs no further discussion. It was sent to the Chairmen of each of the 36 state traditional councils and the FCT traditional council. The deadline for submission window was open, in effect, until middle of December, 2012. As of the time of the detailed analytical work after the yuletide, 19 states had responded, (11 merged responses from the SE and SS geopolitical zones, and 8 individual states, representing the other four zones) (see table 4, annexure 4 and appendix 1B). The Committee appreciates the effort from all the states that responded, with particular commendation to the states of the SE, SS and NW geopolitical zones that achieved over 50% responses for/within their respective zones.
5.3 CHANGING TARGETS OF VIOLENCE As the nature of violent crime and violent mass unrest has changed over time, so have the targets of violence. In the two and a half decades or so, between 1980 and 2004, there were 50 or so serious recorded incidents in the northern part of the country (Chizea & Oarhe, 2011), of which those that targeted ethnic, religious or combined ethno-religious institutions account for some 80%. Community and land tresspass issues were minimal (20%). (See tables 1, 3.1 and annexure 3.1) By contrast, out of the 46 or so Boko Haram attacks recorded between March 2010 and February 2012, majority (54%) were Government targets and only half as many were religious or commercial targets. Police stations Page 30 of 66
and army units have been very hard hit as we all know, together with educational facilities. (see table 2 below, table 3.2, and annexure 3.2) S/N 1.
Date 01/2010
2.
01/2010
3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.
10.
10. 11.
12. 13. 14
15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21.
Location Target Dala Alenderi, Maiduguri Bauchi state Prisons
Casualties 4 persons
Released 700 prison inmates 29/03/2010 Bauchi state Police station 01/04/2010 Bauchi state Police station 09/04/2010 Maiduguri Polling center 15/04/2010 Maiduguri INEC office Killed several persons 20/04/2010 Maiduguri Police stations A Muslim cleric 22/04/2010 Yola, Adamawa Prisons Freed 14 prison state inmates 30/05/2010 Borno state Younger brother of the Killed one person Shehu of Borno, Abas Ibn El-Kanemi 10/2010 Borno State Former Vice Killed one person Chairman, ANPP, Awana Ngala 12/2010 Market 92 of Boko Haram members were arrested 28/01/2011 Former ANPP Killed 5 persons governorship candidate, Modu Gubio 29/05/2011 Several northern Several casualties states 16/06/2011 Damboa, Borno Killed 3 persons state 16/06/2011 Police Headquarters The Inspector General Destruction of 73 in Abuja, Federal of Police, Hafiz vehicles Capital Territory Ringim 20/06/2011 Kankara, Katsina Police station Killed 5 police officers state 26/06/2011 Maiduguri Beer Garden Killed 25 persons 27/06/2011 Maiduguri Officers of Nigerian Killed 2 and injured 3 Customs Service persons 03/07/2011 Maiduguri Beer Garden Killed at least 20 persons 09/07/2011 Borno state Governor of Borno ----state 26/08/2011 Abuja UN office Killed 18 August 28, Bauchi State Home of former No life lost 2011 Minister Yakubu Lame bombed in Page 31 of 66
22. 23.
August 29, 2011 September 6, 2011
Gauche Bauchi State Another bombing in Bauchi Borno State 2 bombings in Baga and Kaleri districts in Maiduguiri Bauchi State Bombing of a police station and a bank in Gauche Bauchi State Bombing of a police station and a bank in Misau Yobe, Kaduna and Bombings Bornu States Bauchi State Bombing of a market in Gauche Kaduna State Bombing of a market in Kaduna
24.
September 6, 2011
25.
September 12, 2011
26.
28.
November 4, 2011 November 11, 2011 December 8, 2011 December 16, 2011
Kano State
29.
December 17, 2011
Kano State
30.
31.
December 22, 2011
Yobe and States
December 24, 2011
Yobe State
32.
27.
33. 34.
