Volume 1, Issue 9
TOURISM AND DIPLOMACY IN THE ARCTIC
Edward H. Huijbens
COMPARING POLISH AND SLOVAKIAN FOREIGN SERVICES
Juraj Marusiak
THE REVIVAL OF A SINO-RUSSIAN ALLIANCE IN EURASIA
Austin Jersild
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October 2015
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Chief Publisher Eugène Matos De Lara
Letter from the Editor Greetings loyal readers,
Editor
Benjamin Miller
Academic Advisors Arne Ruckert Dave Van Ginhoven Jennifer Haire
Associate Publisher Amelia Baxter
Associate Editors Eric Wilkinson Mete Edurcan Guillaume Lacombe-Kishibe Kristina R. Proulx
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Pierre-Alexandre Lubin
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As you have likely recognized by now each issue brings something special to the Border Crossing project. This usually happens by bringing out an aspect that is present in every issue but not always to the same degree. With this is in mind, I think our issue this month is characterized by sheer geographic diversity. We have two articles that involve China in very different ways. Firstly, with a refreshingly historical look at the prospect of future China- Russia relations courtesy of Austin Jersild. Secondly, with an examination of the often overlooked China-Iceland relationship as it relates to Arctic economic development. Moving West, we have a discussion of the always pressing nuclear Pakistan issue. Julian Schofield offers a constructive investigation of the West’s options in engaging Pakistan towards a more stable future. Continuing our journey, Michael Bishku embeds Turkey’s evolving relations with the Syrian regime in the tendencies of its leading personalities and approach to the region as a whole. We then have the benefit of a comparative institutional analysis, a break from our usual case or thematic discussions, of the foreign services of Poland and Slovakia. Juraj Marusiak’s blend of detail with historical narrative will shine light not only on these two foreign services but the dynamics between diplomacy and domestic bureaucracy in general.
Happy reading,
Benjamin Miller
Contents 6
THE REVIVAL OF A SINO-RUSSIAN ALLIANCE IN EURASIA Austin Jersild
TOURISM AND DIPLOMACY IN THE ARCTIC 8
Edward H. Huijbens
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DIPLOMACY, THE POLITICAL SPHERE AND ITS IMPACT ON INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES IN THE DIPLOMACY SECTOR 12
Juraj Marusiak
DEALING WITH PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR BREAKOUT 16
Julian Schofield
UNDERSTANDING TURKEY'S SYRIAN POLICY: FROM ZERO TO MANY PROBLEMS 18
Michael B. Bishku
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THE REVIVAL OF A SINO-RUSSIAN ALLIANCE IN EURASIA Austin Jersild is professor of history at Old Dominion University in Norfolk, VA, and the author of The Sino-Soviet Alliance: An International History (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2014). For this book he conducted archival research in the ministry of foreign affairs and other archives in Moscow, Beijing, Prague, and Berlin.
Austin Jersild
R
ussia’s recent troubles with the West over Crimea and eastern Ukraine have raised anew the prospect of Sino-Russian cooperation in Eurasia as a challenge for the United States and NATO. This trend is not new, as the two vast states of Russia and China have long shared their frustration over NATO expansion, the Iraq War, the abrogation of the 1972 Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty, and American criticism of their human rights violations. More local common concerns, such as trade, drug trafficking, border control, and Islamic separatism, led to the founding of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in 2001, which includes the Central Asian states in addition to Russia and China. Vladimir Putin went to Shanghai in May 2014 to settle a 30-year natural gas deal: a new oil pipeline now takes Russian oil directly from Amur Oblast to Daqing in Heilongjiang province
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in Northeast China, and many Russian and Chinese observers are optimistic about greater levels of cooperation. At the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum in late May 2014, Chinese Vice President Li Yuanchao met with Putin as well as numerous Russian business leaders and suggested new forms of cooperation and exchange that might unite the Russian Far East with the Chinese Northeast. President Xi Jinping and Putin signed over thirty economic and security deals in May 2015. The vast space of Eurasia once gave birth to the Sino-Soviet Alliance, established by Joseph Stalin and Chairman Mao in Moscow in February 1950. The changing character of the “strategic triangle” of the United States, the former Soviet Union, and China has probably been the most significant story in the history of international relations since 1945, and some observers wonder if that equation might change again in the future. For this to happen, however, the
Sino-Russian relationship has to move well beyond primarily the sale of Russian oil and gas to the Chinese, and historical experience suggests this is unlikely. New forms of cooperation need to be substantially different from those of the past. While China and its new economic needs drive the evolution of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation today, the priorities of socialist bloc collaboration in the 1950s were set in Moscow. Soviet advisers and industrial experts arrived in China greeted by banners declaring the importance for the Chinese of "learning from the Soviet Union." But political slogans generally betray themselves, and this one had to be repeated so often precisely because many Chinese in fact thought otherwise. In particular, elderly technical workers possessed a strong memory of European and American methods and standards of living from before the revolution, and wondered about the merits of the new
alliance and Chairman Mao's decision to "lean to one side" (toward the Soviet Union) in the Cold War. Soviet-era archival materials reveal that some advisers even relished the opportunity to travel to China in order to gain access to more advanced industrial technology left behind by the European colonial powers from before Mao's revolution. Even more disturbing and problematic for the future of the socialist bloc were the practices that reminded the Chinese of the history of foreign colonialism in China. Advisers from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe enjoyed rickshaw rides on the streets of Beijing in the 1950s. Instead of enthusiasm about the shared “construction of socialism,” the Chinese complained about Soviet advisers whom they perceived as not just technologically limited but also overpaid, prone to the abuse of alcohol, excessively interested in Chinese women, and eager to enjoy their special privileges in China. While the Soviets issued their public proclamations about the virtues of their benevolent aid, the Chinese instead saw strings attached and the absence of appreciation for what China offered the alliance. They wondered about the terms of industrial exchange, the persistent Soviet interest in Chinese resources, the Soviet eagerness to maintain access to the warm water port of Lüshun (Port Arthur), the price of blueprints, and the quality of material delivered from the Soviet Union to China. The Soviets set up special “joint stock
companies” throughout the bloc and in China that seemed designed primarily to extract valuable resources desired by the Soviet Union. The blurring of the boundary between the Russian Far East and the Chinese Northeast, evident in transportation projects, defense collaboration, labor programs, and other areas, forced the Chinese to worry about traditional matters of national sovereignty and independence. Newly available internal discussions from the socialist world reveal that the Chinese engaged in frank debates with the Central Europeans (Poles, Hungarians, Czechoslovaks, East Germans) about the problem of Russian imperialism. This was especially the case after 1956, when all the bloc communist parties worried about the consequences of Nikita Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin at the 20th Party Congress, and pondered the possible collapse of the bloc because of the rebellions in Poland and Hungary that year.
