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um- m:^
Z-r-
(S[otmil
MmucrBttg Exhtarg JItlfaca,
Ncm ^nrk
WORDSWORTH COLLECTION MADE BY
CYNTHIA MORGAN ITHACA. N.
ST.
JOHN
Y.
THE GIFT OF
VICTOR EMANUEL CLASS OF 1919
1925
SPINOZA
SPINOZA AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
BY
Sir
FREDERICK POLLOCK, BARRISTER-AT-LAW
:
Bart.
LATE FELLOW OF TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE
:
HON. LL.D. OF THE UNIVERSITIES OF EDINBURGH, DUBLIN, AND
HARVARD
:
CORRESPONDING MEMBER OF THE INSTITUTE
OF FRANCE
:
IN
CORPUS PROFESSOR OF JURISPRUDENCE
THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD
SECOND EDITION
'
Wehseele. komtn, uns %u durchdringen
Dann
!
mit dem Weltgeist selbst %u ringen,
Wird unsrer Krdfte Hochberuf. Theilnehmend fiihren gute Gehter^ Gelinde leitend^ hochste Meister,
Zu
dem, der
alles schafft
Goethe
:
LONDON: DUCKWORTH AND NEW YORK: THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
MDCCCXCIX
3a
und schuf
'
Eins und Alles.
CO.
A
fe>
s
i
1
{The rights of translatio7i and of reproauction are reserved)
or o O
i-V^
yw' /
-^t
TO THE MEMORY OF
MY FRIEND
WILLIAM KINGDON CLIFFORD HOMO
LIBER
DE NULLA RE MINUS
QUAM DE MORTE COGITAT
'"&/
"^
The
Cornell University Library
original of this
book
is in
the Cornell University Library.
There are no known copyright
restrictions in
the United States on the use of the
text.
http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924104091370
INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION The
purpose of this book
account, of the
complete in
fairly
life
itself
understood by those
who
which
been
the
my
scale,
aims, in the
first
have not made a
to
first
some who already know
Van
and bibliographical matter
der
Nothing
present
day.
Museum
The
first
edition
the appendix to the
catalogue
guide
be
(now
special
libraries)
will
literature
of the subject.
remains title
if desired,
few items of
it
:
is
supplement
accessible
in
Spinoza in the
also accessible in print in
students,
A
Spinoxa
adequate, and
to undertake such a
leisure
short of a
Linde's Benedictus
(The Hague, 1871) would powers and
have not thought
this edition I
to reproduce the critical
public Hbraries, and British
adequate
hope, expressed in the
formerly collected in this place.
I
Bihliografie
at
In
fulfilled.
complete supplement to
beyond
my
an
readers
hand, and even to critical students of philosophy,
at first
desirable
but
;
might be of some use
it
has, I believe, it
fairly
It
special study of the subject
Spinoza
and on a
and philosophy of Spinoza.
instance, at being
edition, that
to put before English
is
to
special
the
many recent
interest
to
English readers have, however, been worked into the body of the
must make one exception to my rule to mention that Renan's commemorative address on Spinoza, which is a classical
book.
I
piece of literature,
is
now
reprinted in Nouvelles Etudes d''Histoire
Religieuse^ Paris, 1884, p. 499.
The
appendices to the
first
edition, except the English version
— SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
viii
AND PHILOSOPHY
of Colerus, are likewise omitted as being partly superseded and their to warrant partly without sufficient general interest
confirmed by the publication of Prof. FreudenthaPs full collection of documents (see below). The standard edition of Spinoza's works by Van Vloten and
This decision
reproduction.
now
is
Land (The Hague, 1882-83,
2
a
in
also
vols.:
and ones, and
handier
cheaper form, 1895, 3 vols.) has superseded all earlier makes it needless to enumerate the sources of the additional
materials
embodied
convenient to mention the their order of publication 1.
in
first
its
But
text.
it
may
editions of the several
various
be
still
works
in
:
Renati des Cartes Principiorum Philosophiae pars
I
h
II,
more geometrico demonstratae per Benedictum de Spinoza Amstelodamensem. Accesserunt ejusdem cogitata metaphysica, Amsterdam, 1663. etc. 2.
Tractatus
aliquot,
Theologico-politicus,
dissertationes
quibus ostenditur libertatem philosophandi non tantum
salva pietate et reipublicae
cum
continens
pace posse concedi
pace reipublicae ipsaque pietate
tolli
non
:
sed
eandem
nisi
Hamburg Spinoza's own to posse.
Amsterdam), 1670. Some notes of this treatise came to light later, and are printed as an appendix in ed. Van Vloten and Land. Dr. Land found that there were than four distinct less issues of no the first edition, distinguishable by typographical variations. Posthuma. Amsterdam, 1677. The 3. B. d. S. Opera (really
contents are
:
Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata. Tractatus politicus. Tractatus de intellectus emendatione. Epistolae
doctorum quorundam virorum ad B.
d.
et
S.
auctoris responsiones.^
Compendium grammatices Hnguae 4.
(Tractatus
de
Iride.)
hebraeae.
Stelkonstige
reeckening van
den
The Hague,
Regenboog. 1687. This work was long lost sight of and supposed 1
Spinoza's letters are
Van Vloten and Land.
now
referred to in the completed
to
have
and amended order of
ed.
INTRODUCTION
ix
In 1704 the publisher of the Opp, Posth. professed to believe that it existed only in MS. But it is by no means clear perished.
that he
Die
meant
to tell his questioners
Lebensgesch, Spinoza
s^
p.
Ad
Benedicti
supplementum.
By
Dr.
Supplementum
of
version
Spinoza opera
a
purports,
Latin
original
produced a copy of the Ethics^ which
6.
The
omnia
supersunt
quae
it
it is
no doubt truly, to be which has disappeared Opp. Posth^
of the
is
— wrongly described an having been written not — as
and parts of
/.c.],
letters
;
said
Dutch though to
have
in
Dutch by
the Treatise on the RainboWy
not before published.
Dutch
contemporary
a
early draft of
as
Spinoza himself: Freudenthal, letters
(see below).
Contains Spinoza's early Essay on
[this
Rieuwertsz., the publisher
and some
recovered and
Amsterdam, 1862. van Vloten.
J.
Man
God and
de
he knew (Freudenthal,
The book was
227).
reprinted by Dr. van Vloten in his 5.
all
of
translation
Opera
the
Posthuma [De Nagelate Schriften van B. d. S. etc.) appears to have been executed from Spinoza's own MSS., and is for some purposes an original authority. Bruder's edition (1843-46) ones, but
is
is
the best of the older collected
neither complete nor very accurately printed.
I
have,
however, preserved the references to the sections introduced, I believe, by Bruder in some of the works, as they may possibly still
be of use to readers
who
There was no complete
possess that edition.
or adequate
English translation of
book was first published. We have now translations of the chief works (the letters, however, being freely abridged) by R. H. M. Elwes, London, 1883-84, and of the Ethics (2nd ed. London, 1894), and the De Intell. Emend, (1895), by Mr. W. Hale White and Miss A. Hutchison Stirling. The last-named version (now, 1899, reissued by the publishers of this Spinoza when
volume)
is
this
rather the
more elegant
;
both are trustworthy.
book by Johannes Colerus (Kohler), German minister of the Lutheran This congregation, existing side by congregation at the Hague. side with the Dutch Reformed Church in freedom and security
The
chief authority for Spinoza's
much beyond any
rights
officially
life
is
the
allowed to
little
it,
was to some
;
SPINOZA
X
HIS LIFE
:
extent under the protection of
AND PHILOSOPHY
German Lutheran
convenience of Germans residing
for the
service of the States or otherwise, there
and,
;
Hague in the German minister as
at the
was a
by Colerus from 1693 usage of a bilingual ministry was kept up till 1832,
well as a
Dutch
to 1707.
The
when
last
the
princes
This
one.
German
office
was
filled
Colerus
pastor died.
published his
first
life
of Spinoza in Dutch, together with a controversial sermon against
This original edition, though Spinozism (Amsterdam, 1705). It not quite so rare as was once supposed, is still extremely rare. was almost immediately followed, and for all practical purposes supplanted, by a French version (La verite de la resurrection de Jdsus Christ defendue contre B. de Spinoza et ses spectateurs
Avec
[sectateurs].
ses propres Ecrits,
de
que de
la
Par Jean Colerus, Ministre de TEglise Haye. The Hague, 1706. Bibliogr. 90.)
qui Font connu.
foi
Lutherienne de
la
This French version of the accurate, see Freudenthal, it
to be found in
is
French
Prat's
which
p.
is
An
—which unfortunately been 250 — times life
is
has
far
from
reprinted
several
Paulus' edition of Spinoza, in Saisset's and
translations,
of the Letters. year,
fameux philosophe, tiree, tant de bouche de plusieurs personnes dignes
vie de ce
la
and
at the
end of Dr. Ginsberg's edition
English translation of
it
appeared in the same
reprinted at the end of this book, and a
German
one in 1723, remarkable for a portrait of Spinoza, in the lettering of which he is described as "characterem reprobationis in vultu gerens."
There was
Dutch,
1734.
cleared
up
What
a later
Many
since, but
German
details
have
been
Colerus remains
Spinoza, but
He
from the original
added,
corrected,
or
the principal authority.
gives his witness a singular value
suspicion of designed panegyric.
even
translation
is
its
freedom from
all
detests the philosophy of
too honest to slander his character as a man or admiration for it. The original was reprinted in 1880, and is now accessible in Prof. Freudenthars is
to conceal his
at the
Hague
the German version there given appears to book (see below) be new. There is another contemporary biography of Spinoza, attributed in the preface to one Lucas, a physician of the Hague it cannot ;
;
be exactly dated, but
it
seems to have been current in
MS.
before
INTRODUCTION the end of the seventeenth century.
common
the
La
title
a certain Traite des
V esprit
vie et
xi
was often associated, under de Mr. Benoit de Spinosa^ with It
which has nothing to do with Spinoza, and is again distinct from the Latin book De tribus impostoribus^ though it pretends to be from a Latin original. In this form the Hfe was printed at Amsterdam in 17 19, in a pubhcation called Nouvelles Litteraires^ and also in a separate book with several variations and some additions, for which see Prof. Freudenthal's collation. The book was almost immediately called in; the life was reissued alone at Hamburg [?], 1735, and this edition also became very scarce (the British Museum has a copy).^ Meanwhile the Count de Boulainvilliers, who possessed an early MS. copy, had worked it up with the life by Colerus into a not very coherent whole ^( La vie de Spinosa ecrite par AI. yean Colerus augment/e de beaucoup de particularity tirees d'une vie manuscrite de ce philosophe^ faite par un de ses amis) in his book called a refutation of Spinoza, but really a popular exposition, which was published after the author's death (Brussels trois imposteurs^
.
.
.
In Van der Linde's Bibliogr. 107, the date 73 1. as 1726 by the misprint of XXVI. for XXXL). [?],
The
additions in Boulainvilliers, and
omitted by him (these from a edition as
Colerus,
MS.
some
given
is
1
passages of Lucas
copy), are given in
Paulus'
and Lucas, as well as the French ; by the reprinted modern French translators above
footnotes to Colerus is
mentioned. All the early authorities and materials for Spinoza's
ing some unpubHshed matter) have
and admirably edited Lebensgeschichte
nichtamtlichen
me,
this
by Prof.
Spinoza^s
Nachrichten
.
(1899) been collected Freudenthal of Breslau [Die
^uellen-schriften^
in
.
.
(includ-
life
now
herausgegeben).
Urkunden Unluckily
und for
volume, henceforth indispensable to students of Spinoza,
came out
after this present edition
had been some weeks in the
have been unable to profit fully by it. " As to Lucas," nobody seems really to know or to have ever
printer's hands, so that I
1 (le
At
M.
blank.
the foot of
de Spinosa,"
p.
47
is
the catchword
which followed on
p.
49
L'ESPRIT,
belonging to the
in the original
issue
title
of 17 19,
p.
"L'Esprit
48 being
SPINOZA
xii
HIS LIFE
:
known anything about him, and
it is
not clear that there was any-
the other hand, the book was attributed by an
On
such person.
AND PHILOSOPHY
annotator of the second quarter of the eighteenth century Glain,
St.
Politicus,
French translator of the
the
" Lucas," or
confused panegyrist
to
De
Theologico-
Glain, writes like an ardent and rather but Mr. Meinsma's re-examination in the
;
and
light of both old
Tractatus
^
St.
new
evidence goes to
show
that he
knew
more about the earlier period of Spinoza's life than Colerus, and must be accepted, notwithstanding his strong anti-clerical bias and extravagant manner, as a co-ordinate and sometimes superior
his
authority for that period at any rate. thal
[Lehensgesch,
Sp^s.^
unnaturally gone a
little
treatment of this work.
that
240)
p.
agree with Prof. Freuden-
I
Mr. Meinsma
has
not
too far in reaction against the former Prof. Freudenthal also reports a recent
attempt to identify the author with one Johan Louckers of the
Hague, Van der Spyck's lawyer, which he considers ingenious The total absence of any trace of a Dutch but not convincing. original or version seems against
The
work
it.
(K. O. Meinsma, Spinoza en zijn Kring^ 's-Gravenhage, 1896) collects and reviews all, or very nearly all, the available information about Spinoza's life and recent
surroundings
just alluded to
— including the
results of the author's
and elsewhere
in local archives
— with
own
such industry and
research critical
thoroughness that the remaining minor and miscellaneous sources can no longer be separately enumerated with advantage. Any
one
who wants
them
for himself must now use Mr. Meinsma's work, whether he is afraid of learning Dutch or not. I have endeavoured to profit by the valuable corrections, additions and conjectures with which this book abounds. It is not
superseded, in
to verify
my
which, however,
a
most
by
Prof.
Freudenthal's
useful supplement,
collection
and gives
German
to the character of the anecdotic reports about
Spinoza
translations of
As
opinion,
all
is
the
Dutch documents.
preserved in letters and diaries of various persons
I
entirely ap;ree
with Prof. Freudenthal's judicious remarks (p. 301 of his book). These stories must be used with caution, but we cannot afford to ^
Meinsma,
p. xvi.
INTRODUCTION neglect
them
mention
to
now
there
altogether.
xiii
have not thought
I
it
needful, however,
of them, for some are too obviously absurd ; and even less reason for it, as the matter, formerly scattered
all
is
over a dozen or more books, of which few were
some were
rare,
now brought
is
together in a handy form in
one volume, besides
Prof. Freudenthal's
his
additions, and the reader can easily consult
What Mr. Meinsma
common and
it
hitherto unprinted for himself.
has done for Spinoza's relations to his
contemporaries in general was done some years earlier for his rela-
some other incidental correcLeibniz und Spinoza^ Berlin, 1890.
tions to Leibnitz in particular (with
by Dr. Stein
tions)
The now
is
in his
history, both earlier
much
was
my
later,
exhaustively to
collected,
Grunwald [Spinoza So
and
Deutschland^ Berlin, 1897). as to recent contributions to the facts.
plain duty to take account.
many
appearance, by Dr.
Max
in
ence of revising work dealing with of
all
Germany
of Spinozism in
Of
Those who have had
many
these
it
experi-
an interval
details after
years will be ready to forgive any shortcomings or over-
looked inconsistencies.
As
to matters of speculative opinion, or merely probable inter-
pretation of Spinoza's opinions, the case
undertake to revise
my
all
Moreover,
posal, or likely to be.
later
my
opinions to
readers
my
could not
I
the meritorious contributions of recent
more
writers to the subject, without far
or any of
different.
estimate of Spinoza's philosophy as a whole,
or to examine and weigh
all
is
I
leisure
is
at
my
dis-
should have no assurance that
would agree with
earlier
than
me
in preferring
ones in case of difference.
I
my have
therefore confined myself to adding a few explanatory and supple-
mentary passages, and altering such parts of the text as appeared to me, on returning to them, clearly erroneous or misleading. The most considerable changes are in the chapter on the Tractatus Politicus. I know, or ought to know, Hobbes better than I did in 1880, and have now tried to do him better justice on some points
which have
to be considered with regard to Spinoza's
modi-
fication of his doctrine.
most authentic portrait of Spinoza, unknown to me when wrote this book, is at Wolfenbiittel, and a not very good
The I
first
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
xiv
copy of
it
is
at the
Hague.
AND PHILOSOPHY
A photographic
reproduction of
it is
prefixed to Dr. Martineau's excellent Study of Spinoza (noticed by
me
in
Mind^
viii.
one to the second
The
may add in passing), and an engraved volume of Van Vloten and Land's edition.
104,
I
old engraving prefixed to
some
which was reproduced in my first edition, is now derived from this. The publisher, Rieuwertszoon, have said that
it
0pp. Posth, thought to be
copies of the
was executed three or four years
is
reported to
after Spinoza's
But the miniature which belonged to the late Queen of the Netherlands (reproduced by chromolithography in Schaarschmidt's edition of the early treatise De Deo death (Freudenthal,
et
Ho?nine)
is
p.
232).
independent, and
may
be genuine.
mixed pleasure and sadness in going back upon an adventure now twenty years old. Most of my leaders and companions in it are gone my friend Dr. Land of Leyden, an admirable scholar, quite lately and a new generation of workers in
There
is
;
;
philosophy, as in other learning, has sprung up and its
or as
own
must work
in
men may not always be able to learn appreciate. It is enough for us if we are sometimes remembered having done what we could to clear the path for our successors. ways, which older
ADDENDA A
P. 43.
story of Spinoza having behaved contemptuously
grace was said p. 221),
missed
dinner to which he was invited
so contrary to the
Is
as
at a
due either
Freudenthal,
{ap.
may be disnow inexplioffence may have
weight of evidence that
it
malignant invention, or to some
to
cable misunderstanding. really
when
One
can conceive that the
been the other way.
P. 114. intellectus
There
is
a very recent
the
Tractatus de
too late for
me
to
I
Freudenthal's opinion that there
formerly recognized, finds
Maimonides and ahead
com-
owe to Dr. Freudenthal. It was, unfortunately, make use of it. The learned author confirms Dr.
munication of which
difficulties
monograph on
emendatione by Dr. Ismar Elbogen (Breslau, 1898), the
finishing the work.
is
a greater
evidence oi
scholastic
Hebrew
element than
influence from
and thinks that probably the perception of much as want of time prevented Spinoza from
others, as
new
CONTENTS [Note.
— Throughout
this Table and the Index the abbreviation Sp. used for Spinoza, except where it might be ambiguous?^
//
INTRODUCTION PAGE
Preliminary Sp.'s
Works
vii :
original publications
vii
ix
editions
English translations Authorities for Sp.'s
ix
ix
life
Portraits of Sp.
xiii
CHAPTER
I
THE LIFE OF SPINOZA Birth of Sp.
The
.
Jewish Settlement
Their leaders
:
at
Amsterdam
Manasseh ben
3
6
Israel
Uriel da Costa
7
State of Jewish education
youth Van den Ende Story of Clara van den Ende Difficulties with the synagogue Attempt on Sp.'s life excommunication Change of name lawsuit with sisters Changes of residence Friendship and correspondence with Simon de Vries The brothers Koerbagh Friendship with Oldenburg Correspondence as to publication of his works Sp.'s training in
:
:
:
.
.
The
Principles of Descartes' Philosophy published
9 lO 13 15
i6 19
20 22 23 25 26
29
xviii
SPINOZA
HIS LIFE
:
AND PHILOSOPHY PAGS
The
Tract atus Theologico-P oliticus published Controversy, and prohibition of the book
30 32
Invitation to Heidelberg declined French invasion of 1672 Sp.'s visit to Conde's quarters
33
:
Plan of publishing Ethics abandoned Leibnitz's
visit to
Death of Sp.
Sp.
35 36
37 39
.
.
Publication of Opera Posthuma Sp.'s manner of life
4.1
42
CHAPTER
II
spinoza's correspondence
Letters not strictly philosophical the subject of this chapter Sp. questioned by Blyenbergh on origin of evil
44
His reply, and further correspondence Reason and Scripture Anthropomorphism of theology Close of the correspondence Letter to Peter Balling on omens Hugo Boxel on ghosts Sp. on perfections of divine nature Letter on an alchemical experiment Reply to Van Velthuysen's criticism on Tractatus Theologico
46 49
P oliticus
..... .... ..... ...... ....
view of religion Later correspondence with Van Velthuysen as to publication Correspondence with Leibnitz With Tschirnhausen Letter from Albert Burgh on his conversion to Church of Rome Sp.'s answer Sp.'s general
.... ....... CHAPTER
IDEAS
AND SOURCES OF
Part
/.
50
54 55 58 61
62
65 68
69 70
75
m
SPINOZa's PHILOSOPHY
— 'Judaism and Neo-Platonism
Philosophy must renounce rinality Ideas permanent, not systems Leading ideas of Sp. uniformity Identity of body and mind (monism) .
:
45
76 79 80 80
CONTENTS
XIX PAGE
82
Self-preserving effort (natural law) General view of sources of these ideas Uniformity the Essay on God and Man
8+
:
Not
Cartesian in metaphysics
85
.
metaphysics developed from theology Jewish theologico-philosophical authors
87 87 88 89 92
Sp.'s
Maimonides Chasdai Crcskas Alleged influence of Kabbalah on Sp. Possible allusions to
it
in Sp.
94 96
.
Giordano Bruno and Avicebron Points of resemblance in Bruno and Sp.
Part II.
—
98
Descartes
Influence on Sp. most important in physics Sp/s " things immediately produced by God "
.
....
Motion and Rest treated
as things
Descartes' axiom of conservation o^ quantity of motio?i
His consequent errors
Aim
of his physical speculations of Descartes Derivation of principle of self-conservation from Descartes Sp.'s gradual divergence from Descartes in psychology Sp.'s criticism
.
SPINOZA
XX
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
:
....
Sp.'s definition includes explanation
"Eternal things"
.
.
.
.
modes" of
Identified with "infinite
Ethics
•
•
PAGE
138 140 142
CHAPTER V THE NATURE OF THINGS
and terms
State of philosophical ideas Sp.'s geometrical
Definitions of Ethics^ Part Sp.'s causa sui
in Sp.'s time
method i
and conception of Cause
145 147 148 149
Substance
151
Attributes
152 154
Modes Infinity of Attributes
.
156
Parallelism of Attributes Difficulties of Sp.'s theoryImplicit idealism of the system Kant's approximation .
Summary Sp, on infinity notions of time, measure, and number Sp.'s " aids of the imagination " not Kantian
On
Note on the
Infinite
Modes
CHAPTER
162 165 167 169 170 174 175
VI
BODY AND MIND
The
doubleness of experience Subject and Object, Mind and Matter Theories of relation between Mind and Matte Sp.'s account Complexity of human mind Doctrine of association .
Confused knowledge and error Universals Degrees of knowledge Sp.'s
No
.
determinism
distinct faculties of
Will and judgment Automatism of body
mind
.
177 178 179 180 182 183 184 187 187 189 191 191
193
CONTENTS
XXI PAGE
Advantages of necessarianism according No distinct theory of perception in Sp.
CHAPTER
to Sp.
VII
THE NATURE OF MAN Preface to Part
3
of Ethics
xxii
SPINOZA
HIS LIFE
:
AND PHILOSOPHY
CHAPTER
IX
..... .... .... ..... .... ..... .... "... ..... ... THE DELIVERANCE OF MAN
The power of reason Criticism of Descartes' physical theory of will Division of Part 5 of Ethics
.
The government of the passions The use of moral precepts The love of God The eternity of the mind
Aristotelian and Averroist doctrines of immortality Sp.'s
argument
;
Gersonide
Discussion of his meaning The mind's knowledge "under the form of eternity" The " intellectual love of God
.
Return to physical aspect concurrent development of body and mind Morality independent of eternity of mind Virtue its own reward :
.... .
Conclusion of the Ethics
.
PAGE
CONTENTS CHAPTER
xxni
XI
SPINOZA AND THEOLOGY PAGE
Theology and philosophy
318 319
Sp.'s personal position
Criticism of theological doctrines in Ethics^ Part God's action
I
:
320
.... ....
Things could not have been otherwise Deity and moral law
321
323 325 328 329 330 331 333 334 335 337 340 342
.
Final causes
God The
as
conceived by Sp.
"infinite understanding".
Personality Sp.'s
pantheism
Sp. on historical revelations The voice from Sinai .
Revelation in general Religion and morality Sp. on pre-eminence of Christ .
.
Sp.'s letters to
Religion
as
Oldenburg on the Resurrection
guide of
life for
the unlearned
CHAPTER SPINOZA AND MODERN
Nature of
344
XII
THOUGHT
Sp.'s influence
.
.... .... ....
Early controversy in Netherlands Spinozistic heresies in the
Leenhof
Reformed Church
Cartesian opposition ; attitude of Leibnitz Slight notice by English philosophers English theological criticism .
French writers on Sp. Voltaire Boulainvilliers
Montesquieu's knowledge of Sp. Lessing's vindication of Sp.
Conversation with Jacobi
Goethe
Later recognition of Sp. in Post-Kantian philosophers
Germany
necessity o
.
XXIV
SPINOZA
:
HIS LIFE
AND PHILOSOPHY PAGE
375 377 378 379
Coleridge Study of Sp. in England Shelley's intended translation Later English criticism Study of Sp. in France Bicentenary commemoration in Holland :
.
379
APPENDIX The
Life of Spinoza by Colerus
INDEX
....
.
383
•
419
SPINOZA HIS LIFE
AND PHILOSOPHY CHAPTER
I
THE LIFE OF SPINOZA Q,uae
cum magna modis
multis miranda videtur
gentibus humanis regio visendaque fertur, rebus opima bonis, multa munita virum
vi,
tamen hoc habuisse viro praeclarius in se nee sanctum magis et mirum carumque videtur. nil
Lucretius, It
hood
came
}
and
to this, that they
women
went
to the
^adhi and
i.
testified against
726.
me
of unbeliever-
got upon the roofs and cast unclean things upon me.
Abu
Sa'/d, ap.
Tennyson, notes
to "
Akbar's Dream."
born at Amsterdam on the 24th of His parents were members of the community
Baruch de Spinoza was November
1632.
of Jewish emigrants from Portugal and Spain which had then been
estabhshed in the Netherlands for something more than a generation.
One Abraham
settled there
d'Espinoza, possibly Baruch's grandfather,
about the end of the sixteenth century.
Baruch's
was named Michael, and came from Figueira near Coimbra He was thrice married Baruch was a child of the in Portugal. The other children who grew up were two second marriage. daughters, Rebecca by the first marriage and Miriam by the
-father
3
second.
The
house in Amsterdam where Michael
and Hanna Debora
his
d'Espinoza
second wife were hving at the date of B
SPINOZA
2
now
Baruch's birth cannot Spinoza's
life, it
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
:
may
be identified.
be not amiss to
let
Before
we
enter on
our attention rest for a
while on the society in which he was brought up, the vicissitudes of its foundation and growth, and the tone of thought and
Something we may there which prevailed in it.^ find to throw hght on the manner in which the early signs of Spinoza's philosophical genius were received by his own instruction
though we
people,
be disappointed
shall assuredly
of education or
external circumstances
if
we
look in
study, in the influence
of masters or companions either Jewish or Gentile, for an exIt was well said of an Indian planation of that genius itself.
"
Of mighty men and of great rivers the springs are The enlarged and purified vision of modern science obscure." poet
:
much, and guess more, of the conditions that make But the conditions which the appearance of genius possible. fix it at the very time and place, the secret workings of nature which bring it to pass that an ^schylus, a Leonardo, a Faraday, a Kant, or a Spinoza is born upon the earth, are as obscure now The power of these men as they were a thousand years ago. still bears with it the reverence and awe that belong to great
may
perceive
things unaccountable.
The
result
of the
conversions which had earned title
of Catholic, and
banishments, and
persecutions,
laid
at the very height of its
for
forcible
the sovereigns of Spain
the
the foundation of their country's ruin prosperity,
had been to leave in Spain Christians," nominally con-
and Portugal a large class of "new verted and openly conforming Jews who in many cases kept up in secret, from generation to generation, some remnant of Jewish
Their tendencies to covert persistence in the faith and customs of their fathers were watched by the Inquisition with an Persecutions, autos da fe^ and, notwithevil and sleepless eye. usages.
the vigilance of the Spanish Government, flights from the land of the oppressor were constant. Towards the close of
standing
all
the sixteenth century 1
X,,
My
chief authorities
it
on
seemed
this subject are
and Meinsma, Spino%a en %ijn Kring,
Koenen,
Geschiedenis der
Joden
as
in
's
if
the precarious state of the
Gratz, Geschichte der Juden^ vols.
Gravenhage, 1896.
Nederland (Utrecht, 1843).
I
ix. and have also consulted
THE LIFE OF SPINOZA Marranos
—
3
—
unacknowledged
so these
The
about to become hopeless.
was Jews were called power of Spain still waxed in
Europe where Spain went, there the Inquisition followed 3 and where the Inquisition came, there justice and mercy ceased to be. The Italian States, which had formerly offered a refuge to the exiles, were no longer safe for them. England, now the ;
chief Protestant country, had driven out the
Jews three centuries
before,
and they did not again find admission
of the
Commonwealth.
It
its
own
last
days
was out of the dominion of Spain
The
herself that the light of deliverance first shone.
Inquisition defeated
the
till
The
purpose.
fury of the
Netherlands revolted
from the intolerable combination of secular with spiritual tyranny and from the desperate rising, as it at first seemed, of a handful ;
of subjects in a corner of the Spanish Empire there sprang
commonwealth which most
We now
free,
for the greater part of a
century was the
the most prosperous, and the most tolerant in Europe.
shall see that the toleration
accept
No
a
but
;
it
had bounds which
was the widest then
we
should not
to be found.
sooner was the independence of the Netherlands practi-
cally secure
than the
New Christians
to look thither for a refuge.
of Spain and Portugal began
In or about 1591 overtures were
made to the magistrates of Middelburg for a settlement of Marranos, which would have secured to the province of Zealand the first advantages of Jewish industry and commerce. The civil were disposed to enter into the plan, but theological The Reformed clergy set themselves prejudice stood in the way. But in the spring against the proposal, and nothing came of it. authorities
of 1593 ^ vessel sailed in secret from Portugal with a small company of Marranos,^ determined to adventure themselves on
Dutch
and trust their fortunes to the principles of toleration that had been proclaimed by William of Orange. After a not uneventful voyage they landed at Emden, and found assistthe
coasts,
German Jews already settled some time past By their advice the fugitives made their way to
ance at the hands of in East Friesland.
Amsterdam, where they arrived on the 23rd of nucleus of a colony soon received accession. 1
Gratz,
ix.
492, and, as to the exact date,
April.
This
little
In 1596 the EngHsh ib.
note 10.
SPINOZA
4 fleet
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
under Essex, returning from the sack of Cadiz, brought a
New
number of
who
:
Christians, presumably not unwilling prisoners,
openly returned to Judaism
Holland.
of the
was some time before any
It
new community, and
curious accident. the
attracted
immigrants
soon
as
The
suspicion
its
came from
the
Popish
they were safe in
official
notice was taken
recognition was hastened by a
celebration
of
as
of the
citizens, lands,
Day of Atonement who knew that the
and guessed that their
mysterious meeting could be nothing else than a Popish
The
plot.
congregation was surprised by armed force, and the leaders
These, once in the presence of the magistrates, speedily
arrested.
convinced them that the Pope and the Inquisition were as odious themselves
to
as
to
Protestants of the
the
United Provinces.
Being thus made known to the civil powers, the Jews were emboldened to ask leave to build a synagogue. After some discussion this was granted, and the first synagogue of Amsterdam was opened in 1598. Ten years later the numbers of the colony had so much increased that a new synagogue was needed. This was itself only temporary. In 1675, when the Jewish community
Amsterdam had reached
of
the height of
its
prosperity, the present
Portuguese synagogue was completed, amidst the felicitations not only of Jewish but of Christian theologians and poets.
Meanwhile some Jews acquired
a
more seem
years
distinct
legal
status.
to have passed before the
They were
inconvenience from an unexpected quarter
;
exposed to
for in the battle
of
Remonstrants and Contra-Remonstrants the worsted Remonstrants took the line of complaining that various strange sects, including Jews,^ enjoyed a freedom of worship which was denied to them-
These complaints did the Remonstrants no good, but the Jews some little harm. Mixed marriao-es were the Jews were once threatened, if not more, with the forbidden selves.
they did
;
closing of the synagogue
and
seems that in other parts of the Netherlands they were not always sure of even personal liberty. In 1 61 9 an ordinance was made by the States of Holland, on the report of a commission appointed some time before, by which ;
it
" Ja de Joden zelfs, die Christus verzaken, welke zij supplianten {i.e. your petitioners) houden voor hun eenigen Heiland." Remonstrant Petition, 1617, ap. Koenen, p. 14? 1
—
THE made
provision was
We
have
a
still
5
the regular admission and government
for
Hebrew colony waxed and throve
After this the
of the Jews.i apace.
LIFE OF SPINOZA
record
living
of their
prosperity
in
Rembrandt's grave and majestic portraits of Jewish merchants
And
they increased and multiplied with every fresh
and
rabbis.
act
of persecuting
folly
the
in
Spanish
Had
peninsula.
Catholic rulers intended to impoverish their
own
countries and
enrich the heretical provinces, they could not have done
The
descendants
still
purposes)
preserve for official
the
better.
it
though they preserved among themselves
exiles,
the
(as
their
use of the
Portuguese and Spanish languages, and even in their ceremonies
and manners had some remnants of their old outward conformity to the Church of Rome, soon repaid the hospitaHty of their adopted country with faithful attachment, as well as with the material advantages that accompanied their settlement.
was a good citizen
if
not an active one
;
Spinoza
and several passages of
show that the free institutions of the Dutch RepubHc were to him the object not merely of esteem but of patriotic Yet he has been accused even in our own time of affection. But for the present let us preaching maxims of despotism.
his writings
from
return
his
to
critics
immediate ancestors and con-
his
temporaries.
The
occasion was a great one for the rising Jewish community,
New Jerusalem,
the
The
tion.
as
it
leaders of the
was already
called in Spinoza's genera-
Amsterdam synagogue might,
in the
opinion of the latest and most exact historian of the Jewish nation,
have done wonders of their fortune.
if
they had been capable of making the most
But they were not men of
industry, and fortitude they possessed
:
that stamp.
Ability,
the renovating power of
Their learning was rather of that formalist disconcerted by genius, and forces a quarrel on it.
genius was wanting.
kind which
is
was when genius appeared among them in the person The conjecture which deals with lost possibilities of Spinoza. might amuse itself worse than with the contemplation of what
And
^
that
so
it
Koenen, 147. no distinctive
be imposed.
Each Province was dress
Koenen
or
gives
to
make
its
own
rules, subject to
the condition
badge (such as was usual in Catholic countries) should
no
particulars of
what was done
at
Amsterdam,
SPINOZA
6
HIS LIFE
:
AND PHILOSOPHY
the author of the Tractatus Theolog'ico-P oUticus and friend of
Witt might have done if
for his people in civil
and
political matters
he had remained in their community. Saul Levi Morteira, said to have been Spinoza's instructor,
a
De
man who had no
claim to original pov^ers.
He was
remarkable for eloquence, nor did he stand in the
Jewish learning
;
altogether he was of those
vi^as
not specially
rank of
first
who
care
not to
commit themselves out of beaten paths. His colleague, Isaac Aboab de Fonseca, presided over the synagogue of Amsterdam for nearly seventy years. Eloquence was his chief, it would seem his only gift. His discourses commanded admiration, but he was neither eminent in learning nor fitted to deal with questions of practical
moment.
His character was lacking in force, his per-
ceptions in width and comprehension
^
he was not capable of firm
and clear-sighted action.
A
better -known
Manasseh ben
personage
than
His father,
Israel.
either
like others
two was
of these of the
first
founders
of the colony, had escaped from the pious cares of the Holy Office, shattered in body and ruined in estate, to find his last resting-place
among
his
own
The
people.
son has a place in the social history
of England by his unsparing efforts to procure from Cromwell
He had to encounter much opposian extraordinary polemic from Prynne, in which a
the readmission of the Jews. tion, including
great deal of curious learning was mixed up with repetition of the
mediaeval
sacrilege.
stories
Nor
of Jewish
all
child-murder, cannibalism, and
did he live to see his purpose effected
:
he died
in
1657, and the Jews found their way back into England on a footing of informal but unquestioned liberty only after the Restoration.
But the way had none the
by Manasseh ben
Israel's
endeavours.
It
been made for them may be (as Dr. Gratz
less
suggests) that the very foibles of his character, his turn for mystical interpretations of theology, and his credulity as to prophetic signs
and seasons, were additions to and that a stronger
his strength for that particular
man would
work
not have done
creduhty was indeed nothing singular
:
it so well. His about the same time a
deputation of Asiatic Jews came to England to inquire if CromFor his learning, it was ample and well were not the Messiah.
THE
LIFE OF SPINOZA
7
various, and extended to
European as well as Hebrew literature. him from giving himself over to superstition and letter-worship which often ran into puerilities. He was a voluminous writer, but wrote with an undiscerning hand, mixing up in his compilation things wise and foolish. Yet he had one power which may at times almost fill the place of genius the power of winning men's friendship. He was of an open and
But
it
did not save
—
generous nature, which showed polished conversation
dence to
At
which
is
itself in that
frank urbanity and
wont everywhere
to
draw
confi-
it.
the time
when
the congregation of
Amsterdam condemned Eng-
Spinoza, Manasseh ben Israel was absent on his mission to land.
It
may
be doubted whether his presence would have ensured
any more rational course of action. inspiration of the
Talmud
A
believer
by no means
the verbal
could have had nothing to urge for
moderation, unless on grounds of secular policy it is
in
clear that policy
was not
for
and
;
in this case
once on the
side of
the fanatics.
In the generation before Spinoza the Jewish commonwealth of Amsterdam did not enjoy unbroken peace within itself. For
many
years there
was a schism
in the
synagogue, arising out of
members by the survival of and manners; and in Spinoza's first
the scandal caused to the stricter
Spanish- Catholic practices
years the congregation was troubled by the strange career of Uriel
He
da Costa.
too deserves brief mention here
not that he was
;
any weight or influence, much less a precursor of but his fate illustrates the temper of the times, and his
a person of
Spinoza
;
excommunication may have served as a precedent in Spinoza's He was born of a New Christian family in Oporto his case. parents were, however, orthodox in conviction as well as in name, ;
and he received a learned education under Jesuit instructors. Dissatisfied with their formal dogmatism, he betook himself to and the result the study of the prophets of the Old Testament ;
Amsterdam, together with his mother and brothers, joined the synagogue, and changed his former Christian name Gabriel for the purely Jewish one of Uriel. But here also He was perplexed and shocked by disappointment awaited him.
v/as
that he fled to
;
SPINOZA
8
:
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
the discrepance between Judaism such as he found to find
it,
Rabbinical
and such
in the Scriptures,
and
gloss
as
or thought
had been made
it
He denounced
tradition.
it,
the
teachers and rulers as Pharisees, and set their ceremonies at
by-
modern naught
He went
they replied to his criticism by excommunicating him.
on to publish a controversial tract against the immortality of the soul upon this the chiefs of the synagogue denounced him to the civil authorities, and he was fined and imprisoned, and his book publicly burnt. For fifteen years he endured the social penalties of excommunication, but at length his patience gave way, and ;
made no secret of the purely outward character of his conformity.^ At this very time his course of unregulated speculation was leading him on But he seems
he was formally reconciled.
from an anti-Rabbinical and
as
it
were Puritan Judaism to a
Nor
doctrine of bare natural Deism.
to have
did he
There followed
caution in his conversation.
observe ordinary a
new and more
stringent excommunication, to be taken ofF only on condition of a
solemn and public act of penance. seven years, and then
for
again
Da
Costa held out
He
submitted.
this
time
underwent a
humiliating ceremony, modelled on those of the Inquisition, which were probably known by bitter personal experience to some of those present. It
is
a general fact in
human
history,
and one of the saddest,
no sooner has a persecuted community secured its freedom than it takes to persecuting in its turn. This was shown at the very same time by the Reformed Church of the Netherlands " Those who but a few years before had complained of the cruelty that
:
of the Church of
Rome
were no sooner delivered from that, than they began to call for the same ways of persecuting those who were of the other side." ^ And it was not far from this time that the Puritan
tyranny they had
down
far
colonists of
New
set
up an
ecclesiastical
more oppressive and searching than that from which
Da
Costa's penance was completed by his lyinp; athwart the threshold of the synagogue, so that the whole fled.
congregation stepped over him ^
England
Er wollte, wie
er sagte, ^
as
they passed out.
"unter Affen auch ein Affe
Burnet, History of h'n
own Time,
i.
sein."
316.
Humiliation he Gratz
x.
i^j
THE LIFE OF SPINOZA must have expected, but the determined to
live
9
was too much for his pride. He was needful to commit to writing,
reality
only so long as
form of an autobiography, a fierce denunciation of his perseHaving completed this writing, he shot himself in his own house after an unsuccessful attempt on the life of his chief enemy. It does not seem that Da Costa's speculations had any value, and his character cannot be said to call for admiration. Martyrs
in the
cutors.
and confessors in the cause of
weak
or so
that one
who was
free
twice excommunicated, and twice
recanted, can claim a high place least a large
among them
;
and there was
But we cannot
among such untoward
refuse our pity to a
surroundings, nor can
we
of the synagogue of excessive and ill-judged
chiefs
throughout their dealings with
much
prepares us to hear with
this
unhappy man.
less surprise
at
Da
element of personal pique and resentment in
Costa's later courses. cast
thought have not been so few
life
acquit the
harshness
His story
of Spinoza's treatment
sixteen years later.
As
to
the general
state
Amsterdam, they were
exceedingly
appliances of learning and
would
of education
literature
well
among
the Jews
provided
then current.
with So
of the
much
from Spinoza's works and correspondence that of a man who has been brought up
sufficiently appear
His writing is among scholars and has mastered betimes all the knowledge that a scholar is expected to possess. But high literary culture and great literary facility are compatible with great feebleness of intellectual grasp. Scholarship is in itself no warranty of sound thinking. alone.
And
was that the Hebrew scholars who exchanged more or less elegant Latin verses with European scholars of the stamp of Grotius or Barlaeus were ready and even eager to give ear to the wildest and most idle fancies in matters of theology and philosophy. The doctrine of the Kabbalah, hkened by Gratz to a fungus growth creeping over the body of the Law and the Traditions, was almost universally received. A generation filled with the east wind of mystical ravings hungered after signs and wonders, and signs and wonders came without stint. Demoniacs, exorcisms, so
it
miracles, false prophets, even false Messiahs, fed the credulity of
the Levantine Jews, and deceived not a few elsewhere.
The
AND PHILOSOPHY
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
10
most singular appearance of this kind, the career of Sabbatai Zevi, Accounts of the belongs however to a somewhat later date.
new
dreams, revelations, and supernatural feats of the
prophets
and besides these the epidemic One of superstition produced a speculative literature of its own. of these works, composed by a Polish Jew, Naphtali ben Jakob
were published and eagerly read
who had caught
Elchanan,
and published
at
;
the Kabbalistic contagion in Palestine,
Amsterdam
in
1648,
described by
is
Gratz^
as
" yet leading rabbis of not containing a single rational sentence Germany and Poland accepted this puddle of nauseous blasphemy :
wisdom." If these were the studies in favour among Spinoza's teachers and companions, we can hardly wonder at the tone of something Hke contempt in which he
as
a fountain of divine
generally speaks of current Jewish opinion.
Such, then, was the society into which Spinoza was
The
accustomed course of education was almost
confined to the the
medium
Hebrew language and
of the
and
at the
Talmud
With
these, therefore,
imparted through
Spinoza was early made
age of fifteen he had gone so
as to be
far in
the study
one of Rabbi Morteira's most promising
In the advanced classes of the
pupils.
not altog-ether
of Spanish whether the learners were of Spanish or
Portuguese origin. familiar,
literature,
if
born.
Amsterdam
school he had
the opportunity of mastering the philosophical writings of the
golden
age of modern Jewish
Maimonides and Ibn Ezra. development of
his
to say here that
and questionings of these
him
The
thought will
Enough
later place.
commentaries of probable effect of these on the be more fully spoken of in a
learning,
the
he found
men much more
in
the
hints
than his teachers
were themselves capable of finding. Secular learning and accomplishments had to be sought in The elements of Latin were imparted to Spinoza other quarters. by a German master whose name is not known ^ he continued the study with Francis van den Ende,^ a physician as well as a expected
to find or
;
1
Gratz,
2
Possibly a certain heretical
Meinsma ^
X,
(p.
131.
German
scholar
named Jeremiah Felbinger
;
so
Mr.
196 of his book) conjectures, but not confidently.
His name
is
given in the documents relating to the Chevalier de Rohan's plot as See Climent, Episodes de PHistoire de France, Paris, 1859.
Francis Affinius van den Enden.
THE man
of
letters,
LIFE OF SPINOZA
whose high reputation
by the suspicion that he taught
The
Latin.
ii
teacher was quahfied
as a
his pupils free-thinking as well as
may have been
charge
true, but it may just as well have been a mere popular inference from the known fact that he
was a proficient it
is
no
in the natural sciences.
So
much
is
certain,
and
probable that he communicated this part of his knowledge,
less
than that which he specially professed to teach, to those
who showed
themselves apt for
unmistakable
evidence
physical science, and
it
for
:
thorough and
of
more
especially
Spinoza's works afford
sound
display
in
physiology, which cannot
well have been acquired at a later time of his
makes any great
instruction
of knowledge,
life
but
-,
that
not that he
with
many
commits few or none. As to Latin, den Ende's charge was efficiently performed.
occasions for mistakes he
Van
at all events.
Spinoza mastered
completely, not indeed according to the fine
it
and exacting standards of
one sense,
in
language
is
for
he made
not what
command and
we
it
more completely
later scholarship, but
a living instrument of thought.
call classical,
perfectly adapted to
but
its
it is
ends.
His
handled with perfect
At
the same time
it
shows by quotations and allusions that he was fairly well at home with the Latin classics. His knowledge of Greek was more limited, and by his own account not critical.^ Of modern
knew French and
languages he
Italian, besides
Portuguese and
Spanish, one or both of which were native to him, and perhaps
German.
Spanish appears, by the catalogue of his books, to have
been the only language he habitually read appears also from evidences
but afterwards
lost sight
^
Tract. Theol.-Pol. cap. x.
^
This has been
made
for
It
recreation.^
public early in the last century,
of until recently, that he always regarded
ad Jin.
lost sight of
even by one or two careful writers in
late
years.
It
is
Of God and Man " was written by Spinoza in Dutch. The late Dr. Land thought that when Spinoza, writing to Blyenbergh in January 1665, said "I could have wished to write in the tongue in which I impossible to believe,
e.g.
that the early treatise "
have been brought up," he meant that he would rather have written on theological topics
—
in
Hebrew.
obviously meant.
popular than literary, included
in
With
great respect, I cannot accept this.
Dr. Land's statement that Spinoza's Dutch is
of
course authoritative.
the notarial inventory of his
Lebensgeschichte Sp.'s, p. 160.
estate
is
I
not
think Spanish
is
bad, only rather
The catalogue of Spinoza's books is now published in Freudenthal's
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
12
only with difficulty. observable that the only detailed historical illustration in the
Dutch It
AND PHILOSOPHY
is
language, and wrote
as a foreign
Tractatus Politicus
^
is
it
Such little the self-contained isolation in which
from the history of Arragon.
circumstances help us to realize
Hebrew community must have dwelt even among
the
was perhaps through
It
that Spinoza
his
well-wishers.
Van den Ende
intercourse with
became acquainted with the writings of Giordano
As to Descartes, indeed, explanation may be dispensed with no young man with a philosophical turn of mind could help reading him. But as to Giordano Bruno, if one
Bruno and
Descartes. 3
assumes (on the grounds to be mentioned hereafter) that Spinoza
had read him, one for
in
may
be fairly called on to assign the occasion
Giordano Bruno would not otherwise have come naturally Spinoza's way j his theories were scarcely less abhorrent to it.
Jews and Protestants than
Van den Ende may
that
private,
Ende
have more or
and discussed him with a
would have been
But
to Catholics.
select
less
it is
few of
his learners.
just the kind of study to procure for
the alarming reputation handed
down
to us
quite possible, as the late Dr.
would help
account
to
Bruno
cherished
Land suggested, Spinoza gave Van den Ende some assistance in is
quite possible
Spinoza took his place
the ease and
for
among Gentile
a friend, but as a master, after
in
This
Van den
by Colerus.
It
that after a time
This with which
teaching.
rapidity
free-thinkers, not only as
he was cast out by the synagogue.
Besides his graver pursuits Spinoza contrived to acquire considerable skill in
drawing
:
he
filled a
book with
them being of distinguished
persons.
in the possession of Colerus,
but there
There
is
reason to think that at
early studies Spinoza
portrait sketches,
many
of
This book was at one time is no further trace of it. some time in the course of his
came by more systematic knowledge of the
terms and method of the Schoolmen than he has generally been credited with ; but he struck out his own method, from a Cartesian
and not scholastic starting-point, and converted the terms to
own 1
2
his
uses.2
Cap. vii, See Freudenthal, " Spinoza und die Scholastik," No.
Zellerge-jvidmet, Leipzig, 1887.
iii.
in Fhiloz.
Aufmt%e Ed.
THE There by
LIFE OF SPINOZA
13
Van den Ende was
assisted in his teaching
a daughter, of singular wit, learning,
and accomplishments.
is
a story that
among
Spinoza, the story goes, was
became a
lover.
Kerkering,
who
But he had finally
won
Now
able pearl necklace.
riage,
is
rival
in
it
is
fellow-pupil
named
who
left
a
married Theodore Kerckrinck
however, has been ascertained by
when Van den Ende
Van den Ende had
true that
the authentic form of the name).
(the year
a
the lady's hand by the help of a valu-
daughter named Clara Maria, (such
a
her pupils, and from a pupil
The
date of the mar-
Van Vloten
Holland), and
it
to be
1671 appears by the
was twenty-seven years old. Now Spinoza was excommunicated and left Amsterdam in 1656. Clara Maria van den Ende was therefore eleven or twelve years old at the latest time when Spinoza could have been her father's pupil, and the register that the bride
of the students' rivalry and the pearl necklace must be
tale
dis-
Kerckrinck was a physician, who published works on medicine, anatomy, and chemistry, and earned a considerable scienmissed.
tific
reputation, so that
the match was in itself a natural one
enough for Van den Ende's daughter. The question remains whether the tale of Spinoza's love for her is absolutely without There is no reason whatever to suppose that Spinoza foundation. did not keep up his acquaintance with Van den Ende in the visits which we know that he made from time to time to Amsterdam ; and thus we have occasion and room enough for a friendship extending into Klaartje's riper years, which may have passed into
A
a serious inclination.
romantic affection
we cannot
ascribe to
would be too much out of keeping with and one may shrewdly suspect that all his habits and character his inclination never in truth got beyond a hypothetical stage. He was likely enough to be rallied by host or friends on his hermit life, and not unlikely to put them off with some such answer as that, if he married a wife, it should be Van den Ende's daughter. A speech or two of this kind would be ample foundation for the story given by Colerus, and a simple confusion of dates would do Spinoza
at this
time
:
it
;
the
rest.
one chance left if we are minded to hold fast to piece of romance that can be suggested in Spinoza's
Yet there the solitary
is
^
SPINOZA
14
:
HIS LIFE
AND PHILOSOPHY
Nothing forbids us to suppose that at the earlier time there sprang up some half- ideal, half- childish affection between Spinoza and Clara van den Ende there is no violation of possibility in conceiving her as standing to him in a relation like that of Beatrice As far as ages go the probability is even greater than to Dante. life.
;
in Dante's case
;
so that, unless
who would
we
join ourselves to those over-
away the Fita Nuova^ we Beatrice was nine years old, Dante have a fair precedent enough. himself only ten, when the " glorious lady of his soul " first showed herself to his eyes, and the word came to him, Ecce deus fortior Spinoza was not a poet, some me^ qui veniens dominahitur mihi. No, but he was a mystic at the time in question, one will say. which for this purpose will do at least as well. But I throw out this merely for the chance of any one finding comfort in it. As curious persons
a hypothesis
and even
if
it
seems to
allegorise
me much
less
probable than the other
3
the facts had been as suggested, Spinoza was not the
man to be very communicative about them. The truth is that we have no positive evidence at all. We have only a story which, cannot possibly be true, and which does not rest on any satisfactory authority. The absence of any apparent motive for inventing the whole of it raises a certain presumption that it
as it stands,
contains in a more or
form elements of genuine fact derived from statements made by Spinoza himself. But what may be we have no means of determining. those elements den Van Ende to himself, one is sorry to know that he As
came
less distorted
In his old age he settled in France, and had been there only a few years when he was drawn into the conto a bad end.
spiracy of the Chevalier de
Rohan and La Treaumont,
partly by with hopes that the affair would turn to the profit of the Netherlands, partly by flattering his speculative fancy with dreams of a Utopian republic to be established on the
working on
his patriotism
French monarchy. A general rising in Normandy was to be supported by a descent of the Dutch fleet the admiral Cornelius Tromp, was fully prepared to take his part, and Ions: hovered on the French coast awaiting the signal, which never ruins of the
:
1
Even Mr. Meinsma's
episode.
indefatigable research has not
thrown any new
light
on
this
THE LIFE OF SPINOZA came.
But
from the
15
the conspiracy, though carefully planned, was hollow
first
was
it
;
personal ambitions.
It
a venture
of disappointed and desperate
was discovered before any
part of
be put in execution, and
its
successful conspirators.
Van den Ende was hanged
it
could
un-
leaders paid the usual penalty of at Paris
on
November 1674. So much is known of Spinoza for the first twenty-three years Not long after he had fully attained man's estate the of his life. elders of his people began to remark in him an unwonted freedom
the 27th of
of discourse, and possibly some laxity in ceremonial observances
which would of censure.
One
repeating, has
itself
have sufficed
anecdote of
come down
as
an ostensible ground of
this time, plausible
Two
to us.
questioned Spinoza closely on theology
enough
to be
fellow-students, ;
worth
it is
said,
he put them ofF with
general reference to the authority of Moses and the Prophets as sufficient for
all
answered one
of his
God is What say you,
But
true Israelites.
companions,
I
as far as their
authority goes,
cannot find any such thing
as
incorporeal, the soul immortal, or angels real beings.
that
then, to these matters
Spinoza repHed that he
?
could see no objection in point of orthodoxy to holding that
mere apparitions created
has a body,^ or that angels are
special occasion of their ministry (for
thing very like
it,
Hkely enough to be
there
is
known
which, indeed, or
Talmudic authority
:
God
for the
for
some-
a circumstance
to Spinoza and overlooked
by
his ques-
and that the Scriptures use soul as a pure synonym of life-, The two friends without saying anything about immortality. but Spinoza, while he promised to give were only half satisfied tioners),
j
them
fuller explanations
another time, contrived not to find any
opportunity of renewing the discourse.
We
have no trustworthy
or distinct account of the events that led to Spinoza's rupture with
the congregation
;
but certain
it
is
that in the early part of the
was considered by Morteira and his colleague that action of a decided kind must be taken. It has already been remarked that the persecuted Hebrews of Spain and Portugal had brought a leaven of persecuting zeal to their new asylum. But in this case reasons of secular policy were potent year 1656
it
^
Compare Hobbes's arguments on
this point.
AND PHILOSOPHY
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
i6
counsellors to the
same
kind of state within a
and manners to
its
The
effect.
To
hosts.
expose themselves to the charge of
might well have been
a serious
As prudent governors of their household, it men to suffer no more scandals within it like
danger to them.
behoved the chief
Da
language,
state, a society foreign in religion,
fostering novelties in speculation
that of
Jewish community was a
And
Costa.
thought eminently
Spinoza's particular novelties might be
fitted to
He
bring them into trouble.
himself with Descartes, and the Synod of Dort (not the
busied
The
famous, but a second one) had just condemned Cartesianism. best
way would be
the next best,
if
to
make
the erratic
and
first
was yet time member could not be brought to take things quiet while
it
;
the fitting measure of heed, at least in his public ways, was to cut
him
off at once
ingly the
1000
way
and disclaim
all
Accord-
responsibility for him.
of compromise was
first tried, and an annuity of was offered to Spinoza as the price of apparent conThis however was positively declined. The next step ^
florins
formity.
summon
was to
Spinoza before the congregation and
on him the first degree of ecclesiastical censure, the lower excommunication, which excluded the offender for thirty days from the society of the faithful, and was intended to operate as a serious invitation to repentance.
seem
It
is
said that
inflict
Morteira made
(it
at this stage) a strong personal effort to reclaim his
would erring
disciple.
During the period of suspense which followed, Spinoza's life was aimed at by an unknown enemy, presumably some fanatic outrunning the zeal of
his masters, or
thinking himself a divinely
appointed messenger to rebuke their tardiness in defending the faith by a striking example. This man set upon Spinoza with a dagger one evening as he was leaving the Portuguese synagogue, or, 1
according to another account, the theatre.^ Our
data for these events are
still
But he avoided
meagre, and
their order in time uncertain but that a lesser excommunication preceded the final one. See Gratz x gives what purport to be details of the earlier proceedings, but in his usual confused manner and with improbable circumstances. :
we cannot doubt "Lucas" 175. 2
Difficulties
have been
Le'vensbcde, ix. 419,
and
raised about the incident
see
Meinsma,
been after the final excommunication.
p.
91,
The
:
they are discussed in date
is
not certain.
Van Vloten's It may have
—
—
THE LIFE OF SPINOZA the blow in time, and
it
pierced only his coat, which he afterwards
kept in the same condition attack that
17
as a
memorial.
Amsterdam was no longer
Being warned by
this
a safe place for him, he
betook himself to the hospitality of a friend who dwelt a little way out of the city, on the Ouwerkerk road. His host belonged to the small dissenting
community of Remonstrants
or Collegiants,
Here, under the roof of heretics anathematized by the Synod of Dort, he learnt the
final decision
the charge of heresy against
of the Jewish congregation on
nounced on the 27th of July 1656, and
its
effect
"The
is
as follows
The
himself.
sentence was
pro-
in the Portuguese language,
:
you to wit, that having long known the evil opinions and works of Baruch de Espinoza, they have endeavoured by divers ways and promises to withdraw him from his evil ways, and they are unable to find a remedy, but on the contrary have had every day more knowledge of the abominable heresies practised and taught by him, and of other enormities committed by him, and have of this many trustworthy witnesses who have deposed and borne witness in the presence of the said Espinoza, and by whom he stood convicted all which having been examined in the presence of the elders, it has been determined with their assent that the said Espinoza should be excommunicated and cut ofT from the nation of Israel and now he is hereby excommunicated with the following anathema "With the judgment of the angels and of the saints we excommunicate, cut off, curse, and anathematize Baruch de Espinoza, chiefs of the council do
;
;
:
with the consent of the elders and of
all
this
holy congregation,
by the 613 precepts which are written therein, with the anathema wherewith Joshua cursed in the presence
of the holy books
:
which Elisha laid upon the children, and with all the curses which are written in the law. Cursed be he by day and cursed be he by night. Cursed be he in sleeping
Jericho, with the curse
and cursed be he in waking, cursed in going out and cursed in
coming
in.
The Lord
shall
not pardon him, the wrath and fury
of the Lord shall henceforth be kindled against this man, and
upon him all the curses which are written in the book The Lord shall destroy his name under the sun, and of the law. shall
lay
c
AND PHILOSOPHY
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
i8
him
undoing from all the tribes of Israel, with all the curses of the firmament which are written in the book of the law. But ye that cleave unto the Lord your God, live all of you this day. " And we warn you, that none may speak with him by word of mouth nor by writing, nor show any favour to him, nor be under one roof with him, nor come within four cubits of him,
cut
off for his
nor read any paper composed or written by him."
From the terms of much, may be gathered assumed.
It
is
the excommunication something, but not
form which the accusation had not on the face of it a condemnation for mere
speculative opinions
as
to the
indeed such a condemnation would not be
;
The
warranted by Jewish law.
" heresies practised and taught "
("horrendas heresias que practicava e ensinava") point active attempt to spread his
enormities" on Spinoza's English reader
it
some
opinions, and the mention of " other part
("ynormes obras que obrava
probably refers to breaches of ceremonial rules, and to an
at
looks
so
at
first
is
")
not (though
a meaningless
sight)
addition like the alia enormia of old-fashioned English pleadings.^
Thus was Baruch de Spinoza made an outcast from Israel, and cut off from his own people and from his father's house. The which for that people have ever been of exceeding strength and sanctity, were for him severed beyond The bond of fellowship among Israelites is of strength recall. of kindred,
ties
and sanctity only
ties
less
than that of actual kindred
\
and
this also
once and irrevocably dissolved. The excommunicated became as it were a masterless man j he had no title by Jew which he could call upon either Jew or Christian to stand by him If it is a good preparation for philosophy to or answer for him.
was
at
be alone in the world, the needful discipHne came upon Spinoza with terrible completeness. It is hardly possible for men at this time, either in Spinoza's country or in our
own
to realise the
But Spinoza never faltered under it the passionate weakness of Uriel da Costa was far from his nature. full effect
of such a blow.
:
According to Lucas, the charge was not blasphemy, but " d'avoir manque de Moyse et pour la loy." The distinction, however, seems to have no real Freudenthal, p. 243. foundation in Jewish usage. 1
respect et pour
—
"
THE
LIFE OF SPINOZA
" This compels me," he
19
on receiving the news, " to nothing which I should not otherwise have done." Thus it would seem that he held himself to have renounced the synagogue of his own motion rather than to have been driven from it and the title of a defence which he wrote in Spanish and sent to the elders points the same way. This paper itself has never been found ^ it is supposed, however, to have contained some foreshadowing of said
;
;
the Tractatus
Theologico-Politlcus.
It
is
said that the chiefs of
the synagogue were not content with inflicting
They
ecclesiastical penalty.
utmost
their
represented to the civil authorities
that Spinoza was a dangerous person
;
their request
was backed
by the Reformed clergy, and a sentence of banishment for a short time was pronounced against Spinoza, who must have already left the city. But sentences of this kind against men who have The forestalled them by absence are common enough in history. incident lacks coniirmation,^ but the fact that similar proceedings
had been taken in the case of in
From
itself.
Da
Costa renders
time forth, in any
this
it
not improbable
we have
case,
to think of
removed from Amsterdam and the associations of his He marked the severance himself by disusing his Hebrew youth. name Baruch, and substituting for it the Latin equivalent Only once more in his lifetime do we hear anything Benedict. Spinoza became entitled upon the of dealings with his family. death of his father to share the inheritance with his two sisters. The sisters disputed his title, presumably under the belief that an excommunicated heretic would have no part in the estate of a Spinoza has left on record his opinion that in a faithful Israelite. state where just laws are in force it is not only the right of every Spinoza
as
citizen, but his duty towards the
to himself, lest peradventure evil ^
Unless
was
it
identical
with or
common weal, to men should find
developed
into
mentioned by Rieuwertszoon, the publisher of the traveller
as existing
Stolle
edition of the Ethics, 2
It
Colerus
is
in
p.
knows nothing
precedent of
Da
MS. and having
injustice
profit in their
polemic against the Jews Posthuma, to the
Opei-a
been in his possession.
German
See Ginsberg's
20.
with apparent confusion of time and
Lucas,
powers of his country
in
the
resist
of
(in
it,
circumstance,
as
usual.
and Spinoza's tone of admiration and deference for the
the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus)
Costa turns the scale in favour of giving
it
is
likewise against
a place in
the text.
it.
civil
The
SPINOZA
20
case, then,
he acted on
this principle
theological
or,
strife,
as
only a tolerated religion
was made good.
sisters
more
is
because Judaism was
likely,
and Spinoza's claim to share with his But, having established his rights, he did ;
When
not choose to take any material advantage by them. partition
came
but one bed
French
;
to be effected he gave
" qui
etait
and
man
to learn
scientific
polishing
some
At
this
height.
own work
for a liveHhood.
commands
precept which
handicraft, and guided by his philosophical
temper, he had acquired the art of making and
lenses
practical
his
Rabbinical
the
for
optician,
may
Perhaps
instruments.
optical
imitate the example of Descartes, a
everything
his sisters
en verite fort bon," says Colerus in the
now dependent on
compliance with
every
up to
the
version.
Spinoza was In
the
:
law was just, whether on the high ground of indifference to
civil '
own
In his
evil-doing.
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
:
who had
likewise
a
made himself
have entered into Spinoza's motives.
admiration of Descartes was probably at
time
his
The
art enabled
him
its
to earn an income, slender indeed,
but sufficient for his limited v/ants, and a reputation for
and knowledge of optics which preceded
his
The
after,
lenses
to
desire
made by him were sought
fame
disposed of at his death fetched a high price.
as a philosopher.
and those It
skill
left
un-
was ostensibly
as
an optician, moreover, that he made the acquaintance of Huygens
and Leibnitz.
In 1671 Leibnitz wrote to consult him on certain
optical questions,
— though
it
is
now known
that then and long
afterwards he took a keen interest in Spinoza's philosophy, his
letter addresses
It v/as believed
would have
he
science pleted
;
as
was
have been
it
a
lost.
Spinoza
as
by Spinoza's friends that but
made some
considerable
We
small treatise It
was
are
1
The
contribution
to
the
work of that kind which he comon the Rainbow, long supposed to
in truth published at the in
our
own
Hao;ue in 1687 time by Dr. Van
Spinoza had formed the plan on Algebra ("breviori et map;is
also told that
of writing a concise intelligibili
for his early death
was, the only
and has been found and reprinted Vloten.i
—and
a critic of recognized authority.
treatise
methodo"), and other unspecified works.
original copy, believed to be unique,
is
in the
Royal Library
at the Hao-ue.
THE It appears
LIFE OF SPINOZA
21
Spinoza stayed with his Remonstrant friend the end of 1660 or beginning of 1661, when they removed
till
that
together to the village of Rijnsburg, near Leyden, then the head-
The
house where they lived is still standing, and the road bears to this day the name of " Spinoza Lane."
quarters of the sect.
The
Remonstrants were by
this
time practically tolerated, but
had no regular clergy or public ministrations.
There could
no outward evidence that a person living among them, and not being a member of any other religious community, was not one of themselves. Hence the report that Spinoza had therefore be
become enough
would very naturally arise. It gained currency to be thought by Colerus worth an express contradiction. The meagre information given by Colerus and others of the philosopher's movements and occupations in after years is partly filled in by his letters, of which we possess only the selection made, unhappily with a far too sparing hand, by the editors of his posthumous works, and a few more which have been discovered in the orphan asylum at Amsterdam formerly belonging to the Spinoza paid frequent visits to the Hague, where Collegiants. a Christian
he became well
known
in the society of
men
of letters
;
and
it
went on he found more and more content in his entertainment there, for in 1664 he moved again to Voorburg, which is a suburb of the Hague, and in 1670 to the Hague itself, where he spent the rest of his life. In 1663 we find that Spinoza had already sketched out some clear that as time
is
of the leading ideas of his metaphysical system, substantially in the same form in which they eventually appeared in the Opera
Posthuma^
and had
entrusted
his
papers
to
a
number of
his
They had formed a sort of Amsterdam. philosophical club,^ at whose meetings the members took it in If turns to read out and comment on Spinoza's manuscript. after discussion any point remained obscure, a note was made of younger friends
1
The
motto of is
known
at
society iV;7 •volentibus
arduum
(it
was and
is
to
not founded
have been an active till
between the two
some
years later.
the practice in Holland for the
name of the society member (Van Vloten,
a society to be used as the
My
societies was, therefore,
itself),
conjecture in the
unfounded
:
of
which Dr. L. Meyer
Bened. de Spinoza, first
Meinsma,
p.
29),
was
edition of a connection p.
204.
— AND PHILOSOPHY
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
22
company would write to Spinoza for is extant, written by Simon de Vries,
the difficulty, and one of the
Such a
explanation.
letter
young student of medicine, and of much promise, who had conceived for Spinoza an intellectual attachment which grew into a warm friendship. He would willingly have shown his
a
gratitude to his master by substantial benefactions "^
of a
him
of 2000 florins offered by
gift
Spinoza's
as
life,
we
shall see,
to Spinoza
;
but that
for
he died
in Spinoza's lifetime, and not so unexpectedly but that
he had
frailer,
time to form the design of making Spinoza his dissuaded from a
it
first
his
friend's
own
entreaties.
of his
was
De
by
left
own kindred. The own interest, and
for
accepted only in part.
500
florins
refused
shows
;
all
Spinoza's
De
Vries had
master prevailed with the bulk of the estate
The
maintenance.
heir offered
but Spinoza pretended that
take more than 300.
to
and to be
Vries to his brother, charged however with a
annuity
sufficient
heir,
upon him the duty of
and Spinoza pressed
brother living,
thinking
by
the disciple against his
^
are told
and declined.
was not a robust one
of his young disciple seems to have been yet
<
we
;
De
to fix it
Even this was the amount at
was too much, and
Vries's
letter
to Spinoza
the generous enthusiasm of a learner in presence of a
beloved teacher. I have long desired (he says) an occasion to be with you, but weather and the hard winter have not allowed me. Sometimes I complain of my fate in being removed from you by a distance that
much apart. Happy, most happy, is your companion who dwells with you under the same roof, and who can at
keeps us so Casuarius all
times, dining, supping, or walking, hold discourse with
most excellent matters.
But though we
are so
the body, yet you have constantly been present to
when
I
you of the
widely separated in my mind, especially
apply myself to your writings.
Spinoza's answer approves the plan of the society, and gives To De Vries's complaint of their long the desired explanations. separation he replies as follows
:
has been no less disagreeable to me glad that my exercises {lucubratiunI am meanwhile but than to you For thus I speak with you culae) are of use to you and our friends.
Your long-continued absence ;
THE we
LIFE OF SPINOZA
23
away from one another. As to Casearius [this is the correct form ; De Vries had misspelt the name], you need not envy him. There is no one I like less, or with whom I have been more cautious ; so that I must warn you and all our friends not to communicate my opinions to him till he has come to riper years. He is still too childish and inconstant, and cares for novelty more than truth. Yet I hope he will amend these youthful failings some years hence ;
while
indeed
and
I
are
am
nearly sure of
it,
so his general character
This Casearius
so far as I
moves me
He
solitary letter of
been recovered in our fitting
became
Dutch East
a
Indies,
in 1677.^
1665 containing some personal
own
;
with him.
in the vernacular)
v^ent out to the
and died on the Malabar coast
A
to be friendly
Keezer
(possibly
distinguished botanist.
can judge from his disposition
An
time.^
details has
allusion to the fleet then
out against England, and the mention of a journey of
Amsterdam, of which we have other indications, fix the date towards the end of May, or in the first days of June. The person addressed was possibly Adrian Koerbagh, one of two brothers whose position among Spinoza's friends has been quite Spinoza's
to
correspondent both
came back
to
when he went
He
Voorburg.
in philosophy while he
is
of having
complains
Spinoza
established.^
lately
missed
his
Amsterdam and when he
to
then begs his friend to be diligent
young and
has time, and not to be afraid
of writing to him freely.
am pretty sure, that you have some unreasonable distrust of your own parts, and fear to ask or propound something unworthy of a scholar. It is not fit for me to have before
I
now
suspected, and 1
praise your talents to your face letters to others 1
Casuarius
who may
was formerly read
;
but
if
you
ridicule you, I give as a corrupt
is
2
Ep. 28.
2
The
(1668)
whom we
made by Mr. Meinsma,
shall hear later.
pp. i8i
s^ij.
The
of his book.
conserve of red roses which this correspondent had recommended to Spinoza
not only mentioned, but :
you
Latin word meaning " fellow-lodger," and
the person conjecturally identified with Albert Burgh, of perfectly certain correction has been
my showing your my promise on this
fear
Meinsma,
Spinoza rest on
p.
much
246.
is
the only conserve mentioned in A. Koerbagh's Bloemhof
The
general relations of the
fuller evidence
A. Koerbagh was a qualified physician cellany, see Meinsma, p. 296.
j
produced by Mr. as
to this
Koerbaghs to Meyer and
Meinsma
for
the
book, a philological and
first
time.
critical
mis-
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
24
point that
AND PHILOSOPHY
scrupulously keep them, and will communicate
I will
On
no mortal, unless with your leave.
to
you may
terms
these
begin your correspondence with me, unless indeed you doubt faith,
which
I
do not suppose possible.
of the matter by your
letter,
first
I trust
and
to
them
my
good
to hear your opinion
have with
some of the
it
you promised, though I am now much better. After I left this [for Amsterdam] I once let myself blood, yet the fever did not cease (though I was somewhat brisker even before the blood-letting, I think by the change of air), but I was twice or thrice conserve of red roses,
as
troubled with a tertian
and sent
it
packing
care that
it
shall not
He
;
but by dint of good diet
where
;
come
it
has gone I
know
at last I
not, but
As
abouts.
the
am
it
out
taking
back.
then promises to send "the third part of
or a considerable part of
drove I
it,
third
of the
philosophy,"
8oth proposition or there-
as far as the
part
my
Ethics^
as
it
contains nothing like that number, the third and
now
stands,
fourth
parts
must in the first draft have formed but one. He ends by asking for news of the fleet. This is the only letter preserved to us in which Spinoza says anything about him.self as distinct from his works, and it is preserved only by chance the editors of the Opera Posthuma^ adhering rigidly to the principle of selecting only what illustrated the philosophy, had put it aside as "of no value." ^ In 1668 the hand of the orthodox reformed church fell heavy on this Adrian Koerbagh and his brother John. Adrian's published works ^ enounced opinions practically identical with those which Spinoza had already written, and no doubt shown :
intimate friends, but not yet
to his
Theologico-P ol'iticus
A
vernacular.
;
and,
solemn
what made
printed
it
in
the
Tractatus
worse, they were in the
prosecution was instituted
ecclesiastical
Adrian was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment, to be followed by the like term of banishment, and a heavy
and carried through. fine.
He
died in prison, apparently broken
hardship, within eighteen months. 1
Adscripserunt enim
2
The Bloemhof
the chief Points
Meinsma,
p.
:
of Theology and
302).
John Koerbagh,
"is van geender waarde."
already mentioned, dinjine
and
A
Worship
down by
light
(Van Vloten, Supp. shimng
(facsimile
in
of
grief and
after p.
dark Places original
some
303.) to enlighten
title-page
in
— THE
LIFE OF SPINOZA
difFerence of opinion, escaped with
and an undertaking
costs,
This prosecution seems indignation
against
for
an admonition, payment of
He
good behaviour.
to account for the
vulgar
Tractatus
1672.
died in
more than
and
superstition
v^hich informs the preface to the
25
speculative
spiritual
tyranny
Theologico-P oliticus^
published soon after Adrian Koerbagh's condemnation and death.
Another constant friend of Spinoza's well
known
in
the scientific
Henry Oldenburg, of England as the first
history
v\^as
secretary of the Royal Society and the intimate friend of Robert
He
Boyle.
part of his
had settled in life,
in
1653
where he spent the best the course of a journey on
this country,
and in
;
the Continent he visited Spinoza at Rijnsburg and formed an
acquaintance with him, which, though opportunities of meeting
were few, was assiduously kept up by correspondence.
Oldenburg philosophy, and in
had, within discreet limits, a lively interest in
the earlier years of his intercourse with Spinoza was always press-
ing him not to keep back his knowledge from the world.
In the
same letter in which he informs Spinoza of the incorporation of the Royal Society, Oldenburg thus exhorts him to boldness :
I
would by
all
means advise you not
begrudge
to
men
to
of letters
the ripe fruits of your learning in philosophy and theology, but let
them go
forth into the world, whatever grumblings
may proceed from
Your commonwealth is most free, and therein the philosopher should work most freely. Your own prudence will counsel you to publish your thoughts and opinions with as little ostentation as may be ; I would have you, for the rest, commit the petty theologians.
issue to fortune.
Come
then,
my
up against you the pigmies of our time sacrifices sails to
to
the
their ignorance
wind of
and
;
too long have
trifling scruples
;
let
we made
us spread our
true knowledge, and search out the secrets of
nature more thoroughly than has yet been done. it
fear of stirring
friend, cast out all
will be safe, I should think, to print
In your country
your reflections
;
nor
is
any
them to be feared among men of learning. If such are your patrons and promoters and such, I answer for it, you will find offence from
—why should you
Writing some
—
fear the detraction of the ignorant little
?
^
time afterwards, in the spring of 1663, 1
Ep. 7.
AND PHILOSOPHY
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
26
Oldenburg presses Spinoza yet more urgently work then in hand.
me
Permit
his
you (he says), whether you have finished that which you treat of the origin of things and their ask
to
important essay in
dependence from
their
understanding
Surely,
?
complete
to
first
cause, as well as of the
my
amendment of our
excellent friend, I believe that nothing
can be published more pleasant or acceptable to
men
of learning and
This is what a man of pleases theologians what your wit and temper should regard, more than of the present age and fashion, for by them truth is less regarded than their own advantage. I adjure you, therefore, by the bond of our friendship, by every duty of multiplying and spreading abroad the truth, not to withhold from us your writings on those subjects. But if there is any reason more grave than I perceive which hinders you from setting forth the work, I heartily beseech you to be at the pains to give me a summary of it by letter ; and by this service you shall know discernment than such a
as yours.
treatise
that you have earned a friend's gratitude.^
In the following repeated
letters
We
even stronger terms.
in
had some knowledge, though Tractatus
and exhortations are
these requests
it
Theologico- Politicus^
that
collect
Oldenburg
was by no means exact, of the of
the
treatise
Emendatione^ which was never finished, and has
De
Intellectus
come down
us as a fragment, and perhaps of an early draft of the
to
Ethics.
Oldenburg's language seems to mix up the different works, and his later
conduct
still
more
plainly
shows that he did not
know much of their contents. He was abundantly valiant in counsel
at this
time
the risk
before he had measured
but after the publication of the Tractatus Theologico-
;
we
find
his valour has all evaporated.
that
In 1675, when Spinoza thought of publishing the Ethics^ Oldenburg's talk was no longer of spreading all sail and defying the malice of Politicus
theologians.
Now
he
is all
for caution
and conformity
;
he again
invokes friendship, but this time to warn Spinoza against giving any sort of ground for attacks upon religion and virtue. Not that he refuses to take
consigned
to a
Dutch
some
copies of the
friend
in
1
Ep.
London 8.
book for
;
they
may
be
him, and he can
THE
LIFE OF SPINOZA
doubtless find purchasers for it
talked about.
to
remember
them
;
27
but he would rather not have
And when
he learnt from Spinoza that the pubHcation was indefinitely put ofF, his expression of regret was, to say the least, but lukewarm.^ It is only justice to Oldenburg that he had been in trouble himself in the meantime.
In 1667 he was suspected of introducing too much political news into his scientific correspondence, and spent nearly two months in
Tower.
the
After that experience he might well be cautious
all
round. earlier days of which we are now speaking Oldenburg was not unaided in his encouragement to Spinoza's philosophical work. Boyle's name is joined once and again in his messages of greeting and exhortation, and considerable parts of these letters are taken up with communications on questions of chemistry and pneumatics, conveyed through Oldenburg, which amount in effect
In the
between Spinoza and Boyle. They obviously knew and esteemed one another's work ; but there is no trace of any more direct intercourse. The miseries of the great plague and of the war between England and Holland are brought before us by a letter of Oldenburg's in the autumn of 1665. He has no news yet of a book about which Spinoza had asked him, " because the plague forbids to a scientific correspondence
almost
all traffic
besides which, this cruel
;
a very Iliad of mischiefs, and
The
the world."
is
war brings
like to leave
but
in
its
train
little civility
in
public meetings of the Royal Society, he adds,
but the individual by the danger of the times fellows are not unmindful of their quality, and pursue their Indeed meetings were shortly afterwards experiments in private. are suspended
;
members had followed the some time at least, interrupt
held at Oxford, whither several of the
But the war
Court. 2
did not, for
the correspondence, nor abate Oldenburg's curiosity for information.
In
December 1665 he
writes of a widespread report that the
dispersed nation of Israel was about to return to
The news Oldenburg 1
not
having
been
refuses credit to Epp. 62, 68, 71.
it,
confirmed
its
own
country.
from Constantinople,
but would like to 2
know how
Epp_ 29, 31.
it
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
28
AND PHILOSOPHY
The been received in the Jewish society of Amsterdam. allusion is to the stir produced throughout the Jewish world by
has
who
the impostor Sabbatai Zevi, of Smyrna,
proclaimed himself
as
the Messiah or something more, and obtained a large following
not only in the Levant but in
London
the synagogues of Europe.
all
In
the beHevers in his mission were testifying to their faith
by laying heavy odds that Sabbatai Zevi would be the crowned and anointed king of Jerusalem within two years. ^ But within from being crowned at Jerusalem, Constantinople, and completed the discom-
an even shorter time, so he was a prisoner at fiture
of those
Mahometan tensions,
The
who
far
had committed themselves to him by turning
a step which, decisive as
:
was ineffectual
his pre-
number of enthusiasts. forms for at least two or three
to sober a certain
delusion survived in various
One would
years longer.^
seemed against
it
give something to
know what were who had ex-
Spinoza's reflections on seeing the orthodox elders
communicated him rest)
(for Isaac
new
an easy prey to a
fall
But
vulgar kind.
not preserved
:
his
Aboab was
carried
away with the
heresy of the most gross and
answer to Oldenburg's inquiry
we know
not, indeed, if
is
unluckily
any answer were
at this point there ensues a break of ten years in the
sent, for
correspond-
ence of the two friends.
In 1663 Spinoza published the only work to which he ever his
name
;
the origin of
Oldenburg.
letters to
it
He
is
set
described by himself in one of his
had prepared a summary of the second
part of Descartes' Principles of Philosophy for the use of a pupil
whom
he did not choose to make fully acquainted with his
opinions, possibly Casearius.
Certain of Spinoza's friends became
curious about this manual, and desired
of Descartes'
work
also in
own
him
to treat the first part
the same manner.
This was done
within a fortnight, and Spinoza was then urged to publish the 1
Gratz,
X.
'^
"And
yet
226, 229.
most of them affirm that Sabatai
is
not turn'd Turk, but his
Shadow
only remains on Earth, and walks with a white Head, and in the habit of a Mahometan But that his natural Body and Soul are taken into Heaven, there to reside until the time appointed for the accomplishment of these Wonders." " The Counterfeit Messiah :
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
of the
Jews
at
Smyrna,
Burton, London, 1738).
1666 " (in
T%vo Journeys
to
Jerusalem^
etc., collected
by R.
THE
LIFE OF SPINOZA
29
book, which he readily agreed to do upon condition that one of his friends
would
revise the language,
that the author did not agree with
and write a preface explaining all
the Cartesian doctrine set
by him in the text. This task was undertaken by Dr. Meyer, and the book appeared at Amsterdam in the same year j in the following one a Dutch translation was issued by the same publisher. The contents were the exposition of two parts of Descartes' Principles^ a fragment of a third part, and an appendix of Metaphysical Reflections^ professedly written from a Cartesian point of view, but often giving significant hints of the author's real divergence from Descartes. Spinoza took little trouble in the matter himself, and attached no value to the publication except as a means of preparing the way for more important things. " On this opportunity," he writes to Oldenburg,
forth
"we may country "
some persons, holding the highest places in my meaning the De Witts, who certainly were among
find
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
Spinoza's visitors at Rijnsburg and the
anxious to see those other writings which
own,
Hague I
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; "who
acknowledge
and will therefore take such order that I can give
If the world without danger of any inconvenience. publish that shall soon something not I I doubt ;
be
will for
my
them
to
it
so happens,
if
not, I will
my peace than thrust my opinions upon men against The design the v/ill of my country and make enemies of them." The book of Spinoza and his friends was but partly effected.
rather hold
on Descartes excited considerable attention and interest, but the untoward course of public events in succeeding years was unfavourable to a Hberal policy, and deprived Spinoza of the support for
which he had looked.
We
make
estabHshed by this
two facts which are exposition of Descartes, and which have been
often overlooked.