35 36 37 38 39
December 24, 2011 December 25, 2011
December 30, 2011 January 2012 January 2012 January 2012 January
5, 6, 6, 7,
No life lost No life lost
6 policemen and 1 civilian killed Five persons killed
150 persons killed 5 persons killed
15 persons killed including a pregnant woman and children Force 6 persons killed
Attacked Air Comprehensive Secondary School, Dawakin Tofa Clashed with police at Darmunawa Quarters in Kano Borno Multiple bombings in Damaturu and Maiduguiri Clashed with police in Damaturu
3 policemen dead; 4 Boko Haram insurgents killed 6 persons killed
50 persons dead including an Assistant Commissioner of Police Borno State Multiple bombings in 11 persons killed Maiduguiri Niger State Christmas day 43 persons killed bombing of five including 6 policemen churches in Madalla, and 3 Boko Haram Suleja members Borno state A military checkpoint Four Muslim worshippers were killed Gombe city A church Killed six worshippers and wounded 10 others Yola A church Killed eight worshippers Mubi, Adamawa Christian mourners Killed seventeen state Biu town Christian poker Killed 3 and wounded Page 32 of 66
40 41 44 45
46 47 48 48
2012 January 2012 January 2012 January 2012 January 2012
players Yobe Beer garden
10, Damaturu, State 11, Potiskum, Yobe Christians State 17, Maiduguru, Borno Military checkpoint state 20, Kano city Various points including Zone 1 Police Headquarters, Shadara, SSS Headquarters, Kano State Police Command, Bompai, Immigration Passport office, Farm Centre police Station, Naibawa Police station. Yaar Akwa police station, Ungwar Uku and Jedijedi police station February 5, Kogi state Residence of victim 2012 (ex-LG chairman) February 6, Maduguri, Borno 2012 state ,, Kano Sharada Police station February 7, Kaduna I Division of the 2012 Nigerian Army, Airforce Base
seven others Killed eight including five police officers Killed four Killed two soldiers and lost 4 members Killed 185
One Two
Source: Extracted from Osumah, Oarhe, Boko Haram Insurgency in Northern Nigeria and the Vicious Cycle of Internal Insecurity, Draft Manuscript undergoing review in Small Wars and Insurgency
This does not by any means minimise the gruesome, and emotionally wrenching, attacks on Churches and mosques, consequences of which are not neccessarily reckoned only in quantified damages, but also in relationships, perceptions, spiritual and moral considerations and values etc. It may sound controversial, but given such a trend as the above, we need to ask: can it be that the real target of Boko Haram is actually government, and that they consider all other targets as surrogates of the government, and therefore simply secondary? The Committee wishes to
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leave this as an open question, as the data base is not robust enough for us to afford to be less tentative. 5.4 MAJOR CHALLENGES TO SECURITY: RELATIVE FREQUENCY OF MENTION IN THE RESPONSES (See annexure 5) Viewed from a national perspective , it would appear that Boko Haram is the dominant concern (18.5%) though BH’s locus is mainly in the northern states. It is followed by the menace of kidnapping (14.8%) and then by armed robbery, unemployment, Niger Delta criminal activities and cultism/Drugs on more or less equal level (11% each). Corruption, though not a direct security threat in itself, ranks even higher than sectarian violence or even religious intolerance and political violence. This we believe, speaks to the serious concern with which the blithe of corruption is perceived. At zonal level, kidnapping (13%) and armed robbery( 13%) are perceived as the dominant issues, along with the mutually conflicting occupations of settled farming and migrant grazing. Boko Haram, though zonal and state in origin, is perceived to have repercussions across the entire nation, because issues of religion are country wide, and the lives lost are from all over the country. Equally the structures such as the Police, army and security services are statutorily under federal government control, and are coordinated at the highest level of the security hierarchy, not at State level.
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By contrast, the problem of bloody clashes between grazers and farmers, which scored lowest as a national problem scored at the top as primarily a zonal concern. At the State level, Boko Haram further loses significance (5.3%), but surprisingly, so does the militancy/bunkering/illegal refining etc in the Niger Delta. The latter may be a vindication of the amnesty programme, as well as the improved production figures announced by NNPC from time to time, at least as perceptions go. Based on the derived rank orders (national, State and overall average), the following basic statements can be made without too much discussion; a. Issues that are substantially viewed as national , becoming less important at lower administrative tiers in geopolitical structure: Boko Haram, Niger Delta militancy and related activities, Corruption, and sectarian violence. b. Issues that are more important at state and zonal levels: Armed robbery, Land use (territorial & boundary matters), Political Violence . c. Issues that rank more or less the same across the administrative tiers (national, zonal, state): Kidnapping, Unemployment, Cultism/Drugs. This leaves out five issues on which there is no consistent response pattern: Religious Intolerance, Leadership deficit, Political Uncertainty, Farmers vs Grazers and marginalization (of all sorts). This is no surprise, as these are issues that are hard to pin down, define, or prove. The odd ball is the issue of farmers vs grazers which is quite an explosive one in such states as Page 35 of 66
Plateau, Bauchi, Benue, Taraba and to less extent at the fringes of the SE and SW geopolitical zones. We conclude this chapter, by grouping the 15 security issues according to average rank (column 5 of annexure 3): TOP QUINTET: Armed Robbery, Kidnapping, Unemployment, Cultism/Drugs, Boko Haram. MIDDLE QUINTET: Niger Delta Militancy etc, Land/Boundary issues, Farmers vs Grazers, Political Violence, Religious Intolerance. LAST QUINTET: Sectarian Violence, Corruption, Leadership deficit, Political Uncertainty, Marginalization.