are long gone, and today, neighbors such as the Ukrainians and many others routinely seek to arrange forms of international association and exchange independent of the Russian Federation. The relationship between Russia and China has been almost completely reversed from that of the Cold War era. Who can imagine a public campaign today to “earn from Russia” in any area of economic or social life? China will treat Russia like the petro-state it has become, and keep its primary attention focused on the consequences of its entanglement with the economy of the United States.
They used terms such as “great power hegemony" and “great power chauvinism” to describe the enduring influence of the Russian empire upon the Soviet Union, and the Chinese in particular speculated about the problem of a Soviet version of socialism that was distant from the needs and traditions of their country and culture. In both the imperial and Soviet eras, Russians imagined themselves to possess a significant role in the vast space of Eurasia, a world in the twentieth century that stretched from Berlin to Hanoi. Those eras
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TOURISM AND DIPLOMACY IN THE ARCTIC Edward Huijbens is currently the director of the Icelandic Tourism Research Centre (ITRC) along with holding and associate professors chair at the department of business and science at the University of Akureyri. He has formerly taught at the University of Iceland. His main interests lie in innovation, product development and marketing of tourism along with landscape theories and spatial theory."
Edward H. Huijbens
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he role of tourism is becoming increasingly recognised in the Arctic with growing public, political, economic and scientific attention being directed at the region. However, Arctic tourism activities and development are in their infancy. At the same time expectations especially pertaining to tourism’s role in socio-economic development abound, not least since the number of visitors to high latitudes is already substantial and continues to grow albeit somewhat unevenly. This article will discuss the role of tourism in the Arctic in the context of diplomacy and how tourism has become a vehicle for globalised capital investment and national sovereignty claims. The arguments here presented are derived from an analysis of Chinese tourism investment propositions in Iceland and a subsequent analysis of public perception in Iceland regarding Sino-Iceland relations.
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Tourism as a vehicle for global capital investment Tourism represents a new globalised economic expansion coming to the fore in geopolitics rivalling resource extraction. Yet in addition to the development of e.g. a mining site, the creation and investment in a tourism destination is the product of the processes of commodification brought about through the dynamic interplay between actors of capital accumulation, affecting both the materiality and social meaning of places. These globalised flows of capital, images, goods and people need to be monitored in terms of the actions of the individuals being put to work under the terms of tourism at each location. In August 2011, the Beijing based international investment firm Zhongkun proposed a large scale ecotourism resort to be developed in NE Iceland, at the edge of the VatnajĂśkull National Park in a sparsely populated rural area. In the months to follow, a debate erupted in Iceland as to the viability of the scheme and its overall credibility. By November 2012, the proposal had been rejected by a ministerial committee of the
Icelandic government. The ministers thought too many loose ends were attached to the scheme in terms of e.g. responsibilities in infrastructure development to facilitate the building of tourist accommodation and services, and not least housing for staff. Those welcoming and vouching for the scheme were municipal leaders in the region and local business interests. Set in a region bereft from sustained population outmigration and growing economic marginalisation, these parties became involved in constituting, inventing and coordinating concessions that were to be granted to the global firm. In their machinations they relied on how tourism had been instrumental in the recovery of Iceland after the 2008 financial crash. They also played on growing core-periphery tensions in a country where two thirds of the population lives in the capital region, which has thus become the centre of all administrative and economic activities. The arguments presented claimed bias on behalf of those in the capital region towards economic development in the periphery. At the
most extreme, some claimed that those residing in the capital wanted the rest of the country to remain unchanged for them to visit and come in touch with wilderness and a bygone era of Icelandic farming society. On the other extreme were those who claimed that the municipally orchestrated concession was contributing to a scheme wherein Zhongkun could leverage capital from Chinese creditors through lease holdings world-wide. The conflicting worlds of Chinese investment plans, Icelandic core-periphery dichotomies, as well as contesting ideas of regional and tourism development thus animated the heated debate on Zhongkun’s plans. Tourism as a vehicle for national sovereignty claims Concessions from the national government did indeed almost take place to facilitate Zhongkun’s tourism development. Yet, beyond the loose ends identified by the ministerial committee, what made the project suspect was the way in which the ideas of eco-tourism were being put to use. If wanting to stay true to its ecotourism aspirations Zhongkun would need to rely on an unambiguous definition of ecotourism, research indigenous knowledge and conservation ethics, undertake a rural appraisal and map the perceptual register of the local population, identifying endogenous paradigms that would support ecotourism. No such efforts were made. The owner and co-ordinator of the proposed investment, the Chinese millionaire Huang Nubo, made no attempts to come to the island to solicit support for his ideas either. This, coupled with
