ANALYSIS Uncertainties over the Northern Ireland Protocol

analysis

WIDE IRISH SEA

UNCERTAINTIES OVER THE NORTHERN IRELAND PROTOCOL

BY TAMÁS MAGYARICS

Europe has had to navigate in rough waters for some time. No matter how you spin Brexit, the short-sighted and time-serving leadership of the European Union had its fair share in the decision of the majority in the U.K. to leave the Union. It was bad news for the EU that the hard Brexiteers got into power after the 2019 general election in the U.K. They have been putting pressure on PM Boris Johnson to reinterpret – and, possibly, to renegotiate – the Northern Ireland Protocol of the Withdrawal Agreement ever since. One of the most essential reasons for the Protocol is to retain the political achievements of the Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement, which has been instrumental in putting an end to the Troubles, the decade-long bloody sectarian fight between the Catholic and Protestant communities of Ulster, i.e. Northern Ireland. In fact, the Agreement was more than that: it was also to settle a number of outstanding issues between Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland. In short, the stability and the security of the whole region was – and is – at stake.

Sticking to the words of the Agreement or not

The carefully balanced applecart was upset by the Johnson government. The Protocol, wishing to avoid the reinstatement of a ’hard’ border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland with all its security and political implications, provided that Northern Ireland should remain within the EU single market regime; in short, there would not be new checks on goods crossing the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. This provision provoked strong reactions among the ’hard’ unionists on both sides of the Irish Sea. They fear that this continuing economic and trade integration in the EU would ultimately result in Ulster’s joining the Republic of Ireland and therefore, in the destruction of the United Kingdom. The ’hard’ Brexiteers in Britain, as well as the committed unionists in Ulster, practically the followers of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) (the other major unionist party, the UUP is more moderate in questions related to the Protocol and the British attempts to modify it unilaterally). The Conservative government is determined to keep Northern Ireland within the British trade and customs zone. The measure is technically violating the Withdrawal Agreement, and London is engaged in an ongoing debate with Brussels in this question. London, personally, among others, Foreign Secretary Liz Truss came up with a sort of compromise solution with a ’green’ channel for goods to stay in Northern Ireland; these items would be subject to UK regulations and standards, and a ’red’ one for goods which would go to the Republic of Ireland, i.e., to the EU, and they would be treated as items entering the EU single market from a ’third country.’ (For instance, if the U.K. is treated as a ’third country’, agricultural prices could go up 10%, while the price of dairy products as high as 35%.) Besides the potential political implications, the financial costs of customs formalities are also a matter of concern for the British and the Northern Irish alike. The EU is determined to stick to the words of the Agreement. However, there is a loophole for the British government. Article 16 of the Agreement allows safeguard measures if the Protocol is leading to serious "economic, societal or environmental difficulties." Hard Brexiteers, such as Brexit Opportunities Minister Jacob Rees Mogg and, in general, Tory politicians around the European Research Group, argue that the Protocol is a ’constitutional’ and ’cultural’ threat to the U.K., and to ’peace’ and ’stability’ for the whole region. The Tory government has indicated that it would introduce a bill to dismantle the Protocol. So far, it has not made good on this promise, but a growing dissatisfaction among the Tory backbenchers might push PM Johnson to introduce the bill in the Commons in order to prevent a vote of no confidence on this matter within his own party.

New set-up in the Stormont

The situation is complicated by the results of the recent Northern Ireland Assembly election on May 5. For the first time in decades, it has been the Sinn Féin that has gained a plurality in the 90-member body with 27 seats, while the DUP, which enjoyed this position for a long time, has come only second with 25 representatives. The DUP is closely allied with the Conservatives in Britain, and is supporting the Johnson government’s attempts at changing the Protocol. Sinn Féin – and the EU, including the Irish government in Dublin – would have none of it. The Good Friday Agreement, among others, provides for cross-community consent in specific cases, including the election of the Speaker of the Assembly, but the DUP is blocking the nomination, and – by implication – the restoration of devolved power to the Stormont from London. The party, led by Jeffrey Donaldson, does not wish to suffer the fate of the UUP, which was punished by the unionist voters at the Assembly election for its perceived soft position on the revision of the Protocol. If no solution is found within 24 weeks, then Northern Ireland Secretary Brandon Lewis has another 12 weeks to call a new election in Ulster – practically sometime late October 2022. The political fight is likely to threaten the sometimes rather frail truce between the Catholics (in general, the republicans), and the Protestants (whose great majority is unionist), and one of the potential outcomes might be the collapse of the Good Friday Agreement.

Uncertain outlook

The situation is deadlocked to a large extent. It is true that the Protocol can be removed by a majority vote of the Stormont Assembly in 2024 – that is, if London’s and Belfast’s intention coincide. However, the majority of the current MLAs (Members of the Legislative Assembly), namely 53 out of 90, are in favor of meeting the conditions of the Protocol. If a new election were to be held later this year because of the impasse over the appointment of the Speaker, there might be newly party realignments – with potentially new problems. The Irish Sea, figuratively, might become narrower or wider.