One
may
here
a note in passing of
is
that if Spinoza had ever been a disciple
of Descartes, he had completely ceased to be so by the time
when
The he was giving lessons in philosophy to the pupil in question. other is that he did not suppose the geometrical form of statement method of arriving at philosophical work he made use of it to set forth opinions
and argument to be an truth
;
for in this
infallible
with which he himself did not agree, and proofs with which he
fs
— SPINOZA
30
:
HIS LIFE
AND PHILOSOPHY
was not satisfied. We do not know to what extent Spinoza's manual was accepted or taken into use by Cartesians, but its One accuracy as an exposition of Descartes is beyond question. of the many perverse criticisms made on Spinoza by modern writers is
that he did not understand the fundamental proposition cogho
ergo sum?-
In fact he gives precisely the same explanation of
it
given by Descartes himself in the Meditations. The next notable event in Spinoza's life is the publication of
that
is
the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus {16^0)
the
:
full title, as
by an early translator (1689), runs thus " A treatise partly theological and partly
Englished
:
political,
containing
some few discourses to prove that the liberty of philosophizing (that is, making use of natural reason) may be allowed without any prejudice to piety, or to the peace of any commonwealth ; and that the loss of public peace and religion itself must necessarily follow, where such a liberty of reasoning is taken away." The scope of the book is political and practical, not speculative. The final thesis to which all its apparatus of criticism leads up is that " in a free commonwealth it should be lawful for every man a proposition to think what he will and speak what he thinks " :
which, with due reservations in behalf of decency and civil order and the reservations were in no wise neglected by Spinoza has
—
—
now become common world.
It looks to
learning for the greater part of the civilized
our modern eyes infinitely
less
bold than the
arguments by which Spinoza maintained it. In order to gain his desired foundation for the freedom of speculative opinion, he plunges into an investigation of the nature of prophecy, the principles of Scriptural interpretation,
and the true provinces of theology
and philosophy, anticipating with wonderful grasp and insight almost every principle, and not a few of the results, of the school of historical criticism which has arisen within the last two or three generations ; a school which, through Lessing and his circle, is Taking the whole connected by direct descent with Spinoza. in the United Provinces 1
Foucher de Careil,
compris
it
we
cannot be surprised that even was thought needful to issue it without
contents of the treatise together,
Leihni-z, Descartes, et Sphioza, Paris,
le cogito ergo sum.''''
1862,
p.
75
:
"
il
n'a jamais
THE name Hamburg.
LIFE OF SPINOZA
31
of the author and with that of a fictitious printer at
the
The
recent fate of the Koerbaghs was there to
that freedom of conscience was
still
show
confined within pretty narrow
bounds even under the Protestant Government which was reputed
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;and
in
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;the
was
fact
and form of the
most
liberal in
The
such matters.
treatise are conciliatory,
tone
but with the kind of
Much hard hitting high-handed conciliation that exasperates. will be taken without complaint in downright argument ; but few men
can endure to be confuted from their
adversary
who
own
never fully shows his hand.
It
premisses by an is
more
tolerable
dogmatist to be confronted with novelties in speculative
for a
opinion than to be told that speculative opinions are in themselves indifferent lation, is still
and the truth that conduct does not depend on specu-
3
though exemplified abundantly by all generations of men, It is just to this unfamiliar and unwelcome to most of us.
unv/elcome truth that Spinoza bears a testimony of unsurpassed power in the Tractatus Theolog'ico-P oliticus ; but if anything more
were needed him, there
is
to explain the
yet
more
to
storm of polemic that
come.
We
have
said that
burst
upon
Spinoza does
not omit the necessary reservations in favour of the civil power ; we must add that he makes them not only freely but amply, so
amply that he has been charged by some of his modern censors with going about to deify mere brute force. He appeals, moreover, from the Churches to the State, as representing the worldly common-sense of the lay mind. He looks to an enhghtened civil magistrate to deliver men from the barren clamour of anathemas, almost as an Indian heretic vexed by the Brahmans may look to " This is the impartial secular arm of the British Government. a fervent appeal to the conclusion of the whole matter for him the State to save us from the untov/ard generation of metaphysical so Mr. Arnold sums it up in his admirable Article-makers " .^ If the English translator had been minded to give the essay book a second title, after the manner of English controversiaHsts ;
;
1
" Spinoza and the Bible," in Essays
reason
why
I
that justice could be done to the
which
my
in Criticism.
The
existence of this essay
have not dwelt more on the Tractatus Theologico-PoHticus.
studies do not extend.
theme only by
a
The
is
one
other
is
master of modern Biblical criticism, to
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; SPINOZA
32
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
:
of that day, he might fairly have called
Now
scriptural."
" Erastianism not
it
a great error to suppose that the
it is
may
quaHties
metaphy-
Whatever
Article-makers are stupid or undiscerning people.
sical
Un-
be desirable in those v^ho are to believe articles after
they are made, a great deal of energy and acuteness have gone to
making of them
the
;
and the
faculties
very sufficient to perceive the
rule,
drift
imperil their finished handiwork.
thus employed are, as a
of any
new
ideas that
may
In
1670 the generation of Article-makers was mighty in the Netherlands, and still pretty fresh from its great exercise at the Synod of Dort. It was fully on the alert, and lost no time in showing itself equal to the occasion. And the occasion was no common one, for the attack was not only powerful but vital. If there is anything that ecclesiastical dogmatists of it
all
parties are united in hating
with a perfect hatred,
the Erastian view of the relation of the State to religious
is
differences.
Spinoza probably never disguised from himself the opposition
he would have to encounter. Jarig Jellis
When
N. N. [Graevius of Utrecht]
Professor
me, among other
told
political treatise
name he
things,
how
^
saw me, he
lately
he had heard of
my
Theologico-
being translated into Dutch, and that a person whose know was on the point of printing the translation.
and stop the printing alone, but also from
in
his friend
did not
I therefore earnestly entreat
be sorry
In 1671 he wrote thus to
:
to see the
if it
many
you
to inquire
can be done. of
my
friends
book prohibited,
diligently into the matter,
This request is not from me, and acquaintance, who would
as it certainly will
be if
it
appears
Dutch.
seems that Spinoza's wishes were attended
no Dutch version appeared until 1693,2 some years after an English one had But the Synods v/ere already up in been pubhshed in London. arms, and in the spring of 1671 addressed a solemn complaint to the States-General concerning the printing and publishing of divers " Socinian and blasphemous books, to wit, the books called It
to, for
Patrum Polonorum quos unitarios vocant,' the famous book of Hobbes called Leviathan^ and moreover the '
Bibliotheca
1
Meinsma,
p.
336
n.
1
Bibliografie^
No.
17.
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; THE book
Tractatus
called
was given to
Sacrae
33
interpres^ as well
Scripturae
In
Theologico- Politicusr
effect
1674
by a formal prohibition of the book, which, anticipation of such a measure, or in order to obtain a
either in
this
Catholic countries, had already been issued in a second
in
sale
Philosophia
entitled
that
as
LIFE OF SPINOZA
works on medicine or behind the Reformed churches in Theologico - Politicus was ere long
edition with various false title-pages, as of
Rome was not far The Tractatus
history.-
diligence.
put on the Index, and
it
still
holds
the strangely
place in
its
mixed company of that catalogue with many of the best and some But the celebrity which came of the worst books of the world. to Spinoza by reason of this publication was not altogether of a When his treatise had disagreeable kind even in official quarters. been some three years before the world he received an invitation to the Chair of Philosophy at
Fabritius at the
command
Heidelberg, written by Professor
of the Elector Palatine Charles Lewis,
and couched in the most honourable terms. " restriction was in the following sentence ;
only hint of a
have the
will
freedom of speech in philosophy, which the prince
largest
fident that
Now
The You
it
you
is
is
con-
will not misuse to disturb the established religion."
hardly possible to suppose that the Elector and his
were unacquainted with the Tractatus Theologico- Politicus ; and if they were acquainted with its general purport, one to suspect that a phrase of such very mild caution is tempted may have been inserted only as a matter of form especially when we remember that established religion, as such, is treated by
advisers
;
Spinoza with great respect in the treatise
itself.
The
test
seems
almost framed to invite evasion. But even the semblance of evasion was repugnant to Spinoza's of intellectual truthfulness.
ideal
thus
He
answered the invitation
:
Had
it
ever been
my
desire to
occupy
a
chair in
any
faculty, I
could have wished for no other than that which the Most Serene time erroneously attributed to Spinoza.
^
This was
2
Bibliografe, Nos. 4-7.
for a
This protest was not the
first
:
it
was followed
in
the
course of the next few years by most of the ecclesiastical synods and councils in the
Netherlands.
Originally in Freudenthal, pp. 121 sjq.
D
SPINOZA
34
HIS LIFE
:
me by
Elector Palatine offers
AND PHILOSOPHY
your hands
;
and especially on account
of that freedom in philosophy which the prince
pleased to grant, to
is
say nothing of the desire I have long entertained to live under the
whose wisdom is the admiration of all men. But since I have never been minded to give public lectures, I cannot persuade myself to accept even this splendid opportunity, though I rule of a prince
have given long consideration to that I
For
bounds
I
class.
moreover, that
reflect,
the
I reflect, in
must give up philosophical research
teaching a
am
if I
cannot
I
to
first
place,
find time for
tell
within what
ought to confine that philosophical freedom you mention
I
in order to escape Âť
it.
any charge of attempting
Religious dissensions arise not so
religion.
men's zeal for religion
to disturb the established
much from
the ardour of
from their various dispositions and love
itself as
of contradiction, which leads them into
of decrying and con-
a habit
demning everything, however justly it be said. Of this I have already had experience In my private and solitary life ; much more, then, should I have to fear it after mounting to this honourable condition. You see, therefore, that I am not holding back in the hope of some better post, but for mere love of quietness, which I think I can in some measure secure If I abstain from lecturing in public. Wherefore I heartily beseech you to desire the Most Serene Elector that I may be allowed
to consider further
The
of this matter.^
We
Heidelberg was in 1673. have anticipated the order of events to keep the philosophic side of Spinoza's life call
to
from the one point
which
was
visibly touched
by the turmoil of public affairs. The misfortunes of the Netherlands in are the property of general history. Then took place the 1672 sudden and overwhelming invasion in which " the king of France distinct
came down
to
Utrecht
at
like
a
land
it
flood
insolent aggression, so far from uniting
the enemy, bred in the
Commonwealth
all
" ;
after
lives
spent
massacred by a frantic the friend of John de
It
mob
Witt
;
this
war of
a passion of panic that let
The
brothers
De
the service
of their country, were at the Hague. Spinoza had been he had accepted a small pension from
have been consulted by him In affairs of State. was not common with Spinoza to be visibly disturbed or angry
him, and
V
in
and
parties in resistance to
loose the worst excesses of domestic faction.
Witt,
-
is
^
said to
Ep. 48.
2
Burnet,
i.
321.
THE
LIFE OF SPINOZA
but by this event he was
much was
his
moved
35
by no other in his Hfe. So wonted self-control shaken that he was hardly as
restrained from expressing his indignation in public at the risk of
He was
his life.^
shortly afterwards, as
fell
out, to be exposed
to a similar risk, and for a not dissimilar cause.
While the head-
quarters of the French
then in
command
of
army were
it,
it
Utrecht the Prince of Cond6, invited Spinoza to visit him. There is no at
make
the
tempting to imagine
(as
evidence of any other motive than a genuine desire to philosopher's acquaintance, though
it
is
one or two writers have done) a secret political errand, and if the thing had happened while the De Witts were alive and in power, the supposition would have been plausible enough. All one can say is that, if there was any secret in the matter, it was so well kept as not to be penetrable either to Spinoza's enemies in his time, or to his friends in ours.
Spinoza proceeded to Utrecht
with a safe-conduct, but found that Cond(i had been in the meanHe waited some days, but Conde's absence time called away.
was prolonged, and he finally returned to the Hague without The French officers who entertained Spinoza having seen him. if that he would dedicate some work to Louis XIV. he suggested might probably count upon a pension but the proposal fell upon deaf ;
A
ears.
from
man who
could scarcely be prevailed on to accept favours
his friends at
him
patronizing
home was
not likely to
still
in
charge
But
a ferment, sinister
about Spinoza's journey had got abroad his
the reputation of
to the ruler of a hostile country.
Hague, men's minds being on
sell
at the
rumours
and he found himself return the object of the most alarming and most insidious that
can
upon a citizen
fall
landlord feared an assault,
if
-,
in
time
of war.
The
not the sack of the house, from the
among whom these reports were passing, and who might any moment resolve to lay violent hands upon Spinoza as a
populace at
French spy. ^
This was communicated by Spinoza himself
heures apres diner avec Spinoza
MM. il
de
j
il
me
to
Leibnitz.
"J'ay passe quelques
dit qu'il avait este porte, le
jour des massacres de
de Witt, de sortir la nuit et d'afficher quelque part, proche du lieu,
y aurait ultimi barbarorum. sortir, car
il
Mais son hote luy
se serait expose a etre dechire."
Careil, Leibniz, Descartes, et Spinoza,
p.
74.
avait ferme la
MS.
un papier ou
maison pour Tempecher
note of Leibnitz, ap. Foucher de
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
36
AND PHILOSOPHY
Spinoza, however, comforted his host with these words
"Fear nothing on
my
account
I
;
there are people enough, and of chief
who
know
well
comes of
motives
the
can easily justify myself;
men
in the
country too,
But whatever
journey.
crowd make the
so soon as the
it,
my
of
:
least noise
at
your
go out and make straight for them, though they I should serve me as they have done the unhappy De Witts. am a good republican, and have never had any aim but the door,
will
I
honour and welfare of the
The
State."
but
danger passed off;
none the
less
Spinoza'a conduct under
Even
in
is
was unquestionably a our own times, notably in France
worthy of admiration,
very serious one.
it
for
it
during the war of 1870, many innocent persons have been in imminent peril, or have actually lost their lives, on far slighter circumstances of supposed evidence
than appeared in this case.
The
the light
incident also has
value in
its
general esteem in which Spinoza then stood. ness,
not merely
ot
it
throws on the
For the conscious-
an innocent purpose, but of a character above
the possibility of rational suspicion, was necessary to
his visit
French headquarters prudent or justifiable and the authoriof his own country would assuredly never have consented to it
to the ties
make
;
had they not
felt
no way
suffer
known
friend of
by
absolute confidence that the public good it.
It
is
would
in
indeed almost surprising that Spinoza, a
John de Witt, was in the existing state of affairs allowed to go to the French camp at all. Meanwhile Spinoza had been working at the Ethics^ and before the end of 1674 manuscript copies of the finished work were in About the end of July 1675 he the hands of some of his friends.^ made an excursion to Amsterdam in order to arrange for the pubWhat befell him there is best told in the lication of the book. words of
his
own
letter to
Oldenburg.
was busy with this, the report was spread everywhere that a certain book of mine was in the press, wherein I endeavoured to show that there was no God ; and this report found credence with
While
many. of
it)
I
Whereupon
certain theologians (themselves perhaps the authors
took occasion to complain of 1
me
to the prince
Epp. 59, 64.
and the magis-
THE LIFE OF SPINOZA
37
moreover the stupid Cartesians, being supposed to side with me and desiring to free themselves from that suspicion, were diligent without ceasing in their execration of my doctrines and writings, and Having knowledge of these matters from trustare as diligent still.
trates
;
worthy persons, who likewise told me that the theologians were laying plots against me on all sides, I determined to put off the publication until I could see the issue of the affair, and then to signify my designs But the business inclines, as it seems, to the worse from day to you. to day,
and
The time.
I
know not
yet what I shall do.
was that nothing more was done in Spinoza's lifeHe had shown that he could endure much in silence rather result
than barter a jot of his freedom, but he did not choose to be vexed with the petty warfare of clerical controversy ; he must have felt the assurance that his
work would
or later in the date of
its
live,
and that a few years sooner
Can
appearance would be indifferent.
he have surmised that the few years by which the publication was postponed would be a mere fraction in comparison with the time during which his thoughts were in the world but not perceived by it, misunderstood by those who took notice of them, and unheeded by those
who might
have understood
dreamt of the splendour with which to a newer world after the period of treasures of light and vital
poetry of a mighty nation
fire
his
Can he have even
?
work was
to shine forth
up
eclipse, giving
its
hidden
inform the philosophy and
to
Such fame as Spinoza's is the reward only of those who are above fame in their lives. In the autumn of 1676 an event happened which, for inhighly creditable reasons, was afterwards so telligible if not successfully minimised by the person chiefly concerned that it has been restored to
modern
scholar,
published. 1
Spinoza. finally
*
due importance only by the work of a
and since the
edition of this
first
book was
Leibnitz spent some time at Amsterdam, and visited
His
settled
own
;
philosophical opinions were then by
they were not
Leibnix und Spinoza.
Philosophies
its
?
von Prof.
Dr.
so,
indeed,
till
nearly ten years
Ein Beitrag zur Entivtckelungsgeschichte da-
Ludwig
Stein,
Berlin,
1890.
no means
Prof.
Stein's
Lelbni-zischen
proofs
that
Leibnitz was at this time deeply interested in Spinoza's philosophy, and at least favourably disposed towards
its
leading principles, are to
my mind
conclusive.
;s
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
38
He
later.
new
was
AND PHILOSOPHY
with Cartesianism, and in search of
dissatisfied
When
he was ready with his matured system, antiCartesian, anti-Spinozist, and dehberately aiming, if the use of a hght.
modern catchword may be pardoned,
the reconciHation of
at
rehgion and science, he spoke of Spinoza in a tone of polemic opposition, though to the last he thought highly enough of his
powers to consider
not the
it
least
own
of his
merits
to
have
But there is now no doubt that in 1676 he was powerfully attracted by what he knew of Spinoza. This early admiration seemed to him discovered
the
effectual
antidote
to
Spinozism.^
afterwards an error of his philosophical youth
and would gladly have forgotten
it
originally
meant
for publication did
it
;
only
he repented of
;
he admit that he had once had
Spinozistic leanings,'^ and he represented his conversation
Spinoza
having consisted of ordinary talk on public
as
which, he
But
with
affairs, ot
Spinoza had told him some pretty good
said,
not
writings
in
stories.
had repeated interviews with Spinoza, talked
in fact Leibnitz
philosophy with him, discussed the Cartesian proof of the exist-
ence of God, and propounded an amended one of his own, quod
Ens Perfecthsimum
existit^
Leibnitz then wrote Spinoza,
ing to a
who
which
did not at first satisfy Spinoza.
down
the proof and
finally
admitted
note made by Leibnitz
himself.^
its
in writ-
it
validity according
to
This shows much more
Nay
than curiosity on Leibnitz's part.
showed
more, there
is
reason to
think that the real object of Leibnitz's stay in Holland
was none
make
other than to
Spinoza's acquaintance.
The
introduction
was managed by Dr. George Hermann SchuUer, a German physician resident at Amsterdam, and a friend of both Leibnitz and Spinoza, and a passing allusion of Schuller's
in
a letter to
Leibnitz informs us that the relations between the two philosophers became confidential enough for Spinoza to let Leibnitz see the 1
" C'est justement par
auroit raison, p.
3'il
ces
Monades que
n'y avoit point de
le
Spinosisme
Monades."
est ddtruit
Leibnitz, 0pp.
.
Phil.
.
.
il
ed.
[Spinoza")
Erdmann,
720. 2
Nowveaux
3
" Ostendi
solidam
esse
schedam
ei
Essais.
banc ratiocinationem D, Spinosae, cum Hagae Comitis essem, qui putavit, cum enim initio contradiceret, scripto comprehendi et banc
praelegi."
Stein, op.
cit. p.
282.
THE MS.
LIFE OF SPINOZA
39
of the Ethics^ with which he had declined to entrust Leibnitz
knew him personally. may well suppose that Leibnitz was allowed to make for his own use. It also seems quite likely that some
before he
We extracts
of Spinoza's letters were communicated by him to Leibnitz in
At any
the drafts or copies which he preserved.
was
about the publication of the Opera
interested, even eager,
Posthuma^ and very soon
after
they were published showed, in his
with their contents which
letters to various persons, a familiarity
can hardly be accounted
We
volume.
may
Leibnitz
rate
for
by a
reading of the printed
first
be sure, too, that the previous correspondence
between Leibnitz and Spinoza had not been confined, as the world was led to think for two centuries, to a simple exchange of letters
on technical questions of
instance, heard of Spinoza's
Tschirnhausen,
or
most
Spinoza's
shall
meet with
though he was naturally reserved both in writing
sympathy
His
unchanged during
was
to persons
too orthodox
for notorious heretics.
first
Paris through Tschirnhaus
in
correspondents.
acute
towards Spinoza
work
whom we
Leibnitz had, in the
optics.
The
next
few
years,
public utterances and
in
to
attitude
friendly
the
one of
as
later
be trusted with
much
subsequent reaction against
Spinozism, which started from dissatisfaction with Spinoza's rejection of final causes, passed through a
marked Platonic
then took an Aristotelian turn before
phase, and
the doctrine of
Monads
was worked out about the end of 1685, belongs to the history of Leibnitz's philosophy rather than Spinoza's.^
Spinoza had
many
now
but
little
more of
fife
before him.
For
he had suffered from consumption, to which he inherited a tendency, and the disease had made alarming progress,^ years
work of glass-poHshing. On Sunday, the 2 1 St of February 1677, the end came almost suddenly. Spinoza had indeed sent to Amsterdam for his friend and physician Lewis Meyer but on the Saturday he had spent the afternoon in talk aggravated, perhaps, by his
;
^
From
-
" D[ominus] B. de S. vereor ut brevi nos derelicturus
this point of
view
it is
traced by Prof. Stein,
haereditarius) in dies ingravescere videatur."
1677,
ap. Stein, Le'tbni'z u. Spinoza^ p.
285.
op. cit. sit,
cum
pthisis
(morbus
ipsi
SchuUer to Leibnitz, the 6th of February
SPINOZA
40
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
:
Sunday he came down again in the morning, and spoke with them before they went to hear Dr. Cordes, Colerus's predecessor in the Lutheran church at the Hague. They were so far from any immediate apprewith
usual
hosts as
his
and on
;
the
him
hensions that they went out again in the afternoon, leaving
When
alone with Meyer.
Spinoza was no longer
that
surprise,
who was with him at Amsterdam. He is charged by
only person
and rapacity
;
the
tion
his
last,
returned forthwith to
making booty of a But this the room.
or rather, in plain terms, with
so grossly improbable that
may have
Dr. Meyer, the
alive.
Colerus with neglect of duty
money
silver-handled knife and the loose is
home
they came
they found, to their
we
in
can only disregard
it.
Colerus
not been sorry to compensate himself for the admira-
honesty
native
him
compelled
yield to
to
Spinoza's
character by giving currency to a piece of malignant gossip about a friend
opinions, and story,
known
of Spinoza's,
who,
as a
or
suspected
share
to
Spinoza's
person only coming incidentally into the
But
had no particular claim to be treated with justice.
must be given to Colerus, on the other hand, for his downright contradiction of the tales concerning Spinoza's deathbed which were circulated, it would seem, by persons who thought it would tend to edification to represent Spinoza as the
credit
who
blustering infidel of popular orthodox polemics, assailed
by doubt and disquietude
in
his
them with
invariably strives to disguise
knew nothing
invariably
moments, and
last
as
feeble bravado.^
Colerus
whom
he more
very honestly says that the people of the house,
than once questioned,
is
of any such matters, and did
not believe a word of them.
Spinoza
left
behind him but a scanty estate
forty volumes,'^ a
certain 1
One
few engravings, the
number of of these stories
is
finished
lenses
;
tools
which
some
:
thirty or
of his trade, and a last,
we
are
told,
circumstantially repeated by Bayle, Pensees Di'va-ses, ยง
18
1,
" Vanit-i de Spinoza a I'heure de mort." 2
The
catalogue,
which has been
library had, by Spinoza's after
his
Stein, op.
to buy.
death, clt.
p.
and,
it
own
desire,
preserved,
shows nearly 120.
But the best of the been taken away by Schuller before or immediately
seems, distributed
among
289, reporting that nothing was
his
friends.
left
which he could advise Leibnitz
Schuller to Leibnitz,
THE LIFE OF SPINOZA fetched a good
price
besides
41
modest list of personal enumerated by Colerus, and in all so little more than would cover debts and expenses that the surviving sister Rebekah, who at first was disposed to assert her rights, concluded ;
these a
effects, carefully
inheritance was not worth having.
that the
Yet Spinoza had
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
one precious legacy to dispose of the desk containing his letters and unpublished work. Van der Spijck had been charged to convey
death
at
the
year, but without the author's full
own
explains that this was by his
The
Rieuwertszoon, a
Jan was
to
Amsterdam. The trust faithfully executed, Opera Posthu?na appeared in the course of the same
pubHsher
and
Spinoza's
after
this
writer's
name
(they say)
elsewhere only by his
initials
name.
editors' preface
request.
is
expressed on the title-page and
which
;
The
is
done
for
no other reason
than that, shortly before his death, he specially desired that his
should not be prefixed
The
them.
to his Ethics,
only reason for
this prohibition was, as
we
think, that he
chose not that his doctrine should be called after his name. says in the
who
Appendix
name
while he directed the printing of
to the fourth part of the Ethics,
cap.
For he that
25,
by counsel or deed to the common enjoyment of the chief good shall in no wise endeavour themselves that a doctrine be called after their name. Moreover in the third part of the Ethics, in the iith definition of the Passions, where he they
explains those
desire to aid others
the nature of ambition, he plainly charges with vainglory
who do
This
after this sort.
preface,
it
seems, was written by L.
Meyer
;
the pub-
was directed and supervised, as we now know, by G. H. Schuller. His first idea was to persuade Leibnitz's master, the Duke lication
of Hanover, to buy the in
this offer,
overcome promptly
MS.
of the Ethics.
Spinoza's other surviving
their scruples about
Rather than concur
friends
appear
immediate publication, and
settled the plan of the
have
to to
have
Opera Posthuma with Schuller.^
West FriesB. D. S. Opera
In the following year the States of Holland and land,
being
satisfied
that
the
Posthuma " labefactated " various
book
entitled
essential articles of the faith
and
"vilipended the authority of miracles," expressed "the highest ^
Schuller to Leibnitz, Stein,
op. cit.
SPINOZA
42
indignation "
dealing in
The
at
and
atheistic,
:
the disseminating thereof,
it
profane,
selling,
and
high displeasure.^
their
framers of this well-meant enactment earned a permanent
remembrance
for
Instead of their
work,
their
but not
quite
ordinance extinguishing
Ethics have preserved the It
declared
and forbade printing,
blasphemous,
on pain of
it,
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
memory
they desired.
as
Spinoza's
Ethics^ the
of the ordinance.
remains to say something of Spinoza's manner of daily Hfe
and outward habit entirely
through
-,
which however,
as
account, so
Colerus's
we know them they are
almost
presented
by
Colerus with a kind of simple quaintness more impressive than
any studied description can be. The effect of those particulars which we possess is to show us a man who was led to a retired Hfe by choice and circumstance, not by ostentation to an almost incredible frugality by reasons of health and economy, not by ascetic pride who could be free-spoken and of good will towards all sorts of men, but would be dependent on none. His living and diet were of the simplest, his expenses amounting sometimes only to a few pence for the whole day. But he kept down his expenses in this manner chiefly, if not wholly, in order to keep them within his means just making both ends meet, as he would ;
;
;
i^
say of himself, like a snake with
its tail
in its
mouth.
And
his
means remained slender to the last because he did not choose to live on patronage, and the studies to which he devoted the best of his mind had even less bread-winning virtue then than they have now. It is reported that Spinoza, on hearing that a man who owed him 200 florins had become bankrupt, said with a smile, " I must retrench my allowance to make up for this little matter at this price one buys equanimity." 2 Again, Spinoza Hved in a retirement which at times might be ;
1
The 25th
2
This anecdote is only in " Lucas," and as given by him has a slightly theatrical He adds a sort of apologetic explanation " Je ne rapporte pas cette action comme
air.
of June 1678.
Groot Placaet Boek,
3cle deel, p.
525
:
Bibliografe,
No. 24.
:
quelque chose d'eclatant, mais
comme
il
n'y a rien en quoi
le
genie paraisse davantage
qu'en ces sortes de petites choses, je n'ai pu I'omettre sans scrupule." saying reminds one of Epictetus {Man.
dirddeia,
roaovrov drapa^ia.
makes the
story
more rather than
c.
12, 2), iiriXeye 6tl
But, as Epictetus was
less
probable.
The
turn of the
toctovtov TrojXeTraL
among
Spinoza's books this
THE called solitude his
chamber
;
for
LIFE OF SPINOZA
43
when absorbed in work he would hardly leave many days together once he did not leave the ;
house for three months.^
But
if
on these occasions he chose
to be
was not that he loved solitude for its own sake. He had none of the shallow pride and arrogance which fancies that the way to show superior knowledge is to disdain the common intercourse of mankind. There was no touch of misanthropy
alone,
it
from the world which he imposed upon himself. Besides keeping up a not inconsiderable correspondence, Spinoza visited and was visited by not a few men of letters and learning in the retirement
;
we
there was a time, as
him few hours
their civilities left
Nor
own
gather from his
to call his
when
statements,
own.
did he limit his converse to scholars
:
he
knew how
to
win the esteem and affection of the simple folk of the household where he dwelt, an esteem which, as M. Renan has well said, is in truth the most precious of all. He talked freely and familiarly with his hosts the Van der Spijcks, and would counsel their children to good behaviour and obedience. He discussed with them the sermons of Dr. Cordes, the Lutheran pastor who preceded
Spinoza's
biographer
Lutheran congregation give
all
Bold
as
attention
at the
the
to
Colerus
the
in
charge of
the
Hague, and recommended them
discourses
of so excellent
a
he was in speculative thought, and detached in
to
teacher. his
own
and doctrines, Spinoza was no furious He did not seek to make nominal iconoclast in private life. proselytes who would have been neither the wiser nor the happier person
from
all
sects
their conversion,
for
attacked
him with
and when the good
woman
of the
house
a point-blank question as to the sufficiency of
her religion for salvation, he answered that her religion was good if it led
her to a good
life,
and she had no need to seek further.
But the strength of Spinoza's he attached
to fellowship
social feelings,
among men
as the
and the importance
only means by which
worthy of his nature, are most evidently shown in his Ethics ; and the ideal of human life which he there sets forth, and to which he himself was faithful in action, will come under our notice when we endeavour to obtain a view of his philosophy.
man
can
live a life
^
Pref. to Opera Posthuma.
——
CHAPTER
II
Spinoza's correspondence Treu clem Gesetz und treu Dir selbst
He He
We
—
so bleibst
that feeds serves all
du
Proverb.
frei.
men serveth few who dares be true.
j
Emerson.
have already made use of some of Spinoza's
supplement the rather meagre outlines of
from other sources.
possess
Hereafter
his
we
letters in order to
shall
have to refer to
others as containing important passages of authentic
on
his philosophy.
mediate
character,
But we have which,
while
their
speculative rather than personal, yet
Spinoza's systematic thought. in itself,
and
much
that
is
They
lie
commentary
number of an
a certain
interest
is
outside the
contain
we
biography which
much
inter-
literary
main that
is
and
lines
of
curious
useful as an introduction to Spinoza's
manner of thinking and discussion and we may find it worth while to dwell a little upon them before we finally quit the ground of biography and enter upon that of criticism. It is pleasant to linger in a borderland where speculation is still relieved by personal incidents. Of Spinoza's correspondence with Oldenburg and De Vries we have already seen something what remains in those quarters is of strictly philosophical interest. Another friend of Spinoza who must have been in constant intercourse with him was Dr. Lewis Meyer, who undertook the publication
general
;
;
of Cartesian Philosophy and was afterwards What has become of the joint editor of the Opera Posthuma. of
the
letters
ately,
Principles
which passed between these two the answer
is
that
we have
?
At
present, unfortun-
one, and only one, preserved in
— SPINOZA'S
CORRESPONDENCE
45
the Opera Posthuma^ this being an answer to a letter of Meyer's, probably written on behalf of the philosophical club at Amsterdam, and asking Spinoza for the result of his speculations on the
Here, again,
Infinite.
we must
leave the contents for the present
untouched, only remarking the comparatively early date (1663) of the letter. It belongs to the Rijnsburg time, and shows, together
De Vries, that the groundwork at least of Spinoza's system as we now have it was by that time fully formed. Oldenburg, Meyer, and De Vries naturally wrote, as scholars, with the
in Latin
replied
to
letters
(De Vries not without a touch of Batavism), and Spinoza to them in the same language, writing carefully, and
even indulging in purisms he will not put the scholastic form " essendi " before Meyer without an apology.^ But there were :
other
The
less
who
learned correspondents
the vernacular.
preferred
m
originals of their letters are apparently preserved
the
Opera Posthurna^ which was published Dutch version But with Spinoza's almost simultaneously with the Latin text. of the
own
replies to
them
it is
not
Two
so.
of Spinoza's
Dutch
letters
are preserved as he wrote them, and the editors of the " Nagelate
Schriften " found
make considerable amendments In one of them Spinoza expressly apologises in the written language. There is some
necessary to
it
in their composition. for not being perfect
reason to think the Latin versions of the letters originally sent in
Dutch were prepared
The
lion's share
of bulk at
least,
for publication
by Spinoza himself.^
of the miscellaneous correspondence, in point
belongs to William van Blyenbergh, a worthy
merchant and municipal officer of Dort, and a citizen of good family, who was mightily taken, by his own account, with Spinoza's Principles of Cartesian Philosophy.
he wrote to Spinoza Dear
Sir
in these
terms
and unknown Friend
—
December 1664
In
:
I
have already had the pleasure
of several times carefully reading over your treatise lately published, 1
" Iiifinitam existendi sive (invita Latinitate) essendi fruitionem."
'^
See Prof. Land's paper, Over de
1879, and the note
Dutch from an
p.
above.
1 1
early age
j
eerste uitga-ven der brieve?!
Spinoza must have been
van in
—Ep.
Spino'za,
29.
Amsterdam,
the habit of speaking
but there was already in Dutch, as in English, a
difference between literary and colloquial usage.
marked
SPINOZA
46
together with
its
Appendix.
of the pleasure I derived from
and that
;
I
exceeding solidity
This
it.
much
I
me
to speak
found in
and
it
I cannot forbear saying,
with attention, the more I am pleased constantly find something which I had not marked
that the oftener I go over it
be more proper for
It will
to others than to yourself of the
with
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
:
it
before.
He
proceeds to enlarge (in a style
much improved by
the
Latin translation) on his sincere love of philosophic truth
as
the
only thing deserving of affection in this transitory
on
his
admiration for the knowledge and Spinoza's work, and
of a
man
on
so favoured, and
philosophic felicity
make
his desire to
life,
shown
in
the personal acquaintance
disappointment in having been
his
prevented, by various causes, from introducing himself to Spinoza face to face instead of
by
He
letter.
had meant only to ask, in a
preliminary way, whether he might trouble Spinoza with some of his difficulties;
"not
but,
to leave the letter quite
empty," he
one of them forthwith, which concerns the question of If, according creation, especially as bearing on the origin of evil.
states
to
what
is
by Spinoza, both in his exposition
said in various places
own commentary, God is the immediate cause, not only of the existence of the human soul but of its particular operations, is not God the immediate cause of evil of Descartes and in his
example, the determination of
for
volitions,
forbidden fruit
Adam
to
eat
the
Blyenbergh professes himself puzzled, but con-
?
fidently awaits a satisfactory answer, and adds a sentence ominous
" Be assured, dear
of future garrulity
:
other cause than
desire
interests
;
I
am
for
sir,
that I ask this for
the truth, and
no
have no particular
unattached, dependent on no profession
;
I
live
by honest merchandise, and spend my leisure on these subjects. I humbly pray you not to find my difficulties troublesome." Spinoza seems to have thought from this first letter that Blyenbergh was a man of some
real
At any
gained a valuable acquaintance.
unknown
correspondent with a
Unknown
Friend
love of truth, and since
I
direct
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; From
how
rate,
that he had
he received his
warm welcome.
your
that only
my mind upon
capacity, and
understand your exceeding the aim of all your desires ; and
letter 1 is
naught
else, this constrains
me
to deter-
SPINOZA'S
CORRESPONDENCE
47
mine, not only fully to grant your request, which is to answer to the best of my skill the questions which you now send or shall send hereafter, but to perform all else on my part which may avail for our better acquaintance
and sincere
among
my own
things out of
control
into the bonds of friendship with
For
friendship.
none
men who
For myself,
I prize
there
more than entering
are sincere lovers of truth.
own men of
believe that nothing in the world, not being under our
I
control, can be so securely taken for the object of our love as
temper
this
is
;
since
no more possible
'tis
have for one another (seeing
it
they
to dissolve that love
founded on the love each of them
is
hath for the knowledge of truth) than not to embrace the truth
when once delightful
perceived.
which can
This love
is,
itself
moreover, the most perfect and
exist towards objects not in our control, since
no
other thing has such virtue as truth to unite men's minds and affections. I say
nothing of the exceeding conveniences that spring from
it,
that
may no longer detain you with matters which you doubtless well know I have however done so thus far, the better to show how pleasant it is to me now, and will be in future, to hnd any occasion
I
;
of doing you service.
He
then takes up the question proposed by Blyenbergh.
After
observing that Blyenbergh has not defined his notion of
Spinoza declares that for evil
his part
have any positive reahty,
contrary to God's will
nay,
:
he cannot allow that
much it
is
really existing
relation to other things,
is
equivalence of reality and perfection
human
sin against or offend
consider
perfect as far as is
and
sin
that anything happens
only an inexact and
man can thing, if we
fashion of speech to say that
For every
less
evil^
its
it
God.
apart from
its
existence goes (this
one of the keynotes of
Thus, taking Blyenbergh 's example of Adam's determination to eat the forbidden fruit, there is no im-
Spinoza's metaphysic).
perfection in the act as such.
standard of comparison
;
we
Approval or disapproval implies a are
simply amused by actions in
animals which are the object of moral condemnation in men.
note of imperfection, and therefore something apart from the action itself, in so far as it partakes of or " expresses reality."
Sin
it
is
a
Again, we cannot say that Adam's will was evil inasmuch as For we cannot assume anything to happen displeased God.
against God's will without assuming imperfection in God, whose
AND PHILOSOPHY
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
48
being coextensive with
will, indeed,
his
understanding, an event
against God's will could only be an event repugnant to the laws
of understanding.
Adam's determination, then, was not
considered in
nor yet,
will
;
itself,
and there
is
no
strictly speaking,
admitting
difficulty in
evil
contrary to God's
God
to have been
was a real action. Its evil consisted in Adam's losing in consequence of it the state of perfection he enjoyed before. But loss is merely negative, and the conception of it a relative one which has no place in absolute intellect. Our notion of imperfection arises from an individual not conforming to the type of the class which we have obtained by a the cause of
it,
so far as
it
But
process of abstraction.
has no need
intellect
infinite
of
abstraction or definition, and therefore does not and cannot regard
anything
as
Everything
imperfect.
as
is
real
and
as perfect
as
power has made it in other words, as perfect as it can We call things good or bad in their kinds but the divine be. This Spinoza thinks intellect sees everything as perfect in itself.^ but he goes on to a sufficient answer on speculative grounds the divine
:
;
;
As
the practical bearings of the matter. Scriptures, they speak
ascribing
to
God
popular, not
a
in
a
philosophic manner,
anger, jealousy, and even
" Thus the precept given
to
Adam
language of the
to the
liability
to
error.
consisted only in this, that
God revealed to Adam that eating of that tree caused death just as God reveals to us through natural understanding that poison is If you ask for what purpose God revealed this to deadly to us. ;
Adam,
answer, in order to
knowledge.
in a
I
more
""-^
If
perfect will,
you it
is
make him
to that extent
more
perfect
why he did not give Adam asking why God has not endowed
ask, again, like
the circle with the properties of the sphere.
Then
as to the objection that if all
the wicked do
it
no
fashion, but their lot
less is
than the good
:
men
do the will of God,
they do
it
nevertheless very different.
indeed in their
Knowing
not
" Quum ergo mala et peccata in rebus nihil sint, Cf. Cogit. Met. pt. ii. c. 7, § 4 tantum in mente humana res inter se comparante, sequitur Deum ipsa extra mentes Deo singularium cognitionem tribuimus, humanas non cognoscere." And § 5 " universalium denegamus, nisi quatenus mentes humanas intelligit," 2 Cf. Tract. Theol.-Polit. c. 4, §§ 26, 27, where it is said that the revelation was a command or precept only in respect of Adam's imperfect knowledge. 1
:
sed
:
.
.
.
SPINOZA'S
CORRESPONDENCE
49
God, they serve him as a blind instrument in the workman's hand, which perishes in the using the righteous do their service with knowledge, and are made more perfect therein. ;
The in
only parts of Spinoza's ethical theory, and
letter discloses
language adapted to the assumptions of his questioner
many
to
readers,
Yet
aback by them.
but
form they may still and Blyenbergh was entirely taken
Even
these parts are characteristic.
seem daring
;
in this
the leading idea of the letter
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;namely,
that
the notions of good and evil are relative, and have place only in finite intellects
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;had
Observe
nides.
been enunciated centuries before by
complete Nominalism,
Spinoza's
also
important practical use he makes of
it
Maimoand the
against the anthropomorphic
view of the government of the world.
Ten
days later Blyenbergh replied in a very long epistle, the
contents of which
and enlarges on destroys leaves
no ground
own
its
make
protests that Spinoza's doctrine
between right and wrong, and
As for too weak
for preferring virtue to vice.
human
sake,
"See what ground we give
We
He
his objections.
practical" difference
all
virtue for
needless to state further than that he repeats
it is
nature
far
is
to all godless
men and
beginning of the himself in
Blyenbergh
letter that
philosophy.
for that.
their impiety
!
no better than
ourselves like stocks, and our actions
the works of a watch."
desiring
also explains to
Spinoza
at the
he has two rulQS wherewith to guide
Reason and Scripture
;
and that
if
the
apparently clear conclusions of his reason differ from the revealed
word, he can only suppose that his reason
is
wrong.^
This disclosure was a surprise to Spinoza, who answered that on such conditions discussion would not be very profitable.
When
I
well agreed
read your ;
first
letter,
but from the second
and perceive that we
differ
thought that our opinions pretty
I I
understand
first
insomuch
can scarce believe that
another further by firm
it
may
quite otherwise,
not only in the consequences that
be drawn from that I
it is
principles, but also in the principles themselves
letters.
For
I
we
see that
it
agree with
;
be able to instruct one no demonstration, however
shall
be according to the laws of demonstration,
with you unless
may
may
prevail
the interpretation that you, or other 1
Ep. 20.
E
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
50
theologians
familiar
AND PHILOSOPHY
you, put upon
to
Holy Writ.
If
you
find the
(which also
light of Scripture clearer than the light of reason
is
given
by divine wisdom), you are doubtless right in your own conscience For my part, since I plainly confess in making your reason yield. that I do not understand the Scriptures, though I have spent many us
when once I have a firm proof I cannot by any course of thought come to doubt of it, I rest wholly upon that which my understanding commends to me, without any suspicion that I am deceived therein, or that the Scriptures, even though
years upon them, and since I
I
know
that
do not search them, can speak against
flict
with another,
the
Principles
the country I
to pass ness,
my Appendix
to
of Descartes (I cannot give the chapter, as here in But if in any case I did have not the book by me).^
which
find error in that ing, I should
have already clearly shown in
I
as
For one truth cannot con-
it.
count
I
good fortune, since
it
my
have collected from I
natural understand-
enjoy
life,
and endeavour
not in weeping and sighing, but in peace, joy, and cheerful-
it
and from time
to
time climb thereby a step higher.
I
know,
meanwhile (which is the highest pleasure of all), that all things happen by the power and unchangeable decree of the most perfect Being.
He
then turns to the matter of Blyenbergh's objections, which
way of regarding God in his relations to man as a magnified human judge whereas in Spinoza's view the reward of
depend on
his
;
serving
God
not as
is
quence of the work happiness, follows
were a
it
prize, but the necessary conse-
The love of God, which from the knowledge of God as itself.
follows from the nature of a triangle that the
two
"
right angles.
One may
is
man's highest
necessarily as
sum of
its
angles
it is
easily give a general proof of this,
one will only consider the nature of God's decrees, as I have explained in my Appendix. ^ But I confess that all those who
if
confound the divine nature with that of man are very inapt to ^
Cogit.
Met.
pt.
c. 8,
ii.
"Veritas
§ 5.
quales vulgo fingunt, docere potest. naturali asset contrarium, refellere 1
res
eadem
Si
veritati
enim
non repugnat, nee
scriptura nugas,
in ipsa inveniremus aliquid,
libertate,
qua Alcoranum
7,%7
Dei volitiones
et
Thalmud
quod lumini
refellimus, illam
possemus."
Cjgit.
creatas
Met. :
pt.
ii.
c.
" Dei idea
" respectu Dei
unum
et
9
j
sive
cf. c.
decretum."
:,
Cf. too
= eius c.
cognitio circa
4.
Deum ab aeterno rectis, vel Deum hoc ipsum
idem affirmamus, quum dicimus
voluisse tres angulos trianguli aequales esse duobus
et decreta
Tract. Theol.-Pol.
§§
24, 25
:
decrevisse et intellexisse.''
SPINOZA'S CORRESPONDENCE comprehend
this."
dependent on
God
51
Spinoza further shows how Blyenbergh had misunderstood both himself and Descartes, and then repHes with some warmth to the charge that his doctrine is Hkely to have mis" When you say that by making men so chievous consequences. stones, that
full
is
make them Hke
I
the natural elements, herbs, or
my
proof that you take
meaning much
amiss,
and confuse things which are of the understanding with things of the imagination. For if you had clearly conceived in your understanding what dependence on
God
you would never think that things, forasmuch as they depend on God, are dead, corporeal, and imperfect (as who has ever dared speak so meanly of the most perfect being ?) ; you would understand, on the contrary, that thereby, and forasmuch as they depend on God, they are perfect is,
-,
so that
we
best understand this dependence,
ation of things by God's decrees,
and the necessary oper-
when we
look, not
upon stocks
and herbs, but upon the most reasonable and perfect creatures. I
cannot forbear saying that
If
God were
I
greatly
amazed when you
.
.
say.
not to punish evil (to wit, as a judge doth, with a
punishment that the
evil itself
only difference), what reason
manner of wickedness
all
am
.
?
is
brings not with
it,
for that
is
our
there that I should not run into
Surely he
who
things only for fear of punishment (which
abstains from such I
will not think of
no way moved by love towards God, and has mighty little affection for virtue. For my part, I let such things alone, or endeavour so to do, because they would be clearly at strife with my proper nature, and lead me astray from the knowledge and the love of God." you)
is
As that
in
in
to
the rule of submission to the Scriptures, Spinoza says
his opinion
it
is
a
more
Scriptures to recognize that they speak parables than to put hasty
way of treating the in human language and in interpretations upon them
respectful
and absurd
for the purpose of contradicting natural reason.
" Matters of high
speculation have, I think, nothing to do with the Scriptures.
my
part, I
ture,
For
have learnt none of God's eternal attributes from Scrip-
nor have been able to learn any."
One would Blyenbergh,
think
nothing
this
answer not very encouraging,
daunted,
returned
to
the
charge
but
with
AND PHILOSOPHY
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
52
another letter
^
He
nearly as long as the former one.
mildly
com-
of Spinoza's censures, but makes a kind of apology for
plains
He
persisting in his objections.
many new
asks
questions, most
of them unanswerable and some irrational, and winds up with this sage postscript
question, whether
"Through
:
haste I have forgot to add this
we cannot by our
otherwise would befall us
?
"
which
foresight prevent that
Spinoza replied
^
in courteous terms,
but obviously beginning to lose patience, that his purpose had
been not merely to
but to point out to Blyenbergh the
criticize,
" I had thought," he says fundamental nature of their difference. " in substance, that you wished to discuss these matters in a purely
you showed me that it was otherwise, and that the foundation on which I thought to build our friendship was not laid as I had supposed." He consents once more, philosophical manner, but
The leading
however, to address himself to Blyenbergh's objections. passage
so characteristic that
is
it
seems profitable to give
it
nearly
in full.
In the
place
first
I
God
say that
perfectly and truly the cause
is
of everything whatsoever that hath any being.
Now
that evil, error, crimes, and the like are anything
being, I shall fully grant to you that I
have sufficiently
nature of
shown,
evil, error,
expresses real being
to
my
God
which expresses
real
the cause of these things.
mind, that that which constitutes the
crimes, and so forth consists not in anything that ;
and therefore we cannot say that
For example, Nero's matricide,
cause.
is
you can show
if
anything positive, was not
a crime.
in so far as
it
For the outward
God
is
their
comprehended
act,
and likewise
the intention to slay his mother, were the same in Orestes' case, and
yet he
is
not blamed, at least not in the same degree as Nero.
then, was Nero's crime
?
Nothing
What,
but that by such a deed he
else
showed himself ungrateful, unmerciful, and disobedient. 'Tis certain that none of these things express real being, and therefore God was not the cause thereof, though he was of Nero's act and intent.
Further,
would here have you note that while we speak in the manner of philosophy we must not use the language of theology. For since I
theology constantly represents
without reason) desire, that
he ^
is
it
suits
as
a
perfect
man
(and that not
well enough in theology to say that
angered
Ep. 2z.
God
at the
God
has
works of the ungodly, or that he takes 2
Ep^ 23.
CORRESPONDENCE
SPINOZA'S
pleasure in those of the righteous. clearly understand that
make
that
a
man
as little
it is
But
philosophy, where
in
God
to ascribe to
fit
perfect as if one should ascribe to
to the perfection of the elephant or the ass, there,
we
tioned sort of terms have no place, and
I
we may
say, the
man, or that anything are
human
He
qualities,
is
in
God
foremen-
Therefore, philo-
desires
displeasing or agreeable to
which
belong
as
cannot so use them without
God
not say that
we
the properties
man such
greatly confounding our conception of the matter.
sophically speaking,
53
anything of any
him
;
for all
these
have no place.
goes on to say, in answer to specific questions of Blyen-
bergh's, that
however
indifferent acts
may
be in themselves, con-
sidered from the philosophic or universal point of view, this does
not affect our moral judgment of the agents.
Blyenbergh asks with almsgiving ?
whether homicide is equally acceptable to God " Philosophically speaking," says Spinoza, " I do not know what
you mean by acceptable to God, If the question is whether God hates the one and loves the other, and whether the one has given offence to God and the other done him a favour, then I answer No. If the question is whether murderers are equally good and perfect with those
give alms,
whether stealing be
question,
honesty,
who
is
honest man, so
far as
Spinoza's meaning
they are
may want
The
acts
God
The as
actions, are equally perfect.
real
illustration
for
modern
suppose, for example, a thief putting forth his hand to
an honest
man
laying hands on
him
similar
good as of the thief and the
the sight of
in
similarly disposed of.
again say No."
I
to stop him.
The
readers steal,
;
and
motion of
the hand, considered as a natural event exhibiting the structure
human Hmbs,
no better or worse in the honest man's anatomy than in the thief's. Or, again, a thief may steal goods with violence, and an officer of justice may afterwards recover them from the thief, by actions in themselves But the honest man and the thief are not precisely similar. " For by an therefore alike in perfection or happiness of estate. honest man" (Spinoza continues) "I understand one who desires and I show in my Ethics that every one should have his own and functions of
is
in itself
;
(as yet
unpublished) that this desire necessarily arises in righteous
men from
the clear knowledge they have of themselves and of
SPINOZA
54 God."
HIS LIFE
:
AND PHILOSOPHY
Evildoers, not having this desire,
knovv^ledge of
God, and
must be w^ithout the
so miss the great foundation of
human
happiness.
There
w^as
yet a third question
:
if
framed that vice and crime w^ere not repugnant to nature but agreed w^ith
why
it
It
is
to
assume
seems to
proper
evil
Spinoza says
?
a contradiction.
me no
otherwise than
if
one asked, supposing
agreed better with his nature to hang himself, whether there
would be any reason a
its
so
could any rational motive be assigned
such an agent should do good or avoid
that this
"
it,
mind
there existed a
man
for
could really find
eating and drinking, his
Assuming that hanging to agree better with him than only rational course would be to hang not hanging himself."
himself; assuming that such a perverse
by Blyenbergh could become virtue.
"As
exist, vice
human
being as suggested
would with respect
to such a being
which you have added at the end of your letter, since one could put a hundred such in an hour without coming to a conclusion in any case, and you do not much press for an answer yourself, I shall not answer it." The question was indeed a formidably vague one. Probably Blyenbergh wanted to extract from Spinoza something capable of being used as an to the last question,
admission of free-will.
Blyenbergh,
still
unabashed, paid Spinoza a
finding that he could not
remember
to his
Spinoza had said to him, sent yet another string of questions,
visit in
own
person, and
satisfaction
epistle,
asking a
what
new
which rambled pretty well over the whole
ground of the Princ'ipia Philosophise and Cogltata Metaphyslca.
He
concluded by asking,
as a favour necessary
to his
complete
understanding of Spinoza's answers, that Spinoza would furnish
him with
the principal heads of the Ethics.
men (though the contrary seems to be not uncommonly believed), and human long- suffering has Hmits. After some delay Spinoza now replied very shortly,^ to the effect Philosophers are
that he really could not undertake to answer questions of such a scope, but hoped to find an opportunity of explaining by ^
Ep. 27.
word of
CORRESPONDENCE
SPINOZA'S mouth even
that
was impracticable
it
he could do
if
it,
;
55
the chief reason being
that,
the fundamental differences between his
views and Blyenbergh's would remain where they were before. He hopes that, on further consideration of the matter, Blyenbergh his good friend. With from Spinoza's correspondence, but this from him Colerus, who speaks with much we hear more of
will
waive
this
last
and remain
request,
Blyenbergh disappears
admiration
of
controversial
a
against
treatise
the
Tractatus
NotwithTheologko-P oliticus published by Blyenbergh in 1674. intercourse with Spinoza, the worthy standing his former friendly " pronounced the book to be full of curious merchant of Dordrecht but abominable discoveries, the learning and inquiries whereof
must needs have been fetched from
He
hell."
undertook to
prove Spinoza's opinions ruinous to the welfare of souls and of
But such were the usual In most cases they probably amenities of controversy at the time. Eight years later Blyenbergh also implied no personal ill-will. published a refutation of the Ethics^ with the motto Ardua quae pulchra^ probably meant as a counterblast to Spinoza's own concluding words, "omnia praeclara tam difficilia quam rara States,
"Ziel-en Landsverderffelyck."
sunt."
The proper
was not Hmited to the they made no scruple of consulting
curiosity of Spinoza's questioners field
of philosophy
;
him on omens and ghosts.
whom we know
very
little,^
A
friend
but for
named Peter
Balling, of
whom, judging from
the tone
of the answer, Spinoza must have had a sincere regard, announced the death of a child, and at the same
time (seeking
perhaps
distraction in a speculative question) desired Spinoza's opinion of
come
a supposed forewarning that had
stances
it
possible that Spinoza
is
query rather summarily.
We
to
him.
might have
cannot suppose,
In other circumdealt
with such a
for instance, that
Blyenbergh would have taken much by throwing it in among But now Spinoza was full of consideration other difficulties. his
of
friend's
distress,
^
Bibliografie, 380.
-
It
and whatever he
may
his for
have thought of the
appears that he was the translator of Spinoza's Principles of Descartes' Fhilosoi-hy^
which
a
Dutch
version
came out not long
after the Latin.
SPINOZA
56
:
wisdom of the question patiently,
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
though with
in
his
he answered
itself,
usual decision.
it,^
gently and
After expressing his
sympathy and entreating Balling to write to him again
at length,
he proceeds to the matter of the warning.
As
good health you heard
in
still
omen you mention, namely,
to the
when
it
that while your child
groan in the same manner that
had fallen into the sickness whereof
it
it
it
soon after died
was did :
I
should think these were no real groans, but mere imagination, since
you say that when you rose up and
set yourself to listen
for
them,
you heard them not so clearly as either before, or afterwards when you had fallen asleep again. Surely this proves that these groans were nothing else than imagination, which, being detached and free, could frame to itself a sound of groans in a more forcible and lively
manner than tion.
I
in the time
when you
rose
up
to listen in a certain direc-
now say by another One morning as Rijnsburg.
can both confirm and explain what
chance which befell
me
last
winter
at
I
woke out of a very heavy dream (it being already day), the images which had come before me in my dream remained before my eyes I
had been the very things, and specially that of a black Brazilian, whom I had never before seen. This image
lively as if they
as
scurvy
2
vanished for the most part, when, in order to divert myself with some-
what else, I cast my eyes on a book or any other thing but so soon as I removed my eyes from their object, without looking with attention anywhere, the image of this same negro appeared as lively as before, and that again and again, until it vanished even to the head. Now I say that the same thing which happened to me in the inward sense of sight happened in your sense of hearing. But since the causes were very different, there was in your case an omen, and in mine none. ;
[The
effects of the
cause,
imagination are various, according to the exciting
which may be
either mental or bodily.^
Where
it is
bodily, as
in the delirium of fever, there can be
no question of any relation to effects of imagination, or images, which have origin from the condition of the mind, may be omens of some-
future events.] their
But the
thing future, because the
such a thing. ^
Ep. 17.
3
Spinoza
It
mind can have
a
confused presentiment of
can therefore frame to itself -
as
firm and lively an
Or, ''leprous."
here speaking in a popular manner.
We
shall see hereafter that he does not admit any causal connexion between mental and material phenomena, but only a parallel correspondence excluding such a relation. is
SPINOZA'S CORRESPONDENCE image of such
example
a thing as if the thing
were present.
like yours, a father so loves his son that
son are as
it
57
Thus, he and
to take
an
his beloved
were one and the same being.
Spinoza goes on to say, referring for details to some fuller exposition of the subject which cannot be identified with anything in his extant
works, that in so
far as
the father
pathy with the son, he shares not only in in the
is
united by sym-
his actual existence,
but
consequences determined by his present state and potentially
included in
Under
it.
favourable conditions, then, he
may have
an extremely vivid imagination of something depending on the son's
own
constitution and hkely to happen to him, and
does in fact happen to Spinoza's language
him is
which
shortly afterwards.
not altogether clear.
It
seems to assume
and other similar occur-
a physiological theory of presentiments
rences, designed to afford a natural explanation not only of the
subjective facts, but of the supposed warnings being verified in a certain proportion of cases.
struck out by Spinoza in the spirits
;
as
Some such theory may have been days when he still believed in animal
indeed various physical conjectures of a similar kind
have been started in our
own
much
time with
less
Even
excuse.
very ingenious persons will try the most improbable suppositions rather than resign themselves to the incredulity of healthy
common
sense. It
is
fairly certain that the
in the letter does
not
mean
^'
confused presentiment " spoken of
a revelation or literal foreseeing of a
future event as such, but a sort of unconscious
judgment of the
But the exact nature of this operation is not defined, still less the nature and extent of the sympathy which enables us to form a presentiment as to possibilities
involved in existing conditions.
persons closely connected with us.
The
conception of love
impulse to union with the beloved object, which to an almost fantastic consequence,
here pressed
taken from Descartes,
who
it
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
in manuscript to a limited
Balling was one
an
It plays an from some older source. " Spinoza's essay On God and Man," confided
himself probably had
important part in
is
is
as
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; but
whole the remarks
now
number of
friends, of
has disappeared in in question
seem
the
whom
Ethics.
perhaps
On
the
to belong to an early
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; SPINOZA
58
HIS LIFE
:
stage of Spinoza's psychology.
AND PHILOSOPHY Compared with other
letters
of
same date (1664) they present something like an anachronism. But such anachronisms must exist in the mind of man every whose thoughts are still maturing and, under the
about
the
;
circumstances, Spinoza was probably willing to strain a
special
point in favour of treating Balling's question seriously.
Ten years later another correspondent, now known to have been Hugo Boxel of Gorcum, a rather considerable person in his time, wrote
Spinoza, without
to
any particular occasion that
what he thought about
appears, to ask
and ghosts or goWins ; and think of them, and how long they live ?
He
may
Spinoza ghosts at
Some
all
" but
:
'tis
turned compliment letter, I
to
for
exist,
.
.
.
a very thin fine matter, others that ^
begins with a neatly
:
received yesterday, was most acceptable to me, as well
desired some tidings of you, as because I see that you have
bad omen that ghosts
me,
what you some consider them
they
quite aware, however, that
Spinoza's answer
And though
not quite forgotten me. a
is
if
certain the ancients beheved in them.
made of
they are incorporeal."
because
to the
entertain the preliminary doubt whether there be
say they are
Your
comes
"
apparitions,
mortal and some immortal."
He
The reason of my writing know your opinion concerning
point without preface or preparation. to you," he says, "is that I desire to
ghosts.
I find
others might perhaps take
it
for
or goblins should be the cause of your writing
on the contrary something much more
to the
purpose
;
for I perceive that not only real things but trifles of the imagination
may
thus turn to
He with
a
my
profit.
with the question in a tone of perfect courtesy, but " I esteem you too much," he says, " to touch of banter.
deals
contradict you
much
you with a feigned assent. As a middle course I will beseech you to produce one or two thoroughly authenticated ghost stories of your own choice. To be plain with you, I am so far from having met with a satisfactory account of any ghost, that I cannot even make out what a ghost If the philosophers choose to name those things ghosts which is. we do not know, I will not contradict them, for there are an ;
less
can
1
I flatter
Ep. 52.
SPINOZA'S CORRESPONDENCE
59
have no knowledge." He lastly observes that all the ghosts he ever heard of were at best very foolish creatures, and seemed to have nothing better to do than to infinity
make
of things whereof
I
dull practical jokes.
Boxel
that he expected
^
replies
friend not sharing his opinion (so
pose was to start a discussion)
;
some such answer, as from a it would seem his original pur-
but friends, he adds,
may
well
and yet preserve their friendship. Before proceeding to give reasons for his belief he notes, with
differ in things indifferent
which need not surprise us, seeing that it is the present day by believers in table-moving, slate-
a judicial gravity
maintained at
writing, funipotent and other gobhns, that preconceived opinions
He does not meet Spinoza's why there must be disembodied
hinder the investigation of truth. challenge, but gives a priori reasons
or semi-material spirits
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;such
creatures being, in his opinion, in-
On
dispensable for the completeness of the universe. history he sorts,
a little uncertain.
is
"
I
their natural
think there are
of
spirits
Being aware,
though, perhaps, none of the female sex."
however, that these reasons will not be convincing to people think the world was made by chance, he passes to evidence. does
all
not accept the stories of demons and magicians
who He
but for
;
ghosts in general he cites Plutarch, Pliny the Younger, Suetonius,
Lavater, and others
acquaintance,
"a
;
the experience of a burgomaster of his
learned and wise man, yet living,
who
own me
told
working was heard all night in his mother's brewhouse, just like that which brewing made in the daytime," and some similar and never-to-be-forgotten experience of his own of which no particulars are disclosed. that a noise of
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
After a while Spinoza replied,^ answer.
among
He the
still
list
tone of his
first
of authorities given by his friend
them
;
but he found
that the historians
report ghost stories do so merely for the sake of astonishing
their readers.
"
I
confess that I
the stories that are
The
the
had been able to consult only Pliny and Suetonius
these quite enough, for they convinced
who
in
suggestion 1
Ep. 53.
told,
that
but at
there
are
am
not a
those
male
little
who
set
but not 2
amazed, not
at
them down." female
Ep. 54.
ghosts
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
6o is
to
AND PHILOSOPHY
presumably not serious, " otherwise
common feminine." He
the imagination of the
and
masculine
not
I
could only compare
who
sort,
explains
repudiates the notion of the world having been
take
God
that
he
to
it
be
entirely
made by chance,
but he nevertheless cannot admit his friend's assertion that ghosts For perfection and beauty are are necessary to its perfection.
terms
made tions
the world beautiful either that
:
and
desire
God
the eyes
must needs
of men,
see not
I
He who assert
or
the
that
God
has
one of two proposiand eyes of men
desire
Now, whether you assert the former why God must have made goblins and
ghosts to attain either of these two ends. imperfection, they are terms not
much
For perfection and
different
So, not to be tedious, I only ask,
ugliness.
says
has framed the world according to the
according to the w^orld. or the latter,
"
the observer.
to
relative
is
from beauty and the existence of
ghosts more necessary to the adornment and perfection of the
world than that of various other monsters
like Centaurs,
Hydras,
Harpies, Satyrs, Griffins, Argus, and other like vanities
should have been, indeed, had
pretty world
it
beautified
after
it
things as any
the good
man may
adorned and
imagine and dream, but none have
Having
yet been able to understand."
A
of our fancies with such
pleasure
easily
God
?
disposed of the other reasons,
Spinoza regrets that his friend has not been able to furnish him
with any better example than the burgomaster's ghost in the " To cut the matter brewhouse, which he considers laughable. short, I
take for
my
authority Julius Caesar, who, as Suetonius
And so human imagination and who in this matter dream
reports, made sport of such things and yet prospered.
must
all
passions, in
do
who
consider the effects of
whatever Lavater, and others
company with him, may
The writer.
Boxel
was delayed by a passing indisposition of the was mostly taken up with a theological digression.
rejoinder It
asks,
say to the contrary."
^
among
other things, as a retort to his
demand
for a
whether he has so clear an idea of God as of a triangle. As to the main point, he takes refuge in the general consent of ancient and modern philosophers. clearer definition of ghost or spirit,
1
Ep. 55.
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; SPINOZA'S
CORRESPONDENCE
6i
"Plutarch bears witness of this in his treatises of the Opinions of the Philosophers, and of the Daemon of Socrates ; as do all the Stoics, Pythagoreans, Platonists, Peripatetics, Empedocles,
Maximus Tyrius,
Apuleius, and others."
Spinoza must have had reasons of private friendship for being indulgent to the worshipful Boxel, sometime town clerk and syndic of
Gorcum
he not only answered him again, but
for
;
took up his remarks on points quite collateral to the existence of Part
ghosts.
of this letter
^
of some importance.
is
Spinoza
points out that he conceives freedom as opposed, not to necessity,
Every one admits, for example, that God's knowledge of himself is both free and necessary. So, but to external compulsion.
again, man's love of
had
correspondent
human
ascribe
"
When
life
necessary, but not compelled.
is
expressed
qualities
you say that
I
at
Spinoza's
To
this
allow not in
God
God.
to
if
surprise
refusal
is
I
:
know
eminently in him, you
:
the operations of
not what sort of
they
God mine
you believe there is no greater can be explained by the attributes afore-
thence conjecture that
perfection than such as said.
to
Spinoza replies
seeing, hearing, observing, willing, and the like, nor that exist
The
do not wonder at
I
it
manner
and a
circular
attributes to
believe that a triangle, if
that
the divine nature
circle that ;
for I
manner say
could speak, would in Hke triangular,
;
God is
eminently
is
in
an eminent
and thus should every one ascribe
God, and make himself
like
it
his
own
God, counting every-
When
you ask me whether I have so clear an idea of God as of a triangle, I answer Yes. But if you ask me whether I have such a clear image of God thing else
as
misshapen.^
as
of a triangle,
we
I shall
.
.
.
answer
can understand him."
No
:
This
for
we cannot imagine God,
between imagination and understanding runs through the whole of Spinoza's philosophy. He repeats that nothing has been advanced to make but
1
Ep. 56.
^
Cf. the fragment of
Xenophanes
distinction
:
If oxen and horses had hands like ours, and fingers,
Then would
horses like unto horses, and oxen to oxen,
Paint and fashion their gods.
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;(G. H. Lewes's
trans.).
SPINOZA
62
HIS LIFE
:
AND PHILOSOPHY
the existence of ghosts even probable, and altogether declines to
submit to the authority of the ancients.
The authority much with me.
of Plato, Aristotle, and Socrates does not count for
been surprised if you had cited For Epicurus, Democritus, Lucretius, or any of the Atomic school.
it is
have
should
I
nothing strange that the inventors of occult
and
species, substantial forms,
a
qualities, intentional
thousand other vanities, should have
and ghosts, and given credence
also devised goblins
order to destroy Democritus'
envied that they burnt
reputation,
to old wives, in
whose good name they
the books he had published with so
all
so
much
If you choose to believe them, what reason have you for
renown.
denying the miracles of Our Lady and all the saints ? which are described by so many philosophers, theologians, and historians of
renown
that I can
This
last
produce
passage
is
a
hundred of them
for
one of the others.
how very
material, as disclosing
Spinoza was acquainted with Greek philosophy. that he thought Aristotle responsible for
the schoolmen and
with the Epicureans
knew is
its
would seem
the developments of
all
His sympathy
Plato only by name.
no doubt founded on the
system was a genuine attempt world, and was in
It
imperfectly
fact that their
at a scientific explanation of the
day the solitary protest against the contempt
of physics which prevailed in the other post-Aristotelian schools.
But he obviously did not know Lucretius except by hearsay ; for Lucretius and his masters, so far from venturing to deny the objective
reality
of apparitions,
provided an elaborate
physical
hypothesis to account for them.
Alchemy was minds
in
a
Spinoza's
kindred topic which time, and
manner in which he regarded it. Jellis on an alleged conversion of
unknown
alchemy with
He made
men's of the
evidence
In 1667 he wrote to Jarig silver into gold effected
stranger in the presence of the
chemist Helvetius (Schweizer),
exercised
still
we have some
who had by
naturahsed this
by an
German
time taken up
full belief.
inquiries of both the goldsmith
who had
assayed the
gold and Helvetius himself 3 and though he expresses no opinion,
he was obviously disposed to think seriously of the matter
at that
SPINOZA'S CORRESPONDENCE time.i
But
in 1675,
when Dr.
Schuller had sent
63
him an account
of some similar experiment, he simply replied that he did not care
and that the more he considered it the more sure he that no gold was produced which was not there already.^
to repeat felt
We
it,
have also
more nearly connected with Spinoza's
letters
philosophical work, and attached
1673 J^cob Ostens or
In
to particular
Oosten,^ a
forwarded to Spinoza a long
letter,
landmarks of
it.
surgeon of Rotterdam,
written nominally to him, but
by a certain Dr. Lambert van Velthuysen This critic went through all the common topics of of Utrecht. censure against the Tractatus Theologlco-P ollticus^ and concluded for Spinoza's perusal,
the principles of that
that
"introduce atheism, or
religion,
destiny,
treatise
whom men
no room
for
divine
set
destroy the foundations of
up
a
God
can have no reason for worshipping
leave
;
government or providence, and abolish
work has no
all
In short, the author
dispensations of reward and punishment."
of such a
himself subject to
injury to complain of
if
he
is
denounced
teaching mere atheism in a disguised form."^
as
Spinoza thought the criticism not only wrong but perverse so perverse, indeed, as to be hardly consistent
with good
The
and he replied with a sharpness beyond his wont.
faith
;
:
original
been found, and contains even stronger expressions, which on consideration he struck out. The tone draft of the letter has
of this letter shows us an aspect of Spinoza's character which
we
could
intellectual
ill
afford
to
miss.
His indignation
is
not the mere
disgust of a philosopher at the stupidity of an un-
reasonable critic,
it is
the moral resentment of a
man
loving truth
and righteousness at the imputation of teaching what he abhors. It seems well to give here a considerable part of the letter. ^
Ep. 40.
See Lewes, Hist. Phil.
the same year, 1667,
His family
is
2. 180.
a
Helvetius published his Vitulus Aureus
remarkable example of hereditary talent
j
m
his son
and grandson were both eminent as physicians in France, where the son settled early in his great-grandson (1715-1771) was the philosopher by whom the name is best
life}
known, 'â&#x20AC;˘^
â&#x20AC;˘^
Ep. 72.
This identification
is
given by Schuller in a letter to Leibnitz (Stein,
and a small correction of the
name
is
added by Mr.
Meinsma
(p.
op. cit. p.
341).
L
293),
O. was
formerly supposed to be Isaac Orobio de Castro, a well-known Jewish exile from Spain. *
Ep. 42.
SPINOZA
64 "
my
He
begins with saying
way of
nation or
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
:
concerns him
it
known
If he had
life.
have so easily convinced himself that
know what
to
little
it,
he would not
teach atheism.
I
is
It
the
is
character of atheists to seek rank and wealth beyond measure,
things which
I
with me.
.
.
.
have ever despised,
Then
he proceeds
this
to
7ne
In order
:
to be loved
ask, cast off
is
itself?
avoid the reproach
to
with a free affection
virtue
itself,
all
more, that the reward of
?
and the punishment of
and, lastly, that every man's duty
have not only
methinks
see
I
in
and vice
folly
to love his
is
?
but proved by most solid
said,
affirms
that in this only consist our
?
and to obey the commands of the supreme power I
who
religion
the chief good, and that as such he
perfect happiness and perfect liberty
virtue
are acquainted
to
know not. Does he, I would that God is to be accepted for is
know who
have cast off religion altogether. writer means by rehgion and what by superstition, I
of superstition^ he seems
What
as all
what mud
folly
neighbour
These things reasons. But
He
fellow sticks. ^
this
is
finds,
it
should seem, nothing to please him in virtue and knowledge by themselves, and he would choose to live by the mere impulse of his passions but for this
So he abstains from
him than
he
the penalty.
fears
commandments
and with a hesitating mind, and
service looks to be rewarded to
difficulty, that
deeds and follows God's
ill
like a slave, unwilling
one
the love of
God
by
God
itself;
with so
gifts far
much
for
more
this
grateful
the more, I sav, as
he finds the more distaste and repugnance in well-doing.
And
comes about that in his conceit all men who are not restrained by this fear must live without discipline and cast off all But I leave this, and pass to his conclusions where he religion. would fain show that I teach atheism by covert ayid glozing thus
it
argufnents.
"The
foundation of his reasoning
take away God's freedom, and
is
make him
this,
he thinks
that
subject to fate
:
I
which
For I have affirmed that all things follow of inevitable necessity from God's nature no otherwise than all affirm that it follows from God's nature that he understands himself. is
manifestly
^
''
Ouo
in
false.
luto hie
homo
haereat."
Spinoza was scholar enough
classical force of homo in controversial usage, and
I
think he intended
it.
to
know
the
SPINOZA'S CORRESPONDENCE
65
This surely no one denies to follow necessarily from God's nature, and yet no one conceives that God understands himself under any compulsion of
but rather that he does so with entire freedom,
fate,
though necessarily. " This inevitable necessity of things destroys neither divine nor human law. For moral precepts, whether they have the form of law from God himself [Le, by direct revelation] or not, are yet divine and wholesome ; and the good which ensues from .
.
.
God, whether we take it from God as a judge [a political superior issuing distinct commands] or as flowing from the necessity of God's nature, will be neither more nor less desirable ; as on the other hand the evil which ensues from evil deeds is not therefore less to be feared because it so comes of virtue and the love of
necessity
motives are that
still
/ would
there
everything
is
"
hope and
ascribed
I pass to his
myself no argument
is false,
.
to
that all things proceed
.
.
show that judgment of me.
the passages which
all
his
conclusion, where he says that / have
left
Mahomet was not a true prophet. show from my principles, whereas it
prove that
he endeavours to
this
it is settled
mood when he formed
he was in no sober
And
and
to fat e^
by inevitable necessity.
Wherefore
his assertion
our
and commands^ or, as he says of reward or punishment when
no expectation
is
were too long to review
It
Therefore
fear.
free,
leave no room for precepts
later, that
from God
whether our actions be necessary or
in short,
:
from them that Mahomet was an impostor. For which is granted by the catholic religion, as revealed
plainly follows
that liberty
by the light of both nature and prophecy, and which
shown But if
is
most
this
fit
to be granted,
were not
so,
am
such and such a prophet
I is
is
have
by him wholly done away.
concerned, a false
I
one
I ?
pray you, to
On
show
that
the contrary, the
burden lay on the prophets to show that they were truly such. If he should reply that Mahomet also taught God's law, and gave sure tokens of his mission, as the other prophets did, then I grant there will be
no cause
for
him to deny that
Mahomet was
a true
prophet.
" For the Turks themselves and heathens in general, worship
God by
justice
and charity to their neighbours, F
I
if
they
believe
SPINOZA
66
HIS LIFE
:
AND PHILOSOPHY
that they have the spirit of Christ and are saved, whatever per-
suasion they
and their " You
may
entertain through ignorance concerning
oracles. see,
my
friend, hov^ far
much
injury to me, but
from the truth your correspond-
Nevertheless
ent has v\^andered.
that
admit that he has done no
I
to himself,
when he
scruples not to affirm
and glozi?ig arguments.
/
teach atheism with covert
I
do not think you will find anything in
"
Mahomet
judge too harsh
But
terms towards this writer.
in its
that
this
if
you can you light
on any such thing I beg you to strike it out, or else amend it as you shall think fit. I have no mind to anger him, whoever he may be, or make myself enemies by my work ; and because this
commonly happens
disputations of this sort, I
in
bring myself to answer him, nor could
had promised you."
This there
is
protest
not the
have done so unless
I
reason
least
to
doubt
its
its
sincerity.
terms, and has an
It
important bearing on that part of Spinoza's sentiments of which is
peculiarly difficult to
form an exact estimate
We
tion to religious belief in general.
another place the effect of itself,
on religion
of his philosophy here
evident
man's
that
it,
system, taken in
own
he considered religion
as
is
interpretation
something very
and the charge of irreligion or atheism
life,
his rela-
have to consider in
philosophical
His
mean
I
us as a point in his personal character.
and most wicked of calumnies. stands
shall
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
it
on that question material but not conclusive
comes before
it
his
as usually understood. is
I
^
strong and even vehement in
is
could scarce
But
this
It
real
:
is
in
as the grossest
religion, as he under-
not the reHgion of churches and
sects.
It
is
in-
dependent of dogmatic theology, independent of any particular knowledge or belief as to revelation, independent even of the so-called natural theology as
a Person after
all
which holds
to the conception of
God
other definitions of his nature have been
renounced, and to the expectation of another redress the balance of the present all
in
one
in
life which shall some manner of which
knowledge is disclaimed. The essence of religion is Spinoza's mind a cheerful and wilhng co-operation with the specific
^
Ep- 43-
CORRESPONDENCE
SPINOZA'S
order of the world as manifested in the nature of society.
that
Irreligion
is its
own
has nothing
is
reward
better
67
man and
of
the self-seeking spirit to which the love
The
unknown.
is
atheist
is
man who of his own
the
pursue than the satisfaction
to
vulgar appetites, whose only plan of
"honores et divitias modum quaerere." The true and saving worship is to do justice and love one's neighbour. And observe that Spinoza does life
is
supra
not put this as something beside or opposed to religion of
it
as religion itself,
;
he speaks
definite religious beliefs (in the
and regards
popular sense) as things in themselves comparatively indifferent,
but good
in
so far as they serve as a vehicle, so to speak, for the
essential virtues of love
and well-doing.
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
His attitude towards Christianity not the dogmas ot Catholic or Reformed divines, but the " spirit of Christ " which men may is one of respect and have in intellectual and historical ignorance In the Tractatus Theologico-P oliticus one is not even reverence.
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
absolutely safe in relying is
on expressions of
this kind, as the treatise
framed throughout on an accommodating and hypothetical plan,
which gives occasion for a certain vein of irony. But in this letter there was no reason why Spinoza should go out of his way to please Van Velthuysen, for whose reading the reply was ultimately intended.
The
tone of the Tractatus and of Spinoza's remarks in divers
passages of other writings like
Hobbes, regards
on the ground that
is
indeed strongly anti-clerical.
clerical influence as a it
absolutely certain that
wrong
is
which
is
to teach
Spinoza,
bad thing, not so
much
with authority and
false or doubtful, as
as
because such
influence tends to disturb the order of society and diminish respect for the civil law. like
But
Hence
the peculiar hostility with which, also
Hobbes, Spinoza has been pursued by professional theologians. as
regards individual belief there
anti-religious to be
sented to his
found in him.
name being
inscribed
is
nothing irreligious or
He would
never have con-
on the banner of
a materialist
crusade.
Notwithstanding the sharpness of this first passage of arms, Van Velthuysen and Spinoza came into direct communication afterwards, and on terms of mutual respect, if not friendship.
AND PHILOSOPHY
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
68
There
is
a letter
^
from Spinoza
to
Velthuysen concerning
his
some explanatory notes to certain papers which appear to be
intention of publishing, together with
the Tractatus Theologico-Polit'icus^
no other than the correspondence we have
The
seems to be one of a
letter
to have been preserved only for the fine sense of literary
"
I
am
series
of at
opponents, so
or three, and
I
am
little
past,
my
treatise
you that I which have
and intended to include your
sure I never intended to refute any
did
any of them seem
to
me worth
an
I remember to have said to Mr. Neustadt is that purposed to publish some notes explaining the more difficult
answer. I
number.
in the
my
two
surprised at our friend Neustadt having told
been published for some time of
least
us.
I give it here, however, by accident. courtesy which it shows.
thought of replying to the writings against
MS.
had before
just
All
passages of the treatise, and to add to these your
answer,
had your leave for so doing.
if I
This
MS. and my him
I desired
to
ask of you, and added that in case you should be unwilling to
on the score of certain expressions in the answer being rather severe, you should be at full liberty either to amend or to
grant
it
cancel them.
N.
\
but
I
Meanwhile
thought
it
I
have no cause of offence against Mr.
well to
show you
so that, if I cannot obtain your leave, I
the real state of the case,
might
clear that I
had no manner of design to publish
your
I
will.
may be done without any your name is not affixed to it
beHeve, indeed,
your reputation, provided
make it your MS. against at least
risk to
it
\
but
I
you grant me leave and licence to publish you would do me a far greater favour if you would set down the arguments with which you think you can attack my treatise, and add them to your MS. \ and this I most heartily beseech you to do. There is no one whose arguments I should be more willing to consider, for I am aware that your only motive is affection for the truth, and I know the candour of your mind \ in the name of which I again entreat you
will do nothing unless it.
But
I
am
free
to confess
not to decline giving yourself
The scheme or
this trouble."
here mentioned was not carried out, and a year
two afterwards Van Velthuysen published } Ep. 69.
his
arguments
as
CORRESPONDENCE
SPINOZA'iS an independent work.
69
one of the polemics against Spinoza mentioned with approbation by Colerus. Leibnitz, as we have already mentioned,^ appears in Spinoza's
lifetime
among
the
It
list
is
of his correspondents, but
for
a
very
limited purpose on the face of the letters which were preserved
and pubhshed.
In 1671 he wrote to Spinoza enclosing for his He addresses him note on the improvement of lenses.
opinion a as
an expert of well-known standing and authority
your other merits
known
excellent skill in optics,
my
essay,
such as
it is,
:
" Among
you have address to you
to fame, I understand that
which persuades me
as I shall
to
not easily find a better
yourself in this kind of inquiry."
critic
than
Spinoza replied courteously,
and offered to send Leibnitz a copy of the Tractatus Theologico-
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; an
which would scarcely have been made |if Leibnitz's letter had contained no The more than the editors of the Opera Posthuma printed. Politicus^
disclosure to
he had not one already
if
of Leibnitz's
is
a rather
offer
surprising exception
we know now
was an which Schuller apologized to Leibnitz and rebuked
the editors'
oversight for
name
^
usual practice
:
that
it
the publisher.^
hear that Tschirnhausen (of whom presently) had " met in Paris a man of excellent learning, accomplished in many sciences, and likewise free from vulgar theological prejudice, by
In 1675
we
name Leibnitz," who thought very highly of logico-Politicus^
and had
(if
the Tractatus Theo-
he remembered right) written about
Tschirnhausen thought he might safely be trusted with Spinoza's writings [i.e. the Ethics in MS.), and that, for reasons he could explain on occasion, it would be well worth it
to Spinoza.
The
answer to this overture was however more Spinoza wrote to cautious than might have been expected. Schuller, through whom it had been communicated, that he Spinoza's while.
thought he already knew this Leibnitz by correspondence, but From his letters he could not tell what he was doing in France. judged him to be an accomplished and liberal-minded man, but he thought
it
imprudent to trust him with the unpublished work ^
^
Page 39 above. ^
Stein, op.
cit.
Epp. 45, 46.
pp. 291, 293.
SPINOZA
70
HIS LIFE
:
AND PHILOSOPHY On
without knowing more of him.
the whole he would await a
further report from Tschirnhausen.^
we have
All this, as
already seen,
no one but Leibnitz had in public at the time,
a right to
only part of a story which
is
which could not be
tell,
and which Leibnitz chose to keep
told
in the
background afterwards. In the
last
two
years
important philosophical
one of the in
men who
of Spinoza's
letters
we have a series of him into relation with
life
which bring
were diligent Ehrenfried Walter von
in the following generation
extending the domain
of science.