the mystery of Zhongkun’s tourism practices worldwide as evidenced by their out of-date website and vague portfolio of activities, lead to the conclusion that those endorsing the proposal were either incompetent or that there was an ulterior motivation for the project. Following up on the latter, it is recognised within the tourism literature how most states that have declared sovereignty over lands and seas in the northern and southern polar regions, have targeted tourism to underscore their claims. In this context the proposed investment started to be seen as part and parcel of Chinese imperial ambitions. At the extreme, concern was expressed that the concession could be utilised in future as a strategic military base by China. More temperate commentators argued though that with this investment China was seeking to develop its influence in the Arctic in a non-violent way. The rapid and significant changes coming to the Arctic region and China’s interest in the region might help in understanding the bid for tourism development in NE Iceland, and other places in the Arctic, but Zhongkun has recently expressed interest in similar developments as proposed in Iceland, on Svalbard. In the modern day experience economy, tourism development is fast becoming equally feasible as investment in resource extraction or real estate. Concession territories are as real today as they were in colonial times, albeit with a different rationale. The remaining wilderness areas of the world have a perceived worth of growing importance in times of increasing environmental awareness and global climate change. These areas are mostly to be found where
core-periphery tensions abound. Local investment advocates could in this context be emulating the practises of the compradors of old, the local go-betweens for foreign companies and countries seeking investment opportunities in colonised states. Lessons to be learned The lessons to be learned from the proposed investment are how peripheral regions and peripheral states, lumbered with struggling economies and a regionally divided political class, need to be wary of the ways in which globalised capital seeks ways to plant its feet in local contexts. In Iceland it is clear that scientific engagement and trade-based economic engagement with China is viewed positively. On the other hand, political and economic engagement beyond trade are greeted with suspicion by the general public whilst more welcomed by the political and business elites. In particular, the public is strongly opposed to any engagement with China that threatens Icelandic ownership of sensitive sectors (fisheries mainly) and by extension, its sovereignty. Chinese FDI into Iceland is especially feared. While Icelandic elites see Chinese FDI as leading to investment, jobs, and enabling of Arctic opportunities, the public sees this same FDI as being an existential risk to Iceland’s nationhood. In this matter, Iceland being independent and standing on its own two feet is valued over economic alliances that may bring benefits, but also high perceived risks. The reasons for this public view can be summed up in one word – trust. While the Icelandic elite (perhaps due to their increased
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knowledge and international perspective) have a certain trust in Chinese and Icelandic institutions, the average Icelander does not. They do not trust their own knowledge about the Chinese, they do not trust the Chinese government, they do not trust Iceland’s political leaders, they do not trust Iceland’s legislation, and they do not trust Iceland’s capability to plan for the future. As trust in these people and institutions is lacking, Icelanders perceive certain engagement with China as too risky.
no change to the political or institutional landscape, there is the risk that what happened with the Zhongkun’s investment plan, i.e. a long, contorted affair which was ultimately rejected amid international embarrassment and discord over the process – may be repeated over and over again. A different future is possible if there is a movement towards building the public’s trust through transparency of initiatives and procuring local equity.
Iceland’s elites may risk much by not being attuned to public sentiment. If things proceed as they are now with
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I would like to acknowledge the role of my colleagues in developing the above thoughts and lines of inquiry. Dr. Jesse Hastings, National University of Singapore, Mr. Gustav Petursson, University of Lapland, Ms. Jennifer Smith, University Centre of the Westfjords and Prof. Dominic Alessio, Richmond the American International University in London have all made this possible.
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Mastermind China’s RDIPLOMACY, THE POLITICAL SPHERE AND ITS
IMPACT ON INSTITUTIONAL Merging CHANGES IN THE DIPLOMACY SECTOR: COMPARISON BE TWEEN Energy Diplomacy SLOVAKIA AND POLAND
Mgr. Juraj Marušiak, PhD. (1970) graduated at Comenius University in Bratislava in History – Slovak language and Literature (1994). Since 1996 he works as the research fellow at the Institute of Political Mgr. Juraj Marušiak, PhD. (1970) graduated at Comenius University in Bratislava in History – Slovak language and Literature (1994). Since 1996 he works as the research fellow at the Institute of Political Science, Slovak Academy of Sciences, where he in 2003 obtained the PhD. degree. His research is focused on the history of Slovakia of 20th century and on the issues of international relations in the region of Central and Eastern Europe since 1989. He is an author of the monograph „Slovenská literatúra a moc v druhej polovici päťdesiatych rokov“ (Slovak Literature and the Power in the second half of the 50´s; Brno, Prius 2001).,
Juraj Marusiak Since 1989, the diplomacy sector in the post-communist states is undergoing a process of democratization and de-ideologisation, which was a consequence of breaking the power monopoly of the Communist Party. Another important aspect was the break-away from the Soviet bloc and opting for a new foreign policy orientation towards entry into the European structures and later into NATO. For our analysis, we choose the comparison of the institutional changes in diplomacy sector in two post-communist countries – Slovakia and Poland, with similar political cultures, connected with close cooperation and bilateral ties, which were likened to a “strategic partnership” in the late 1990s. Especially in Poland, these two major changes were also reflected in the staffing of the sector, which had to get rid of a number of exponents of the previous regime and people associated with the enforcement of a policy of unilateral dependence on the USSR. Problem of politicization of the sector persisted in the later period and concerned mainly the filling of managerial positions at foreign diplomatic missions of the state, which resulted in the exodus of experts from the foreign ministry following the
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parliamentary elections. The question of personnel replacement was raised again after the ruling coalition of national-conservative Law and Justice (PiS) Party with Christian-National League of Polish Families (LPR) and socio-populist Self-Defense in 2005 – 2007 came into power. One of the key policy priorities of the new government was accelerating and completing the process of "decommunization". One of the elements of this campaign was to be gradual dismissal of those employees of the ministry who had graduated from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO). It was argued that these graduates could pose a security risk to the Polish state, as they could have been recruited to cooperate with Soviet or Russian special services during their studies. Such approach of "the presumption of guilt", associated with politically motivated dismissals, was abandoned following the early parliamentary elections in 2007, when Radosław Sikorski became the new Minister of Foreign Affairs (Lorenc, 2007). The Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a new institution was marked by a higher degree of personal stability, which was, especially in the early stages of its existence, due to the absence of relevant experts. More attention was given to building the