6.0
FACTORS THAT MAY TRIGGER-OFF OR PRE-DISPOSE TO VIOLENCE (Annexure 6)
Eight potential triggers of violence were listed for the respondents to consider, along with any others they might consider relevant. These eight were:
Economic
hardship
in
general,
Unemployment,
Religious
fanatism(extreme intolerance), ethnicity, social injustice, political issues (high handedness, exclusion, denial of rights, lack of due process, imposition of candidates, election rigging etc), governance deficit and land matters (some land related problems are decades old)
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The Committee is aware that there is a good degreee of overlap between annexure 5 (listing the security concerns) and annexure 6 (listing the potential triggers). This is a case of symptoms and causes, which is inevitable, given that a potential cause of actual violence can be as much a concern as the violence or insecurity it triggers. For example, religious intolerance is a security concern because it can lead from bigotry to fanaticism to actual insurrection and killings (i.e. sectarian violence). Annexure 6, clearly shows the prominence of economic hardship as a first rank pre-disposing factor to violence, as NCTRN has pointed out severally to Government. The same goes for unemployment in 2nd place rank order, at national and zonal levels, and even first place at state level. An overview, of the matrix shows that the potential for extreme religious intolerance to trigger violence is not confined to states, but more of a national issue. As with the security concerns in annexure 5, triggers can be grouped by average rank order (column 5 of annexure 6), in three’s this time as follows: MOST IMPORTANT: 1. Economic Hardship (general) 2. Unemployment 3. Religious Issues IMPORTANT : 4. Social Injustice 5. Political Issues 6. Ethnicity Page 37 of 66
LESS PRESSING: 7. Governance deficit 8. Land Matters 9. Others (Unspecified)
7.0
MOTIVES AND MOTIVATION (Table 7, Annexure 7)
The motives of groups that have chosen to challenge the nation’s authority, and their source of inspiration and motivation received only 7 mentions out of a possible 19, based on the questionaires that were completed for us. Specifically, given that only the South South and Sokoto state addressed this question, perhaps we should not overdraw conclusions. Be that as it may, it would appear that lawless operating groups and movements may more likely than not, be motivated by ethnicity and their own group interest. Moreover, we know from experience that many of them, by upbringing and Page 38 of 66
limited exposure, are just not equipped to think in lofty national or moral terms, beyond improving their immediate personal circumstances, however much they might profess to the contrary.