651-1708) was of a noble Bohemian family, and later in life attained high distinction in mathematics and physics, and was at a comparatively early age admitted to the French Academy of Sciences. He became especially known by his Tschirnhausen
(i
improvements in the construction of lenses and burning glasses, with which he produced extraordinary effects, and his name has left a
class
taste
permanent place
in
mathematics by
of curves
known
was
during his studies
laid
we may
well suppose that
that he
first'
with him
The
as caustics.
it
at the
his investigation of the
foundation of his scientific
University of Leyden, and
was on the
special
sought Spinoza's acquaintance.
ground of optics When we meet
on the footing of an old His name was suppressed by the editors of the Opera friend. Posthuma^^JiikG those of most of the other correspondents, and his part, formerly attributed by conjecture to Dr. Meyer, has only been restored to him since the full text of these letters was in the
letters
he
is
already
He
Van Vloten. Spinoza's memory
Hke Leibnitz, turn but neither did he make any open against The work by which he is best known, attempt to vindicate it. Medicina Mentis (Amsterdam, 1687), draws largely and tacitly on Spinoza's treatise on the " Amendment of the Understanding." The borrowing is of an extent which in our more scrupulous age published
by
did
not,
;
would amply warrant
a charge of plagiary
;
but
when we
consider
the lax habits of the time in this respect, and the prejudice which
any open reference to Spinoza would certainly have excited against Tschirnhausen's work, we should be at least cautious in blaming 1
Ep. 72.
SPINOZA'S CORRESPONDENCE him.
71
object was to gain a hearing for Spinoza's ideas the respectable pubHc, there can be no doubt that the
If his
among
course he adopted was the most plausible
At
one.
the same time
it is
if
not the only practicable
certain that Tschirnhausen, without
any such excuse, gave some offence to both Huygens and Leibnitz by his use of unpublished matter which they had communicated to him.^
Tschirnhausen was an eager student of Descartes, and In 1675-76 he
Spinoza's yet unpublished writings.
made
also of
a journey
London, where he exerted himself with success to remove an opinion which Boyle and Oldenburg had formed of the ill Tractatus Theologico-Politicus and of Spinoza himself; and on his way back he stayed in Paris, and, as we have seen, made the During this time he exchanged letters acquaintance of Leibnitz. with Spinoza on several metaphysical points. His questions and objections were the most deserving of attention of any that They are always intelligent, and one or Spinoza had received. two are so acute and forcibly put that it would be difficult for a modern critic to improve upon them. Even an uncritical reader to
may
perceive
strong evidence of their aptness in the fact that
Spinoza himself found considerable difficulty in meeting
Tschirnhausen's power of appreciation
seem however original
work
to have in
and criticism does not
been accompanied by
philosophy.
He
them.
much
entertained
capacity for
an exaggerated
notion of the advances in physical discovery which might secured by an a priori doctrine of method.
We
be
already see traces
of this in his correspondence with Spinoza, and at a later time his
too sanguine expectations were gently rebuked by Huygens."
But with
all
allowances for errors of judgment and other
infirmities, his career
was a
useful
have been Tschirnhausen's master
*
Van
-
See their correspondence in
curious.
human
and honourable one, and is
no contemptible addition
to to
Vloten, Benedictus de Spiwza, App, III.
Van
Tschirnhausen's statements
Vloten's Supplement, which as
to an expecte<]
is
in
many respects Academy of
pension from the
amount of assistance he required " ad studia bona excolenda," show Huygens' just estimate of the that the endowment of research is no new invention. amount of inevitable labour still lying before science is also worth noting. Sciences, and the
SPINOZA
72
Spinoza's
memory.
with Spinoza
There
is
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
:
Huygens was
in philosophical
correspondence
as early as 1666.^
yet one correspondent to be recorded
who
stands
In the autumn of 1675 Spinoza received a strange epistle ^ dated from Florence, and written by one Albert Burgh, a son of one of the wealthiest families in Amsterdam, at one time a alone.
promising scholar, and,
we must
He now announced
thinker.
Church
fold of the Catholic
suppose,
more
or less of a free-
that he had been received into the
the particular circumstances of his
;
conversion might be seen in a letter he had written to Professor
Kranen ^ of Ley den
his present
;
important for Spinoza's
own
purpose was to ofFer a few remarks
And
welfare.
with that he launched
no small length into denunciation of Spinoza's profane and chimerical philosophy, mixed with compassion (of the right
forth at
ecclesiastical sort) for the
persist
in
damnable
his
wretched estate of
He
errors.
how
marvels
Spinoza's abihties, eager in the pursuit of truth, could
"
be so deceived by the devil. ful simplicity,
How
do you
You
"that you have
know
shall ever
be taught hereafter
?
man
a
of
himself
let
assume," he asks with deHght-
at last
found the true philosophy.
that your philosophy
which have ever been taught
he should
his soul if
is
the best of
now
in the world, are
To
say nothing of
those
all
taught, or
what may be
you examined all those philosophies both ancient and modern which are taught here, in India, and all And even supposing you have duly examined the world over ? them, how do you know that you have chosen the best ? devised in the future, have
.
"
Do
" with
.
triumphant
proselyte,
the reflection that the Calvinists or so-called
Reformed
not
flatter
yourself,"
divines, the Lutherans, the
wretched of death.
as
the
cries
Mennonites, the Socinians, or others
cannot refute your doctrines.
1
.
All those poor creatures are as
yourself, and sitting along with
How
Epp. 34, 35, 36.
dare
you
The name,
set yourself
you
up above
suppressed in Opey-a Post/iuma,
all is
in the
shadow
the patriarchs,
restored by
Van Vloten
and Land. 2
Ep. 67.
3
Professor of philosophy at
Nymegen, then
at
Leyden, where he was translated to
medical chair in 1673 because his opinions were too Cartesian is
not
known whether he was among
Spinoza's acquaintance.
:
Meinsma,
p.
401.
a It
CORRESPONDENCE
SPINOZA'S
73
prophets, apostles, martyrs, doctors, and confessors of the
Miserable
and food
man and worm upon the for worms, how can you
with your unspeakable blasphemy for
this
you
earth that
Church
?
are, yea, ashes
confront the eternal wisdom
What
?
rash, insane, deplorable, accursed
foundation have you
presumption
What
?
judgment on mysteries which Catholics themselves declare to be incomprehensible ? " This and much more of the same fashion is enforced with arguments which it would be intolerably tedious to repeat. One of them, however, devilish pride pufFs
may
you up
to pass
deserve to be singled out
:
it
is
that, because Julius
Caesar
prophecy of gunpowder, it is unreasonable to disbelieve in the divining-rod, alchemy, magic, and demonology. Burgh protests that he has written to Spinoza " with a truly Christian intention ; first that you may understand
would probably have laughed
at a
the love I bear to you, though a heathen
you not
to persist
in perverting others."
Spinoza with eternal damnation
and abominable
It will
errors.
discourse of Brother
Peter in
;
and next, to beseech Finally he threatens
wicked be remembered that the immortal the Tale of a Tub ends with inif
voking similar consequences on believe otherwise
;
he does not repent of
the
hearers
if
his
they offer
to
but the genuine crudity of Albert Burgh's
room
effusion hardly leaves
for
even a Swift to add any touch of
caricature.
Spinoza was at
first
unwilling to
But some common
attack.
friends,
make any answer
to such an
who had known Burgh,
with Spinoza, hoped better things of him, represented that
and,
it
was
but due to their old friendship to try the effect of remonstrance.
Being once prevailed upon
show
to write, Spinoza could not but
of the extreme folly and insolence displayed in Burgh's
his sense
The
would have been sufficiently gross if addressed to a Protestant to one who had never professed himself a Christian at all it was extravagant. The answer is far the sharpest ever written by Spinoza.^ For serious argument he had letter.
arrogance of
it
;
^
Ep. 76.
Hanover
:
Leibnitz
Professor
attempts then being op. cif, pp.
76, 300.
made
it
the subject of a letter to
Stein acutely
made
to
Duke John
conjectures that this was an
win over Leibnitz himself
to the
Frederick of
indirect
Church of
answer to
Rome
:
Stein,
SPINOZA
74
:
HIS LIFE
AND PHILOSOPHY
on what he called chimerical philosophy was easily answered out of his own mouth. " You who assume that you have at last found the best religion, or rather the best teachers, and fixed your credulity on them, how do you know that they are the best among those occasion
little
j
the convert's attack
who have taught
Have
teach them ?
and
now
And
Rome
or shall
hereafter
in
India and all the world
even supposing you have duly examined them^
you know that you have chosen the best ?
Spinoza
teach
you examined all those religions both ancient
which are taught here and
fnodern
over?
other religions^ or
to the hot-headed proselyte,
recalls
has a
monopoly of all the
how do
"
who
fancies that
virtues, that in Alva's persecution
own ancestors had suffered valiantly for the Protestant religion. The historical claims of the Church of Rome are met not with
his
direct criticism but
" As
with an unexpected counter-attack.
what you add touching the common consent of multitudes of men, the uninterrupted continuance of the Church, and the like, that is the very same old tale as the Pharisees'. They bring forward their myriad witnesses with no less confidence than for
the devotees of as if
they were
Rome, and facts
Roman
those witnesses repeat their traditions,
own knowledge, no
within their
less
stoutly
Their lineage they carry back to Adam. They boast as proudly as any that their Church has been continued to this day, and stands unshaken in spite of the enmity of heathens and Christians. They have more antiquity for them than any They proclaim with one voice that their tradition other sect. comes direct from God, and that they alone possess the word of God both written and unwritten. It cannot be denied that all heresies have branched off from them, while they have remained firm during several thousand years with no political power to The compel them, but in the mere strength of fanaticism. miracles they report would weary a thousand nimble tongues. But their most notable claim is that they count far more martyrs than any other nation, and they daily increase the number of than the
those
who
profess
;
have with singular constancy suffered for the faith they
and
one Judah,
ones.
this
is
no
fable.
called the Believer,
I
know
who,
myself,
in the
among
midst of the
others, of fire,
when
CORRESPONDENCE
SPINOZA'S
75
he was supposed already dead, began to sing the psalm, To thee^ God^ I commit my soul^ and so expired singing it.^ " The discipline of the Roman Church, which you so much
and brings gain to many. I should think, indeed, that there was none more convenient for deceiving the vulgar and subduing men's minds, were it not for the discipHne praise,
of the
is,
I
confess, politic
Mahometan Church, which
superstition had
its rise,
Spinoza means,
I
far excels
no schism has taken
it.
place in
For since that their Church."
suppose, that in the history of Islam there
no great doctrinal rupture comparable to the Reformation in Europe. He can hardly have failed to know, from his study of the Jewish philosophers, who abound in allusions to the Arabic It schools, that Mahometanism has no lack of sects to show. shares with Judaism, however, the advantage of never having complicated its fundamental formula. But under the circumstances Spinoza could not be expected to write with minute exactness, even if he were capable of it. A broad and rapid presentation of things was the only instrument that could possibly have any effect In fact it had none. on Albert Burgh's sublime ignorance. is
Burgh
ultimately took up his abode at
Rome
as a Franciscan.
This was Don Lope de Vera y Alarcon de San Clemente, a Spanish nobleman who was converted to Judaism through the study of Hebrew, and was burnt at Valladolid ^
on the 25th of July 1644.
Gratz,
Gesch.
der Juden^
x.
Dr. Gratz supposes
loi.
that Spinoza here speaks as an eye-witness, and must consequently have been born and passed his youth in referring
them
to
Spain.
congregation of Amsterdam. that
But the sense of Spinoza's words is amply satisfied by the event doubtless had among the Jewish
the notoriety which
Burgh had witnessed the
cannot be suggested that in § 3 Spinoza means to say own ancestors under the Duke of Alva.
It
sufferings of his
quendam Judam novi, qui .) and adopted by one or The inference drawn by Gratz, is exactly the same in both cases. two Jewish scholars, is now finally exploded, Mr. Meinsma's research having shown that Spinoza's parents came from Portugal, not Spain, and were settled in Amsterdam But the phrase (parentes tuos nosti
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
long before his birth.
qui
.
.
.
ipse
.
.
.
.
.
—
CHAPTER AND SOURCES
IDEAS Laudemus
III
OF SPINOZa's PHILOSOPHY Ecclus. xliv.
viros gloriosos, et parentes nostros in generatione sua.
Lo, thou hast learned that whosoever brings redemption to the world.
— Pereq
tells a
thing in the
R. Meir
name
of
him
that said
C. Taylor's Sayings of the
(in
i.
it
Jewhh
Fathers).
Part
The
time has passed
as final as a
was
1.
and
absolute.
—Judaism and Neo-Platonism
when It
is
systems of philosophy could be regarded not so very long since
matter of course that the key to
all
it
was assumed
the secrets of the universe
in man's hands, and that only culpable perversity could fail
to find
it.
In our
own
day the nearest approach to a dogmatic
philosophy of the old pattern has been a doctrine which proceeds
on the systematic assumption that the problems of philosophy are There are some who find in this state of things the insoluble. death-warrant of philosophy itself, and thereupon exult or revolt,
But change which has come
according to their temper, as at a matter irrevocably judged.
such are over-hasty, forgetting that the
over men's view of the great problems of the world or casual, but
is
the
last step in a vast
is
not single
movement of human thought
which has profoundly modified our whole conception of the nature and limits of knowledge. Science has for good and all abandoned The discoverer well knows that his disthe dream of finality. covery, while it brings new certainty and new power over things, will also throw open a new series of questions. In the first flush of conquering advance, armed with instruments whose power seemed unbounded, and mighty in their new-born freedom of mind.
SOURCES OF SPINOZA'S PHILOSOPHY
^^
the leaders of the great revival saw visions of a goal near at hand. Let the right method be once obtained, and a few simple
principles
might
suffice to explain the
whole course of nature.
Descartes and his ardent followers,
So thought
among whom we have
already
seen Spinoza's friend Tschirnhausen.
So thought Leibnitz even warning of their failures. A few more cautious workers, with the prescience which only practical experience gives, refused to be dazzled by these magnificent and facile promises. Thus after the
Huygens perceived explorers
was
work of
But the world
grew and multipHed
knowledge, accepting
At
absolute truth.
Thus Newton
the lesson of patient exactness
self-denial.
science
long and arduous one.
best a
at
taught the world
example of
the course which lay before scientific
that
last
is
by
his
great
slow to learn, and
as the
admired with imperfect provisional or even erroneous results as it
the various paths of science were seen to
The
converge into a broad road.
atomic theory brought chemistry into relation with general physics, and the ideas of correlation and
continuity drew together the several branches of physical knowledge, while the undulatory theory of light opened to the scientific
imagination a
But
new world
coextensive with the sensible universe.
was also seen that this was not the end of questionings, but the beginning of new and higher questionings. A fresh problem arose in the place of every one that had been solved or set aside and, so far from resting on her conquests, science only girded herit
:
more strenuous continuance of the campaign.
self for a
face
to
handle pulled
face with
we have
infinite
mysteries in the things
We we
stand
see
and
no longer with inert masses pushed and through space by a convenient something called Force, but ;
to do
myriadfold complexities of rushing, vibrating, pulsating units, each
of them endowed with a definite character and persisting in it against the assaults of the whole universe ; endless motion, shock
and counter-shock, taken up and reverberated by the all-pervading ether ^ everywhere restless activity, and changes rapid beyond our
numbered and measured in our calculations ; new and immense variety in the manifestations of nature, a
conception, though a
boundless
and
unexplored
wealth
in
her
powers.
elements of our physical knowledge are transformed.
The Only
very a
few
^
SPINOZA
78
years ago
we
^
HIS LIFE
:
even
to tell us that
The
in the
elements
were a
Down
thing.
real
brought up to speak of Force
become
has
Energy has come
we must always
either a
to the present time
as if it
name
tainty of the natural sciences
We
research abated.
we have found
it
we
still
shall
is
be learning
Motion
in the description ;
and
Yet the
cer-
to hide our ignorance
not shaken, nor
have to seek
still
been
Now Force
a real thing.
seek knowledge,
as if
we have
almost reduced to a vehicle for Energy.
is
Was
were
mere compendious symbol
of motion, or a worse than idle
matter
doctrine of
Descartes, and Spinoza after him, spoke of
afresh.
were things
talked of Matter and Force as if they
obvious and within our grasp.
it
AND PHILOSOPHY
is
the ardour of
knowing
when
that
farther.
it
any wonder, then, that philosophy, having not only the
difficulties
of scientific inquiry to contend with, but other peculiar
ones differing in kind from those
encountered in
the
natural
sciences, should be slower to enter into the critical period in
which
knowledge becomes conscious of its provisional character ? Is it surprising, on the other hand, that philosophy also should at last conform to the conditions that science has already recognised ?
And
become
We
fruitless or
can
why
does submit to those conditions,
if it
see,
ever were in
its
v/ork
work of science ? There are no longer
worthless any more than the
indeed,
that
it
is
not
so.
Platonist and Aristotelian schools, but
more exactly
should
more
Plato and Aristotle are
honoured and revered, than they the days when men blindly worshipped them. The though less conspicuously true, of the great names of studied,
same is true, more modern times. called after his
name
truly
Kant \
certainly has
disciples
who may
be
but that would be a very shallow estimate
which should reckon the power of Kant
in philosophy
by the
number of professed Kantians in the world. For the work done by Kant was not that he established this and that proposition about the mental mechanism of perception and thought, but that he announced the entry of philosophy into her critical age. application of the critical method may or may not be
may ^
new
or
It
may not
win
be
be complete
remembered that
this
;
but his
was written
in
work 1880.
physical questions in the closing years of the century.
His
own
correct,
it
stands nevertheless. There has been no lack of
SOURCES OF SPINOZA'S PHILOSOPHY
79
Ardent and strenuous thinkers began to strive against it when it was barely finished they have striven ever since to find some form in which dogmatic philosophy could be revived, and they -,
have
striven
all
Reason
in
vain.
The
harvest of the Critique of Pure
reaped by hundreds and thousands
is
of the Categories and Antinomies.
It
is
not
who know nothing systems that make
the Hfe of philosophy, but the ideas of which systems are the
framework
perishable fellows
and the philosopher's
;
among
place
who
determined not by counting the heads of those
is
his
accept the system as a whole, but by the strength and fruitfulness
of the ideas which he sets
men's minds.
astir in
In every scheme of philosophy, then, which consideration, there
more or
is
a vital core of ideas
construction.
less artificial
It
is
worth serious
embodied
is
frame of
in a
the task of the historv
of philosophy to trace from generation to generation the
growth of these underlying temporary
and
local
ideas
incidents
to disengage
;
life
them from
and thereby to keep
;
and
their clear
a
pathway for the work of philosophy itself. This is the spirit in which we would fain approach that splendid effort of constructive genius which Spinoza has left us in his Ethics; not with a minute curiosity seeking for mere curiosity's sake to retrace each individual stone of his building to the quarry whence he may have
hewn
which
it,
nor yet with the incurious and barren admiration
forgets that even the loftiest genius
materials
given to the workman's
Spinoza that his theory was after all
other systems
a charge, if
charge
did not seek to will
go
can be
it
farther
j
it
be,
it
It
has
been
said
of
but a system, and that like
away never
to
come
Such
back.
Spinoza
can freely afford to admit.
Nay, we
sect,
and he founded none.
at
least
doubtful whether a single person
it
stands.
is
has accepted the system of the Ethics in
But
the level of the people for
we
all
conditioned bv the
found a
named who
points as
has passed
hand.
is
that
is
because Spinoza's mind
who hunger and
thirst after
that very reason the thought of Spinoza's
is
systems
all
above ;
and
Ethics has slowly
but surely interpenetrated the thought of the world, and even
now works mightily in it, while other systems welcomed in their own day as new revelations are now in very truth past and
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
8o
Or
forgotten.
we
are
to go,
AND PHILOSOPHY perchance, in search of systems
which have not passed away ? Assuredly such are to be found they drag on their barren life, a fixed monotony of centuries, in the schools of Brahmans and Buddhists and Confucians, who have drained off the life-giving words of their ancient masters There in the overinto labyrinthine canals and stagnant pools. teemed East is the limbo of unchangeable systems, preserved from the fertilizing breath of change by a universal inertia. If Spinoza's philosophy were identical, as not a few shallow critics :
have
with
fancied,
pantheism or
Indian
then
indifFerentism,
Spinozism would be an existing, unchanged, and unshaken system
;
but such an existence and such security are the death of philosophy.
In
order
philosophical
ideas,
will
it
our account of his
extent
growth of Spinoza's be necessary to anticipate to some
the
consider
to
his
system
Nature,
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
as
that of the unity and
is
is
the only part of
first it,
and
in fact,
commonly formed of
uniformity of the world.
by him, includes thought no
conceived
things, and the order of nature
there
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
entered into the notion
at all
The
doctrine.
finished
leading idea in Spinoza's philosophy
which has
and
origin
knows no
less
interruption.
than
Again,
not a world of thought opposed to or interfering with
a world of things different
aspects.
there
a
is
Spinoza's
;
Nature
thing it
is
we have everywhere
;
one
as
be well marked
to itself
and a physical or
is
the same reality under
about
Now
uniform.
well as
conception of
this
two-sided, having an ideal or speculative,
On
scientific aspect.
the one hand
we
find
a line of reasoning derived from the metaphysical treatment of
theology
;
in other words,
a philosophy starting
sideration of the nature and perfection of
hand,
we
find a
follows this track
whatever
flights
physics.
The
most
On
God.
the other
view of the existing universe guarded by the
requirements of exact natural science, so
who
from the con-
it
is
may
bound over take, shall
that
the philosopher
to see that his speculation,
at all events
not contradict
combination of these two elements
characteristic
features
of Spinoza's
is
philosophy.
one of the
No
one
him attempted such a combination with anything like the same knowledge of the conditions of the task. Few have had before
SOURCES OF SPINOZA'S PHILOSOPHY even
after
him been
The
endeavour.
so courageous
8i
and straightforward in the
we may
pantheist or mystical element, as
(though both terms are ambiguous and
liable to abuse),
is
call it
not merely
placed beside the scientific element, but fused into one with it. Here, then, is a twofold root of Spinoza's conception of the universe, and
each branch of
The
greater
appHcation
entities
an account of the
part of Spinoza's
Ethics
soil is
that nourished
it.
occupied with the
of his general ideas to investigating the nature of
The body
man.
for
it calls
and the mind are not treated
working upon one another, much
That which
is
mind
two
separate
the one allowed
less is
Mind and body
to be the product of the other.
and the same.
as
one
are in truth
to the inner sense
(or if
is
would be) body to the outer sense. There is no mind Physical without body but also there is no body without mind. the and mental events run exactly parallel to one another physical sequence cannot interfere with the mental sequence, or accessible
;
;
the mental with
of the
the physical, just
Such
same thing.
the
is
determines Spinoza's psychology.
deduced from,
general
his
venient to speak of
because they are two sides
metaphysical theory which
It
implied
is
view of the world
and directly
but
;
which
separately, for reasons
it
in,
it
is
con-
will appear,
as the monistic element.
When a
human
he comes to
particular
living thing
case
actions, Spinoza regards
of the operation of universal causes.
(though
not only living
things) has
them as Every an
appetite^
impulse making for certain ends and determined by the tendency or effort (conatus) of effort
is
given by the very fact that the individual thing does
exist as such.
becomes
things towards self-preservation, which
all
When
desire.
appetite as thus understood
With
this
fundamental
out an account of the passions which masterpiece, and which even passed. effort
is
In the ethical
field
the ultimate fact of
no other than the
effort to
now may
idea
conscious,
Spinoza
it
works
by general consent
is
his
be said to stand unsur-
of action also the self-preserving life.
"
The
maintain one's
foundation of virtue
own
happiness consists in the power of so doing." 1
is
Eth. 4. 18, Schol.
G
^
is
being, and man's
That
is
the
first
^
SPINOZA
82
:
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
law of our moral nature in the
scientific sense of
law
;
it
is
a
which must be faced and reckoned with. But this For man is known by does not lead to a system of selfishness. experience to be a social animal, and this is no less a law of his universal fact
Thus he
being.
can maintain his being only in society.
As an
individual living in society, and unable to be solitary if he would,
he must preserve society in order to preserve himself; or rather the preservation and welfare of society are his only true preserva-
Thus
tion and welfare.
To
social.
this
the foundation of morality
element of Spinoza's doctrine
The
the idea of natural law.
we
is
essentially
shall refer as
choice of that term will explain
itself hereafter.
We out of shall
need not say anything thus early of Spinoza's following this idea in
Of
politics.
the
last
only say here that, notwithstanding
work,
it is
in the
main
to be assigned to
part of the Ethics
its
we
place in the finished
what we have
called the
mystical element in the principles of Spinoza's philosophy, and to be explained, so far as
it
may
is
be capable of historical explana-
by reference to the same sources. The interpretation is, the result I have myself arrived at however, difficult at best after much doubt will be submitted to the reader in its due order. tion,
:
This division enables us to give at once in a summary way some kind of introductory general notion of what is at present known or surmised about the birth and growth of Spinoza's philosophical ideas.
The
pantheist or mystical element
is
traced to the mediaeval
Jewish philosophers, with whose works we know that Spinoza was familiar. This is to some extent matter of direct evidence. A claim has also been put in, and with likelihood practically amounting to certainty, for Giordano Bruno. Now Bruno himself was subject in certain ways to Oriental influences, while the Jewish and Arabic schools of the Middle Ages were again strongly imbued with Neo-Platonism, and Neo-Platonism in turn has a It seems impossible, even if it were semi-Oriental character.
worth while,
to disentangle
all
ently clear, whatever theory
the details.
we may
But
it
remains
suffici-
adopt, that the East has a
considerable share in this portion of Spinoza's materials.
SOURCES OF SPINOZA'S PHILOSOPHY The
element
scientific
may
83
be assigned without hesitation to
Descartes, though Spinoza carried out the scientific view of the
world farther and more vigorously than Descartes himself.
union with the mystical element
as regards its
it
is
But
material to
remark that a nascent scientific impulse runs through the naturalism of the Renaissance philosophy as represented by Bruno and others and thus the Hne of contact was in a manner already traced. The monistic element is given by reaction from the dualism of Cartesian philosophy, and determined chiefly, as I think, by con;
have
The
of a scientific order.
siderations
But we can
pantheist
idea
may
also
no exact account between the Spinoza had completed the fusion of the mystical and the
part.
its
two, for
scientific principles before
The
strike
he settled
idea of natural law remains,
work of
monism
his
and
in its final form.^
the most independent
is
Ideas and suggestions of a general
Spinoza's genius.
kind he had from Descartes, and a good deal of more definite
who
material from Hobbes,
there
;
and
an extraordinary amount of resemblance to Stoic doctrine,
is
suggestive at the
show
will
in fact his master in politics
is
first
But
glance of imitation.
closer attention
that such a supposition presents greater difficulties than
that of coincidence.
would seem,
It
the really
that
which
it is
now
if
the foregoing statement can
practical
be accepted,
of Spinoza's philosophy, that by
part
operative and keeps hold on men's living interests,
most peculiarly his own. I am aware that such a conclusion may not be free from unconscious bias, nor is it to be assumed that historical criticism has said its last word.
is
also the part
It
is
which
is
certain that critics have
hitherto
busied
more with the metaphysical than with the system
;
and
it is
which has
in this region.
It
if little
search.
own ^
ethical part of Spinoza's
yet to be seen whether the revival of interest in
ethical problems
that
much
themselves
may
be,
lately
though such
has been found here,
In the meantime
shown
I
it is
itself is
not
not be fruitful
my own judgment,
because there has been
little
can only beg the reader to use his
diligence in verifying whatever
is
advanced.
This appears from the advance of the Ethics on the
(see next note) in that respect.
may
Tractatulus de Deo
et
Homine
SPINOZA:
84
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
First let us take in
purely speculative aspect the idea of the
its
Much
nature of things as one and uniform.
thrown on the growth of discovery of his date of
work
itself a
has been
mind by the God and Man." ^ The only approximately known, nor is the idea in
this
Spinoza's
unpublished " Essay on
composition
its
light
is
On
uniform whole.
the one hand
must be
it
earlier
than any of Spinoza's other writings, and the absence of any
mention of it in the letters goes to show that by 1661 at latest it was for Spinoza himself a superseded work. On the other hand it was written originally in Latin, and therefore after he had mastered the language under Van den Ende, and it shows familiarity
We
with Descartes.
placing
it
probably not be
shall
far
wrong
about the time of Spinoza's excommunication.
the essay or
some portions of
may have been
the
privately circulated
"abominable
Compared with the Ethics
Amendment
it,
Inasmuch
friends,
he taught."
or even with the earlier treatise on the
of the Understanding,
performance.
Possibly
among
v/hich
heresies
in
we
as
it is
a brilliant but
immature
possess the Ethics^ the essay has
only a historical value, but that value
is
very great.
It
shows
us the ferment and conflict of elements received from different
quarters and not yet subdued to their places and proportions in a
new
structure.
As
to the matter
now
in hand,
gives positive
it
proof that Spinoza really worked out his metaphysic by starting in the first instance
from theology, and did not
metaphysic and then clothe
and everything that has a
it
first
scientific bearing
by Descartes when he wrote the
essay.
he was
Not
conceive his
In psychology
in theological terms.
still
dominated
that he even then
adopted the Cartesian doctrines.
He
was struggling, but
work out
as yet
without a perfectly fixed aim, to
for himself the reconciliation of Cartesian analysis
a priori speculation.
The
leaders of mediaeval
with
Jewish thought
had endeavoured to recast their theology in an Aristotelian mould given them by the philosophic culture of their time. Spinoza in 1 It is preserved only in an indifferently executed Dutch version, which seems to have been made in the early part of the eighteenth century. The original title, rendered by " Korte Verhandeling van God, den mensch, en deszelfs welstand," was probably Tractatulm de Deo et Homine eiusque Felicitate.
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; SOURCES OF SPINOZA'S PHILOSOPHY
85
where they had left off, set himself to refashion their handiwork with the instruments furnished by Descartes. But he took up the work with the resolve to carry it through at all costs, and the result was that both matter and method became transformed in his hands. It must remain doubtful, I think, whether Spinoza himself was ever fully aware of the amount of
turn, beginning
the transformation he had effected, especially as regards his theo-
He
logical premisses.
could not have been what he was without
the Jewish doctors or without Descartes, but his
philosophy
is
neither Cartesian nor Jewish.
The
essay likewise gives to
holding (though
it is
my mind
commonly assumed
Spinoza was ever actually a Cartesian. parts
parts
it
is
the
strong reasons against
were certain) that For though as to certain as if it
Cartesian in language and arrangement, in those very
enunciates anti- Cartesian
essay
pointedly than the Ethics afterwards did.
Not
that sorrow and the passions derived
from
it
whereas Descartes says that sorrow
is
in
a
necessary for
men
than joy
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; but
all
only
is
it
more denied
can ever be useful
manner even more
passions whatever, except the
two
divine love,^ and, in a qualified sense, one or
more
even
doctrine
others of the
unworthy of the philosophic any time it must have been
active kind, are repudiated as
was a Cartesian at and moreover he could not have before the essay was written become a Cartesian without utterly breaking with the Jewish philosophic traditions, on whose lines, however, or at any rate If Spinoza
life.
;
from out of them, he
is
working
the essay.
in
We
should be
driven to suppose, then, that Spinoza broke with Jewish literature to take
up Descartes, and becoming
dissatisfied
turned back again to the Jewish authors. ^
But
with Descartes,
violent oscillations
of this kind are not in Spinoza's character, to say nothing of the
time between Spinoza's introduction to Descartes and his composition
And 1
2
of this essay being too short to afford room for them.
even so the essay should present to
In treating this
This
is
as a passion the
in fact the
Essay
differs
theory of Dr. Joel.
from the
He
it.
not a juxtaposition
Ethics.
puts the supposed return to Jewish
philosophy as late as the composition of the Tractatm finds the occasion for
us,
T/ieoIogico-Polificus, in
which he
AND PHILOSOPHY
86
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
of
non- Cartesian metaphysic and
Cartesian
but
psychology,
modified Cartesian doctrine throughout. And this it certainly does not. I conclude, therefore, not only that Spinoza was not
dependent on Descartes, but that he was never a Cartesian
solely at all.i
The argument
of the essay
starts, in a
from the nature and attributes of God. of nature, and the implied rejection of
purely a priori manner,
The
absolute uniformity
final causes, are
deduced
from the consideration of his freedom and perfection. The universe is governed by divine laws, which, unlike those of man's making, are immutable, inviolable, and an end to themselves, not instruments for the attainment of particular objects.
God
is
From
man's only true good.
ourselves, but not
from
other passions
" because
love,
for the
The love of we can free
weakness of our
we could not subsist without the enjoyment of something Only the knowthat may strengthen us by our union with it." us subdue the hurtful will enable to passions. of This, ledge God nature
the source of
as
all
knowledge,
knowledge
is
the most perfect of
all
\
and,
derived from the
knowledge of God, we may know God better 'than we know ourselves. This knowledge in turn leads to the love of God, which is the soul's
inasmuch
as all
The
union with him.
is
union of the soul with
God
is its
second
and therein consist man's immortality and freedom. The detachment from ordinary cares and interests in which the
birth,
essay
makes man's happiness
approach quietism.
manner
in such
consist
A great contrast
passages as
description of Hate.
to
It
is
is
is
carried
so far as
to
presented to Spinoza's later
the following, which occur in the
said to be produced, in
common with
other passions, by false opinion. " Hate is the right contrary to love, and ariseth from the For when a man hath delusion that is begotten of mere opinion. concluded concerning such and such a thing that it is good, and
another comes and doth somewhat to the prejudice of the same,
then the
first
conceives hate against
should have no place in 1
The same
him
if
him
so doing.
the true good were
The which known,
as
we
conclusion has been arrived at by Dr. Avenarius in his very careful
discussion of Spinoza's philosophical development.
SOURCES OF SPINOZA'S PHILOSOPHY shall
show
For
hereafter.
that
all
or
is
may
87
be thought of
is
in
comparison with the true good [the love of God] nothing but mere wretchedness, and is not he that so affects wretched things
much more worthy
of pity than of hate
?
"
^
In the Ethics the ordinary pleasures and amenities of life, though not exclusive or sufficient objects of a reasonable man's pursuit, nor to be lamented for
treated
shall see that the love
of God, though
the crown and perfect state of the
more
are not attainable, are
something very different from " mere wretchedness."
as
And we
when they
human mind,
intellectual character, if indeed
it
presented as
still
can be at
acquires a all
much
distinguished
from pure speculative knowledge. It
appears
therefore
transformed subsequently,
among
Spinoza's ideas.
the
that
may
We
element, however
theological
claim the right of primogeniture
shall
be pursuing an order not only
historical in point of actual chronology, but just
and
regard to the probable history of Spinoza's thought,
fitting
with
we
first
if
turn our attention to the Jewish doctors of the Middle
who brought
a philosophical treatment to bear
Ages
upon theological
problems. Partly coinciding in time with Catholic scholasticism, but with their rise
and culminating period nearly a century
earlier, a series
of Jewish philosophers in Spain, Provence, and the East did work
which has
a far
more important
philosophy than has
place in the general history of
commonly been allowed
they set themselves was the same in kind
to
as that
it.
The
task
of the school-
men, who, in spite of religious diiTerence, joined hands with them on the common ground of Aristotle, and used their work with open acknowledgment and respect. They strove, in one word, For this to systematize theology on an Aristotelian footing. purpose it was necessary to embark on a critical and philosophical interpretation
of Scripture
;
and in
this
undertaking the com-
paratively undefined character of Jewish orthodoxy secured a certain
amount of freedom.^
^
Korte Verhandel'mg, part
2
The Mahometan
ii.
Or
rather
them
philosophy presented
cap. 3.
schools enjoyed the same advantage.
Judaism nor Islam has any dogmatic theology
at
all.
At
Strictly speaking, neither
the same time there
must
AND PHILOSOPHY
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
88
itself to
Jewish speculation
as
hidden meaning of the law.
Ezra were
The to
an enlightened interpretation of the Thus Moses ben Maimon and Ibn
no
leaders in biblical criticism
ideas they put forward in this field
their
full
development in
Spinoza's object
is
it
there
than in philosophy.
were to be carried out
Tractatus
Theologico-Politicus.
So
indeed opposite to that of Maimonides.
from finding philosophy to seek
the
less
in the Scriptures,
he maintains that
it is
far
idle
and the sharpness of his criticism on Maimonides'
;
system of interpretation has probably distracted attenMaimonides' tion from that which they really have in common.
artificial
work was continued by Levi ben Gerson,
or Gersonides (born
who, professing to be a mere interpreter of the Scriptures and to rely on them as the source of every kind of knowledge, was at the same time more thoroughly Aristotelian than his predecessors. His discovery of AristoteHan metaphysics in the Song of Solomon was probably the extreme feat of the Jewish theologico-philosophical dialectic. The influence of these writers is most marked in the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus^ with which we are not immediately concerned Bagnal
at
in
in this place. it
Provence
in 1288, living in 1340),
In the purely philosophical part of Spinoza's work
was comparatively
slight
that there are only traces of
it
of the mind's eternity in the the Averroists through
The
are notable.
:
it
is
perhaps not too
much
to say
from the doctrine beHeve comes from
in the Ethics^ apart
fifth part,
Gersonides.
which Still
I
the points of affinity
following are specimens of those which
may
be
found in Maimonides' great work, the Alore Nehuchim?-
The will and And not only is
the
wisdom of God
are regarded as inseparable.
there no real distinction between the divine attri-
no attribute whatever can be predicated of God in the Even eternity and existence, as applied to him, ordinary sense. are not synonymous.^ but merely homonymous with the same terms in butes, but
have been in practice that on
many
a
good deal of
restraint.
Maimonides expressly warns
points he will be deliberately obscure
:
his readers
and Ibn Ezra could only hint with
elaborate mystery .that " the Canaanite was then in the land " could not have been the
The
language of Moses' generation. Isaiah are even 1
more
Edited by Dr.
intervals of absolute silence in his
commentary on
significant.
Munk,
iub
tit.
Le Guide
des Egares,
with
literal
French translation.
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; SOURCES OF SPINOZA'S PHILOSOPHY
89
any other application.^ This, however, is by no means peculiar to Maimonides it is a common possession of the scholastic writers, and is distinctly enounced in the treatise on mystical theology which bears the name of Dionysius the Areopagite. Probably it might be traced much farther back by any one conversant with ;
The
Neo-Platonism.
know-
application of the principle to God's
ledge as distinguished from man's was strenuously disputed by
Levi ben Gerson.
The
existence of
God
is
involved in his essence
the existence of any finite creature, which
an accident
God
may
;
otherwise of
be considered
as
in the logical sense.^
coexists with the creation as
its
cause in actu^ not as a
cause in potentia^ which precedes the effect in time.^ Perfect intellect forms no conception of good and true and false.
Such was the
first state
of
evil,
only of
Good and
Adam.
evil
belong to the region of probable opinion.*
Dr. Joel also calls attention to Maimonides' reflexions on final causes as being fitted to prepare the way for Spinoza's entire rejec-
Maimonides holds that the conceptions of design cause have no intelligible application except as regards
tion of them.^
and
final
things created in time.
Chasdai Creskas of Barcelona, and afterwards of Saragossa, lived in the latter part of the fourteenth
who
and early part of the
was a more daring and original thinker than his predecessors, though to a certain extent in the interest of orthoHe broke with the Peripatetic tradition to strike out an doxy. independent line of his own, and Dr. Joel's research has shown fifteenth century,
any other of the His principal work, the Light of the Lord
that he stands in a closer relation to Spinoza than
Jewish philosophers. (Or Adonai), finished ^
Cap. 56, and elsewhere.
2
Capp. 57, 58. Cap. 69. One
^
may
in
141 o, contains
number, neither more nor 4
Cap.
^
Zur
things which
be allowed to note (though not here relevant)
answer to the standing question why time rather than another.
many
He less,
says
the world, it
is
if
created in time,
just like asking
of individuals of any kind
why
e.g.
Maimonides'
was created
there exists a
the fixed stars.
2.
Genesis der Lchre Spino%a''s (in Beitrage "zur Gesch der Philos.).
come
at
one
certain
SPINOZA
90
:
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
Some of
near to characteristic points of Spinoza's philosophy. these points are already well developed.
He
censures as fallacious the notion of infinite extension being
made up of measurable
parts
(cf.
Spinoza, Eth.
i.
15 schol., Ep.
he also holds matter to be eternal, the act of creation consisting only in the ordering of it ; and maintains that the material world, being good in its kind (which he takes, I presume, as a 12)
:
truth
The tinct
known by
revelation), participates in
the Divine nature.
contrast of this with the Cartesian theory of substances disin
probably had
genere
conception of extension
something to do with Spinoza's
an attribute coequal with thought.
as
Again, the perfection of
God
consists not in
This
Aristotelians say, but in love.
love
is
knowledge,
the
as
what determines God
same time a necessity of his nature and an act of will. Love being the chief attribute of God, the perfection of any creature depends on the extent to which it shares therein thus the love of God (for its own sake, not as a means of salvation) is the chief end of man. We have already had occasion to see what an important part is assigned to this in the essay " On God and Man " which preceded Spinoza's Ethics. Most remarkable of all, perhaps, is Chasdai's thorough determinism. He explicitly denies that any event, whether depending on human choice or not, can be called possible or contingent in an absolute sense. It is inconceivable, he says, " that two men, being themselves of like temper and character, and having before to creation, as at the
:
them
like objects
differently."
anything
of choice in like circumstances, should choose
by motives
Volitions are determined
else in
nature
not
is
determined.
in so far as
it
uncaused.
The argument on
is
out, and to deal with
cojnpelled^
An
much
act of free will
but necessary in so this topic
as
far as
is
free
is
not
worked have been made in
seems to be
most of the points that
it
as
fully
The fallacy of fatalism, for The objector who says. If example, is clearly enough exposed. happen are necessary, why do men take pains to all things that later
controversy on the subject.
compass their ends
?
forgets
that things are necessary only with
reference to their conditions, and that in the case of
takings forethought and labour are
among
human under-
the conditions.
SOURCES OF SPINOZA'S PHILOSOPHY Reward and punishment,
as
91
the consequences of good and bad
actions, are themselves part of the necessary order of things.
How
is
their wickedness
is
asked.
It
wicked should be punished, if necessary ? Chasdai answers, with Zeno before him and Spinoza after him, that their punishment is necessary too. Reward and punishment, commands and prohibitions, are nevertheless ordained by Providence as means to lead men to salvation. The love of God is man's chief good, even as love is God's own perfection and therefore the fore-ordained sanctions are attached it is
just that the
it
:
to those actions and thoughts that
of
is,
God
which
which are determined by or
its
are free in the popular sense,
a state of
mind involving the
love
contrary.
must be remembered, to the idea or designed order in the universe, though final causes in the ordinary sense are as it were swallowed up in the absolute, self-sufficient necessity by which God's love manifests itself. He likewise holds fast to the necessity of revelation, and goes so far as to say Chasdai holds
fast,
it
that the fundamental doctrine of the unity of
otherwise known.
Thus he cannot
of Spinoza's system.
God
be regarded
could not be
as a
forerunner
Spinoza took the suggestions in detail and
worked them into a systematic connexion of his own which would probably have found little favour in Chasdai's eyes. Chasdai Creskas deserves to be remembered, apart from his probable influence on Spinoza, as one of the first who ventured attack
to
the prevalent
dogmatism.
Aristotelian
appear to have been purely theological
;
the
artificial
His motives constructions
on Scripture by the school of Ben Maimon and Ben Gerson were repugnant both to his reason and to his faith. When theologians fall out philosophy sometimes comes by her own. For Spinoza's knowledge of Chasdai's work we have the direct and, as we evidence of one express quotation^ (Ep* 12, ad fin.) have occasion to note elsewhere, express quotation was much more significant two centuries ago than it is now. forced
;
^
puto,
"
Verum
hie obiter adhuc notari velim, quod Peripatetici
male intellexerunt
Nam
existentiam. sic sonat."
,
.
.
demonstrationem
ut ipsam apud
The
passage
philosophische Lehren, etc. p. 9).
is
veterum,
qua
recentiores, ut
ostendere
Judaeum quendam, Rab Ghasdai vocatum,
identified
quidem
nitebantur
Dei
reperio,
by Dr. Joel {Dof7 Chasdai Creskas' Religions-
SPINOZA
92
A
word must
HIS LIFE
:
AND PHILOSOPHY
be said of the mystical literature which
also
modern Judaism than the
exercised an even greater influence on Aristotelian
according
development was due,
philosophy, and whose later
one
to
high authority,^
to
The
rationalism of the philosophic writers.
the
against
reaction
a
influence
possible
of the Kabbalah on Spinoza has been discussed from time to time ever since Spinoza's writings have been an object of notice to the
learned
world.
One
endeavoured to trace
of his
earliest
critics,
J.
his principal doctrines to that
Wachter, quarter ^ and E.
:
others in later times, without going so far as to ascribe to the
KabbaHsts the chief share have claimed
for
them
to put this question
Spinoza's philosophical genealogy,
more or
a
on
in
less
a rational footing
it
is
very necessary to
distinguish between the Kabbalah properly so called,
which
from the thirteenth century, and the older mystical which the KabbaHsts deliberately confounded with fantastic
speculations
in
The
sanction of antiquity.
give themselves
order to
In order
considerable one.
dates
traditions their
an
own
apparent
from an highly symbolic
Kabbalah, starting
later
cosmology expressed in language, rapidly became overwhelmed by its own anthropomorphic symbolism, and overran all Jewry with demonology, thaumaturgy, and other wild fancies beyond measure for all which the professors idealist
theology and
;
of this so-called philosophy found warrant in Scripture by trifling
and wearisome schemes of non-natural interpretation, anagrammatic readings, arbitrary transpositions and substitutions of letters, allegorical
the like.
and other occult meanings, virtues of numbers, and The greatest play was made with the numerical values
of words and
way
letters, a
method which has
The
into Christian theology also.
to
some extent found
its
metaphysical foundations
of the system appear to have been derived by some road not fully
known from Neo-Platonism, and bear marks
it
is
said
by the best authorities
of imitation from the Greek.
that
the very terms
The God
doctrine of emanations and intermediate powers laid
vii.
Der Spino%ismus im "Judenthumb^ 1699. Linde, Bibliogr. No. 274.
^
between
hold of in order to have a philosophic
Dr. Gr'atz, in Gesch. der Juden^ vol.
1
(ler
and the world was
Elucidar'ms Cabbalisticus, 1706.
See
Van
SOURCES OF SPINOZA'S PHILOSOPHY
93
standing-ground against Maimonides and the rationalists, and at the same time to preserve tradition and rituahsm in their Hteral
In Spinoza's generation
significance.
this
system had attained
and most extravagant development and it seems to have become by that time the most unmitigated nonsense ever put together by the perverted ingenuity of man. In its
its
fullest
:
appHcation a
mass of ludicrous or disgusting
seen in
ceremonial observances
to
in
the
the
outbreaks
exploits
of the
it
was
puerilities.
little
Its
of delusion and imposture false
else
than
fruits
v^ere
culminating
Messiah, Sabbatai Zevi, of which
mention has already been made in a former chapter. Such a doctrine, we may be sure, had little attraction for Spinoza and in an age when historical criticism did not exist he would scarcely have had the patience to search the rubbish-heap for the jewels that might be buried in it. He has indeed left us in no doubt as to his opinion of the Kabbalists of his time. For he says in the ninth chapter of the Tractatus TheologicoPoUticus : " I have read and moreover known some Kabbalistic triflers, at whose follies I was astonished beyond description." It is hardly worth while to insist on the diiTerences between The doctrines of emanation and Spinoza and the Kabbalah. ;
the transmigration of souls are both fundamental in the Kabbalistic
account of the world, and are both utterly incompatible with Spinoza's metaphysic.
But on the other hand Spinoza twice refers, in passages of marked importance and in a tone of respect, though in vague terms, to ancient references
Hebrew
may with some
mysticism which
opinions and traditions
3
and these
plausibility be assigned to the earlier
undoubtedly preceded the modern Kabbalah,
and was afterwards
confused with
it.
Only an accomplished
Orientahst can be entitled to a positive opinion on the sources
But all mysticism is Eastern and antiquity of these speculations. in its ultimate origin, and the choice would seem to be substantially between holding that the Jewish mysticism was indirectly derived from the East through Neo-Platonism and the Alexandrian schools, or that
came,
earlier
it
came,
as
we know
that
modern Jewish theology
and more directly from the old Persian religion, in
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; SPINOZA: HIS LIFE AND PHILOSOPHY
94
which case Jewish and Alexandrian mysticism would be related to one another, not in a direct line of descent, but as parallel and partlyintermixed streams from the same fountain-head. The question is hardly a proper one to be pursued here, even if I were qualified for the undertaking. But it is easy to see that, apart from the evidence of actual coincidences, which in a case of this kind is difficult to
fix at
true value, the last-mentioned opinion has a
its
and even a stranger to Oriental literature may be permitted to appreciate the weight of M. Franck's arguments for it. strong antecedent probability in
The
favour
its
:
allusions in Spinoza are the following
:
In the Scholium to the seventh Proposition of the Second Part " A mode of extension \_i,e. a finite material of the Ethics he says :
mode
thing] and the idea of that
are
one and the same thing, but
Hebrews seem to have seen as through a cloud, when they say that God, the understanding of God, and the things understood by him are one and Now this is distinctly said in the commentary of the same." Moses of Cordova on the Kabbalistic book Zohar. " It is to be known that the knowledge of the Creator is not as that of his creatures. For in these knowledge is distinct from the subject of knowledge, and is directed upon objects which in their turn are This is denoted by these three distinguished from the subject. thought, that which thinks, and that which is thought terms But the Creator, on the contrary, is himself at once knowof. His ledge and that which knows and that which is known. manner of knowledge consists not in applying his thoughts to in the knowledge of himself he knows and things outside him Nothing exists which is not united to perceives all that exists. him or which he finds not in his own substance." ^ The coinciexpressed in
two ways
;
which
certain of the
:
;
dence
is
striking,
and
it
is
quite possible that Spinoza had read
But then
Moses of Cordova.
it
is
quite certain that Spinoza had
read and digested the Kabbalist's far greater namesake Moses ben 1 p.
Franck,
100.
La Kabbah^
The book Zohar
by recent criticism to be jiote 12.
pp. 27,
itself,
194
5
Sigwart, Spinoza's Neuentdeckter Tractate etc.
the great armoury of the Kabbalists,
a forgery of
the thirteenth century.
is
finally ascertained
Gratz,
op. cit. vol. vii.
.
SOURCES OF SPINOZA'S PHILOSOPHY And
Maimon.
95
same thought is even more fully and distinctly expressed in a chapter of Maimonides' masterpiece, to which Spinoza makes on another point an unmistakable reference the
The
elsewhere.^
famous proposition wit that he
chapter opens
down by
laid
thus
"
:
Thou knowest
the
philosophers concerning God, to
and the intelligible, and make but one and the same thing,
intellect, the intelligent,
is
God wherein is no multiplicity." And again at the end of the chapter " Hence (from God being intellect always in actu^ never in potentia that these three things in
:
the knowledge of finite minds)
like
it
follows that he
stantly and perpetually intelligent, intellect, and intelligible
very essence that
his
intelligible,
with
and
intelligent,
is
the same that
still
Ibn-Sina, and the idea
we have
a
is
the same that
is
intellect, as
Maimonides himself
intellect in act."
all
is
it
the
must be the
case
is
here following
warning of some significance against jumping kind.
It
may
certain
mind the passage of Maimonides he may had before him the adaptation of it by Moses
that Spinoza had in his or
Thus
at simple
practically
is
it is
;
is
ultimately derived from Aristotle.
coincidences in matters of this
con-
is
not have also
;
of Cordova to a purpose superficially like Spinoza's own.
The
other passage to be considered
is
in a letter to
Oldenburg
written late in 1675.'^
"
hold
I
God
immanent cause, That all things have
for the
not the transient.
God
Paul, and perhaps
affirm with
I
they say, of
as
their being I
may
ancient philosophers, though in another form bold to say, with
all
;
all
and move in
say with
I
the ancient Hebrews, so far
things,
all
the
might even make as one may guess
though they may be in many ways The traditions here mentioned might well belong to corrupted." the metaphysical kernel ot the Kabbalah, which Spinoza must, in from certain
traditions,
common
all
fit
scholars of the time, have beheved to be of great
and the manifold corruptions of which he speaks would very well with the vagaries of the later Kabbalists, and the
antiquity also
with ;
opinion expressed of them in the 1
note) ^
More Ncbuchim^ J
part
i.
c.
68
Spinoza, Cogitata Metaphysica,
Ep, 73.
(vol. pt.
i.
ii.
301
p. c.
Tractatus
6
in
Theologico-P oUticus
Munk's
translation, and
see his
ยง 3.
Leibnitz had a copy of this letter, see note in ed.
Van Vloten
and Land.
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
96
But such itself;
very
too vague to be
is
and we have seen that the passage
little
It
a reference
AND PHILOSOPHY
is
much
Eth.
in
upon by
relied ii.
7 gives
it
support.
further to be observed that the Kabbalah v^as taken up
Raymond
with great ardour by
Lull within the century of
its
and that it was eagerly studied by Pico de Mirandola, Reuchlin, and other scholars of the Renaissance, who, entertaining no doubt of the antiquity alleged for it, thought to find in it a venerable and birth,
and thus obtained a
currency
partial
Christendom
in
3
authoritative confirmation of the Platonic or Neo-Platonic philo-
sophy that prevailed among them.^ Giordano Bruno, whose relation to Spinoza will immediately be considered, was probably not free from this influence.
At
all
work of the Jewish Neo-Platonist Avicebron (Ibnand thus we Gebirol) was known to him and freely used by him have yet another road by which the Neo-Platonic ideas may have Solomon Ibn-Gebirol, born at found their way to Spinoza. Cordova or Malaga about 1020, came at an unfortunate time for events the
;
his philosophical reputation
which he
writings, in
among
and
lived
entirely forgotten as
work had been
own
people.
still
was already lives
as
rising before his death,
a religious
translated into Latin under the
he was
poet,^
But
philosophical writer.
a
His speculative
were overwhelmed
closely followed Plotinus,
in the Peripatetic flood that
and while he
his
name
his
principal
of Fo?is Vitae^
The
author's name was and was current among the schoolmen. form Avicebron, and he was set down disguised under the Latinized without further inquiry, by a sort of unreasoned mental attraction,
belonging
as 1
to
Arabic
the
Spinoza's library included
school
Leon Abarbanel
headed
God,
in
it
at
and
Amor,
a
Venice, 1568, from an
After a great deal of pedantic mythological allegorizing, the author
concludes that philosophy
which
Averroes
(or Abravanel)'s Dialogos de
Neo-Platonic work of the Renaissance, published in Spanish Italian original.
by
is
the beauty of the intellectual soul, and the spiritual love of
realizes its divine nature,
is
its
highest good.
discloses nothing original in the matter or treatment, and gives
Spinoza learnt anything from the book, which, I conceive, was ^ " Den Gabirol, diesen treuen
A
cursory examination
no reason to suppose that in fashion for a time.
Gottgeweihten Minnesanger, Diese
fromme
Nachtigall,
Deren Rose Gott gewesen."
Heine, Hehr'dhche Melodien.
SOURCES OF SPINOZA'S PHILOSOPHY The
Avicenna.
identity of Avicebron with
own
rediscovered only in our late
Dr.
The
Munk.
mediaeval philosophy,
Ibn-Gebirol was
day by the sagacious industry of the
Fons Vitae^ well
fell
known
to the leaders of
of the Renaissance, naturally received
more kindred
spirit
strain of their speculations,
We
is
it
in a
much
Bruno repeatedly
than the Aristotelians.
Avicebron with approval, and there
common
who,
into the hands of Giordano Bruno,
as a Platonist
use of
97
much
cites
likeness in the general
which, however,
may
be due to the
sources.
have no direct evidence that Spinoza was acquainted with
Giordano Bruno's writings but the want of such evidence counts for very little. But for his reply in a letter to a friend's passing question, we should be in the same case as to Spinoza's knowledge of Hobbes yet his political theory is so evidently founded on that of Hobbes that the letter adds nothing to our certainty. At that time it was still the constant practice for writers to make in silence such use of their predecessors' work as in our day would be thought to demand the most ample acknowledgment. And in this particular case there was a special reason for silence, the same reason which probably accounts for Tschirnhausen's later omission Any avowed following of of all reference to Spinoza himself. Bruno would have been sure to excite the most violent prejudice, It was by no means at Catholic even among Protestant readers. orthodoxy alone that Giordano Bruno had struck in his daring ;
;
and unconfined speculations. full
and
worth the internal evidence it is
of such strength
We
are free, then, to take at
for Spinoza's
as to carry all
but
its
knowledge of Bruno
;
irresistible conviction.
Whether Spinoza had actually read Bruno's dialogues, or had become acquainted with their substance in some other way (for example, through
Van den Ende),
it
is
impossible with
our
present materials to decide.
One
is
tempted to linger on the singular career and tragic fate
man whose fame, crushed for awhile but not consumed, has revived in our own day for the eternal dishonour of his persecutors. They who curse liberty and the advancement of man's estate in our own day are true and worthy successors of those who of the
burnt Giordano Bruno and were ready to torture Galileo.
H
The
SPINOZA
98
whom we now
philosopher and martyr of celebrated
of the
the verse of one of our
in
spirit
of the Renaissance,
impatience of authority in
its
ambition, and
me
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
:
its
on
its
own
ideal
forms,
all
speak
its
passionate love of beauty.^
at
is
last
fitly
poets, himself full
ardour for freedom, height of speculative
my
But
task forbids
must proceed to notice the points of Bruno's philosophy which bear on the matter in hand. Bruno admits only one first principle, cause, or substance in the universe. He is never tired of dwelHng on the unity of all things, which he regards as a multiform unity embracing the whole and present in every part. He rejects the notion of formless matter, and maintains that matter and form are inseparable. Finite things differ from one another, not in their being, but only in their mode of being, so that in them the one substance is not diverse, but only diversely fashioned and figured ; all things are in The study of nature the universe, and the universe in all things. seems to disclose two substances of mind and body, but further and the ultimate object of contemplation reduces them to one to enter
and
digressions,
I
;
philosophy and science
all
as to supernatural
is
declared (with an ironical reservation
knowledge) to be the perception of
In one dialogue the speaker
who
represents Bruno's
this unity.
own
opinions
asserts that the " first principle " is infinite in all its attributes, and that one of those attributes is extension [uno ampUssimo Again, it is animated, inasmuch as it indimensionale infinito).
cludes
all
life
as
one and the same being
part of
:
all
particular
things, "
Natura find in Bruno the terms attribute and est deus in rebus." manner a which, though it has not anything like mode^ used in lives are effects
of the divine
life
present in
all
We
Spinoza's
precision,
may
adoption of the words. likewise worth noting
very
The
well
have
suggested
Spinoza's
constant polemic against Aristotle
Spinoza was a reader of Bruno, his almost contemptuous view of Aristotle (p. 62 above) might be partly accounted for by this. is
;
if
In some of Bruno's writings much prominence is given to the identification of the highest kind of speculative knowledge with 1
" For the
Feast of Giordano
Poems and Ballads, second
series.
Bruno, philosopher and
martyr," in
Swinburne,
SOURCES OF SPINOZA'S PHILOSOPHY
and the power and and intellectual love are dwelt
the love of God, or the one perfect object surpassing excellence of this ideal
99
;
upon with exuberant poetic fancy. Notwithstanding the wide difference between Bruno's manner and Spinoza's, the thought and even the expressions are often strikingly
God and Man.
Essay on
common
the
At
property of
those of the
like
the same time this topic
and
mystic
all
much
so
is
inclined
mystically
much
writers that I can hardly think these resemblances add very to the evidence of a specific connection between the
would be no great matter for surprise parallel could be produced from the Persian It
certainly had not studied
;
two
thinkers.
good
an equally
if
whom
Sufis,
Spinoza
there are also striking resemblances
^
between Spinoza's doctrines and those of the mystical schools, orthodox or otherwise, of mediaeval Christendom from John the
unknown
Scot to the
he was)
who wrote though
Deutsche
that powerful and fascinating
here
probability to warrant
when
again
any
there
all
evidence
neither
is
belief in a historical connection.
that
Descartes also
indebted to Giordano Bruno, and there
Leaving
this
to Descartes
is
is
once
the
master
who
may have been
nothing unlikely in
question aside as too remote, as
we must now
gave the most
immediate impulse to Spinoza's thought
By him were
Still,
in itself be capable of a different explanation.
been suggested
has
Bruno
nor
points of coincidence have a certain cumulative value,
though each may
spirit
book Theologia
the general probability of Spinoza's relation to
estabhshed,
It
philosopher (for a considerable philosopher
in
it.
turn
powerful and
another direction.
nourished the exact method, the close analysis, the
of scientific curiosity, which
we
find in Spinoza's earliest
writing side by side with the ardour of universal contemplation,
and in the Ethics interpenetrating and transforming
Part
The
real
II.
merit of Descartes
it.
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;Descartes is
not to be found in the particular
which he started in either natural or universal philosophy. His fundamental axiom in psychology, though first brought into
novelties
1
See
1893.
now
chap.
vi.
of
Mr. Edward G. Browne's
A Tear amongst
the Persians,
London,
SPINOZA
100
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
:
prominence by him, was not altogether new. His physical principles were unsatisfactory not only in themselves, but as compared with the results already arrived at by other workers full
to
whom
many
absolutely erroneous in
occasion
modern is
to
see.
respects, as
The amount
presently have
which
edification
direct
a
It
only in pure mathematics,
is
all
its
achievements and extensions, that
later
contributions to man's positive knowledge have retained a
permanent all
shall
the undoubted creator of analytical geometry, he can
as
claim his part in his
of
we
indeed
reader can get out of Descartes' Principia Philosophiae
in truth exceedingly small.
where,
They were
Descartes failed to do justice.
value.
Yet
the
name
of Descartes, notwithstanding
the shortcomings of his actual performance, marks an epoch
in the history of science and philosophy. justly
won
because he
made
His fame
great and
is
a serious attempt to give an account
of the world on a scientific plan, to apply the same method to the problems of outward and inward experience, and to combine
He
the results into a consistent whole.
saw, with clearness and
boldness then without parallel, that physiology was a branch of physical
knowledge, and to be investigated on just the same
He saw
principles as every other branch.
leave science alone with the things
that the business of philosophy fall
is
that philosophy
which pertain
to
must
science
;
not with the particulars which
within the province of scientific inquiry, but with the inter-
pretation of the facts of experience
which
for science are ultimate.
We
have no right to be offended or even surprised when his He knew that he ought execution falls short of his intentions. not to be imposed upon by words or dogmatic fictions, but it was only natural that he should in many cases be unconsciously
There away by them. unfortunately, which has to Descartes' work as a whole
led
;
caution towards the Church.
is
be I
It
another
disturbing
allowed
mean is
his
certain
for
in
influence,
considering
attitude of extreme
that he
was much
hampered by the danger of an open conflict with orthodoxy, which he was determined to avoid at almost any cost. As it was all his astuteness was too little to save himself or his immediate followers from ecclesiastical hostility which was even more bitter
SOURCES OF SPINOZA'S PHILOSOPHY in the Protestant Netherlands than in
loi
any part of the CathoHc
world, and which, though
it never rose to the importance of a was able in various ways to inflict considerable inconvenience. It would be neither generous nor wise to ascribe
persecution,
Descartes' hesitation and reticence in the face of these difficulties
mere personal
to
He
timidity.
had
sincere
a
aversion
to
controversies of this kind and a sincere dread of violent changes.
He would
have liked the Church to adopt modern science and
philosophy
;
failing
he was content that they should be
that,
no harm to secure immunity, if on some points and transparent dissimulation
unmolested, and thought
left
necessary, by silence
on
others.
Certain
it
apologetic
Descartes' physical
passages in
writings are as manifestly ironical as anything in defiance
must have appeared
disastrous,
if
it
had
for science itself.
to
been
These
Open
Hume.
him an impracticable poHcy, and
practicable,
both
for
and
society
questions, however, do not touch the
physical side of Descartes' teaching, as
And
to
which there
is
no
was on this side, as I conceive, that Spinoza first approached him and felt his power. In Spinoza's earliest essay the psychology shows a reader of Descartes, but a reader very far from being a disciple the physics, on the other hand, are simply and solely Cartesian. suspicion of reserve.
it
-,
Yet, while the influence of Descartes' philosophical conceptions
on Spinoza has over and over again been discussed, sometimes with exaggeration, sometimes with depreciation, the not less important and certainly more persistent influence of his physical conceptions has passed, so notice.^
The
far
as
I
am
aware, almost
without
very peculiar account of motion given by Descartes
was not only repeated by Spinoza,
duty bound, in
his
Principles of Cartesian Philosophy^ but occurs in the Essay on
God
and Man^ and has left its that without going back
as
in
traces in the Ethics.
to the
I
venture to say
Cartesian theory of dynamic
Spinoza's account of the material world
We
is not intelligible. " certain things immediately produced read in Spinoza of
by God, which, though individual things, are ^
infinite in
Professor Sigwart, however, has indicated the point here discussed and
cance.
Spinoza's Neuentdeckter Tractat, etc., Gotha, 1866,
p.
49.
their
its signifi-
SPINOZA
102
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
:
kind, and necessary in an eminent manner, as being coextensive
with the attribute or aspect of existence to which they belong.
What
these things are
is
not stated in the Ethics
must be sought partly in one of the later the early essay which has already come before
tion
the following explanation
"As
is
the explana-
;
in
letters, partly
In this
us.^
last
given.
concerning Natura naturata in
that
general,
the
is,
modes or creatures which immediately depend on God or are created by him, of such we know two and no more namely, ;
Of
motions in matter, and understanding in the thinking thing. these
we
say that they have been from
unchangeable, a work verily
eternity shall remain
and to
eternity,
all
as
all
great as
beseemed the greatness of the master-worker."
The
subject of motion
is
more properly belongMotion and understanding,
not pursued,
ing to a treatise on natural science.
as
immutable creatures, are called by a startling Hebraism Sons of God. Indications of this kind have their value as showing that Spinoza was really striving to find a scientific
the eternal and
Not
interpretation for mystical conceptions.
less
significant
We
the disappearance of such language from the Ethics. stated, again, that
extended bodies
" proportion of rest and motion "
we
ordinary,
differ ;
et
toti
eorumque
vii. ยง
27)
we
from one another only
in
what is still more extramotion by the impact of
itself, is
In the Tractatus
its rest?'
read of "res
though
maxime
motum
naturae communes, videlicet
leges et regulas," which,
attention by
it
hear of a body being set in
Theologico-P oUticus (c. sales
find
and,
another body having motion greater than
is
it
et
univer-
quietem,
might excite
little
significant in connection with other passages.
1675 he gives Motion and Rest as examples of the " things immediately produced by God." Motion and Rest, then, were for Spinoza not relative terms describing the state of bodies with regard to each other, but in some sense and
And
1
in a letter as late as
Eth.
I,
propp. 21, 23, and 28, schol.
which there is an odd really thought motion itself 9, to
2
Korte Verh. part
ii.
;
Ep. 66, ยง 8
j
Korte Verhandcling^ part
i.
cap.
note, presumably by a transcriber, stating that the author to be capable of further explanation.
note ad ink.
(I
have no doubt that
and cap. 19 (pp. 49, 99 in Schaarschmidt's ed.).
Cf. Ethics^
this note 4,
39
is
Spinoza's
own)
SOURCES OF SPINOZA'S PHILOSOPHY some purposes
for as
Indeed he
real things.
103
but defined Matter
all
Extension modified by Rest and Motion.
For the key Descartes'
to these ideas
Principia
we must
Philosophiae^
look to the second part of followed
closely
by Spinoza
himself in the professed exposition of Cartesian doctrine which
was
his first published
work.
Descartes
tells
us that the nature of
matter, or body generally considered, does not consist in hardness,
weight, or any other sensible quality, but only in extension in three dimensions
;
and that
("in toto universo una
matter
all
is
ultimately
homogeneous
eadem existit"), and all the differences in its sensible properties depend on differences of motion ("omnis materiae variatio, sive omnium eius formarum diversitas, pendet a motu "). The relative nature of motion is clearly enough pointed out ("nullum esse permanentem ullius rei locum, nisi quatenus a cogitatione nostra determinatur "), and the same illustration of it is given which has (no doubt independently) been repeated by Mr. Herbert Spencer [First Principles^ c. 3, ยง 17). Thus far the modern reader may follow Descartes with admiration
but then
;
universe
is
et
it is laid
down
that the quantity of motion in the
from the perfection of God. observes the utmost constancy
We in
not suppose any changes in his
known by
which
constant, a proposition
is
demonstrated a priori
presume that God all his operations, and we must works which are not actually
experience or revelation.
are
to
Hence we
are to believe that
motion and rest, " materiam simul cum motu et
in the beginning he created a certain quantity of
and preserves
them unchanged
:
suum concursum tota, quantum tunc
quiete in principio creavit, iamque per solum
ordinarium tantundem motus posuit, conservat."
thing,
is
shown by
may have been
The
et quietis in ea
addition of rest, as
if
that also
were
the context to be merely rhetorical.
misled by
it,
or his
own
language
may
a real
Spinoza
be nothing
would seem, indeed, that Descartes himself was not free from confusion on this point for some paragraphs later he speaks of motion as contrary to rest, and of speed as contrary to slowness, " in so far as such slowness but an excessive imitation of Descartes.
It
;
partakes of the nature of rest."
of
finite
Spinoza, again, speaks elsewhere
existence as " de nihilo participans," partaking of nulKty
AND PHILOSOPHY
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
104
Met.
[Cogit.
Nothing
pt.
ii.
c. 3,
§
laid dov^^n
;
but he certainly did not regard
Here, then,
as a real thing.
of motion
i)
by Descartes
we
have the conservation
as a first principle
of physics,
and taken over by Spinoza vi^ithout question. The first remark that occurs on it is that, however we take the supposed principle, it is not true ; and it is almost impossible to beheve that the
was satisfying to the inventor himself. Yet Descartes had a perfectly distinct and right intention, and one may even say that he came near to a definite truth. But unhappily he had not the patience to abstain from premature generalisation ; he violated all the rules of sound scientific method, including his own maxims, and his haste led him into deep and irreparable error. He was added to the number of those mighty ones who in their supposed proof of
it
search for the truth of things have, as Lucretius says, mightily fallen
:
By
" graviter magno magni cecidere
ibi
casu."
of ?notion Descartes meant what is now called momentum^ a quantity measured by mass and velocity jointly.
The
quantity
term " quantity of motion " has indeed been preserved
synonym
for
momentum
and therefore as
magnitude.
It
is
Now velocity,
modern books.
in several
momentum,
a quantity
as a
having direction
as well
seems unaccountable that Descartes should have
neglected to consider
this,
of directed quantities
all
but he did neglect
over the universe, in
criminately, and asserted
that
He
it.
would symboHcally be expressed thus
sum
directions indis-
all
was constant
it
took a
proposition
his
j
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;2 [mv) = C.
This
is
not
For, motion and velocity being
only untrue but unintelligible.
knew), we are Descartes took no not told how the velocity is to be estimated. account whatever of direction, holding the nature of motion in itself to be something apart from its direction, which he calls " the determination of motion towards this or that part " ; and this is further made clear by the application of his principle which immerelative (as Descartes himself, strange to say, well
diately follows.
He
remain the same
after
quantity
being the same
The
as
still
two quantity of motion must
considers various cases of the colHsion of
bodies on the assumption that the
total
the collision as before
most curious confusion of
when
all
is
;
and he
the direction
that, after
is
treats the
reversed.
duly warning us
SOURCES OF SPINOZA'S PHILOSOPHY that
two
the
bodies in question
105
must be regarded as an indesic divisa ut eorum motus a
pendent system ("a reliquis omnibus
circumiacentibus impedirentur nee
iuvarentur "), he proceeds to speak of cases in which one of them is absolutely at
nullis
aliis
and other cases in which they are moving with different velocities. The results he obtains are in part wholly wrong, in part such as might be theoretically true in a Hmiting and physirest,
cally impossible case.
Spinoza was apparently
(Ep. 32,
Descartes' rules except one.
Had Descartes attended to the from momentum, he might have proposition
momentum
that
in
satisfied
with
all
10.)
ยง
truth that direction lighted
upon the
a given direction
inseparable
is
perfectly true
conserved.
is
from Newton's Third Law of Motion, that action and reaction are equal and opposite. For, if any change took place in the momentum of a system resolved along any
This
a corollary
is
particular
direction whatever, such
change would be due to an
inequality between action and reaction measured in that direction,
which
is
what the
third law of
But Newton's
motion excludes.^
was unknown to Descartes j and in truth its scope and importance have only in late years been redeemed from general third law
Descartes, however, had a grand object in his specula-
neglect. tions
on the
know
to
first
that
it
He
principles of physics.
could not be expected
was unattainable with the means
command,
at his
and the importance of the conception may almost excuse his rashHe was in search ness in clutching at it and seizing a phantom. of a principle which should enable
him
to deal with the material
universe as a machine self-acting and complete in
itself.
Given
a
whole future series and was to follow without
certain disposition of matter and motion, the
of phenomena was to be involved in
any necessity logical
for a
criticism
it,
renewal of interference from outside.
was met,
if
Theo-
not disarmed, by postulating an
endow the matter of the universe with its " quantity of motion." Descartes was in truth feeling about, fixed without sufficient light, for some such general doctrine as that which is now known as the Conservation of Energy and if it original creative act to
\
^
The
Erdmann,
proposition was also correctly enounced by Leibnitz Berlin, 1840), pp. 108, 133.
:
Opera Ph'ilowphica
(ed.
io6
SPINOZA:
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
had been in the nature of things that the Conservation of Energy, or anything equivalent to it, should be either discovered or proved a priori^ Descartes would in contemporaries were too
system to perceive
Hebrew of
its
much
it.
His
dazzled by the briUiance of his
scientific
its
done
probability have
all
weakness.
Spinoza,
full
of the
conviction of the perfect unity of the divine nature and
manifestations in the sensible world, and determined to carry
that principle to
its
utmost consequences, found in Descartes a
seeming demonstration, on grounds of scientific evidence, of that unity and uniformity in the physical world which speculation had already led him to expect, and it must have come upon him almost as a revelation.
It
is
curious that Spinoza's language about
we
derived as
Motion and Rest,
have seen from the most confused and erroneous
part of the Cartesian physics,
of a rational interpretation.
is
He
nevertheless in a is
asked to
manner capable
name
the particular
things which are infinite in their kind, and necessary to the existence of finite things of the same kind.
Matter he does not count as such (at least not in the first rank), though in his view the material universe may be considered as an individual whole no Probably he regarded matter as nothing less than any part of it. and the visible universe, " facies totius but figured extension ;
universi," involves
" motus examples
et
change and motion.
quies," as
desired.
being, in
Now
if
Energy
is,
accordingly
we might read energy of position, we should have a fairly
for motus
motion, and for quies energy of plausible result.
He names
the attribute of extension, the
according to the notions of modern
most fundamental property of the sensible universe, coextensive with it, and necessary to everything that happens in physics, the
Every physical event may be regarded as a transference of Again, though kinetic energy and potential energy, energy. it.
taken separately, are not constant, the
sum
so that, if anything in the physical world
and immutable. Energy, taken
as
this
of is
them
is
constant
;
to be called infinite
sum, appears to have a
good enough claim to the title. And thus (if we chose to disregard historical facts and conditions) we might find in Spinoza's dark saying a kind of prophetic vision, and assign to him the
SOURCES OF SPINOZA'S PHILOSOPHY glory of having pointed the science.
But
was no more
it
to the latest generalisation of
fancy would of course be wholly untenable
this
because
first,
way
possible
of the Conservation of Energy Spinoza's phrase to
Why
Cartesian origin.
way
of the
must be used
is
it
may
not uninstructive
be asked, do
it
to
go out
I
reply
I
?
fixed
showing what caution
as
meaning
in assigning a
the philosophy of past
we
then,
to suggest the possibility of such a fancy
that the example
where
we have
only admissible meaning by tracing
its
;
for
modern conception
secondly, because
j
than
Spinoza
for
Descartes, or even Leibnitz, to arrive at the
its
107
to
obscure language in
how
generations, and
important
practicable, to ascertain the history of the ideas
it
is,
and terms
have to do with.
At his
life
the same time
we have
indications that towards the end ot
Spinoza had become deeply
dissatisfied
with the physical
This appears by his last letters to the year 1676). Tschirnhausen asks (Ep. 69)
conceptions of Descartes.
Tschirnhausen
how
(in
Spinoza would prove a priori the existence of bodies figured
and in motion, extension in the abstract being conceivable without " From extenany such thing. Spinoza makes answer thus :
sion
as
conceived by Descartes, that
quiescentem),
it
is
not only,
as
you
an inert mass (molem
is,
say, difficult,
but altogether
For matter
impossible to prove the existence of bodies.
at rest
and will not be impelled to motion unless by a more powerful external cause, and for this reason I long ago did not hesitate to affirm that the Cartesian will, so far as in it lies, persist in its rest,
principles of natural philosophy are useless, not to say absurd."
Tschirnhausen replied
that
Descartes
did
not,
in
his
opinion,
profess to account for the existing material universe as a product
of inert matter, since he supposes matter to have been animated
with motion by a creative reason of increasing length.
ill
His rejoinder
act.
Spinoza was unable, probably by
up the discussion at any " As to your question these terms
health, to keep is
in
:
whether the variety of existing things can be proved a priori from the mere conception of extension, ciently ill
shown
that
it is
impossible
I ;
think
I
have already
suffi-
and that therefore matter
is
defined by Descartes as identical with extension (materiam a
SPINOZA
io8
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
:
Cartesio male definiri per extensionem), but must necessarily be explained by an attribute which expresses an eternal and infinite
But perhaps
nature.
some
day, if
me.
life suffices
down anything
set
I will discourse
fuller explanation
of this more clearly with you
For hitherto
orderly on the matter."
I
have not been able to
The
never came, and the passage
opportunity for
as it stands
is,
like
One same correspondence, somewhat obscure. would expect the meaning to be that matter without motion is as inconceivable as matter without extension, so that Descartes' assumption that matter was there first, as an inert lump, and motion was put into it afterwards, was illegitimate and irrational. But if Spinoza meant this, I cannot see why he should not have said it with his usual distinctness. At any rate it is pretty clear that the Cartesian conception of others
in
the
material substance as consisting merely in extension fusion of matter with space, as Professor Clerk it
^
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;which
leaves the fact
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
Maxwell
the con-
has called
and the idea of mass inexplicable, and
motion being inconsistently regarded, now as an ens rationis like the configuration of a system or part of space, now as a kind of thing-in-itself, was not accepted by Spinoza in his later days. This alone would not show that he did not accept it when he wrote the Ethics^ but it is enough to make us wary in
leads
to
reading those propositions which involve physical ideas.
Another physical proposition given by Descartes, and included in Newton's first law of motion, appears to have furnished the groundwork of the more general proposition used by Spinoza as the starting-point of human psychology and ethics. Descartes says [Princ. Phil, 2,
c.
37) that "everything, in so
simple and undivided, remains, as condition, and suffers
much
far
as in it lies, in
as
it
is
the same
no change unless from external causes."
Spinoza, in his manual of Cartesian philosophy, repeats the proposition in almost the
simplex et indivisa est,
1
semper
in
same words.
est, et
eodem
in se sola consideratur,
statu perseverat."
Clerk Maxwell was living when these
through
the press
" Unaquaeque
without adding
a
word of
lines
were written
tribute to a
genius, too early lost to England and to science.
The man
:
res,
quatenus
quantum
in se
demonstration he I
cannot
let
them
pass
of profound and original
[This note stands
as in
1880.]
SOURCES OF SPINOZA'S PHILOSOPHY
109
framed in such general terms as to show that he regarded the proposition as not merely physical ; Descartes having already gives
is
treated
as the
it
most general
And
c.
of physical action {Princ. Phil,
lav^^
the Cogitata Metaphysica^ pubHshed as an
in
43). appendix to this v^ork, v^e find the general idea of the self-pre2,
serving effort of things, " conatus quo res in statu suo perseverare
This
conantur."
than the thing
itself
condition.
motion
itself,
that
[Cogit.
Met.
pt.
c.
i.
as identical
of motion
powder of persisting in
nothing
i, c.
with the self-preserving
lies,
it
is
effort.
every particular thing, so
:
endeavours to persist in
quo unaquaeque
praeter ipsius rei actualem essentiam "
everything strives to persist in fact of the thing being
own
its
in the se est,
much
"Conatus,
being.
suo esse perseverare conatur, nihil
in
res
its
than
else
In the Essay on God and Man 5) in which Providence is explained
in suo esse perseverare conatur " in
a
the the nature of motion " ^
is
Let us now turn to the sixth and seventh propositions " Unaquaeque res, quantum in third book of the Ethics. as
as
9).
6, ยง
a curious chapter (pt.
lav^
first
the fact that such
is,
in truth nothing else
is
he gives the
"Motion has the Nov^ this pov^er
simple example.
is
says,
should nov^ say, the fact of the
or, as v^^e
;
And
thing being there.
actual
Spinoza
effort,
what
:
being
its
the endeavour wherewith
nothing
is
The
it is.
est
else
than the
physical aspect of the
may
be stated in modern language by saying that no change of configuration takes place without work being done ; proposition
this gets
rid
of the
objectionable
term
conatus.^
and dispenses
with the auxiliary proposition which Spinoza required to guard Both the conception and the against the illusions it might lead to.
name of
the self- preserving endeavour are older, possibly
older, than 1
Descartes
est appetit
.
that the
esse."
A
.
.
if
di
that had been the
meaning Spinoza
common
to all creatures.
conservarsi " as
ยง 15,
and the proposition
first
" but
we find it assumed similar maxim was familiar
i,
impulse of every living thing
first
iavTo)
suum
:
motus.
Giordano Bruno speaks of a " desio
In Dante, De Monarchia, the
ht'ius
much
but the connection between Spinoza's
perhaps, " of the particular motion
Or
would probably have written 2
; ^
is
is
directed
as
a
principle that "
to the
Stoics.
to self-preservation (eTrt rb TTjpelv
thus stated by Chrysippus in his
property of every living creature
is
omne quod " They say that
first
book on Ends
the conscious maintenance of itself"
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; no
AND PHILOSOPHY
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
law of nature appears to be sufficiently made out by comparison of the passages above proposition and
Descartes' so-called
first
given.^
Here again we are led criticism. It would be
to
remark the importance of
easy,
notwithstanding
historical
own
Spinoza's
warning, to find in the conatus an inkling of the struggle for existence, as scientific
we now
call it,
which
account of the world.
even been suggested that
It has
But the
Spinoza here anticipates the doctrine of evolution.
There
modern
so important in the
is
facts
no more of evolution in Spinoza than there is in one sense the general idea of evolution in Descartes in both, namely, that the whole physical universe, animate as well What as inanimate, is to be accounted for by physical causes. the doctrine of evolution has done is to put this idea into forms whereby it becomes capable of definite scientific treatment, and are inexorable.
is
;
leads
to definite
results.
The
point
not
is
to
see
there
that
a constant endeavour, or even competition, of kinds to preserve their existence, but to see that and individuals in
is
nature
the competition
itself
is
an orderly process, and that existing forms
worked out by it in ways which may be investigated and reduced to law. This belongs to natural, not to speculative the most the speculative philosopher can do is to philosophy
are
;
know his own business and leave the road And this is the credit I would claim for prophecy but the
gift
clear for natural history.
Spinoza, not the gift of
But we
of discernment.
shall return to this
hereafter.
Thus much {Ty]v
avTov avaracnv koX
Preller, § 420). I
of Descartes' physical doctrines in their relation
I
can learn (though
commonplace
mind
it is
much
all
suum
85
Ritter and
(ap.
5
but
it is
So
far as
discoverable
Through
conservare " became a
esse
Before the end of the sixteenth century Sir John Davis,
Things
else,
:
which Nature makes
to be.
Their Being to preserve are chiefly taught
And
vii.
farther back.
not in Aristotle
the general notion of "
to be an innovator, w^rote
For
Diog. L.
to trace the idea
See the fragment on the Stoics in Grote's Arhtotk.
tradition
of the schools.
certainly w^ith no
ravrrjs avveid'qai.v).
speak with diffidence)
I
in the later Peripatetics.
the Aristotelian
t7]v
have not been able
j
some Things desire a Change to see, Yet never Thing did long to turn to nought.
^
It
is
briefly noticed
tho'
by Trendelenburg, Hhtorhche
Beitr'dge zur Philosophies
ii.
82.