institution into a fully-fledged partner in the foreign relations of the newly established state, although in contrast to Poland, the foreign policy agenda of the 1993 – 1998 period was not of primary interest to the ruling elite. Prior to 1998, the leadership of this sector underwent frequent personnel changes, which, however, only slightly affected employee turnover. MFA SR maintained its apolitical character even before 1998, which may have been one of the reasons why, in the eyes of the public, the area of foreign policy was a point of consensus in society. The operation of MFA SR and the exercise of foreign policy were marred by the conflict between Prime Minister V. Mečiar and President Michal Kováč. Since 1998, no similar conflicts arising from political or jurisdiction disagreements have been reported, perhaps also because President Rudolf Schuster, Ivan Gašparovič and Andrej Kiska had no ambitions to build a counterweight to the government, but also due to the consensus among political elites on Slovakia’s foreign policy orientation. The Slovak diplomatic sector maintained a considerable degree of autonomy also in the years 2006 - 2010, when two non-party men (Ján Kubiš and Miroslav Lajčák) stood at its head, and all ministers of foreign affairs from 1993 onwards were nominated by the
strongest political party, which also produced the Prime Minister. This allowed consensual informal sharing of agenda between the Ministry and the Prime Minister, who was usually more actively engaged in issues that, due to their prestigious status, were given higher priority. So, for example, Prime Minister Mikuláš Dzurinda saw his priority in issues related to the integration of Slovakia into the EU, relations with the U.S. and partly Visegrad cooperation; for Prime Minister Robert Fico, the top priority, in addition to Slovakia's membership in the EU, was relations with the Russian Federation. A change in the Foreign Ministry’s attitude to the political elites came after the parliamentary elections in 2010, when there was a significant and, according to the sector employees, unprecedented increase in the number of political nominees in this institution, which upset the existing unofficial rule of the apolitical nature of the sector (Vavrová, 2010). By contrast, Poland's internal political conflicts have significantly marked also the foreign policy’s institutional framework. The conflicts often resulted from different political affiliations of the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs (e.g. in the 1997 – 2000 period) or from problematic "cohabitation" between the President and the Prime Minister, who came from different political backgrounds (e.g., 1993-1995, or 20072010). As mentioned above, it is the President who plays an important role in the foreign policy of the state. Previously, his status was significantly higher, confirmed constitutionally by the so-called Small Constitution of 1992, which regulated the relationship between the highest state authorities, allowing the directly elected President to assess candidates for the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Interior (Dudek, 2002, 305-308). However, in President Lech Walesa’s interpretation, this gave him the right to veto their nominations and review the given departments as
"presidential." Poland's new constitution, adopted in 1997, halted this shift to the presidential form of governance. On the other hand, the Prime Ministers have been building up their own sections of Foreign Affairs in the Office of the Council of Ministers (henceforth Prime Minister or Premiere) with the increase of their role in the situation where the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister come from different political parties. The operation of this section showed markedly when Jerzy Buzek headed the government while Bronislaw Geremek held the post of Foreign Minister (1997-2000). The importance of the President’s role in Poland’s foreign policy is determined not only by his constitutional status, i. e. direct election, but also by a tradition of strong head of state epitomised by Józef Piłsudski, whose political legacy was carried on by presidents L. Walesa and Lech Kaczynski (supported by the Law and Justice Party, PiS). In this spirit the constitutional role of the President of the Polish Republic was conceived as one of "the supreme representative of the Republic of Poland and the guarantor of the continuity of state power, as well as a person guarding the observance of the Constitution, standing on guard of the sovereignty and security of the state and also of the indivisibility and inviolability of its territory" (Konstytucja RP 1997). Based on the Decree of the President of the Republic of January 31 1991, the National Security Office (BBN) was established at the President’s Office. In the early years, BBN was subordinated to the state minister for national security in the Office of President of the Polish Republic; currently he reports directly to the President. In addition, under Article 4, paragraph 6 of the General Conscription Act, the Polish President’s role is "to initiate and maintain patronage over activities oriented to the formation of patriotic and defensive attitudes in society."(1) This
symbolic role of head of state, defined not only by political tradition, but also by legislation, greatly increases his status in the foreign and security policy area. The president thus plays an important part in organizing celebrations commemorating historic events; under his supervision, BBN also focuses on patriotic education of youth and provides financial backing for research projects and release of most significant book titles. He develops long-term cooperation with organizations and an institution whose task is to form civic and defence attitudes, or supervises veterans’ organizations and harcery (Polish equivalent of scouting). In addition, BBN initiates various events of educational nature. Last but not least, it operates as an Analytical Centre and auxiliary machinery of the Office of President of the Republic to work on draft legislative acts concerning the protection of national heritage, such as the “Corpus of veterans fighting for the independence of the Republic of Poland” draft law. Hence, BBN represents a relatively strong institution with its own expertise; in addition to the construction of historical memory, it also issues book publications and a professional journal "Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe" on matters of security. Disagreements between the President or the presidential nominee in the post of Poland’s Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski in the years 1993 – 1995, the ruling coalition of the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) and the Polish Peasants' Party (PSL) led to the strengthening of the role of the Ministry of Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries, headed by PSL’s nominee Lesław Podkański. With regard to long-term informal agenda sharing during the tenure of President Aleksander Kwasniewski and L. Kaczynski, the President’s domain were relations with Ukraine, the issue of energy security and cooperation with NATO, while issues related to the "European" dimension