8. SUSPECTED SOURCE OF SUPPORT FOR VIOLENT GROUPS(Table 8, Annexure 8) A total 18 responses were received on this very sensitive issue. Majority of responses suggested internal finance by the groups, which is assumed to mean it is within the country, and is self-finance by the groups themselves. If it is self-finance, potential sources and modalities are not hard to guess: bank robberies (like the one at Auchi recently), car snatches, Kidnap-forransom, illegal crude and products bunkering, illegal crude oil refining, cross-border products trucking, etc. Page 39 of 66
Next in rank order is grassroot moral support, which is understood to mean sympathisers providing food, shelter, and hiding as well as tip-offs and early warning of security raids. Clandestine medical assistance and even personal cash donations cannot be ruled out( rank order 3 out of 4). Considered less likely is external finance, which if actually so, is not surprising, given the global crack-down on shady cash movemeents, following 9/11. Media speculation of arms influx from Ghadaffi’s Libya and especially after its collapse, were not addressed in any of the responses, and we do not wish to join in the speculation! Lately though, Malian insurgents have come under suspicion for training Boko Haram operatives and providing arms. Unfortunately, the Committee is not in a position to comment, although Mr. President himself is quoted to have said that about 50% Boko Haram operatives are trained in Mali, and this was repeated by the Hon Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Nation newspaper of 25th January, 2013. 9.0
GOVERNMENT
INTERVENTION AND CURRENT STATUS OF
SECURITY IN THE NATION( Annexure 7 & 8) 9.1
General Statement
The Committee wishes to place on record its appreciation of the good intentions of government, and the resources it is making available for the fight against the excesses of Boko Haram, and other violent crimes. We are all withnesses to the huge 2012 budget outlay for the National Security Agency, and the deployment of remote camera’s in strategic public
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places in Abuja and beyond. There is possibly more that we don’t even know about and we can only commend the government for all these efforts.. However, after long discussion and review of the responses received, the Committee came to the conclusion that these efforts are neither consistent or sustained, and that there is need for more coherence in security policy and administration. Although the nature of security challenges varies from country to country, we feel that we have much to learn from the 9/11 crisis in the USA, and the coordinated bombing episode of 2010 and the IRA challenge of the 1960’s, in the UK. Before all these crises, there were also the frequent plane hijacks by the Arab terrorist groups. In each case, the US, UK and the civilised world found a way to get over the problem, through policy coherence, consistent and sustained application of resources, and effective public mobilization against the threat in question. In the case of 9/11, the US declared war on terror, and fought it relentlessly until Osama Bin Laden was made to pay the ultimate price for his bloody deeds. By comparison with the advanced democracies, our resources are limited, even precarious when measured against the huge social needs of our people. Moreover, the polity is culturally and by religion
highly
heterogeneous, making consensus building a lot more difficult. Yes, but we still believe we can get over this present state of siege, if in the face of limited resources, our public discourse can define the priorities to focus Page 41 of 66
upon, for consensus alert the public to a cause that they can believe in. This , we see as the big challenge of the political class. After all, on soccer Nigeria is always one people! Note that we posed the question earlier in this report whether, if a foreign country were to annexe from us a number of oil fields with a production of 450,000 bpd equivalent to what the bunkerers are sucking, we would not declare war? This is the challenge that the nation has to confront one way or the other, because the declaration of war, any war is more often than not response to the mood of a nation. 9.2 Analysis of the Responses On the current state of security in the nation, perceptions are 50:50, but leaning more towards a worsening state of affairs (annexure 9 ). There is a suggestion of ‘no change’, though such might seem now to have been more like a temporary lull given the spate of fresh Kidnapping, pipeline incidents and Boko Haram attacks that have happened since the questionaires were distributed, e.g more mass killings in the NE, the Jaji bombing, the attempt on our respected colleague, the Emir of Kano, many high profile abductions (Mama Okonjo, ex-Governor Rotimi’s wife, the mother of the speaker of the Bayelsa House of Assembly, etc) Notably, those states that think it is worsening, suggest also that we might even be approaching a state of total collapse of the security system. For example, we know for certain that Local Government Chairmen in several states, have totally neglected to call security meetings thus giving violent crime free rein. On the adequacy of government intervention in the present situation, opinion is very clear. 77.8%, think it is not enough(annexure 10). Less than Page 42 of 66
12% only of responses indicate that government effort is adequate. On this basis the need for government to do more is quite unambiguous, as we already indicated in our earlier general statement (section 9.1).