SOURCES OF SPINOZA'S PHILOSOPHY As
to Spinoza.
to
that Spinoza was profoundly influenced by his
and by
Indeed
when
it
Spinoza's
powers ripening first flush
is
manner of approaching metaphysical and psychological
his
questions.
time
no doubt doctrine of method
philosophy in general, there
his
for
could not have been otherwise.
At
the
mind was opening
and
his
to philosophy,
independent work, Descartes was
Every student who meant
of his renown.
still
reason on a
new
who had
Spinoza necessarily dwelt in a
footing.
Cartesian atmosphere and drew his
much
in the
to think for
himself would turn eagerly to Descartes as the liberator set
iii
life
from
it.
But, however
Spinoza must have admired the height and range of Descartes'
genius, and been fascinated by the brilliance of his invention, he
found the actual performance wanting. in the foregoing notice of the Essay on
Reasons have been given,
God and Man^
that Spinoza was never a Cartesian in metaphysics
;
for believing it
is
certain
though more gradually, to a marked divergence from Cartesian opinions and we have just seen that even in physics, where until the advent of Newton Descartes seemed to reign without a rival, Spinoza did not give him unWhen he wrote his early essay, Spinoza had reserved allegiance. already made up his mind to reject the metaphysical dualism of Descartes \ the conception of spirit and matter as two distinct substances is entirely put aside. On the other hand he still so far that in psychology he came,
;
adhered to Cartesian psychology
as
to hold that interaction took
between the mind and the body by means of the " animal spirits," the direction of whose motion, though not the motion place
itself,
This was the made by Descartes
could be changed by a purely mental act.
philosophical use of the fallacious distinction
between motion and or that part."
It
its
direction or " determination towards this
enabled
him
to assign, as
he thought, a point of
contact for the material and the immaterial worlds, and not only to leave
room
for the operation
explanation of
it.
The
will
of free will but to give a scientific could impress as
much change
as
might be required on the direction of the animal spirits without Spinoza, as violating the axiom of the conservation of motion.^ 1
to
Attempts have been made quite
modern
physical knowledge.
lately to
revive this invention in a form adapted
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
112
own work
his
AND PHILOSOPHY
advanced, perceived the weakness of the Cartesian
theory, and not only ceased to follow it
it
but explicitly controverted
in the Ethics.
Spinoza's doctrine of the unity of Substance was held by him, I believe,
without interruption from the
He was
activity.
Cartesian duaHsm
first
by examination of the we think of his opinion on this
only strengthened in ;
and, so far as
point in relation to Descartes,
days of his philosophic
it
we must
reaction rather than a development.
It
think of is
it
as a critical
true that philosophy
could not in any case have rested content with the form of dualism
propounded by Descartes ; the school of Descartes himself did not He had drawn a sharp line of separation between the so rest. subjective and objective aspects of the world, the mental and the material series of phenomena, without
show how they came
making any
distinct
attempt
one The gap was filled up by the ingenuity of his immediate another. followers with the doctrine of Occasional Causes ; which however is really equivalent to giving up the problem as hopeless, and Yet no other way is possible taking refuge in a perpetual miracle. so long as the fundamental distinction of substances is retained. to
into relation and correspondence with
Spinoza saw that the apparent explanation was no explanation at
and took up the question again from the beginning. If it can be said of him that he only continued the work of Descartes, it can with equal justice be said of Kant that he only continued the all,
Both found new difficulties probed and of search indicated by their great precursors
work of Hume.
new
lines
laid bare, ;
but the
problems thus started had in the one case been solved imperfectly or erroneously, in the other they were conspicuously and of set purpose
left
unsolved.
Kant and Spinoza, men of widely
different
genius and considering the questions of philosophy under widely different
root and
forms, both produced results which have struck
deep
brought forth a manifold harvest in the subsequent course
of philosophic inquiry.
Every new step in so far
as
its
in philosophy
is
a continuation of
the
last,
character and direction are determined by that
which has been found wanting in the account of things obtained But it can properly be called a conin the last preceding stage.
SOURCES OF SPINOZA'S PHILOSOPHY
113
when
it pushes on in the same direction, not when comes back from it as leading nowhere and strikes out a distinct one. This last was the case with Spinoza as regards Descartes and to speak of his philosophy as a branch of the philosophy of
tinuation only it
;
Descartes appears to
me
nothing short of a paradox.
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
CHAPTER
IV
THE DOCTRINE OF METHOD Et j'avais toujours un extreme pour voir
clair
desir d'apprendre a distinguer
le vrai
en mes actions et marcher avec assurance en cette
d'avec
vie.
faux,
le
Descartes,
Discours de la Methode.
As
a
Of
On
King's Daughter, being in Person sought divers Princes,
who
none of them can
Tho' she
do neighbour near.
constant Thought,
fix a
to all do lend a gentle Ear.
So while the Virgin-Soul on Earth doth
She woo'd and tempted
is
stay.
ten thousand ways,
By these great Pow'rs, which on the Earth bear sway. The Wisdom of the World, Wealth, Pleasure, Praise
With
these sometimes she doth her
Time
:
beguile,
These do by Fits her Fantasie possess j But she distastes them all within a while,
And
in the sweetest finds a Tediousness.
Bodies are fed with Things of mortal kind.
And
so are subject to Mortality
But Truth, which
The Tree
is
of Life,
:
eternal, feeds the
which
Mind
j
will not let her die.
Sir
The
John Davis.
best general introduction to the philosophy of Spinoza
is
perhaps that which he has himself given us in his unfinished work,
On
the
Amendment of
the
Understanding.
It
was begun some
considerable time before the Ethics^ probably on the suggestion of
Descartes' Discourse on Adethod^ but on a
seems
to
aim
at
nothing
less
much
larger scale
;
it
than a complete analytical account of
the objects, nature, and instruments of philosophic inquiry.
Thus
THE DOCTRINE OF METHOD it
was to prepare the way
now
At
it
out,
is
by the
the time of writing this treatise his designs were
probably more extensive ones, had
which
for a constructive exposition,
represented, so far as Spinoza was able to carry
Ethics.
115
come
;
and changes, though not fundamental
over his opinions in
assumed their present form. Essay on God and
Man
points before the Ethics
But on the whole the
much
Emendatione stands so
some
that
De
Intellectus
nearer to the Ethics than it
may
analytical preface to Spinoza's latest
the
to
be fairly regarded as the
work, bearing to
it
some such
relation as Descartes' Discourse to his Principles of Philosophy^ or
Kant's Prolegomena to the Kritik. trust the statement of his editors,
Spinoza himself,
if
we may
had not dropped the work
as
out of harmony with his later views, but always intended to take it
up and
finish
it.
Several of the footnotes attached to
present shape look as
if
it
in
its
they had been made by Spinoza on a
some time after the text was written, and were meant as memoranda for his own use in the subsequent revision and completion which was never executed.
reperusal
The
treatise begins
human
by considering the
futility
of the
common
which
are reduced to the heads of wealth,
power, and pleasures of sense.
All these are vain and precarious
objects of
in themselves,
good.
But
is
desire,
and
distract the
mind from the
not that pursuit also precarious
pursuit of the true ?
and
if for its
sake
which men commonly seek after, may we not lose the substance of life for a shadow ? The answer gives in a few sentences the whole aim of Spinoza's " After I had somewhat thought over the matter, I philosophy. found, in the first place, that, by abandoning these objects and undertaking a new course of life, I should abandon a good uncertain in its own nature, as we may plainly gather from what I have said, for one uncertain, not in its own nature (for it was a constant good I was in search of), but only as to the attainment of it. Further, I came by persevering reflection to see that by so doing, if only I could thoroughly weigh the question, I should abandon certain evils for a certain good. For I perceived that I was encompassed by the utmost danger, and drove myself to seek a remedy with all my power, uncertain as it might be 3 as one
we renounce
that
i
SPINOZA;
ii6
HIS LIFE
sick of a mortal disease,
remedy be
applied,
power, uncertain though
Now
all
when he
driven
is
AND PHILOSOPHY
to
be,
it
foresees certain death unless a
seek that remedy with
and his whole hope
is
his
all
set thereon.
those things which the multitude pursue not only provide
no remedy for the maintenance of our being, but actually hinder it, and are oftentimes the occasion of ruin to such as possess them, Happiness or unalways to such as are possessed by them." happiness depends on the nature of the object whereon we fix our .
.
affection.
.
envy, hatred, and fear are the constant penalty
Strife,
" But love towards a thing eternal and infinite feeds the mind with pure joy, and is wholly free from sorrow ; this is to be greatly desired and strenuously sought for." of loving perishable things.
Spinoza, like Descartes,
tells
with him
truth, taking us along
the story of his in the path
and retracing with us the steps by which able.
But the
way.
in the right
Descartes
is
own
which he struck
at last
difference of their ambitions
is
might
walk with confidence
see the
in
this
He
supporting
lofty
many
for
terrestrial
dis-
found literature instructive
guide to heaven (whither he meant to go no
man), but too
I ever
There was no ardent
mathematics admirable and
;
"
how to distinguish truth from way clearly in my actions and
life."
quietude in his pursuit of truth.
and agreeable
remark-
in search, not of blessedness, not of the supreme
had an exceeding desire to learn I
out,
he found himself
good, but of certainty for the conduct of man's action.
falsehood, that
search for
uses
-,
useful less
;
theology a
than any other
philosophy an art of
diverse opinions with equally plausible reasons
;
and special branches of learning appeared to him in the same case with philosophy, save that they were practical roads to wealth and From the pursuit of these he could honourable employments. stand apart
;
he
knew enough
be proof against them failure,
;
of vulgar imposture and delusion to
and having found the school of books
he went forth into the school of men.
It
was only
a
after
some years that in the leisure of a long winter he turned back upon himself to find some better foundations of knowledge and Meanwhile active life was well enough ; every man finds belief. at least some truth in attending to his own business, for therein error brings its own speedy punishment. As for the common
THE DOCTRINE OF METHOD
117
objects of men's desires and undertakings, their vanity
What may
over v/ith the briefest mention.
not discussed, not even glanced
be the real object of
Knowledge
life
is
for
our present search, Descartes seems to say.
where we It
at.
passed
is
is
enough
Let us know
and then there will be time enough for the rest. otherwise with Spinoza. Following a more ancient course
is
are,
of thought than that struck out by Descartes, he
is
impelled by
the futility of earthly desires to set forth on the quest of man's It is not enough for him to " practical need of walking with confidence in this
true and perfect good.
would
purpose to which
The
all
life
particular
for a season,
of courts and camps, the
was not open to him.
He
or remission, to attack the problem of
world, but apart from
good
is
field
find
it
them
;
he
man
can make
The
good also. any form.
man
life
set himself,
life,
without delay
not in and through the
;
human
Spinoza assumes that there
is
permanent that by finding it the good for himself, and help others to
alternative of pessimism does not occur to
Descartes certainly had no reason to complain
Spinoza, so
;
his questionings aside
so sure and so
in
of the world
of varied activity
Descartes assumes tacitly that
it.
to a reasonable
some human good reasonable
"
knowledge and actions are sub-
and observation where Descartes could leave
hfe
life
understand the consummation of the journey, and the
fain
ordinate.
satisfy the
as little reason to praise
outward circumstances went, had But for each of them it was equally
far as
it.
impossible to devise that sort of stimulant for jaded philosophical
They
appetites.
lived in too fresh
and stirring an
air.
Spinoza's early mention of " love towards a thing eternal and infinite"
Man.
But
Ethics.
manner of the Essay on God arid the following paragraphs no less foreshadow the
reminds us in
He
not
does
storm, but prepares to approaches.
But
a
rush
make
for the
off
to
sure of
glimpse he
take it
the
by
first
conducted
we
should not
gave us
in sight.
the chief good,
to be observed, he says, that
only relative terms. be called satisfied
either
In considering what
that everything
or
imperfect
3
is
the true or
good and
evil are
own nature is to especially when v/e are
" Nothing regarded in
perfect
by
artificially
know what he had it is
Chief Good
which happens does
its
so according to
an
AND PHILOSOPHY
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
ii8
conception of a sees that
may
help
help
him
human
character
He
this ideal.
him towards
casts
this
"
a true good.
is
improved by
possible for his existing character to be
it is
approach to
But man can form the more constant than his own, and
and fixed laws of nature."
eternal order
about therefore for means which
perfection
And
the chief good
with other persons,
pass that he, together
may
everything that
;
to bring
is
may
if so it
be,
it
so to
may be we shall
endowed with such a character. What that character is show in its proper place, namely, that it consists in knowledge of the union which the mind has with the whole of nature. This then is the end for which I make, to acquire such a character, and to labour that many acquire
my
to
may wholly
many
belongs
is, it
others
do, that their understanding-s
I
may
under-
and desires
Here is announced the essentially human morality and improvement, which we
of
find
all
wisdom
is
To
developed in the Ethics.
only half the battle, and the
An
that
\
agree with mine."
social nature
afterwards
me
with
happiness to endeavour myself that
stand the same that
for
it
is
the triumph of the seeker
lesser half;
to find for his
be wise alone
fellow-men
as well
as
for himself.
and enlightened society must be formed if its members are to attain wisdom. For this end moral philosophy and the science of education must be cultivated (and how far, two instructed
centuries after Spinoza,
we
are
still
from a science of education)
;
and health being an important condition of our undertaking, medicine in every branch is to be perfected ^ nor are the mechanical arts to be omitted which multiply the convenience of " But before all is to be devised a method of curing the life. understanding, and purifying it so far as we are able at this stage, ;
that
it
may
succeed in understanding things
and without error."
Thus
the scope of
the perfection of man's nature that end
Some 1
its
usefulness
is
;
all
and by
as well as
knowledge
its
is
possible
the same,
tendency to promote
to be judged.
provisional rules are laid
Cf. Descartes, Disc, de la Met/iode, part
vi.,
est possible de trouver quelque nioyen qui rende
down
for the
whose language
communement
conduct of
is
stronger.
les
hommes
"...
life
S'il
plus sages et
plus habiles qu'ils n'ont ete jusqu'ici, je crois que c'est dans la medecine qu'on doit le
chercher."
THE DOCTRINE OF METHOD
119
during the period of inevitable ignorance, but they are of no great
One
moment.
of
them
looks as
Spinoza thought
if
it
possible at
one time that a guarded and judicious introduction of his opinions would save them from being unpopular. Then v^e come to the degrees of perception, or as
we
now say, knowledge. We may learn things
should
Four kinds are enumerated. hearsay or on authority {ex auditu)
(2) by the
;
of experience [ab experientia vaga'^)
(i)
by
mere suggestion
(3) by reasoning [essentia rei ex alia re concluditur) ; (4) by immediate and complete perception [res percipitur per solain suam essentiam). Thus a man's
birthday, the
known
are
;
names and condition of
him by hearsay
to
his ancestors,
and the
such matters as that
;
like,
oil increases
and water puts it out, and most things that make up the common knowledge of life, he knows by unreasoned experience ; while by reasoning from the known properties of light and optical fire,
we
instruments
correct the illusions of our sight as to the size of
heavenly bodies, or from our peculiar experience of our
we
infer that there
A
single example, however, will serve to illustrate
own
bodies,
some kind between the mind and the body. We know immediately, or by the nature of the thing alone, a few of the simplest and most general truths. of knowledge
where the
;
is
and
a peculiar relation of
this
classification
example alone is
all
retained in the
is
tradition and
repeated, but
the kinds
Ethics
loose ex-
perience are taken together as sources of knowledge of the
kind
;
first
reasoning forming the second kind, and intuition the third
and highest.
The
example chosen
is
that of a simple arithmetical
proportion.
Let three numbers be given be to the third
which shall Tradesmen have no hesita-
in order to find a fourth,
the second to the
as
first.
by the third and dividing the product by the first ; either because they have not forgotten the rule they once heard from a master without any proof [knowledge ex auditii\ or tion in multiplying the second
because they have often made perientia
^
This
trial
of
with simple numbers \ex-
it
vaga\ or by virtue of the proof in the nineteenth proposition is
Tractat, etc.,
a p.
Baconian phrase. 157.
No'u, Org.
Aph. loo.
Sigwart, Spino-za's Neuentdeckter
Prof. Sigwart's other evidences of Baconian influence in Spinoza's
treatise are not so clear
j
the influence, at
all
events,
was
a transitory one.
SPINOZA:
120
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
of the seventh book of Euclid, that
by the general property of proportionals [ratio or secundi generis cognitio]. But with very simple numbers there is no need of this. For example, if the given numbers
be
I,
2,
no one
3,
much more
this
from the
fails
to see that the fourth proportional
clearly, because
which we
ratio
is,
see
by
we
is
6
;
and
once infer the fourth number
at
a single intuitive act that the first has
to the second.^
We
have to choose between these modes of acquiring information as the means of arriving at exact knowledge, and thereby
the
at
Tradition
and
greatest loose
experience
of man's
perfection
possible
obviously
are
nature.
uncertain
and
was Spinoza's intention, as we learn by his marginal note, to discuss in this place the whole subject of experimental knowledge and research. Reasoning will lead us to certainty, if rightly carried out ; " yet by itself it will not be a means of attaining our perfection." The fourth mode of peruntrustworthy.
It
ception alone (the third kind of knowledge in the nomenclature
of the Ethics)
is
the only one which
is
both adequate^ as giving
whole nature of the thing perceived, and free from risk. Our task is therefore to find the best and shortest way for bringus the
ing things
Now
at present
that
we
have to deliver shall be first
to
that
is,
found,
its
have learnt what knowledge
is
grasp.^
needful for us,
the things to be
we
known
To which end
that kind of knowledge.
it
be considered, that there shall not be here an infinite search in order that the best
we
method of discovering the
do not need another method to discover
in this
that,
truth
is ;
may be
and to discover
method we do not want yet a third, and so on without end. manner we should never arrive at knowledge of the truth,
nor at any knowledge at
way
to us within
way and method, whereby
known with
the second
For
a
unknown
all.
The
matter stands indeed in the same
where one might argue in like work iron one must have a hammer, which hammer for which yet another hammer and other tools are
that of material instruments,
as
manner.
For to
must be made
;
needful, and to produce these again
1
Eth. 2, 40, schol. 2,
we
shall
need other
"
De
Int.
tools,
Em.
c.
5.
and so
THE DOCTRINE OF METHOD on without end prove that
Man many
:
and in
^
one might vainly endeavour to
this fashion
men have no power
of working iron.^
has in fact succeeded in
At
progressive steps.
121
first
making
tools
he used
his
and machines by
hands to obtain, by
rough and toilsome processes, a few of the simplest instruments. By the help of these he made other and better ones with less
from stage to stage arrived at his command of mechanical arts. So too the human mind, using its native strength to procure instruments for its work, proceeds from one and
labour,
consummate wisdom. What then are the instruments with which the mind is equipped by nature, and which suffice it for the construction of other and more finished ones ? They are true ideas, and the sole and Acsufficient proof of their truth is furnished by themselves. cordingly the doctrine of method is not concerned to assign a test of truth to be applied to our ideas after we have got them the problem is to find the due order in which truth, the representations of the nature of things,^ or true ideas (all which This naturally terms are synonymous) are to be sought for. appears to a modern reader at first sight as the most absolute undertaking to another
till it
attains
;
dogmatism. to accept
The
author seems to be claiming an arbitrary right
anything he pleases
really the case.
But
self-evident.
as
Spinoza's drift in this passage,
this
when
not
is
freed
from
no logical device whatever can we escape the necessity of starting from something or other as self-evident, and throwing on its self-evidence the whole weight of all the subsequent knowledge we may build on the technical form of his argument,
is
that by
our leading assumptions.
Let us take Spinoza's own explanation in the more concise and In the second part finished form which it assumes in the Ethics.
"whoever
(Prop. 43) he asserts that 1
Cf. the Rabbinical
of "things created between the suns," in
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; C. Taylor,
2 ^
" Essentiae obiectivae rerum,"
also,
or taken
as the object of
correlative term, \%
list
made with tongs." De Int. Em. c. 6.
tongs
formaVn
;
is
knowledge
knows
at the
which "some
say,
Sayings of the Jeivish Fathers^ v, 9.
In Spinoza's usage obiectivus means represented
thought, and
where the thing
so that true
has a true idea,
is
often equivalent to the
considered in in the
mind
is
itself,
or as
modern
suhjectinje.
we should now
in,
The
say objecti'uely,
said referre obiectwe formalitatem naturae.
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
122
same time
AND PHILOSOPHY
that he has a true idea, and cannot doubt the truth of
the thing perceived."
After the regular demonstration, which
remarks are added by w^ay of Scholium It
of
For no man who has
itself.
a true idea
involves the utmost degree of certitude.
pretty manifest
is
unaware
is
For
that a true idea
have
to
;
true idea
a
nothing else than to know the thing perfectly or
signifies
possible
these
artificial,
:
noted that the foregoing proposition
to be
is
very
is
as
well as
nor can any one possibly doubt of this unless he thinks an
mode of
idea to be a lifeless thing like a picture on a panel, and not a
thought, to wit the very act of understanding.
Who
that he understands anything, unless he do
understand the thing
who
in other words,
can
know
that he
is
first
can know,
I ask,
sure of anything unless he
?
is
indeed sure of that thing ? Again, what can be found more clear and certain than a true idea, which may be the test of truth ? Even as light makes manifest both itself and darkness, so is truth the measure of itself and of falsehood. first
Spinoza does
not say, be
it
observed,
every apparent
that
no true knowledge without certainty, and the certainty is given in the knowledge itself. In other words, there is ultimately no external test of truth ; we must be content in the last resort with the clear and persistent witness of consciousness. This doctrine is not
certainty
is
true knowledge, but that there
necessarily transcendental or dogmatic.
It
purely empirical account of the origin of
indeed
is
is
compatible with a
is
all
our knowledge, and
adopted in that connection by one of the leading philo-
sophical authors
of our
own
time and country.
Mr. Herbert
Spencer's view of the final test of truth, though he puts
negative form as the inconceivableness of the contrary, stantially
not distinguishable from Spinoza's.
the doctrine
ing against
is
not an assumption of
any such assumption.
in the
it
is
sub-
Rightly understood,
infallibility,
When
a
but a warn-
man
is
once
in
may well be deceived into supposing himself in possession of it when he is not. To take an illustration used elsewhere by Spinoza himself, a man dreaming often fancies himself sure that he is awake but a man possession of the truth, he cannot doubt
it
;
but he
;
really
awake can never think he
is
dreaming.
The
things
I see
THE DOCTRINE OF METHOD and
feel,
my
phenomena, are ultimate
The
they go.
to separate the
experience has
when
difficulty
is
certainties to
how
to ascertain
far
123
me
so far as
they really do go,
phenomena from my interpretation of them, which shown to be in many ways liable to error. Again,
have clearly grasped the relations between the parts of a geometrical diagram, I can entertain no doubt concerning them.
Yet
I
before
had sufficiently considered them
I
wrong conception of
or even entertain a
and imagine Spinoza
how
it
the geometrical relations
one knew better than to hold confused and erroneous beliefs with
it is
absolute confidence.
might be uncertain,
No
to be certainly right.
easy
I
Some of
the current notions in philosophy
and psychology which he makes the objects of his most unsparing attack are precisely those which have been most commonly maintained on the ground that they are principles given by consciousness as clear, ultimate, and self-evident.
At
the same time there
underrate (as almost
all
no reason
is
to
doubt that Spinoza did
constructive philosophers have underrated)
the difficulty of ascertaining what the ultimate data of sense and
thought
really are
;
he nowhere undertakes the analysis of these
does he separate
data, nor
from the business of ascertaining
it
concrete truth in particular cases.
Descartes'
own
testimony
is
express that he thought the whole body of possible knowledge to lie,
generally if not in detail, within a moderate compass, and to
be deducible from principles which might be single generation,
Spinoza
is
when once
the problem of
not so explicit, but
it
were of the same kind. For men in mind it was natural also to underrate the
among mankind
method was
seems probable that
tions
acceptance
finally settled in a
this
solved.
his expecta-
sanguine frame of
difficulty
for the conceptions
of procuring
which
to
them
appeared to shine with the hght of evident and self-justifying
This kind of excessive hope, however, is capable of being and while dashed by experience in all but incorrigible visionaries it appears, though not extravagantly, in the fragment De Intellectus Emendatione^ no sign of it is left in the Ethics. So far I have put the matter in my own way, to avoid the difficulties of Spinoza's vocabulary but his use of the term idea truth.
;
;
calls
for
some consideration
in
this
place, the
point being too
AND PHILOSOPHY
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
124
important
the understanding of Spinoza's psychology to be
for
omitted or evaded.
now
In the passage
before
us
idea
^
is
a
knowing mind, in which the object known This again may become the subject of another
conscious state of the is
represented.
"The man
representation, and so on.
The
[quid reale).
idea
true
Peter
of Peter
is
an existing thing
the nature of Peter
is
represented in thought [essentia Petri obiectiva\ and
itself
is
an
existing object wholly distinct from Peter."
This idea of Peter may then be the object of another which will contain by representation [obiective) all that the of Peter contains actually [formaliter)
idea idea
and again the idea thus
;
formed of the idea of Peter has its own nature which may likewise be the object of another idea, and so on. Thus to know the idea of Peter is not a previous condition of knowing Peter himself; in other words, knowing that I know is not a condition of
knowledge, but on the contrary the reflective knowledge is a consequence of the direct. And the certainty of knowledge is nothing
thought
than the nature of the thing
else
whence we
;
see again that there
truth outside the truth
So the
a
is
represented
in
no ultimate mark of
itself.
Amendment of seems equivalent to what
then, and as far as the treatise on the
far,
Understanding goes, Spinoza's idea
we now
itself
call a
But we
concept.
wider significance.
shall
always
It
find elsewhere that
denotes
has
it
mode of thought
a
considered as corresponding to an object, but the nature of the
correspondence
Now
is
a
spoken of
man doing
always
be very different from
The most
dealt with.
which
may
important case
which
that of the
every
here
human mind,
own
and when he does
his
body, but he
human being were an accomplished
And
physiologist,
it.
not
is
thought will not
accurate unless he has learnt something of physiology. if
is
the idea of the body associated with
as
can easily think of his so,
is
that
be
even the
constant relation of the mind as a whole to the body as a whole be something different from the relation of the
would
still
to the
known.
work
for a large part of
The
knowing
organic sensations which furnish the ground-
^
our conscious
De
Int.
Em.
c. 6,
life
ยง 33.
are not
knowledge or
THE DOCTRINE OF METHOD But Spinoza makes use of the one term
concepts.
125
idea to idenote
two kinds of relation, and we have to find out by the context which he means. ^ If I think of Peter, the state of my consciousthe
an idea of Peter according to Spinoza's first usage of the term. But according to his other usage, it is the idea^ not of Peter, but of the corresponding state of my own brain and nerves, ness
is
or such parts of
them
as are, in
modern language, the organs of In the one sense the
that particular phase of conscious thought.
object of the idea
is
Peter, in the other
And
correlated to the thinking mind.
it
the bodily organism
is
it is
important to observe
that in this other sense idea has a far wider application than in
the is
called the object of the idea
it
may
The
not.
mind, or with
may
may
be,
idea
may
may
which
material correlate
be a living organism, but also
coincide with a concept in a conscious
a conscious
mind forming concepts, but
also
it
Considering, for example, the whole material universe
not.
the object,
as
The
and more familiar sense.
first
we
have a corresponding idea which, whatever
not part of any
is
human
In
consciousness.
this sense,
accordingly, there can be only one idea of any given object
;
the former sense, in which idea was equivalent to concept,
might have
a distinct
and individual idea of the object
mind capable of thinking about it. Taking idea in the narrower sense of concept,
it
in
we
in every
finite
as
it
is
Spinoza points out, that the process denoted by
it
and
repeated on the idea itself;
mind
itself or
mind,
we
ledge.
in another.
either
this
this takes
have a thought thinking upon
The
itself,
in
may
idea ideae.
to hold fast the unity
Now
place in the or reflective
same
knowis
have nothing to do with separate faculties,
knowing and the known
When
in
Spinoza was firmly minded
He
and continuity of mental processes.
an ascending scale of them.
be
the conceiving
mind's operation thus taking account of itself
Spinoza's language
would
When
obvious,
the
are one and
much
mind knows the same.
less
with
itself,
the
In order to
The corresponding German term Vorstellung is capable of the same latitude. Hence we find the ambiguity of Spinoza's own language to some extent reproduced Spinoza himself once calls attention to even by the best of his German expounders. 1
the distinction
:
Eth. 2, 17, schol.
SPINOZA:
126
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
enforce this he carries over the term idea ideae^ naturally framed,
we have
as
on
seen,
employment
his
as
(where idea
united with the body,
correlate in the world correlate
for
is
idea
is
concept
corporis
is
idea
Spinoza tacitly substitutes
united with the
is
new
(where idea =
the interpretation of idea
in
a
The mind
the concept).
of thought).
concludes that the idea mentis
mind mind
word idea^ to Reflective knowledge
sense of the
the second sense.
in
mentis or idea ideae itself,
first
ideae^
mind
as
and the
But the mind and the "idea of the
is with the body. " are both modes of thought.
If therefore they correspond
must be one and the same thing not the same thing under different aspects, as the mind and body, but the same The thing under the same aspect, and identical to all intents.^ blending, logically not to be justified, of the two meanings of idea^ seems to give us the key to some of the difficulties we must hereexactly they
;
after face in the Ethics.
Spinoza goes on to say that the object of method
is
neither to
(which has been shown to be needless) nor the actual acquisition of knowledge, but the guidance of the Method is "nothing else than reflective search for knowledge. knowledge or the idea of an ideaT ^ Now the reflective knowfind a special test of truth
ledge which has for is
more
its
object the idea of the most perfect being
This
excellent than any other.
knowledge of
It
own
its
is
the ultimate
is
Here, again, the two senses of idea
object of the mind's pursuit. are not separated.
idea, then,
by no means evident that the mind's
operations
is
more
knowmore
or less perfect as
ledge by reason of those operations being concerned with a or less perfect subject-matter. ligible
we
To make
have to suppose a correlation
the assumption intelas
well as
a
relation
between the mind which knows in the first instance and the What is meant by the idea of the most object which is known.^ perfect being 1
Etk. 2, 22.
2
De
Int.
resemblance 3
We
the most
Em. is
not further explained in this place
is
c.
7,
ad
Jin.
Cf.
Descartes, Disc,
;
except that
de la Methode^ part
ii.
5
but the
not close.
shall find ultimately, perfect being
the contingent merely
5
as
however, that
all
exact knowledge involves the idea of
and Spinoza's thought really seems to be that contingent
is
to that extent imperfect.
all
knowledge of
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; THE DOCTRINE OF METHOD true ideas
in
mind should be produced from "that which
the
represents the origin and source of
things
derived from the origin
is
127
all
nature," as the reality of
Once more
itself.
distinct conceptions of representation
two thrown
the
and correlation are
together under the term idea.
The
by which the human mind
road
is
to
attain
goal
its
knowledge of its own powers and Were the true method once found and of the order of nature. But it is in truth seldom followed, advance would be certain. found, by reason of men's prejudices, the toil and clearness of thought needed for the work, and other causes. Even if the method, being found, were exhibited in action without any previous warning, it would probably fail to carry conviction for lead to unexpected results, which men it might well happen to without examination. prone to reject It is therefore not would be for immediate call an production of to results to test the reasonable As for absolute sceptics, if any such there value of the method by. be, they are by their own showing beyond the pale of reasonable
is
practically to be found in the
:
A man who will admit nothing cannot
discourse.
own
his
doubt, although he cannot live without acting on a great
number of assumptions
The
be certain even of
as to
inquiry, so far as
have ascertained,
firstly,
the reality of himself and the world.
it
what
has gone, is
is
now summed
up.
We
the ultimate object of our search;
what kind of knowledge we may best attain thirdly, what course we must follow to think rightly perfection from the beginning, or how we may enlarge our stock of " true To provide for this demand is the special task of method, ideas."
secondly, through ;
and
its
problems are the following
To
1.
distinguish a true idea from
restrain the
To
2.
into
mind from
deliver rules
others
To
establish
useless labour
all
other conceptions, and
:
whereby things unknown may be brought
knowledge according
3.
:
to this distinction
:
an order of inquiry whereby
we may
be saved
:
" idea of the most perfect being," as the surest way to the perfection of our method. This may not look very promising at first sight to a student 4.
And
to arrive at the
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
128 of
modem
science
canon of method has a
especially the fourth
:
hopelessly unpractical
The
AND PHILOSOPHY
But
air.
reflection will alter this view.
three rules are open, in our day at least, only to the
first
objection that they savour of commonplace.
Clearness of conception and avoidance of confused thought, a procedure step by
known
step from the
to the unknown, and an arrangement of the whole work such that every step has its value, and no labour is spent in vain, are beyond question among the most essential conditions for the successful conduct of all scientific inquiry. Every one seriously concerned with the investigation of truth in
philosophy, law, natural science, or the practical affairs of
endeavour to
in fact
those conditions in his
fulfil
and the success of the body of
own
life,
does
business,
his enterprise will be in proportion
to his success in fulfilling them.
The
fourth rule
is
But we
in appearance a harder saying.
have already seen that for Spinoza, attached by race and tradition to the
Hebrew sentiment of
by an
intellectual
passion
one and only supreme power, and
a
to
pursuit of exact
the
science, the
God, conceived as the most perfect being, " constant in all his works," meant above all things unity and uniformity. Thus the " idea of the most perfect being " includes, if it is not perfection of
equivalent
to,
the belief that the whole nature of things
Now
and uniform.
The
this
is
the very
principle of
first
uniformity of the course of nature
that to
is
uniformities converge, and by which they are
we do
not
call
it
a
law of nature,
it is
all
is
one
all
science.
which
all lesser
supported.
If
because there could be no
And Spinoza will have laws of nature and no science without it. no exceptions from it. In knowing the "most perfect being," the
mind
one with
also it
:
knows
itself as
part of the universal order
therein finding, as
we have
and
at
to learn elsewhere, the
What more meant this much is
secret of man's happiness and true freedom.
Spinoza
may have meant
certain.
Such
is
is
doubtful
that he
not the mind of a dreamer of dogmatic dreams.
Spinoza proceeds
method
:
;
to
work out
the
several
departments
an operation interesting to us not because
it
is
of
more
any one to the actual discovery of truth than other expositions of the same kind, but because it throws light on likely to lead
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
THE DOCTRINE OF METHOD Spinoza's theory of knowledge and helps to
make
The others
first
part
us familiar with
more closely handled of method was to distinguish true
the conceptions afterwards
129
the Ethics.
in
ideas
from
all
the nature of fiction, error, and doubt, has therefore to be
:
Fiction or fancy in
considered.
with things considered
common
most
its
shape deals
We
but undetermined.
as possible
make
which we know or assume to be consistent in itself, but without knowing the facts on which its actual truth depends. An omniscient mind would be incapable of making suppositions of this kind ; ^ nor can we make them as to matters of which
a supposition
we
contrary of what
is
well
erroneous idea which
known This
goes round the earth.
or
we
In another sense, however,
are certain.
is
to us
can imagine the
for instance, that
;
the mental representation of an
we may have
ourselves formerly entertained,
which might be entertained by
Again,
others.
suppositions contrary to our immediate perceptions
candle burning before us effort
memory or we have seen,
of
is
not burning.
abstraction
the sun
;
This
is
;
we make as
that a
nothing but an
the recollection of unlighted
image of the candle before us apart from its flame. Spinoza gives in a note the important remark that the mind can really create nothing by way of "fiction," but can only recall and combine the elements already given in experiremember spoken words and a tree and if attention ence. " confusedly and without distinction " to these mental is directed candles
or the
We
;
representations,
we can form
the notion of a tree speaking.
As
to the fictions which involve the nature of things apart from or in addition to particular facts, they depend simply on ignorance. The less we know of nature, the more absurdities can we accept from the workshop of unregulated fancy ; such as talking trees, magic and apparitions, transformations of men into stones, and On the whole, then, the mere fictions of the imaginathe Hke. tion are always confused, and will never impose on us if we trace out their consequences, which if they are absurd will show the 1
Reading with Sigwart eum or
already been
made
enig God, of
iets
p.
id for nos
by the contemporary
alweetend
is,
Dutch
hy gantschelijk
423.
K
in
§
54,
translator
niets
ad :
init.
The
correction had
" Hier uit volgt dat, zo' er
kan verdichten."
Nagelate Schriften^
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
130
AND PHILOSOPHY them
absurdity of the assumption, or analyse
into elements so
simple as to exclude that confused representation of several things at
once which
is
the essence of baseless fancies.
Positive error [idea falsa) differing
remedy
from
is
it
^
is
of the same nature as fiction,
the same as in the
case,
last
our ideas to a degree of simplicity that
and
clear
A
distinct.
we Spinoza now
The
only in the addition of intellectual assent.
namely, the reduction of shall
ensure their being
simple idea
perfectly
cannot
be
false,
understand truth and falsehood in the sense which
provided
The
proceeds to explain.
truth or falsehood of an
much on
idea does not, in his view, depend so
external things as
upon the constitution and operation of the mind itself. An architect conceives in his mind a building of a new design, which may peradventure never be executed. If the plan is not repugnant to
the laws of construction,^ he has an idea vera.
makes a
ment
If a
man
means of knowledge his judghim not true, though it may turn out to
reckless assertion without
with regard to accordance with
is
"
The affirmation that Peter exists is true only with regard to him who has assured knowledge of Again, even a fiction may be idea vera when Peter's existence." be in
fact.
used consistently and hmited to the purpose for which
it is
Thus we may imagine
made.
revolution of a semicircle that
it
and
;
a sphere to be generated this
conception, though
does not correspond to any physical
mate and true If
sphere.
we
for
took
fact,
is
it
was
by the
we know
perfectly legiti-
the purpose of defining our conception of a it
as the
statement of a physical event
it
would
So the mathematical ideas of imaginary quantities and loci, the circular points at infinity, and the like, are " true ideas " in Spinoza's meaning, for they are consistently worked out and lead to intelligible results. Probably Spinoza would have said
become
false.
the same of the non-Euclidean systems of geometry which have
been the subject of modern speculations. Truth, in short, is not the correspondence of the concept with an external object, but the result of the normal operation of the mind on elements given
by in
clear this, 1
and distinct conception. that Cap,
9.
somewhat
is ^
" Error
affirmed
"Si
of a
{falsitas) consists
thing which
quis faber ord'me concepit," etc., ยง 69.
is
only not
THE DOCTRINE OF METHOD we have formed
contained in the concept rest
[i.e,
as
physical
facts]
such an affirmation, "
it
j
as
motion or
When we make
of a semicircle."
shows
it
of
131
a defect in our conception, or that
were maimed and cut short." ^ Spinoza's definition of truth may seem to verge on paradox.
our thought or idea
But
we
is
as it
his estimate of the value of truth coincides
derive both
from
common
other facts which enable us to
we
dental
knowledge
may
make
for the
On
most
in connection
it
the right use of
seek in every particular inquiry. is
Not
sense and from science.
bare possession of a fact, but the possession of
object
with that which
it,
the
with the
is
Disjointed and acci-
part little better than none,
and
we may and constantly do use fictitious conceptions as the most convenient way of arriving and there is no harm in this if we confine the at real results Thus the corpuscular theory of light, fiction to its proper use. though known to be false as a physical hypothesis, may still be be even worse.
the other hand
;
used as a legitimate fiction in geometrical optics
:
and conceptions of the Ptolemaic system are
many
Thus
and the language still
employed
in
modern law we do not hesitate to avail ourselves freely of the fiction which ascribes an individual person to a corporation, a fiction without which modern astronomy
for
purposes.
in
business could not be carried on ; not to speak of " constructive possession " and other fictions which, though less easily apprehended
by laymen, are no
less
useful
in
their
formal part of Spinoza's exposition
thinking than last
it
When
appears.
right place.
less
is
Even
alien to our
the
ways of
he makes truth consist, in the
of ideas clearly seen to be equivalent,
resort, in the identity
falsehood in the juxtaposition of incongruous ones, he
is
really
on
more than one recent inquirer. The position becomes dogmatic only on the assumption that we have but of such ideas Spinoza knows ideas antecedent to experience the same line of thought as
;
nothing.
He
does not dwell,
of testing our work, in
all
it is
true,
on the
departments where
by fresh appeals to experience.
But
this
it
practical necessity
can be so tested,
belongs to the art of
conducting research in the particular subject-matter, whatever ^ Cf. Ep. 37, where Spinoza says even more positively that the chain of " clear distinct perceptions " is independent of external circumstances. See especially ยง 3.
it
and
SPINOZA:
132
may
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
and Spinoza does not profess to give rules extending so far. At the same time it is hardly open to doubt that Spinoza very much underrated the difficulty of making sure of " clear and be
;
distinct ideas " at the outset.
all
philosophers of
times
all
he supposed that the ultimate elements of things
dov^^n to his ow^n,
and of knowledge
when
With
few and simple
v^ere comparatively
;
and that
the fundamental principles were once ascertained, everything
them with very
could be explained by deduction from
little
need
Previous inquirers, he says, have fallen
for external verification.
into error by not understanding the
first
principles of the universe
;
" whereby, proceeding without due order, and confounding the in nature of things with rules which, though true, are abstract " modern language, by applying general rules or definitions without
—
first
ascertaining whether they were really applicable to the par-
ticular class of facts
He
order of nature."
who
— " they
identified the soul
confound themselves and
distort the
the materialism of the
instances
Stoics,
with the subtlest kind of matter by mixing
up a physical conception which was clear as far as it went with a confused notion of mind. " But we," he continues, " if we proceed with as little abstraction as may be, and begin from first principles at the earliest possible point, that is, from the source and origin of nature, shall be free from all fear of such illusion." The reason
why
the danger of abstractions disappears
is
that (as
hereafter) the idea of the first principle of nature
be an abstraction. that
is, it is
proposed
knowledge of fitly
it
single as
and infinite
the
is
final
object
why
denied by Spinoza to be abstract.
and
infinite,
which no being is found." ^ " is that which has been of
all
knowledge,
being man's only durable good.
observe here the reason
are to learn
not and cannot
in fact a being single
is
the whole of being, beside
This " being already
" This
we
And we may
the idea of this being
We
may
the
is
justly
arrive at an abstract
by forming more and more general notions which, as we proceed from one to another, shall comprise a greater number of subordinate kinds and individuals agreeing in fewer idea of being
attributes
which no
-,
until at length distinct attribute 1
we
arrive at a bare notion of being in
is
left.
Cap.
9, §§
This 74-76.
is
the vanishing-point
THE DOCTRINE OF METHOD of logical classification, where there
is
133
no longer a handle
for the
dividing
mind
different
from our conception of the sum of things
which
the conception not of a class or genus but of existing
is
things, and
is
lay
to
hold
no more
But
of.
To
sented to sense.
simpler
which cannot be
may be general name
a certain extent this
We
examples.
abstraction
have the
quite
is
as a
than the conception
abstract
object or assemblage of objects
this
whole, of any pre-
directly
illustrated
army^
by
and a
But the name of the British army, and the idea called up by it, stand for no abstraction, but for a certain real aggregate of men, together with their arms, horses, and various munitions of war, all which are In our idea of the British army as it exists definite existing things. at a given moment, as when the annual Army Act for next year comes into operation, there is no abstraction at all. There is a sort of abstraction when we regard the army as a body which
corresponding general or abstract
retains an
historical
idea.
and moral continuity notwithstanding the
changes of men, material, and organisation which are constantly taking place
'\n
it
but
:
this, as
may
in the course of nature as a whole.
easily
be seen, has no analogy
For changes of this kind are something outside the subject
from without, or with regard to but there is nothing outside the whole of nature. of change Now the idea of the whole of being, as Spinoza calls it, is the idea of the whole actual sum of existence and of all its conand it differs from the abstract idea of being in the sequences :
:
same way that our thought of the British army differs from our thought of an army in general, but in an even greater degree. It is not a vanishing conception which eludes the understanding by having no real contents, but it baffles the imagination because And it its contents are too rich and manifold to be grasped. has the singular property that no abstraction can be formed from
The
including
everything,
generis^ or rather above all genera
and species
it.
universe,
as
is :
manifestly
we cannot
sui
speak
would be a universe no longer.^ But all this may so far seem to be mere trifling with words. For suppose we have an idea of the universe or whole of this or that universe, for
^
In other words,
belief in
God
is
then
it
philosophical, belief in a
God
is
absurd.
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
134
sum is
of being, which, embracing
AND PHILOSOPHY
as it does all particular existence,
and all-containing, what then
necessarily single
we
the mighty profit which, according to Spinoza,
Where
?
is
are to derive
from the contemplation of it ? Nothing is more certain than that no man ever made or will make a discovery of any moment
by dint of thinking on the nature of things at large. But it is no less an assured fact that discoveries are not made without belief in the nature of things, by which I mean in art or science
the sure trust that under
all
diversity of appearances there
spring of
unless there be
sound reason. reason, and
is
science and the condition of
all
idea of the
Belief in
a clue.
sound thinking,
all
some kind of sound thinking which diverges from Now Spinoza's philosophy is the enthronement of
it is
this belief that
sum and
source of
all
he requires.
The
truth
Ethics^ includes the idea of uniformity as ruling
and
uniformity
is
that his
is
being, or the most perfect being, in
name
other words, of God, as he afterwards explained that
this
a
no maze which has not the nature of things is the main-
certain and sufficient order, that there
somewhere
is
all
in the
events whatever,
regarded as inseparable from the unity of the
" Deus
summe constans in suis The Mosaic conception of the one God of Israel wedded
only and all-embracing whole. operibus."
est
though with bated breath by
to the Lucretian conception, revived
Descartes, of the one and inflexible nature of things
mood Spinoza would have
;
such
is
the
us bring to the questioning of the world,
Here we have such the majesty and gravity of nature in his eyes. no matter of verbal definitions, but a fundamental principle ; and whoever would enter into Spinoza's mind must at
home
in this the central point of Spinoza's philosophy.
Let us return
which
himself
first feel
is
for
take place,
Method
Having spoken of true and Spinoza goes on to the nature of doubt, which can he says, only in the case of ideas which are confused or
our text in
false ideas,
present to the fragment on
the
We
imperfect.
this
know by
chapter.
past experience that error
is
possible,
but have not the means of ascertaining or removing the possible sources of
it
because they rustic stares
in the particular case.
know nothing
Ignorant people are confident
of their liability to mistake
and disbelieves when he
is
told that the
sun
;
is
thus a
much
THE DOCTRINE OF METHOD bigger than a clod of earth.
So that doubt
may
135
be said always to
from our inquiries not being pursued in a due order. Here again there is the tacit assumption that it is possible to conform
arise
to an ideal type of order in every kind of investigation, so as to
ensure demonstrative certainty for every step that a
What
in
other v^ords,
general and infallible theory of method can be found.^
memory in Ethics^ and may
Spinoza says of
repeated in the
summary of dv/ells
;
the
results
thus
the next chapter
is
more
be here passed over
far
obtained
is
:
fully
but his
He
important.
on the point that error has been shov^n to be a product not
of the understanding but of the imagination.
As
we have shown that it is simple or that it shows how and why something
to a true idea (he proceeds),
compounded of simple ideas ; effects of the object as is or has become what it is ; and that the represented in the mind correspond to the reality of the object itself.^
Which was
said that true
indeed the meaning of the ancients
knowledge proceeds from the cause
when
to the effects
they
;
save
my
knowledge conceived, as we do here, the mind and like an immaterial automaton. as acting conformably Hence we have gained, so far as we might at the outset, the description of our understanding, and such a rule of true ideas as leaves us in that they never to
to fixed laws
no
fear of
confounding true things with
we wonder why we
false or feigned
;
neither shall
understand sundry things that are in no wise
subject to the imagination, while others are in the imagination
which
wholly repugnant to the understanding, and others again agree For we know that the operations by which the works of therewith. imagination are produced have place according to laws of their own are
wholly diverse from those of the understanding, and that the mind, Whence regards the imagination, is in a merely passive condition. also appears
how
easily those
been careful to distinguish
may
fall
into great error
between the
who have
acts of imagination
as it
not
and of
understanding.
De Int. Em. cap. lo. "^uod ipsius effectus obiectivi in anima procedunt ad rationem formalitatis ipsius One might be tempted to read affectus for effectus. But effectus obiectivi is obiecti." As to " automaton probably equivalent to the ordo et connexio idearum of Eth. 2, 7. 1
2
spirituale,"
which occurs immediately below,
Treatise of the Passions, §§ 6, 16.
cf.
what Descartes
says of the body in the
This
distinction
psychology
mind
the
:
is
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; which,
as
Of God
we may remember, and
Man â&#x20AC;&#x201D; is
He now
mature work.
as
an activity of
not found in the
is
of hardly
less
importance in
applies his doctrine of the imagina-
tion to illustrate the fallacies of is
corner-stones of Spinoza's
one of the
and the conception of knowledge
early treatise his
AND PHILOSOPHY
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
136
common
language.
The
passage
remarkable. Since words belong to the imagination (that
many
notions according as the words expressing
put together in the
memory by
we cannot doubt that source of many grievous
is
to say,
them
are confusedly
reason of particular bodily conditions),
words, no
less
errors, unless
than imagination,
we
may be
as
that
on
all
they
incorporeal^
truth
as
they are in the understanding.
not
tion
they are but signs of things
such things
have
fixed
and the
infinite^
affirmative
they are in the imagination,
Which
are
that
Many
like.
they express in
because in each case the contrary
them, and they used positive terms
we
last,
we might
evident from
is
oftentimes
this,
is
negative,
are
as
other things which are in
negative
terms,
far easier to
the names occurred in that easier form to the
that
common
understanding only and not in imagina-
as lie in
names
the
are very watchful against them.
Besides, they are framed after the fancy and capacity of the sort, so that
we form
and conversely,^
be imagined
men who
framed
first
There
for negative ideas.
thus
:
is
much
and deny because the nature of language allows us so to do, and yet the nature of things doth not ; so that, not knowing this affirm
well take falsehood for truth.
Spinoza proceeds
^
to the second part of the doctrine of
method,
which prescribes as the ends to be sought, first the possession of clear and distinct ideas " produced by the pure operation of the mind, not by casual bodily notions " ; next the reduction of these For this purpose we must endeavour so to connect to unity. and order our ideas " that our mind, so far as possible, may represent in thought the reality of nature both as a whole and in 1
The
Latin here repeats instances of terms negative in form, but gives none of
terms affirmative in form but negative in meaning. or omission in the text. clear
first
Cap. 12.
There seems
to be
some confusion
sentence of the paragraph here translated,
whether the subject of componuntur
former. 2
In the
is
â&#x20AC;˘verba
or conceptus.
I
it is
not
have assumed the
THE DOCTRINE OF METHOD
137
must be understood through their immediate causes ; " for the knowledge of an effect is in truth nothing else than acquiring a more perfect knowledge of the its
Finite
parts."
Hence
cause."
it
things
Spinoza in a note, that
appears, adds
we
can
understand no part of nature without at the same time increasing our knowledge of the
first
cause or
God
;
in
modern language,
every true explanation of a particular fact gives us a particular piece of the single and universal order of nature, and thereby adds
knowledge of that order. " Therefore," the text continues, "so long as our business is inquiry concerning actual things, we may never form any conclusion from abstract notions , and we shall use exceeding care not to confound that which is only in the understanding with that which is in the thing itself." To appreciate the significance of this we must bear in mind that Spinoza was a thorough-going nominalist. And further on he says that our chief aim should be to acquire knowledge of particulars. Such an outspoken abjuration of all figments and preconceived notions might almost be expected to introduce without more ceremony an exhortation to practical observation. But Spinoza proceeds otherwise he tells us that the best way is to work from the true definition of the thing investigated, and that the next problem is to fix the conditions of such a definition. What he says on this topic ^ is very characteristic. " A to our
:
definition,
if
it
is
be called perfect^ must explain the very
to
nature of the thing, and beware of using instead thereof only
some of of a
its
circle,
being,
like
properties."
gives as an example the definition
which he chooses merely all
really matters
we
He
geometrical
figures,
circle,
we were
we
an abstraction, so
we
a circle
that
take.^
it
If
get only a particular property
and have not accounted
readers,
quam
And if serious. The
for the circle itself.
dealing with a real thing this would be
Cap. 13. " Figura non aliud
Modern is
\
define a circle as a figure such that the radii from the centre
of the
2
convenience
not which of the possible definitions
to the circumference are equal,
1
for
determinatio, et determinatio negatio est."
however, will have no difficulty in admitting that a
not a physically existing thing.
Ep. 50, ยง 4. hyperbola
circle or
AND PHILOSOPHY
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
138
means finite i) thing should satisfy two conditions. i. It must include the immediate cause [causa proxima) of the thing. 2. It must be
true
definition
such that
of a created (which
practically
the properties of the thing, so far as
all
apart from everything else, can be deduced from
of the circle these conditions would be the figure described by the free
other end
As
fixed.
is
considered
it is
In the case
it.
by defining it as extremity of a straight line whose fulfilled
to the definition of
an uncreated thing,
must show that the thing is not explained by reference to anything outside itself, which Spinoza calls the exclusion of a cause it must make the existence of the thing evident the explanation must involve no abstract notions ; and all the properties of the thing must be deducible from the definition, which however is not so material in this case. it
;
3
All this
and
at first sight perplexing,
is
common meaning
their
it is
if
we
take the terms in
We
hardly intelligible.
have then to
consider what Spinoza really meant by a definition, and
the causa proxima which, wherever a cause
must
tion
me, a great
may
He
include. deal
admissible, the defini-
requires of a definition, as
more than
logicians require
be suggested that what he
fairly
is
be called a scientific explanation.
;
so
appears to
it
much
calls a definition
It
what was
that
it
would now
not merely an equation of
is
names, but an equation of ideas corresponding to a constant
rela-
and expressing the reduction of something unknown to terms of known elements. If this be so, the " imme-
between
tion
known condition unknown thing can be
diate cause "
is
of which the
same is
facts,
the
Definition
expressed.
process, considered with regard to the observer's mind,
explanation
the object
is
when we
consider
to our idea of
explanation resolves the given
more
it
it,
is
which
with regard to the object.
so
is
the
As
explanation to definition
phenomenon
into better
known
known
view
it
is
or
more
familiar elements of thought.
quite natural that
where there
is
no
;
or
familiar elements of fact, definition resolves the idea of
into better this
or set of conditions in terms
it
On
real physical
sequence, as in the case of geometrical figures, the causa proxima 'â&#x20AC;˘
Not
infinite
exactly, for res creata here
modes.
(See above,
p.
loi.)
must = wo<^?ÂŤ
in
the Ethics, and Spinoza speaks of
THE DOCTRINE OF METHOD should be diiFerent
139
we
approach the subject from one or another direction, and that, as Spinoza says, it should matter little which direction
we
as
take.
The
causa proxima of a circle,
ourselves to pure geometry,
is
if
we
confine
the revolution of a straight
line.
But in analytical geometry it is otherwise. Although it is easy " to show that this process will give a circle, the " immediate cause of a circle will not be any such graphical process, but the existence
of a certain relation
among
of the second degree.
the coefficients of the general equation
For
in
geometry the general prior to that of any par-
analytical
notion of a curve of the second order ticular kind such as circle or ellipse
:
is
and from
con-
this general
ception can be deduced not only the familiar geometrical properties
of the
but others which are neither demonstrable nor intel-
circle,
from the more general point of view.
ligible except
We
may
also find
more
practical examples of that
which
(as I
A
venture to suggest) Spinoza means to require in a definition.
chemical formula will give us a
fairly
good
illustration.
In this
case the formula describes the thing exactly and in terms of
its
" immediate cause," namely, the elements by whose combination in definite proportions
And
formed.
it is
the definition itself leads
knowledge of the thing defined which is incomplete only by reason that our knowledge of the simple elements and of the dynamical laws according to which combination takes place is Or, to take another example from a science which not complete. is not physical, Savigny's definition of Agreement [Vertrag) as a legal term furnishes us with a perfect instance of what is sought by Spinoza. Most of the definitions found in our law books, and not least the definitions of Contract, are loose and unsatisfying.^ They are vague, insufficient, and redundant they assume knowto a scientific
;
ledge of other matters that have never been explained in Spinoza's language, to
causa proxima.
its
and gives us a
up the
expound the thing defined
But Savigny goes
;
in
they
terms of
to the root of the matter
clear statement of the simple elements that
legal idea.
His definition
is
fail,
make
accurate and exhaustive, and
therefore fruitful. ^
Since the
first
method and form
edition
was written there has been
of our text-books.
a great
improvement
in
the
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
140
The
last
AND PHILOSOPHY
chapter of Spinoza's treatise
now
ever breaks ofF abruptly, shows that the
in hand,
way
which how-
to a definition, as
understood by him, was not to discuss the application of a word,
we know
but to consider what
True
about the thing denoted by
that the greater part of the
it is
words and
it.
ideas in ordinary
use are in the present state of our knowledge not capable of being defined at
characteristics
:
and
We
it
we
is
to give us not only the specific
kind in question, but
of the
cause," in other words, to
history
any " natural kind,"
definition of
would have
to use J. S. Mill's term,
are
The
in this sense.
all
" immediate
their
show how they come
to be
what they
barely conceivable that in this region of natural
shall ever get
beyond more or
less
probable conjecture.
have verae causae in natural selection, adaptation, and the
but to assign the proxima causa of any existing type
know
we
like,
should
what manner and proportions their effects took place in the particular instance. There is no reason to suppose, however, that Spinoza would have been afraid of saying that very few perfect definitions had been found or could be expected. have to
The as
exactly in
statement made earlier in the treatise
(c. 4, ยง
22) that he had
yet been able to comprehend but very few things with the
fourth or most perfect kind of knowledge, " ubi res percipitur per
solam suam essentiam vel per cognitionem suae proximae causae," is
indeed equivalent to
beheved his
own
this.
definition
I
have
little
of God, the
doubt that Spinoza
sum and
origin
of
all
we shall come afterwards) to satisfy the condown by him I am by no means sure that he
existence (to which ditions here laid
did not consider
;
it
the only perfect definition attainable, except
those of geometrical and other abstract conceptions, and possibly
of the "infinite modes."
It
is
impossible to see
how
his require-
ments can be strictly complied with in the case of any finite thing whatever and it is equally impossible to suppose that he over:
looked so manifest a difficulty.
" the means of knowing eternal things." ^ must constantly derive our ideas, he says, from physical or
Spinoza's next topic
We
really existing things,
from one
is
proceeding according to the series of causes
really existent thing to another, 1
Cap. 14.
and so
as
never to pass
THE DOCTRINE OF METHOD over into abstract and universal notions. difficulty in accepting his counsel
;
but
So v^^e
tion v^hich seems to unsettle everything.
far
there
141 is
not
come upon an
We
much
explana-
are bidden to note
that the series of causes and realities here mentioned
is not a series of particular and mutable things " but only of constant and eternal
beyond human powers
up the innumerable and complicated sequences of particular things but it is also " needless, for the actual train of events or " order of existence
ones."
It
is
to follov^
:
among
things depends on external circumstances, and the " very nature " [intima essentia) of things is to be sought in the finite
" constant and eternal things," and the laws whereof those things are as it were the tables, and by which the course of all mutable things is governed. These " constant and eternal " things are themselves particular [singularia)^ but, as they are present and operative everywhere, we must regard them as universal with " regard to all mutable things, and as being the " immediate causes of
all
other particular existence.
What lies
can these eternal things be
?
The
interpretation that
modern reader is to identify them with among phenomena which we now call the
nearest at hand for a
the constant relations
But this the downright enemy of laws of nature.
between
difference
is
evidently not admissible.
abstractions and universals,
relations
and things
far
Spinoza,
knew
the
too well to confuse
wanted no artificial way of describing laws of nature ; the name was already familiar in his time, and he could speak of them, when he thought fit, just as we
them
do.
in
In
this
fact,
own
way.
Besides,
he
he does speak of the " eternal things "
as
having laws
some way attached to or involved in them, which Clearly, therefore, the pervade the whole world of phenomena. Another explanation things in question are not themselves laws. is offered by a writer who has done excellent work for the history
of their
in
of Spinoza's philosophical ideas. Professor Sigwart of Tiibingen.
He
says with
some confidence, on the strength of
certain resem-
between our treatise and the Novum Organum^ that the "eternal things" of Spinoza are identical But surely this with the Forms of Bacon's doctrine of Method. blances
will
in
language
not serve either.
For the Baconian Forms are not things
at
SPINOZA
142
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
:
would not be recognised
such by Spinoza
all,
certainly
we
are to find a parallel in this treatise to
the
Form
of a thing,
it
seems to
as
if
what Bacon meant by me that it would be more hope-
And
sought in Spinoza's causa prox'ima.
fully
and
:
Spinoza's nominal-
which we have always to bear in mind, is a sufficient warning against assuming that the "eternal things" have anything to do ism,
with kinds,
My
qualities, or classification.
own
opinion
is
perhaps too simple to be acceptable.^
We
have just found in the chapter treating of definition that Spinoza,
whatever reason, sometimes
for
description
was
really
even to a soHtary one.
meant
general
used
to apply to very
terms
when
his
few instances or
Accordingly we need not expect to find
any great number of "eternal things," if we succeed in finding them at all. There would be nothing repugnant to Spinoza's habit of thought and discourse if there turned out to be very few
But when the illusory expectation of a large class of things, representing some such higher order of existence as the Platonic Ideas, is once done away with, the true solution presents of them.
as
itself,
I
think, readily enough.
"
The
" eternal
things " are
modes " which afterwards occur in the Ethics^ and which we have had occasion to mention in speaking of the influence exercised on Spinoza by the physical conceptions These are, in the material world, in the first of Descartes.2 place Motion, which to a disciple of the Cartesian physics was a simply
real,
the
eternal,
infinite
and constant thing
;
in
the second place, as pre-
supposing Motion, the material universe constant under
itself,
taken
as a
sum of
which aspects. In have, corresponding we thought to of Motion, world a the fact or process called " infinite intellect " 5 what should answer in thought to the sum of material things, the " facies totius universi," existence
is
all
its
changing
1 It is not far removed from Trendelenburg's, Histor. Beitrage -zur Philosophies iii. 387. But he seems to identify Spinoza's " eternal things " not with the infinite modes themSee, too, Leibnitz's marginal note on this selves, but with their laws or relations.
passage, ap. list
Foucher de Careil,
Leibni-z, Descartes, et Sfinoza, P- 123.
:
words
in italics are cancelled.
The
an interpretation of Spinoza, but for 2
It consists of this
Dens, spatium, materia, motus, potentia universi, intellectus agens,
Page loi, above.
mundus.
were meant by Leibnitz, not an improvement on him. others, I suspect,
The for
THE DOCTRINE OF METHOD we
not
are
told.^
We
must
143
assume other corresponding
also
without limit in other aspects of existence capable of being
facts
related to
minds associated with them
ways analogous to the human thought but these
relation of the material universe to
could be no part of
This
human
in
;
experience, nor imaginable by
human
from the theory of the Infinite Attributes, of which there is no mention in the present treatise. The assertion that all particular things happen according to the laws of the " eternal things " is on the view here taken
faculties.
results
equivalent, so far as concerns the material world, to saying that physical events are ultimately inexplicable by dynamical laws.
all
And in all
what could Spinoza more appropriately ascribe " presence parts and unbounded operation" than to Matter and Motion ?
to
Again, a certain configuration of matter under dynamical con-
would be most naturally described
in Spinoza's language proxima of every individual object.^ But we are left as the causa further light by Spinoza, for he goes into an auxiliary without any and nature of the the powers of understanding discussion and ditions
:
with
the
chapter
enumerates
the
practicable
way
nature.
He
its
operations of
containing
properties
of
as
knowledge or
full
human
speaks not of
work breaks
understanding,
the
of arriving at the
human thought
the
this
off.
He
the
only
definition of
understanding, but of the
depending
(nostras cogitationes) as
on the nature of understanding in general and I think there is room for more than a suspicion that the object of the definition which was never completed was to be not the human understanding :
as such,
We
but "intellectus absolute infinitus."
note of only one of the propositions
laid
down
shall
here take
as to the properties
of intellect, which throws light on Spinoza's distinction between
understanding and imagination, and
is
the
first
using a phrase on which the difficulties of the Ethics m.ay in
1
Ep. 64, ad fin.
2
What
great
measure be said to turn.
Spinoza actually says, however,
is
the inaccuracy.
i.
last
"
Part of the It
perceives
that the " iixa et aeterna " (instead of the
camae proximae. This is not exact, and 28 goes to show that he afterwards perceived
particular configurations) are themselves the
the comparison of this passage with Eth.
occasion of his
144
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE much under
things not so
AND PHILOSOPHY
the head of duration, as under a certain
number or rather it attends But to the perception itself and not to number or duration. when it imagines things, it perceives them as certain in number,
form of
and without
eternity
finite
;
and with a definite duration and quantity."
This appears
to
mean
that acts of pure intellect (such as the
perception of a general truth in physics) are of universal vahdity
and have no reference to particular events
as such.
For example, the theoretical statement of the jectile in a resisting
medium under
the influence of gravity, and
of the energy transferred to other bodies by applicable
at
all
flight of a pro-
times, everywhere, and
its
impact,
is
equally
one or a thousand
to
experiences, assuming the laws of matter and motion to suffer no
change.
It
numero
is
an affirmation " sub quadam specie aeternitatis et
infinito."
On
the other hand
the observation of the
course and effects of a projectile in a particular experiment
is
the
record of a specific event which happened at a given time and place,
and otherwise under defined conditions
velocity, so
much
less at
:
so
much
the end of successive seconds, so
initial
many
foot-tons of striking energy, such and such fractures and displace-
ments
in
the target.
The
facts
are found
determinata duratione et quantitate."
interpretations of this kind are perilous
present one to be of
is
some
am
I ;
"sub
certo
numero,
not unconscious that
but
I
believe that the
near enough to the substance of Spinoza's meaning assistance until a better
is
found.
CHAPTER V THE NATURE OF THINGS Know
in thyself
and the world one selfsame soul
:
Banish the dream that sunders the part from the whole.
Sankara Acharya. I
am
that
which began
j
Out of me the years roll Out of me God and man
;
j
I
God
am
equal and whole
changes, and man, and the form of
them
j
bodily
I
j
am
the soul,
Swinburne, Hertha.
Having
in
foregoing
chapters
Spinoza's habit of thought,
we
learnt are
now
I
of
prepared to go up into
the heart and citadel of his philosophy as
the Ethics.
know something
to
we
find
it
set forth in
have endeavoured to make the philosopher himself
some measure smooth the reader's path but it is not to be supposed his great work
to the difficulties of
in
that these difficulties
:
can be wholly done
Spinoza has cast his thought in singular and even startling forms, and we must be content to grapple with the form it
may not
away. if
we mean
Yet
to grasp the substance.
be useless to give at one's
own
risk a sort of free
translation of the thought which, according to the view here taken
of Spinoza's general purpose,
may
be apprehended
elaborate construction of his metaphysic. in
It
as
underlying the
seems to
me
that
modern language it may be rendered somewhat as follows. Europe had for centuries been filled with the noise
of
scholastic discussion over questions incomprehensible to ordinary
sense,
of
which the
staple
was furnished
substance^ attribute^ essence^ existence^ eternity.
were the established stock-in-trade, L
as
it
by such terms
And
these
as
terms
were, not only of
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
146
philosophical language
AND PHILOSOPHY Such
but of philosophical thought.
as
were the tools with which Spinoza had to work. Even if he could have conceived the notion of discarding them altogether and inventing new ones, which however was in his circumstances not possible, it was only by keeping them in
they were, these
use that he had any prospect of inducing students of philosophy
But the powerful and subtle minds which had exercised themselves on these ideas had troubled themselves but little as to their relation to actual things and man's knowledge of
to listen to him.
them.
was assumed that the foundations had been
It
once
for
was
in
all,
new
while the flood of
ideas,
unseen and
irresistible,
The
cunningly
advancing to break them up.
truth
settled
wrought structure of mediaeval philosophy was doomed and now that it has crumbled away philosophy goes houseless, though ;
not despairing
for after all
;
dwell in castles in the
it is
air.
But meanwhile what was
The
better to be a wanderer than to
a
man
in
terms were there to his hand,
scholars
Spinoza's place to do
still
the only currency of
the ideas for which they had been framed were dead
;
or dying, and the great scientific
conception of the unity and
uniformity of the world, often seen as in visions, but veiled in
all
power by Descartes, had already begun
its
subduing everything to
abroad,
?
A
dominion.
its
now
un-
to spread
sincere and
unflinching eye could already see that in the end nothing would escape
from
thought.
it,
Only
not
even
the
most
secret
recesses
of
human
in the light of this conquering idea could the
old words Hve, if they
were
to live at
all.
If
any
vital truth lay
hidden in them from of old, it would thus be brought out and bear its due fruit ; and what new life was wanting must be
them through the new conception of the nature
breathed into
of things.
upon
This,
himself.
a possible one
was
fully
I
It ;
believe,
in
effect the task
cannot be maintained that
and
aware of
it is
its
of philosophical terms.
it
Spinoza took
was altogether
whether Spinoza himself do not think he realised
at least doubtful
magnitude.
the extent of the revolution
faith
was
He
shocked and surprised
I
which was
really involved in his use
seems to have been at the
in perfect good vehemence of the opposition
THE NATURE OF THINGS
147
excited by his opinions, though, from the point of view of the objectors, nothing could be
more
He
natural.
when
thought he was
was in truth abrogating the text. Thus we find almost everywhere in his work scientific and essentially modern thought clothed in the semblance of scholastic forms and this creates for a modern correcting
erroneous
interpretations
he
;
reader an It
which it is extremely difficult to shake off. sight a mere paradox to say that Spinoza is not
illusion
seems at
first
only more scientific than his predecessors, but, allowing for the unavoidable defects of his physical knowledge, as
scientific
any modern philosopher whatever that, so far from physical principles being repugnant or foreign to thinking,
it
just the
is
meta-
his
-,
as
scientific
thoroughly scientific cast of Spinoza's
thought which has made his work a stumbling-block to the greater part of his readers ; and that when he has been misunderstood,
has generally been
it
because his interpreters have
not had enough of scientific training or temper to understand
him
Nevertheless
rightly.
paradox
In
is
hope to show that
I
apparent
this
true.
of
exposition
the
made by
suggestion
his
Spinoza
philosophy
and throws
Descartes,
it
follows
into
a
highly
a
There form borrowed from the usage of geometry. the same array of definitions, axioms, propositions, and is and every step in the argument purports corollaries, as in Euclid to be definitely warranted by something already demonstrated
artificial
;
Only
or claimed as self-evident.
the diagrams are wanting to
complete the external resemblance. present time be found to doubt that
whole unfortunate. its
It
many
before they had
The
will
system.
real
been thus
frightened
about
of
rigid
consistency
Admirers have pushed
their
enthusiasm on
and
critics,
away
acquaintance with his thought.
the
hyperbole,
the
of abstruseness and technicality.
have
students
made any
language
at
proceeding was on the
geometrical form of exposition has also led to
aggerated
into
this
readers
gives to Spinoza's work, in addition to
real difficulties, a needless air
Probably
Few
taking them
at
their
much
ex-
Spinoza's this
point
word, have
assumed that the whole system would be disposed of
if
they
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; SPINOZA
148
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
:
few of the definitions. Again, critics have been misled in another way by the supposition that Spinoza's doctrines were intimately connected with the form in which they were stated and no small ingenuity has could
succeed
picking
in
holes
in
a
or
supposed
;
been wasted on tracing
his
of Spinoza's
sideration
this
on
Spinoza
particular, that
it
works,
Lastly,
mode of
artificial
influence
it
is
as
exposition
himself.
I
we
have
already
had
very possible that in some
am
had
unfavourable
an
disposed
to
think,
in
him the nature and work was really founded,
materially disguised from
extent of the assumptions on which his
and of the
his
method.
other
occasion to point out.
ways
mistakes to
This oversight, though might have been avoided by more careful con-
rehance on the geometrical perhaps natural,
real
tacit appeals
to experience contained
in them.
In
geometry these appeals rest on a ground so broad and secure that, which involves discussion of the nature of geometrical truth itself, but in it does not matter whether they are recognised or not :
philosophy
it is
otherwise.
seems therefore not only permissible but desirable to depart
It
considerably from the strict order of the original in the endeavour to give a
generally intelligible outline of the
Ethics.
But we
cannot altogether leave the peculiar form out of sight ; for much that is important and characteristic depends on Spinoza's use of
which cannot be understood without referAnd before we go farther it will be condefinitions.
particular expressions,
ence to his
venient to translate once for
They
are as follows
all
the Definitions of the First Part.
:
Definitions 1.
By
involves existence, that
than 2.
understand that of which the essence
self-caused (causa sui) I is,
whose nature cannot be conceived otherwise
as existing.
A
thing
is
which can be limited by For example, a body is called finite,
called finite in
its
kind,
another of the same nature. because we may always conceive another limited by another thought.
But
a
as greater.
body
So a thought
is
is
not limited by thought,
is
in itself
nor a thought by body. 3.
By
substance I understand that
which
and
is
conceived
THE NATURE OF THINGS
149
whose concept needs not the concept of another thing for it to be formed from. 4. By attribute I understand that which intellect perceives con-
by
itself;
that
is,
cerning Substance,
By mode
5. is
understand
I
stance
consisting
eternal
and
denied of
is it
7.
A
being absolutely
infinite, that
Sub-
is.
infinite being.
say infinite absolutely, not in
I
only in
infinite ;
but
if
thing
is
nature and
it is
its
own
kind
may
its
own
For
kind.
have infinite attributes
absolutely infinite, there belongs to
its
nature
and involves no denial. called/r^^, which exists by the mere necessity of
whatever expresses
own
a
conceived.
it is
of infinite attributes, whereof each one expresses
Explanation,
whatever
through which also
else,
By God
6.
essence thereof.^
understand the affections of Substance, or that which
I
somewhat
in
as constituting the
reality,^
determined
is
^
or rather co?istrained, if
it is
to action
by
alone
itself
:
determined by something else
its
but necessary^
and
to exist
operate in a certain determined manner. 8.
By
eternity I
understand existence
to follow necessarily
Explanation. as
itself, so far as it is
conceived
from the mere definition of the eternal thing.
For such existence
conceived
is
as
an eternal truth,
well as the essence of the thing, and therefore cannot be explained
in terms
of duration or time, though
its
duration
be conceived
as
without beginning or end.
Of
these definitions the third, fourth,
fifth,
the fundamental ideas of Spinoza's metaphysic.
and sixth contain
The
others
may
go without comment for the present except the first, which is remarkable rather for what it does not say than for what it says. Spinoza takes the current phrase causa
manner which his definition is
leaves causation
and defines
sui^
wholly out of account.
impHes that the use of the word cause in
really inappropriate
:
and except so
we
far as
it
in a
In
fact,
this
sense
are left to assume
the converse, namely, that everything which can " be conceived otherwise than as existing " must, if it does exist, be said to be
caused by something
else,
he does not
by the word Cause in any other ^
An
earlier
attribute,
form of
except that
it
this definition is
called
is
tell
us
use.
given in Ep. 27
attribute
with respect
what he understands
In the axioms, indeed :
"I understand the same by to the understanding, which
attributes to substance such a determined nature as aforesaid." ^
The
Latin has essentiam in both places.
SPINOZA;
150
HIS LIFE
AND PHILOSOPHY
he says "the knowledge of an effect depends on the knowledge of the cause and involves it." This must mean, if it (ax.
4)
to give
is
such
;
knowledge of the effect as obviously true, but throws no direct light
any acceptable
in that sense
it is
sense, the
on Spinoza's conception of causation. Yet, when we couple it with the absence of any further definition, it does appear to suggest something very much at variance with the notions commonly formed about Spinoza's philosophy. This is that, so far from regarding causation as a kind of mysterious power which keeps together the order of nature, Spinoza regarded Cause and Effect as correlated terms framed by us to detach parts of the
order of nature from the whole for more convenient examination,
and nothing
We
else.
know
that he believed with an intense
phenomena and modern thinkers have independently come to
and vivid belief in the continuity of processes.
Several
all
natural
the conclusion that this same continuity does not suffer us to
look upon the notion of Cause and Effect as other than a con-
venient artifice to keep our materials within manageable bounds. It
is
the separation of that which
is
separable only in thought.^
calls time and space, considered as measurable quantities, " aids of the imagination " on this view causation would be an ^' aid But if we assume a real causal of the imag-ination " too. causation becomes the most universal power or nexus, the law of law of nature, prior even to that of uniformity for we might conceive the causal power to be universal but capricious in its operation. Had Spinoza held this opinion, we might surely expect to find causality prominent among the " constant and eternal things " which gave us some trouble to explain in the treatise on the Amendment of the Understanding (p. 140 above). It would indeed hold a unique and supreme position among laws for it would not only be universal of nature on Spinoza's system
Spinoza
:
;
:
1
G. H. Lewes,
Mr. Shadworth Hodgson, in of Life and Mind, vol. ii. Read's Carveth remarks Mr. in his Essay on the cf. 1878 ;
in Problems
his Philosophy
;
of Reflection, Theory of Logic, 1878 ; and see W. K. Clifford, Aims and Instruments of Scientific Thought, ^^- ^^^° Trendelenburg's suggestion in Lectures and Essays, Lond. 1879, ^°^' ^- P* '^49' {Histor. Beitrage,
iii.
275), that Causation in general (die abstracte Causalitat)
resolved into the idea of
Motion
jective and the objective side.
;
Motion being considered
as
may
be
equally real on the sub-
THE NATURE OF THINGS in each Attribute, but this there
is
no
common
hint, so far as
to I
all
151
But of
the Attributes.
know,
in
all
any part of Spinoza's
writings.
If the inference
now
suggested
said that infinite intellect
is
correct, Spinoza
forms no idea of cause and
would have except
effect,
For a mind possessing infinite capacity and means of knowledge would perceive all things at once as being, and necessarily being, what they are and not
as
being an idea present in
otherwise
;
finite
minds.^
but would not perceive the necessity
so to speak, over the particular states
To
perceive things as necessary
is
distributed,
as
and operations of nature.
them
to perceive
as
they are,
and the necessity of each thing is no other than the necessity of the universal order.^ If it had occurred to any correspondent to put to Spinoza the particular question here proposed, possibly have had a decisive answer.
As
we
it is,
fore, in addition to
no general
what has been already
should
are left to con-
Spinoza does
jecture, but not without probability to guide us.
actually say that infinite intellect forms
we
There-
ideas.
said, there
seems to be
no alternative between holding that Spinoza regarded cause and effect as merely the machinery of finite conceptions, and that he thought causation as much a real thing as matter and motion. What is it that Spinoza regards as " self-caused " within the
meaning of
his
first
definition
The
?
reply
is
given by the
definition of Substance and by the chain of propositions formally
showing that the two coincide. itself" or self-subsistent,
that
is,
and
is
Substance
external reason for
existence.
for the reason
outside
go.
between particular things
^
The
infinito intellectu
;
of particular things, but
Explanation
the universe in
of the relations
is
its
entirety
to say of the universe, in the scholastic
position suggested
non
itself,
But we cannot seriously apply anything short of the whole sum of being,
its
we may seek which we cannot
And
"in
else to exist.
within which
plicable.
is
can be conceived as existing without any
it
such a conception to
which
conceived by or through
without assuming anything
In other words,
that
is
might
dari obiective
is
language
be expressed in Spinoza's language thus
ideam causae singularis
quatenus humanae mentis naturam constituit."
j
sive ^
inex-
:
" In Dei
tantum eatenus
Eth.
ii.
44.
dari,
retained by Spinoza, that really exist.
essence involves existence, does not
its
import any greater assumption than that something does and It may indeed be asked v^hat v^^e mean by existence -,
the question this
AND PHILOSOPHY
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
152
not only a reasonable but an important one.
is
way of considering
the general problem of knowledge belongs
to a later age than Spinoza's, for not
But
and
useless to
it is
having formally anticipated
complain of him
Anything, then, which
it.
is
susceptible of explanation, derivation, or subordination to some-
thing outside Attribute
not Substance in Spinoza's meaning.
it, is is
of Substance
which
that
is
perceived as constituting the nature
and to understand Spinoza's view we must dismiss
;
common
from our mind the
use of the term.
If
we
think of
Spinoza's Substance as distinct from and underlying the Attributes,
the back of the Attributes and guarded
as being, so to speak, at
by them against any Attribute
is
we
closer approach,
shall certainly
go wrong.
perceived, not as merely belonging to Substance, but
"as constituting
its
the Attributes, but there manifestations.
Substance
nature."
The
is
is
indeed manifested in
not an inaccessible reality behind the
manifestations are themselves
the reality
,
Substance consists of the attributes and has no reality other than theirs.
As
for the suggestion
standing in this respect reality of things
is
may
that the perception of the under-
be illusory, in other words that the
unknowable,
incapable of entertaining
:
it
is
it
is
one which Spinoza was
wholly foreign to
his
thought,
ought so to be to all sound thinking. This is not the place to enter on a general metaphysical discussion ; but I may be permitted to say here shortly, by way of clearing the ground, that to me it amounts to a contradiction in terms to speak of " unknowable existence " or " unknowable reality " in I cannot tell what existence means, if not the an absolute sense. This position, implicitly possibiHty of being known or perceived. contained in Spinoza's definitions, was explicitly taken up, and, as I venture to think, in the main conclusively established, by and
I
submit that
Berkeley. science
accepts
Since his time philosophy has done something, and
much,
point will it,
it
But
to confirm his work.
bear
much
labouring
;
it
or one does not, and the
is
I
do not
know
that the
too fundamental.
One
whole view of the character
THE NATURE OF THINGS and
possibilities
153
of metaphysic depends on this primary decision.
For the present, however, our chief concern is not to defend Spinoza's conception, but to ascertain what it actually was. And I
think there can hardly be a reasonable doubt that for Spinoza
to exist
and to be
intelligible
were
one.
all
Substance
is
not an
Unknowable, Noumenon, or Ding an sich^ nor are the Attributes forms imposed on it by the human mind. Yet, when we have settled what the Attributes are not, there is no small difficulty in They finding an unexceptionable term to describe what they are. are not forms of Substance, as
we have
seen
operations or energies, for that also would to
and distinct from them
any
\
and
much
\
neither are they
make Substance
less are
we
prior
to be misled
by
analogy to Neo-Platonic fancies of emanations and the
false
The
word I can suggest is aspect^ which has already been used by modern writers with virtually the same meaning. Attribute, as Spinoza himself said in the earlier form of the definition, is Substance itself as known and identified by like.
least unsatisfactory
the understanding.
The
human
division of attributes, as far as
knowledge goes, is the ultimate division of experience into We know a subjective and objective, or mental and material. world of things extended in space, to the understanding of which, so far as
we
can understand them, the laws of matter and motion
This
are our sole and sufficient guide.
is,
in Spinoza's language.
Again,
Substance perceived under the Attribute of Extension.
we know a world we may call its
of thoughts, feelings, mental events, or however elements, to which
extension are wholly inapplicable sensation,
;
we
the notions of space and
cannot ascribe mass to a
or resolve a thought into atoms.
And
this
is
the
domain of Substance perceived under the Attribute of Thought. It is to be observed that, inasmuch as Attribute is defined by reference to intellect, and Thought is itself an attribute. Thought appears to be in a manner counted twice over. Likewise Extension and Thought, although they are the only Attributes we have anything to do with, are in Spinoza's view only two out of an infinite number. But the difficulties that arise on both these points are better postponed for a while.
As
for the
modes or
affections of Substance, they are
nothing
AND PHILOSOPHY
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
154
Every material object is a mode of Thought.
than particular things.
else
Extension, and every feeling
It v^ill as a
meaning
rule be found a help to the apprehension of Spinoza's
mode
mode of
a
is
to
remembering that any aggregate whatever, within the limits of the same Attribute, may be taken as a single thing and that this extends even to the whole material universe, and to the sum of all thought. The whole contents of any Attribute are regarded by Spinoza as an infinite mode. But his acceptance of motion as a real thing of constant quantity compelled him to regard Motion as an infinite Mode by itself, and more " immediately produced by God," or dependent on the very nature of the attribute of Extension, than Matter since the read thing for
;
;
;
sensible world, " facies totius universi," is not matter alone, but matter diversified by motion. This peculiarity has no sensible
on the general bearings of Spinoza's philosophy.^
effect
The
God
definition of
"substance consisting of infinite
as
whereof every one expresses eternal and
attributes,
infinite being,"
brings us face to face with Spinoza's metaphysical imagination in
the
extent of
full
Part
First
its
of the
In the eleventh proposition of the
daring.