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were within the Prime Minister’s domain. After 2007, the PolishGerman relations became the subject of specific attention of Prime Minister Tusk. The significance of this agenda was symbolised in the figure of the former Minister of Foreign Affairs PR (1995, 2000-2001) Wladyslaw Bartoszewski, a supporter of PolishGerman reconciliation, at the post of Prime Minister’s Advisor. In contrast to Slovakia, tensions and conflicts of jurisdiction between the highest constitutional officials on matters of foreign policy resulted in a disagreement over the participation of the Prime Minister and President at the European Council’s session. This dispute was resolved by the Constitutional Court of the Polish Republic by a decision according to which the president had the right to attend the European Council’s talks while decisions on the foreign policy of the country were to be adopted by the government. It also bound the president and government to cooperate in the situation where they plan to jointly participate in the European Council. The President gained the right to comment on issues related to the government's position in the European Council’s negotiations and was obliged to participate in meetings where amendments to agreements are discussed that pertain to the foundations of EU’s operation, which "could be related to the issues of sovereignty of the Republic" (Trybunał Konstytucyjny 2009). The Parliament’s rights and responsibilities in the foreign policy of Poland as compared to SR are stipulated only in general terms. The Sejm has the constitutional authority to take decisions on declaring a state of war and concluding peace (čl.116, par. 1), but his powers in this area are limited only to the case of an armed attack on the territory of the Republic of Poland, or if there is an obligation to participate in common defence against aggression, which flows from international agreements. If the
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session of the Sejm (i.e., the lower house of parliament) cannot take place, the decision to declare the state of war lies with the President (Art.116, par. 1). The principles of the use of armed forces outside the territory of the Polish Republic is determined by a ratified international treaty or law, as is the case with the principles of stationing foreign troops on the territory of the Republic of Poland (Art. 117)(2). The Slovak Constitution provides for the National Council’s scope of operation in foreign policy in more detail. Its role is, particularly prior to the ratification of international conventions, to grant consent to international treaties on human rights and fundamental freedoms, to international political treaties, to international treaties of military nature, to international treaties that give rise to the Slovak Republic’s membership in international organizations, to international economic treaties of a general nature, to international treaties whose implementation requires a law and to the international treaties which directly confer rights or obligations of natural or legal persons, and also to decide whether the international treaties fall under Article 7, par. 5 of the Constitution (Article 86, section d). Furthermore, it is authorised to decide on the declaration of war, if the Slovak Republic is attacked or if this stems from the obligations of international treaties on common defence against aggression, and, after the war, on concluding peace (Article 86, section j) or to assent to the deployment of armed forces outside the territory of the Slovak Republic, unless the case referred to in Art. 119, section p (Article 86, section. k), or, to assent to the presence of foreign troops on the territory of the Slovak Republic (Article 86, section l) (3). In addition to these constitutionally defined powers, the Parliaments of both countries have gained an unofficial power to exercise public control of foreign policy. While the Slovak
Ministry of Foreign Affairs annually submits a Foreign Policy Strategy report for the current year; in Poland, the Minister of Foreign Affairs annually speaks before the Sejm, summarizing the most important achievements of the foreign policy for the past year and presenting tasks for the upcoming year. Apart from this, the foreign committees of both parliaments enjoy the power (legally unamended) of hearing candidates for ambassadors before finalizing their nominations and deployment to the country of operation. So for example, in Poland, the aforesaid procedure has been applied since 1990, and deputies strive to interpret this authority of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Sejm as binding and as a final act of nomination of the ambassador (Walendziak, 2001), although in legal terms the ultimate decision on the appointment lies within the authority of the President (Cimoszewicz, 2001). A similar resolution was adopted by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Council of the Slovak Republic (NC SR), but only as late as June 2008. According to this decision, all ambassadors have to submit to the Committee’s members their own concept of diplomatic mission either before or after starting their mission. Hence, like in Poland, the position of the Foreign Affairs Committee is not legally binding, and in terms of the procedure of appointing ambassadors, the MPs only play an advisory role. References 1 Ustawa z dnia 21 listopada 1967 r. o powszechnym obowiązku obrony Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. (Tekst jednolity). (Dz. U. z 2004 r. Nr 241, poz. 2416). 2 Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 2 kwietnia 1997. Warszawa, Sejm RP. http://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/ polski/kon1.htm 3 Constitution of the Slovak Republic No 460/1992 Coll. Bratislava, National Council of the Slovak Republic.
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DEALING WITH PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR BREAKOUT
Dr. Julian Schofield is a professor of political science at Concordia University (Montreal). He has been conducting research in and on Pakistan for twenty years. His publications include Militarization and War (Palgrave, 2007), Pakistan: Geopolitics (with Usama Butt, Pluto, 2012), and Strategic Nuclear Sharing (Palgrave, 2013).