10.0 CONCLUSIONS 10.1 General 10.1.1 Basic Attitude to Security: The Committee observes that part of the problem in the fight against violent crime, is our resigned and ambivalent attitude towards security matters. Many of our citizens are simply not interested. Many others show interest and may even be prepared to Page 43 of 66
volunteer information to security agents, but fear that they might be wrongfully implicated, or be exposed to reprisal by the criminals. These are issues to which solutions must be urgently found, if violent crime is to be reduced appreciably. 10.1.2 Responsibility for security: This issue is in two parts: share of responsibility between the three, tiers of government, on one hand, and between government and civil society (including the traditional institution on the other ). This ambiguity as well as the gaps, and overlaps in who deals with which type of violent crime, and the lopsided manner in which resources are allocated for security, poses a big draw-back in the fight against violent crime. It is no surprise , therefore, that the advocacy for state Police has grown stronger in the last 3years or so. Added to the above, is also the all too obvious inter-agency rivalry, especially between the military and the Police. The increasing deployment of soldiers to duties hitherto discharged by the Police can potentially breed resentment, while expossing the military to petty corruption, all of which can only weaken the effectiveness of our security apparatus. 10.1.3 National Priorities and Resource allocation to Security: It is the view of the Committee that the present high focus on security should be further intensified. We gave as an example the manner in which the Page 44 of 66
U. S and the UK handled their recent high profile security challenges. The nation has to have a rallying call, a robust policy statement spelling out targets and time lines in the fight against violence. To this should be added a sustainable public enlightenment programme, and allocation of resources in which the traaditional institution is taken on board as a bridge between government and the people. If deemed neccessary, governement can seek emergency powers for a specified duration to deal with the major security challenges facing the nation, as the US did in the wake of 9/11. We feel certain that there will be strong public support for such a move, if the objectives are clearly articulated and disseminated. There can be no static position on violent crime: it is either the criminals are winning or governement and the people are winning. 10.1.4 Loopholes in Security Administration: This is related to item 10.1.2. A good example is where the Federal Government is reluctant to declare a state of emergency in a given state(s) and the governor wants to continue in office rather than hand over to an Administrator. Yet, often enough such State expects the Federal Government to carry maximum burden for the crisis involved. This obviously leads to gaps in responsibility which compromise the anticrime effort. Page 45 of 66
10.1.5 Preventive vs Reactive: The fire brigade approach that we have grown used to in the fight against major breakdown in security in the past is increasingly unsuited to the present generation. The modern approach is a lot more sophisticated and technology intensive. As crime itself is more sophisticated, so do the security agencies need to be in order to be ahead of the game, through effective surveillance, and information processing. In addition to the above, there should be a visible and credible effort to address the factors that trigger and fuel security crises. These are listed and discussed in Chapter 7 of this report. It is clear we need to borrow a leaf from the field of engineering where there is the practice of preventive maintenance and fail-safe design, and from the field of medicine where they have preventive health-care. Needless to say that a life lost to crime is one life too late for an incident that could have been prevented.
10.1.6 History, Culture and Religion in Security enforcement : Since administrative boundaries were imposed on the expression called Nigeria by the colonial authorities, the fragmentation of our centuries old cultural-religious identities have progressed unabated. Sometimes, boundaries which are clearly stated to be for Page 46 of 66
administrative convenience only, have resulted in permanent shrinking of the territorial span of an existing traditional authority, thus sowing the seeds of resentiment which periodically boil over into crises. By such acts as these, and the rampant creation of “autonomous communities”, the stability conferred by a sociocultural system based on history and traditions, has been sacrificed on the altar of political expediency or calculated mischief. This disregard for history and culture and the traditional institution that is the custodian of both, has contributed in a major way to the intractable security problems of the nation.
10.2 SPECIFIC CONCLUSIONS 10.2.1 Boko Haram, in our view, is the no.1 security challenge facing the nation at this time. The ruthlessness and human carnage they inflict; their stated separatist objectives; and the religious and economic dimension of their actions; together with their recent media publicised linkage to Al Qaeda, have led the Committee to this conclusion. Based on the responses to our questionaire, we include 4 other issues as deserving of top security attention: Armed Robbery, kidnapping, Unemployment and Cultism/Drugs.
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10.2.2 The activities of the Niger Delta militants and all those in the related criminal business of pipeline vandalisation and products stealing constitute national enemies no. 2, next to Boko Haram. The scale of economic loss is too colossal, and the distortion of grassroot values too severe for us to play down, regardless of the NNPC postings of improved oil production, which gives the impression that all is well in the ‘deep south’. Other security issues in the second tier are Land/Boundary matters, Farmers vs Grazers, Political Violence and Religious Intolerance.
10.2.3 In the third categorry of security concerns are: Sectarian Violence, Religious Intolerance, Leadership deficit, political uncertainty, and marginalisation.
10.2.4 Underlying factors which have the potential to trigger and fuel violence can be grouped in three categories: General Economic hardship, Unemployment, and Religious issues are perceived as the most important, followed by social injustice, political issues, and ethnicity, as next in importance, while governance deficit, Land matters and other unspecified issues are viewed as less pressing. Page 48 of 66
10.2.5 The perception of the traditional institution is that the security organs are not doing enough to battle violent crime and the growing culture of impunity, and are certainly not winning as is sometimes claimed by their apologists, some of whom are certainly not being sincere. 10.2.6 Although the cross-border support for Boko Haram is now becoming clearer, according to government public statements, there is need to also pay close attention to the possible internal sources of support identified in this report.