Ethics
he
demonstrates that
formally
this
" absolutely perfect being " exists. Most people are content nowadays, when they set about explaining the nature of things, assume that there
to
were
all,
aside
as
is
something to be explained
;
and
if that
Spinoza's proof that the universe exists might be
But
an historical curiosity.
reason for dwelling on
it.
there
is
left
more than one
Spinoza follows in form, and even
made
by theologians, and philosophers under theological influence or pressure, who had undertaken to prove the existence of a being apart from and He does not simply break off from theoabove the universe. examples
language, the
in
logical
speculation and seek
dependent footing speculation last 1
purge The
elsewhere.
reason
it
See
would p.
philosophy on an in-
is
once allowed
of anthropomorphism and
doctrine of the Infinite
language that
establish
he seems intent on showing that theological
when
itself,
itself
;
to
familiar
Modes
is
given in Eth.
i,
free
come round
to
at
the
21-23, ^^^ in such general
be unintelligible without the parallel passages
138, above.
must
play,
in
Ep. 64 and
.
THE NATURE OF THINGS scientific view.
an euthanasia
for
155
Spinoza does not ignore theology, but provides it ; and there is every reason to believe that in
so doing he faithfully reproduces the development of his system in his
own
Hence
mind.
his
work
has a peculiar fascination for
Hberal-minded theologians, and from the very violent
abhorrence
similar grounds, as
exceeding
more orthodox
of the
was remarked of
bitterness
the
our
in
first
has excited the
ones. first
There were
chapter, for the
encountered
opposition
by
the
Tractatus Theologico-P oliticus If Spinoza swallows is
up speculative theology
in philosophy,
he
equally determined not to confine the range of philosophical
human
construction within the bounds of
experience.
Rejecting
the theological conception of the universe as created and governed
by a magnified human despot, which indirectly makes man the measure of all things, Spinoza was not more willing to accept the contrary form of anthropomorphism which admits no reality of things outside what
is
known
to ourselves.
And he was
deter-
mined withal not to give up the substance and reality of the knowledge we have in the search for some other imagined reality which might peradventure turn out a shadow. Thus encompassed with dangers, he escaped from them by a flight of speculation as daring and splendid as any that human intellect has achieved.
The God
of Spinoza
is
not merely Substance, but "Substance
The
consisting of infinite attributes."
deduced from the perfection and
and
reality
are
infinity of attributes
reality of Substance.
with Spinoza synonymous
terms.^
is
Perfection
Whatever
must exist as much is to under itself, is no possible restraint either exist, or which exists of could external which set bounds internal or to its existence. as
exists
Therefore
it
will exist
with
it
can
;
and that whose nature
infinite reality, in every possible
way,
The existent must ascribe to it infinite attributes. accessible a particular order of to universe, though not the world finite minds, must include every possible consequence of infinite being, and there is no real distinction between the actual and the and we
possible.
Let us endeavour
to put this 1
Eth.
in a shape
2, def. 6.
more congenial
to
SPINOZA
156
modern
HIS LIFE
:
We
habits of thought.
AND PHILOSOPHY
know
the world under the Attri-
butes or aspects of extension and thought, and in each kind the
sum
Our
of reahty appears to be inexhaustible.
modes of extension
associated with
world consists of
modes of thought
the
:
two
orders of events being, as Spinoza sets forth later, strictly correlated
But we have no right to assume that this is the only How world for this would be to set bounds to infinite being. can we tell what other aspects existence may not have to intelligence other than ours ? ^ We can conceive, though not imagine, relations of thought to other worlds analogous to those which we For all we can ever perceive between thought and extension. and
parallel. :
know
there
may
be endless aspects of existence unimaginable to
That which
us.
to the
possibility, forbidding us
modern thinker appears as a speculative to affirm that human knowledge is every-
thing, appeared to Spinoza as a positive necessity, and he afiirmed
the infinity of Attributes as required by the perfection of Substance.
Things must
exist,
not only after the manner in which they are
manifested to us, but in every manner which infinite understanding
Yet
can conceive.
that
fraction of the reality
;
which we do perceive
is
unknown
for the Attributes
not a part or to us express^
ways the very same reality of things which we know, or may conceivably know, under the Attributes In each Attribute the same order of Thought and Extension.
as
Spinoza
says, in infinite
and sequence
is
repeated in the aspect or expression proper to that
Differing in kind, they are strictly homologous and
Attribute.
A geometrical illustration
form.
parallel in
may
help us to under-
Let any one of the Attributes be plane, and let figures be drawn all over the
stand Spinoza's conception.
likened to an infinite
The
plane.
figures
may
then stand for the Modes, or particular
things, comprised under that Attribute
Now
Mode.
let
It
and the whole plane
is
number of other be drawn on them similar and
us suppose an infinite
be taken, and figures to 1
:
considered as a figured surface, will represent an infinite
itself,
planes to similarly
by this time a commonplace that our impressions of the material world might
be vastly changed by a considerable or even a seemingly slight modification in our organs of sensation
5
if for
example we had the dog's keenness of
relevant illustration here.
scent.
But
this
is
hardly a
THE NATURE OF THINGS drawn upon the
situated to those
figures to vary continuously,
correspondent in tion of
all
first.
and the variations
the planes, so that at
the planes
Further,
all
157
we
suppose the
to be similar
and
times the configura-
Intelligent beings living on one of these planes and confined to two dimensions could have no imagination of any surface outside their plane, which however is all
is
identical.
to observers furnished with normal organs of sense in three dimensions only
one plane
arbitrarily selected out of an infinite
number
" plane of the paper."
Yet such beings might conceive, though they could not imagine, the configurations of which they
as the
had experience
as
being repeated on infinite other planes inacces-
This is the sort of correspondence assumed by Spinoza to hold good between all the Attributes. But the illustration is imperfect in this, that there is no reason in the nature of the supposed case why the figures on different planes whereas in Spinoza's view of the universe should not be dissimilar the corresponding modes in different attributes are not different things at all, but the same thing " differently expressed." Thus there are not infinite and similar there is no room for divergence orders of things running parallel to one another, but one order in The order itself is the same in every infinite manifestations. the symbolical operations of mathematics aspect, somewhat as in sible to their faculties.
:
;
the development of a function remains constant in form, whatever values
we may
The
give to the variables.
parallelism of the Attributes includes as a particular case
the exact correspondence of body and mind, to which the Cartesian school was already committed, though
its
founder tried to effect a
compromise with prevailing notions by means of the doctrine of animal spirits a doctrine which, as we have seen, was followed by Spinoza himself in his earlier essay Of God and Man. By the time he wrote the Ethics he was convinced that such a compromise was untenable and there can be little doubt that his final and complete acceptance of the correlation of mind and body rested on grounds which we should now call scientific, the same in fact on which the most eminent of recent and Hving psychologists have come to the same conclusion. Hence, while the infinity of the :
;
Attributes was determined by a supposed necessity of speculation.
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
158
AND PHILOSOPHY
the parallelism which constitutes the original and peculiar feature
of this part of Spinoza's system appears to be an extension of the parallelism already fixed in Spinoza's
view of the world of human
experience as a necessity of scientific thought.
It
is
to be observed
would be a mere have abounded both before
that without this feature the Infinite Attributes
formless vision of unseen worlds, such as
and since the time of Spinoza. farthest in overleaping scientific
element
that
So that even
when Spinoza
the bounds of experience, gives
consistence and
it
goes the
still
is
to his
definition
work.
We
may now see that although nothing outside Extension and Thought can affect human knowledge or impeach its reality, the Infinite Attributes are not merely ornamental.
Spinoza's purpose
to keep a clear course
between materialism on the one hand and subjective idealism on the other. He makes extension and thought equally real, and co-ordinate not only with one another but with is
infinite other aspects of existence.
not materialism.^
It
is
no
less
Thus
the system
is
obviously
remote from the subjective idealism
which turns the universe into a phantom. It is proof even against the objections to which Berkeley's idealism is exposed. Professor Huxley, in his essay on Berkeley, supposes a piano to be conscious " It would become acquainted with of sound and of nothing else. a system of nature entirely composed of sounds, and the laws of and, having nature would be the laws of melody and of harmony " no conception of any other sort of existence, it might reason thus " All my knowledge consists of sounds and the perception of the ;
:
relation of sounds
;
now
the being of sound
is
to be heard
inconceivable that the existence of the sounds
is
I
and
;
know
it
should
depend upon any other existence than that of the mind of a hearing
But we know that the existence of these sounds requires, besides the mind of a hearing being, the structure of wood and metal which makes the visible and tangible piano, and a musician So that the Berkeleian piano would be mistaken, to play upon it. being."
1
Except in the nomenclature of certain modern writers,
who
signify by materialist (as
appears by their usage, though they do not give themselves the pains so to define
one
who
does not admit
some dogma, generally that of
writer to be essential to religion and morality.
free-will, affirmed
it)
any
by the particular
THE NATURE OF THINGS though by the hypothesis
Now^
manner.
It w^ould
me
manifest to
could never have proof of
it
vary the supposition and
let us
in
make
then say something of
Thought and Sound
under v^hich
I
and perfectly
real in its
159
:
it
this
kind
But
kind.
error.
Existence
:
is
these are the Attributes
perceive the reality of things, and each
own
its
reason after Spinoza's
I
may
is
infinite
not assume that
these are the only possible aspects of existence, though they are
the only ones that
fall v^^ithin
my
apprehension.
The
fulness of
things must be infinite in infinite kinds, and must be expressed in
two of Thought and Sound. "The auditory consciousness of our speculative piano " would thus ways
infinite
besides these
vindicate the reality of
perceptions as far as they went, or the
its
identity of esse and percipi within the supposed limits of ties,
and yet
speculation would leave ample
its
room
its
facul-
for the exist-
ence of the material piano, the musician, and the world in general.
Sound
Substitute Extension for
thus varied, and
knowledge
The
we have
in Professor Huxley's parable as
Spinoza's view of the relation of
human
to the totality of existence.
remark on Spinoza's hypothesis that occurs to a modern reader, being probably the last that would have occurred to any of his contemporaries, is that by the nature of the case it But perhaps that objection is not is incapable of verification. first
open to grave doubt whether any metaphysical hypothesis can be brought to this test, or can have, to use the Kantian phrase, any other than a regulative value. conclusive
Leaving theory
for
this
is
of our
j
it
is
point
at least
consistent in
actual
we have
aside, itself,
experience.
see whether Spinoza's and gives a consistent interpretation And, notwithstanding its apparent
inspection shows
to
that
the
symmetry,
closer
superable.
Spinoza found himself, indeed, unable to resolve the
difficulties
are
in-
doubts propounded by Tschirnhausen, whose letters will compare very favourably with most of the modern criticism on the Ethics.
Man
as
is,
we know by
all
thinking being, and nothing the reality of everything
and body are only two
number
:
how
then
is
our experience, an extended and else.
But, according to Spinoza,
expressed in infinite ways.
Mind
expressions or aspects out of an infinite
do
these
two
come
to
be
exclusively
associated
And
AND PHILOSOPHY
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
i6o
we
are
worlds
Why
?
suppose
to
by
perceived
Extension
those
to
us
?
Attributes to constitute other
who
creatures
finite
unknown
no notion of
have
Such is the effect of Tschirnhausen's first set of The answer he received ^ failed to satisfy him and ^
?
questions. in truth
the other Attributes
are
;
it
not only obscure, but
is
Spinoza says
seems to evade the main
it
that
the
thought and extension, because
it is
difficulty.
human mind nothing
else
knows only
than a mode of
thought associated with a particular body or mode of extension
But
(idea corporis actu existentis).
how
this dual association
co-ordination of
all
is
the difficulty
to be reconciled
just to see
is
with the symmetrical
Tschirnhausen returned,
the Attributes.
courteously but stoutly, to the attack. I
well perceive (he says), that in your system the universe
and not many you refer
me
but
;
that
^
of every single thing
Whence
one,
no
it is
expressed in infinite ways, and that the being
is
less
from the very passage
clear
to
which
so expressed.
seems to follow that though the modification constitut-
it
my mind
is
it is
my
body be one and the same, yet that modification is expressed in infinite ways ; once under thought, again under extension, thirdly under an attribute of God to me unknown, and so on to infinity ; for the attributes of God are infinite, and the order and connexion of the modifications is, as I ing
and the modification constituting
understand, the same in
—which modification ways — why, mind
in
expression of
arises
embodies (repraesentat) expressed,
is
expressed
Hence
all.
say,
I
the
extension it
a
this
question
:
why
certain modification,
the
which
not only in extension, but in infinite other
mind (that
perceives is,
?
modification
only
human body) and no
the
under other attributes
that
as
other
*
Spinoza's reply, apparently only a part of the letter in which it
was given,
is
so brief that
it
may
be translated in
In answer to your objection I say thing
is
that,
full.
although every particular
expressed in infinite ways in the infinite understanding of
1
Ep. 63.
^
Ep. 65.
^
This
through SchuUer.
Is
3
Ep. 64.
written to Spinoza direct
j
£^/^_
iJ_
y^ g^]^Q2_
the former communications were
made
THE NATURE OF THINGS God, yet those
whereby
Infinite ideas
it is
i6i
expressed cannot constitute
one and the same mind of a particular thing, but constitute infinite minds ; inasmuch as these infinite ideas have severally no connexion among themselves, as I have explained in the aforesaid scholium to Prop.
Part 2 of the Ethics, and appears from Prop. 10, Part
7,
you will
If
i.
apply yourself to these, you will see that no
sufficiently
difficulty remains.^
Spinoza seems to say that every
Thought
than
other
thought to
has
We
itself.
a
several
Mode
of every Attribute
mind
or
have an interesting confirmation
note of Leibnitz's, made
known
of
modification in
a
only of late years, in which he
records a conversation with Tschirnhaus on Spinoza's philosophy.
This must have been before Leibnitz had seen Spinoza, and it looks as if Tschirnhaus had not then seen any of Spinoza's
MSS.
however,
substance,
statement
that
passage
:
He
thought,
What
immediately concerns us
as in this
world there
But is
in
is
What
in extension. is
infinite
they are its
own
^
mode of thought
infinite
is
appropriated
Attribute only, and they are infinite in number.
all
in
is
the tntellectus absolute infinitus appears to be manifold,
so that each
of
the following
of them there
all
every one
;
kind, like space in this world."
that the
curious
a
for
thinks there are infinite other positive attributes
not conceivable by us
Even
except
accurate,
thought and extension.
besides
is
"
quite
is
Spinoza believed in some sort of Pythagorean
transmigration.
like
The
or been informed in detail of the plan of his works.
modes of Thought
The
to
one
result
is
modes other words. Thought,
are numerically equal to the
the other Attributes together
;
in
instead of being co-equal with the infinity of other Attributes, infinitely infinite,
is
and has a pre-eminence which
explicitly accorded to
^
-
Sed
it.^
But
if
we go back
is
nowhere
to the definition
Ep. 66 (seemingly only part of the letter is given). " Putat infinita alia esse attributa affirmativa praeter cogitationem et extensionem. in
omnibus
esse
nobis concipi non
cogitationem, ut hie in extensione.
posse,
unum
quodque
in suo genere esse
^ualia autem sint
ilia
Stein, Leibni-z u. Spino'za, Beilage II. p. 283. 2
Cf.
Erdmann,
Grufidriss der Gesc/i. der Philosophies ยง 272, 5, 6 (vol.
M
a
infinitum, ut hie spatium."
ii.
pp. 55-61).
we
find
that this pre-eminence has
substance as
the while been implied.
all
" that which understanding perceives concerning Thus the ground constituting the essence thereof."
For Attribute is
AND PHILOSOPHY
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
i62
is
cut from under the apparent equality of the Attributes
though the system escapes the snares of subjective
we must
escape was possible at
face
the
If, as I
all.
and,
idealism,
it
In order to judge Spinoza's
does not escape idealism altogether.
attempt rightly,
;
whether such an
question
think, his failure was due not
any want of philosophical power or ingenuity, but to the nature of the problem itself, it will be no mere exercise of historical curiosity to undertake a narrower scrutiny of his conception. Before we do this, one or two other difficulties may to
be mentioned. referred
In a continuation of the correspondence already
Tschirnhausen
to,
on Spinoza to show how the
calls
existence and variety of extended things
to be
is
deduced a priori
from the Attribute of extension. It is not very clear whether Spinoza thought himself bound to meet such a challenge or not
;
he was not ready with an answer.^
at all events
regard his metaphysic as an attempt not only to interpret
experience as
Tschirnhausen's question was,
But
the white.
must be what it is, Trendelenburg says, a shot into
but to demonstrate that
it is,
it
as
we human If
it
we
loses all significance if
treat the
system
as
on a foundation of empirical facts, and professing not to construct the world a priori^ but only to make the world
in truth resting
And
intelligible.
this
we
are
entitled
to
do
our present
for
might not have been content limitation of his aims. There are still, how-
purposes, though Spinoza himself to accept such a
ever, other stumbling-blocks.
It
is
part of Spinoza's theory that
everything possible must actually exist it
ought
all
to exist at once, or else
thing should exist before another, that
duration in
minds.
time
The same
Spinoza
had,
is
only
is
a
;
2
^nd the objection that
must be shown why one not adequately met by saying it
relative
conception
in
finite
principle has yet another strange consequence.
of course,
no suspicion
the
that
properties
of
Extension could be conceivably different from those assumed in ordinary geometry, and verified in 1
Epp. 82, 83.
all
our experience 2
jF^/^^ ii_
16^
as
far
as
THE NATURE OF THINGS
163
But modern geometers have shown
verification has gone.
that
such differences are perfectly conceivable, and that an indefinite
number of
may
consistent geometrical systems
axioms contradicting
be framed
vi^ith
ways those of Euclid and this in the range of three dimensions, without any reference to the more knotty question whether space of more than three dimensions
in various
:
So that a thorough -going
conceivable or not.
is
Spinozist, could such an one be found at the present day,
have to believe that
many
dynamical laws to match
more than as
conceivable geometries are realized in as
worlds of extension in three dimensions, presumably with
varied
have
all
would
dimensions
three believe
to
in
infinite
actually existing.^
Besides
and
;
if
he believed
be conceivable, he would also
to
worlds all
of
this,
dimensions
infinite
he would have
pose corresponding modifications running through
of
series
parallel
to sup-
the infinite
One may
the other Attributes.
all
of
space
doubt
if
even the boldest metaphysician of modern times, or the thinker
most eager to find room for the free play of a constructive philosophy untrammelled by the conditions of experience, would care to take upon himself such a burden of unseen worlds as this.
Let
us
ideahsm.
now
What
What would
main point of Spinoza's implicit the conclusion to which it really points ?
turn to is
the
Spinoza have done
hampered by
a
of mutual interference things as extended
is
is
extended thing has
its
is
complete in
have to
the possibility
The
perception of
not a relation between the extended thing for
they are incommensurable.
correlate in
part of a conscious
mind
Thought, whether
or not
in a conscious
mind, the perception
nothing
And
else.
We
?
itself:
rigorously excluded.
and the perceiving mind,
is
he had not been unconsciously
remnant of Cartesian duaHsm
observe that each Attribute
late
if
-,
is
and when a
mode
it is
of
Every
that correa perception
Thought and
the thing correlated to the perception
not
is
the object perceived, but the organism of the perceiving subject. ^ One ingenious modern writer (von Reichenau, Die monhtische Philosophie) on the contrary, that Spinoza disproves imaginary geometry by anticipation.
unable to follow him.
says, I
am
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE AND PHILOSOPHY
i64
The
of ideas or modes of
series
no other Attribute has any
Thought
part in
it.
whole and continuous
is
How
Thought perceives Extension ? or making Extension co-ordinate with Thought, and
that
which nevertheless
not causation, necessary to
is
its
blotted out
let
us assume Extension and
of existence.
Thought and
hypothesis remain unaffected fact will
things,
be precisely what
ordo
its
an infinity
for
modes
its
modes
?
to be
by the
will
every mental correlate of a material
;
was before
it
comiexio idearum^
et
all
some way,
in
manifestations
Putting out of sight the supposed a priori necessity of Attributes,
;
we say what ground have we for then can
will
;
be
the psychical order of
In other
unaltered.
words, there will be no effect on the perceptions which take place
any mind, and though Extension be annihilated as an independent Attribute, no thinking being will miss it. The difference would be sensible only to an infinite intelligence placed as a spectator outside the universe and all its Attributes ; but such an in
intelligence
we
are forbidden to suppose, for the universe can have
nothing outside
unknown
The same
it.
to
simplest terms,
its
the other
all
the Attributes except
all
Thought
and Spinoza's doctrine, when thus reduced
:
is
that nothing exists but thought
and
its
Feeling, or something commensurable with FeeHng,
modifications. is
Hence
Attributes.
are really superfluous
reasoning applies to
the only unit and measure of reality.
The
ultimate elements
of thought are not merely correlated with the ultimate elements of things
when
\
they are the elements of things themselves.
the principle of continuity
need to assume any other.
seem
at first sight,
may
And
is
once admitted, there
this
view, strange as
be arrived at by divers ways.
It
For, is
no
may may be it
reached even through the notion of a thing-in-itself or substratum
of phenomena it,
but
left
it
and Kant was on the very point of thus reaching
;
aside.
Accepting the alleged necessity
stratum, noumenon, or whatever else
it
may
for a sub-
be called, to support
we must admit that of the nature of this substratum, as it is in itself, we know nothing whatever. Therefore the substratum may as well be of the nature of mind our phenomenal experience,
as
anything
else.
which we have
But mind
is
direct experience
the one sort of real existence of ;
it
is
that
which
is
known
in
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; THE NATURE OF THINGS And, seeing
conscious feeling.
165
known kind
that a
will satisfy the conditions required of the substratum,
of existence
we
have no
unknown kinds. Indeed, the law of economy forbids us thus to multiply entities without need. Kant's authority, no doubt, is against this last conclusion ; for he occasion
to postulate
other
dehberately refused to proceed to
not strictly
it.
His reasons, however, were
they are inseparable, historically
scientific, as
if
not
formally, from his determination to reserve an inaccessible world
of things-in-themselves as a
field
for the exercise,
^
assumed
to be
whose demands could not be knowledge. But Kant's own
indispensable, of a Practical Reason
the
in
satisfied
region
language on the subject it
of real
too important to be omitted
is
accordingly in a free translation
ward
sense, not things in themselves.
our thinking self
is
give
I
:
phenomena of our
has been proved that bodies arc only
It
:
Accordingly
we may
out-
affirm that
not bodily in this sense, that, being conceived as
an object of the inner sense,
it
cannot, so far
as it is
a
thinking thing,
be an object of outward sense or a phenomenon in space.
In other
words, thinking things as such can never occur among outward pheno-
mena
we can have no outward
;
sciousness,
sense.
.
.
desires,
etc.
;
for
all
perception of their thoughts, conthis
the
is
domain of the inward
.
But though extension, impenetrability, cohesion and motion, in short everything we obtain exclusively through the outward sense, cannot be or contain thought, feeling or the like, which in no case can be objects of outward perception ; yet the something which underlies the outward phenomena, and so affects our sense as to furnish it with the notions of space, matter, form,
etc.
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
this
something,
I
say,
noumenon, might well be the subject of thoughts, though it through the outward sense no perception of ideas, we This somewill, or the like, but only of space and its modifications. thing, whatever it be, has in itself none of the qualities of matter, such considered
as
obtain from
as extension,
qualities
are
impenetrability and the like
;
for statements
proper to the inner sense, namely, ideas and thought, to
it
without contradiction. ^
Or might one
.
.
say playground P
.
Matter
is
complex
Sfielraum, at any rate,
about these
But the
statements about our perceptions.
is
may be
as a
qualities
ascribed
phenomenon,
an innocent term,
i66
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
but only
as a
phenomenon
and
:
I
AND PHILOSOPHY
am
free to
assume that
It is
in itself
which to our outward sense is extended, accompanied by thoughts capable of being represented in consciousness by an inward sense of its own. In this way the same
simple, and that the substance is
in itself
thing that in one aspect
is
called bodily
would
in another be a thinking
which we could not perceive the thought, but could perceive it in-the phenomenon. Then we should no longer say
being, of
the signs of
that only souls think, assuming soul to be a special kind of Substance
we
common
should say, with
speech, that
men
that the same thing which as an outward phenomenon
which
or in itself a Subject^
is
;
think, in other words is
extended
not composite, but which
is
inwardly
simple and
is
thinks.^
Kant, however, threw out this hypothesis only for a special purpose, and did not pursue it. The closeness of the approach to Spinoza, of which Kant was probably not aware, is most striking and the suggestion differs only in one point from the result which ;
follows, as above pointed out,
from developing the implicit idealism
of Spinoza's theory of the Attributes.
Kant assumes
The
difference
is
that
the ideal or psychical thing-in-itself, or rather sub-
the thing-in-itself, to be a simple subject or monad.
stitute for
In Spinoza's system, on the other hand, as well as in the simplified
form of
it
here proposed, the ultimate fact
is
not only represented,
but adequately represented, by the phenomenon.
The
inward
mode of thought, corresponds point for point with the outward fact, or mode of extension, and is complex in the same fact, or
proportion.
We
must remember, however,
that the inner and
the outer world are not really different and parallel, but one and
the same world under two aspects. repeatedly stated by Spinoza.
This, indeed,
is
expressly and
If Spinoza could be interrogated in
the language of Kant, he would answer,
I
conceive, that he re-
cognises no Thing-in-itself short of Substance as a whole.
God
is
not because he undetermined reality but his determinate phenomena, because manifestations in illusory his reality. Herein Spinoza and express comes, almost constitute certainly without knowing It, very near to the philosophical the only Absolute
^
Kr'itik der r.
V.
ist
veils his
;
ed.
Kr. des
-ziveiten
287, 288, Rosenkr. 304-306, Kehrbach
Parahgismus der
(in Universal-Bibliothek).
traz-issc.
Psychologies pp.
THE NATURE OF THINGS who
position of the medieval doctors free speculative
The it
development
make room
strove to
have just gone through, supposing
to be legitimate, does not aiFect the substantial
The
value of Spinoza's metaphysic.
ground on v^hich
it
we shall who only
success,
Jacobi,
groundwork
see in
only to strip
is
of
it
man may
so long as he finds a single
psychology, and with
for
Spinoza,
made
a
him
The
obscure.
cheap effect by reckless
Goethe knew
and
Lessing
difficulties.
the extra-
profess to understand
line of the Ethics
one of those which produce
disregard of the real
Spinoza uses his meta-
due time.
half understood
ordinary statement that no
is
How
really stands.
physical conception as a
saying
effect
and u^orking
but dangerous ornaments, and lay open the speculative
brilliant
what
for
Church.
in the Christian
we
process of criticism
167
And as to more recent philosophers and critics, it is too much to say that no two of them have understood
better.
hardly
the metaphysical principles of the Ethics in precisely the same
This being
manner.
am
so, I
acceptance for the
general
content
if I
have made
bearing
of Spinoza's
nature
clear
is
from claiming or expecting above given
interpretation intelHgible.
it
principles
enough, and
far
I
in
do not
On
know
to
understand, though opinions
possible as to their correctness
human
that his practical results
have ever been found obscure except by those
mined not
am
the other hand the
appHcation to
their
I
;
who were
differ
as
Whether
and value.
deter-
widely as
the criticism
of the purely speculative part be found interesting depends on one's belief or taste as to metaphysics in
who
general.
The
reader
thinks metaphysics an impossibility or a useless luxury will
probably have quitted
remain
it
may
me
several
be worth while to
pages
sum up
For those who
back.
the criticism in a
technical form than I have yet allowed myself.
more
Spinoza's Attri-
butes are in effect defined as objects, or rather as objective worlds.
But
the general form of the definition disguises the all-important
fact that the
world of Thought, and that alone,
objective at once.
The
intellect
is
subjective and
which perceives an Attribute
as
" constituting the essence of Substance," itself belongs to the Thus, if we push analysis further, we Attribute of Thought.
— SPINOZA
i68
:
Thought swallows up
find that
Thought
all
turn out
conceivable Attributes
all
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
the other to
Attributes
be objective aspects of
Spinoza does indeed return, but too
itself.
double aspect of
Thought
:
late, to
and the formal part of
^
for
;
his
the
system
remains a magnificent attempt at an impossible symmetry of the
which thought vainly struggles
universe, in
own
fundamental conditions, and to conquer
from
to escape
new
its
worlds beyond
the inexorable boundaries of experience.
At this stage some serious young students may be disappointed. Only a young and ardent student, indeed, can be much disappointed at finding that there is
no
is
who
the hope of us older learners
youth, and
we owe them
unknown young ?
— Yes
friend. is
;
was that posterity
am
—
have
But
on
Whither
?
is
of idealism
for a
that
Is
few words of
talk
find if
of
we
with our
the best you have to say for
not enough
?
— You
write a whole book
—
don't
—Yes, and
—
thank
let us
he to lead us ;
such
lost the first free play
to regard Spinoza as a schoolmaster to lead us to
farther
in
want me to be a Spinozist ? The What he did want not want any Spinozists. should go on building on his work. Then I
about Spinoza and master himself did
it
in philosophy.
the comfort and encouragement
all
Let us pause
can give them.
Spinoza
word
last
?
—
If
you
God
for
are of
something
such a schoolmaster.
my
mind, to some form
but you must seek for yourself, and you will surely
you take
and trust the argument.
Plato's advice
What
you find may not be what you expect, but that does not matter. But what kind of idealism ? for there are many. That, my good No one man friend, is the whole problem of modern philosophy. and no one system will ever be done with it. Set your own hand to the plough if you feel like it, and you may plough as good an acre who knows ? as any other man. But is there no Yes at infinity. If you want rest and infallibility, you end ? if not, go forward fearing nothing, can do as Albert Burgh did But you will know better than Albert Burgh. and prosper. And if any of the people who cannot be happy without readymade formulas ask you wherein you hope to be saved, you may answer with Omar Khayyam an answer which Spinoza would
—
—
—
—
—
:
;
—
1
Et/i.
ii.
20, 21, 43.
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; THE NATURE OF THINGS surely have approved
And
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; " Because
I
169
One
never called the
two."
^
so farev/ell.
has been seen hov^^ great a part
It
Spinoza's system
;
we.
is
played by infinity in
have Attributes, infinite in number and in
Modes, and the like. It is evidently know what precise meaning was attached by Spinoza
their several kinds, infinite
material to
The
to the term.
we have
his
friend's
inquiries,
incidentally sets forth
ceptions which, though
is
its
Meyer where,
secondary and
of the
infinite
nature, that
is,
of great
has
always been considered very
who
have handled
by virtue of
without limits by virtue not of
as a
are
auxiliary,
its
its
is
matter of fact
not distinguished between
is
it,
because they
concluded to be
definition,
essence but of
its
indefinite in quantity)
;
infinite
and that which
cause (in
language, between that which cannot be conceived as
which
in
view of other metaphysical con-
his
nay inexplicable, by those
own
but
Spinoza discusses the problem.
have not distinguished between that which
by
to Dr.
:
:
question
difficult,
partly given in the Ethics
After a complimentary introduction Spinoza proceeds
importance.
thus (Ep. 12)
The
is
to look chiefly to the letter
answer to
He
explanation
finite,
modern
and that
again they have
thing called infinite from having no limit,
a
and a thing whose parts cannot be measured or expressed by any number, though a greatest and a least magnitude of the thing itself can finally, because they have not distinguished between be assigned that which we can only understand but not imagine, and that which ;
we
can
as
well imagine
as
understand.
Had
they attended,
I say, to
would never have been overwhelmed by such a crowd of difficulties. For then they would have clearly understood what kind of infinite quantity is not capable of having or being divided into parts, and what without any contradiction is so. They would likewise have understood what kind of infinite may without any repugnance be greater than another infinite, and what kind may not be so conceived, as will plainly appear from what I shall presently say. these points, they
He
shortly recapitulates his technical use of the terms substance^
jnode^ eternity^ ^
''
Zdn
and duration.
ru ki yaki-ra
dii
Duration, he says,
na-guftam ^argiz."
Bodl. ed. Heron-Allen, London, 1898.
is
a
term appli-
Introductory quatrain at head of
MS.
SPINOZA:
170
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
To
cable only to the existence of particular things or modes.
substance belongs eternity, "that
of existence or being."
is,
infinite faculty (fruitionem)
When we
consider the existence and
duration of particular things with regard to those things only,
and apart from the order of nature, we may freely conceive it as bounded, greater or less, and divided into parts, without in any
way
But
contradicting our conception of the thing.
and substance cannot be conceived
limited
as
eternity
we
therefore if
:
seek to apply the conceptions of limit and measure to them the principal conception
Wherefore they
.
.
and
.
talk
all
commonly go about pieces of
who
say madly,
think extended
from one
parts or bodies really distinct
show
that extended substance
is
finite falls
to
In the same case are others who, having persuaded
itself.
a line
many arguments
to
if
to
that heap of arguments with which philosophers
to
themselves that
Now
idly, not
made up of
substance to be another,
already gone.
is
you ask
is
show
made up of that a line
why we
are
points, have succeeded in finding
is
not infinitely divisible.^
by nature
so
prone to treat extended
is conceived by us by abstraction or superficially, as it is present to us in imagination through the senses, or in its quality of substance, which can be done only by the understanding. So that if we con-
substance as divisible, I answer, because quantity in
two manners
:
sider quantity as
easy way),
it
manifold.
But is
Substance
i?i
at
former
indivisible,
it
will
and the thing is
to wit,
if
in the imagination
be found divisible,
we
itself)
as it
which
sufficiently
is
is
(which
as it is in
in itself
{i.e.
exceedingly
shown you,
it
the
common and
difficult,
will
and
the understanding,
Substance
as
parts,
be
;
for
only
then, as I have
found
infinite,
single.
we can assign bounds is, when we conceive
Again, from the fact that tity at
is
made up of
finite,
consider substance
considered
times
and
is
our pleasure (that
to duration
and quan-
quantity abstractedly,
apart from Substance, and separate duration in our thought from the
manner of measure
;
its
derivation
from eternal things), there
time being conceived in order
to
arise
ti?ne
and
determine duration, measure
in order to determine quantity, so that we may most conveniently Then from the fact that we separate represent them in imagination.
the affections of substance from substance itself and reduce ^
Cf. Eth.
i.
15, schol.
them
to
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; THE NATURE OF THINGS
171
convenience of our imagination, there arises 7itmber, determine the same. Whence it is plainly to be seen
classes for the like
whereby we
and number are nothing else than ways of thinking, Therefore it is no wonder that all who have understand the course of nature by means of notions of
that measure, time,
or rather of imagining.^
attempted to
and those too
this kind,
themselves that
at
understood, have so marvellously entangled
ill
they could find no escape but by breaking
last
bounds and committing themselves
Hence
all
beyond measure.
to absurdities
the attempt to explain the ideas of substance, eternity,
which belong purely to the understanding, by means of conceptions which are mere "aids of the imagination," is
or the like,
necessarily futile.
It
is
like applying
the intellectual tests of
sanity and insanity to acts of pure imagination (nihilo plus agit
quam
si
det
operam ut sua imaginatione
things cannot be rightly understood
if
we confound
with these " aids of the imagination." confounds duration with measurable time^ into parts,
it
it is
Wherefore many who
first pass,
To
then half of the
on without end
are not used to distinguish abstractions
reality
have made bold
and one
have fallen into Scylla in flying from Charybdis.
compound
their reality
impossible to understand the lapse of time.
residue, then half of the next remainder, and so
to
finite
For instance, if one and goes about to divide
bring an hour to an end, half the hour must
so
Even
insaniat).
to assert that duration
is
compounded of
:
from
instants,
For
it is all
make number by
duration out of instants and to
adding up noughts.
We
have here,
be observed, Spinoza's answer to the
will
it
standing puzzles as to the impossibility of motion, the difficulty of conceiving
matter
as
either
being or not
divisible, the contradictions implied in
being
infinitely
assuming time to have had
or not to have had a beginning, and other catches of that sort.
They
are
for
the most
part
who
were brought into new prominence by Kant, ^
Cf.
Cogit.
Met. part
c.
i.
i,
cogitandi habemus, determinando
"Ad rem
4:
scilicet
deinde
expHcandam
earn per comparationem ad
efficimus vocantur tempus, niimerus, mensura, et
cogitandi quibus
id
Horum autem
tempus
mensura
§
inservit
quantitati continuae
:
durationi
" and part
Some
as old as philosophy itself.
ii.
explicandae, c. 4.
si
numerus
used them etiani
aliam.
modos
Modi
quae adhuc
alia sunt.
quantitati
discretae,
172
SPINOZA:
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
with extreme ingenuity to
set
mate operations of human
reason, and leave a world
barrier, not accessible to reason
In our
own
an impassable barrier to the
legiti-
beyond the
and yet not inaccessible altogether.
time an elaborate misunderstanding of Kant has
on the invention of the
to the waste of great powers
led
so-called
Philosophy of the Conditioned, which, having barely survived inventor and Spinoza's
promoters,
first
meaning
vocabulary, and
really
is
more we
be dismissed as past criticism.^
clearly expressed, but in his
seems to
it
nature of things inquiries the
is
may
call for a
modern
continuous
;
common uses of life our imagination What we call things are persistent :
peculiar
The
we push our
the further
parcels
own
interpretation.
are compelled so to regard
of relations between them
its
But
it.
in
the
out for convenience.
it
groups of our sensations and
and the conception of
a thing varies
according to our knowledge and the purpose for which the conception
The
required.
is
identity
and individuality of things relations, and
nothing but the persistence and similarity of different as is
we
A
take one or another set of relations.
living
is is
body
the same from day to day in one sense, not the same in another.
To common
apprehension the
touch are unities complete rest of the
world
visibly divided.
common
in themselves
and marked off from the
they are conceived as whole until they are
;
To
the scientific apprehension they are composite
structures built up of molecules,
which again
For common purposes and many
we
are built
scientific purposes
internal parts of inanimate bodies as at rest
purposes
objects of sight and
which we have thus
we
regard the
for other scientific
;
regard them as in constant motion.
separate things into
up of atoms.
If
we
take the
parcelled out the world,
and try to reconstruct the unity of the world out of them, we For the unity was broken up in the act of shall naturally fail. imagining each thing with
it
We
separately.
the dividing
As we
as separate,
and
for the
purpose of dealing
cannot restore the unity without undoing
work of the imagination.
divide the unity of the world materially
tion of separate things, so
measurable space and time. ^
I
suppose
we
also divide
Extension it is
now
is
it
by the concep-
formally by those of
one and
(1899) quite dead.
indivisible,
but
THE NATURE OF THINGS we measure
out space by feet and inches, or by fractions of a milli-
metre, or by diameters of the earth's orbit, as
Duration
in hand.
173
Newton
said,
and then
we
is
continuous, but
we
may
first
serve the matter
conceive time, as
something constantly and equably flowing, it, as it were, and mark them off into
to be
take lengths of
years, days, hours,
Number
and minutes.
is
involved in the possi-
we perceive or conceive things and classes of things as persistent, we can range them, in fact or in mental representation, side by side. And we find that they still persist, however we may alter the arrangement. As Sir James Stephen has excellently said, we are able to measure of things being conceived as separate.^
bility
If
and count things because they stay to be measured and counted. take matter occupying a definite part of space, and consider its motions and the transformations of energy therein involved apart from the general sum of matter and energy in Spinoza's words, " a modo, quo a rebus aeternis fluit,^ separamus."
We
:
That things do thus cohere and persist, so as to make measure and number possible, is a universal fact of experience indeed ;
there could be no experience without
Why
it.
it
an impracticable and barren inquiry (except so research
may
it
But he
over.
less
also
nature of understanding
as
physical
complex ones), and Spinoza seems to seems to assume that it is not of the such to perceive things by the "aids of
as
Extension, as
the imagination."
one of innumerable
only
far
is
succeed in expressing the more complex properties
of matter in terms of pass
should be so
we have
aspects
of
seen,
existence.
for
is
Spinoza
Intelligences
attributes would presumably have " aids of the imagination," corresponding to our spatial
knowing Substance under other
own
their
But we also find indications that existence and knowledge out of time were conceived by Spinoza as possible ; in fact, he regards all scientific knowledge, the knowledge of things measurements.
as necessary or
"sub
Everything
eternal in
^
Cf. Cogit. Met. part
modum aliquo 2
is
i.
cogitandi esse, quo
specie aeternitatis," as independent of time. its
cap. 6, ยง
rem ab
i
aliis
necessary aspect, or as part of the
:
" Nos autem dicimus unitatem
separamus, quae
ipsi
....
similes sunt, vel
tantum
cum
ipsa
modo conveniunt."
Res aeternae = infinite modes =
in extension,
Motion and Matter.
See
p.
142 above.
knowledge of
universal order, and the
expected use
made of
is
which there
Ethics^ of I
AND PHILOSOPHY
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
174
is
more
An
eternal also.
conception in the
this
is
it
last
to be said hereafter.
un-
part of the
In
this point,
The
think, Spinoza was again striving to transcend experience.
knowledge that something is true at all times and in all places is not a knowledge out of time for the act of knowing or feeling Without risking any involves change, and change involves time. :
transcendental proposition
we may
safely affirm that to the
human
we
live in,
mind, or to any mind similarly organized in the world existence out of time It
not
is
intelligible.
material to note that the " aids of the imagination " are
is
not represented by Spinoza
They
things.
arise
as
forms imposed by the mind upon
out of the relation between the reality of
mind which is unable to grasp it in imagination as an unbroken whole. Only the division and measuring is that which we represent as divided and the work of the mind things and the finite
;
measured
is
in space because
ceive
them
We
perfectly real.
as
such
Thus
is
Kant assumes
He would
The
are
unperceivable
to consciousness. is
is
understanding makes exist-
inner and outer aspects of the world are
correlated, co-equal,
ness, but neither
which
real existences
ence what
known
never have admitted
extended only in respect of our per-
also denies that the
is.
we
the purpose of comparing our
for
unintelligible, and
him
per-
Spinoza denies that any kind of existence
and uninteUigible.
for
we
Spinoza's doctrine of time and space cannot be
that the material world
it
;
extended
extended because our bodies are extended, and
called an anticipation of Kant's.
ception.
as
the constitution of our minds
is
measure and divide extension perceptions.
do not perceive things
and co-ordinate.
Thought
derived from
is
it.
Extension
made known
On
is
made
in conscious-
the contrary, the con-
mind is a highly complex mode of thought, organized as body, which is its outward aspect, is organized. Unorganized
scious
the
matter
is
correlated with proportionately simpler groupings of the
ultimate elements of thought or feeling are, in
accordance with both
of science, regarded
being no
less
as
common
unconscious.
and unorganized things language and the inferences ;
At
the same time, thought
continuous than extension, or rather their continuity
THE NATURE OF THINGS being the same,
it
is
impossible to
175
the point where
fix
life
begins
Why self-consciousness should be conditioned in off. our world of phenomena by a particular kind and degree of organized complexity is a question Spinoza does not attempt to deal with. So far as such a question has any real meaning, it would seem to
or leaves
belong not to metaphysics but to natural history, and to
common ground
We
lie
of psychology and physiology.
are here partly anticipating Spinoza's psychology
may conduce
to clearness to exhibit
connexion with
on the
its
It
but
it
principles in immediate
their metaphysical foundation before
appHcation in the following chapter.
;
may
we
also be
anticipate the results so far as to observe that they
trace their
permitted to
show
a
remark-
modern English or empirical school. Spinoza starts from premisses which are in appearance dogmatic and transcendental, and yet his conclusions are the same that have been independently reached by inquirers who acknowledged no source of knowledge but experience. At first sight the
able coincidence with those of the
coincidence
is
The
explain.
perplexing, but
it
is
not really very difficult to
psychology of the Ethics
is
founded in part on
tacit
assumptions of an empirical kind, in part on express ones which are in form universal and unqualified.
much
But, in one way or another,
the same positions are assumed by Spinoza that are accepted
by modern science and psychology as the basis of their work. And since a working hypothesis must be treated, so long as one works with it, as if it were absolutely true, there is no reason why the results and even the processes should not in great measure Thus we may well hold that all human knowledge is coincide. provisional, and yet receive as real additions to knowledge, and vahd for practical purposes, doctrines arrived at and asserted in the first instance without any thought of such reservations.
NOTE TO CHAPTER V The
doctrine of the Infinite Modes, one of the most difficult points
in Spinoza's system, has
one and another aspect. the results.
been discussed piecemeal It
may
came up under summary view of
as it
be useful to give a
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; AND PHILOSOPHY
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
176
According as follows
to the explanation here proposed, the Infinite
Modes
are
:
In Extension.
1.
a.
Motion, conceived
after
Cartesian
the
theory as
real
a
thing and constant in quantity: "quantity of motion'* being the " momentum " of modern usage. b.
The
material
or sum of extended things taken Mode, " facies totius universi." This,
universe
together as one
being extension modified by motion and
God
produced by
rest, is said to
immediately but
not
be
through the
operation of motion (" mediantibus his primis," Eth.
i.
28,
Schol.).
In Thought.
2.
a.
The sum
of
the psychical facts or events corresponding
all
to physical motion, b.
" intellectus absolute infinitus."
There should be a sum of all particular modes of Thought taken as making up one Mode, to correspond to the universi." But this is not specified by might be the " idea Dei in cogitatione " of 21, but there it seems not to be distinguished
"facies totius
Spinoza. Eth.
i.
It
from "intellectus absolute
We
have then
infinitus."
:
A
T>tus {causa absolute proximo).
Extensio.
Cogitatio.
B. Res a Deo immediate productae.
Motus.
Res aeternae seu
modi
B'.
infi
niti (causae
Modi qui
Intellectus absolute infinitus. et necessario et infiniti existu7it,
mediantibus
his primis,
proximae)
Facies totius universi.
(?)
Idea Dei in cogitatione.
C. Res singular es quae finitae sunt.
There would
the numerically infinite
This matter ii.
is
Zeitschr. filr
Halle, 1863)
which
;
modes answering to these in each of Attributes to us unknown. and ably discussed by Ed. Bohmer [Spinozana
also in theory be
fully
Philosophie
phnlos.
Kritik, vol.
seems
to
42,
his results agree to a considerable extent
He
I had arrived before seeing his work.
totius universi " to cover as it
u.
Thought
as
well
me, doubtful interpretation.
as
pp.
107- 116,
with mine,
at
takes Spinoza's " facies
Extension
:
a possible but,
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
CHAPTER
VI
BODY AND MIND Pensiti aver tu solo provvidenza,
E Le
'1
ciel, la terra, e
1'
altre cose belle,
quali sprezzi tu, starsene senza
Sciocco, d' onde
Dunque
Mai
ci e
se'
nato tu
senno
e
Muta
Dio.
contrasta a chi guida
si
rj
kolvov dei vbixov ev
sentenza.
le stelle.
dWo
0VT6 ^poToh yepas 0VTâ&#x201A;Ź deols
?
da quelle,
?
Campanella,
tl fiel'^ov
diKj) vfxveiv.
Cleanthes, Hymn
Our
sooner begin to reflect upon is
a
We
not single but double.
and space is
Zeus.
But
experience manifests to us a series of events in time.
we no series
to
as if
we find commonly speak than
it
they were on exactly the same footing
distinction
of some
j
that the
of time yet there
Whatever happens
importance.
in
space can be perceived by several observers at once, so far as the conditions admit of their being conveniently placed.
other hand, every one of us
On
the
aware of an immense number of
is
events which can be perceived by nobody but himself, namely, his
own
thoughts and
feelings.
When
I
move my hand
to
write on this paper the motion can be seen by another person in the
room
full as
well as by myself.
of his experience as of mine.
But
The
my
event will
as
is
much
a part
and sensations that
accompany the act belong to me and to my experience alone. My companion can see my fingers on the pen, but he cannot he can follow feel the pressure which the pen exerts on them He can the movements, but not the desires which direct them. form a notion of my feelings only by inference from what his N ;
AND PHILOSOPHY
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
178
own
feelings
have
been
experience of them
we
If
desire
are in this sense
Each of
unknowable
feelings of
mental
or
;
What
is
what
is
which he can share with
known by inward experience we known by outward experience It
even more familiar to
discuss
connexion.
It
mind,
call
named
is
not needful at present to consider
is
how
language of modern philosophers,
the
in
knowledge
m
the
problems
may
be observed, however, that the distinction
of
reflective
of subject and object, being given
knowledge, must
any case be
in
between mind and matter, already set forth in the
ultimate fact, and
The
any one mind
with the distinction of Subject and Object, which
far this coincides
nor
a
world of inner experience reserved to himself
us has a
matter, or material.
is
find
every other mind.
for
alone, and a world of outer experience
other men.
immediate
his reach.
by saying that the
it
;
word unknowable^ we may
the
use
to
harmless use for
wholly beyond
is
circumstances
similar
in
distinction in
and mankind, taking
immediately in the act of
real
whereas the distinction
;
there be any validity in the reasons
if
chapter,
last
a fact at
is
this
far
from being an
only in a qualified sense.
all
human
very
is
however quite real the measure of existence,
experience
their experience as
is
;
have conceived the world of mind and the world of matter
two sharply defined
regions set over against one another.
as
But
the same experience which suggested the division also shows us a
constant connexion.
my
The
feelings
which
I
cannot show to
fellow-man in any but a symbolic and representative manner,
namely, by signs
that he
feelings, are paired
experience.
bridged.
How
The bridge
exercised philosophers of failed
interpret
all
gulf is
between
possible
ages
terms
of his
own
;
and
is
all
a
two worlds is problem which has the
their endeavours
have
so long as they have not perceived that the gulf itself
own thought. It is how mind acts upon
the creature of our task
in
with outward events which are parcel of our
common
the
can
to inquire
mind. have no
We
an irrational and hopeless matter,
are trying to find a relation
common
measure.
The
is
or
matter
upon
between things which
strength of an emotion cannot
be expressed in foot-pounds, nor will our sensations of
warmth
BODY AND MIND
179
help us to fix the mechanical equivalent of heat.
must give up the problem
as
another mystery to explain
common way which
founded
it is
The
of stating is
it
invent
say plainly that the
also.
saw the
of mind and
difficulty,
matter
The
as
but
entities
held
still
or
to
substances
notion of mutual action was very
not quite, rejected by Descartes.
but
nearly,
we must
we
wrong, and that the distinction on
wrong
distinct in themselves.
we must
or
it,
is
Cartesian school
the conception
mystery, or
a
Either
He
supposed a
by means of the "animal spirits," the soul being able to change the direction though not the amount of their motion. His followers went further, and devised the theory of Occasional Causes, first propounded in its completeness
communication
The
by Arnold Geulinx.
correspondence of body and mind was
kept up at every instant by a special operation of God's power.
on the immaterial mind, but was the occasion of God's producing in the mind the This was nothing else than sensations of light and heat. and the Cartesians not only postulating a perpetual' miracle admitted as much, but made it a reason for recommending the Material
no
could have
fire
of
effect
itself
,
Leibnitz put forward a simpler but not
opinion.
arbitrary
less
His famous doctrine of Pre-established Harmony,
supposition.
mind and matter to two clocks constructed with absolute perfection of mechanism and set going at the same rate, so that, while each goes inas applied to this particular question, likens
The
dependently of the other, they keep exact time together.
metaphor of the two clocks
also
is
found in Cartesian literature
and we might perhaps liken the communication ^
note
Editor's
Cartesienne,
the
and
systeme et
i.
to
que
comme
si
ed.).
activities
of
With the
bodily
que
ames
les
organism
comme
et
simili
industria
Ethics (ap. Bouillier,
meram
constitutum
Hist, dc
la
est."
Philosophic
is a universal harmony between monads or " simple substances " which harmony the correspondence between the
Leibnitz there
this
" Ce Monadologie, §§ 78-81. (par impossible) il n'y avoit point d'ames,
particular
comme
s'il
I'un influoit sur I'autre."
automaton.*'
a
is
corps agissent
agissent
arte
infinite
Of
the sentient universe. the
fait
les
eadem
ab
Geulinx's posthumous
305, 3rd
independent
make up soul
through the
" Sicut duobus horologiis rite inter se et ad solis cursum quadratis propter
dependentiam qua utrumque
^ ;
si
case:
n'y avoit point de corps, et que tons deux agissent Leibnitz, like Spinoza, calls the
[Theodic. § 403, and elsewhere.)
mind
a " spiritual
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
i8o
" animal
which
spirits "
AND PHILOSOPHY
admitted
is
theory to an electrical connexion such as a
number of
is
Cartesian
earHer
the
in
now
used to regulate
clocks by a standard timekeeper.
Spinoza's psychology takes the same view of the facts
but in-
;
stead of seeking an artificial explanation for the correspondence of
two such different things as body and mind, he boldly says that they are the same thing, and differ only as aspects. Their parallelism and mutual independence
To
fact.
ask
is
why mind
thus not a mystery but an elementary
should correspond with matter
like
is
why the convexity of a curve should answer to the concavity. Let us now proceed to consider Spinoza's work more in detail, giving to the reader who may not be acquainted with it the
asking
warning that the second Part of the Ethics is very difficult in form, and that many of the propositions become clear only by repeated consideration. The preliminaries however are less formidable in appearance than those of the first part, and we need not dwell much upon them. The specific assumptions as to the " nature of man are simple appeals to common experience.^ thinks " ; " we are aware of a particular body " that is, each is
aware of
—
—
own body " as affected nor have we perceptions,
his
not aware,
in
modes of thought."
besides bodies and
themselves, and
from external
its
"
;
man we are
of any individual things
Some
are introduced at a later stage (after Prop.
composite nature of the
"
many ways
Man
human frame and
further postulates
13) concerning the the
component
parts
powers of acting on and receiving impressions
bodies.
The human
mind, or
man
as a
thinking being,
thought, and "part of the infinite intellect of
a
is
God"
mode of
(Prop.
11,
As such
it must have its correlate or "object" in same reality of Substance is expressed in extenextension ; This object is nothing else than the human sion as in thought. 2 body, the existence of which is made known to us by our experi-
CorolL).
for the
1
Spinoza
himself attaches some
postulata vix quicquam continent quod dubitare." 2
This
— Prop.
Prop. 7. difficulty,
importance to
this
:
" Omnia
ilia
quae sumpsi
non constet experientia de qua nobis non
licet
17, Schol.
What which
becomes of the corresponding modes of the other Attributes? is
insoluble
on Spinoza's principle of equal co-ordination, has
already been discussed in the last chapter.
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; BODY AND MIND ence of
its
At
affections (Prop. 13).
note of
this point occurs a
great importance, the substance of which
own words
i8i
is
best given in Spinoza's
:
Hence we
understand, not only that the
the body, but what
can understand
this
is
to
be understood by
human mind this
But no one
union.
adequately or distinctly unless he
united to
is
first
has adequate
knowledge of the nature of our body. For the propositions hitherto established are very general, and apply no more to man than to all other individual things ; which indeed are all endowed with mind, though in various degrees. For of every thing soever there is necessarily in
God
an idea, whereof
God
is
manner
the cause, in like
as
there
is
human body and thus whatever we have said of the human body must also be said of the idea of everything else. At the same time we cannot deny that ideas differ among themselves as their objects do [the relations among modes of thought are parallel to those among the corresponding modes of extension] and that an idea of the
;
idea of the
more excellent than another, and comprehends more reality ; and therefore in order to determine wherein the human mind differs one
is
from others, and nature of
its
here explain, nor
But
this
others in
how
it
excels them,
object, that
much
is it
I will
its fitness
for
is,
it
know
needful for us to
is
human body.
the
This however
my
necessary for the purpose of
I
the
cannot
demonstration.
more any body surpasses impressions, the more doth
generally say, that the
manifold actions or
mind surpass others in capacity for manifold perceptions and the more the actions of a given body depend upon itself alone, and the less other bodies concur with it in its actions, the more capable is its mind Hence we can obtain knowledge of the of distinct understanding. and moreover see why we have excellence of one mind above others its
;
;
but a very confused knowledge of our
own
body, and several other
matters which I shall in the sequel deduce from these principles.
There could not be
more
a
distinct or positive declaration of
the necessity that psychology, if
it
is
to be a serious branch of
go hand in hand with physiology, and verify its results, as far as possible, by physiological observation. Persons who describe Spinoza as a mere dogmatic metaphysician scientific inquiry, should
have obviously never read
as far as this
to Spinoza's consequences.
constituting the
One
human mind,
as
it
Scholium.
to proceed
first
is
that " the idea
in itself,
is
not simple, but
of the is
But
AND PHILOSOPHY
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
i82
compounded of very many
For the human mind is the idea, or correlate in thought, of an extended body which is known and every part of the body must have its to be very complex ideas."
;
corresponding idea
;
so that the
make up
the m^mifold parts that
mind
is
mind
complex precisely
as
is
composed of the
In other words, the
the body.
the body
is
ideas of
complex.
Here
at all
no metaphysical assumption in the popular sense of nothing about a soul, or an Ego, or a simple substance, the term We must complain of or an inward assurance of personality. events there
is
;
Spinoza,
we complain From this we
if
enough.
of
him
are led
at all, for
on
not being metaphysical
to the association of ideas, a
which Spinoza has anticipated not only the propositions down by modern psychologists, but the modern manner of
topic in laid
handling them.
The
perception of an external object
is
the state of
mind
corresponding to the modification of the bodily organism produced
by that object.
So long
the corresponding idea
;
as
that modification lasts, so long will
in other words, the external
perceived or thought of as present.
And
body will be
this will be repeated if
the parts of the organism concerned are again placed in the same
whether by the presence of the same object or by any Hence we may imagine things as present when other accident. Here likewise it is observed that our notion of an they are not. external body is a function of our own organism, and has more to disposition,
do with the nature of our own body than with that of the external Thus " we understand what is the difference between that one.
which constitutes the reality of Peter's own mind, For of Peter which is in another man, say in Paul.
idea of Peter
and the idea
the former directly answers to (explicat) the reality of Peter's
own
body, and does not imply existence except while Peter exists ; the latter indicates rather the disposition of PauPs body than the nature
of Peter^ and therefore while that disposition lasts Paul's mind, though Peter may not exist, will yet regard him as present to it." Spinoza
is
fully conscious in this
overworked term
idea
;
yet
place of his double use of the
elsewhere, as
we
pointed out in a
and in former chapter, he appears to mix up the two meanings a later proposition (Part 2, Pr. 32) the verbal confusion reaches ;
BODY AND MIND its
The
climax.
state
proposition amounts to saying that every mental
one sense
in
is
true^
inasmuch
as
is
in
itself
exist,
it
;
is
mind
If the
but also knows
as present,
to
further noted
not capable of error.
imagines a non-existent thing
But
really exists.
it
return to the passage immediately before us that imagination
183
not to
it
no error, but a pure activity of the imaginative Again, " if the human body has once been affected at
there
power.^
is
the same time by tv^o or
more
wards imagines any one of them,
This
others also."
^
Memory
defined as
is
mind afterthereupon remember the
will
it
"
An
mind according
affections of the
And hence we
human
association.
(concatenatio) of ideas
association
involving the nature of things outside the arises in the
the
memory and
the ground of
is
when
bodies, then
to the order
human
body, which
and association of the
body."
why
mind should upon the thought of one thing fall into the thought of another thing which hath no likeness with the first. As for example, from thinking upon the word pomufn a Roman will fall to thinking upon the fruit apple, which hath no likeness to that articulate sound, nor anything common
with
two
that
is,
that the
man
often heard the
the fruit itself; and thus every
another,
thereupon
soldier fall to
warfare and the horse
to
every
man
customed
man
word pomum when he saw
will fall from
one thought into
the habit of each has ordered the images of things in his
as
A
body.
the
save that the man's body has often been affected by these
it, ;
further understand
when he
sees the footprints of a horse in
like.
But
a
thinking of ploughs, fall
to
sand will
thinking of a horseman, and thence into thoughts of
farmer will fields,
fall
and the
from thinking of the like
;
and thus will been ac-
into this or that course of thought, as he has
join and associate
the ideas
of things in
this
or
that
manner.
This contains, though only in outline, all the essentials of the modern doctrine on the subject. Readers of Hobbes (who ought to
include
all
English-speaking
poHtical philosophy)
will
not
fail
people interested to
in
perceive that Spinoza had
studied and profited by his very similar exposition. 1
Prop. 17, Schol.
moral or
2
Prop. i8.
1
AND PHILOSOPHY
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
84
The
nature and limitations of
human knowledge
are
We
on the same psychological method.
further discussed
then
know
own
bodies only through our " ideas of the affections wherewith the body is affected " ; and we also have a reflective know-
our
ledge of these ideas, and this
is
mind
the most abstruse act of reflexion
has of
Even
itself.^
the mental operation
in
the only knowledge which the
accompanied by the material
is
changes in the organism
;
we cannot by any
effort
series
of
whatever
transcend the organic conditions of thought, for they are the other side of thought
All our perceptions of external
itself.
own body
things consist in perceptions of our
them
as
modified by
but this does not give us accurate knowledge of the con-
;
stitution either of our
own
bodies or of the objects affecting them.
For the things we actually perceive, whether due to the internal functions of our organism or to impressions on it from without, are but limited parts of extremely complex physical events extending far beyond our sentient organs. And on the whole, " the
human mind, whenever
it
perceives
things after the
common
order of nature, has not an adequate knowledge either of itself or
of
its
own
body, or of external bodies, but only a confused and
The mind
fragmentary one."
common
the
order of nature,"
is
said to
when
" perceive things
after
thoughts are determined
its
by external circumstances, which with regard to the mind may be called accidental, and not by its own operation of reasoning.
Hence we have but
a confused notion of the duration
either
own depends on the " common order of nature " ; and thus we regard all particular for to call a thing contingent things as contingent and perishable and perishable is as much as to say that we have no adequate knowledge of its duration. Error in general is explained as the privation of knowledge which accompanies inadequate or confused body or of external things,
of our
for this
-,
ideas.
For example,
freedom
;
scious of their ^
cf, p.
Eth.
ii.
men
are
mistaken
in
their opinion
which opinion consisteth only in
own
19-23.
126 above.
As
actions,
this,
of their
own
that they are con-
and ignorant of the causes whereby they
to Spinoza's peculiar
way
of stating the doctrine of " idea ideae,"
^
BODY AND MIND are determined.
185
So that their idea of freedom
nothing
is
else
than
knowing any cause of their actions. For when they say that human actions depend on the will, these are words for which they have no idea to answer them. What the will is, or how it moves the their not
all know nothing the pretensions of those who, know somewhat, devise houses and dwelling-places for the
body, thereof they feigning to
;
soul, are either ludicrous or disgusting.
Again, our
visual impression of the sun's apparent distance
not altered by knowledge of the
common
sort
not in the visual impression
is
ignorance that accompanies us,
The
real distance.
we know
not because
"We
it.
not
is
error of the
but in the
itself,
imagine the sun
as
near
true distance, but because the
its
present affection of our body involves the nature of the sun only in so far as the
same body
is
thereby affected."
It
to be ob-
is
served that imagination here stands for the acquired interpretations
of sensation which
tinguished from the sensation the representation of
many
their various associations in a finite
perceptions are not dis-
ordinary adult
in
itself,
but which really depend on
sensations experienced in the past and
The
and consequences.
mind, however, are in themselves
as
erroneous ideas necessary as the
On
true ones, being part of the general order of nature.
other hand there are ideas in the sarily adequate,
to
all
namely
ideas of those elements
all
mind will be fitted to perceive more them adequately, as its body has more :
are
common
it
a
bodies "
which
the
are neces-
from the objective side, to the " Hence it follows that bodies affecting it.
perceptions, or, taking
human body and
human mind which
in other words, the
things, and in
to
common
perceive
with other
power of gaining knowledge from
the outer world depends on the variety of the organs of sensation,
and their adaptation to the physical influences by which they can be affected; a conclusion which must be admitted as very just, whatever
we may
think of Spinoza's
In modern language,
position
his
statement that sensation
way of demonstrating
amounts
a function of the
is
to the
now
organism
it.
familiar
as affected
But the condition of the affected by some external body. organism does not necessarily resemble the condition of the 1
Prop. 35, Schol.
AND PHILOSOPHY
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
i86
affected body, except so far as they are both material systems in
which motion and
Thus
transferences of energy are going on.
neither our sensations nor the physical events in the organism
immediately correlated with them can be said in any proper sense to resemble the external objects and events indicated by them. Spinoza's argument seems to imply further that
adequate idea of matter and motion principles
the
-,
for these are
common
only constituents
to
men
all
on
have an
his physical
This
bodies.
all
appears to be another consequence of the ambiguous use of the
word " idea." That which is feeling in sense, would be to the outward sense,
or to the inward
itself,
if
were
it
accessible,
a
motions in a material organism. And motion, as such, everywhere the same, whether occurring in the organism or
series of is
outside
But
no farther as to the correctness of the information we derive from our senses concerning the outer world, much less of the conceptions of matter and motion which we may form by reflexion on our experience. Because my idea, it.
this carries
us
in the general sense of mental state, corresponds exactly to a series
of physical events in
my
an adequate
the sense of a consciously held conception,
when
idea, in
I try to
directly
know
brain,
it
follows not that I shall frame
think what matter and motion is
a state of
my own
feeling.
are. It
long course of education and experiment that
I
is
All that I can
only through a
can interpret any
such state in terms of other people's possible feelings, words, proceed from condition of
my own
it
to a statement about the
or, in
other
accompanying
organs or the dispositions of external bodies
determining that condition. Spinoza, however, does not here explain what are the notions
common to all men, or the secondary maxims deducible from them. He refers us for all this to another treatise, probably the unfinished work on the Amendment of the Understanding, of which an account has already been given, and he goes on explanation of universals.^
The
to his
limited resources of our organism
permit us to form only a limited number of images.
There
is
a
point beyond which our senses become incapable of perceiving
minute differences
;
the various organs of the ^
Prop. 40, Schol.
2.
human
body, with
BODY AND MIND
delicacy of adaptation, are but rough instruments to observe
all its
the
boundless variety of nature
in form,
is
ology.
The
confirmed to the
full
overlapping and
by the
number member
of all
human
is
We
may
observe
of modern physi-
results
many
per-
similar
them beget our generic or
have seen,
beings in the course of
example, a great
for life,
and cannot
re-
the differences of stature, complexion, features, and
other matters.
Every one
distinct impression
carries
a
though not very
strong
of the points in which
or
all
most of the
perceptions have agreed, and the aggregate of these
several
in
here partly modernized
confusion of
ceptions and the representations of so-called universal notions.
We
w^ithal.
passing that Spinoza's statement, which
called
187
by the generic name of
Thus one man's
rnan.
ideas are not exactly like another's
;
is
general
they depend in each case on
the individual's aptitude for perceiving and remembering this or
common
that
feature in a multitude of objects.
grapher's idea of diamond
is
different
The
crystallo-
from the chemist's, and that
again from the jeweller's.
Those who have often admired the stature of men understand by the name of man an animal of upright stature ; while those who are accustomed to consider some other attribute will form some other general imagination of men, as, that man is an animal capable of laughter, two-legged, without feathers, or rational
and thus
;
in other
cases every one will form universal images of things after the habit of his body.
arisen
Wherefore
among
it is
philosophers,
no wonder that
so
many
who have been minded
controversies have
to explain things as
they are in nature by mere images of things.^
This
The
first
leads is
to a classification of
knowledge
opinion or imagination, proceeding from one's
confused experience or the report of others.
In
this class are
own now
and second kinds of knowledge which we met
included the
first
with in the
treatise
(p.
in three degrees.
on the Amendment of the Understanding
19 above). The second or reasonable kind 1
common
is
obtained by the possession of
notions (which are necessarily adequate) and adequate
ideas of particular properties of things. 1
Prop. 40, Schol.
I.
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE AND PHILOSOPHY
i88
The
third, or intuitive kind,
"proceeds from an adequate idea
of the absolute nature of some attribute of
knowledge of the nature of things." that 6
to 3 as
is
2 to
to an adequate
Our immediate
given as an instance of
is
I
God
formidable language of the general statement
is
it
perception ;
but the
not otherwise
explained.
Knowledge of
the
first
kind
is
precarious
;
the second and
and are our only means of distinguishing Then comes the proposition as to the ultimate
third kinds are certain,
truth from error. test
of truth which
The
we have
cited in a foregoing chapter (p. I2i).
of the second Part of the Ethics is mainly devoted to working out the theory of determinism. " It is of the nature of rest
reason to consider things not as contingent, but as necessary it is
the
work of the imagination
and our notion of contingency
to regard
arises
them
:
"
^
as contingent,
from the confusion of many
somewhat the same way that general notions arise from the confused impression of many particular experiences. Let a child on a given day see Peter in the morning, Paul at noon, and Simon in the evening then at the beginning of the next day he will expect the day to run its course, and will also expect, if nothing occurs to counteract it, the sight of Peter, Paul, and Simon to be repeated in the same order and the expectation will But if one be strengthened by repetition of the experience.
associations, in
;
;
evening James comes instead of Simon, the next morning's expectations of evening will bring with it conflicting images of
Simon and James. For the boy
is
assumed
to
have seen
at
eventide only one or the
With the coming eventide he will other of them, not both together. imagine now the one, now the other ; that is, he will imagine neither of them
as
certainly, but both as contingently about to be present.
Moreover the wavering of the imagination will be the same if imagination of things which
we
consider in the same
it is
an
manner with
reference to time past or present, and accordingly we may equally regard things as contingent, whether they be referred to a time present, past, or future.
^
Prop. 44.
BODY AND MIND This passage suggests
that determlnists
189
may
turn the tables
on the maintainers of free-will in its popular sense of causeless choice by their own favourite device of an appeal to the common use
of language.
It
is
said
that
determinism
reduces
to
an
absurdity our ordinary feeHngs and forms of speech with regard to future events
but
:
it
is
we
overlooked that
habitually apply the
very same feelings or forms of speech to events which at the time are unquestionably determined.
know
Nay, we may
of the conceivable determinations
While we await result of
the one that has occurred.
the disclosure of a parliamentary division
list,
the
hundred
arrival in a distant country, or a
friend's
other things no
less easily called to
hope, and fear are but is
is
know which
do not
an examination, the return of casualties in an action, the
account of a
itself
we
that they are determined, so long as
believe or positively
little
already decided
\
mind, our emotions of curiosity,
allayed by the thought that the matter
of those emotions
for the source
is
not in
we wonder, speculate, what we shall do in this
the facts but in our ignorance of them, and
and form provisional imaginations of or that event, just as if the event were familiar language
we do
In
in the future.
not hesitate to couple hope or fear with
the present and even the past tense.
"
still
"
hope you have enjoyed
I
you have got wet " it were mere pedantry to Again, the historian who replace these by more accurate phrases. investigates the actions and motives of men in the transactions of a past made obscure by distance, by the conflict of evidence, by the flattering or violence of partisans, or by the machinations of yourself"
;
wrongdoers,
I fear
is
:
constantly driven to deal in surmise, contingency,
and conjecture.
Probably, he will say, this was the course of
was perhaps the reason
events
;
this
action
;
possibly this
commonly
is
complete explanation
such or such a singular
received account
standing the difliculties attaching to confess (unless he
for
it
;
true,
is
now and
then he will
a historian of the confident sort, for
notwith-
who
has a
everything) that with his existing means
of information he can only suspend his judgment.
All statements
of this kind are statements about our imperfect knowledge of matters which in truth have been settled once for that events happened
somehow and
are past
all.
we know
;
The the
fact
manner
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
190 of
it
we
Yet we
do not know.
uncertain, finding
it
AND PHILOSOPHY constantly speak of
and indeed necessary to do
useful
them
as
We
so.
example, that Alcibiades was possibly concerned in the
say, for
mutilation of the Hermae, though
it is
most certain that either he
was or he was not.
There
does not appear to be anything in the nature of reason
or of language that should compel one to suppose the notion of
contingency it
be anything else than what
as regards future events to
undoubtedly
is
as
regards past and present events
;
that
is
to
imposed on us by our limited means of knowledge. hope and fear, not because the events are uncertain, but
say, a fiction
We
because
we
are uncertain
nor would a general belief that future
;
events are as certain as past ones, at least the expectations or conduct of
Assuredly little
mankind
if intelligently held, alter
for
any practical purpose.
does not lead to the indifference of fatalism
it
consideration will
show
:
for a
that fatalism consists, not in believing
events to be the definite results of definite conditions, but in
all
holding that the course of events
is
overruled by an
arbitrary
power which so constantly baffles all man's forethought as to make Philosophical it not worth while to take thought for the future. determinism
accordance with
men is
is
among
The
the opposite of this.
is
common
experience, that the deliberate action of
the conditions that shape the course of events, and If particular
men
own
acts
or
a condition too, and
its
often the most important condition.
societies
fooHsh
are
omissions count for
enough
to
think
nothing, that
is
that
their
short, if only
one
applies
it
thoroughly, leaves
For
exactly where they were.
life
nowise arbitrary.
But
the complex
For
is
the sense of power
the
or
in
common
part, I
hold
determined and involved in the
none the less pleasurable for that. schoolboy who runs, leaps, or swims knows mighty little of
conscious exercise of choice
The
all
my own
that the choice I exercise in writing these lines in
Determinism,
be greatly to their disadvantage.
results will
uses of
determinist holds, in
all
teachers
mechanism
is
that governs every action of his body.
that English schoolboys could learn from their appointed till
within a few years
past,
acted immediately on his hands and
he might fancy that his will feet.
The
student of riper
BODY AND MIND who
years is
not
191
seeks recreation in active exercise well
He
so.
is
aware that he cannot
knows
from the ground,
his foot
lift
that this
or adjust the balance of his oar, or shift the grasp of his ice-axe,
without calling into play an apparatus exceeding in its intricate variety the staff and transport of a modern army. He knows that innumerable
must work harmoniously together
parts
several functions to produce the desired motion.
delight of putting forth strength or skill
than in the boy. observation.
But perhaps
common it
This,
know much
I
a
why
not
it
Yet
the physical
less
in
man of common
matter
is
the
should be otherwise in the mind.
shorter answer should sufficiently
objection that determinism robs
life
of
number of
the experience of a reasonable
is
body,
as regards the
no
is
their
in
meet the
interest
its
for
;
who hold other men to
persons
who are not less competent than bear witness to their own feelings, that it does nothing of the sort. In any case, it is time to return to Spinoza's own exposition. The mind, he says, is a particular and determined mode of
the doctrine, and
thought, and
power of
volition.
which
itself is
The
without end.^
among them,
Its
state
we may
so-called faculty
cause,
can have no absolute or
such
as
refer
given moment, to whatever
a
at
the effect of
is
it,
unconditioned
some
definite
the effect of a preceding cause, and so on
supposed faculties of the mind, and the will
are abstract terms having a merely verbal existence.
" Understanding and
will
have
same
the
relation
to
this
and
that idea, or this and that voHtion, as lapideity to this and that
man
stone, or
Spinoza does not mean to
Peter and Paul."
to
say that the desire which begets will fact.
How
explains that as,
in
he
treats
desire
the abstract, a faculty, or,
This appears
to a
of his
It
case.
modern
is
sense as including
we
not a real and individual see
shall
from
desire,
the
in
should
later
and regards
concrete,
now
say, of
Eth.
all
if
we
48.
it
an act of
judgment.
take idea in Spinoza's larger
states of consciousness,
' ii.
he
coupled with the doctrine that every idea
is
a paradox,
take idea in the restricted sense of conception, 1
here
\
reader to be a needless comphcation
involves a judgment,^ which,
we
we
he distinguishes will
affirmation or negation, or, as
is
still
Prop. 49, and Schol.
and
if
remains
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; SPINOZA
192
:
HIS LIFE
of digestion.
difficult
Spinoza gives
an example of a volition.
Most
the
that
people w^ould deny that there
volition concerned in such a
is
What
judgment.
Spinoza's choice of such an example
mind
the affirmation
of a triangle are together equal to two right angles
angles
any
AND PHILOSOPHY
is
that
in
is
his
as is
implied in
view the
quite as active in the formation of a necessary inference
on one conclusion or course of action out of several which may appear plausible. And whoever admits this cannot well refuse the corollary that " will and understanding are one and the same." In like manner perception is inseparable from judgment: to perceive a winged horse is to affirm that a horse has wings. So long as a winged horse or anything else is present to the imagination, and no other perception is present which as in fixing
contradicts object.
its
This
imagination is
made
we we
have
is
reality, is
the
we
shall believe in the real existence
common
experience of dreams,
And
active and unchecked.
of the
when
the
thus, if the objection
that will differs in nature from understanding, because it
in our free choice to suspend our
shall or shall
to reality, the
judgment whether
not assent to a given perception
answer
is
that
what we
call
as
corresponding
suspense of judgment
our consciousness that the given perception is inadequate ; in other words, it is itself a perception and belongs to the intellect. is
must be confessed, is a rather barren discussion, and at this day serves chiefly to show with what poverty of language, both in extent and in definition, psychology had to labour in But the manner in which he explains the Spinoza's time. strength of the common notions as to the relation of mind and All
this, it
body, of which the popular doctrine of free-will is really parcel, It occurs in a later place,^ but it will be is of lasting interest.
convenient
to
translate
part
of
it
here.
After
giving
as
a
separate proposition the doctrine that the body can give rise to
no operation of thought in the mind, nor the mind to any phenomenon of motion or otherwise in the body, he proceeds to the difficulties of common sense on the subject :
I scarce
ence
that
believe, until I shall have assured myself of
men
can be brought 1
Etk.
to iii.
it
by experi-
consider this matter impartially 2, Schol,
:
BODY AND MIND so firmly are they persuaded that
mind
193
from the mere decree of the
'tis
now move, now
and perform much from the pure will and faculty of invention in the mind. Certainly no man hath yet determined what are the powers of the body I mean that none has yet learnt from experience what the that their bodies
are at rest,
else that flows
:
body may perform by mere laws of nature, considering it only as a material thing, and what it cannot do without the mind's determination of it. For nobody has known as yet the frame of the body so thoroughly
much
as to
explain
all
noted which doth
is
its
operations
far surpass
;
not to say that in brutes
human cunning, and
that
men
walking in their sleep often perform, so sleeping, that which they would never dare waking ; which is proof enough that the body may, merely by the laws of its own constitution, do much that its own
mind is amazed at. Again, there is none can tell how and in what manner the mind moves the body, what measure of motion it can impart
to
To
it,
or with
what
as to
its
cuts both ways.
is
the
mind
its
particular
of the body
action
is
only a grudging confession of ignorance
is
As
real cause.
it
in
that a
say, therefore,
caused by the mind
velocity.
common
for the appeal to
If the
body
is
helpless
experience,
without the mind, so
subject to be disabled by sleep, and otherwise limited
operation
by bodily conditions.
If
it
be said that the
existence of material works of art, such as houses, pictures, and
on the supposition that the human body is governed only by the physical laws of its constitution, and that the body could never perform such feats if it were not
statues,
is
inexplicable
guided by the mind
knows not what
the answer
;
is,
as before,
that the objector
the powers of the body really are.
human body itself human art. Men
is
infinitely
say
absolute power of the
more
artificial
than any work of
they have experience that
mind
Moreover, the in
the
either to speak or to keep silence,
and
it
is
which Spinoza replies that if it were indeed as much in man's power to be silent as to speak, the world would be much The argument is a little more fully illustrated in a letter happier. (Ep. 58), which is partly identical with the passage in hand. the hke
;
to
I call a thing free if
laws of
its
own
it
exists
and acts merely from the necessary
nature, but constrained if
O
it is
determined by something
;
SPINOZA
194
and act
else to exist
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
:
in a certain determinate
Thus God
way.
exists
necessarily, and yet freely, because he exists
own
So
nature alone.
thing else, because
make freedom necessity.
.
You
then that
see
I
not in a free decision of the will, but in free
consist .
.
Imagine,
freely
must understand everything.
that he
nature
it
by the necessity of his understands himself and everyfollows solely from the necessity of his own
God
you can, that a stone, while its motion continues, is conscious, and knows that so far as it can it endeavours to persist in its motion. This stone, since it is conscious only of its own endeavour and deeply interested therein {minime in differens) will believe that it is if
^
perfectly free and continues in motion for no other reason than that so wills.
Now
such
boasts of possessing,
it
freedom of man's will which every one and which consists only in this, that men are is
this
aware of their own desires and ignorant of the causes by which those desires are determined. free
So an infant thinks
so a child in anger thinks his will
;
for revenge, in fear that
is
it is
Again, a drunkard thinks he speaks of his free will things
for flight.
when
which,
is
appetite for milk
his
sober, he
That which we correlated,
or
would
call
rather
fain not
have spoken.
choice in the mind
with
identical,
is
in truth
some determined
exactly physical
must be conceded that our freedom of action depends on memory we must remember a particular event in the body.
Again,
it
;
word,
for
example, before
and memory
is
we
can will to speak or not to speak
not subject to the
will.
At
best, therefore, the
power of volition can be exercised only within the by the range of memory.
alleged fixed
it
limits
But when we dream of speaking, we believe ourselves to speak from mind, and yet we speak not, or if we do, it is by an independent motion of the body. We dream, again, of doing by the like and hereon decision sundry things which as waking men we dare not in the mind know if there be two of sorts decisions, fain the would I one merely fantastic and the other truly free. But if we choose not to go that length in folly, it must needs be allowed that this decision of the mind which is believed to be free is not in truth distinguishable from the imagination or memory preceding it, and is nothing else than that affirmation which an idea, insomuch as it is an idea, doth of necesa free decision of the
;
sity include.
So that these decisions of the mind
arise therein
by the
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; BODY AND MIND same necessity
as
195
And
ideas of really existing things.
its
they
who
believe themselves to speak or keep silence or do aught else by the free
men dreaming with
decision of their minds are
So ends
their eyes open.
and
uncompromising exposition, too clear to need much commentary. Spinoza seems to assume rather confidently that no advocate of free-w^ill v^^ould go
which
characteristic
this
is
so far as to maintain that there
As
faculty in dreaming. it is
a real operation of that excellent
a matter of pure psychological
But know, maintained on
not easy to see what should prevent
free-will tific
is
never, so far as
is
footing
:
it
I
always rested,
is
supposed necessity of having bility.
it
at
the doctrine of
it.
in
least
argument,
a purely scien-
great part, on the
foundation of moral responsi-
as a
Therefore a disputant who, defending free-will on the
usual grounds, should assert that free-will
dreams, would find himself in an
awkward
is
really exercised
position.
in
For he must
admit either that free-will and moral responsibility are not inseparable, or that we are morally responsible for all the crimes and follies
which the
best and wisest of us, as
shows, are
liable to
commit
in
common
our dreams.
experience abundantly
The
alternative
first
deprives the volitionist of his principal interest in his cause
second
is
too repugnant to
common
;
the
sense to be entertained, though
something not unlike it was held by St. Augustine. Let us return to the conclusion of the Second Part of the Ethics^ where Spinoza sets forth the advantages of the philosophical It gives a marked foretaste of the manner doctrine of necessity. in
which the
practical side of his teaching coincides with that of
man through
the Stoics.
The
his intimate
union with the whole nature of things
attainment of happiness by
;
realizing
the distinction
our power and things not in our power
between things
in
avoidance of
disturbing passions, and the performance of social
duties
from
all
rational
desire
for
the
points occur in the paragraph I shall
common good now translate,
:
all
and
;
the
these all
are
not only present but conspicuous in the Stoic theory of morals. Spinoza's words are as follows It
remains to show
knowledge of considerations.
this
:
how much
doctrine,
is
gained for the uses of
which we
shall easily perceive
life
by the
from these
SPINOZA
196
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
:
we
by the decree of God, and arc partakers of the divine nature, and that in proportion as we are more perfect in our actions and more advanced in the understanding of GodÂť Wherefore this doctrine, besides that it begets an absolute content in First, it teaches us that
the mind, excels also in
act only
this, that
teaches us wherein our highest
it
that is, in the knowledge of which leadeth us to do only such things as be commended by love and duty. Hence we clearly understand how far they go astray from a right judgment of virtue who look to be illustrated by God with extreme rewards for virtue and perfect actions, as for some extreme hardship of service as if virtue and the service of God were not themselves very happiness and the extreme height of freedom.
happiness or blessedness doth consist
God
;
only,
;
Secondly,
how
teaches us
it
concerning the
to carry ourselves as
of fortune or things which are not in our power,
gifts
things as depend not on our
own
nature
;
that
is,
I
we
that
mean such should with
an equal mind await and bear either countenance of fortune, seeing
God
that all things follow from the eternal ordinance of
necessity
whereby
it
with the same
follows from the nature of a triangle that
three
its
angles are equal to two right angles.