Julian Schofield
T
he 2003 conquest of Iraq, disintegration of Syria, and recent nuclear deal with Iran has seemingly pushed the nuclear non-proliferation frontier to Pakistan. There is concern (1) that at current rates of production, within ten years Pakistan will have the world’s third largest nuclear arsenal, from a count of approximately 70 boosted-fission warheads in 2008, to over 500, and with sufficient range to reach Israel and Turkey. There is a temptation, as part of the next step to rollback nuclear proliferation, for the West to isolate Pakistan as it did with Iraq, Iran and North Korea in the 1990s. Pakistan’s current weapons grade fissile material production is four times India’s, and Pakistan is more determined to concentrate these resources into warhead production. It possesses four operational production reactors at Khushab collectively able to manufacture 25 to 50 kg of plutonium every twelve months, which, combined with Pakistan’s ongoing highly enriched uranium (HEU) production with 20,000 centrifuges at Kahuta, gives it the capacity for the production of between 14 to 27 warheads annually. Refinements at the Khushab site may double this total. India, by contrast, can manufacture between two and five nuclear weapons in the same period (2). This pace has continued unabated since 1998, and has received
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further stimulus from recent Indian-US nuclear material agreements. Turning international attention and pressure on Pakistan to compel it to join the non-proliferation regime will not succeed. The 1968 NonProliferation treaty (NPT) is often advertised as a collective security framework to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. In fact, it was a bargain between two great powers, the US and the USSR, to jointly promise not to permit the proliferation of nuclear weapons to their allies. In particular, Moscow was concerned that West Germany would acquire an independent nuclear arsenal. Moscow and Washington conceded their failures to reign-in China, France or Israel, and the USSR accepted the NATO framework for the sharing of US nuclear weapons, including with West Germany (3). Huge arsenals maintained general deterrence against new nuclear weapons programs, as well as extended deterrence to insecure allies, and the deal proved a great success in arresting proliferation. With the end of the Cold War, the US extended the principles of the NPT in order to neutralize former Soviet clientstates. The outlines of a second grand bargain took place between China and the US in the 1990s, with China imposing firm export controls on dual-use technology to the developing world. China agreed to cut-off Iran, but was determined to
maintain its relationship with Pakistan, on which it depends to drawoff Indian security efforts (4). Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program has, since 1974, received important assistance from China, including warhead designs, HEU, scientific testing and training, and missiles technology and production capacity. Although China has reduced its support to Pakistan, primarily because the latter has attained an adequate level of strategic self-sufficiency to deter India, this could be reversed promptly if India were to obtain some technological breakout capacity (5). Any new great power bargain to contain Pakistan will be imperiled by the interests of three pivotal states. China will not reign in Pakistan unless India emulates Pakistani disarmament. India will not submit to any arrangement that puts it into a separate class from the great powers. Saudi Arabia will continue to provide financial, energy and diplomatic support to Pakistan to offset Israel or a future Iran, Egypt, or Turkey. Isolating Pakistan will push it closer under a Chinese strategic nuclear umbrella. US threats to facilitate the countervailing nuclear armament of Japan, Australia or South Korea are incredible because they would cause as much difficulty for the US as China. Even if Pakistan never joined a formal alliance with China, and did not further contribute to nuclear proliferation, its regionally-destabilizing
arsenal would continue along its current maximal growth trajectory. However, to put the arsenal into correct perspective, Pakistan’s will consist primarily of fission or boosted-fission weapons (15 to 50 kiloton yields), but will likely not include mass-produced fusion warheads (megaton range) for at least two decades. Its delivery systems consist of medium range aircraft (F-16s, Mirages, and JF-17s) and the mobile Haft and solid fuelled Shaheen series of missiles, which are likely never to be able to target Europe. Despite the significant destruction it could inflict on India’s cities, the arsenal would remain regional and strategically insignificant as long as they weren’t based outside of Pakistan. So how should the international community approach the problem of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal? Pakistan is quite vulnerable to economic sanctions, because of an array of ad hoc export agreements providing Pakistani goods access to EU and US markets. But the high priority placed on national security in Islamabad means that Pakistan would not likely be dissuaded by sanctions, nor has it historically. Furthermore, these trading arrangements sustain an emerging commercial class, which in turn is believed to create the conditions for a more stable democracy. Another approach is to institutionalize Pakistan’s status as a major non-NATO ally. The outlines of a constructive informal alliance should consist of military to military interaction in the form of ongoing strategic dialogues, perhaps through a permanent NATO agency, joint training, but most importantly operational officer exchanges and student positions at staff colleges. Institutionalizing this constructive engagement of Pakistan’s military would buffet it against the usual political friction typical of Pakistani-Western relations. Nor are weapons sales necessary to sustain this relationship. However, this arrangement would require political will as interest in engaging with Pakistan would inevitably decline with the reduced involvement of NATO in Afghanistan. On the one hand, it seems absurd to