11
RECOMMENDATIONS:
Annexure summarizes the solutions to the insecurity problems of the nation in order of priority according to the responses received. This priority order is reflected in the prominence we have given to the recommendation Page 49 of 66
regarding the traditional institution and the need to implement the reports of the previous investigative committees. We have however exercised on our own judgment regarding more amorphous issues such as social justice and moral rearmament which are very valid, but are the duty of all and will be ongoing for quite some time to come. 11.1. Tapping into the unique capacities of the Traditional Institution 11.1.1 Representation of the traditional institution in the National Council of State, as is already being advocated by the National Council of Traditional Rulers under our co-leadership, His Eminence the Sultan of Sokoto and His Imperial Majesty the Ooni of Ife; 11.1.2 Regular security meetings, involving government and the traditional institution at local government and state levels are suffering increasing neglect, and must be urgently resucitated and reinvigorated. They should be a part of a coordinated data gathering network (see section 11.3 below); 11.1.3 The Institution can play a stronger, more structured role in Police – Community relations; 11.1.4 Traditional fathers should be taken into confidence in the design of security administrative processes, e.g we should be consulted at the appropriate level on questions as whether police should be deployed to their areas of origin or not. The conduct of DPO’s is also a matter Page 50 of 66
on which royal fathers should have an input. These are just a few examples out of many;
11.1.5 Empowerment of grassroot vigilante (communication gear, kitting, appropriate allowance etc) to partner with police in fighting local crime such as robberies, drugs, cults, sea-piracy etc; 11.1.6 Occasional refresher seminars on security to update traditional fathers on current professional thinking and methodologies. These can be conducted at state or zonal level. 11.1.7 Traditional fathers should be involved in rehabilitation programmes, following major crises: e.g . The Niger Delta Amnesty Programme. This is because of the need to re-integrate such ex-militants back to their families and communities, so that they do not drift about in the urban centres to be attracted to other crimes . 11.1.8 Traditional fathers need security protection, appropriate to their status, and level of involvement at national, zonal, state and local government. 11.1.9 Application of traditional sanctions as may be admissible under our laws; 11.1.10
Deter cultic and other anti social behavior at grass root level
before they spill over into armed movements; Page 51 of 66
11.1.11
There should be empowerment for public sensitization and
information dissemination on security and moral re-armament issues, within their respectiive domains; 11.1.12
Restoration of recognition and adequate facilitation for the
Traditional Institution in all facets of our increasingly complex national life. The wisdom and experience we can muster, and the cultural and moral values we represent are utterly invaluable in the search for solutions to our national problems, of which violent crime is only one out of many.
11.2 Reports by Government Panels: 11.2.1 – Review all outstanding ones; 11.2.2 – Issue white paper; 11.2.3 – Make a note of lessons applicable to the present situation, tactical or strategic. 11.2.4 - Implement as applicable. 11.3 Security and Information management 11.3.1 Create and inter-agency electronic data centre (if one does not already exist) to record all relevant security related incidents; 11.3.2 Analyse same by training experts for appropriate response and strategic planning; Page 52 of 66
11.3.3 Set up a mechanism to access and collate public opinion and perception in a quantified manner; 11.3.4 A pool of responsible leaders in the polity, including the traditional fathers may be identified to participate in such exercise, without public notice . This low-profile network approach is probably more effective than the public hearings and ‘security summits’ which are often attended and hijacked by a vocal, not neccessarily knowledgeable, few.
11.4 Closing the gaps in security responsibility between federal, State and Local Government 11.4.1 Whether by legislation or constitutional amendment, we support the growing view that certain aspects of security responsibility should be devolved to the states: eg. Prison services, Community Policing etc. This will allow for greater efficiency, while reducing the federal bureaucracy. Community policing, as in the days of the Native Authorities should be reconsidered as a mechanism for the Federal and State Governments to in turn devolve responsibility to the Local Government and the Traditional institution. 11.5 Prioritisation
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With a growing population and a depletable and depleting overdominant income source (oil and gas) it will always be tight to provide all the spending that is required in the fight against violent crime. Our recommendation in this circumstance is two-fold: 11.5.1 Security has to be given further higher priority , because the oil and gas from the Niger Delta and the solid mineral deposits and agropotential in the northern parts of the country, are both dependent on foreign capital, to attract which requires a safe and secure nation for investors to come to.