Thirdly,
this
doctrine
teaches us to hold no
be angered or envious
man
every
bour
good
is
man at
for civil conversation,
in hatred,
any one.
insomuch
as it
contempt, or derision, and not to Further, because
should be content with his
own and
it
teaches that
helpful to his neigh-
not from womanish pity, favour, or superstition, but merely at
;
the bidding of reason, according to the time and matter, as I shall
show
in the third part.^
Lastly, this doctrine that
it
shows
how
make them do
And
best.
is
of no small profit for the commonwealth in
citizens are to be governed
service, but to cause
herewith
in this Scholium,
and
I
them
to
and
make an end of
this
not to
is,
do freely whatsoever
have finished that of which
so I
led, that
I
is
purposed to treat
our second part
;
con-
ceiving that therein I have explained the nature and qualities of the
human mind thing admits sions
may
at sufficient length, ;
and
as clearly as
and that from that which
I
the difhculty of the
have delivered
many
conclu-
be drawn of excellent use and very necessary to be known,
as
in the sequel shall partly appear.
With 1
Or
the second book of the Ethics the general part, as
rather the fourth.
parts of the Ethics
It appears
from Spinoza's
were originally meant to form one.
letters that the third
we
and fourth,
BODY AND MIND may
call it,
197
The
of Spinoza's philosophy comes to an end.
rest
concerned with the appHcation to definite problems of the principles already laid out. Before we pass on to these we cannot but notice the one extraordinary defect which is conspicuous in
is
Spinoza's psychology.
psychologist nowadays
One is
of the
we
things
first
expect from a
a systematic account of the processes or
But Spinoza does not appear
perception and knowledge.
to have
any theory of perception at all. He assumes, as we all assume, that there is some kind of correspondence between sensations in consciousness and things in the external world. But of the nature
We
of that correspondence he has very Httle to say.
find the
important proposition, which had already been given by Descartes, that sensation, being
function of the organism, depends not
a
simply on the external object, but on the organism the object
;
we
to be derived
any
What
:
is
is
First, the
?
The
omission
aim of Spinoza's
not to give a complete system of philosophy or psychology,
but to show the
way
to
introduction, elaborate as
human it
The
happiness.
appears,
is
They were
philosophical
subordinate to the ethical
Next, these questions were not prominent
purpose. time.
do not find, how-
Knowledge
be ascribed to several reasons.
treatise
We
problems which are started by
explicit handling of the
the old Platonic question
may
by
find also a marked appreciation of the advantages from studying the phenomena of sensation and
thought under their physiological aspect. ever,
as affected
in Spinoza's
put in the front rank of discussion by Locke,
contemporary
by birth, but in philosophy standing wholly apart from him and belonging to another generation. And I conceive that the psychological problem of knowledge was obscured to Spinoza's own mind by that ambiguous and distracting Spinoza's
use of the noticed.
word
Not
idea
which has already been more than once
that his metaphysical principles are in themselves
unable to furnish means of dealing with the problem contrary they very
when
much
simplify
considered in the usual way,
is
it.
The
that there
in
my
is
to say exactly what, and thereupon I
between Something
a relation
may or may Can my see.
optic nerves, physiology
on the
puzzle of sensation,
the heterogeneous terms of consciousness and motion.
happens
:
not be able sensation of
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
198
AND PHILOSOPHY
sight be said to resemble the thing seen, or the images retinae, or the
motions in the optic nerves, and
These questions
are essentially insoluble
on the
if so, in
on my two what sense ?
common
supposition
mind are distinct substances or orders in nature. If body and mind are really the same thing, the knot is cut, or rather vanishes. The problem of making a connexion between the inner and the outer series of phenomena becomes a purely that body and
no longer a metaphysical paradox, but the combination of two methods of observing the same facts, or facts belonging to the same order and the science of physiological psychology can justify itself on philosophical grounds, besides making good its claims by the practical test of results. But the
scientific one.
It is
:
people
who
cry materialism at everything they disagree with or
cannot understand will doubtless cry out that
And
they are very welcome to any good
it
this also
is
materialism.
can do them.
CHAPTER
VII
THE NATURE OF MAN Behold,
I
show you
truth
Lower than
!
Higher than heaven, outside the utmost
Brahm
Farther than
hell,
stars,
doth dwell,
Before beginning, and without an end.
As
space eternal and as surety sure.
Is fixed a
Only
power divine which moves
its
to good.
laws endure.
Out of the dark it wrought the heart of man, Out of dull shells the pheasant's pencilled neck Ever
at toil,
it
j
brings to loveliness
All ancient wrath and wreck.
It slayeth
and
it
saveth, nowise
moved
Except unto the working out of doom Its threads are
The
Love and
shuttles of
its
Life
j
;
and Death and Pain
loom.
Edwin Arnold, The Light of Asia.
Spinoza's
inquiry
Third Part of the
concerning Ethics^
is
the
Passions,
which forms the
best introduced in his
own
words.
THE PREFACE Most of those who have writ concerning the way of life appear as if they handled not such
passions
and man's
things as belong to
common laws, but things outside nature ; insoman to be in nature as a kingdom within a kingdom. For they suppose that man rather confounds than follows the order of nature, and has an absolute power over his own actions, nature, and follow her
much
that they conceive
being no otherwise determined than by himself.
As concerning men's
weakness and unsteadfastness, they attribute these not
to the
common
;
SPINOZA
200
power of
:
HIS LIFE
AND PHILOSOPHY
some defect in the nature of man which therefore they bewail, mock, despise, or (which for the most part happens) vituperate and he passes for the best prophet who can most eloquently and shrewdly rebuke the human mind for its weakness. Not that most renowned authors have been wanting (to whose labour and ingenuity we do confess ourselves much indebted) who have nature, but to
;
;
written
much and
way of
excellently on the right
life,
and have given
But none of these, to my knowledge, hath determined the nature and strength of the passions, or what on the other part the mind can do in restraining them. I well
mankind precepts
to
know
full
of wisdom.
that the admirable Descartes (though he supposed the
have an absolute power over
its
own
actions) yet
mind
to
endeavoured both to
human passions by their immediate causes, and to show the whereby the mind could come to a perfect mastery thereof. road But, in my judgment, he hath shown nothing but the exceeding sharpness of his own wit, as I shall prove in the fitting place. But to return to those who choose rather to abhor or deride the passions and this sort will no doubt be actions of men than to understand them amazed that I go about to treat of human defects and follies after the geometrical manner,"and would fain demonstrate by certain reasoning explain
;
that which, as they so loudly protest,
But such
and abominable.
is
my
is
against
way.
all
reason, idle, absurd,
Nothing happens
that can be ascribed to a defect of nature
;
for nature
is
in nature
always and
everywhere one and the same, and her virtue and power of operation is
the same
all
things
:
that
are
is,
the laws and rules of nature, according to
made and change from one form
everywhere and always the same
;
into
which
another,
are
and therefore there should be but one
and the same way of understanding things of whatsoever kind, to wit, by Thus the passions of hatred, the universal laws and rules of nature. when considered in themselves, follow from the anger, envy and the like, and like necessity and virtue of nature as all other individual things accordingly they obey fixed causes, whereby they may be understood, and have their fixed properties, equally worthy of our knowledge as the properties of any other thing in the mere contemplation whereof ;
we
take delight.
I shall
treat therefore of the nature
the passions, and the power of the
method and
I
if the
as I
shall
have treated of consider
human
God and
and strength of
mind over them, by the same mind in the foregoing parts
the
actions and desires after the
same
inquiry were concerned with lines, surfaces, or solids.
sort as
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; THE NATURE OF MAN This passage throws
among
light,
201
other things, on the true
significance of Spinoza's geometrical method.
It
not that he
is
thinks the geometrical method of exposition an infallible engine
of discovery
human
of
but he
;
determined to conduct the investigation
is
nature in a purely scientific
and he chooses the
spirit,
geometrical form as the most perfect and striking type of scientific
method. vi^ork
is
The
not only recognized by modern criticism, but
described as the one point on w^hich almost
have agreed.
critics
spoken of
versally
part of his
scientific value of his results in this
scientific testimony,
masterpiece.
his
which has
uni-
is
quote only one
shall
I
be
expounders and
all
Spinoza's account of the passions as
may
a peculiar value as
coming from
a
leading authority in physiology, being given in the course of his
proper scientific work, and acted upon by him in an unmistakable
manner.
With
This witness
is
Johannes Miiller.
regard to the relations of the passions to one another, apart
from their physiological conditions, it is impossible to give any better account than that which Spinoza has laid down with unsurpassed In the following statement I shall therefore confine myself mastery. to giving the propositions of Spinoza
And
he proceeds
this
on that subject.^
do
to
without
further
or
criticism
comment. We shall find that his view is indirectly confirmed by the work of more recent inquirers in both natural science and psychology.
The is
first
spring of action,
to
man
must not say the desire of conceived by Spinoza, comes later.
propositions on the subject are thus expressed
Each individual
own The
its
with every creature,
We
self-preservation.
tion, for desire, as
common
thing, so far as in
it
lies,
self-preserva-
His leading
:
endeavours to persist in
being. effort
wherewith everything endeavours
to persist in
own
its
Physiologic des Menschen, ii, 543. Dr. Diihring's remarks on this are curious Zeit Physiolog von einigem Professorruf, Johannes Miiller, neuester hat auch ein In ^
*'
:
ungeachtet
seiner
engherzigen,
seinem Standpunkt aus
gelungen
erachtet,"' etc.
die
religios
und
von Spinoza
politisch
gelieferte
riicklaufigen
Statik
der
Denkweise,
Leidenschaften
von
fiir
so
"^^
SPINOZA
202 being rei
is
HIS LIFE
:
AND PHILOSOPHY
nothing else than that thing's being what
(praeter ipsius
it is
actualem essentiam).i
we
In a former chapter
traced
fundamental proposition
this
from its Cartesian use as a physical axiom or law of motion through Spinoza's repetition and extension of it in the exposition
which was his first published work. We also noticed that in a more extensive application it was current in the post- Aristotelian schools of Greek philosophy, and notably among of Descartes
In the middle ages, too,
the Stoics.
famiHar in a scholastic form.
nothing of concern
its earlier
limit
the
have been
Spinoza, however, probably
them.
He
Descartes as a general law of physics
out
to
knew
history and meaning, and certainly did not
with
himself
appears
it
view of
scientific
took ;
the
from
statement
and, as he extended with-
world
the
by from
propounded
Descartes, so he extended the range of those principles
which the Cartesian system undertook to explain all sensible phenomena, or at least to show that they were explicable. It is important to bear in mind the interpretation and warning The statement that everything given by Spinoza himself. endeavours to persist in its own being might seem to imply some notion that the effort or tendency to self-preservation is a mysterious power implanted in things and antecedent to their Such a power has been conceived in both ancient existence. Varieties of it are the karma of and modern philosophies. Buddhism, which performs the singular chain of transmigration when there is no the
supposed
ultimate
activity
feat
of keeping up a
soul to transmigrate
symbolically
called
Will
^ ;
by
Schopenhauer ; and the more elaborate version of it given as But Spinoza most the Unconscious in Hartmann's system. carefully
excludes
preserving effort
all
is
assumptions
nothing
else
of
this
kind.
The
self-
than the thing's being what
it
Whatever the thing in question may be, the mere fact of Great or its existence means that it must be reckoned with. small, there it is, and you cannot get it out of the way without is.
1
Eth.
iii. '^
pr. 6, 7
j
cf. Cogit.
Met.
Rhys Davids, Buddhism,
pt. p.
i.
cap. 7, ยง 8.
10 1.
THE NATURE OF MAN doing work upon
of change which are
important in their every motion
Destruction
it.
is
203
name
only a
peculiarly conspicuous
for processes
our
to
or
senses
Every change implies motion, and
results.
implies work,
and
resistance overcome.
signifies
This resistance, as we call it from the point of view of the worker overcoming it from the outside, is persistence or "effort of self-preservation " eye,
and
we
the adjustment of the mind's
shift
the centre of the field of imagination in the thing
fix
The
operated upon. the
if
use of the
word
effort [conatus) belongs to
He
habits of scientific language in Spinoza's time.
realistic
speaks of effort in this relation, just as long afterwards mathe-
maticians were
accustomed
speak of a
to
force
power of
or
which is indeed the same thing in its simplest physical aspect. It might be rash to affirm that even now vis inertiae and other terms of the same kind do not survive in books which may be put into the hands of students. But at that time the usage went farther. Not only inertia was a force, but velocity was spoken of as the cause of a body's changing its place. Nay, inertia,
own
our
in
momentum
time Mr. Herbert Spencer has called
the cause of motion.
We
need not be surprised, then, that
elsewhere Spinoza speaks of this self-preserving endeavour as a force (vis qua unaquaeque [res] in existendo perseverat).^ case of living
complex
creatures
he identifies
with
it
world
relations of the material
In the
life.
would appear
it
have just seen) in the fundamental properties of matter
and
mass,
ultimate
But
impenetrability.
for
ordinary scientific
the
view be no more than a striking equally present in
combinations.
A
Eth.
ii.
45, Schol.,
be decomposed
with which
cf.
Ethics^ but quite as strongly by a passage c.
6,
§§
8, 9).
I
inertia, as
atom of Spinoza's
in
The
conatus
is
the most stable of
molecule of water endeavours, in the peculiar
Cogit.
there says, "Ilia vis a rebus ipsis est diversa,"
up of notes written
in
we
(as
—
every
would
illustration.
the most unstable as
sense here explained, not to 1
that
itself,
less
now assumed
fact
purposes,
every element succeeds in preserving
In the
Met.
which
which stands
,
and not
so,
but he cap. 6, § ii. 3 ; contradicted not only by the
pt. is
earlier
in
the same
have already suggested that the Cogitata Metaphysica at various dates.
less
work
may
be
(pt.
i.
made
while tory
holds together, does the molecule of
it
compounds which explode
some of those
touch or vibration.
at a
invert the order of his terms.
easy as
what we mean by
We
seems
it
take
means
A
persistence.
Herein
thing
individuality,
its
is
an
time,
appreciable
question
not as
is
existence, he
:
tells
us,
to be counted apart find that persistence
shall
manner obvious
against appreciable external force,
us ask
be given in few words.
its title
We
a
in
effort, let
group of phenomena which
a
is
from the surrounding medium. for
may
from Mr. Herbert Spencer
it
persists.
The
a thing. ^
yet an answer
;
if
Instead of considering whether
things can be said to exercise a self-preserving ourselves
transi-
perhaps help us to understand Spinoza's meaning
It will
we
AND PHILOSOPHY
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
204
and
sense,
to
the test applied by the un-
is
conscious philosophizing of language.
The
requisite of a thing
first
continuous
in
must be more must
definite,
It
it.
still
What
all.
ing
is
and
itself
with
name it we could not name it at
should not want
and not
itself,
Take
to
it
is
depend-
as
precarious
a
as
;
result
a cubical vessel full of water.
beyond question a thing.
Every molecule of
outside
things
more, the persistence must be conceived
external conditions. is
should be apparently
it
continuous
we
or
that
be persistent, or
it
on the thing
vessel
not
is
assuredly
of
The
the water also a thing
Is
represented as
a real
?
thing
in the duly trained imagination, though it cannot be separately But the body of water is not regarded as a thing observed.
either
by
continuous, and
it
walls of the vessel
external
It is sensibly an unscientific observer. persistent so long as it is confined by the
a scientific or
restraint
is ;
is
but
Take air
it
is
will
removed
forms, and be dispersed.
because
it
We
refuse
the
it
name
of a thing
by external
forces.
a cubic inch of water inside this vessel, or a cubic foot of
the atmosphere
in
Spinoza gives
in Part
will
manifestly held together only
:
these again are
speech, and for the like reasons. ^
it
no longer. When the flow away, assume other
persist
ii.
Cases
a physical definition in Cartesian
not things in
may
is
it
be put, however, so
terms oi unum corpus sme indhiduum
of the Et/iics (excursus after Schol. to Pr. 13).
present purpose, nor
common
very lucid to the modern reader.
But
it
is
not exactly to the
:
THE NATURE OF MAN present
to
as
degrees of doubt.
all
of cannon-balls a thing
For example,
More work
?
of the shot than to sever or destroy
we may
reality^ if
the pile
not
is
is
many
things of undoubted
many
continuous to the eye than
less
itself,
pile
required to dislodge one
a
;
and
rough
kept together merely by
is
Nevertheless, while nobody would hesitate
and gravity.
whether any one
to speak of the wall or cairn as a things I doubt
would
a
is
use the term in a strictly scholastic sense
stone wall or cairn which, like friction
205
so speak of the pile of shot, unless as an object confusedly
seen in the distance. considerations of stones
to
is
individual
be
human built
stones
are
we are determined by and intention. The normal use of
conceive that here
I
use
into walls, and
too
the possible uses of the
Cannon-balls are made to be separately in itself of
no use whatever.
fired
in the case of the pile of shot the
Hence
v/e regard the
whole
and are merged
individual things as such
an
is
pile
is
affair
as
meant
as
in
it
there for the sake of
heap of stones
permanent thing, and the heap of shot In arrangement of many things. is
and the
off,
of.
In the case of the wall or cairn the
parts are there for the sake of the whole,
the parts.
much thought
be
to
trifling
for
one
for a provisional
conception
the
fine,
meant
of
of our perceptions, and to
some extent of our convenience.^ That such was Spinoza's view is pretty manifest from what he says in various places in the First and Second Parts of the Ethics^ and
now
reading
goes to support the
this
offered of his principle of self-preservation.
How then So understood, the principle is simple enough. does Spinoza connect it with the world of life and action ? or what
The desire
throw on the intricate play of human passions ? connexion is made out by affirming that the impulse or of self-preservation which we know in our own feeling is a
light can
it
special manifestation of the universal principle involved in existence itself
The mind
"endeavours to
certain undetermined duration, and
deavour." alone, ^
is
is
in
its
being with a
conscious of this
its
en-
Such endeavour, considered with regard to the mind considered with regard to mind and body called will ^
;
So in law,
as a possible
persist
as I
have
tried to
show
in
another work,
and individual object of rights.
^
a
thing
Eth.
iii.
is
9,
whatever we conceive and Schol.
2o6
SPINOZA
together,
it
called appetite;
is
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
:
"which
is
nothing
than the
else
very being of the man, from whose nature those things of necessity-
make
follow which
preservation
for his
determined to the doing of such things.
and desire there
is
no
;
and thus the man
Then
difference, save that for the
is
betwixt appetite
most part
desire
men in so far as they be conscious of their appetite desire is and therefore it may be thus defined, that is to say appetite with consciousness thereof. From all which it appears that we have not endeavour, will, appetite, or desire for anybut contrariwise deem a thing, because we deem it good thing good, because we have an endeavour, will, appetite, or is
ascribed to
;
:
;
desire for it."
Whether
be justified in
whole extent
its
no doubt
entertain
and far-reaching thought of Spinoza's can
this bold
profound and
vital
complexity and the
I
do not venture to say.
that, after all possible deductions,
truth.
It
But
I
contains
it
seems probable that the extreme
development of distinct consciousness, and
late
consequently of the emotions as they are known in the adult It may be experience of mankind, were underrated by Spinoza.
were very much underrated, though we have already seen that the composite character of mind was most clearly asserted by him. He appears to jump from unconscious organic processes which, let us again repeat it, are in his view mental as well that they
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; as
material, or
sciousness.
feehng
;
rather
The
both in one
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
to
the facts of vivid con-
man is more than an organic memory and expectation, and even
love of Hfe in
the finished ideas of
the highly-wrought conceptions of our ethical and social nature, And in our active consciousness these more have their part in it. refined elements are predominant. for Spinoza's
But
in the
purpose that the organic feeling
main is
such a feeling is in truth deeply rooted in us which we need not waste time in establishing. called in
Mr. Herbert Spencer
Spinoza's thought. definition of
life,
We
which
shall
is
to help us to a
now
it
there is
We
a
is ;
enough
and that
proposition
have already
modern reading of
for a like purpose appeal to his
especially valuable as an interpretation
of scientific results framed in perfect independence of Spinoza's worlq, and proceeding
on
different lines.
THE NATURE OF MAN
207
" the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations " ; it " consists in maintenance of inner actions corresponding with outer actions."
According
Now
life
is
adjustment or maintenance
this
means by
to this definition,
a thing's persistence in
precisely
is
own
its
what Spinoza
The
being.
organism
endeavours to persist in the face of external conditions, converting
them
to
its
use
when
success of this endeavour
It
life.
is
is
Spencer himself that the definition in
may
to whatever extent this
history or
them
can, or resisting
it
at
need
;
and the
observed by Mr. Herbert
form
this
is
too wide
;
but,
be a defect for the purposes of natural
biology, from Spinoza's point of view
it
merit.
a
is
The
correlation of mind and matter being universal, and all things endowed with life in various degrees, philosophy is not concerned to draw a line anywhere to mark where life begins. Philosophically speaking, the attempt to draw one is illusory and it is a ;
question whether science
same
to the to
We
report.
may
itself
may
not ere long bring us the
confine ourselves for the present, however,
undoubted manifestations of
Spinoza does not profess
life.
give a particular account of nature, or even the whole of
animated nature, but of man. acceptation,
it
will be seen
factor of great importance
that
As regards life in its common Mr. Herbert Spencer takes in a
which
not marked by Spinoza.
is
implying
speaks of continuous adjustment, thus
that
He
external
changing and requiring adjustments to be effected. Nature commands the adjustment under the penalty of Now the striving of every creature to keep its own extinction. relations are constantly
nature in harmony with the world around fact
whose consequences
evolution.
are
Natural history,
have taught us to
see,
is
traced as
in
it
is
the fundamental
the modern doctrine of
Mr. Darwin and Mr. Spencer
the history of the never-ceasing effort of
between
individuals and races to maintain a certain correspondence
the organism and
its
The
environment.
nearer this correspond-
ence approaches to completeness, the more perfect and secure is Spinoza pointed to the existence of the individual and the kind. the law of persistence, but could not trace
know
that in operation
it
becomes
by countless ages than conscious
a
its
working.
We
law of development.
desire, older
now
Older
than anything to
SPINOZA
2o8
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
:
which we now grant the name of life, the primeval and common impulse " the will to live, the competence to be " is at length in the sight of all men, as it was for Spinoza's keener vision, the root of all action and of all that makes the world alive. Not that
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
we
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
He
claim Spinoza as a forerunner of the theory of evolution.
had no materials prophesy
or
tact
As
his
work
But one
:
he had seemed to
one does not see that on the face of
stands,
there
also
supplied by
if
from any prematurely ambitious construction.
instinct,
world
and even
rather to have abstained, with a singular philosophical
is
principle of self-conservation real
;
the prophecy would have been a guess in the dark.
it,
His merit
for anticipating it
a void space between the idea and the facts.
is
that
sees
connexion
the required
The
Mr. Darwin.
gap has been
left
is
wonderfully
open
at exactly
the right place, and Spinoza had the wisdom to leave rather than
it
fill
his
connected with the
sufficiently
is
it
open
it
up inadequately, and the courage to stand by
the idea with such light as he had.
The
analysis of the passions
practical value of Spinoza's
is,
however, to a great extent independent of the general axiom from
which he
man
All that
starts.
is
really necessary to be granted
is
that
has the impulse or instinct of self-preservation, and desires
power and boldness
to
fulness of
dispute,
life
and
:
much
this
however the
fact
would need some
it
itself
may
be explicable.
Let us see how Spinoza reaches the cardinal definitions of Pleasure and Pain cardinal because with him Pleasure, Pain, and Desire ;
are the primary elements of which, according to the variety of
stated as a direct
mind
human
compounded. It is consequence from the correspondence of body and
objects exciting them,
all
passions are
that " whatsoever increases or diminishes, helps or hinders,
the active power (agendi potentiam) of our body likewise increases or diminishes, helps or
;
the idea thereof
hinders,
the sentient
power (cogitandi potentiam) of our mind." "Thus we see," adds the Scholium, " that the mind may undergo great variations, and
pass
now
to
a
greater,
now
to a lesser
perfection
;
which
By pleasure effects explain to us the states of pleasure and pain. I shall therefore hereafter understand an affection whereby the mind
passes to a greater
perfection
;
and by pain an aflection
THE NATURE OF MAN whereby
it
singular
coincidence with
passes to a lesser perfection."
modern
209
Here again there
^
a
Mr.
speculation.
scientific
is
on the one hand by the evidence of the actual conditions of pleasure and pain in their most conspicuous and regular manifestations, on the other hand by deduction from the hypothesis of evolution, to conclude that " pains are the corHerbert Spencer
led,
is
relatives of actions injurious to the organism,
the correlatives of actions conducive to
while pleasures are
welfare."
its
or event conducive to the welfare of the organism
is
But an action precisely what
Spinoza means by " transition to a greater perfection " ; conversely, an action injurious to the organism is in Spinoza's language a Pleasure marks the raising, pain the
transition to less perfection.
lowering, of the vital energies, and consequently the advance or depression of the creature in the scale of being, to a corresponding
extent and in so far as the particular event
who
results of the philosopher
agree in their
full
still
facts
of biology.
will be seen, implies that pleasure
variably beneficial in
in
it
not only normally but in-
is
may
indications of pain and pleasure
mere dogmatist inquirer working
Spinoza's definition,
Not
and pain hurtful.
itself,
The
concerned.
passes for a
extent with those of the latest
by induction from the
make them
is
that the normal
not be disturbed, so as to
particular cases blind or worse than blind guides.
kind
common
and the explanation
Experience of
this
of
touched on by Mr. Herbert Spencer, and has been
it is
more
briefly
lately considered
to ultimate
bought by
only too
by others.
But the
yet not an evil in
is
at a ruinous
itself a
avoided.
harm
is
price
;
pleasure
itself,
which
but a partial good
the pain which brings healing
:
good, but an evil submitted to that greater evil
And we
leads
is
not
may
be
here use the terms good and evil as denoting
the quality, not of the sensation as such (for that would only be to say that pleasure
and
pleasure and pain
is
pain), but of the events
organism immediately indicated by the sensaAnaesthetics, for example, are useful not merely because
relations in the
tion.
pain
is
is
escaped for the
moment, but because the shock and
exhaustion which are the direct consequences of pain are escaped
with
it.
intrinsic utility of pleasure
This view of the ^
Eth.
iii.
P
II.
and hurt-
210
AND PHILOSOPHY
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
by Mr. Grant Allen, who thus completes the accordance between Mr. Herbert Spencer's doctrine and that of Spinoza. Accepting this view, we
fulness of pain has been ingeniously maintained
shall say that the action beneficial to the
Spencer's language,
organism which, in Mr.
correlated with pleasure,
is
is
not the antecedent
or concomitant of the pleasurable sensation, but the corporeal or
objective aspect of the sensation
itself.
The
importance of the
remoter consequences, and the weight of Mr. Spencer's argument
The
therefrom, remain, of course, unchanged.
individuals and
whose nervous system has been trained by experience to impending good or ill at an early stage, and to report them by means of pleasure and pain to the centres of voluntary action,
races
forecast
have an advantage in the struggle
for life precisely like that of the
prudent over the unthinking man, or of an army where sentinel
and outpost duties are carefully performed over one in which they But we must return to following Spinoza. are neglected. The special forms of Pleasure and Pain on which most of the passions depend are Love and Hatred. In Spinoza's language these include like and dislike
;
in fact the
English language
is
alone, or
nearly so, in marking a difference of degree in these emotions so
sharply as
The mind
does.
it
whatever increases
its
seeks to retain in consciousness
power, and to
recall
whatever may counteract
the impression of such things as hurt or hinder
simple manifestations arise
Love, which
external cause
;
companiment.
is
it
;
these being
Hence
of the self-preserving
tendency.
Pleasure accompanied
by the idea of an
and Hatred, which
And, by the law of
is
Pain with the
like
ac-
association of ideas already
given in the Second Part, objects in themselves indiiFerent
may
excite pleasure, pain, and desire by their casual association with
other things which are of themselves apt to excite those emotions.
and dislikings which are commonly referred to an unknown cause called sympathy or antipathy. They
Hence the obscure
likings
depend on some association by resemblance which in
its effects.^
is
possible
same time
;
for call
Through
is
known only
association, again, a conflict of
something which
affects us
^
Et/i, hi.
12-15.
may
at the
pleasure.
But
with pain
up memories of equal or greater
emotions
THE NATURE OF MAN
211
may
be more directly produced, for the human body is exceedingly complex, and therefore may be variously affected at the same time and by the same object. External objects, too, are conflicts
may have complex
themselves complex, and
The
bodily organs. joy, and
emotions of hope,
fear,
on the same
effects
confidence, despair,
disappointment, are accounted for by the imagination
w^orking on the conception of pleasurable or painful events as future or
The
past.^
effects
of love and
hatred
inducing
in
emotions of pleasure and pain by sympathy are then set forth. have pleasure in the welfare of a beloved object, and pain in
We its
destruction
in us
we
;
pleasure and pain give rise to the like affections
its
3
which we conceive
love that
as giving
and hate that which we conceive as giving pain the other hand produces the contrary effects [Eth.
;
mere conception of anything
it,
and hatred on
iii.
the range and power of sympathy are yet wider. these causes the
pleasure to
19-26).
But
In addition to
as like ourselves
is
a
source of induced emotion.
When
it
happens that we imagine
a thing like ourselves,
and which
we have not regarded with any particular emotion, to be affected with any emotion, we are thereupon affected with the like emotion ^ (Pr, 27). For, in so
in a particular
sentation of
an external object conceived by us
far as
its
way
resembles our
own
as affected
body, so far will our repre-
condition include a representation or faint repetition
own
or, under the physio" the idea of the external body logical aspect, as Spinoza puts it, imagined by us will imply an affection of our body Hke to that of
of similar states of our
consciousness
:
and accordingly if we imagine any one ourselves to be affected with any emotion, this imagination be the expression in consciousness of an affection of our body the external body
;
Here,
the said emotion."
as often in
But
in
its 1
main
Pr. 17, 18.
Remorse ~
The
is
the psychology
I translate conscientiae morsus
us at the end of the
book that
his
is
thoroughly sound it
was by
by "disappointment," as Spinoza warns
terms do not always bear their
common
described later as poenitetjtia.
original Affectus.
is
a
wider term
j
like
inquiry are apparently
and we must never forget that
features,
vi^ill
Spinoza, the complexity and
difficulty of the physiological side of the
slurred or underrated.
like
not being confined to consciousness.
meaning.
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
212
AND PHILOSOPHY
keeping the physiological side constantly in view that Spinoza escaped the countless fallacies from which not even
Kant
has been
able wholly to deliver us.
Varieties of these induced or imitative emotions of sympathy are pity, emulation or the pursuit of similar objects of desire, and
benevolence, which
is
defined as a desire arising from pity, and
seeking to Hberate the object of pity from the
Another
result
language
we may
exactly kindliness)
is
of
its
condition.^
sympathy (which in modern the sympathy of race, or more shortly and
of this call
evils
extended
that "
we
endeavour to do whatever we
shall
men to look upon with pleasure, and shun the doing of that which we conceive them to shun " (Pr. 29). If we think we have succeeded in pleasing other men by our actions, the result is complacency if we seem to have displeased them, it is shame.
conceive
;
The
belief that our affection towards
will strengthen that affection
;
if
any object
is
shared by others
the disposition of another towards
an object liked or disliked by us
is
contrary to our own, there
ensues a fluctuation or conflict of emotion in us.
Hence we
endeavour to associate others with us in our emotions. desire that others should agree
with us has in
its
This
crude form the
nature of ambition, and begets mutual hindrance and discord.
Hence
envy for another's enjoyment excites in us an appetite for the like enjoyment j and if it is such that it cannot be shared with our neighbour, we shall wish to deprive him of it.^ How these effects of sympathy may be controlled to rational and also arises
social uses
is
:
not considered in the present part of the Ethics^ but
will appear in due course.
dwelling on passions
the important hint that the psychology of the
it,
may
Spinoza throws out here, but without
be studied to advantage in children, their tender
organism being
as it
were
in a state of unstable equilibrium,
and
We
see that the
laughing or weeping of others in their presence will
make them
offering sHght resistance to external impressions.
laugh or weep
that they seek to imitate whatever they see others
;
doing, and desire for themselves whatever seems to give pleasure to others.^ 1
Benevolentia
Schol. 2.)
.
.
.
nihil aliud est 2
quam
Pr. 30-32.
cupiditas e commiseratione orta. 3
Pr. 32, Schol.
(Pr. 27,
THE NATURE OF MAN
213
Other combinations and effects of the master passions of love and hatred are worked out in a series of propositions which we shall not follow in detail. But it may be useful to translate a few of them as specimens of Spinoza's manner. The omitted demonstrations involve reference to other propositions without which they are not intelligible.
Hatred
Prop. 43.
may be
is
increased by mutual hatred, and contrariwise
abolished by love.
Whenever one conceives
Demonstration.
a
person hated by him to
be affected with hatred towards him, thereupon a
while the
by the supposition,
first,
him, in so
far as
he conceives
this
he will regard himself with pleasure,
that extent he endeavours not to hate
And
him.
this
emotion whence
But if on the be affected with love towards
endeavour to please that other
to that extent will
him and
endeavour will be greater or it
arises.
hatred arises
yet in being.
is
other hand he conceive this person to
and
new
Therefore
if
it
to
;
that
is,
do no displeasure
less in
to to
proportion to the
be greater than that which
from hatred, and through which the man endeavours to do displeasure to the thing he hates, it will prevail over it, and abolish the hate from his mind ; which was to be proved. When hatred is wholly overcome by love, it passes into Prop. 44. arises
love
;
and
this love
Scholium.
anything or pleasure
Though is,
For every
and to keep a
man may
this
be
so,
yet no that
man will endeavour may enjoy this
he
no one will desire harm
the hope of making
whole.
greater than if hatred had not gone before
undergo displeasure
that
;
is
it
to be
good, nor long to be sick for
man
be,
to hate
greater
done to himself for the hope of growing
will always endeavour to preserve his being
he can.
But if it can be supposed that hate some one that he may afterwards be affected
off pain as far as
desire to
with greater love towards him, then he will constantly desire him.
it.
to hate
For the greater the hatred has been, the greater the love
and therefore he will constantly wish the hate
to be
shall
more and
more augmented ; and for the like reason a man will endeavour to be more and more sick, that he may enjoy greater pleasure afterwards in which is absurd. the return of health Prop. 49. Love and hatred towards a thing which we conceive as ;
free
must both be
towards
a
greater, the occasion being otherwise the same, than
thing conceived as necessary.
AND PHILOSOPHY
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
214
Schoi.
free, are
Hence it follows that men, because they deem themselves moved toward one another with greater love and hate than
other creatures
which
besides
;
be considered the imitation of
to
is
emotions above mentioned (Prop. 27, 34, 40, and 43 of
A
farther
little
this Part).
on we have an important group of propositions
concerning the active powers of the mind. When the mind contemplates itself and its own power, this gives rise to pleasure ;
own weakness
while the contemplation of one's
gives
to
rise
pain.^
This displeasure accompanied by the idea of our own weakness called dejection
{humiiitas)
templation of oneself seeing this
is
mind, and
own
man
contemplates
his
eager to
is
men
men
are troublesome to
one another.
be enviously disposed, that
to
Also
to rejoice
is,
of their fellows, and be displeased at their excellence.
at the infirmity
For so often
And own
doings and display his strength both of body and
this reason
for
that a
likewise follows that every one
it
is
the con-
self-love or self-complacency.
renewed every time
oftentimes leads
this
;
named
is
faculties or active power,
recount his
the pleasure that arises from
as
this
or
man
that
own
conceives his
he
actions,
is
affected with pleasure, and the more
so as he conceives them more and as expressing a greater perfection or in other words, the more he can distinguish them from others and contemplate them Wherefore every one will most rejoice in the as individual things.
distinctly
;
contemplation of himself when the quality contemplated in himself
somewhat he allows not
in
affirms of himself be ascribed
not be so
will if
he conceives
And
this
by him
much delighted his own actions as
;
displeasure he will
But
other creatures. to
man
if that
Thus
envy, which
way
'tis
plain
or animals in general, he
infirm in comparison of other men's.
strive
last is also
that
which he
contrariwise he will be displeased
to
put
off,
namely, by perversely
construing the actions of his fellows, or dressing out his
he may.
is
men
are naturally prone
favoured by their bringing up.
own
as
best
to hate
and
For
it
is
the
of parents to urge their children towards excellence with the
But peradventure some doubt remains, because we often admire men's excellence and do them honour. To following corollary. this add shall I remove this spur of ambition and envy.
1
Pr. 53, 54, 55.
Pr. 54
is
a curious
example of Spinoza's most
artificial
manner.
THE NATURE OF MAN No man
is
215
envious of excellence unless in one supposed his equal.
Envy
Demonstration.
is
of the nature of hate or displeasure, that
an affection whereby man's active power or endeavour is hindered. But man doth not endeavour or desire to do anything but what can follow from his own nature as he finds the same. Therefore a man will not desire any active power or excellence (for 'tis all one) to be attributed to him which belongs to some other nature and is foreign to his own. So his desire cannot be hindered, that is, the man cannot suffer displeasure, from his contemplation of some excellence in one But unlike himself, and by consequence he cannot envy such an one. his equal fellow he can envy, since he is assumed to be of like nature with him.
is,
So that when
we admire men
or other qualities, this
for singular foresight, courage,
because
is
least in that degree, as singular
we
conceive their qualities, at
common
and above the
fortune of
men. The hero is conceived as not of one mould with ourselves, and we no more entertain envy with respect to him than against the lion for his courage or against a tree for It
is
to be observed that Spinoza
only with the play of the emotions
mean
deny that
is
when
height.^
its
in
this
left
book concerned
to themselves.
He
and unselfish admiration of human excellence as such is possible and practicable. But this is the effect of right knowledge and the discipline of society, which does not
to
rational
have not yet been considered. pain and desire, and therefore are of as
many
It all
is
next pointed out that pleasure,
the emotions derived from them,
kinds and varieties as the external objects which
are the occasion of
them
;
and
also that the
emotions
differ in
every individual according to the difference of the internal conditions of his
constitution.
Thus
the
desires
and appetites of
animals are specifically different from the analogous desires and appetites in
man, and the pleasure of
a
drunkard
the same as the pleasure of a philosopher. the question whether
all
is
by no means
Spinoza here approaches
pleasures are commensurable,
which
is
but he prominent in modern discussions of the theory of ethics From his point of view it is at best superdoes not pursue it. :
fluous,
and
I
cannot help suspecting 1
that, either in Spinoza's
Scholia to Prop. 55.
way
AND PHILOSOPHY
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
2i6
some other not very the same conclusion.
or in
So
from
far
it,
we
shall finally acquiesce in
the discourse has been of the emotions considered as
far
passions, or
" ascribed to
man
he
in so far as
there are also emotions of an active kind.
the mind's contemplation of tion
its ov^^n
mind
present whenever the
is
power
acted
is
upon
"
;
but
Pleasure arises from ;
but such contempla-
has a true or adequate idea
(because true knowledge includes certitude or the consciousness
of
truth, Eth,
Therefore the con43, see p. 121 above). ception of adequate ideas is a pleasurable activity of the mind ; its
and activity
Hence
such includes the effort or desire of self-maintenance.
as
there
ii.
a desire
is
reasonable desire
is
branches according
which
the source of virtue as
desire
This active and which has two main
purely active.
is
;
directed by reason to the welfare
is
of the agent himself, or to doing good to other (Prop. 59, SchoL). of the Ethics to an end,
their friendship.
third
part
definitions of the emotions
explanations.
shall
I
men and
seeking
Having thus brought the Spinoza recapitulates
with some few additions and
make no apology
for
translating
his
new this
piece at length.
THE DEFINITIONS OF THE EMOTIONS I.
Desire
is
determined
the being of
to a particular action
itself,
we conceive
in so far as
by any given
affection of
it
as
it.
We
have said above, in the Scholium to Prop. 9 of part, that desire is appetite with consciousness thereof; and that
Explanation. this
man
appetite
is
actions as
the being itself of man, in so far as
make
for his preservation.
But
it is
in that
determined scholium
I
to
such
likewise
acknowledged no difference between the appetite and the desire of men. For whether a man be conscious of his appetite or not, yet the appetite is still one and the same ; and thus, lest I noted that in truth
I
would not explain desire by appetite, but have sought so to define it as to comprise in one word all those efforts of human nature which we signify by the name of should seem to
fall
into
tautology, I
appetite, will, desire or impulse.
I
might well have
said that desire
is
THE NATURE OF MAN the being of
man
particular action
-,
itself,
but from
this definition it
was needful
add
to
human being
whether
:
we
or nature
understand be
it
to a
would not follow (by Prop. its
by any given affection of it.
be innate, whether
it
determined
as
it
Therefore, in order to include the cause of
desire.
of
conceive
mind could be conscious of
23, Part 2)1 that the
it
we
so far as
217
own
appetite or
this consciousness
For by an affection
every disposition thereof,
conceived
purely
under the
attribute of thought or purely under that of extension, or be ascribed
Here therefore I understand by desire man's efforts, impulses, appetites and volitions whatsoever, which after the manifold disposition of the same man be themselves manifold and not seldom contrary to one another, so that the man is dragged this way and that and knows not where to turn. to
both together.
2.
Pleasure
3.
Pain
is
Explanation.
man from less to greater perfection. man from greater to less perfection.
the passage of a
is
the passage of a
say passage
I
:
for pleasure
is
not perfection
itself.
man were
born with that perfection whereto he passes, he same without the emotion of pleasure as more For no man can plainly appears from the contrary emotion of pain. deny that pain consists in a passage to less perfection, and not in lesser
For
the
if
would
possess the
perfection
itself,
some degree of
;
since a
man cannot have pain in that he Neither can we say that pain
perfection.
being deprived of a greater perfection
emotion
the
of pain
is
an
act,
of passing
to a less perfection, that
man
diminished or hindered.
of
is
this Part.
and
grief,
:
for deprivation
is
partakes of consists in
So
nothing.
which can be no other than that is, an act whereby the active power See the Scholium to Prop.
1 1
of
For the definitions of cheerfulness, merriment, melancholy I
pass
them
over, because they have rather the nature of
bodily affections, and are but kinds of pleasure or pain.
Wonder
4.
is
imagination of somewhat whereon
the
the
mind
remains fixed because that particular imagination hath no sensible conSee Prop. 52 with the Scholium.
nexion with others. Explanation.
what
is
way
In the Scholium to Prop. 18, Part
the cause that the
falls
2,
we have shown
mind from contemplating one
into thinking of another
;
thing straight-
namely because the images
^
of
those things are mutually linked together in such order that one follows 1
"The mind knows
not
itself,
save so far as
it
perceives ideas of the affections of the
body." '^
In modern language
we
should say ideas or concepts.
SPINOZA:
2i8
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
on the
other.
Which
thing
novel
so that in such case the
is
;
cannot be supposed where the image of the
contemplation of the same thing to think
we
consider
it
in itself,
is
I
new
the imagination of a
of like nature with others
reason I do not reckon wonder
why
will be holden in the
be determined by other causes
till it
Thus
on other matters.
mind
among
object, if
and
:
for
this
the emotions, nor see any ground
should, since this distraction of the mindariseth from no positive
cause that should draw the this, that a
to think
cause
mind off from other things, but only from wanting for which the mind should be determined
is
on other things.
Therefore
admit
I
(as I
have noted
in the
Scholium to Prop, ii) only three primitive or primary emotions, namely, of pleasure, pain, and desire and I have mentioned wonder for no other reason than that It Is our custom to call certain emotions :
when they
derived from the three primitive ones by different names
And
have regard to objects of our wonder.
for the
same reason
I
am
minded to add here a definition of contempt. 5. Contempt is the imagination of a thing which so little moves the mind that by the presence of the thing it is inclined rather to imagine the qualities which are not in the thing than those which are in it. See the scholium
The
to
Prop. 52.
definitions of worship
and scorn
{verier atmiis et dedigriationis) I
here leave alone, since no emotions are to
my
knowledge named
after
them. 6.
Love
is
accompanied by the idea
pleasure
an
ot
external
cause.
This definition clearly explains wherein love
Explanation.
But that of the authors who define
as
it
consists.
the will of the lover to unite
himself to the thing loved expresses not the nature of love but a And since the nature of love was not well particular property thereof. understood by these authors, they could not so notion of that property
and hence
;
esteemed pretty obscure. that this property
mean by the mind (for this
loved, I
is
But
In love, to
their definition hath
have
Its
a clear
been generally
when
I
say
will not an assent or conclusion, nor a free resolve I
have shown to be
presence
when
without either of these desires content which
form
union with the thing
a will for
a fiction In
Prop. 48, Part 2)
when it love may
yet the desire of being united to the thing loved
continuing in
as
to be observed that
is
it
much
arises in
him
It ;
is
by
but by
that loves
;
for this
will
I
is
;
of
nor
away, or of
be conceived
understand the
upon the presence of the thing
THE NATURE OF MAN whereby the pleasure of the lover
loved,
219
strengthened or
is
at least
encouraged.^
Hate
7.
(or dislike)
pain accompanied by the idea of an external
is
cause.
Whatever
Explanation,
from the explanation
to be
is
observed here
to the foregoing definition,
easily collected
is
and
Scholium
see the
to Prop. 13. 8.
Inclination
which a
pleasure accompanied by the idea of something
is
{pr accidens causa) of pleasure. 9. Aversion is pain accompanied by the idea of something which is casual occasion of pain. See as to these the Scholium to Prop. 15. 10. Devotion is love towards one whom we admire. is
a casual occasion
Admiration or wonder ariseth from the novelty of the
Explanation, thing, as
we showed
in Prop. 52.
we
imagine something we admire,
we
see that devotion
Derision
1.
1
we contemn
is
is
If therefore
shall cease to
apt to reduce itself to
So
Explanation.
happen
that
admire
it
mere
we
often
and thus
;
love.
pleasure arising from our imagination that something
we
present in something which
is
it
far
we contemn
as
hate.
thing which we hate, we and therefore (by Prop. 20)
a
deny existence of
it
we
But since we assume that the man who derides
are pleased.
thing also hates
it, it
(see Prop. 52, Schol.)
follows that such pleasure
is
a
See the
unsubstantial.
Schol. to Prop. 47. 12. Hope is an unconstant pleasure bred of the idea of a future or past thing, of the issue
See
as to this
13. Fear
^
whereof we
Prop. 18, Schol.
are to
some extent
thing, of the issue
whereof we
doubt.
2.
an unconstant pain bred of the idea of
is
in
are to
some extent
future or past
a
See
in doubt.
as to
these Prop. 18, Schol. 2.
From
Explanation.
without
fear,
these definitions
it
doubts of the issue of the matter, the same ^
Remembering
doubt
if
that Spinoza's amor
the property in question
is
is
follows that there
For whoever
nor fear without hope.
is
assumed
is
to
in
is
no hope
hope and
imagine somemay may do
taken in the widest possible sense, we
universal.
A
statesman or philanthropist
who never heard of his existence. he thinks of the good he has done them collectively, his feeling will be " laetitia concomitante idea causae externae " j but their individual presence may be indifferent or good to people hundreds or thousands of miles away
When
even disagreeable to him. that 2
it is
Spinoza would say that even here there
overpowered by dislike arising from other causes.
Or "happening."
is
some
pleasure, but
SPINOZA
220 what
HIS LIFE
:
AND PHILOSOPHY
that excludes the existence of the thing hoped for
therefore, to receive pain (Prop. 19) and, while he
may
that the desired thing is,
not happen.
doubts of the issue of a thing he
Again, he
dislikes,
excludes the existence of that thing
that
who
Despair
is
Thus
Explanation.
when
away as
not happen.
removed.
is
is
removed.
there ariseth of hope confidence, and of fear
our cause of doubt as to the issue of the thing
which happens because
;
pleased
pain bred of the idea of a future or past thing con-
cerning which our cause of doubt despair,
may
somewhat is
pleasure bred of the idea of a future or past thing
is
concerning which our cause of doubt 15.
in fear, that
is
also imagines
and therefore
;
so far,
in hope, to fear
is
(Prop. 20), and so to that extent has hope that the thing 14. Confidence
and
;
a
man
imagines a past or future thing
present to him, and as such contemplates
other matters which
exclude the
threw him into doubt.
it
or because he imagines
;
existence of those things
For although
taken
is
we can never be
which
truly certain of
the issue of particular things (by the Corollary to Prop. 31, Part 2),^ yet
may
it
so
be that
we have no doubt
thereof.
For
we
have shown
Scholium, Prop. 49, Part 2) that it is one thing to have no doubt of a matter, another to have the certainty of it ; and thus it may (see the
come
to pass that the imagination oi a past or future thing
us with the
thing
same emotion of pleasure
when
see, as
well
16.
Joy
present
affect
we have proved
in Prop. 18 of this Part,
which
second Scholium.
as its is
as
:
may
or pain as the imagination of the
pleasure accompanied by the idea
of something past
which happened beyond our expectation. 17.
Disappointment
or grief
{conscientiae
morsus)
is
pain accom-
panied by the idea of something past which happened beyond our expectation. 18.
Pity {commiseratio)
happening to another
is
pain accompanied by the idea of evil
whom we
conceive to be like ourselves.
See
the Scholia to Prop. 22 and 27 of this Part.
Between
Explanation. to be
no
in particular, ^
"
Omnes
seems more nisi -
mercy
is
mercy
{misericordiam) there seems
to the disposition thereto.^
res particulares
in point
:
even more
contingentes et corruptibiles esse."
The
Proposition
itself
" Nos de duratione rerum singularium quae extra nos sunt nullam
admodum inadaequatam It
pity and
difference, unless perhaps that pity has regard to the emotion
cognitionem habere possumus."
difficult to
find
Auerbach uses Mitleid and M'ltgefiihl.
in English the
difference indicated
by Spinoza,
THE NATURE OF MAN Approval {favor)
19.
is
love
tow^ard
221
some one who has done good
to another.
20. Indignation
hate tow^ards some
is
who
one
has done
to
ill
another. Explanation.
common
know
I
my
But
use.
that these terms have a different
purpose
is
meaning
in
not to explain the meaning of words
but the nature of things, and to signify the things by words whose
accustomed meaning is not wholly repugnant to that in which I And so let it suffice to note this once for all. desire to use them. As to the causes of these emotions, see Coroll. i, Prop. 27, and the Schol. to Prop. 22 of this Part. 21. Over-esteem {existimatio)
is
to
think too highly of a
man
for
is
to
think too meanly of a
man
for
love's sake.
22. Disparagement {despectus) hate's sake.
Over-esteem
Explanation.
and disparagement of hate thus defined, that
it
is
is ;
thus an
and
so
effect
or property of love,
may likewise be moves a man to think
over-esteem
love, so far forth as
it
too highly of the thing loved, and on the other part disparagement
may be
moves a man to think too meanly See the Scholium to Prop. 26 of this Part.
defined as hate, so far forth as
of one
whom
23.
Envy
he hates.
hate, in so far as
is
it
it
disposeth a
man
to
be sorry at
another's happiness, and contrariwise rejoice in his misfortune.
To Envy we commonly
Explanation.
may be
ingly
word
thus defined, though against the usual
Mercy
Good
(or
to rejoice in another's
Will)
is
love, in so far as
it
disposeth a
good fortune and contrariwise be sorry
man
at
his
fortune.
Explanation. in this
Part.
See more of envy. Prop. 24, Schol. and 32, Schol, Now these be the emotions of pain, which the idea of
somewhat outside its
meaning of the
:
24.
ill
oppose Mercy, which accord-
own
those
doth accompany
us
as
being their cause, whether of
nature or by casual association {per accidens).
which
Hence
I pass to
accompanied by the idea of somewhat within us
are
as a
cause. 25. Self-contentment
himself and his
own
26. Humility
is
is
pleasure
bred of
a
man's contemplating
active power.
pain bred of a man's contemplating his
potence or infirmity.
own im-
AND PHILOSOPHY
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
222
Explanation,
understand by active
power.
Self-contentment
opposed
we own
to humility, so far as
pleasure that arises from contemplating our
a
it
is
But
so
far
we
as
also
understand by
it
a
pleasure
accompanied by the idea of some act which we conceive ourselves to a free resolve of the mind, then it is the opposite
have performed by
we
of repentance, which
Repentance
define thus
:
accompanied by the idea of some act which we conceive ourselves to have performed by a free resolve of 27.
pain
is
the mind. Explanation.
We
of this Part, and Propp. 53, 54, and 55 and mind, see Prop. 35, Part
Schol. to Prop. 51
As
Scholium.
have shown the causes of these emotions in the
to the free resolve of the
its
2,
But here it is also to be observed that 'tis no wonder that all acts in general which by custom are called wrong are followed by pain, and those which are called right by pleasure. For we may easily comprehend from what has been above said that this chiefly depends on education. Parents have so ordered it by reproving the one sort of actions and often rebuking their children therefor, and contrariwise commending and praising the other, that passions of pain And this is are joined with the one, but of pleasure with the other. For custom and religion likewise confirmed by actual experience. be not for all men the same ; but what is holy with some is profane with others, and what is honourable with some is base with others. Schol.
So that according particular deed or 28. Pride
is
Explanation.
man
every
as
is
brought up, he repenteth of a
maketh boast of the same.
to think too
The
highly of oneself by reason of self-love. of pride and over-esteem
difi^erence
latter hath regard to an outward object, but pride to the
esteeming himself overmuch. property of love, so thus defined, that
is
it
is
Now
as
over-esteem
pride of selfishness, and
this
emotion there
an
that the
himself,
or
eff'ect
therefore be also
self-love or self-contentment, in so far as
disposeth one to think too highly of himself.
To
may
is
is
man
is
none contrary.
it
See Prop. 26, Schol.
For no
man
thinks
too
meanly of himself through hating himself; nay there is no man thinks too meanly of himself, so far as he conceives that he cannot do
this or
that thing.
For whatever
a
man
conceives he cannot do,
that he necessarily conceives,^ and by that notion he 1
" Conceives as necessarily impossible
emend
"
the text so as to give this sense, but
is
so disposed
would be an improvement, and one might would be rash.
it
THE NATURE OF MAN
223
that in truth he cannot do that
which he conceives he cannot do. he conceives that he cannot do a thing, so long is his action not determined to that thing ; and therefore so long is it impossible that he should do it. But now if we consider such things For so long
as
depend merely on opinion, we can conceive how it may be that man should think too meanly of himself. It may happen that as
man is
in sorrow, while
he considers
despised by everybody
to
and
while other
this
Again,
a
he
infirmity, imagines that
in their thoughts than despising him.
less
too
;
own
his
a
men have nothing a man may think
meanly of himself if he deny somewhat of himself with regard a future time whereof he is uncertain as if he should suppose ;
that he can have no certain conceptions, or can desire and perform
nothing but wicked and base things, and the
man
Again we may say
like.
meanly of himself when we see that for exceeding fear of shame he will not adventure what others being his equals will. Thus we have an emotion fit to be opposed to pride, which I that a
thinks too
For
shall call dejection.
dejection of humility
;
as
pride
bred of self-contentment, so
is
and accordingly we define
29. Dejection [abtectio)
is
it
thus
is
:
meanly of oneself by reason
to think too
of displeasure. Nevertheless pride
Explanation.
we
but then
We
call that
consider the effects
man
proud^
who
wont to be opposed to humility of them rather than their nature. is
:
boasts exceedingly (see Prop. 30, Schol.),
who talks of nothing but excellence who would fain have precedence of
in
himself and faults in others,
all
others,
dignity and apparel used by those whose estate
Whereas we faults
and
and who
is
call
tells
him
humble^
who
who
who
aflects
the
much above his own. who confesses his own
is
often blushes,
of other men's excellence,
and
men, Howbeit
gives place to all
of a downcast carriage and negligent of his apparel.
these emotions, I say humility and dejection, are very scarce.
them with
For man's
power (see and hence those who pass for being most downPropp. 15 and 54) cast and humble are oftentimes the most self-seeking and envious. 30. Honour {gloria) is pleasure accompanied by the idea of some action of our own which we suppose to be praised by others. 31. Shame is pain accompanied by the idea of some action which nature, considered in
itself, strives
against
all its
;
we
suppose to be blamed by others. As to these see the Scholium to Prop. 30 of this Explanation.
Part.
I
shall
here
observe
the
difference
between
shame and
SPINOZA
224
Shame
modesty.
but modesty
:
HIS LIFE
the pain following a deed whereof one
is
any disgraceful action.
opposed shamelessness, which in
more
purposed 32.
is
:
as I
have already
This much now expounded as
to their application than to their nature.
and
Regret
;
in truth not an emotion, as I shall
is
of the emotions of pleasure and pain, which I have I
ashamed
whereby a man is modesty is commonly
To
But the names of the emotions,
due place.
noted, go
is
the apprehension or fear of shame,
is
restrained from
show
AND PHILOSOPHY
is
I
go on to those which I ascribe to Desire.
which the same time
the desire or appetite of possessing something,
nourished by the remembrance of that thing, and
at
checked by the remembrance of other things which exclude the ence of the thing so desired. Explanation.
When we remember
anything
(as
we have
exist-
often said
before), this of itself disposeth us to regard the thing with the
same
were actually present. But this disposition or effect, at least in waking hours, is mostly constrained by ideas of things which exclude the existence of the thing remembered by us. When therefore we remember a thing which affects us with any sort of pleasure, we at once endeavour to regard it with the same emotion of and this endeavour is thereupon pleasure as if it were present restrained by the remembrance of things which exclude its existence. emotion
as if it
;
Wherefore regret Schol. desire,
33.
in truth
is
from the absence of
arises
a
pain opposite to that pleasure which
a thing
we
hate, as to
which
But since the name of regret seemeth to I reckon this emotion among those of desire. Emulation is the desire of something excited in
Prop. 47, have regard to see
us
by our con-
ception that others have the like desire. Explanation.
When
one runs away
at seeing others
run or fears
at
on seeing that another hath burnt his hand, draws as if his own hand were burnt, we say that he imitates the emotion of the other, but not that he emulates him not because we know of any difference between the causes of emulation and of imitation, but because use will so have it that we speak of emulation only in him who imitates what he deems honourable, useful, seeing others
in his
fear, or
own hand and moves
:
or agreeable.
As
for the cause of emulation, see Prop.
And why
27 of this Part emotion doth mostly go in couples
and the Scholium. with envy, see Prop. 32 with the Scholium thereto. 34.
this
Thankfulness or gratitude
whereby we endeavour
to
is
do good
a desire or to
bent prompted by love
him who
has conferred benefit
THE NATURE OF MAN on us in the to Prop.
like disposition.
41 of
Anger
36. to
one
the desire of doing good to one
is
See Prop. 27, Schol. ill
[first]
Scholium
this Part.
Benevolence
35.
See Prop. 39, with the
225
a desire
is
whom we
Revenge
whom we
pity.
[2].^
whereby we
hate.
are impelled through hatred to
do
See Prop. 39.
whereby we are stirred up through mutual hath done ill to us with the like disposition. See Prop. 40, Coroll. 2, and the Scholium thereon. 38. Cruelty or barbarity {saevitia) is the desire whereby any one is 37.
hatred to do
ill
impelled to do
a desire
is
one
to
who
whom we love or pity. To cruelty is opposed clemency, which is
evil to
Explanation,
one
but the power of the mind whereby 39.
Fear
a
man
restrains anger
not a passion,
and revenge.
the desire of avoiding at the cost of a lesser evil a greater
is
one which we apprehend. 40. Daring
See Prop. 39, Schol. a desire whereby one is impelled to do somewhat
is
a danger which his peers are afraid to undergo. Cowardice is ascribed to him whose desire is checked by the 41. fear of a danger which his peers dare to undergo.
attended with
Cowardice therefore is naught else than the fear of an evil which most men are not wont to fear for which cause I reckon it not with the emotions of desire. Yet I have chosen to explain it Explanation.
;
here,
because, in so far as
opposition betwixt
attend to
the desire, there
is
a
true
and daring.
it
42. Consternation
is
checked by amazement Explanation.
we
ascribed to at the evil
Consternation
is
him whose
he
desire to avoid evil
is
fears.
therefore a kind of cowardice.
But
fear, it may be more conveniwhich holds a man in such bewilderment or distraction that he cannot remove the evil from him. I say bewilderment, so far as we understand his desire to remove the evil to be checked by amazement. And I say distraction, in so far as we conceive the same desire to be^ checked by the fear of another ill which whereby it comes to pass that he knows not equally vexeth him See the Scholia to Propp. against which of the two to defend himself. daring, Prop. As and see to cowardice 51, Schol. 39 and 52.
since consternation
ently defined
as
is
bred of a double
fear
:
43. Civility or deference {Jmmanitas sen modestid) is the desire of doing what pleaseth men and omitting what displeaseth them. 1
(Quoted above,
Q
p.
212, note.
AND PHILOSOPHY
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
226
44. Ambition
is
Explanation.
Ambition
an immoderate desire for honour. is
whereby
desire
a
nourished and fortified (by Prop. 27 and 31 of
the emotions are
all
this Part)
and there-
;
For so long as a man is " The of necessity holden by this withal. excels," saith Cicero, " the more is he led by honour yea
fore this emotion can scarce be overcome.
holden by any desire, he
more
a
man
is
:
the philosophers write books of despising honour and glory, and set
names to them." 45. Luxury is unrestrained
their
(which you will)
desire or love
of
feasting.
46. Drunkenness
unrestrained desire and love of drinking.
is
47. Avarice is unrestrained desire and love of wealth. 48. Lust is in the like manner desire and love in bodily intercourse.
Whether
Explanation.
commonly Prop.
to
and
chastity,
a passion
which
as to
I
be restrained or not,
desire
last
For deference
And though
man
shall
may be
it
that an
abstain from excess in these
yet avarice, ambition, and fear are not contraries to luxury,
kinds,
to stuff
or
nothing
For an avaricious man
lust.^
himself with food and drink
ambitious man, so long ;
as
he hopes
it
at
is
oftentimes
another man's
may be
An
hid, will stint himself in
indeed, if he live in drunken and debauched company, his
timid man, he doth what he would not.
For though
cast his wealth into the sea to escape death, yet
so if a lustful
man
is
he
is
for the
a miser should
a miser
And
in general
still
;
and
these emotions regard not
the acts of feasting, drinking, and so forth,
appetite and liking.
As
grieved that he cannot follow his bent, he ceases
not thereby to be lustful.
much
eager
charges.
ambition will but make him the more prone to those vices.
So that nothing can be opposed
but high-mindedness and valour {generositatem
"
kind of
itself a
is
have already noted of these also that they express not
but a power of the mind.
drunkenness,
more
is
For temperance, soberness,
see Prop. 29, Schol.
avaricious, ambitious, or timid
so
it
these five emotions as noted in the Schol.
have no contraries.
56)
ambition,
this
And
called lust.
et
as
the inward
to these
animositatem),
emotions
whereof
presently.^
Castitati in the
Latin text by an obvious
slip.
Animositas and generositas are the two species of Cp. Prop. 59 of this Part, Schol. " Per animositatem intelligo cupiditatem qua unusquisque conatur suum esse fort'itudo. ^
ex solo rationis dictamine conservare.
Per generositatem autem cupiditatem intelligo
qua unusquisque ex solo rationis dictamine conatur reliquos homines iuvare iungere."
et sibi amicitia
THE NATURE OF MAN The
227
definitions of jealousy
and other perturbations of the mind I pass over in silence, as well because they spring from the compounding of the emotions already defined, as because they mostly have no special names w^hich is a sign that for the uses of life it sufficeth to have a :
And it is established from those definiwhich we have expounded that they all have their
general knowledge of them. tions of the
emotions
from Desire, Pleasure, or Pain
none beside is wont to be called by divers names after the divers presentments and tokens of them in outward operation. Considering these primitive emotions and that which we have above
rise
;
or rather that there be
these three, every one whereof
said of the nature of the so far as they
mind, we may
now
thus define the emotions,
have regard to the mind alone.
GENERAL DEFINITION OF THE EMOTIONS Emotion, which
is
called a passion {pathema) of the soul,
a
is
confused
whereby the mind affirms a greater or less faculty of existence^ in its body or some part thereof than it had before, and on the occurrence of which the mind itself is determined to think on one thing more than idea
another. Explanation.
confused idea.
For
emotion or passion
we have shown
(Prop.
3
in the soul
of this Part) that the
a
is
mind
far
as it
hath inadequate or confused ideas.
the
mind
affirms a greater or less
Next,
only so
"whereby
suffers
say
First, I say that
power of existence
I
in
some part thereof than it had before." For all ideas of [other] bodies which we have denote rather the existing disposition of our own body than the nature of the external body (Part 2, Prop. But the idea wherein an emotion really consists must 16, Cor. 2). denote or express the disposition oi the body or some part thereof, because the body's active power or faculty of existing is increased or its
body
or
diminished, forwarded or hindered.
It
is
to be
observed that
when
I
say " a greater or less faculty of existence than before," I intend not
body with a past one, but that the idea wherein the being of the emotion doth consist affirms of the body something which in fact involves more or less that the
mind compares the present
of reality than before. this,
1
that
it
And
disposition of the
since the nature of the
affirms the real present existence of
Existendi vis really
means neither more nor
less
its
mind
consists in
body (Part
than exhtentia.
See
p.
2,
Prop.
203, above.
228 II
SPINOZA
:
HIS LIFE
AND PHILOSOPHY
and 13) and we mean by perfection the nature of the thing
itself;
hence it follows that the mind passes to a greater or less perfection when it happens to it to affirm somewhat of its body or some part thereof
which involves more or said
less
of reality than before.
above that the mind's power of thinking
I desired to
have only
own body
this
is
When
therefore I
increased or diminished,.
meaning, that the mind formed an idea of
some part thereof which expressed more or less reality For the dignity of than it had formerly affirmed of the same body. ideas and the present power of thinking are measured by the dignity of Lastly I have added the object. "and on the occurrence of which the mind itself is determined to think on one thing more than another," that besides the nature of pleasure and pain, which the first part of the
its
or
:
definition explains, T might also express that of desire.
:
CHAPTER
VIII
THE BURDEN OF MAN Denn Zu
Kraft dringt vorwarts in
alle
die
Weite,
und zu wirken hier und dort j Dagegen engt und hemmt von jeder Seite Der Strom der Welt und reisst uns mit leben
sich fort
j
In diesem innern Sturm und aussern Streite
Vernimmt
Von
j
der
die alle
Mensch
Befreit der
iS~
schwer verstanden
der Geist ein
Gewalt,
Wesen
Wort
bindet,
sich, der sich iiberwindet.
Goethe, Die
Once
read thy
And
Man
own
breast right.
thou hast done with fears
gets
no other
Geheimnisse.
j
light.
Search he a thousand years.
Sink
in thyself
!
there ask
what
Having
that shrine.
ails thee, at
Matthew
Arnold, Empedocles
ofi
Et?:a.
concluded his purely scientific analysis of the springs of
action and passion, Spinoza proceeds to expound in the fourth
Part of the Ethics "the slavery of man, or the power of the
In a short preface he explains the notions of good
emotions."
and
evil, as
When the same
a
he conceives them.
man
hath determined to make something and brought
to pass, not only that
man
but' also every one that rightly
the
mind and aim which
if a
man
finished)
will call
it.
see
work had.
work (which
that the aim of
its
work
perfect,
or conceives himself to
the author of that
a particular
and knows
knows
call his
author
I
assume is
know
For example, to
be not yet
to build a house,
he
the house imperfect, but contrariwise perfect whenever he
work brought to the end which its author proposed to make But if a man sees a work the like whereof he hath never seen,
sees the
of
shall
himself will
:
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
230
AND PHILOSOPHY
nor knows the mind of the workman, that
work be perfect
A
'tis
plain he cannot tell whether
or not.
may remark in passing, which deserves much part of those who discuss natural theology, but
sentence, one
meditation on the
has been before the world these two centuries without producing
much
result
in
the digression will
it
:
and
we
if
pause awhile to discuss the idea contained be
less
than
seems.
it
depends Spinoza's view of ethical good and his
whole theory of ethics. The argument from design
of the obvious objections to
it,
in all
its
evil,
common
For on
this
and consequently forms, and most
proceed on the assumption that
we
have some independent knowledge of what the designs of nature are or
may
What we
be expected to be.
animated nature,
find in nature, especially
fitness in various degrees for various purposes
is
;
organs of sense for example, ranging from a rudimentary state in the lower animals to the delicate and complex apparatus possessed
To
by the highest.
say that this comes of design, and that the
particular degree of fitness
assumption
as far
degrees of fitness
as ;
was designed
the evidence of nature goes.
for
Everything that
possible
since
;
then and there,
which was
I
is
a pure
speak of
to talk of absolute fitness in nature, as
popular teleology does or recently did, facts.
in each case,
exists
is
merely to disregard the
indeed in one sense the
is
fittest
would not be the thing existing but the place would be filled by something else
if it
fitter
were not
so, it
under the given conditions.
In other words,
not a bare fact but a continuing process, and at every moment of the process the particular set of conditions has one and only one possible result. This was long ago seen in a general way by Hume, and has been fixed as a distinct scientific concepexistence
tion by
is
Mr. Darwin's discovery of
striking concrete form.
But
if
it
in
a
we assume
most important and a particular designed
purpose, as seeing in the case of the eye, and inquire if the means are as perfect as they conceivably might be, we shall generally if
Thus the human eye, connot always find that they are not. sidered as an optical instrument, has more than one grave defect and the human ankle-joint is inconveniently weak in proportion to the strain thrown upon it by man's erect attitude in standing
THE BURDEN OF MAN and walking.
If,
given conditions
again, is
we
231
say that the greatest fitness under
equivalent to absolute fitness, and
in fact
is
the standard of perfection in
human workmanship, it must be human workmanship we know that
observed that in the case of
workman
the
ditions as to
control,
we
did not
which we
make
his conditions
are uncertain
suspend our judgment
how as
;
far
or, if there
be con-
they were within his
to the
of his work
part
by them. Now in the case of the universe we have not knowledge, and the suspense of judgment must needs be
affected this
indefinite.
We
cannot separate the work from the conditions.
In order to arrive at any
final
judgment we ought
to
know
whether the conditions themselves were given with any and what and if so, whether or not subject to other conditions. And thus the inquiry would become endless, and we should never have anything solid to show for it. In short, the frame of nature is what it is, neither more nor less. If we believe it to be the design,
work of an extremely powerful being, of intelligence and activities more or less analogous to our own, then we must also believe that was and is intended to be just what it is. What inferences of any practical value could be drawn from that conclusion is rather too wide a question to be taken in the course of a digression. Some of those which might be drawn by an observer confining it
himself strictly to the evidence would be
as
follows
:
that if the
being in question took any pleasure in his operations,
it
could
only be the purely intellectual pleasure of working out a set of fixed rules,
own
which he might
possibly be supposed to have fixed
choice with that pleasure in view
by
no conception of pain, and was therefore regardless of the amount of it that might be involved in executing the grand scheme of the universe (for one would not gratuitously ascribe malice to him) and that if that scheme had any ulterior object, it was not the happiness of living creatures generally or of any particular species These inferences, however, are not such as expounders of them. his
;
that he had
;
of natural theology either desire or profess to arrive at ; and, as I do not myself attach any particular validity to the assumptions on
which they would depend, it seems needless to dwell on them. It is possible and common, on the other hand, for theologians
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
232
AND PHILOSOPHY
well within the limits of orthodoxy to hold that this present
world
is
With
not and was intended not to be a happy one.
opinion also
But now
we
this
are not concerned here.
us assume [that
let
pendent grounds.
Will
we
much
take us
this
on inde-
believe in design farther
We
?
still
cannot criticize the works of nature by the analogy of the productions
of
human
art
knowing
without
objects and conditions are similar
:
we
what extent the
to
therefore
shall
same condition of absolute suspense.
ourselves in the
known from
If
still
find
we
take
is a work of wisdom and goodness, and perfectly adapted to fulfil some purpose which does not appear on the face of things, and which
it
as
other sources that the universe
perfect
we
we have
can only partly understand, then
But
account of the whole matter.
it
after
a sort an
an account which the
is
witness of nature itself cannot either add to or confirm in any
Detailed criticism and detailed apologies
way.
tone of modern natural theology at times rather in vacuo.
of nature as is it
It
if it
is
with the
for
such
in
human
least possible
Plainly because the available
is
the
are alike in the air, or
to speak of the wastefulness
But why
were something requiring an excuse.
esteemed a merit
result
uncommon
not
—
—
operations to effect the desired
expenditure of
work and
work and
materials
materials are limited.
?
If
the resources of the universe were at one's disposal, there would
be no occasion for economy. tion in the matter, intelligence
we might
commanding
all
wasteful as nature actually
So
far as
we can form any
expecta-
reasonably expect a magnified
human
the powers of nature to be at least as
is.^
The
stability or instability
—
of the
We
would likewise do well " Cp. Berkeley, Principles of Human Knoivledge, § 152 to examine whether our taxing the waste of seeds and embryos, and accidental destruction of plants and animals, before they come to full maturity, as an imprudence in 1
:
the Author of nature, be not the effect of prejudice contracted by our familiarity with In man, indeed, a thrifty management of those things impotent and saving mortals.
which he cannot procure without much pains and industry may be esteemed wisdom. But we must not imagine that the inexplicably fine machine of an animal or vegetable costs the great Creator any more pains or trouble in its production than a pebble doth :
nothing being more evident than that an omnipotent every thing by a mere fat or act of his will.
Hence
it
Spirit is
can indifferently produce
plain that the splendid pro-
fusion of natural things should not be interpreted weakness or prodigality in the agent
who
produces them, but rather be looked on as an argument of the riches of his power."
THE BURDEN OF MAN
233
existing order of nature cannot, in like manner, be judged perfect or imperfect unless we know whether or not the order was in-
tended to be permanent.
It was an accepted opinion till very system was a self-maintaining and self-compensating machine which, if left to itself, would go on for ever.
lately that the solar
And, strangely enough,
was commonly held by the same persons who extolled this as a perfection that the solar system, or at any rate the part of it inhabited by mankind, was intended to last only a few thousand years, and at the end of that time to be destroyed.
On
it
their assumptions the designer of the solar system acted like a
who
builder
should put a stone house where a wooden shed would
have done as well
were a mere display of magnificence like that of a barbaric prince at whose command whole palaces rise for the service of a day's festival, and are swept away with all their ornaments when the feast is over. For precisely the same reasons, it would be absurd to say that the instability
now
:
indeed,
unless,
it
discovered by science in the constitution of the solar
any mark of imperfection. And if we believe that we have evidence or presumption from other quarters of a design
system
is
tending to the dissolution of the present state of nature, then quite fair to speculate on the physical
atoms or the designer
may
like)
by which
might be carried out. Again, a choice of means either by external
conditions or by some reason of his sensible world and
information) that ideas of design
a finite being,
ments
as
its
may know
order
means (imperfect vortex-
it
be limited in his
or reasons the spectator
it
is
own
;
and of these conditions
nothing.
certain (apart
we know nothing
In the case of the
from supernatural
of them whatever.
and perfection are derived from the
working
for definite objects
he can procure
:
it is
All our
efforts of
man,
and with such instru-
and the attempt to find something
answering to them in the constitution of the universe leads to All this was most clearly nothing but insoluble perplexities. seen by Spinoza, and the mastery of his conceptions, whether
from himself or from some other teacher, is the first condition of any free and rational treatment of the questions which I do not beset the boundaries of our positive knowledge. learnt
mean
that
it
is
necessary to
accept Spinoza's ideas, but
that
it
AND PHILOSOPHY
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
234
necessary to
is
know
of their existence and
to
understand
them.
The
primary meaning of such terms
and imperfect
as perfect
is
according to Spinoza not only relative, but relative to the accom-
plishment of some particular design. ideas leads
men
But the formation of general
to take their general idea of a species or kind as a
standard, and regard every departure from
And
this
way
of thinking and speaking
to natural and to artificial productions,
is
an imperfection.
as
it
applied indiscriminately
though we cannot ascribe
design, or therefore apply any test of perfection in this sense, to
nature as a whole.
For that eternal and
infinite
being which
we
call
God
or nature
by the same necessity wherewith it exists ... so that the reason or cause why God or nature acts, and why he exists, is one and the same. As therefore he exists not for the sake of any end, so he acts for the sake of none but hath as well of existing as of acting no beginning nor end. That which is called a final cause is nothing but acts
;
the desire of
man
itself,
considered
As when we say
anything.
as
the origin or primary cause of
that to be inhabited was the final cause of
we understand merely
this
or that house, then
man
having conceived in his mind the conveniency of dwelling in a
plain
'tis
house, was thereupon desirous to build
this,
that a
it.
Perfection and imperfection, then, are relative notions or ways
of thinking, dependent on our classification and comparison of things.
If
we
them on
try to apply
a universal scale, the only
class-notion remaining with us for the purpose
issimum of mere being, and of being or reality.
we must measure
Thus Spinoza
perfection by
explains his
tion of perfection as identical with reality.^
regards
it,
or tends in this place to regard
aspect of things to finite
" plus
the genus general-
is
it,
own And as
amount
former definiapparently he
only a particular
minds that one should appear to have
entitatis seu realitatis "
than another.
But on
this
he
is
not
exphcit.
The
ethical notions of
good and
tion and imperfection, as applied to 1
Eth.
ii.
evil are the
human
def. 6.
notions of perfec-
character and conduct
THE BURDEN OF MAN by means of
normal idea or standard of man.
a
are in themselves relative
Music
man
deaf
for a
good
is
is
man
melancholic patient, bad for a neither good nor bad. But though
for a
it is
type of
as a
human
For since
is
means
a
nature
assured
is
we
we
of
itself,
exist
;
less
now
more
as
us, it w^ill
we
or
;
and by
ez^i/
which we
that
not
of
axiom
"
No
is
known
which we do not know
production are
its
particular thing
There nature which
fulfilled.
found in
is
not exceeded in power and strength by some other
is
may
a part of nature
depends the strength of
;
his
first
but what-
can be
found,
powers are limited and subject to
On
human
passions
;
external causes,
for passion
of the mind under an external cause.
proposition of the
:
be destroyed."
be overmastered by external causes.
fication
is
be taken, another more powerful first
defined as
to be necessary or impos-
a single
whereby the
by a
equally well conceive to exist or not to
is
thing
that,
to be necessary or impossible in respect
conditions, or as to
its
:
are
Further,
which we need only say
introduced, a contingent thing
first
the conditions required for
Man
are assured
or less perfect, as they approach this
a possible thing as one not
soever
be
By
have mentioned.
nearly.
known which we can
is
sible in respect if
men
definitions follow, of
which
that
set before ourselves
of
pattern more or
distinction
yet
so,
form an
desire to
hindrance to our copying of the same pattern.
a
shall speak
Some
I
in grief;
be
this
approaching more and more nearly to the pattern of
for
human
wq
understand hereafter that which
I shall therefore
the terms
man
nature to be set before
convenient to keep these words in the sense good
That
obvious.
these words are to be kept in use.
idea of
235
practical importance, that
is
too,
the modi-
Hence flows a "emotion cannot
be controlled or removed, save by a contrary emotion stronger
than that which
is
to be controlled."
^
Repeatedly one
is
led to
and ask oneself if they really have read him and here one stops to doubt whether this most true and pregnant statement can ever have been considered by those who represent Spinoza as a framer of mere intellectual puzzles, having marvel at Spinoza's
critics,
:
no root
in the deeper part
of man's feehngs. 1
Eth.
iv. 7.
It
is
not insignificant
SPINOZA
236
HIS LIFE
:
AND PHILOSOPHY
which however would not add much to the convicmodern reader, is in form physiological. Hence know-
that the proof, tion of a
ledge, as such,
is
incompetent to restrain the passions
that effect only in
so
far
as
it
is
an emotion.^
:
it
can have
And
in
fact
knowledge of good or evil is in the nature of pleasure or pain ; for it is by reference to supposed utility, which involves reference to pleasure and pain, that we determine any particular thing to be good or evil. Thus " the knowledge of good and evil is nothing else than an emotion of pleasure or pain, in so far as we are conscious thereof." Observe that this knowledge, or in English it would be better to say judgment, is not as yet assumed to be correct. Or, if we say that pleasure as such is always good, and pain as such always bad, which Spinoza does say later (Pr. 41 of this Part), we may affirm that an immediate judgment of good or evil
correct in
is
itself,
but not necessarily so with regard to
concomitants and consequences.
judgment [vera
may
But even
honi et mail cognitio)
if
we have
a true
the emotion produced by
not prevail over other emotions conflicting with
it.
it
For
emotion due to a present exciting cause is, other things being equal, stronger than that which proceeds from contemplation of something distant in time or place and so memory and expecta:
tion are themselves their objects
;
more
intense in proportion to the nearness of
unless indeed the remoteness in time of the different
compared be such that for our imagination both are practiAgain, that which we conceive as necessary affects infinite.^
objects cally
us
more strongly than In
tingent.
that
which
is
conceived
as possible or
con-
this and other ways the desires arising from a true
knowledge of good and evil may be restrained or suppressed by others arising from divers contrary emotions. And in particular " the desire arising from the knowledge of good and evil, so far as
knowledge has regard to the future, may easily be constrained or extinguished by the desire of things which are agreeable in the present." ^ Hence the weakness of human nature and the difficulty hence the danger of wrongof obeying the dictates of reason doing in the face of knowledge, whereof the Preacher said. He that this
-,
increaseth ^
knowledge increaseth sorrow.
Prop. 14.
^
Prop.
9, 10.
We
see that Spinoza felt ^
Prop. 16.
^
THE BURDEN OF MAN
237
profoundly and acutely the need of understanding being " touched with emotion " before it can bring forth the fruit of good living. But his purpose is not to discourage men from well-doing.
This
I say
not for any such purpose
as to conclude that ignorance chosen before knowledge, or that a fool and a man of understanding differ nothing as to the control of their passions ; but because
is
to be
know as well the power as the weakness of our nature, determine what reason can and cannot do in controlling
it is
needful to
that
we may
And
the passions.
of
human
in this part, as I
shall
I
treat
only
For of the power of reason over the passions
weakness.
am minded
have promised,
I
to treat apart.
Leaving
then, for future consideration
it,
following reason
is
how
the power of
to be acquired, Spinoza proceeds to set forth
what the precepts of reason are. He begins with a summary introduction which gives the leading ideas of his ethical system in a wonderfully short compass.
Since reason demands nothing against nature,
man do
that every
which
is
perfection
;
love himself, seek his
and
truly so),
that the
whole
nothing
else
is
:
it
man
greater than
this
as
to
maintain his
follows in the
first
own
him
necessary a truth
Then forasmuch own
part.
its
is
that
to greater
so far as in
than acting by the proper laws of one's
no man endeavours laws
And
being.
mean
interest (I
desire whatsoever truly leads a
own
demands
therefore
and generally that every man endeavour,
maintain his
lies, to
own
it
as
as virtue is
nature,
and
being otherwise than by those
place that the foundation of virtue
is
this
very endeavour, and that happiness doth consist in a man's having power to maintain his own being. Secondly it follows that virtue is to be desired for
its
own
sake,
can be found for w^hose sake follows that
men who
kill
and nothing preferable or more useful it
should be desired.
And
thirdly,
it
themselves are infirm of mind, and merely
overcome by external causes repugnant to their own nature.^ Again, ^ that we never it follows from the fourth postulate of the second Part 1
Prop. 17, Schol.
2
It
is
difficult to see
why
a point of detail like
this
should be
made
Can Spinoza have been thinking of Uriel Da Costa ? 3 " The human body has need for its maintenance of many other is
constantly as
it
were refashioned."
so
bodies,
prominent.
whereby
it
;
SPINOZA
238
can bring
it
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
:
we need nothing
to pass that
outside us to maintain our
being, or live without any conversation with things that are outside us
moreover we consider our own mind, our understanding would surely be less perfect if the mind were alone and understood not anything beyond itself. Thus there be many things outside us, which are
and
if
Among
useful for us and therefore to be desired.
these none
more
excellent can be thought of than such as wholly agree with our
nature
:
since if
they make a therefore,
two individuals of the same nature
new
men
can be sought by
are joined together,
individual twice as powerful as either.
so useful to
is
man
man
as
own
Nothing,
nothing more excellent, I
;
towards maintaining their being than that
say, all
all things as that the minds and bodies of all should were one mind and one body, and all together strive to maintain their being to the best of their power, and all together seek
should so agree in
make up
as it
common
the
of
interest
governed by reason, or
who
of reason, desire nothing
men
;
and therefore
This
is
Hence
all.
seek their
also they
given expressly
this principle,
ovv^n interest,
quite distinctly laid
down
the
men who
are
interest after the guidance
be
just, faithful,
as a short
and honourable.
preliminary sketch, in order
who might
be disposed to think is
to seek his
the beginning of wickedness, and not of virtue
is
But
notice
own
that
namely, that every man's duty
and righteousness." to
follows
themselves which they desire not for other
for
to obviate the prejudices of those
"that
it
singular
the outlines of an ethical system are ;
and we may conveniently pause here
resemblance to Stoic doctrine.