establish such close relations with a nuclear-armed state so allegedly unstable, plagued with militant Islamists, and which has also been accused repeatedly of feeding insurgency in Afghanistan and Indian-occupied Kashmir (6). However, military to military contacts are a particularly effective avenue of influence of Western values to the elites of the security state within Pakistan. This could influence everything from democratization to more humanitarian approaches to counter-insurgency (7). Other less amenable avenues of influence, such as through the mass population, would compete unfavourably with indigenous nationalism and Gulf Arab-funded Islamist movements. The principal national political parties, the PPP and PML-NS, are primarily dynastically-run ethnic groupings, and are preferential towards China and Saudi Arabia, respectively (8). The tribal regions are under active suppression, and the poorest regions of Pakistan, while open to foreign aid efforts, are politically marginalized. The military elite are the most effective and representative national organization in Pakistan, technocratic, and committed to socio-economic development (9). The Western disinclination to engage with Pakistan has a lot to do with its caricature as a both illiberal and religiously extremist state and society. Pakistan certainly has a great many socioeconomic developmental challenges, including entrenched rural feudalism, mistreatment of minorities, and a heavy-handed approach to governance in the outerprovinces. But Pakistan has a great many factors in its favour. Its Sufi-based Barelvi variant of Hanafi Islam remains dominant and tolerant, and is the main reason Pakistani religious parties have far less influence in politics than they do in Egypt, Turkey or Indonesia (10). Democratic political culture in Pakistan is genuine and has widespread support, even within the military. Pakistan has a competent national security bureaucracy, which has preserved stability at the centre despite repeated
existential challenges. A relationship at this level would draw Pakistan away from Chinese, Saudi and Islamist influence, would facilitate further attempts at dialogue to repair the tragedy that is Indo-Pakistani relations, and reduce the security anxiety that is propelling Pakistan’s nuclear build-up. References 1 Toby Dalton and Michael Krepon, A Normal Nuclear Pakistan (Stimson Center, 2015). 2 Dalton and Krepon, 19 3 Julian Schofield, Strategic Nuclear Sharing (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2014), 29-38. 4 “The Robustness of Chinese-Pakistan Alliance Relations,” in Riaz Ahmed Shaikh (ed) Back from the Brink – India-Pakistan Ties Revisited (Karachi: Ushba Publishing International, 2013), 205-259. 5 Julian Schofield, “Pakistan’s Evolving Role in China’s Grand Strategy,” in Donovan Chau and Thomas Kane (eds), China and International Security: History, Strategy, and 21st Century Policy (Westport: Praeger, 2013), Vol.3, 149-166. 6 Julian Schofield, “Diversionary Wars: Pashtun Unrest and the Sources of the Pakistan‐ Afghan Confrontation,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal (March 2011), Vol.17, No.1, 38-49. 7 Julian Schofield, “Pakistan’s Counter-Insurgency Doctrine,” in Paul Rich, and Isabelle Duyvesteyn (eds.) Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency (London: Routledge, 2012), 324-334. 8 Julian Schofield, “The Prospect of a Populist IslamistTakeover of Pakistan,” in Usama Butt and N. Elahi (eds), Escaping Quagmire: Strategy, Security and the Future of Pakistan (New York: Continuum, 2010). 9 Ahmad Faruqui and Julian Schofield, “Pakistan: The Political Economy of Militarism,” Journal of Conflict, Security and Development, Vol. 2, No.2 (2003), 5-23. 10 Julian Schofield and Michael Zekulin, “Appraising the Threat of an Islamist Military Coup in post-OBL Pakistan,” Defense & Security Analysis (December 2011), Vol.27, No.4, 181-192.
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UNDERSTANDING TURKEY'S SYRIAN POLICY: FROM ZERO TO MANY PROBLEMS Dr. Michael B. Bishku is a Professor of Middle Eastern History at Georgia Regents University in Augusta, USA. He has published numerous articles on the diplomatic history and the politics of the region and is the former President of both the American Council for the Study of Islamic Societies and the Association of Third World Studies. He is currently one of the editors for Oxford University Press’ online Bibliographies for Islamic Studies.
Michael B. Bishku
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ecep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Justice and Development (AK) Party came to power in 2002. At the time, relations with Syria had been improving – by reaching accommodation on Kurdish and water issues – after a much checkered history. However, Erdoğan, (formerly prime minister since 2003 and now president since 2014) influenced by the ideas of Professor Ahmet Davutoğlu (formerly foreign minister since 2009 and Erdoğan’s successor as prime minister), desired for Turkey to play a greater role in world affairs and have “zero problems” with all of Turkey’s neighbors. The AK Party publicly professed pro-Western orientations, while seeking greater ties with other states in the Islamic world. As accession talks with the European Union (EU) made insufficient progress, Turkey looked more towards the Middle East as it developed a policy within the region, including in dealings with Iran and Hamas, somewhat independent of the West, just as political relations with Israel began to deteriorate greatly. Despite a promising beginning, Turkey’s relations have become worse with Syria and some other countries in the region. Furthermore, Turkey now has a very
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troubling security situation along its southern land borders and continuing disagreements with the West over how best to deal with the Syrian Kurds, Islamist organizations involved in the Syrian civil war and Assad’s government. At first, Turkey either failed to take the threat of the Islamic State (IS) seriously enough or was fearful of getting involved militarily and later it was accused by Kurdish factions of attempting to conflate its troubles with the Turkish Kurds of the Kurdish Workers’ Party or PKK – and their Syrian brethren of the Democratic Union Party or YDP – with those of the IS. What factors and influences have contributed to the current situation? 1) Erdoğan’s personality and his desire to concentrate power through a presidential system; 2) The AKP’s increasingly Islamist agenda and; 3) The continuing preoccupation of all Turkish governments of maintaining a unitary state and the protection of its borders; all of its Middle Eastern neighbors – Syria, Iraq and Iran – have Kurdish populations with varying degrees of nationalist aspirations. While Davutoğlu tends to be more pragmatic, Erdoğan possesses a “gambler’s mentality” in making and carrying out policy. Turkey will be having another round of parliamentary elections in November 2015 following the breakdown of negotiations with the PKK and the