11.5.2 Above presupposes that the security challenges themselves must be quantitatively prioritised, so that the resources provided to meet those challenges will be cost effective and goal oriented. We recommend a rigorous quantitative approach to security as part of our national economic planning, given that security, the economy and national unity can no longer be treated as separate. The priority order shown on page 27 of this report and fully discussed, is based on a very limited data set, but it illustrates what can be done with a larger data pool, and more rigorous statistical tools. 11.6 Government Authority and the Culture of Impunity
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There is need for security agencies to re-assert authority over the growing lawlessness in the nation, which is anchored largely on the belief that one can get away with anything so long as the crime investigation agencies and the courts can somehow be compromised. We were already in seroius trouble from about 1999, but the recent manifistation leaves no one in doubt that our troubles could spiral out of control. Specific ominous indicators are: a. A city the size of Auchi is cordoned off and robbed with impunity b. The Niger Delta illegal refineries continue business unchecked c. Petroleum products theft continues to be big business. d. Public figures including senior royal fathers, wives, children and parents are abducted or attacked with relish. e. Boko Haram can pick any target for torching or masacre, whenever and wherever they like. f. A growing feeling that there are sacred cows in the society, or that the law applies to some only and is not for all.
11.6.2 Where there is armed regular confrontation against government forces, and the degree of co-lateral damage may be unacceptable for government to gain outright victory, a strategy is required for “softening up” the insurgents in order to bring them to the negotiating table. We feel, Page 55 of 66
from experience that this is what is needed for Boko Haram at this point i.e to hit hard at first but be ready to negotiate from a position of authority. The loss of innocent lives by both sides is already unacceptably high in our view, and some means short of outright victory has to be found to stop the carnage. 11.7 Public Enlightenment: It is our view that the nation is under virtual siege from within by armed robbers, kidnappers, assasins and all forms of uncontrolled crime and violence. We recommend an approach as appropriate to an actual siege. 11.7.1 Accordingly, the relevant security policy organs should design a comprehensive strategy, involving curfews, state of emergency, special legislation and special courts as may be applicable, make a well articulated declaration which can mobilize the citizenry to mass participation in the fight against violent crime.
11.7.2 Sustained public enlightenment should be launched, such that citizens know their duty and such duty is not abused by law enforcement. 11.7.3 Implementation then becomes the duty of all. This we would call a war against crime of the sort mounted by the Colombian Government and
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other countries that were at one time or the other under siege by Terrorists, Opium warlords, Drug Barons or mafia type organised crime
11.8 an inclusive economy has been identified in many security related studies as part of the remedy for widespread frustration and poverty which break out into violence in and against society. National economic planning should without delay address this challenge structurally
and
not
just
dispense
uncoordinated hardship
programmes that are often of little impact.
TABLE 3 3.1 CHANGING TARGETS OF VIOLENCE 1980-2004 (VARIOUS INCIDENTS) Total recorded attacks: 50 (100%) Type of target: Page 57 of 66
Ethno-Religious Religious Ethnic Community/Land General (unsp.)
16 (32%) 14 (28%) 10 (20%) 7 (14%) 3 (6%)
3.2. MARCH 2010 - FEB.2012 (BOKO HARAM ATTACKS) Total all targets: 46 (100%) Type of target: Government Religious Commercial Others (unsp.)