A
Hfe
according to reason, w^hich consists in following out the law of one's
own
nature, or self-preservation in the fullest sense, was pre-
which the Stoics aimed at. What they meant by following nature, however vague the phrase appears in itself, is It is the the same that Spinoza means by suum esse conservare. cisely that
putting forth and maintenance of the activities proper to the individual and the species.
With them no
less
than with Spinoza
self-conservation was the ultimate spring of action.
For them, likewise,
it is
a fundamental
society of his fellow-men can fulfil
man
axiom
that only in the
effectually preserve his being,
the law of his specific welfare, or, as they said, "follow
nature."
Both the
character of
man
Stoics and Spinoza
as a
fact
of
common
seem
to treat the social
experience not open to
;
THE BURDEN OF MAN contradiction and requiring no proof. egoistic that they admit as a
own
seek his their first
mediate axioms
is
it is
morality
a
is
is
part,
not
selfish
;
for the
so far
is
man must
very
the contradiction of selfishness.
as
is
of
first
The
the welfare of the society of
the Stoics said, a limb.
Practical
therefore not individual but social, and the reasonable
can find his
and doing good
There
or,
Their morality
principle that every
first
condition of a man's welfare
which he
man
But
welfare.
239
own
weal only by pursuing the
common
weal
to his fellow-men.
are other points of coincidence, for
terminism which
is
example the de-
hardly less prominent in the Stoics than in
Spinoza, and the stress laid on the active nature of virtue.
On
the other hand there are great differences in the general philo-
The
of the two systems.
were devoted adherents of teleology, which Spinoza wholly rejects and to the same thing as to follow reason, follow nature was to them
sophical
bases
Stoics
;
because they held nature, both in specific forms,
to
general constitution and in
be eminently reasonable.
speak of " following Nature "
them of following
its
as
Spinoza could not
they did, though he speaks with
reason, and coincides with Stoic language even
in the detail of ascribing
freedom
as a special
honourable attribute
" The wise man alone is free, to the wise or reasonable man. and the fool is a slave " was one of the famous Stoic paradoxes a :
wisdom in the Stoic sense is an ideal state of passionless perfection which hardly any one attains, and whoever has not attained this wisdom is yet in the outer darkness A form of speech like this might easily have been of folly. paradox for
this reason, that
picked up by Spinoza from Horace or Cicero ; but as to the deeper resemblances, I do not think they are to be ascribed to imitation, for the
very reason that they go so
Spinoza'"S
far
down.
It
is
certain that
acquaintance with Greek philosophy was superficial
anything he
knew
of the Stoics must have been at second-hand,
and the resemblances in question have much more the air of being due to independent work on parallel lines than of being derived
from second-hand information.
One
very characteristic point
of Spinoza's ethical theory, the doctrine that emotion can be controlled only by emotion, is entirely absent from the teaching
SPINOZA
240
They
of the Stoics. light but heat
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
:
pure reason to furnish not only
to
trust
and motive power, thus ignoring the strength and
bondage of the passions, the "affectuum vires" on v^hich Spinoza so minutely and pitilessly dv^ells. The difference may not be of importance if we compare the two systems as working systems of morality, in which point of view they seem almost identical. For the mental discipline and contemplation recommended by the Stoics are of a kind well fitted to produce the moral emotion required by Spinoza and all the best modern great
practical
moralists as a necessary condition of righteousness, or rather the
we
constant reserve of moral emotion which
And,
if
the disposition be produced,
purposes whether
it
call a
matters Httle for practical
it
due place in the
finds its
moral temper.
scientific
account of
This temper of moral devotion, and the means of maintaining it, were indeed
the process given by the teachers. if
one
may
so call
recognized
it,
of importance
as
example, they are not unfre-
for
;
quently considered by Marcus Aurelius
;
but these reflexions go
by side with positive statements that the mere knowledge ot or in other good and evil suffices to overcome evil impulses words that vice is nothing but ignorance. The scientific advance of Spinoza's doctrine upon this is very
side
3
great,
and
The
is
of
itself
enough
to establish his independent merit.^
following propositions, in which Spinoza works out the
doctrines briefly sketched in the passage
last
translated,
fall
into
four groups.
The
first
deals
virtue (Prop. 19-25) tion of ethical
with :
self-
maintenance
as
the foundation of
the second with intelligence as the founda-
judgment (26-28)
men
:
the third with the
common
ground of social ethics (29-37) the fourth considers in detail what bodily and mental affections are good or bad with reference to man's common weal, and herein nature and interests of
as the
â&#x20AC;˘
lastly, of the conduct and duties of the reasonable man (38-73) the ethical maxims are collected and restated in an Appendix. :
First, the self-maintaining activity
For virtue 1
On
the
is
active power, and
resemblance
and
Trendelenburg, Histor. Beitrage,
contrast iii.
is
power between
396, 397.
the foundation of virtue. is
the affirmation of the
Spinoza
and
the
Stoics,
compare
THE BURDEN OF MAN Living must come before living
agent's existence.
man
241
can desire a virtuous
w^ithout also desiring
life
and no
w^ell, life
itself.
"Virtuous action, as such (ex virtute absolute agere)^ is in us nothing else than to act, live, or maintain one's omn being (these three are all one) according to reason and on the footing of seeking our ow^n interest."
Now
^
mind is understanding, since the proper nature of the human mind is to understand so that the self-maintaining endeavour which is the beginning of virtue is an endeavour after understanding. Hence good is whatever the self-affirmation of the
:
helps the understanding, evil whatever hinders
good
To know God
(in other
and knowledge,
activity,
The mind
and the highest
is
good
for its
know-
other knowledge and existence.
all
words to know the order of nature and
regard the universe as orderly) ;
;
the knowledge of God, the most complete object of
is
ledge and the condition of
mind
it
is
the highest function of the
as the perfect
own
form of the mind's normal
sake and not as a means.
attempt to reduce the proper nature and function of the
which is made in Pr. 26, is open to much criticism. It depends on the doctrine that all real action is a function of intellect (Part 3, Pr. 3) but even assuming this, " " the self-maintaining effort of the mind quatenus ratiocinatur is briefly taken as equivalent to and involving the maintenance or The supremacy of reason is insuffiwelfare of the whole man. to pure intelligence,
:
ciently explained and not proved at is
no doubt connected with the
intellect,
the
fifth
The
Spinoza's position here
all.
Peripatetic theory of the active
and prepares the way for the peculiar developments of Part of the Ethics.
next group of propositions leads up to the social grounds
more ingenious For than convincing, and seems not even formally invulnerable. instance, "commune aliquid nobiscum " in Prop. 29 appears to be used in a different sense from " cum nostra natura commune,"
of morality by a chain of formal proof which
in Prop.
30
:
and Prop. 30
is
difficult
to
is
follow.
It
is
easy to
understand the position of Prop. 29, that we cannot be affected for good or harm by anything which has not " commune aliquid 1
Prop. 24.
R
AND PHILOSOPHY
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
242
nobiscum " e.g. bodily hurt must be inflicted by a material body. But how then can we say with Prop. 30 that a thing is never hurtful " per id quod cum nostra natura commune habet " ? One :
human body may
hurt another very much, by knocking
or otherwise.
we
If
body being human, but on properties of matter
himself:
its
remain
still
common
being a solid body, the
A
:
B much
and hurts
runs against
true he might have hurt himself as
it is
down
it
say that this depends not on the assailing
more
or
by running against a post. But in any case the properties of mass and impenetrability are common to A's body and B's, and are of the essence of the hurt that follows.
For
if parts
of A's
body and B's could be in the same place at once, there would be no resistance, no violent compression of the colliding parts, and no hurt. Or if natura includes, as it probably does, the amount and distribution of energy in the particular material system Prop. 39), still the difference or incongruousness between the disturbed system and the external body is not of
affected
(cp.
There
kind but of degree.
"aliquid
is still
commune."
I
think
must be allowed that Spinoza's way of talking of natura in this and similar passages is not free from residual entanglements of it
scholasticism.
Spinoza's object
is
show
to
that
men
disagree only in so far as
they are swayed by passion, and agree in so
far as
Passion being an infirmity or negation,
by reason.
be said to agree in
it
;
just as
position that " in so far as
and necessarily agree," is
more
men
is
live
men
cannot
an abuse of language to say that
it is
white and black are similar in not being red.
which
they are governed
The
counter-pro-
according to reason, they always
supported by an appeal to experience
satisfactory than the formal reasoning.
Experience likewise bears witness
to our proposition
every day, so
and abundantly that it is a common speech, that man is as a God to man. Yet it seldom happens that men live according to reason ; but such is their fashion that they mostly bear ill will and do mischief clearly
to
one another.
that
Nevertheless they cannot endure a
the definition of
approved
:
as
indeed
venience than hurt
it
man is
arises
as
a social
life
of solitude, so
animal hath been in general
the truth of the matter that far more con-
from the
common
fellowship of
men
{i.e.
THE BURDEN OF MAN even
when
satirists
they do not live according to reason).
make
human
sport of
logians decry
them
and churlish
life,
;
let
affairs
much
as
as
243 Wherefore
they will
let
theo-
let
;
the
misanthropes do their utmost to extol a rude
despising men, and admiring the brutes
:
yet
men
needs are much best satisfied by mutual help, and by joining their strength they can escape the dangers that everywhere beset them ; not to say how much more excellent it is and worthy of our knowledge to consider the actions of men than of beasts.^ shall find that their
that only
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;strange second-hand â&#x20AC;&#x201D; the character
Passages of this kind give to Spinoza's system
may
know it only at common sense and herein he shows an
appear to such as
of a morality of
as this
:
affinity
which in this particular place is conspicuous. The position that good men are naturally friends, and that theirs is the best and only durable friendship, is dwelt upon with some fulness in the Eighth Book of the Nicomachean to Aristotle's cast of thought
Ethics.^
And
of reasonable
Aristotle calls to witness the ordinary experience
men
in very
much
this case imitation or derivation
Spinoza
knew
way
the same is
Spinoza.
as
In
wholly out of the question
:
Aristotle only in the distorted version given by so-
The work
called Aristotelian philosophy.
of restoring Aristotle
to his true place has hardly been effected even yet
:
in Spinoza's
had not been begun. Spinoza goes on to show that the highest good aimed at by virtuous or reasonable men is common to all and may be equally time
it
enjoyed by
all,
and that the virtuous
for his fellows as for himself:
^
man
and he
foundations of civil society and law.
desires the
down
lays
same good
in outline the
His position, expressed in
modern language, would be that society is antecedent to law that legal right and wrong can exist only with reference to a government, and moral right and wrong only with reference to a community. The form in which he states it, however, is that " every one exists by an absolute natural right," and pursues by the j
same right whatever he supposes
men
to be his
own
lived according to reason, their desires 1
2
Cap.
3, sqq.
I
am
interest.
Pr. 35, Schol.
Pr. 36, 37.
all
and pursuits would
indebted for this parallel to Prof, Land. 3
If
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
244
never clash, and the "
summum
without further definition. passions,
and one man's
they can
live
AND PHILOSOPHY
naturae ius " would suffice them
But, since in fact
men
are subject to
with another's,
desires are incompatible
together and form a society only on the footing of
mutual concession.
This concession
is
guaranteed by the
authority of the society, operating not by reason
common
(for the passions
can be restrained only by stronger passion) but by the
fear
of
The course of living prescribed by the community " and the community thus under the sanction of a penalty^ is law
penalties.
:
by laws and the power of self-maintenance is called a and those who are within its protection citizens." Good and ill desert, justice and injustice, depend on the political order and exist only in the political or social state, " where it is ordained by established state,
common to
consent what
obey the
good and bad, and every man
is
bound
is
civil authority."
man
owner of anything by common consent, nor does anything exist which can be said to be one man's more than another's but all things are all men's, and thus in the state In the state of nature no
is
;
of nature
we
own,^ nor yet of depriving any one of that which
done
man
cannot conceive any purpose of giving every is
his
:
that
is,
nothing
in the state of nature can be called either just or unjust.
becomes possible only consent what belongs
where that man.
in the civil state, to this
and
to
it is
ordained by
his
This
common
Here we have a first sketch of Spinoza's theory of law and poHtics, which coincides in the main with that of Hobbes, and so anticipates in
by the ever
its
broad features the analysis adopted and developed
English school of jurisprudence. In this place howmeagrely and not quite opportunely presented, and is not
later
it is
seen to advantage. tinguish in any
we now
call
One
is
struck by the capital omission to dis-
way between
positive
positive civil law, custom,
morality.
The
and what
obvious fact that moral
wrong-doing extends far beyond disobedience to the civil law, which leaves untouched many things commonly judged worthy of the strongest moral disapprobation, appears to be simply ignored. In order to make Spinoza's account complete even in outline on 1
Voluntas unicuique suum tribuendl
in the civil
law
(iustitia est
:
alluding to the familiar definition of justice
constans et perpetua voluntas ius
suum
cuique tribuens,
I.
i.
i).
THE BURDEN OF MAN own ground and from
its
own
its
conception of positive morality
aims
at
as
245
we need
point of view,
a kind of informal law
the
which
governing conduct in a particular society, and acts through
the sanctions of collective approbation and disapprobation, being
administered not by any set tribunal or officers, but by the members of the community at large. But on these points we need not dwell at present.
Next comes
common
and hurtful to man's useful
is
which tends
language of
his
what things
the consideration in detail of
In the
estate.
to preserve
first
are useful
place, everything
Spinoza puts
life, or, as
it
in the
Cartesian physics and physiology, " whatever tends
motion and rest subsisting betwixt is good and contrariwise that is bad which tends to alter the same proportion " ^ the specific and individual character of any body whatever being considered as resulting from the mutual communication of motion among its to preserve the proportion of
human body
the parts of the
;
:
particles
in
certain
a
The
proportion.
definite
destruction or
change of character consequent on the disturbance of this proportion in a living body is however not necessarily equivalent to death in the ordinary sense.
am not human body, I
which
so bold as to
deny (adds Spinoza
keeping the circulation of the blood and other properties
are esteemed the
marks of
nature wholly different from
me
to
in the Scholium), that a
its
life,
may
nevertheless receive another
For no reason compels
former one.
hold that the body dies not unless
it
become
experience would seem to suggest the contrary. a
man
as
I
to suffer
such change
have heard
tell
as that I
would
of a Spanish poet,
corpse
a
sometimes
It
scarce call
him
who having been
great sickness and recovered therefrom, yet
was
;
nay
befalls
the same,
seized with
left so forgetful
of his
pastlife that he believed not the plays he had writ to be his own, and
might indeed have been held his
mother-tongue
we
say of infants,
self in kind that
as well.
whom
a
for a
And man of
grown-up child
if this
if
he had forgotten
appear incredible, what shall
ripe age thinks to be so unlike
him-
he could never be persuaded he had been such himself,
did he not apply to himself the analogy of other
men
?
But
lest
I
should afford occasion to superstitious persons for raising novel questions, I shall leave these 1
matters alone.
Pr. 39, referring to Def, in the Excursus after Pr. 13, Part 2.
SPINOZA
246
This
is
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
:
the whole
question of personal
of Spinoza's contribution
which he seems
the vexed
to to
regard (and
rightly so from the scientific point of view) as at
best merely
identity,
In an equally general but simpler proposition which
curious.
down that such things increase the capacity of the human body to receive from without and to impress its own action on
immediately precedes
good
are
as
impressions
one^
it
is
laid
For the manifold and various adaptation of the mind and increases its power
outward things.
body
this
likewise an adaptation of the
is
of knowledge.
Pleasure as such
of active power, and pain {titlUatio)
may
as
good, since
is
such
Hatred
man
may
it,
never good
such
as
derision
and laughter is
Surely
life,
and hunger than
and thus have
of our fellow-
the emotions derived
all
Here
I
a very
why
great
and therefore
is
it
a better
melancholy
to drive out
attuned
;
a
difference. is
For
in itself good,
but an ill-favoured and sour super-
'tis
For
mark
I
mere pleasure
stition that forbids rejoicing.
thirst
at the destruction
added.
is
be not excessive.
it
aims
envy, derision, contempt, anger.
laughter, like jesting, so
for it
;
interesting Scholium
Between
Love and
be good.
the same cause, be excessive and unreasonable.
for
and the same consequence holds of
;
from
is
and a pain which serves
;
to control this local excess of pleasure
may,
localized pleasure
be bad as interfering unduly with the activity of
other parts and of the body as a whole
desire
But
bad.^
is
tends to increase
it
my mind. No in my infirmity
an envious churl, hath delight reckons towards our virtues weeping,
sobs, fear,
?
deed to quench
This
is
deity, nor
my way
of
any one but
and inconvenience, nor and other such matters
which are tokens of a feeble mind but contrariwise the more we are moved with pleasure, the more we pass to greater perfection, that is, Therefore it the more must we needs partake of the divine nature. ;
is
the wise man's part to use the world and delight himself in
it
as
he best may, not indeed to satiety, for that is no delight. A wise man, I say, will recruit and refresh himself with temperate and pleasant meat and drink, yea and with perfumes, the fair prospect of green 1
Pr. 38.
2
Laetitia directe
Pr.41.
;
mala non
est, sed
bona
;
tristitia
autem contra
directe est mala.
THE BURDEN OF MAN
247
woods, apparel, music, sports and exercises, stage-plays and the which every man may enjoy without any harm to his neighbour.
human body
the
is
compounded of very many
like,
For
parts different of kind,
which ever stand in need of new and various nourishment, that the whole body alike may be fit for all actions incident to its kind, and that by consequence the mind may be equally fit for apprehending
many
things at once.^
we were tempted to call Spinoza a Stoic, tempted now to call him an Epicurean. Here
If at a former passage
we is
shall
perhaps be
none of the Stoic disdain
artificial
striving to visit
attempt
to
make
a
common
for the
them with
amenities of
life,
indifference or discredit,
Let us
them.
virtue of dispensing with
no no
one who did in his own person largely dispense with them, and whose life was not only temperate, but quiet and frugal in the extreme. This is not the apology of
remember
a
man
that
the speaker
is
of the world for his careless living, but the grave unrepining
approval of innocent pleasures by a student debarred by his
circumstances from sharing in
many
Nor
of them.
approve them simply because they are pleasant, but
as
own
does
he
tending to
body and mind. Yet the pursuits and enjoyments he mentions are simple and familiar ones, such as are more or less within the reach of every one above absolute poverty, and such as at this day naturally present them-
a high purpose, the many-sided culture of
most civilized countries. England, unhappily, is the one land where Spinoza's lesson falls most strangely on the ears of good and well-meaning men and is most In truth the need is a crying one, and we are sorely needed.
selves
to
an
observer
in
only beginning to learn that rational recreation
But perhaps we
studying. this
matter while
we
shall
worth
hardly give ear to Spinoza in
refuse to profit
nearest neighbours and kinsfolk.
we
a thing
is
by the living example of our
After
all
it
may
be best that
who first of human
should go farther back yet and learn of the Greeks,
and most perfectly discovered the worth and dignity can say nothing better or greater of Spinoza's doctrine life.
We
in this passage than that he unconsciously Atticizes.
There
is
something touching 1
in the
Prop. 45. Cor.
2.
thought of
Schol.
this
man, weak
SPINOZA
248
HIS LIFE
:
in body, of slender estate, living
AND PHILOSOPHY by sedentary
and giving
toil
leisure to philosophy, thus reconstructing for himself the ideal
his
Athenian
of a free and joyous
life, in w^hich the pursuit of beauty chastened by v^isdom and temperance, v^hile vv^isdom itself is
is
informed w^ith the delight of a fine art, and contemplation goes hand in hand v^ith the manhood and active fellowship of citizens. l(
it
be said that this ideal
denying aspects of for the
present
scribes a
it
fails
to include the strenuous
virtue, the proposition
canon of conduct
as
lofty
teacher of ancient or
modern
any virtue
self-denying:
is
really
is
at least doubtful
to say that Spinoza at
suffices
times.
and unselfish
Not for
and ;
self-
but
all
events pre-
as
any moral
that in Spinoza's view
the denial and restraint
of the unruly passions and of all that we call ening and affirmation of man's true self.
selfish
But
is
let
the strengthus hear his
next precept.
He who
lives
according to reason endeavours to the utmost of his
power to outweigh another man's hate, anger or despite against him with love or high-mindedness. ... He who chooses to avenge wrong by requiting it with hatred is assuredly miserable. But he who strives to cast
out hatred by love
may
he can withstand many foes to fortune for aid.
As
fight his fight in
as easily as
one, and
is
joy and confidence in nowise
;
beholden
those he doth conquer, they yield to
him
joyfully, and that not because their strength faileth, but because
it is
for
increased.^
The
ethical value of the specific emotions
is
assigned on the
good which spring from the active and rational part of man's nature. Hope and fear, since they involve pain, are good only so far as they may check the excess of Pity, for the same reason, is in itself other passions (Pr. 47). worse than useless, and will be shunned by the reasonable man Spinoza is careful to explain in what sense he means (Pr. 50). this, which in fact is the sense in which the Stoics laid down principle that only those are
similar rules.
A man who sity
rightly
knows
that everything follows from the neces-
of God's being and happens according to the eternal laws of ^
Prop. 46, and Schol.
THE BURDEN OF MAN
249
nature will in truth find nothing worthy of hate, mockery, or contempt,
nor will he pity any one
;
much
but, so
as
human power
admits, he
will endeavour to do well, as they say,
and be of good cheer. Moretouched with the passion of pity and moved by the distress or tears of another often doth somewhat of the which he afterwards repents ; because as well we do
over
it
is
be noted that he
to
nothing out of passion which
who
we
is
lightly
surely
easily deceived
by feigned lamentations.
larly intend
man who
a
lives
know But^
to
be good,
according to reason.
who
For one
neither by reason nor by pity to help others inhuman, since he acts as if he had no likeness to man. like
are
in this place I particu-
moved
In
we
as
is
is
justly called
manner humility and repentance, though not
part of
the reasonable man's character, are relatively useful, and necessary
government of mankind. Since men must err, it is better they should err on the side of submission than on that of pride and violence. This admission of a scale of relative merit as between passions and motives which in themselves are all alike unworthy of the reasonable man may remind us of certain features in the Stoic system, though the analogy is not exact. On the other hand the emotions which can be purely active, as goodwill [favor)^ self-contentment [acquiescentia in se ipso\ honour [glona\ may have a reasonable origin and be positively good. And generally "every activity to which we are determined by an emotion in the nature of passion may be determined in us by reason without such emotion " (Pr. 59). No particular action is in itself either good or bad, and therefore every particular action may in some conceivable circumstances be induced by reason. for the
The
act of striking, for instance,
closing of the
fist,
in itself the lifting
of the arm,
and forcible bringing down of the arm
considered as a physical action, or excellence proper to the
humani fabric a
is
concipitur).
it is
;
and,
power
a manifestation of the
human body {virtus quae ex corporis But the act may be performed for an
infinite variety of purposes, lawful or unlawful, wise or foolish.
The
attitude and
are the 1
same
as
movements of Hamlet playing
those of Laertes with his poisoned rapier.
Perhaps we should read atqui
altogether.
in
for atque.
The Dutch
good
faith
Cicero's
version omits the conjunction
AND PHILOSOPHY
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
250
hand wrote consummate prose with the same motion and characters as worthless verse.
man
moved with anger or hate is thereby determined to close his fist or move his arm, this happens (as we showed in the second part) because one and the same action may be joined with any So, if a
that
is
of images of things
sort
we
images of things
and
clearly
and thus we may be determined
;
conceive confusedly,
well by
by those we conceive
as
one and the same action.
distinctly, to
as
It appears there-
fore that every desire arising from an emotion of the passionate kind
would be of no
men
utility if
In other words, reason
could be led by reason.
and the active emotions related to
afford an adequate motive for every reasonably desirable act
such motives will be effective only so they are presented
One interest
pleasure
far as the
man
to
:
it
but
whom
reasonable.
is
reason of desire being irrational, or not regarding the
of the agent pain
or
some one
part
as a
" since
and
;
whole,
proceeding from local
its
is
pleasure
is
we mostly
of the body,
mostly
referred
exercise the
to
desire to
maintain our being without taking any thought of our health a
as
whole."
Another reason
is
the undue preponderance of
the present over the future in our most
common
This
desires.^
however does not occur when the mind is guided by reason in its judgments; for then it conceives things "under the form of eternity or necessity," and facts are regarded in their true relations
Hence,
and independent of their being in
so
far
as
we
past, present or future.
reasonably,
act
the greater of two goods and the
lesser
we
choose not only
of two
evils,
but
a
greater good in the future before a lesser in the present, and a lesser evil in the present
good
in
the future.^
which
In
this
is
to be
group of propositions
pointed out that reasonable action
" under reasonable 1
Pr. 60, and Schol.
2
Pr. 62, 65, 66.
w^//,'' is
p.
244).
we
is
seek the
it
is
also
never produced by fear
good
directly
:
and avoid
"malum praesens minus quod causa est futuri alicuius The contemporary Dutch translator appears to have read
In Pr. 66,
obviously corrupt.
maioris boni,
desire
outweighed by a greater
which may be accepted
as a
practically certain correction [Nagel. Sckriften,
THE BURDEN OF MAN evil indirectly.
.
This
.
The
healthy man. death
.
is
by the case of a sick and a what he dislikes for fear of
illustrated
man eats whole man enjoys
but the
251
sick
and so hath better use of life than if he feared death and had an immediate desire of avoiding it. So the judge, when he sentences a criminal to death not from hate or anger, but merely for love toward the ;
public weal,
This
is
led
his food
by reason alone."
part of the
Ethics
(Pr. 63, schol. 2.)
now brought
is
to
a
close
enunciation of the qualities of the reasonable, or,
now
puts
with the
it
Stoics, the free
man.
Here
as
by an Spinoza
his propositions
assume the nature of aphorisms ; they cannot be considered strictly capable of proof, and that which stands first, one of the noblest and most weighty sayings ever uttered, seems to foreshadow the more daring flights of the succeeding book. Yet, if
we
regard
as a
it
of man's nature
precept for use in
as just
as it
and the demonstration offered by Spinoza
A
free
man
thinks of death least of
meditation not of death but of Demonstr. of reason,
good
;
A
is,
less
which was
view
morally elevating
is
;
extremely simple. and
things,
his
wisdom
a
is
life.
man, that
to
act,
to
footing of seeking his
nothing
all
is
a scientific
is,
one who
only by the bidding
lives
not led by the fear of death, but immediately desires
is
that
free
on
life, it is
and reasonable
live,
than of death, and
to be proved.
and maintain
true interest. his
And
wisdom
his
own
therefore is
a
being on the
he
thinks
meditation of
of
life
;
(Pr. 6^.)
Again, If men were born free, they would, no notion of good and evil. (Pr. 62>.)
so long as
they were free, form
This depends on a foregoing proposition (64) that the knowledge of evil is necessarily inadequate and it seems to be a direct reminiscence of Maimonides, who says (More Nebuchim, c. 2) that Adam before the Fall had a true "intellectual comprehension " and knew nothing of probable opinion, to which By the unfallen intellect the categories of good and evil belong. things were distinguished not as good and evil, but only as true ;
SPINOZA
252 and
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
:
Spinoza gives in a Scholium a not dissimilar interpretation of the Mosaic history, and endeavours incidentally to false.
find authority in
various
for
it
points of his
v^hat extent he w^as serious in this
conjecture
;
it
regard
the
to every reader's
left
quite possible that he v^as really disposed,
is
the example
after
to
but
must be
To
psychology.
abundantly
legends
of
by Maimonides and others,
set
Genesis
as
elaborate
philosophical
allegories.
The
men
statement that "only free
are perfectly grateful to
one another," which has already been terms,
nov^ given as a formal
is
out in general
throv^^n
proposition
(Pr.
71): there
seems to be a play on the meaning of the adjective
more
rather
hand
(Pr.
70),
man whose
free
a
On
Latin than in English.
natural in
conversation
is
ignorant will avoid receiving favours from them
them except by requiting them
please
with such things of the free
man
only that which
is
is
good
are
as
and
pointed out as good by reason.
the free man, that he
may
neither
come
into
ill
among
the
cannot
own manner
But the
in their conceit.
is
the other
for he
;
after their
to seek both for himself
v^^hich
desire
for other
men
" Therefore
repute with the
ignorant, nor follow their appetites instead of holding to reason only, will endeavour, so far as he may, to eschew favour from
them."
show "
But Spinoza
is
careful to add a
word of explanation
to
that he does not counsel a cynical and unsociable reserve.
far as he may. For though men be ignorant, yet they are men, and in our necessary occasions can give a man's help, than which nothing is more excellent. And therefore it often happens to be of necessity to receive some favour from them, and by consequence to return thanks to them after their own fashion. Moreover a certain caution must be observed in the act of declining favours, lest we seem to despise men, or to I
say
so
be so avaricious that
thus it.
fall
we
fear
having to recompense them, and
into giving ground of offence by our very care to avoid
So that
in
decHning favours regard must be had
to
ex-
pediency and good manners." Again " the free man never acts fraudulently, but always in
good
faith "
j
and
this
is
laid
down
as
an universal proposition
THE BURDEN OF MAN applicable even to extreme cases
man
able
finds
(Pr. 72).!
253
Lastly the reason-
and
true
perfect freedom not in a solitary independence but in living in society and under a common hw v^ith his fellov/-men
(Pr.
considered unnecessary to out in detail the character of the v^^ise or, as he is now
follov^
strong man.
called, the
It
73).
is
That he
will hate
no man, have no
anger, envy, or contempt for any one, and be free from pride,
from the general propositions already given conditions of social and reasonable Hfe. Spinoza
easily follows
the
as
to
now
proceeds to collect the precepts of right Hving already stated or implied in various parts of his argument into a more compact
This appendix
form. Cap.
I.
is
as follows.
All our endeavours or desires so follow of necessity from
may be understood either by that nature alone immediate cause, or only by regarding ourselves as a part ot nature, which cannot be adequately conceived by itself apart from our nature that they as their
other particular things.
C. they
2. The may be
desires
which follow from our nature in such wise that it alone are those which are ascribed
understood by
to the
mind
ideas
but other desires are ascribed to the mind only in so
;
in so
far as it
is
conceived
as
consisting of adequate far as
it
conceives things inadequately, and their strength and increase must
be defined not by the power of
man
but by the power of things out-
side us.
And
passions.
For the former ever denote our power, the
therefore the former are justly called actions, the latter latter
our im-
potence and maimed knowledge. C. 3. Our actions (that is, those desires which be determined by man's power or by reason) are always good the rest may be either ;
good or bad. C.
we
4.
It
is
therefore of exceeding use in
life to
perfect, so far as
can, the understanding or reason, and herein alone consisteth the blessedness of man.
highest happiness or
Blessedness,
indeed,
is
nothing else than the contentment of mind arising from the intuitive
knowledge of God. else than to
And to perfect the understanding God and the attributes of God, and
understand
that necessarily follow from his nature. 1
Many
Wherefore the
persons seem to think that the question here involved
verbal falsehood
is
ever justified
:
vv^hich
is
a
is,
is
final
and
is
nothing
the actions
aim of
a
only, w^hether
shallow and erroneous opinion.
//^
254
SPINOZA
man
led by reason,
govern
all
others,
:
is
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE that that
both of himself and of
is,
the
chief desire whereby he seeks to
which makes for the adequate conception things which be subjects of his intelli-
all
gence.
C. 5. There is therefore no reasonable life without intelligence, and things are good only in so far as they help man to enjoy that spiritual life which the name of intelligence doth signify. And those things which hinder man from perfecting his reason and enjoying the rational life are alone by us called evil. C. 6. Now because all things whereof man is the sole efficient cause are necessarily good, no evil can happen to man save by outward causes to wit, inasmuch as man is a part of nature, whose laws his nature is bound to obey, and he to accommodate himself to ;
her in almost infinite ways.
C.
7.
And
it
cannot be otherwise than that
nature and follow her
such
creatures as
power
will
common
order
agree with his
;
own
be holpen and fostered.
but
man
if his
should be a part of
conversation be with
nature, thereby man's active
Contrariwise
if
he be among
those whose nature agrees not with his own, he will scarce be able to
them without some great change in himself. is found in nature which we judge to be evil^ or to be capable of hindering our existence and enjoyment of life in reason, that we may repel from ourselves by whatever way seems the And whatever is found on the other hand which we judge safer.
accommodate himself C. 8. Whatsoever
to
good or useful for the maintenance of our being and enjoyment of life
in reason, that
will.
And
we may
own
take and convert to our
generally every one
use as
hath an absolute natural
right
we of
doing what he judgeth to make for his own advantage. C. 9. Nothing can agree better with the nature of any particular thing than other individuals of the same kind. there
is
nothing more useful to
man
Therefore (by cap. 7) for the maintenance of his being
man who governs himself by Again, since among particular things we know of none more reason. excellent than a man who governs himself by reason, therefore a man
and enjoyment of
rational life than a
can in no way better show the power of his skill and understanding than in so training up men that at last they may live as true subjects
under the dominion of reason. C. 10. So far as men bear
to
one another envy or any emotion
derived from hate, they are contrary to one another
;
and are there-
THE BURDEN OF MAN fore to
255
be feared in proportion to the excess of their power over
that of other creatures.
C. II. Yet minds are conquered not by force of arms, but by love and highmindedness. C. 12.
and
so
It
bind
themselves
of exceeding use to
is
themselves
together
men
they
that
one power, and generally
all
to enter
to
upon acquaintance
may
the
make
better
do such things
as are fitted
to establish friendship.
C. 13. But
for
they
this
many minds
need
and vigilance.
skill
For
men
few of them live as reason prescribes), and yet are mostly envious and more prone to revenge than to pity. So that to endure every man's humour and restrain oneself from copying their passions is a matter of no small resolution. Yet those who rather chide men and rebuke their faults than teach them virtue, and be of
can break their to
(seeing
but not strengthen them, are grievous both
spirits,
Thus many have been
themselves and others.
overmuch impatience brutes rather than
misguided zeal
or
men
;
boys and lads
as
be scolded by their parents will go for ships
driven by their
religion
for
who
to
live
with
cannot quietly bear to
soldiers,
and choose the hard-
of war and a tyrannical discipline rather than convenience
home and
counsel withal, and suffer any burden to be put
a father's
upon them
if
only they
may
spite their parents.
C. 14. Therefore although
own
after their
at
fancies, yet
men
for the
from their
most part carry everything
common
fellowship there ensues
more convenience than harm. So it is the better part to bear wrong from them with an even mind, and be diligent in whatever is fitted to far
bring about concord and friendship.
C. 15. That which begetteth concord justice,
and good report.
equity,
is
which belongs to what is unjust and
that
For, besides
what is in ill repute, or when And for a man doth reject the usage received in their commonwealth. winning their love those things be chiefly necessary which have regard
men
iniquitous,
to religion
and
[Reference Religion
is
the
are also displeased with
piety,
made to previous propositions as to these sum of desires and actions proceeding from the is
terms. idea or
knowledge of God, i.e. from the conception of the order of nature as one and uniform. Piety is the desire of well-doing produced by living Pr. 37, Schol. i.]
according to reason. C. 16. Concord
is
also
commonly produced by
fear;
but
this
is
256
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
treacherous.
Also
fear
ariseth
AND PHILOSOPHY
from a weakness of the mind and
therefore belongs not to the exercise of reason
compassion, though
it
hath on the face of
it
;
and the same holds of
a certain
show of piety.
C. 17. Men are likewise overcome by liberality, chiefly those who have not wherewithal to buy the necessaries of life. But helping
beyond the means and convenience of any man's wealth is no match for such a demand. Also a single man's opportunities are too narrow for him to Wherefore providing for the poor is a contract friendship with all. falls the whole community that on and has regard only to the duty
every one in need
For
private person.
common
is
far
a private
interest.
C. 18. In receiving favours and the return of gratitude there
is
a
material distinction, as to which see the Scholia to Pr. 70 and 71.
[That
is,
the reasonable
man
ignorant which would place
endeavours to decline favours from the
him under embarrassing
obligations
;
but
between free men there is a free and unrestrained affection, apart from and above any question of returning or recompensing favours.] C. 19. Meretricious love, that is, the lust of generation which ariseth from outward beauty, and in general every kind of love that hath any cause beside freedom of mind, doth easily pass into hate, unless (which is worse) it be a kind of madness ; and then more discord than concord grows of
it.
See the Coroll. to Pr. 31, Part
C. 20. As concerning marriage, if
the desire of bodily union
is
'tis
certain that
it
3.
agrees with reason
bred not merely of outward sense but of
them up in wisdom ; and also if namely the man and the woman, has not outward sense alone for its cause, but freedom of mind in the chief place. C. 21. Concord is also produced by flattery ; but this is at the cost None are more easily taken with of vile slavishness or falsehood. flattery than the proud ones, who fain would be first, and are not. C. 22. Dejection hath a false show of piety and religion. And
the desire to beget children and bring
the love of both parties,
though dejection be contrary to pride, yet is the downcast man very See Schol. to Pr. 57. near being proud. C. 23. Likewise concord is advanced by shame, but only in things which cannot be hid. Also because shame is in itself a kind of pain it belongs not to the exercise of reason. C. 24. The other emotions of pain towards justice, equity,
good report, piety and
hath on the face of
it
a
religion.
show of equity, yet
men are plainly against And though indignation
life is
but lawless where any
THE BURDEN OF MAN man may
257
judgment on another's deeds and vindicate
pass
his
own
or
another's right.
C. 25. Civility {modestia\ that is
determined by reason,
But
a desire
is,
we
referred (as
is
from passion
of pleasing
men which
said in the Schol. to Pr. 37)
it is ambition, a desire whereby and tumults under the pretence of piety. help others by counsel or deed, so as they may together enjoy the chief good, will be very forward to win their love to him, but not to draw them into admiration of him, that a doctrine may be called after his name, nor in any manner to give cause of offence. Also in common talk he will eschew telling of men's faults, and will
to piety.
if it arise
men do mostly stir up A man who desires to
^
strife
human weakness.
But he will speak at large of man's virtue and power, and the means of perfecting the same, that thus men may endeavour, not from fear or disgust, but wholly in joyfulness, to live, so far as in them lies, after the commandment of speak but sparingly of
reason.
men we know of no particular thing in nature, in whose mind we may take pleasure and which we may join to ourselves C. 26. Except
by friendship beside
men
or
any manner of society
in the
;
and therefore whatever there
is
world the reason of our convenience doth not require
us to preserve, but persuades us according to the divers uses thereof to
preserve, destroy, or adapt
C. 27.
The
utility
we
experience and knowledge
it
own
to our
And
can so
will.
derive from things outside us
we
acquire from observing
ing them from one form into another) in the
of our body.
we
use as
first
is
(besides the
them and chang-
place the conservation
in this regard those things are chiefly useful
feed and nourish the body
as to
make
all its
parts
fit
which
for their
body is to be impressed and to impress outward bodies in divers ways the more fit is the mind for thinkBut of this kind there seem to be very (See Propp. 38 and 39.) ing. for nourishing the body as it needs Wherefore nature. in few things proper
For the better
offices.
we must
use
many
fitted the
foods of different kinds
indeed made up of very
many
:
the
human body being
parts of different kinds,
which be
in
need
of constant and manifold nourishment, that the body may be equally fit for performing all things which are within its natural power, and
consequently that the mind
may
also
be equally
fit
for perceiving
many
different things.
C. 28.
Now ^
the strength of every
for achieving this
Affectu
:
but Spinoza
must mean S
affectu qui fassio est.
man would
SPINOZA
258
scarce avail unless
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
:
men
one another
lent
given us a token for everything.
Whence
But money has
their help. it
happens, that the imagina-
mainly busy the minds of the common sort ; for they can scarce imagine any kind of pleasure v^ithout having w^ithal the idea of money as its cause. tion thereof doth
C. 29. This is the fault only of them v^^ho seek money not from poverty nor for their needs, but because they have learnt arts of gain
and make a mighty show with them. 'Tis true they tend their bodies by habit but scantily, since they esteem themselves to be losing so ;
much
of their goods
as
they spend on maintaining their
But they who know the
money and
right use of
wealth only according to need can
fix
contented with a
live
C. 30. Since then those things are good which
of the body to perform their
and pleasure
office,
the power of man, in so far as he
own
bodies.
the measure of little.
assist
the
members
consists in this, that
composed of body and mind, is advanced or increased , therefore all things be good which bring us Yet since things operate not for any such purpose as to give us pleasure. pleasure, nor is their power of action limited according to our convenience, and also because pleasure is mostly related to some one part of the body above the rest; therefore most emotions of pleasure are subject to excess, unless reason be on guard, and consequently so are the desires engendered of them. Besides all which emotion leads us to count that first which is agreeable in the present, and we cannot consider things is
future with a proportionate liveliness.
See the Scholia to Pr. 44 and
Pr. 60.
C. 31. But superstition seemeth contrariwise
which
brings pain, and that for evil
have said (Schol. in
my
to Pr. 45)
which brings
only an envious
weakness and inconvenience.
more do we
j
man's power
is
very
Yet we
shall
as a
toil is
much
surpassed by the power of external causes
any absolute
as
is
we
our pleasure the
when it But he who
nor can pleasure ever be bad,
led by fear and doth good only to avoid
Now
But,
and therefore the more do we
governed by a just regard for our interest C. 32.
hold that for good
can take any delight
For the greater
pass to greater perfection,
partake of the divine nature
man
to
pleasure.
;
whole.
is
is
not led by reason.
confined, and
and therefore
is
infinitely
we have
not
power of converting to our own use things outside us. bear with an even mind that which happens to us against
the conditions of our
own
advantage
if
we
are aware that
we
have done
our part of the business, and that the power we possess could not have
THE BURDEN OF MAN gone
so far as to avoid those evils
;
order of nature and bound thereby.
and that we are
Which
we
if
259
a part
of the whole
clearly and distinctly
understand, that part of us which is described as intelligence^ that is, our better part, will therein be wholly contented and will endeavour to persist in that
content.
nothing but what truth
;
is
For
so far as
necessary, nor can
and therefore
so far as
we understand, we can desire we rest content in aught but the
we understand
these things rightly, the
endeavour of our better part agrees with the universal order of nature.
This summary does not appear
The
explanation.
to
call
any particular
for
equivalence of action, intelligence, and virtue,
which stands out in the leading enunciations, has already been remarked on the description of intelligence as " our better part " at the conclusion is of some importance as leading up to the :
doctrine of the following Part.
Attention
may
be called to the
moral elevation of the precept given in cap. 25. refinement of the fundamental duty of good will to not to be found, so tone
is
far
very like that
with an exact elsewhere.
parallel
know, in any other of Marcus Aurelius, but as
I
to the
matter either in
It
is
men which
moralist. I
a lofty is
The
have not met
M.
Aurelius or
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
CHAPTER
IX
THE DELIVERANCE OF MAN Nee
velatum saepe
pietas uUast
vertier ad lapidem atque
nee procumbere
deum
ante
spargere
humi prostratum
et
aras
pandere palmas
delubra nee aras sanguine multo
quadrupedum nee
mage
sed
videri
omnis accedere ad
votis neetere vota,
paeata posse omnia mente tueri,
Lucretius croi,
Je
dist
d'Atropos.
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
La E,
With I
/
'
:
:
Pantagj-uel,
book
198.
elle, c'est
travailler
pour I'eternite.
Discours de reception, 3 avril, 1879.
the fourth Part of the Ethics
human
1
iv. eh. xxvii.
He
that Spinoza's task was ended.
of
v.
Pantagruel, que toutes ames intelleetives sont exemptes des ciseaulx
Rabelais
raison triomphe de la mort, et travailler pour
Renan
:
motives and passions
;
it
might appear
at first sight
has laid bare the constituents
he has explained the working of
these passions in the various circumstances of Hfe
;
he has con-
man, and But he has declared the precepts of righteousness and goodwill. esteems his work only half done, and goes on to that which remains as to something he has been longing to take in hand. trasted the slave of passion with the reasonable or free
At length (he other division of
says
my
the Preface to Part V.), I pass on to the
in
Ethics,
concerning the method or path which
And in this I shall treat of the power of reason, strength against the emotions, and thence native its is what and show what is the freedom or blessedness of the mind. Whence we shall see But by in how much better case is the wise man than the ignorant. understanding is to be the perfected, and by what means and method that it may tended truly to be do its office, is body perthe what skill
leads us to freedom.
tains
not to this inquiry
;
for
medicine, the former of logic.
the latter of these
is
the concern
of
THE DELIVERANCE OF MAN The He
fact
is
261
aim has throughout been
that Spinoza's
practical.
has undertaken the scientific analysis of the passions, not
without the pure curiosity of the man of science, but mainly to the end of showing how they may be mastered, and the conditions of man's happiness assured. In this he is at one with the Greeks,
and
particularly, as in
many
points before, with the Stoics.
But
Spinoza explicitly denies the Stoic assumption that the will has an absolute power over the emotions
a denial
-,
which, on comparison
of his express contradictions of Descartes, might be taken to imply
an admission that in other ways the Stoic doctrine appeared to him profitable and worthy of respect. In the same passage he goes on to controvert the Cartesian theory of a connexion between
mind and the body through the pineal gland, by which Descartes endeavoured to show " that there is no soul so feeble
the
but that, being rightly trained, over
its
passions."
it
may
acquire an absolute dominion
Spinoza points out that the hypothesis of the
pineal gland being the seat of consciousness, transmitting impressions to the
mind which animal
work
mind from without, and are sent
spirits, is
as it
own
also
principles of scientific
more baseless and occult which Descartes rejected.
does assumptions
than any of the scholastic occult qualities
He
motion by means of the
to the nerves of
contrary to Descartes'
introducing
;
on
receiving orders from the
remarks that Descartes did not and could not assign any
mechanical measure of the alleged power of the mind to initiate " in truth, will and motion or control the motions of this gland :
no comparison betwixt the power and therefore the force of the or force of the mind and the body The latter can in no wise be determined by that of the former." being incommensurable, there
is
:
physiological difficulties of the hypothesis are lightly touched on,
but so
form
as to
this
monument
show
that Spinoza did not overlook them.
preHminary discussion
is
now
In
its
actual
chiefly interesting as a
of the extraordinary hold the Cartesian philosophy
must have acquired on that generation to make Spinoza thus go out of his way to refute the most fantastic and untenable point of But the substance of Spinoza's argument remains applicable it. to the various quasi-materialist attempts that from time to time have been made, in the supposed interest of
spiritual
truth, to
SPINOZA
262
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
:
make plausible some kind of between the mind and the brain.
establish or
When we
physical
communication
what Spinoza has to say "of the power of the understanding, or of Man's freedom," ^ we find that it consists of two independent parts. The first (Part V. of Ethics examine
Prop. 20)
to
in detail
a consistent following out of the psychological
is
become familiar with. The condition of mastering the emotions is shown to be a clear and distinct understanding of their nature and causes and the love of God which
method we have
already
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
;
is
nothing
else
than the rational contemplation of the order of the
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
human
world, and of
greatest happiness of
nature as part thereof
man
described as the
is
and the surest way of estab-
in this life,
lishing the rule of the understanding over the
Here
passions.
again one might suppose, and with more reason than before, that
nothing more remained to be
But
set forth.
it is
not so
:
Spinoza
proceeds to lay before us a theory of intellectual immortality, or rather eternity, the perfection whereof consists in an intellectual
God which is likewise eternal, and " is part of the infinite wherewith God loves himself" This exposition, which takes
love of
love
up the
Part of the Ethics from Prop. 21 onwards, presents
fifth
great difficulties.
what
is
It
is
Spinoza's real
explanation
is
by no means obvious
meaning
nor can
;
the right one until
we
we
in the first place, feel
sure that any
have some probable account
we And
of the manner in which Spinoza reconciled the doctrine, as
may
propose to read
this latter
The those
problem
is
it,
with the
rest
of his
philosophy.
a yet harder one.
question has been evaded, as
who have
own
seems to me, by most of
it
written on Spinoza.
Critics
who
regard
him
as
no particular difficulty why should not Spinoza dogmatize about the at this point eternity of the mind as well as about Substance and Attributes ? So they are content to give some abridgment or paraphrase of Others, Spinoza's argument which in truth explains nothing. a transcendental dogmatist naturally feel :
led
by
their
own
prepossessions
to
disregard
and
Spinoza's
express and repeated warnings, to
probability,
1
the rules of
have sought, in the face of
historical
critical
all
Title of Part
V.
make out
that his
THE DELIVERANCE OF MAN theory or
263
a doctrine of personal immortality in the ordinary sense
is
some sense
practically equivalent to
way and supported by
it,
only stated in an unusual
Some
reasoning.
artificial
few, taking a
view of the general meaning of Spinoza's philosophy similar to that which has been maintained in the foregoing chapters, have manfully striven
to
reduce this
apparently eccentric
But they
conformity to the main body.
scientific
know
say either that Spinoza did not clearly
his
part
into
are forced to
own meaning,
or that he did not succeed in saying what he meant, or that he
mean
none of which suppositions can be entertained by any serious and impartial reader of the Ethics except as a desperate remedy. For my part, I would rather confess myself baffled than help myself out by any one of them, especially the last and in fact I long thought the obscurity deliberately said things he did not
:
:
of the
portion of the Ethics
last
The
explanation I shall
but hopeless.
all
now
put forward with the hope of
throwing some light upon the historical affinities of this speculation, and its logical connexion with Spinoza's psychology, is one that has occurred to me almost at the last moment, and after repeated consideration. It
may
be observed here, as a matter
independent of any
some he was himself conscious of not standing on
particular interpretation of Spinoza's thought, that there
reason to believe that
The
the firmest ground in this place. the eternity of^the rest
:
the love of
ledge (Prop. 15)
God is
the privilege of the
on almost any coincide
;
mind seem
propositions concerning
to be carefully isolated
from the
arising from clear and distinct self-know-
kept apart from the intellectual love which
mind
possible
and
is
at the
is
though reading of Spinoza's theory the two must in
its
eternal quality (Prop. 33),
end Spinoza guards himself by showing that
the validity of ethical motives and
precepts
is
independent of
the exalted doctrine he has just been setting forth (Prop. 41).
In a writer so careful and subtle indications of this kind are not I believe that
to be neglected. self satisfactory
in his theory of
danger of
its
;
but
it
Spinoza's argument was to him-
hangs, as
knowledge, and
on
a very special point
I
read
it,
it
may
well be that he saw the
not being satisfactory to other people.
Moreover
I
SPINOZA
264
am
:
HIS LIFE
AND PHILOSOPHY
inclined to think that Spinoza wished emphatically to disclaim
any intention of relying on for the foundations
accept
it,
much
so
be impaired.
It
He
of ordinary virtue and morality.
mind
eternity of the
a supernatural or supersensible world
as a
puts his
kind of supplemental speculation
the better
;
not, the rest of his
if
work
;
if
we
will not
might perhaps be suggested
that this series of
But
conjectures of this
propositions was in fact an afterthought.
kind are too uncertain to be worth pursuing.
Let us now turn first
in order, as
The opening
it
to a connected survey of the
comes, the practical and
book
fairly
;
taking
obvious part.
power of
self-control are laid
which the conditions of the mind's down, run as follows
As
particular thoughts
and
1.
propositions, in
:
ideas of things are arranged
and
connected in the mind, exactly so are bodily modifications or
images of things arranged and connected
(This
is
in the body.
an immediate inference from the complete parallelism
of mind and body.) 2.
If
we
mind from
separate a disturbance or emotion of the
outward cause, and associate it with other thoughts, then love or hatred towards that outward cause, as likewise the agitations arising from those emotions, will be de-
the thought of
its
stroyed.
(For love and hate depend on the idea of the external cause being present.)
That emotion which is a passion ceases soon as we form a clear and distinct idea thereof. 3.
(For passion
as
such
is
to be passion as
a confused idea.)
There is no modification of the body whereof we cannot form some clear and distinct conception. (For all bodies and affections of bodies have some properties in 4.
common, and our conceptions of these are adequate.) Hence it appears that it is more or less in every to attain a clear understanding of his
extent to be superior to passion.
freedom
may
be thus expressed
:
own
one's
power
nature, and to that
So that the
first
precept of
Understand the passions that
you may be master of them. Nay, the very emotions and desires that otherwise would be pernicious are converted to beneficial
THE DELIVERANCE OF MAN
265
by the government of the understanding. For example, we have found man's nature to be such that he desires others to hve after his own plan. And in a man not governed by reason
uses ''
this desire
is
the passion called ambition, which
from pride
,
whereas in the
is
a virtue or activity, and
man who
is
removed
according to reason
lives
Such
called piety."
the mind's power over the emotions.
little
is
the nature of
is
Of course
it
might equally be expressed in terms of the attribute of Extension, as a power of the body over the particular modifications of the organism which correspond to the emotions in consciousness.
it
But,
as
Spinoza
is
here considering the emotions in their mental aspect as states of
he naturally follows both convenience and
feeling,
common
use in
regarding the facts on the psychical rather than the physical
This does not the he
loses
least
sight of the
imply, as a hasty reader might think, that physical side.
If there
more important than another
interpretation
standing of Spinoza,
it
side.
is
for the right
the physiological
that
mental action are never overlooked by him
may be. Next, how may this power
one canon of
is
for a
under-
correlations
of
moment, what-
ever his language
conceiving as
of the mind be strengthened
things as necessary
all
;
for the
determined by definite causes tends to
any emotion upon
The more
it
?
By
knowledge of a thing prevent us from fixing
(Pr. 5, 6).
knowledge of things as necessary is applied to particular things whereof we have a distinct and lively imagination, the greater is this power of the mind over the emotions, as experience For we perceive sorrow for any possession also doth bear witness. that is lost to be abated whenever the man who hath lost it adviseth with himself that this possession could in no manner have been saved. So likewise we see that no man pities a child because it cannot speak, this
walk, or reason, or because for so unconscious.
But
if
one here and there since then
we
we might mark is
as a
more
years
its
life
part of us were born
child, then
who
as a defect or fault in
several other instances.
is
in a
manner
grown up, and
but would pity children
should regard the state of infancy not
and necessary, but
It
the
many
nature.
as a
And
?
thing natural
after this sort
(Pr. 6, Schol.)
further pointed out that an emotion arising from rational
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; SPINOZA
266
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
:
contemplation, since
it
depends on constant and ever present
in the order of nature, will be stronger, other things
being equal,
than emotions directed towards a particular absent object that emotion
stronger in proportion to the
is
exciting causes acting together to produce
number of
So
we
and
;
distinct
Then comes
it.
proposition in the nature of practical application
facts
a
:
by emotions contrary^ to our nature, we have the power of ordering and connecting the affections ot the body in pursuance of the intellectual order. (Prop. lo.) long
as
are not disturbed
Spinoza comments on
this in a
a period in the discussion.
It
is
Scholium, which seems to mark
of a very practical kind, and
strike the reader as not being original
him
we have much
to reflect that
moral precepts intended for
in
which
case I
would ask
reason to be thankful that in
use no great originality
real
The
needful or practicable.
:
may
is
either
and explanation
scientific discussion
But morality itself is made by the community of right-minded men, whether they happen to be philosophers or not and when we come to speak of
of morality
is
the task of philosophers.
:
the actual contents of morality and the conduct of
sopher has
little
life,
the philo-
no advantage over any other right-minded man
or
beyond the habit of expressing himself in accurate language. No system of ethics can do more than organize the common moral Let us hear Spinoza, therefore, as one speaksense of good men. That which is spoken with the ing to us in the name of us all. common voice and in the common name of man's conscience may well be
But
it
By
common
if it
;
is
not,
we
should strive to
make
it
so.
can never be commonplace.
power of duly ordering and linking together the affections of our body we may bring it to pass that we be not easily wrought on For greater force is needed to control emotions by evil passions. this
ordered and linked according
which
are uncertain
so long as
out 1
a
method and
Contrarii
Dutch
and
we have not
is
loose.
a perfect
to
the intellectual
we can
knowledge of our emotions,
settled rules of life, to
commit
omitted in the text of the 0pp. Posth.
translator.
order than
Wherefore the best
It
is
these to
those
compass, is
to lay
memory,
tacitly supplied by the
;
THE DELIVERANCE OF MAN and constantly!
267
apply them to such particular cases as do commonly meet us in life, that so our imagination may be penetrated therewith, and we may ever have them at hand. laid down, for example, to
We
among
the precepts of
life,
that hatred should be
Now
or high-mindedness, not repaid in kind.
reason
may
always be ready for us at need,
we
conquered by love
that this
command
of
should often think upon
and consider the wrongs commonly done by men, and in what manner they are warded off by a noble mind. For thus we shall knit the image of a wrong done us to the imagination of this precept, and the precept will always be
hand when
wrong is offered us. But we shall note that in ordering our thoughts and imaginations we are ever to attend to that which is good in a particular thing, that we at
a
.
.
.
may
always be determined to action by an emotion of pleasure. For example, it one sees that he exceedeth in the pursuit of honour, let him think of the right use thereof, and for what purpose it is to be pursued, and by
vanity of
man
it,
what means
to
be acquired
thinks except for infirmity of
ambitious
men most
fain be thought philosophers.
who
of the world.
spirit.
plague themselves,
the station they are bent upon
of honour
;
not of the misuse and
the inconstancy of mankind and the
and
;
so
like,
For with such thoughts do
when they
despair of attaining
venting their anger they would
'Tis certain that they are most greedy
are loudest concerning the misuse of
Nor
is
this peculiar to the case
common to all who meet with ... So he who endeavours to
of which no
ill
it
and the vanity
of ambition, but
it is
fortune and lack strength of mind.
govern his emotions and desires purely
by the love of freedom will strive, as best he may, to know the virtues and their causes, and to fill his mind with the joy which arises from
them ; but in no wise to study men's faults, nor to flatter them and make merry with a false show of liberty. And whoever will diligently observe and use these precepts (for they are the true knowledge of
not
difficult),
assuredly in a short space of time he will be able for the
most part to guide
We
his actions after the rule of reason.
are next introduced to the exercise of contemplative reason
God, which consists in the distinct underThere is no form or mode of standing of one's own nature. knowledge which cannot be made to some extent clear and distinct in other words, "referred to the idea of God," since without God described as the love of
1 it
Continuo
would not
:
Spinoza was probably not ignorant of the classical usage of the word, but
suit this context.
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; SPINOZA
268
nothing
own
nature involves pleasure, and this
God
panied by the idea of
God, and, being
love of
or pain, and
is
and therefore the resulting emotion
;
mind
in the
we cannot
desire that
nature and perfections, " he
that
God
common
men
to
that
have is,
loves
it
not
is
and
a pause
is
should contradict his
God
And
in return."
liable
men, by envy or
affections of
now
who
God
collected (we read)
a
to
it
Whence
over the emotions consists, (see Schol. to Pr.
4 of
3.
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
it
we
number of
;
much
for others as
summing
up.
the remedies against the emotions,
all
itself
capable of
is
mind
appears that the power of the
In actual knowledge of the emotions
i.
this Part).
2.
In the separation of the emotions
we have
confused
a
we understand overmatch
those that have regard
conceive confusedly or brokenly (Prop.
causes by
which those
In the
4.
7).
affections are fostered
that
have
regard to the universal properties of things or to God. (Prop. 9 and 5.
Finally in that order in
gether
its
own
Spinoza
which the mind can arrange and
1
1.)
link
to-
consists
in
emotions.
goes on to say that the mind's
power
knowledo;e, considered not as freedom from error but as
and proper
it
In respect of time, wherein those affections which
have regard to things to things
the
is
jealousy.^
from the thought of the external cause of which imagination.
God
of
be marred, like the
everything that the mind considered in
doing against them.
cannot endeavour
this love
men, and we can wish
all
Here again there I
God, on
it.
can seek under the guidance of reason
Thus
for ourselves.
common
him
should love
chief good which
as
that entertains
not subject to passion, not capable of pleasure
own
be
is
cannot properly be said to love or hate any one.
Therefore, since
may
accom-
is
associated with every act of understanding,
must hold the chief place the other hand,
Clear and distinct under-
can be conceived.
exists or
standing of one's
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
:
activity.
Not
its
natural
absence of inadequate ideas, but pre-
ponderance of adequate ones,
is
the condition of mental health.
Clear and distinct knowledge, more especially the third or intuitive kind, gives us the
means of controlling the
passions to such an
extent that they have but an insignificant part in the ^
Propp, 11-20.
mind
:
THE DELIVERANCE OF MAN Likewise
it
engenders
being, truly within
our
269
an immutable and eternal which therefore can be sullied by
towards
love
reach
;
none of the defects common to other kinds of love, but may constantly increase, and may possess the best part of the mind and thoroughly penetrate it. And herewith I have finished what concerns this present life. And so it is time for me to pass on to other matters which belong to the duration of the mind without .
.
.
regard to the body.
We
are
now on
the threshold of the singular and difficult part
of Spinoza's exposition.
can what
I
I
shall
begin by stating as clearly as
Next
conceive his meaning to have been.
point out what
I
I
I
shall
believe to be the historical ancestry of his doctrine.
Then I shall give the leading points of the argument in Spinoza's own words, or as nearly so as may be, and at the same time exhibit in detail, for any reader who cares to follow me so far, the manner in
which I justify my interpretation. Whatever is known as part of the necessary order of
nature, in
is said by Spinoza to be known " under the form of eternity." And this is eminently true of the immediate knowledge which he calls the third kind. Now in every act of knowledge the mind is (in Spinoza's technical sense) the idea of a certain state of its own body and if we regard this as a knowledge of its own body (which I shall show that Spinoza
other words exactly or scientifically,
;
mind in contemplating things as necessary knows its " own body under the form of eternity." But the knowing mind has a consciousness or knowledge of itself which exactly corresponds does), the
knowledge of the body
to
its
of
itself as well as
the
mind knows
eternity
is
in Spinoza's language,
Therefore
of the body.
itself
in every such act
j
it is
in all exact
" under the form of eternity " eternal,
and knows
it is
:
the idea
knowledge
that
is
itself as eternal.
to say,
This
not a persistence in time after the dissolution of the
body, no more than a pre-existence in time, for surable with time at
all.
And
there
is
it is
not
associated with
or quality of perfection called the intellectual love of God.
commenit
a state
This
is
not an emotion, since the emotion of pleasure involves transition to greater perfection, and therefore a finite time ; but it is related to the emotion of love as the eternity of the
mind
is
related to
its
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
;
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
270
AND PHILOSOPHY
The intelman for God is part of the infinite intellectual love wherewith God loves himself; and the mind, together with whatexistence in time in a particular act of knowledge.
lectual love of
soever
it
knows " under
chain of eternal beings, which
mind of God.
all
argument,
let
a
is
Reserving the discussion of
analysis of Spinoza's
critical
Hnk in an together make up the
the form of eternity,"
infinite infinite
and the
difficulties
us endeavour to seize
the points which stand out most distinctly in this daring flight of
The
speculation.
eternity of the
human mind
a function of
is
pure intellect, and depends on the mind's power and habit of exact
knowledge.
goes along with the attainment of the
Its perfection
most perfect kind of knowledge, and its degree is different It has no relation to time, and therefore different individuals. not a future
life
At
thought " which lost in
It
the same time
is
part
of the
in
it is
and understanding mind
active
is
or continuance of personal consciousness in the
ordinary sense. ^ the
in
some sense an
is
infinite
individual
mode of
"eternal
intellect,
but
is
not
it.
seems to
me
we cannot
that
but trace in this a direct con-
nexion with the Aristotelian doctrine of immortality taken up
M.
and developed by the Averroists in the middle ages.
warning
before
is
my
eyes
;
but
^
it
is
M. Renan
Renan's
himself
who
supplies us with the links that complete, as I submit, a sufficient
chain of evidence.
In various immortality
is
of
passages
indicated rather than
receptive elements of the intellect {vovs Trot^^rtKos),
takes
thereof,
intellect
1
Since
is
are
E.
mind
sum
a
of intellectual
doctrine
worked
The
out.
are perishable
-,
immortal.
passive or
only the active
and the individual mind so
eternal and
only the
Mr. A.
Aristotle
far as
Whether
this
it
par-
active
of similar elements in individual minds,
Taylor's able and independent reconsideration of this
part of
Spinoza's doctrine {Mind, N. S. v. p. 145) I venture to think this point may be taken On the wider questions of positive interpretation I am pleased to find no as settled.
material variance between Mr. Taylor's conclusions and my own. 2 " Rechercher si Averroes peut revendiquer quelque chose dans d'
Amsterdam,
de systemes, une juste curiosite s'est
le
systeme du penseur
ce serait depasser la limite ou doit s'arreter, dans les questions de filiation
perdu dans
la prairie."
j
ce serait vouloir retrouver la trace du ruisseau
A'uerrch
et
PAverroisme, 2nd ed.
p.
199.
quand
il
THE DELIVERANCE OF MAN
271
which the mind is rational in each case, or is to be regarded as having a permanent existence beside and beyond the minds of individual men, is a point not altogether free from
that by virtue of
doubt
Aristotle
in
The
himself.
commentators resolved and Ibn-Roshd (Averroes)
developed the question in various w2Lys.
appears to have considered the active intellect as being independent
of this and that man's individuality, and of one substance in
men, but existing only
in individual
men
;
personal immortality of the individual
as
The
doctrine.
istic
embodied
individuals
:
in the
active intellect
human
race
is
is
In any case, the
excluded by the Averro-
immortal, either in
which
is
mortal only
and that soul can be immortal only so
this
have part in the active intellect
;
and
a unity realized
reflected in the multiplicity of finite minds.
all
itself or
regards
as
they
far as
not as individual, but
as rational
and belonging to universal reason.^
When
Mussulman
the
Averroes' lifetime had
fanaticism
which took alarm even
effectually suppressed
in
the cultivation of
philosophy within the bounds of Islam, the light was kept alive
by a
series
of Jewish scholars of
contemporary of Averroes, was
whom
first in
Moses ben Maimon, the
time and in renown.
The
various problems of the Peripatetic system, and this particular one
among them, were taken up and fully entered
eagerly discussed.
It
was not go with
upon by Maimonides, but he inclined to holding that immortality was not individual.
Levi Ibn-Roshd in ben Gerson dealt with it at length, and after elaborately criticizing the opinions of Ibn-Roshd and others, concluded in favour of an Rejecting immortality which was intellectual but also individual. the notion of union with the universal reason, and retaining the Aristotelian
theory that
contemplative
knowledge
is
only
the
proper function of an eternal mind, he held that the individual
mind
is
immortal
the time of
its
in respect of the
knowledge possessed by
emancipation from the body.
freer possession of this
it
It has a fuller
and
knowledge, but not having the organism
and senses by which alone new experience can be acquired, cannot in any way extend it.^ 1 "
Renan, Joel,
op. cit. pp.
at
it
122-158.
Levi ben Gerson (Gersonides),
als
Religions-philosoph (in Beitrage %ur Gesch.
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; SPINOZA
272
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
:
;
Spinoza was acquainted with the writings of Gersonides, to whom he refers in his notes to the Tractatus Theologico-P oliticus
through them he would have become acquainted with the Peripatetic doctrine of intellectual immortality as understood
by the commentators, and with the Averroist modification of it, as well as with Gersonides' own speculations. And if this knowledge is admitted, no supposition is more natural than that Spinoza's own
him from
doctrine was suggested to ideas are the same, only
worked
The
this quarter.
leading
we
into formal agreement, as
shall
presently see, with Spinoza's metaphysics and psychology.
His
on the eternity of the mind being wholly independent of time, and incommensurable with existence determined in time, insistence
appears to be peculiar to himself; and in the transfiguration of
contemplative knowledge
as the
"
God
intellectual love of
" there
perhaps a reminiscence of the Neo-Platonic influence which
is
predominant when he wrote the Treatise of God and Man. In that work, it may not be amiss to observe here, we find little
was
still
or nothing to throw light on the part of his mature system
The
under consideration. sketched out, and, so
far as
theory of immortality
we can
assign
decidedly Neo-Platonic rather than
is
it
to
now
but vaguely
is
any generic type,
Aristotelian
;
^
the soul's
capacity for immortality being represented as depending on
its
detachment from the body and union with God. But it is worth noting that in the Cogitata Metaphysica some space is given to denouncing the error of those who " consider eternity as a form
And on
of duration." essentia
not
being of a
exist entia^
said
:
at this
Metaphysica^ Part
day than
it
it is
will ever say that the
an eternal truth, hath
had \n Adam's."
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
Cogitata
2, c. i.
The
proceed to the fuller statement of Spinoza's argument.
leading propositions are as follows d. Philosophie)
auf einmal Stande," 1
" Nobody
circle or a triangle, so far as
endured longer
I
the point of eternity having to do with
it is
p.
:
:
" Der von Seek und Leib befreite Geist denkt
und
als
Einheit.
alle
seine Erkenntnisse
Nur neue Erkenntnisse zu erwerben
ist
er
ausser
45.
After Leibnitz had been on the verge of accepting Spinoza's principles, and before
he had worked out
his
own
system, he passed through
and then an Aristotelian stage.
See Stein, Leibniz
u.
first a
Spinoza.
Platonic or Neo-Platonic
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; THE DELIVERANCE OF MAN
273
The mind cannot imagine anything or remember things
Prop. 21.
past except while the body endures.
be sufficient to observe, without reproducing Spinoza's proof and references, that in the Second Part memory has been It will
treated
as
mechanism
dependent on association, which involves a material in the brain ; and in like manner imagination cannot
be exercised without a material organ of thought and storehouse of impressions. Prop. 22.
which
There nevertheless necessarily exists in
expresses the being of the individual
human
God an
idea
body under the form
of eternity.
Again
let us pass
44 of Part
to Prop.
over the formal demonstration, and look back
There we
2.
"
find that
it is
of the nature of
reason to perceive things under a certain form of eternity," which is
the
same thing
of nature.
as
perceiving
The human
them
as part
of the necessary order
body, like everything
else, is part
of the
necessary order of nature, and can therefore be thought of " under
the form of eternity," as determined by natural laws whose operation
The
always and everywhere the same.
is
of given conditions, or what
it
shall be, has
essentia of a result
nothing
do with
to
the tract of time or portion of space in which the conditions are
found
:
most
for Spinoza, like
if
not
all
writers
down
time, assumes that the laws of nature can be exactly are
known
to be absolutely
of a particular result fact that
it
and universally
when and where
it
does occur at a given time and place
existentia
be, if at all
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
own
known, and
The
valid.
shall
to our
this
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;the
cannot be
expressed in terms of the eternal laws of nature alone, and therefore
cannot be determined in thought by pure intellect, but only with Thus the " idea which expresses the the help of the imagination. essence of this and that
human body under
the form of eternity
"
would seem to be nothing else than the knowledge of the human body as a necessary part of the order of nature. Further, it seems language to say that everything known " under the form of eternity " is to that extent eternal. shall
a fair extension of Spinoza's
We
presently see that he
Spinoza has
all
but says
really arrived at, then,
human body may
it is
be called eternal.
T
in so
many
words.
What
that in a certain sense the
We
must
carefully observe
SPINOZA
274
:
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
that this eternity has nothing to do with the persistence in time
of the ultimate elements of the organism after the organism
Let us now
dissolved.
Prop. 23.
what
see
follows.
The human mind cannot be wholly destroyed with
but somewhat of it remains which
There
Demonstr.
is
the body,
eternal.
necessarily in
is
is
God, by the foregoing proposi-
concept or idea which doth express the being of the human
tion, a
This accordingly must needs be something which pertains to But we do not the being of the human mind (by Prop. 13, Part 2).^
body.
assign to the
human mind any
except so far
as it
doth express the actual existence of the body, which
explained by duration and
is
Coroll. Prop.
8,
Part 2)
^
we
may
be described by time
assign not existence to
But seeing there
the body endures.
by
duration that can be described by time,
a certain eternal necessity
is
is
that
is
(by
nevertheless somewhat which
conceived through the being of God,
somewhat which belongs to the being of the
this
;
except while
it
mind
will necessarily
be eternal. Schol.
This idea which doth express the being of the body under is, as we said, a determined mode of thought
the form of eternity
which belongs to the being of the mind and is necessarily eternal. Yet it cannot come to pass that we remember anything of an existence before the body, since neither can there occur any traces thereof in
the body, nor can eternity be described by time, nor have unto time
any proportion.
But none the
less
we
do
feel
and
are aware that
we
For the mind feels not less those things which it conare eternal. ceives by the understanding than those which it doth hold in memory. The eyes of the mind, wherewith she sees and observes things, are no So that although we remember not that other than demonstrations.
we
existed before our body, yet
we
feel
that our mind, in so far as
involves the being of the body under the form of eternity,
and that this manner of 1
"
The
object of the idea
actually existing 2
mode
its
;
which makes up the human mind
is
a
body or certain
of extension, and nothing else."
" So long as particular things do not exist, save so far as they are contained in the
God \j.e. ideas of them
so long as they exist
being or
do not
is
exist,
must
potentially but not actually], the objective
save in so far as the infinite idea of
a case of the universal parallelism.
in the order of extension
The
eternal
existence cannot be described by time or
attributes of
This
is
it
Whatever can
God
exists."
be said to exist potentially
also be said to exist potentially in the order of thought.
universe as a whole, which on the side of thought
is
" infinita Dei idea," involves
the whole history of things and every possible consequence of the laws of nature.
"
THE DELIVERANCE OF MAN explained in terms of duration.
and
said to endure,
275
Thus our mind can only
be
so far
existence be described by a determined time,
its
as it involves the actual
existence of the body
and
;
hath only so
it
power of limiting the existence of things by time, and conceiving them under the category of duration. far the
how
Observe, again,
time
distinctly
the notion of persistence in
cut off from that of eternity.
is
a continuance of existence but a
Spinoza's eternal Hfe
manner of existence
is
not
something
;
which can be realized here and now as much as at any other time and place not a future reward of the soul's perfection but the soul's perfection itself. In which, it is almost needless to remind ;
the reader, he agrees with the higher and nobler interpretation of
almost
all
Whether
the religious systems of the world.
called the life eternal, the
kingdom of God, wisdom,
it
is
hberation,
by the something not apart from and
or nirvana^ the state of blessedness has been put forward
great moral teachers of after this
mankind
as
but entering into and transforming
life,
coming generations of of the
these glories
dull free
and backsliding
human mind
it.^
after-
have degraded
disciples
into
The
gross
mechanical
systems of future rewards and punishments.
But we must return
to the critical study of the
argument.
A
which has weighed much with those who have thought that Spinoza's only real meaning
difficulty presents itself at first sight,
(notwithstanding his express declaration that eternity relation to time)
mind
alike
in
persist
other forms after the living organism
stated
what
tion asserted of
saying aloud
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; and
:
is
all
asserted
Spinoza would then be
things whatever.
" The human mind
is
in a certain sense eternal
adding in a whisper, for the few
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; "and
is
much had been proved, though not of the human mind were by impHca-
It looks as if too
as if
out of
must be that the ultimate elements of body and
broken up. ;
is
who
could penetrate his
This reading was long ago put forward (still with a certain amount of reserve) by BoullainvilHers in his so-called Refutation of Spinoza^ 173I) ^ title which
secret:
everything else too."
thinly disguises a popular exposition 1
1 fear this
j
and
it
has been suggested
cannot be said of Mahomet, and moral enthusiasm
religion founded by
him seems
to be
most wanting
in.
is
precisely
what the
AND PHILOSOPHY
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
276 in our
own
day in Holland by Dr.
Van
ever insuperable.
Vloten, and propounded
The
with some confidence by Mr. Lotsy.
how-
objections are
Either Spinoza gratuitously gives an involved
and obscure demonstration of a consequence which on
his
meta-
perfectly simple, or his argument is from beginning to end a piece of deliberate dupHcity. The first alternative is repugnant to Spinoza's intellectual character, the second to his moral. And then, even if he were capable of
physical
principles
throwing dust
To
is
in his readers' eyes,
save appearances,
it
what
suggested.
is
possible motive
had he
If that were so,
it
?
would
be a curious thing that he began to think of saving appearances
he had written
after
regard
slightest
to
nine- tenths
Ethics without
of the
the
There
any such prudential economy.
is
nothing of the kind in his treatment of popular theology, of final causes, of free-will, of current ethical notions, of dominant
Nay, the
Cartesian theories. this
allusions
very series of propositions are as
to
far
opinion in
from disguise and con-
ciHation as anything in the earlier Parts. to save appearances, he has
common
If Spinoza's design
was
gone about the work with incredible
clumsiness and want of tact.
Besides
this, it
all
hopeless to
is
reconcile the proposed interpretation with Spinoza's express words.
In short,
how any
do not see
I
on full consteadfastly minded not
careful reader can
sideration so understand him, unless he
is
only to find in the Ethics a complete modern doctrine of physio-
nothing
logical psychology, but to find
Let
consider
us
human body may
Spinoza's reasoning
known
be
the form of eternity," and so allowed.
else.
The human
as
part of an eternal order, " under
may any
mind,
as
other body
strictly
manner
;
may
and so
the
mind
may
more
?
and
is
there
Is
no prerogative
Yes, and a great one, the prerogative of knowledge. of matter and the primitive
cell
be
known
the in
of organic
life
there nothing left for
If the
may
man
?
atom
be called
only in the thought of the higher
eternal, yet
their eternity
intelligence
which knows them
is
must be
or complex of mental facts
corresponding to any other aggregate of matter. to be said then
that
;
corresponding to
body, point for point and element for element, like
The
more narrowly.
as
part of the
immutable order.
THE DELIVERANCE OF MAN The knowledge is
of the material atom "under the form of eternity"
not in the mind-atom that
is
human body " under
ledge of the
paired with
body
But the know-
it.
the form of eternity " need not
may be in the mind of The mind can know its own body " under the
be in some separate thinking being that
277
itself.
it
:
form of eternity " ; and in knowing the body it knows itself. The knowing and self-conscious mind is, as we saw in the Second
Thus
Part, idea ideae as well as idea.
of
own knowledge,
its
clear consciousness
and
is
it is
eternal in the strength
conscious of
accompanying every
its
when he
says
But what
as
is
Spinoza
is
the
on by the
relied
to
calls
Sentimus experimurque nos aeternos
:
It
act of knowledge, not
any such vague sentiment or presentiment popular doctrine of immortality, that
eternity.
witness
esse.
the mind's knowledge of the body "under the " form of eternity ? know under the form of eternity is to is
To
know
rationally or exactly.
In modern language what
we mean
by having a rational knowledge of our own body is being able to and if we give a scientific account of its structure and functions :
carried
make
conception
this
into
Spinoza's propositions
we
should
mind depend on one special kind of knowledge, and reduce the way of salvation to a course of human the eternity of the
physiology
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
a conclusion too grotesque to dwell upon.
In fact
knowledge of the body, as understood by Spinoza, is not a knowledge of the human body generically, but a relation between the particular mind and the particular body which we should not now think of calling knowledge at all. The key to this part of his argument is the ambiguous use of the word idea on which we have already commented in the Second The word is sometimes used in the common Part of the Ethics. sense, as meaning a concept in the mind referred to some object sometimes in the sense peculiar to of knowledge outside it Spinoza's metaphysical system, as meaning the mode of thought (which may or may not be in a conscious mind) corresponding the mind's eternal
:
to
a
given
mode
of extension.
In the
first
sense idea
is
the
image or concept, ideatum the thing perceived or conceived ; in the second idea and ideatum are one and the same thing "expressed " in the attributes of
Thought and of Extension.
To
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
278
AND PHILOSOPHY The
take a concrete instance, Peter thinks of Paul. Peter's it is
Paul
mind
is
in the first sense idea
Pauli
idea affectionis corporis Petri^ that is
in
in the second sense
Peter's thought about
is,
So
Peter's brain.
geometrical proposition, the ideate of
my
idea
is
if I
think of a
in the
one sense
a set of geometrical relations in space, in the other sense
body (and
my
especially
Now
of thought.
we
habitually carries over statements
least
suspicion
that
my own
brain) as modified in that particular act
Spinoza, as
meaning of the term
in
definite state of the material
strictly parallel to a certain
machinery of imagination
;
thought
have already pointed
out,
and inferences from the one
idea to the other, apparently without the
procedure
his
is
open to any objection.
which is my knowledge is the idea of the external fact in one sense. But it is the idea of a certain state of my own body in the other sense. Accordingly Spinoza affirms that the mind in every act of knowthough so long as it perceives ledge also knows its own body " things after the common order of nature " its knowledge of Now when the mind is in itself and the body is not adequate.^
When
I
know
an external
fact,
the state of
my mind
;
the act of rational or scientific knowledge of anything whatever in other words,
when
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;Spinoza
it
perceives
things " under the form of
between the mind and its own body what belongs to the relation between the mind and the object of knowledge, that the mind knows its own body " under the form of eternity." So knowing its own body and consequently itself, it is eternal, and depends only on its own As Spinoza says farther on, "the activity for this eternity.
eternity,"
says, transferring to the relation
mind conceives nothing under it
conceives the being of
that
is,
The
own body
under the form of eternity,
{Eth. V. Pr. 31, Demonstr. ; verbal confusion involved in Spinoza's way of
save so far as
cp. Pr. 29).
its
the form of eternity, save so far as
it is
eternal."
no doubt surprising at the present day. But it has not been assumed here to explain this particular we could not help taking note of it, on quite indedoctrine And pendent grounds, in going through the Second Part.^ when we remember that in Spinoza's time psychology was really
stating his doctrine
is
;
1
Eth.
ii.,
Pr. 24-29.
^
P. 182, above.
THE DELIVERANCE OF MAN in
to
279
infancy, and hardly any serious attempt had
its
work out
the theory of perception, our surprise
been made
may
be con-
siderably abated.
Apart from the peculiar form of his argument, Spinoza has here to meet a metaphysical difficulty of which he was so far aware that he made a distinct effort to escape it. The eternity of which the mind is
conscious in the act of rational knowledge
is
wholly out of relation to time.
be a kind of existence.^ time, and
a
Now
at
time
it is
is
Also
Here, then,
distinctly stated to
it is
we have
existence out of
knowledge or perception of it in consciousness. least a serious question whether existence out of
We
conceivable.
cannot think of existence except in
But experience
terms of actual or possible experience.
And
consciousness or at least feeling.
it
involves
not a metaphysical
is
speculation,
but an established fact of science, that change of
some kind
the necessary condition of
is
all
feeHng and experience.
Every feeling of which we know anything or can form a notion is a feeling of transition, of an event, of something happening which on the physical side is motion of some kind in the :
sentient organism.
Even an apparently continuous rapidly
succeeding
feeling, the
nervous
more we
find
sensation
is
a series of
The more we
shocks.
change and motion
to be
its
many
analyse
constant
and these involve time. It would seem, therefore, that without making any transcendental or universal affirmation, but
form
as a
:
matter of
human
experience as far as
say that existence out of time
is
a
it
has gone,
we must
combination of words to
which we can attach no real meaning. The position involves more consequences than can be here discussed as for instance the total rejection of all attempts, however powerful and ingenious, to set up an Absolute, Unconditioned, Unknowable, or any form of unapproachable reality supposed to be somehow more For the present it is real than the things we feel and know. enough to beg the reader to believe that such a position is ;
philosophically tenable, notwithstanding that (as he can see for 1
Hanc
eius existentiam
Prop. 23, Schol.
tempore
definiri
sive per
durationem explicari non posse
:
SPINOZA
28o
himself) valiant
it
in
no way repugnant to common sense. speculation and disregarding objections of to
practical shape
something alleged
about
talk
time,
to
If,
being
this
kind,
in
is
we begin relation
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
:
the objection
by the extreme
be forced
will
we
difficulty
without
exist
to
upon us
in
soon find in
shall
pursuing our discourse without manifest contradictions.
Probably
the objection did not occur to Spinoza in the shape in which is
here put
But he
felt
shape
that
for
:
is
the result of modern
j
it
inquiries.
the logical difficulty of discussing eternity in
language of time
a
the
and he endeavoured to secure himself by the
following characteristic remark.