AKP’s failure to form a coalition government, as the Turkish president believes that it will result in his party achieving a majority in parliament by taking a strong stand against the PKK and their Syrian brethren. Never mind the fact that prior to the last election in June 2015, Erdoğan felt confident of gaining an absolute majority necessary to change the Turkish Constitution to allow for a strong presidential system by trying to woo the Kurds with piecemeal cultural concessions to support the AKP, instead many voted for the Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP). Even though Turkey still has a parliamentary system, Erdoğan is the final decision-maker in both domestic and foreign policy. Furthermore, the Turkish president, unlike his prime minister, who speaks English, German and Arabic, knows no foreign languages, but has been quite a popular politician especially appealing to devout Muslims who have felt marginalized by previous secular governments in Turkey as well as small businessmen who have benefitted from a generally growing economy and increasing opportunity for trade and investment, especially with Turkey’s neighbors. Yet he is also very arrogant and tends to personalize his relations, feeling betrayed when world leaders either refuse to take his advice or
engage in actions for which he disapproves. During the first decade of the 21st century, Erdoğan and Assad took family vacations together. The Turkish leader was pleased that the Kurdish issue no longer stood between the two countries and that economic relations were expanding. However, with the coming of the Arab Spring to Syria in 2011, Assad’s reluctance to reform despite Erdoğan’s entreaties to do so, and his subsequent brutal treatment especially of Syria’s predominantly Sunni Muslim population, Erdoğan and his government called for Assad’s removal from power, which they believed would be swift as was the case with Tunisia’s Ben-Ali and Egypt’s Mubarak. Aside from his dealings with Syria in the past, Erdoğan has misjudged the consequences of his actions, such as the Israel’s reaction to the Mavi Marmara’s attempt in 2010 to break its blockade of Gaza, and is reluctant to admit mistakes. However, he has been known to change course for what he perceives to be in Turkey’s best interests or those of the AKP. The AKP favored the Sunni Islamist Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, with whom it has political ties, but radical Islamist parties in that country have had a greater impact being able to challenge Assad’s regime militarily. On the humanitarian side, Turkey has done more than any other Middle Eastern country for the mostly Sunni Syrian refugees. It reportedly has spent $6 billion for their care – the U.S. is the second largest donor contributing $4 billion – and believes that perhaps as many as 1.9 million Syrians eventually will seek refuge in Turkey. Some Syrians have been allowed to work, attend school and receive medical care, but other refugees who can afford to pay smugglers have transited through Turkey and made the short trip to the Greek islands offshore, hoping to gain asylum in Western European countries. Meanwhile, until recently, the Turkish government has remained somewhat
complacent about radical Islamist activities, even on their territory if actions were not directed at Turkey. IS recruits traveled through Turkey on their way to Syria or Iraq. While Turkey is now becoming more proactive with airstrikes against the IS, just as in the U.S. and other countries in the Middle East, there is no public support for ground operations. Also, negotiations between the conflicting parties in the Syrian civil war appear to be currently unfeasible. All Turkish governments have been committed to maintaining a unitary state and with having stability on Turkey’s borders. Turkey has come to accept begrudgingly Kurdish autonomy in Iraq and indeed has benefitted economically from investments in that region and from oil sales, but some of its actions have disturbed the Iraqi government, which does not want to see Assad removed from power. Nevertheless, while Turkey supports the territorial integrity of Iraq as it does Syria, it regards Kurdish autonomy in principle as a bad precedent, and something that would never be offered to its own Kurdish population. Furthermore, Syrian rebels supported by the United States have accused Turkey of cooperation with Jabhat al-Nusra, an al-Qaida affiliate, while Turkish officials have criticized the U.S. for coordinating its bombing campaign in northern Syria with Kurdish forces fighting there against the IS and it feels that those same forces have not opposed the Syrian government’s army. Nevertheless, by late August 2015, Turkish fighter jets finally joined the U.S.-led air campaign against the IS, having the previous month allowed the U.S. to use Incirlik airbase following a suicide bombing in Suruç, Turkey, blamed on the IS. While Turkey could have done more to stop the flow of recruits to the IS, clamped down on radical Islamist activities within its territory immediately, and joined the air campaign sooner, it cannot become
involved in a ground campaign without the assistance of other Middle Eastern countries nor, if such is the case, is there any easy way once in Syria to ensure that Turkey does not become involved in conflict there with the Kurds. There is also the problem of finding reliable Syrian parties to assist militarily or adequate means to bring about a negotiated settlement, whatever that may be. Previous attempts have failed miserably and the IS’s participation in conflict has further complicated matters. The Syrian civil war has left perhaps 250,000 people dead and displaced more than 11 million people and there is no end in sight. Turkey’s best course is to cooperate as well as it can with its Middle Eastern neighbors and its Western allies to arrive at a coordinated policy that addresses adequately an end to the conflict and will bring stability to Syria. No one seems to have an answer for that problem and fighting could go on until all parties in the conflict no longer wish to engage each other militarily as was the case in Lebanon’s civil war from 1975-1990. Erdoğan’s personality may be wellsuited to getting political support in elections and may have street appeal not only in Turkey, but also in other parts of the Muslim world. However, Turkey is part of NATO, whose member states might have declared the PKK a terrorist organisation, but given the changing conditions in the Middle East, support is turning in favor of the Kurds. Turkey needs to reestablish a ceasefire with the PKK and negotiate in good faith towards some form of autonomy, the only status the Kurds will accept after many years of conflict. At the same time, Turkey needs to continue to help the West in its fight against the IS and not do anything to interfere with the efforts of the Syrian Kurds, whose Peoples’ Defense Units (YPG) are the only party that has been successful in ground operations against the IS.
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