25 (54%) 6 (13%) 6 (13%) 9 (20%)
TABLE 4 QUANTIFICATION OF RESPONSES BY ZONE NORTH-EAST: 2 out of 6 (33%) (Adamawa and Taraba) NORTH-WEST : 4 out of 7 (57%) (Kaduna, Katsina) (Kebbi & Sokoto) NORTH-CENTRAL :1 out of 6 (17%) (Plateau) SOUTH-EAST : Combined zonal submission 5 States (100%) SOUTH-WEST : 1 out of 6 (17%) SOUTH-SOUTH : Combined zonal submission, 6 States (100%) TOTAL RESPONSE : 19/37 (51.4%) TABLE 5 ANALYSIS OF MAJOR SECURITY CONCERNS BY RELATIVE FREQUENCY OF MENTION S/N 1 2
ISSUES Boko Haram Kidnapping
NATION 18.5%(1) 14.8%(2)
ZONE STATE 8.7%(4) 5.3%(7) 13.0%(1) 10.5%(3)
AV. [4.0] [2.0]
RANK {5} {2} Page 58 of 66
11.1%(3) “(“) “(“)
“(“) 8.7%(4) “(“)
26.3%(1) [1.67] 10.5%(3) [3.3] Nil(10) [5.67]
{1} {3} {6}
6 7 8 9 10
Armed Robbery Unemployment Niger Delta Militancy/Bunkeering pipeline vandalization Cultism/Drugs Corruption Sectarian Violence Religous Intolerance Leadership Deficit
“(“) 7.4%(7) 3.7%(8) “(“) “(“)
“(“) Nil (13) 4.3%(9) “(“) Nil(13)
10.5%(3) [3.3] Nil(10) [10.0] “(“) [9.0] 5.3%(7) [8.0] Nil(10) [10.3]
{3} {12} {11} {9 } {13}
11 12 13 14 15
Political Uncertainty Political Violence Farmers vs Grazers Land/Boundary Marginalization
“(“) Nil(12) “(“) “(“) “(“)
“(“) “(“) [“] “(“) 10.5%(3) [8.0] 13.0%(1) 5.3%(7) [6.67] 8.7%(4) 15.8(2) [6.0] 4.3%(9) Nil(10) [10.3]
{“} {9} {8} {7} {13}
3 4 5
( ) Rank order A (Primary) [ ] “ “ B (Simple Average of A) { } “ “ C (Derived from B)
TABLE 6 PERCEIVED CAUSES OF INSECURITY RANKED BY RELATIVE FREQUENCY OF MENTION S/N
ISSUES
NATION
ZONE
STATE
1
Economic Hardship Unemployment Religion Ethnicity Social Injustice
20% (1)
20.6% (1)
24.2%(1) [1.0]
`{1}
14.3%(2) 14.3%(“) 11.4%(4) 11.4%(“)
17.6%(2) 14.7%(3) 8.8%(6) 11.8% (4)
24.2%(1) 9.1% (5) 9.1%(“) 12.1%(3)
[1.67] [3.33] [5.0] [3.67]
{2} {3} {6} {4}
Political Issues Government Deficit Land Matters Others
11.4%(“) 8.6%(7)
11.8%(4) 8.8%(6)
12.1%(“) [3.67] 9.1%(5) [6.0]
{“} {7}
2.8%(8) 2.8%(“)
2.9%(8) 2.9%(“)
3.0%(“) 3.0%(“)
{8} {“}
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
AV
RANK ORDER
[8.0] [8.0]
( ) Rank order A (Primary) [ ] “ “ B (Simple Average of A) { } “ “ C (Derived from B)
TABLE 7 WHERE DO LAWLESS GROUPS DRAW THEIR MOTIVATION FROM? Ethnic interest : 2 out of 7 (28.6%) Class Interest : 2 “ “ “ (28.6%) Religions interest : 1 out of 7 (14.3%) Zonal Interest : 1 out of 7 (14.3%) Page 59 of 66
Local Interest : 1 out of 7 (14.3%) National Interest : Other Interests :-
TABLE 8 SUSPECTED SOURCES OF SUPPORT Internal Self-finance : 6 out of 18 (33.3%) Grass Root Moral Support : 5 out of 18 (27.8%) Private , Individual/Groups : 4 out of 18 (22.2%) International Finance: 3 out of 18 (16.7%) TABLE 9 CURRENT STATUS OF SECURITY IN THE NATION 1. Improving : 3 out of 7 (42.9%) 2. Worsening : 3 out of 7 (42.9%) 3. No change : 1 out of 7 (14.2%) TABLE 10 OVERALL PERCEPTION OF GOVERNMENT EFFORT/INTERVENTION Not Enough : 7 out of 9 (77.8%) Adequate : 1 out of 9 (11.1%) Out of Balance : 1 out of 9 (11.1%)
TABLE 11 SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS Greater use of the traditional system : 7/25 = 28% Social justice : 5/25 = 20% Leadership at all levels : 4/25 = 16% Implementation of existing reports : 4/25 = 16% Inclusive Economy : 3/25 = 12% Moral re-armament : 2/25 = 8% ANNEXURE 3.1
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ANNEURE 3.2
ANNEXTURE 4
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ANNEXURE 5 Page 62 of 66
+ Tallest bar is most worrisome Shortest is least
ANNEXURE 6
ANNEXURE 7
+ Tallest bar is most significant Shortest is least Page 63 of 66
ANNEXURE 8
ANNEXURE 9
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ANNEXURE 10
ANNEXURE 11 Page 65 of 66
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