We mind,
here note that, although
shall
so far as
eternal
we
now
be
certain
the
that
doth conceive things under the form of eternity,
in order that
yet,
;
it
may be the mind (like
our ensuing exposition
is
easier
and the better understood, we shall consider the as we have done thus far) as if at a given moment it began to be, and to understand things under the form of eternity ; and this we may safely do without any risk of error, so that we use care to conclude nothing except from evident premisses.^
we may
Perhaps
formidable than they appear at
less is
think, on reflexion, that the objections are
maintaining in an
really
artificial
sight.
first
form
is
What
Spinoza
that the necessary
and universal character of exact knowledge is not affected either by this and that particular act of knowledge being associated, as
a
occurring
fact
world,
the sensible
in
with a transitory
condition of a bodily organism, or by the act, as a particular
human
act,
being subject to the conditions of our
And
consciousness.
The
finite
human
seems a sound position in substance.
this
second branch of the difficulty disappears for those
who
accept time as an ultimate reality.
Spinoza proceeds to
which
is
the
set forth
the " intellectual love of
crown of the mind's
perfection.
It
has
God
"
already
been stated that the most perfect activity and excellence of the mind is to understand things with the third or intuitive kind of knowledge
;
and
that 1
this
begets
Prop. 31, Schol.
the
highest
degree
of
THE DELIVERANCE OF MAN
281
contentment attainable by human nature.^ Again, this knowledge impHes the knowledge of God ; hence the delight of the highest intellectual activity idea of
that
that
God
we we
That
cause.
its
a pleasure
accompanied with the
God
God
love of
is, it is
conceive him," adds Spinoza, " as
now
;
"not
in
present, but in
what I call the Like the knowledge from which love of God." ^ it is eternal on which there is another curious
understand
intellectual it
as
is
springs,
eternal,
as
and
this
is
;
remark. Although all
this love
God
toward
hath had no beginning, yet
manner
the perfections of love in the same
time,
And
as
we
as if it
had
it
hath
arisen in
feigned in the corollary to the foregoing proposition.
no difference but that the mind hath eternally had the same perfections which (as we feigned) accrued to it at a parherein there
ticular time,
and that accompanied by the idea of
And
cause thereof. perfection,
is
'tis
must
idea of an eternal causation
we regard the case we have to of time at once.
There
Spinoza.
and
effect
as
the contrary,
mind
consist in this, that the
;
and
we this
are required
to
form the
lands us in an impossibility
cause as an antecedent of the effect, as in that
conceive a relation which
But is
difficulty
this
is
in
time and out
would probably not touch
nothing to show that he conceived cause
being necessarily antecedent and consequent it is
that he did not.
relations
on
3
pretty clear from the First Part of the Ethics
God,
as
the absolute
first
cause of motion and matter, and they of similar
the eternal
full possession.
Here, the reader will observe,
if
as
since pleasure consisteth in a passage to greater
plain blessedness
hath perfection in
God
hold in
the
cause,
all
is
the immediate
material things
other Attributes.
But
;
and
there
is
here no question of priority in time.
though not itself perfection, is a hence the mind, so far as it partakes condition of perfection of eternity, must enjoy this freedom, and Spinoza naturally proceeds to show that "the mind is not exposed, except while the body endures, to those emotions which are reckoned as
Freedom from the
passions, :
1
Propp. 25, 27.
2
Pr. 32, Coroll.
X
SPINOZA
282
:
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
Whence it follows that none but the intellectual is eternal. And here for the first time Spinoza takes distinct notice of the common opinion of immortality. "If we consider the general opinion of mankind, we shall find that they are indeed aware of the eternity of their own
passions."
love
mind
but confound the same with duration, and ascribe
;
it
to
or memory, which they suppose to remain This explains why Spinoza throughout this part of his work avoids the use of the term immortality^ and it exposes more fully than any comment could do the hopelessness of attempting to represent him as maintaining the immortality
the
imagination
after death."
^
of the soul in the ordinary sense
One more to
outdo
remains
surprise
:
yet the attempt has been made.
:
the
determined " God vocabulary.
philosopher
own
the theologians with their
is
loves himself with an infinite and intellectual love " tual
love of
love,
and in
human minds towards God is part it God may be said to love men ;
the intellec-
:
of this infinite
which there
in
no contradiction of the foregoing statement that God neither loves nor hates any one, since this intellectual love is not an emotion. It is perhaps difficult to remember that the substance is
of the propositions thus expressed
human
mind's
knowledge
of the
part
a
as
the universe
than
contemplation
is
of
purely and simply the
still
and
itself
acceptance
conscious
certain
and necessary order of
infinite
that for Spinoza the divine love
\
own
its
of universal
law,
nothing else the " welcoming is
every event" of the Stoics; and that the secret of blessedness
and glory â&#x20AC;˘J
(for
those
none other than It
seems
a
a
titles
mind
poor
inveterate
:
barren
so strong
custom of hungering
the realities under our hands.
thought into a guide
for
conclusion the
is
action, if
justified)
we
bear
prejudice
all,
propositions into a practical imperative,
is
if
the
bred of our
and neglecting
we
turn Spinoza's
translate his
what
up
is
the
speculative
outcome
?
which true and fearless men have preached through Seek the truth, fear not the generations to unheeding ears.
Even all
to
dreams
after
After
and
on the truth.
steadfastly bent
and
solemnity of language
are expressly claimed
that
^
Pr, 34, CoroU. and Schol.
THE DELIVERANCE OF MAN and spare not
this first,
:
this
for
own
its
283
sake, this
only
;
and
the truth itself
is your reward, a reward not measured by length of days nor by any reckoning of men. This lesson assuredly is not an idle one, or unworthy to be set forth with fervent and
And
solemn words.
if
repeat the lesson, that
an example of
On
any man ever had a special title so to man was Spinoza, whose whole life was
it.
the strength of these passages Spinoza has been called a
mystic (not that
a bad
it is
name
mystical doctors of the middle ages were tive
some of the
to be called, for
power) and, while the passages
men
of great specula-
question have perplexed
in
philosophical inquirers, they have exercised a sort of fascination
on many author
As
readers.
more
no
is
endeavoured to
a
to
the
mystic
show, the
contents of them, their
actual
than
Aristotle,
groundwork of
his
if,
as
doctrine
AristoteHan theory that contemplative knowledge
is
have
I is
the
the highest
and most proper function of the mind, in respect of which alone it can be said to partake of eternity. Moreover the form chosen
by Spinoza may be partly due, as I have already hinted, to the desire of encountering theologians with their own weapons. But there is unquestionably something of an exalted and mystical temper in his expressions and it seems possible enough that, ;
but for his scientific training
in
the school of Descartes, he
might have gone the way of those mystics who have thought to If this be so, Descartes take the kingdom of heaven by force. has one claim the more to the gratitude of mankind. But these seemingly transcendental propositions are not left without
practical
quality of the
application.
The
mind " inasmuch
truth depending on the nature of
the greater
as it
intellectual is
God,"
the activity in a particular
is
standing described the more does the
as
love,
regarded is
as
being
an eternal
indestructible.
mind of
a
And
the clear under-
the second and third kinds of knowledge,
man
partake of eternity, the
less is
he exposed
to evil passions, and the less does he fear death (Pr. 38, 39).
And
sudden return to the physical aspect of things, as if " He that hath a body to show that it has never been forgotten. of most various capacities hath also a mind whose greatest part is then there
is
a
.J
SPINOZA
284
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
:
eternal " (Prop. 39).
For the " power of ordering and connecting the affections of the body according to the intellectual order " is a perfection of the body.
organs
thought
of
Naturally the body includes the special
and reflexion
;
and apparent
outward
the
human body is not asserted to be the necessary index of contemplative power. At the same time Spinoza would no doubt have said that, other things being equal, the commonly
excellence of the
recognized qualities of health, strength, comeliness, activity, and the like, are ever
makes
in themselves
all
they
may
bodies possess various capacities, there
much knowledge
that
we
we change a child or a
and contrariwise
who
is
it
the full course of
truth he
to
this
no doubt
is
be attached to minds that have
such a point that they scarce fear
understanding of this
in perpetual mutation,
live
from being
and
for the better
according as
as to
of themselves and of God, and whose greatest or
eternal,
is
But
death.
and that what-
some degree make meaning is defined
in
In this place his
be of such a character
chief part
;
SchoHum.
in a
human
Since
mind.
desirable
body must
for the health of the
for the health of the
by himself
good and
life
(like
it
shall
and are called
/^appy
a corpse
accounted happiness with
a
sound mind
a child) hath
a
we
if
in a
or unhappy
Thus one who
for the better or the worse.
youth becomes
be observed
said to be
is
unhappy,
have been able to run
sound body.
And
in
body of very few capacities and
mind which, if we take it in itself, is little or not at all aware of itself, or God, or the nature of and contrariwise he that hath a body of many capacities hath a things mind which, if we take it in itself, is very well aware of itself, of God, largely subject to outward influences, hath a
;
and of the nature of things. this life
Therefore
it
convenient, into another which shall have
may
our chief endeavour in
is
to change the infant's body, so far as
its
many
nature admits and capacities,
belong to a mind
as fully
nature of things
and so that everything that belongs
;
aware
as
be of
itself,
and
is
shall
of God, and of the to
its
memory
or
imagination shall in comparison of the understanding be of hardly any weight.
Here Spinoza seems
to regard
education, both physical and
mental, as a process of organic development not difl^ering in kind
from the purely natural processes of growth
;
a guiding
and train-
THE DELIVERANCE OF MAN ing of the
Though
285
of variation already given in the organism. but sHghtly touched, there is enough to shov^
possibilities
the point
is
a striking approximation to our
most recent discoveries in this branch of the science of human nature, the most important and perhaps the most neglected of its practical applications. It has already
mind
the
is
been incidentally stated that the eternal part of
greater in
some
individuals and less in others.
But
however this proportion may be, the eternal part is in every case the more perfect for this is the only truly active part of the :
mind, and perfection consists in and is measured by active power. And here Spinoza adds, rather abruptly, a final metaphysical conclusion namely, " that our mind, so far as it understands, is an :
eternal
mode
of thought, which
is
determined by another eternal
mode of thought, and that again by another, and so on to infinity so that all together make up the eternal and infinite understanding of God." The other eternal mode of thought by which the mind is immediately determined would seem to be the thing known by ;
mind " under the form of eternity," and the infinite chain in which these are links to be the whole order of the universe under the attribute of Thought. But, it may be said, this will be only the order as existing at a given moment, since the thing known the
" under the form of eternity " must be a particular thing.
might reply that
that
it
is
only, the infirmity of
human imagination
compels us to conceive the order of things
fixed
as
at
a
we can conceive that the state of moment includes potentially the whole
particular time, and even as
the universe at a given
Spinoza
it is
This would involve holding that the difference between potential and actual existence is only
history for an infinite past and future.
in respect of
human
imagination, besides the assumption (made as
by Spinoza) that our knowledge of the laws of nature is or may be exact and universal. However, the speculation is not pursued, and we are brought back to a more practical ground. " Though we knew not that our mind is eternal, we should a matter of course
still
1
put in the
first
place piety and religion,^ and generally every-
These terms have been defined
in Eth. 4, 37, Schol. i.
action prompted by knowledge of God,
of well-doing produced by a
life
i.e.^
Religion
by rational knowledge
according to reason.
:
is
piety
all desire is
and
the desire
AND PHILOSOPHY
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
286
thing which in the Fourth Part
we showed
to belong to valour
and high-mindedness " (Pr. 41).
The
proof
simply
is
them
practising
that
the
have already
and
virtues
been
the reasons
on a
established
for
footing
independent of the mind's eternity.
But the belief of the common otherwise. For they mostly seem proportion
as
may do
they
sort
after their
own
added), seemeth to be
is
lusts,
bound
their right in proportion as they are
ment of God's
(it
to hold themselves to be free in
and
to
be deprived ot
to live after the
command-
So they hold piety and religion, and generally
law.
everything that belongs to firmness of mind, to be burdens, and hope after death to cast is
them
and have the reward of their service, that But not merely this hope, but likewise (and
off
of piety and religion.
chiefly)
fear,
death, doth
to
move them
and weakness of fear,
wit of being punished with grievous torments after
but held that the
God's law, so
to live after
And
doth admit.
spirit
mind
if
far as their
men had
perishes with the body,
poverty
not this hope and
and no longer
life
remains for poor mortals (worn out forsooth with the burden of pious living),
own
they would go back to their
the desire of the
themselves.
desires, guide their actions
moment, and be ruled
Which
me seemeth no
to
less
absurd than
time, should choose to
or because he
perceives
cram himself with poison and deadly things that
immortal, would therefore live
The
the as
;
mind is not eternal, I mean not one demented and without aid of
But things of such absurdity
reason.
man, body for
if a
because he knows he cannot with wholesome food sustain his all
by
rather by hazard than by
are scarce
fit
to
be mentioned.
vulgar notion of virtue having a reward to claim
is
further
contradicted in the next and final proposition.
"Blessedness
have
we
we
is
not the prize of virtue, but virtue
nor
the gifts of virtue through controlling our desires, but
can control our desires because
"...
itself;
Herewith
I
we
have finished
have the
all
gifts
of virtue.
that I purposed to set forth
of the power of the mind over the emotions, and of her freedom. Whence it is evident how great is the wise man's power and his
advantage over the ignorant
man who
is
driven by blind desire.
distracted by external influences and in
many
contentment
in his
For such a man is other ways besides, and doth never
attain true
THE DELIVERANCE OF MAN soul
he
287
were without sense of himself and God and the nature of things, and no sooner ceases to suffer than he ceases to be. Whereas the wise man, if we take him as such, is of a constant mind, and, being aware of himself and God and the ;
lives as it
way of
nature of things in a be, but
way may
I
For
if
trouble, it
These
That
the
?
should
But every
come
it
excellent
work
In their
what he has
quite consistent with
is
to pass that nearly
so seldom
there read that
it
is
of reason and freedom
:
Spinoza's principles, to
wisdom and
and such a
is
rare."
words of gravity
;
former proposition
difficult to
life
mankind
sense they are not
literal
said in a
not
all
as difficult as it
is
words of Spinoza's Ethics
are the last
we have
must be hard which
it
were so easy and could be found with
salvation
how
truly
but not of discouragement.
for
if
have shown to lead hither seems exceedingly hard, yet
be discovered.
neglect
And
ever in possession of true contentment.
is
found. little
eternal necessity, doth never cease to
pursue the
must lead
ere long,
true knowledge.
;
life
on
Perhaps he
contemplated a practical standard of righteous living and happiness
by ordinary men with a good will, and a higher kind of satisfaction accessible only by strenuous thinking and the habit He seems to have thought it at least of contemplative science. attainable
improbable that the great bulk of mankind should ever be able to dispense with the external coercion of
human
laws and ordinances,
or even with the belief in supernatural rewards and punishments, as a
to
Once more we note how near he comes The wise man is thoroughly possessed of the
guide of conduct.
the Stoics.
knowledge that virtue
is
self-sufficient,
happiness, whatever his external conditions
and therein finds his but the perfect ideal
:
of wisdom can scarcely be realized by man. nevertheless
The way mankind
is
makes open
this his aim,
one alike
to every
are governed
and comes :
as
but as
The near it
philosopher
it
is,
as
he can.
the bulk of
by the coarser motives which alone they
which experience has shown to be necessary for Such is the Stoic position as well as the maintenance of society. In so far as this is a statement of fact, we have no Spinoza's. appreciate, and
right to ask whether
but only whether
it is
it is
agreeable or flattering to
true
;
and, whether
we
human
pride,
consider Spinoza's
,
AND PHILOSOPHY
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
288
time or our own,
we
So
not easy to deny.
shall find it
implies the absence of hope that the description
far as
may some
it
day
commonwealth of civilized nations, we may regret that Spinoza did not see his way to believing in the improvement of mankind. But before we pass any intellectual or moral censure upon him for this, we should ask cease to be true, at least as regards the
ourselves whether, his circumstances and his
and institutions grounds a time
for
being
such
as
they
knowledge of history
were,
he had reasonable
He
expecting any continuous improvement.
which on the whole was one of
reaction, and in
blessings of a far distant past, partly by the legendary bias all
wrote in
which the
common
ages, partly under the special influence of the Renaissance,
to
were
The movement of free thought seemed arrested
vastly exaggerated.
growth of science was only beginning. Spinoza was not the man to win a cheap reputation for large-heartedness by facile promises of a golden age. in
politics
In this
everything was
last
confusion
Part of the Ethics
we
;
the
have traced a curiously in-
show
what extent it turns on Spinoza's peculiar use of language which modern criticism cannot allow to pass current. Yet his doctrine of the eternity of the mind must remain one of the most brilliant
volved and
artificial
argument, and have
tried
endeavours of speculative philosophy, and poetical
still
2;ive
we
it
linger over
to
throws a sort of
We
have
has a sufficiently certain practical lesson.
But
glow over the formality of
already said that
it
to
it,
his
exposition.
seeking for some expression which
us the central idea that
we
can accept and use
it
may
so
for ourselves,
some concentration of the commanding thought without the preIf the task were carious dialectical form in which it is clothed. but there is no need for still to attempt, it might be a hard one ;
any such attempt. secured for us by
The
essence of Spinoza's thought
a master
who combines
is
already
delicacy of perception
and the intellectual tact which is the flower of criticism with consummate power over language. M. Renan has expressed it in the perfectly chosen words which I have placed at the head of and with which, so far as I can preserve them in Reason leads Death in triumph^ translation, I shall now end it and the work done for Reason is done for eternity. this chapter,
:
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
CHAPTER X THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE Ond'
egli
Per r
ancora
uomo
Si, rispos' io
Or
:
di'
in terra, se
j
e qui ragion
:
sarebbe
non
peggio
il
fosse cive
?
non cheggio.
Dante:
Paradiso, 8, 115.
Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of war, where every man is enemy to man j the same is consequent to the time wherein men live without other security
every
than what their
own
strength and their
such condition, there
is
no place
own
and consequently no culture of the earth that
may
be imported by sea
and removing, such things earth
j
no account of time
continual
fear,
as
require
no
arts
j
Hobbes
:
them
j
much
no
withal. is
force
letters
j
j
thought
:
and
in a
in
:
no society
and the
j
no instruments of moving,
;
no knowledge of the
life
and which
;
man,
of
is
face of the
worst of
all,
solitary, poor, nasty,
Lez/iathan, ch. 13.
metaphysical parts of Spinoza's philosophy are expressed,
must be allowed,
In
uncertain
no navigation, nor use of the commodities
no commodious building
j
and danger of violent death
brutish, and short.
The
;
invention shall furnish
industry, because the fruit thereof
for
manner not congenial
studying
be at some disadvantage
as
his
Ethics the
it
EngHsh habits of EngHsh reader may
to
compared with those who have been
trained in a Continental school.
When we come
to Spinoza's
Though not actually theory of politics the balance is redressed. a disciple of Hobbes, Spinoza so closely follows him that the philosophy of law and government which appears in the Tractatus Theologico - Politicus^
worked out
in
the
is
just
indicated
Tractatus
in
Politicus^
the general doctrine characteristic of the
the
Ethics^
distinctly
EngHsh
and
belongs
is
to
school of juris-
This doctrine was first clearly given out by Hobbes, then taken up after a long interval by Bentham, then carried on prudence.
with additions into a new generation by Austin ; it has in our own time been endowed by the work of Sir Henry Maine and
u
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; SPINOZA
290
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
:
others with the breadth and flexibility that were wanting in
and has come
earlier stages,
any doctrine
as
its
near to being officially received as
such matters can well come in English seats of
in
learning.
Hence
the leading ideas of Spinoza's treatise on Politics ought
EngHsh
to have for an
was the
treatise
work of
latest
which remained
The
reader nothing very strange in them. his
life,
and
is
unfinished
but that
;
would have been concerned mostly with points of detail. The editors of the Opera Posthuma have given in the preface an extract from a letter of Spinoza's written while he was engaged on this work. I
to be added
should not miss
matter
I
judge more to the purpose, and which I think will also please
you better, that your persuasion chapters
opportunity were I not already engaged by a
this
now
the composition of a treatise on Politics, which on
is,
began some time ago.
I
The The
finished.
the body of the work.
first
Of
second
treats of the
of the right of the supreme magistrate
third,
this treatise there are six
contains a kind of introduction to
;
the fourth, what
of state be in the supreme magistrate's discretion that last
by what method
sixth,
that
and chief good which
it
may
a
a society
formally prove
-I
;
the
;
all
At present
am on
I
this I
shall
affairs
the seventh
the heads of the foregoing sixth
chapter touching the institution of a well-ordered monarchy.
legislation
the
what is and the
fifth,
may contemplate
;
monarchical government ought to be established
not slide into a tyranny.
chapter, wherein
law of nature
proceed to aristocracy and popular government,
and other particular questions regarding
political science.
Neitlier the date, the occasion alluded to in the
nor the correspondent's name
is
disclosed.
After
lastly to
The
sentence,
first
chapters on aris-
tocracy were afterwards added, and one on democracy was begun, in the middle of
which the
treatise
breaks
off.
There
another
is
(Ep. 47), dated the 17th of February 1671, which seems to throw some more Hght on the In this he says matter. of Spinoza's to Jarig JeUis
letter
:
A ^
friend of
A
mine
work answering
sent
et
a
while ago a book entitled Homo Politicus^
this description
ouvragei anonymes (No. 2o,6o2
novus, officiarius
me
aulicus
in
ed.
is
catalogued by Barbier in his Dictionnaire des
1824).
"Homo
politicus,
hoc
est,
consiliarius
secundum hodiernam praxin, auctore Pacifico
a
Lapide
THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE whereof I had heard much chievous a book author's
mind
his teaching.
.
.
perusal of
For the
found
treat of the chief good,
as
mis-
To
this
it
he mightily recommends deceit, pro-
rest,
might indirectly controvert
who
I
rank and wealth, and thereto he directs
is
mising and breaking one's promise, lying, of the same kind. When I had read all
those
it
can be devised or composed by man.
as
the chief good .
On
talk.
291
much else thinking how I and
false swearing,
this I fell
to
author by a book in which I should
this
then show the distracted and wretched state of
seek office and fortune, and lastly prove by convincing reasons
and abundant examples that commonwealths must needs perish, and have perished, through men's insatiable appetite for these things. It
possible that
is
we have
germ of the
here the
Tractatus
though the plan sketched out is very different from that which Spinoza began to execute. All that is left of it is the problem, treated in a purely scientific manner, of determining the Politicus^
conditions of stability in political institutions. treatise
cannot be said to hold a place in
which
parable to that
Spinoza's unfinished
held by the Ethics in philosophy.
is
com-
political science at all
So
far as I
know, it has been but Httle studied and has had no marked influence on Continental thought. In England, where it might have had a better chance, the general prejudice against Spinoza prevented
from obtaining the attention theory of Spinoza has been
two main
as
left
Thus
deserved.
it
it
it
the political
were stranded between the shall find, however, that
We
currents of speculation.
no waste of time. The Tractatus Politicus is much more than what it appears to be at first sight, a mere Hobbes adaptation of Hobbes to the terminology of the Ethics. is nowhere expressly mentioned by Spinoza, save once in answer the examination of
it is
to a correspondent,
and once in a note to the Tractatus
Politicus?-
But
the departures from his
(Christophoro Rapp, Cancellario Electoral!
among sion
Spinoza's papers was a
which he had
seen,
though
politicus liber rarissimus," 1
Cap. 16, ยง 34,
certainly a
n.
man may
list
laws of the
this
Borussiae).
Cosmopoli,
1665, in-4."
is
But
posses-
not clear) including " Franclscus Datisii
"In whatever commonwealth is
own
homo
to Leibnitz ap. Stein, Leibni'z u. Sp. p. 287.
be so far free as he
commonwealth
method and conclusions
of rare books (apparently books not in his
SchuUer
persuadeth to peace (N.B. Hobbes
Theologico-
is
otherwise)
are kept."
peace the first object of rational desire.
a
man
is,
governed by reason.
There
5
is
he
may
be free.
For
But reason every way
but this cannot be secured unless the
an oversight here,
Le'viathan,
c.
13,
ad jin. and
for c.
Hobbes makes 14.
292
SPINOZA
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
:
involve a good deal of tacit criticism
;
and
implied criticism
this
modern line on some points. anticipation of modern constitutional doctrines takes a strikingly
For substantial it would be un-
reasonable to look in a writer of Spinoza's time. Occasional remarks occur, however, which make us regret that Spinoza never wrote his chapter on the theory of legislation. He points out
with perfect clearness the
of sumptuary laws, and assigns
futility
it, namely, that society has no interest in " Laws which can be broken without any wrong
the true ground of
enforcing them.
made
to one's neighbour are
from such laws
light of; and so far
restraining the appetite and lusts of mankind, they rather heighten
them.
Nitimur
in vetitum semper^
Men who
cupimusque negata?-
have the leisure will always find the wit to evade laws made to be wholly forbidden, banquets,
regulate such matters as cannot
games, apparel, and the to
like
;
wherein excess only
evil,
is
be measured by the particular citizen's fortune
;
cannot be defined by statutes of general application." has been charged, and
still is
The
preaching absolutism. logico-P oliticus^
which
and expression,
charged by some of his
many
different temper.
Such
:
and there
Spinoza
-
critics,
with
occur in the
also
maxims which show a very the following " It makes for slavery,
sentences and
are
:
power
all
it
an elaborate plea for liberty of thought
is
Tractatus Politicus
not peace, to deliver
that
so
whole scope of the Tractatus Theo-
a refutation of this
is
and that
—
"
one man."
to
It
is
better that
the just counsels of a realm should be laid open to enemies, than that
the
wicked
With
citizens."
saying
this last
" In deliberations that ought
many
occasions
in
should
of tyrants
secrets
we may
may
Hobbes
:
to be kept secret, whereof there be
the counsels of
public business,
especially \n assembHes, are dangerous." It
be concealed from
contrast one of
many, and
^
be convenient, before entering upon
details, to
give a
general view of Spinoza's plan, and of the extent to which he agrees with and differs
They
from Hobbes.
both aim at the
construction of a science of politics on the basis of the 1
"We
spurn at rule, and seek forbidden joys." 2
Tract. Polit. '^
c.
Le'uiathan,
— Ovid, Amor.
10, § 5.
c.
25.
iii.
known
4. 17,
THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE facts of
average
293
human nature and the assumptions they make about human nature are much the same. But Hobbes, writing ;
with a view to immediate controversies, does not adventure himself to any length on the path of speculative construction. The practical
may
bearing of his argument
Every monarch ought and temporal
spiritual
king of England
summed up
in
supreme
in
to be absolutely
England
;
is
monarchy
a
one sentence
:
matters both therefore the
;
Spinoza, on the other hand, under-
absolute.
is
be
takes the ideal construction of the most stable types of institutions
monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy nearly as far as Hobbes, but not quite, in for
of revolutions
;
and, probably taking from
respectively. his dislike
Hobbes
and
He
goes
distrust
his notions of
the English Constitution and of contemporary English history,
EngHsh
gives the
ended fatal
in
complete
civil
war
as
an instance of a rebellion which had
He
failure.
thinks
it
must be almost always
a
mistake to attempt a fundamental change in an existing
may
But in the abstract his preference is for democracy, a preference more distinctly expressed in the Tractatus Theologico-P oliticus than anywhere else. Demo-
government, of whatever type
cracy
is
it
defined, however, in such a
be.
way
as to
include most of the
governments commonly called aristocratic or constitutional. It is also remarkable that Spinoza's ideal monarchy is on the whole a more popular government than his ideal aristocracy. His theory But he of sovereignty is essentially the same as that of Hobbes. does not carry
out into the same unqualified consequences.
it
According to Hobbes the origin of the State is a covenant of mutual concession prompted by the mutual fear of men in a lawless condition, and by the rational desire of peace which is the where a law of nature means a rule discovered first law of nature by reason as a means toward self-preservation. The sovereign, whether he be one man or an assembly of men, bears the person of the united multitude who " reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices, unto one will," and in this union become a commonwealth. The collected power and authority of every citizen is \
transferred
to
him by their
the
peace
common mandate, to be used at Further, and common defence.
discretion
for
mandate
irrevocable, since
is
it
is
his
the
not several from each citizen to
294
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE AND PHILOSOPHY
the sovereign, but citizens.
depends on
the social
Every subject has covenanted
covenant of
vi^ith
all
the
every other that
and remain transferred to the sovereign. that the unanimous assent of the sovereign and all
their natural right shall be
Hobbes admits the
subjects
(not
of the
subjects without
determine the sovereign's right
the sovereign)
may
the result of which would be a government and return to the natural state of war. Whether the whole commonwealth, including the sovereign, might change the form of government without passing through anarchy is a question which, so far as I know, he left untouched. At all events, the sovereign is an agent whose powers cannot be eiFectually recalled or renounced in any practically possible circumstances and no subject can complain of acts of state done by the sovereign, because every such act has been authorized by the subject and must be deemed his own. Modern readers cry out, of course, that all this scheme of covenants and mandates is the purest fiction. But Hobbes is not altogether unprepared even ;
total dissolution of
:
for
this.
He
the
catches
objecting
individual
in
a
dilemma.
Either you have agreed, he says, to transfer your power to the sovereign or you have not.
you have, then you are estopped from disputing the acts of the sovereign. If you have not, you declare yourself a stranger to the State, and therefore the State has no duties towards you and may treat you as an enemy. Apart from these particular turns of dialectic, Hobbes' argument always comes round to offering the choice between submission and war ; and war is for him so clearly the worst of evils that the choice Whether the argument is not equally good cannot be doubtful. to establish (as Dante long before had actually sought to establish) the necessity of an universal monarch to keep the peace between sovereign states, as the sovereign in each state between individuals, another question to which Hobbes does not seem to have is If
applied himself.
In Spinoza describes
governed,
we do
government but
as
there
is
not
find
these
founded on the
no elaborate
He
rigorous
extremes.
common
consent of the
analysis
of the
supposed
Again, the power of the State not as swallowing up the natural power or right of the individual to act
contract.
he
regards
THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE as
he thinks best
own
for his
295
interest, but as holding
out effectual motives to the citizens to agree in exercising that right or power in a particular way, namely, by living peaceably under the laws. Further, although he nowhere expressly says that rebellion is right even in an extreme case, he does say quite plainly that
no
government is really absolute, since in the last resort its power is limited by the endurance of its subjects, and there are some things which no community will endure. Thus a supreme government, though it cannot offend against its own civil laws, may in a certain
sense
offend
against
the
law of nature.
who
Rulers
contempt or hatred of their subjects run the risk of committing political suicide. "Such deeds turn fear into indignation, and the state of civil society into a state of war." As far as the theory of the EngHsh constitution goes, Parliament might pass an Act forbidding people to perform so carry themselves as to invite the
But in that case Parliament would cease to be obeyed, and Englishmen would have to find some other form of government. Moreover Spinoza holds it competent to the sovereign power not only to interpret but to alter the fundamental laws of the commonwealth, provided that it can be done without provoking a revolution that would in fact, not only by the contheir contracts.
structive dissolution of a supposed covenant, dissolve civil society
;
which Hobbes does not seem to contemplate. There is indeed one natural right which Hobbes holds to be inalienable, the right of personal self-defence
;
and consequently the right of inflicting
punishment "is not grounded on any concession or subjects, "
but
is
part of the natural right
exercised by the sovereign on behalf of the
gift
of the
of self-preservation
commonwealth.
the subjects did not give the sovereign that right
;
" For
but only in
laying down theirs, strengthened him to use his own, as he should so that it was not think fit, for the preservation of them all Spinoza's exceptions given, but left to him, and to him only." ^ :
are
much
larger.
of the Tractatus
His language on
this point in the
Theolog'ico-P oUticus
the foregoing chapter he has laid
is
17th Chapter
particularly explicit.
down
In
the theory of absolute
sovereignty as founded on a concurrent cession of individual rights, ^
Leviathan, ch. 28.
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; SPINOZA
296
:
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
without even Hobbes' reservation of points out that absolute sovereignty
No man
realized.
can
;
some
of their subjects.
fear
In truth,
ever
put
an
is
ideal
if
men
never completely
himself wholly
who
nor have there ever been rulers
discretion
But he now
self- defence.
at
another's
did not stand in
could so far lose their natural right, that for time
come they might do nothing without
them that held sovereign right, then governors might without remedy use all extremities of violence towards their subjects which opinion I think no man can entertain. Wherefore it must be allowed that every man reserveth to himself much of his own right, which therefore dependeth to
the will of
:
on no other man's resolution, but on
In
fine, the right
own
his
of a government over
power of commanding
their obedience
not the motive, that makes
men
its
it is
subjects.
law whether he obeys from hope,
fear,
subjects
is
really its
but this does not
:
only commanding by force or threats, for
alone.^
mean
the fact of obedience,
The
subject
fulfils
the
both together, or any other
cause.
A man mines of
is
full
then most under another's government
consent to observe
that the prince
who
all
that other's orders
hath most dominion
is
when he and
;
it
deter-
follows
he that reigns over his
But if they had most dominion who be most eminence would manifestly belong to the subjects of despots, who by their despots are most greatly feared. subjects' minds.
feared, then that
And though governments affections directly, they may like a reflexion
cannot control men's thoughts and do
on Hobbes, who
it is
This again looks emphatic on the point that
indirectly.
governments can control nothing but overt acts. may now understand Spinoza's answer to in Ep. 50
We
his
correspondent
:
As concerning the politics, the difference betwixt Hobbes and myself of which you ask consists in this, that I ever save natural right harmless, and hold that the sovereign magistrate in any state hath no more right over his subjects than is measured by the excess of his ^
there
Cf. is
Hume,
in
the Essay on the Origin of Government.
a perpetual intestine struggle,
neither of
them can
open or
secret,
" In
all
governments
between Authority and Liberty, and
ever absolutely prevail in the contest."
THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE power over the
subject
which
;
(i.e.
297
the identity of right and power)
always takes place in the state of nature.
would appear that altogether Spinoza attached decidedly less importance than Hobbes to the question of the origin of governIt
What
ment.
he regarded
government existing Hobbes' view it is
and
only exists de jure^ but
is
He
nobody can undo.
being able
difficult
established can ever lose
main thing was the
as the
to
its title
:
see
maintain
to
how
a
that, if the rightful
of
its
itself.
government once
knit together by a vinculum juris is
In
the Leviathan once framed not
driven to admit in
principle of allegiance to de facto governments is
fact of a
:
which
some measure the but
government becomes unable
all
he will say
to protect
any
subjects, these subjects are remitted to their natural right of
and may give their allegiance to any power from which protection can be had. His greatest aversion and contempt
self-preservation,
is
for the doctrine of
mixed government
and
;
over the fallacy of divided sovereignty
is
his logical
triumph
hardly distinguishable
from his practical dishke of all attempts to shift the centre of power or divide the substance of it from the form. While Hobbes expressly admits that an aristocracy or democracy may exist under monarchical appearances, he utterly refuses to consider
whether there is anything to be of England to be of this kind.
enough
to dazzle his
Spinoza
case.
does
holding the constitution
The name
of monarchy seems
judgment when he comes not
share
this
temper.
to the
specific
His theoretical
prevent him from having regard to the con-
does not
analysis
said for
no more an absolutist than Bentham. In his ideal commonwealths he makes elaborate provision for checks and balances, which in their spirit almost anticipate the venience of mankind, and he
is
constitutional publicists of the eighteenth century.
The
point on which Hobbes and Spinoza are most thoroughly
in accord
is
the total rejection of
all
claims,
on grounds of religion
or otherwise, to set up a jurisdiction equal or superior to that of
the
civil
power.
â&#x201A;Źvery opportunity
man
They ;
both denounce ecclesiastical pretensions at
and, while they both admit that
has a special revelation he
they give
it
must obey
it
if a
private
even against the State,
to be understood, in almost identical terms, that the
SPINOZA
298
possibility of a special revelation
No man
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
:
need not be practically considered.
can have immediate assurance of
whom
it
bound
to take notice of
its
actually revealed, and therefore
is
him
to
citizen
is
truth except
no private
anything alleged for revealed truth by " another, who, being a man, may err, and, which is more, may lie."
One who
^
up
sets
prove his office by miracles
of a true prophet that
test
established
prophet
for a
is
at the very least
to
Hobbes adds as a no less indispensable he must not preach any religion but the ;
Spinoza suggests that even
one.
bound
if
a real
prophet
appeared in a modern commonwealth there would be no
strict
So that "
in a commonwealth, a subject no certain and assured revelation particularly to himself concerning the will of God is to obey for such the command of
obligation to receive him. that has
the commonwealth." in all
Xhe
^
causes, ecclesiastical
State
is
supreme over
all
persons and
and temporal, except in hypothetical
events which cannot happen.
We have
seen that Spinoza
unqualified
in
qualifications
terms, and
which he
first
gives the theory of sovereignty
then states
another
in
sees to be needful in applying
word of
chapter the it
to existing
The
faculty of
facts.
This deserves
clearly
grasping an abstract doctrine, and withal remembering
that
it is
a
special notice.
an abstraction, and not a complete account of the actual
phenomena, is by no means a common one. In our own day it has been reserved for Sir Henry Maine ^ to point out with accuracy the ideal character of the conception of sovereignty and positive
law developed by Hobbes and his followers, and thus to furnish the means of assigning
That Spinoza
its
real philosophical
and practical value.
should have seriously attempted a similar process,
and to a certain extent succeeded, is perhaps not the least of the circumstances that show the independence of his thought even
where there is the strongest appearance of his following others. Having thus indicated the general nature of Spinoza's political theory, we may proceed to a more detailed view of the Tractatus 1
Leviathan^ ch. 32.
2
Leviathan, ch. 26
§§ 61 ^
sqq.
and
j
cp.
Spinoza, Tract. Polit.
c. 3,
§ 10
19, passim.
Lectures on Sovereignty in The Early History of Institutions.
j
Tract. Theol.-Pol.
c.
i6,
THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE
299
Pohticus,
In the introductory chapter Spinoza announces his intention of dealing with the subject in a purely scientific manner.
On
he repeats in substance what he had said in the Preface to the Third Part of the Ethics, One remarkable passage this point
betrays
how
strangely he underrated the extent and complexity of
the problem.
am
commonwealths which can be devised for men's living together in harmony, and likewise the means whereby a multitude should be guided and kept within settled bounds, have been shown by experience ; so that I do not think there is anything not repugnant to experience and practice which we can discover by meditation on this topic, but hath before now been known and put to trial. For such is the temper of men that they cannot live except in some common bond of laws and the laws of commonwealths I
firmly convinced that
all
the kinds of
;
and
of
ajffairs
have been founded and considered by
state
by policy
greatest wit (whether
we
credible that to society
men
have not discerned,
by
We
this
fairly
by
craft)
;
affairs (c.
of the
'tis
hardly
wherefore
should be able to devise anything
which opportunity
busied on public
Yet
or
men
fitted
to
or accident hath never offered,
be of use and which
and mindful of assuring their own interest
i, ยง 3.)
only seems strange to the eyes of us
trying scientific methods
who
how complex
have learnt
the world
is.
have already seen that Spinoza's belief in a comparatively short
road to certain and complete knowledge of everything was the belief of almost
all
Not
the aspiring minds of his time.
only
Descartes before him, but Leibnitz after him, sought and expected to find universal methods, and looked forward to the
of the sciences within a few generations. allowed to put in a word for Bacon,
who
And
consummation
here
we may
be
has been both praised
and blamed more inconsiderately than almost any philosophical writer.
Bacon's belief in a general art of scientific discovery
which would go near
to equalize men's intellects
ridicule
him
century
later.
for
now
easily seen
was not a singular or a perverse If we ridicule Bacon on this score, we must
to have been erroneous. belief at the time.
But
is
not having
it
known more
than Leibnitz did a
So too in the present case of
politics,
Spinoza's
opinion that no experiment of importance remained to be tried
AND PHILOSOPHY
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
300
was the opinion generally held by the most competent persons of
The
his time.
maining
variety of constitutions then existing in the re-
Empire, and the
Italian republics, the free cities of the
Swiss cantons, appears to have suggested that
all
possible variety
was exhausted rather than to have stimulated curiosity. Certainly Hobbes never dreamt of the great experiment impending in England, which has been directly and indirectly the parent of so
many
more. Again, the writers of the eighteenth century treated the English
constitution as having reached
its
final
development
;
and they
regarded a state which Hobbes would have called anarchy
as the
Nor had
highest actual and theoretical perfection of government.
they any clear notion of the distinction between the outlines of positive constitutional law and the great
body of informal conskeleton with full and
which clothes the legal various life. Hume's political essays, though full of brilliant remarks, are still in the main unfruitful. His Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth is not unlike the Tractatus Politicus in design and arrangement, allowance being made for the difference of scale, and it has about as much or as little practical value. In Montesquieu we find the true forerunner of the modern historical method. But to pursue this here would be to go too far astray. stitutional usage
It
may
be well to translate the next following paragraph of the
introductory chapter of the
Tractatus Politicus as
phrase (italicized in the translation) which
is
it
contains a
often and deservedly
quoted by modern writers on Spinoza. In applying myself therefore nothing
new
or
to the science
unknown, but only
to
prove by certain and undoubted
reasons, or to deduce from the constitution of tions
most agreeable
to practical
And
use.
of politics, I pretended
man
to
made
it
my
the proposi-
in order to inquire of the
matters of this science with the same freedom of use in the mathematics, I have
itself,
mind we
bewail, nor to denounce menu's actions, but to understand them
this
end
I
wont
are
to
especial care neither to mock,
have considered men's emotions, such
:
and
to
as love, hate, anger,
and other agitations of the mind, not as defects of human nature, but as properties which belong to it in like manner as envy, honour, pity,
to the nature of air there belong heat, cold, storms, thunder,
and the
THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE like
which though they be inconvenient, yet
;
constant causes w^hereby
mind
the
v^^e
endeavour
to
301 and have
are necessary
understand their nature, and
rejoices in the right contemplation of
them no
less
than in
the know^ledge of such things as are pleasing to the senses. Political science
ought to
it
to concern itself with
is
be, but as
it
nature not as
must not be assumed
It
is.
human
that
men
will act in public affairs according to the true dictates of reason
unless
made
it is
For
their obvious interest not to do otherwise.
the welfare of the State
one from what motive men obey
it is all
the law and perform the duties of their station, so that good
" Freedom and strength of mind are
government be secured.
men
virtues in private
but the virtue of governments
-,
is
safety.'*
Spinoza proceeds to consider the fundamental principles of government, starting from the facts of average human nature (cap. 2).
We
theory are
his
Any
laid
down.
may
particular thing in nature
existeth or no.
it
which the philosophical grounds of
translate the paragraph in
And
as
deduced from
things in nature cannot be
their definition, so neither
For the thing
can their continuance in existing.
conception,^ remains the same after
As
be adequately conceived, whether
the beginning of existence of particular
itself, as it is in
our
has begun to exist as before.
it
therefore the beginning of their existence cannot follow from their
essence
the knowledge of
{i.e.
ledge tSat such a thing existence
:
zu/^at a
so
is),
thing
is
differs
neither doth their
from the knowcontinuance
in
but to go on existing they need the same power which they
Whence
power of all things in nature, whereby they exist, and therefore whereby they have For effects, can be no other than the eternal power of God himself. not maintain itself, it could nor by if it were any other created power, consequence other things, but would need for its own continuing in existence the same power that was needed to create it. Now from this conclusion, that the power of things in nature, whereby they exist and work, is identically the power of God, we need
easily
for
beginning to
understand what
is
Essentia idealis
2
Spinoza uses the one term
j
a
in English.
it
follows that the
natural law or right.^
term which does not,
1
any single word ius
exist.
ius naturae.
Hobbes,
and lex which Spinoza does not
as
use.
we
I
For since
God
hath
think, occur in the Ethics.
The
double meaning cannot be given by
shall forthwith see, has a distinction between
302
AND PHILOSOPHY
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
right to everything,
power of God,
and the right of God
so far as
regarded
it is
nothing else than the
is
as absolutely free, it
follows that
much right as it hath power to and work ; seeing the power of each several thing in nature, whereby it doth exist and work, is no other than the free and absolute power of God. Therefore I understand by the law of nature the everything in nature hath of nature so exist
statutes or rules of nature according to is,
And
merely the power of nature.
which
things happen, that
all
thus the natural right of the
whole of nature, and by consequence of each several individual, doth extend so far forth as its power consequently whatever every man does by the rules of his own nature, that he does by perfect natural right, and hath right over nature so far as by his power he prevails. ;
must be observed how far Spinoza goes with Hobbes in his use of the term " Law of Nature," in which Hobbes and Spinoza stand alone, save so far as it may seem to go back to that unhappy would-be philosophical phrase of Ulpian's "ius quod natura omnia animalia docuit " which Justinian's commissioners preserved for
l'^
[It
the confusion of
many
generations.
I
do not think
that Spinoza was aware of that coincidence, as he
any sign of even
Roman
law.
By
nowhere gives
with civilian learning or
superficial acquaintance
the terminology of
at all likely
it
the law of nature Spinoza's
contemporaries, led by Grotius, meant rules of conduct ascertained
by reason
man
expedient for
as necessary or
as a
social
being,
antecedent to any particular political institutions, and independent
This
of any particular revelation. so far as
it is
the
is still
meaning of the term
For English-speaking lawyers
in use.
it
survives in
the closely allied term "natural justice," namely, the elementary rules of fairness
common
quasi-judicial proceedings
and necessary to
all
of which the rule that no one must be
;
condemned without notice of what he opportunity of defending
Hobbes recognizes as
he understands
of publicists not to their criterion,
For Hobbes,
it,
reasonable judicial or
himself
is
charged
the most familiar.
is
a law of nature in this sense, in
some
He
detail.^
as to the existence or
which he holds
with
differs
and
and
Now
sets it forth,
with the majority
scope of such rules, but
as
to be merely self-preservation.
they are not only prior to positive law
as for others, 1
Le^nathan^
c.
14.
THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;and
to the original covenant
of making
lavi^s
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; but
which
creates a sovereign capable
some extent not mutable by
to
Spinoza's system the precepts set
down
Ethics for the conduct of a reasonable
way
303
In
it.
in the fourth part of the
man answer
in a general
to Hobbes' lex naturalis^ a
term which Hobbes uses with a and if Spinoza had called those precepts laws of nature he would perhaps have been better understood
special distinction
from
ius
But nature
at the time.
in the first intention,
terminology
; ^
always for Spinoza, so to speak, nature
is
and he preferred to carry through
at all risks.
We
may now
his
own
shortly recapitulate the
assumed by Spinoza's philosophy with regard to the fundamental ideas of ethics and law. position
The
notions of good and bad arise as soon as
we
consider an
whose existence and welfare are distinguishable from the existence of the universe as a whole. For every creature some things are good and others bad. But the same things need not be good and bad for different individuals, or for the same individual individual
in different circumstances.
When we
have a society composed of individual
independent action, that which
men
capable of
good or bad for the society be-
is
comes right or wrong for the individuals composing it. What is esteemed good or bad by the society at large, or by the opinion prevailing
members
in
it,
is
prescribed
or
This
being right or wrong.
as
writers have called Positive Morality
mined not by any
^
may
is
definite
to
the
individual
what modern English
" positive "
being deter-
as
but by the actual prevailing
be wise or not.
in a particular society there has been
government provided with
each
:
final ethical criterion,
opinion of the society, which
When
forbidden
formed an organized
means of making
itself
obeyed,
" The Right of Nature, which Writers commonly call Jus Naturale, is the Liberty man hath, to use his own power, as he will himselfe, for the preservation of his own
Nature
j
that
is
to say, of his
own
Life
;
and consequently, of doing any thing, which in
his own Judgement, and Reason, hee shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto, " A Law of Nature {Lex Naturalis) is a Precept, or generall Rule, found out by Reason, .
by which
a
man
is
forbidden to do that
the means of preserving the same
is
liberty,
which
is
destructive of his
life,
or taketh
and to omit that, by which he thinketh
it
.
away
may
be
[J^s and Lex, though commonly confounded, must be distinguished Hobbes, Le-v. c. 14. /aiv a binding rule.]
best preserved."
rigM
j
.
;
SPINOZA
304
HIS LIFE
:
AND PHILOSOPHY
and that government prescribes, permits, and forbids particular kinds of conduct, then conduct falling under these rules acquires
What
further special qualities.
what
is
allowed
is
legally right
This
or unjust.
in the
is,
I
prescribed
what
;
is
is
duty or just
legal
forbidden
is
;
wrong
legally
language to which modern English
readers are accustomed. Positive as
is
have said elsewhere, that
My
Law.
for
own
opinion
now,
is
the purposes of jurisprudence,
whether analytical or historical, this conception is inadequate and erroneous that law is not law merely because the State enforces it, but on the contrary the State enforces it because it is law. But I am not here concerned to set forth my own opinions. Spinoza pays no attention to the distinction between the ;
positive
law which
positive
or conventional
enforced
is
opinion and social pressure.
of justice and the
by courts
morality which
is
enforced by public
Indeed the existence of conventional
morality in our actual societies, as distinct from the natural or absolute morality ascertainable by enlightened reason, does not
seem
to be present to
him
at
all.
Perhaps he would have said that
was no material difference between compulsion. It is a commonplace that
for his purpose there
merely
social
kinds of
affairs
more The modern
sanction, or
the social sanction
is
as effectual
as
and
legal
in
some
any
legal
so.
moralist, however, cannot neglect
or
publicist
these distinctions, if only for the sake of determining the elements
We
of possible conflict.
have three distinct and different sources
One set of rules is propounded by men another by the community as
of rules of conduct. good for reasonable
members of binding on
that
;
community
3
another by the
the subjects of that State.
Now
civil it
reason as right for
power
may
as
law
be that
all
these rules coincide, so far as they cover the
same ground
we
Indeed there could
are not entitled to assume that they will.
;
but
not be a complete and universal coincidence unless all societies and all governments were guided by right reason ; which is not the case.
Positive
both Positive dictates
Law
of reason.
Law may
with Positive Morality ; and Positive Morality may conflict with the If this
conflict
happens, which are
Spinoza does not explicitly discuss questions of
we
to follow
this kind.
?
All he
:
THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE has to say on the matter
with
is
man
that reason bids
305
Hve sociably
to
fellow-men, and prescribes obedience to the civil law as being, in general, the surest way to that end. And when reason " says, obey the law," we follow reason in obeying the law, though his
may
the particular law
we
be one that
indication of the relation of Ethics to Politics as
can be expected in a
political
This general
disapprove.
treatise.
It
much
perhaps as
is
also proper to
is
observe that although Spinoza constantly impHes that the ethical
conceptions of right and wrong are of a quasi-legal character, and
men
not applicable except to
are
is
not
necessary to his political theory as such.
Having premised
this
much, we resume the order of the treatise. Every man does what he thinks most
for his
living in society, this
own
interest
and whatever he actually does, whether reasonably or
foolishly,
has, in Spinoza's terminology, a natural right to do.
Men
conflicting interests in so far as they are subject to passion
man men
is
more formidable
are subject
to
man
passions
to
;
would
be in frequent conflict, or
nature
is
a state of war.
which every man must be tolerable.
Man
On
m
men
:
and
social animal.
;
other words
But
the state of
the other hand, a state of
fight for his
own hand
is
and
to themselves
left
in
life
too precarious to
cannot exercise his faculties with any pleasure
or convenience except in society, where his strength
by union
have
than any other creature.
therefore
he
in this sense
When
may
it
a multitude of
each individual, being powerless
is
justly be said that
men
live
as against the
multiplied
man
is
a
together in society, united will of the
more right than the society chooses to leave him. The right which arises from and is determined by the power of the society over the individual is called government or dominion (imperium\ and is vested in the person or persons, be they many, rest,
has no
few, or one,
who
are appointed to the
supreme charge of public
affairs.
The
body of
members
are
men
called
subject to one citizens
government
respect of their
in
privileges, subjects in respect of their duties. free to do
whatever he pleases 1
;
for if
Cap.
X
3.
a State. ^
Its
franchises
and
is
No
citizen can be
he were, he would be above
SPINOZA
3o6
of the State
own
as
they please
for this
;
to obey the law
If
The
is
be said that
it
and a secure State.
would make every man judge and
just and unjust,
It
for
is
for the citizen
the will of the State must be the will of every
;
own judgment,
one's
free to interpret the laws
cause, and virtually independent of the State.
the State to determine what
citizen.
AND PHILOSOPHY
Neither can the citizens be
the State.
in his
HIS LIFE
:
it
is
the answer
is
that reason exhorts to peace
which cannot be had except
life,
up
against reason thus to give
in a well-ordered
advantage of living under settled laws
far greater
is
we may feel in a particular case from law which we think unreasonable. This leaves
than any hardship which
having to obey a it
quite open to citizens to suggest
and endeavour by
amendments in existing laws, peaceable means to procure them which is
all
expressly mentioned
;
in the
Tractatus
Theologico-Politicus as not
only allowable but commendable.
Next
man
the free or reasonable State
is
strongest
whose
is
State
most according
depends on
to reason.
union of the
the
Again, the subjection of the citizen
to the State consists either in fear of the
of
so that
and union cannot be unless the laws of the State are
;
directed to the general good.
love
among men,
the strongest
institutions are
For the strength of the citizens
As
the limits to the power of the State are considered.
things
over
jurisdiction
and order.
society
civil
to
power of the State or
in
Therefore the State has no
which men cannot be induced by
reward or compelled by punishment.
No man
can abandon, for
own power
Nobody
can be compelled
example, his
to believe that the
does not exist
the
like.
;
of judgment.
whole
is
not greater than
its
part
that a finite body before his eyes
Further,
there are matters
so
is
;
that
infinite,
repugnant
to
God and
human
nature in other ways that no power can compel obedience in
them
;
as, to
produce evidence against oneself, to
not to attempt saving one's
withstanding
command
that
the
and the
like.
commonwealth hath
we man
such things,
life,
kill
one's parents,
" If we say not-
right or
power to
can no otherwise conceive this than
as
has a right to be mad. For what else one might say that a than madness would be a rule of law to which no man can be bound ? " This is to the same effect as what Hobbes says under
THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE the rubric of the law [lex not
of nature
ius)
:
307
a term which, as
we
have seen, Spinoza does not use in the same sense. In applying this test, however, we must consider the ordinary temper of men.
There may always be some
perverse or insane persons inaccessible
upon which most men
to the motives
most circumstances obey does not prevent the law from being in general
But this efficacious. As for the
the law.
particular
in
individual
who
sets
himself
against the State, as one having nothing to hope or fear from
Spinoza says (in
may is
again agreeing with Hobbes) that he
this point
Again, the power of the State " such matters are not within the
be considered as an enemy.
limited by public opinion
right
of the
State as
j
commands which provoke many
issues
resistance,
thereby deprives
its
it
For
general opposition."
excite a
government of
it,
itself at
i{ a
citizens
to
once of a certain measure
power.
As
for the rights of
independent States against one another,
they are the same as those of individuals in the imaginary state of nature.
between
Peace
States
upon consent. The obligation long as the reasons for which they were made, proposition which may be unacceptable to some
individuals in so far that
of
treaties lasts as
and no longer
a
:
corresponds to society between
it
rests
which has been abundantly
theorists, but
Europe, and not
less since
verified in the history of
Spinoza's time than before
it.
Indeed
seems impossible, on any political or ethical principles whatever, to lay it down as an absolute proposition that the obligation of Whence can governments derive the right treaties is perpetual. it
of binding their subjects and successors for undertakings It follows
all
time by improvident
?
from the view already given of the functions of a
commonwealth
that the sovereign authority alone has the direction
any one to meddle with them unIf it be asked whether authorized is a usurpation of government. ^ the sovereign power in a commonwealth is bound by law, and capable of doing wrong, the answer is that civilly it is not so, but "For if a commonwealth were bound by no law naturally it is. of public
affairs,
or rule, without
and that
which
it
for
would not be 1
Cap.
4.
a
commonwealth, then we
SPINOZA
3o8
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
:
should have to regard a commonwealth not as a thing existing in
Thus
nature but as a chimaera.
when by
action
sufferance
or
Power
a
commonwealth
brings in causes of
it
wrong
does
own
its
always limited by the capacities of the " If I say, thing acted upon as well as the faculties of the agent. destruction."
is
may
for instance, that I
of right do
suppose not thereby that grass."
I
as I will
with
this table, I
have a right to make the table eat
So the commonwealth cannot compel
its
citizens,
being
men, to a kind or extent of submission contrary to human nature. "Therefore that the commonwealth may maintain its right, it is bound to maintain the motives of fear and respect otherwise it ceases to be a commonwealth." Nevertheless fundamental changes ;
can be regularly effected only by the sovereign authority Revolutions extra-legal
may
in
extreme cases
and in the nature of
should
now
say, of a
be necessary, but they are
acts of war.
Spinoza then considers what
we
itself.
is
the best condition or ideal, as
government,^ without regard to
its
par-
This is a question of fact, not of right it is one thing to govern by law, another to govern well. The object of a commonwealth is peace and protection ; the excellence of a commonwealth consists therefore in men's living in amity and For since men are by nature much the same observing the law. everywhere, habitual discord and law-breaking are more the fault ticular form.
;
And the peace of institutions than of the particular offenders. acquiescence in the law, not here meant is a cheerful and rational a submission compelled by force.
A
commonwealth whose
overcome by
terror
is
subjects rise not in arms because they are
rather to be spoken of as being without
war
For peace is not mere absence of war, but an excellence proceeding from highmindedness ; since obedience is the constant will to perform that which by the common ordinance of the than
as
enjoying peace.
State ought to be done.
Moreover
commonwealth whose peace
a
depends on the dulness of its subjects, and on their being driven like cattle, to learn nothing but slavery, is more fitly called a wilderness than a commonwealth.^ When therefore we say that the government 1
2
Cap.
5,
De Optimo
" Rectius solitudo
known
imperii statu.
quam
civitas dici potest "
"solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant."
:
with obvious allusion
to the well-
THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE
309
which men lead a peaceable life, I mean that life of man consisteth not only in the circulation of the blood and other properties common to all animals, but whose chief part is reason and
is
best under
which
the true
and excellence of the mind.
life
In the same
spirit
he says again
in the following chapter
:
If slavery, rudeness, and desolation are to be called peace, then is peace the most wretched state of mankind. Truly there are more
and sharper disputes between parents and children than between masters and slaves ; and yet it were no good housekeeping to make the father into a master, and hold the children for slaves. It makes for slavery, not for peace, to confer unlimited power on one man. Reference
is
made
to Machiavelli
in
terms of great respect,
and Spinoza conjectures that his real purpose in elaborately showing " what means a prince who has no other motive than the lust of power should use to strengthen his government" may have been to point out the futility of removing a despot when the untouched which impel the ruler, whoever he may be, to reign despotically and perhaps also to warn free communities against putting themselves in the power of any one man. The true intention of Machiavelli's treatise has been a standing puzzle to modern critics, and Spinoza's guess is perhaps as good as any other. causes are
left
-,
Before
we
observe that for
if
leave
the general
part
of the
treatise,
we may
there be anything illiberal or tending to an apology
despotism in Spinoza's marked dislike to violent changes in
him with one of the most thoughtful of EngHsh Liberal statesmen of recent times. At the " Dialogue on the best form of government " Sir end of his George Cornewall Lewis puts the following sentiment in the mouth of Crito, an impartial bystander whose opinions may fairly affairs
of State, the fault
be taken
as
is
shared by
corresponding with those of the author himself.
Looking back upon the course of revolutionary movements and upon the character of their consequences, the practical conclusion which I draw is that it is the part of wisdom and prudence to acquiesce in any form of government which is tolerably well administered and affords tolerable security to person
and property.
AND PHILOSOPHY
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
310
And we may
add that,
matter of
as
fact,
the most successful
revokitions have been either re-assertions of ancient rights (as in
England
not merely domestic revolutions, but risings
in 1688), or
which was
against a dominion
actually or virtually foreign
as in
;
the struggle for the independence of the Netherlands, and the
Cases of this kind are not considered
liberation of Italy in i860.
by Spinoza, and, though not uncommon
in history, scarcely
belong
to the theory of municipal poHtics.
In the remainder of the Tractatus
Politicus^ as far as
it
goes,^
the ideal institutions appropriate for the different forms of govern-
ment
are sketched out and justified.
It
is
not worth while to
work
follow Spinoza minutely through this part of his
;
we may
be content with fixing our attention on a few salient points.
Under
Monarchy
some emphasis (and it would seem with implied criticism of Hobbes) that no one man can really be sovereign. A monarch must in practice be guided by counsellors, and thus a nominally absolute monarchy is
the head of
it
is
repeated with
a covert and therefore bad form of aristocracy.
Spinoza's ideal
monarchy
great council roughly corresponding to
constitutional system
:
it
Accordingly
There is a the Parliament of a modern
limited in various ways.
is
however not
is
elective, but appointed
by the Crown, subject to fixed conditions as to age and otherwise. The Crown must take the advice of this assembly, but is free to act
upon any opinion supported by
smaller standing Council
a certain
number of
votes.
A
to take charge of executive business
is
and the routine of administration. The army is to consist only of citizens, and to receive pay only in time of war ; and military commands are to be annual. Although this is to modern eyes one of the most unpractical points in Spinoza's scheme, it probably did not
seem
Not only then, but throughout the a standing army was the bugbear of conand to this day the forms of the Enghsh
so at the time.
eighteenth century, stitutional theorists
constitution treat
:
as a
it
temporary necessity rather than a constant
part of the appliances of an independent State. affairs,
no
particular religion
to be established
is
king may have a private chapel. 1
Capp. 6-1
1
:
As
cap. ii
is
unfinished.
to ecclesiastical
by law, but the
THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE Next comes
311
the ideal aristocratic constitution, which
unlike the monarchical in
general features
its
is
not
the precautions
;
and checks being however more elaborate. Aristocracy is defined as the government in which the sovereign power belongs to a
number of
select
who
the citizens
indeed according to
:
the terms of
fix
The number may
admission to the governing body. small or large
themselves
Spinoza's
be either
definitions
the
governing body might bear a larger proportion to the whole adult
There
population in some aristocracies than in some democracies.
must be an
established religion, for the sake of unity
governing body, but of the simplest possible kind
among
the
as to doctrine.
Others are to be tolerated, but may not compete with the established one in public display. A conjecture is made as to the historical origin of aristocracies (c. 8, ยง 12) which comes remarkably near what is now known or presumed to be the truth from the results of later researches.
We have originally a
homogeneous
community of free men founding, let us suppose, a new city. As between themselves they are equal, and willingly recognize But strangers will gather round the original their equaHty. stock, attracted by various motives
:
and to these strangers equal
them
rights will not be allowed, nor indeed will they seek first
instance.
become
In course of time the
increase,
and
assimilated to the original stock of the founders in every-
thing but
civil status
and rights
:
them appears conventional, and its
new comers
in the
outskirt of dependants
favoured
class.
A
;
between
community of free men with become a people governed by a
the
with a promise, unhappily not
in a future chapter.
it
at last the difference
few words are given by Spinoza to the subject
of public instruction
resuming
has
till
He
fulfilled,
of
expresses a decided opinion
against ofi^cial endowments, holding that State universities "are established not for the cultivation but for the repression of understanding " and that every citizen should be free to teach in public at his
own
The
charges and his
polity for
which an
own
risk.
aristocratic
government
which consists of several confederated and further rules mately equal power (c. 9) is
that
;
special case.
One
is
cities
best adapted
of approxi-
are given for this
of them, namely, that the permanent seat of
AND PHILOSOPHY
SPINOZA; HIS LIFE
312
the federal government must not be in any one of the united
commonwealths,
is
in effect identical
with the precaution observed
by the founders of the United States in providing a seat of government exempt from the jurisdiction of any particular State, and subject to the exclusive authority of Congress.
The
general aim of
institutions,
all
as
well those expressly
recommended as others "which may be devised in each several government agreeably to the nature of the country and the temper of the inhabitants," should be to rather than compel them.
A
government which aims
at
nothing
else
lead
men
to obedience
than to guide
may deem
be so guided as that they to live after their
own mind and
men by
Men
will be rather free from defects than possessed of merit.
fear
are to
themselves not to be guided, but
own
of their
free resolve
;
and that
they be kept to allegiance by love of freedom, care for increasing their substance,
and the hope of attaining honourable places
But
government.
for
statues,
and other such whets
triumphs
valour, they be tokens rather of slavery than of freedom. are ordained for the valour of servants, not of free
that
by, spurs
of
such things, which as
at first
Likewise those
honest people
all
lastly,
I
to
Rewards do confess
quickened
but
;
to worthless fellows that are puffed
who can make
And
extremely
are
a
show of
statues think themselves to be wronged
over others.
men.
the
are awarded to notable men, yet afterwards,
envy increaseth, are given
with wealth, whereby
men
kind
this
in
to
say
are
in
great
indignation.
their ancestors' triumphs if
no more,
up and
they have not precedence 'tis
certain that equality
(which once being cast off, the liberty of a society must needs perish) can by no means be preserved when especial honours are awarded as of common right to any one man of illustrious excellence. Passages like this are interesting as showing a
good deal of our
political
experience
is.
how
very modern
Spinoza does not seem
to contemplate the possibility of a social aristocracy being
combined
with a system of equaHty before the law, and coinciding only in nor does it occur to him that evils part with political eminence :
which now appear concentrating official
to us obvious
enough
human ambition and
power and
distinction.
are likely to result
from
vanity on the one object of
THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE Having explained his some confidence that a stable as
Spinoza declares with
federal aristocracy,
State framed on
313
model would be as be, and could be
this
government to only by some overwhelming external violence. He then passes on to democracy (c. 11). The definition of democracy is peculiar ; the criterion of a democratic government, it
is
possible
for
a
dissolved
as
By
understood by Spinoza, being a franchise fixed by law.
franchise
modern
we do
not
mean
a
representative
franchise
in
the
government Spinoza seems no notion) but simply the right to take part, in some way or other, in the government of the country, which however would include the voting power of modern constitutions. Thus there may be a qualification by age, by primogeniture, or by payment of taxes to a certain amount, and it matters not whether the actual governing body thus constituted be large or small in proportion to the whole number of inhabitants. Even though the qualified citizens be fewer than the sovereign council might be in an aristocratic commonwealth of the same size, the government is still to be classed as democratic, " because the citizens sense (for of representative
to have
appointed to rule the commonwealth are not thereto chosen by a sovereign council as the
This
law."
different
fittest,
but are appointed merely by the
definition includes,
political
systems.
it
To
is
obvious, the most widely
begin
with,
form of
every
government is a democracy in Spinoza's sense the French monarchy under Louis Philippe, with its restricted pay! legalj no less than England since the Reform Act of 1867, or But the French Republic since 1871 with universal suffrage. Spinoza announces it as his intention to treat only of one form of democracy, that namely " in which all men indifferently who owe representative
;
undivided allegiance to the State, are in other respects of legal capacity, and are of good conversation, are entitled to vote in the
sovereign assembly and to undertake the offices of government."
This
is
intended to exclude, as Spinoza explains, aliens,
women,
On
women
infants, serfs,
from the
political last
of
and criminals.
the point of excluding
power he gives reasons the
the ground that
unfinished
men
in a
He
chapter.
are the stronger
,
separate
paragraph,
puts
simply on
it
not merely with their
314
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE AND PHILOSOPHY
physical strength
as
and
individuals, but intellectually
in social
combination. If
women were by
nature the equals of men, and equally
with firmness of mind and power, and consequently
wherein chiefly consists human
intellect,
right,
endowed
among
then surely
many and
so
various
nations there should be found some where both sexes ruled equally,
and others where men were ruled by women and be inferior to them in intellect. (This anticipates the topic
much
insisted
advocates, that the general inferiority of
brought up
so
as
to
on by some recent
women
to
men
is
entirely
the result of education.)
And seeing this that women have
hath nowhere come
wc may
to pass,
clearly affirm
not by nature an equal right with men, but must
needs give place to them
and hence that
;
sexes should bear rule equally,
much
it
is
not possible the two
men
less that
should be ruled by
women. Further, a will
show
little
consideration of
that " equal rule of
human
passions and jealousies
men and women cannot
without great prejudice to peace."
It
open to supporters of
is
female suffrage either to disregard Spinoza's objections
and dismiss him,
like other opponents, as a
or to distinguish
him on
have place
as frivolous,
narrow-minded person,
the ground that he was considering the
question, not of a vote for representatives, but of a direct and active participation in public affairs.
It
more
is
purpose to remark that the objections, whatever
of their merits, are not at
man answering
to the fable of the I
of the kind
we
may
to a
man who
sits
be thought
should expect from a
to the popular notion of Spinoza.
from being appropriate metaphysical cobwebs.
(which
all
to our present
They
in a garret
are far
and spins
Indeed, with the exception of a reference
Amazons
have thought
it
in the pedantic
manner of the time
needless to translate), they are such as
might well be used at this day Here the treatise comes
in the
to
an
House of Commons. untimely
end.
It
is
not
probable that Spinoza's account of an ideal democratic State would
have contributed regret not having
much it.
to the science of politics, but
Some
light
we may
still
might have been thrown on the
THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE
315
question, at present obscure, what was the extent of Spinoza's familiarity with the public affairs of his
own
with a subject-matter more apt to be examples and, it would seem, more after
In deahng
country.
by domestic
illustrated
own
his
heart than the
discussion of monarchical and aristocratical institutions, he
have had a better occasion of showing
on matters of present
political writings of the
time
his
knowledge and opinions
That he
interest.
would
not
did
we know from
the
neglect
a reference in the
discussion of aristocracy (c, 8, mentioned by ยง 31) to an author Spinoza as " prudentissimus Belga V.H." This V.H. is Pieter
de
la
Court
under the
Dutch
the
(161 8-1 685), an
1
initials
(De
D.C.
who
is
not lavish of praise, refers
without significance
to his
as
own
The terms in which to De la Court are not
political sympathies.
divers excellent persons have maintained, Spinozism
we own
who wrote
la
opposed to the party of the Stadtholders. Spinoza,
publicist
Court) V.H. (Van den Hove, was a friend of John de Witt, and
He
equivalent).
eminent
is
as
If,
in politics
a doctrine of absolutism,
are driven to conclude that Spinoza
did not understand his
philosophy, and in fact that he was
the
first
But the reader
anti-Spinozist.
will
now
be in a position
to judge this question even without referring to Spinoza's text. It sufficiently appears, I
venture to think, not only that Spinoza
was a firm and consistent supporter of political liberty, but that he was disposed to go much farther in letting individual thought, habits, and enterprise alone than the majority of statesmen of his own time. His condemnation of sumptuary laws must have appeared rash, his mistrust of State endowments pedantic
if
not
suspicious, and his notions of religious toleration wildly extravagant.
Even
his
be subject to the
should ^
I
contention that in
owe
this identification
a monarchical State the
law was
(so far as I
know
likely
to
who
with
be received
hitherto unpublished) to the late Dr.
Campbell, sometime librarian of the Royal Library at the Hague. possibly have been the friend
monarch
Can De
la
Court
suggested the writing of this treatise ("quod ante
aliquod tempus te auctore inchoavi ") as mentioned in a letter of Spinoza's extracted in
the Editors' preface to the Opera Posthuma f
personal
acquaintance
The want
counts for nothing, for our
present
of any direct evidence of
knowledge of
Spinoza's friends has been preserved or recovered by the merest accident. expect, however, that Spinoza in writing to
De
la
Court.
would use
a
more formal
address than
several
of
One might
"amice
dilectc"
3i6
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
AND PHILOSOPHY
doubtful favour in some quarters.
For various reasons his work has been eclipsed by that of Hobbes and in the actual history ;
of the theory of politics to the Leviathan.
it
can hold only a rank subordinate
But the judgment of
the judgment of philosophy.
mastery of English it
would be
history
is
not always
Hobbes' power of reasoning and
command and
difficult to exaggerate.
deserve an admiration
which
But Spinoza's doctrine
rests
on a wider and most generous view of human life it is less encumbered with fictions ; it aims at a higher mark. It is the work, not of a powerful mind which has espoused the cause of a party and makes philosophy a partisan, but of a philosopher who ;
is
proud of being a
free citizen.
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
CHAPTER
XI
SPINOZA AND THEOLOGY Some draw
And some
the wine to drink thereof full deep,
Unstedfast
ONE
For
mosque
the
i'
all,
doth
their night-long vigil
tossed on a shoreless flood
wake
One knocked
at
Beloved's door
the
me
And
and thee."
is
And
And
again the voice asked, "
MS.
the voice said,
Then went
the door was not opened.
and fasted and prayed in solitude. the door.
{Q. 48 in
Bodl. ed. Heron-Allen).
and a voice asked from within,
j
Then
I."
:
fools in their folly sleep.
j
Omar Khayyam there?" and he answered, "It
keep
after a year
Who
is
"This house
"
Who
is
will not hold
the Lover into the desert,
he rcturned and knocked again at
there?" and he
said,
"
It
is
Thyself!
"
and the door was opened to him. E.
FitzGerald, from Jalalu-'d-d/n Rum/.
man merken wa ware liebe und das ware liecht ist in einem menschen, da volkomen gilt bekant und geliebet von im selber und als sich selber Und dar umb wirt ouch da nicht geminnet dis oder das, ich noch du oder des glichen, sunder allein das eine, das weder ich noch du, dis oder das ist, sunder es ist ubcr alle ich und du, Und dis was und ist in disz und das, und in dem wirt alles gut geliebet als ein gut. Ouch
sol
:
wirt das
.
.
.
.
.
.
Kristo in ganzer volkomenheit, er were anders nicht Kristus.
Theologia Deutsch,
In various
parts of Spinoza's
of prevailing direct
attack
different
work
c.
43.
there are incidental discussions
much by way of explaining Spinoza's own
theological conceptions, not so as
for
the purpose of
point of view.
We
have hitherto not noticed
these
Their interest is perhaps more historical than philosophical, and moreover the consideration of Spinoza's metaphysical theory gave us quite enough to do without attending at the time But Spinoza's bearing towards to his controversial digressions. the current theology of his time is an element of some importance in our knowledge of the man, and his position as regards religion passages.
in a wider sense excites questions
to
answer them to our
which, even
satisfaction,
it
is
if it
be impossible
impossible
to
leave
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
3i8
untouched. professes
It has already
been pointed out that Spinoza nowhere
theology in general, but only to refute the
to attack
erroneous philosophical
doctrines attached to theology
He
Churches and theologians.
ticular for a
AND PHILOSOPHY
no room, however,
leaves
technical system of theology standing side
philosophy, whether as claiming to control
it
identical
by
with
side
or merely to belong
to a distinct and independent sphere of thought. is
by par-
Natural reHgion
with philosophy, and the power of revealed religion
new
consists not in adding
philosophical truth, or systematic truth
of any kind, to that which reason can discover, but in showing
men
a
way of
theology
is
not wisdom.
independent of philosophy.
from philosophy
distinct
but a rule of
Politicus^
salvation
Obedience
life.
This
is
the
is
far
as
not a body of doctrine
is
within every man's power, but
burden of the
and the severance of
of does not mean that what
is
it
So
Tractatus
Theologico-
from philosophy there spoken
faith
disbelieved as matter of reason
when
be beheved as matter of faith, but that
may
the distinct objects
The
of the two are rightly understood no
collision
whole scope of revelation
is
and the claims of revealed
religion to be accepted by
mankind
on moral
lative questions as
was
We
certainty.
practical, rest
is
possible.
not on demonstrative but
further collect that, apart from specu-
to the actual truth of particular doctrines,
it
view a practical necessity that the great majority of mankind should have a dogmatic rehgion of some sort, but that he also thought it possible and desirable that the fundamental in Spinoza's
dogmas should be very few and made in the treatise on Politics,
Now
we cannot
from the writings
simple.^ as
we saw
in the last chapter.
expect to learn the whole mind of Spinoza
which these statements occur.
in
Tractatus Politicus he professes to take
the
Similar assumptions are
Theologico - Politicus
he
is
to
a
men
as
great
he finds them
extent
hypothetical argument on premisses which he
In
is
the ;
in
conducting a
content to assume
by way of concession. He is addressing himself as a citizen to On citizens and statesmen, not as a philosopher to philosophers. him that the position taken by the other hand we cannot assume and aside as merely set occasional for this purpose is to be 1
Tract. Theol.-Pol. cc. 13-15.
SPINOZA AND THEOLOGY The
hypothetical.
philosophical criticism of the Ethics does not
justify us in disregarding
been
the
arguments
is
it
point
to
first
:
man who
without harm, or even with
But
subject-matter of the
the
The
Tractatus
profit, believe
it is
clear
it
two
Theologico-PoUticus
does not enter upon philosophy
edifying, provided that he believes
freedom to others.
Spinoza himself would have
for, as
out,
not the same.
affirms that a plain
319
may
whatever he finds most
sincerely and allows the like
enough that the author himself
does not accept popular theology or the popular interpretation of Scripture
j
the Ethics
and the discussion of current theological philosophy in is
only the development of what
work.
in the earlier
Then we
already suggested
is
have a curious correspondence
with Oldenburg on special points, belonging to the
two of Spinoza's
much his
Here, again, one cannot
life.
tell
year or
last
exactly
how
made for Spinoza's desire to accommodate of unwelcome opinions to his friend's habits of
allowance
to be
is
expressions
thought and language.
There
are
two
distinct things to be considered.
The
general
mixed theology and
discussion of propositions in theology, or in
metaphysics, has a speculative value independent of the conclusions
we may form theology.
about Spinoza's exact personal relations to historical
But
the
which
place
and
religion life
without some endeavour
those
ascertain
religious
cannot be estimated
sentiment held in Spinoza's individual to
the
relations,
may be. It will be best to take first where we are on firmer ground, and the
however
difficult it
that branch of the
subject
matter
interest.
We
which
this sense
God
as
And
own
his
we
have seen, the doctrine of a universal
freedom when we consider the he says (Pr. 17) that " God acts merely
identical with
is
universe as a whole.
by the laws of
nature and without constraint "
alone can rightly be called a free cause.
words, the order of the universe as a whole self-determined.
from
it
is
and in In other ;
self-contained and
Discussion follows in a SchoHum.
Others hold that
he can bring
of wider
turn back, then, to the First Part of the Ethics.
Spinoza maintains, necessity
is
God
is
a free cause,
to pass that the things
his nature or are in his
forasmuch
which,
as
as (in their
we have
opinion)
said,
follow
power, do not happen or be not produced
:
SPINOZA
320
HIS LIFE
:
by him.
But
to follow
from the nature of
this
is
not follow, which
;
a triangle that
its
could make
Also
I shall
it
not
three angles should be
or that from a given cause
absurd.
is
God
they should say that
as if
equal to two right angles
AND PHILOSOPHY
its effect
should
prove below, without the
help of this proposition, that neither understanding nor will belong to the nature of God.
I
know
there are
many who
think they can prove
that free-will and the height of understanding belong to the nature of
God
since, as they say, they
;
God
can attribute to
know no
than that which
Again, though they conceive
selves.
greater perfection
is
which they
the highest perfection in our-
God
having in act the per-
as
make all which he doth in act understand ; for thus they conceive the power of God would be taken away. If, they say, he had created all things that were in his understanding, then he could have created nothing more, which they hold repugnant to God's
fection of understanding, yet they believe not that he can
those things to exist
omnipotence.
And
so they
have chosen to describe
and creating nothing else but what by will he hath determined to create.
indifferent,
But we have shown, Spinoza
a
continues, that
God
as
every
way
supposed absolute
all
things follow
by the same necessity from the infinite nature or power of God so that the omnipotence of God is always and eternally in act
j
whereas the other opinion really denies his omnipotence, for it is assumed that God cannot or must not create everything he has conceived, lest he should " exhaust his omnipotence and make himself imperfect."
"Therefore
in order to aflirm
God's perfection these men
are
driven to affirm at the same time that he cannot bring about
everything to which his power extendeth
more absurd,
than which I more repugnant ;
see not
to the what can be As for of understanding God." and will in omnipotence God, they must be wholly different from ours, and resemble them only
devised
in
name.
understanding
the divine understanding
stood
;
It
also
is
Human
the cause of
human
reason must be different from piece of formal argument.
points out that
conditioned by things under-
is is
or
the cause and origin of them.
understanding, and for that very it,
But
as this
Spinoza proves by a curious is
not
all.
Farther on he
both understanding and will are in every case
SPINOZA AND THEOLOGY particular determined causes.
They
And of God
in the
modes of thought, having
321
particular finite
belong to natura naturata^ not to natura naturans. accordingly " will and understanding are related to the nature
same way as motion and rest^ and generally all things in nature, which must be determined by God to exist and act in a particular manner. For will, like all other things, needs a cause to determine it to exist and act. And though any particular act of will or understanding hath infinite consequences, yet
God
cannot therefore any more be said to act out of freedom of
will than because of the consequences of
motion and
(which
rest
be likewise infinite) he can be said to act out of freedom of motion
and
Wherefore
rest.
will belongeth not to the nature of
God
more than other things in nature, but standeth with respect to
it
no otherwise than motion and rest and all other things, which we have shown to follow from the necessity of God's nature, and " thereby to be determined to exist and act in a particular manner (Pr. 32, Coroll. 2).
next proposition affirms that " things could not have been
The
produced by been
God
any other manner or order than they have
in
And
produced.'*
it
is
maintained
(Schol.
2)
that
doctrine, so far from detracting from the perfection of
many
persons
may
hastily
suppose,
is
by
required
it.
this
God,
as
Assume
with the objectors that will belongs to the nature of God it will be admitted that all things depend on his will for being what they are, and that his decrees are eternal \ for his mind cannot be " But since in eternity there is not any when^ supposed variable. :
or before^ or after^
it
follows merely from the perfection of
God
God never can or could decree otherwise than he doth or that God was not before his decrees, nor can be without them." To say that God might have made things otherwise than he did that
is
;
to say that his will
wise than they It
is
agreed by
Schoolmen
are. all
and understanding might have been other-
But
this leads to inadmissible
philosophers (Spinoza possibly
as well as
is
consequences.
thinking of the
of the Jewish Aristotelians) that the divine
But since understanding is never in potentia but always in actu. the will and understanding of God are indistinguishable from God 1
As
" to Spinoza's theory about
motus
Y
et quies," see p. 102, above.
SPINOZA
322
himself, as
HIS LIFE
:
likewise admitted,
is
AND PHILOSOPHY it
follows that if God's will and
understanding had not been what they other than he
God
than they are
some
That
is.
in order to
is,
make
things otherwise
himself must have been other than he
on the
will say that perfection itself depends
and that what
he must have been
are,
now
will
But of God,
is.
might have been imperfection if he had thought fit so to make it. But this would amount to the assertion "that God, who must needs understand that which he wills, can by his will bring it to pass that he shall understand things otherwise than he doth understand them. Which (as above shown) is an exceeding absurdity."^ Then follows a very is
perfection
characteristic remark. I confess this opinion,
indifferent
will
of
which doth subject
God and
all
things to an alleged
holdeth everything to depend on his
wide of the truth than the opinion of those who hold that all God's actions have regard to a rule of good (Deum omnia sub ratione boni agere). For such men seem to affirm somewhat outside pleasure,
less
is
God, and not dependent on him, which God keeps before him as a This pattern in his works, or at which he aims as at a fixed mark. which than plainly is naught else than to make God subject to fate nothing more absurd can be propounded of God, whom we have shown ;
be the
to
and singular
first
free cause of all things,
both
as to their
essence and as to their existence.
Spinoza here repudiates two popular conceptions of the Deity
one breath j one which makes him an absolute ruler whose only law is his own will, and another which regards him as constantly fulfilling a moral law conceived as in some way independent of him. In the one view he is a despotic monarch, in in
the other a governor bound
The
world
master.
is
his
In the
by an unchangeable constitution.
plaything, or an inscrutable something
latter case,
is
his
we have of the human conscience
the only evidence
ultimate sovereignty of the moral law
is
in the
:
would seem that conscience must be the judge of God as well as of man. And this may really be the view obscurely held by a large number of the right-minded persons who and hence
^
With
the
Tkcologiae, Part
it
whole passage compare and i.
Quaest, 19, artt. 2-5.
contrast
St.
Thomas
Aquinas,
Summa
SPINOZA AND THEOLOGY accept
theology in
323
ordinary forms, even those
its
who would
verbally assert the other opinion, namely, that the moral law
what
it
many
is
because
God
has chosen to
make
it
is
For though
so.
moral commandments are binding because they express the will of God, few of those who say so would not also say
that
say that the will of
God
is
where the meaning of any rate would be something
always good
good might indeed be vague, but at
;
more than the name of that which God wills. A more philosophical variety of this opinion with Spinoza law
as
is
to say that the order of nature,
as part thereof,
belongs to the nature of
God
go so
to
far
and the moral
itself
;
and then
some peculiar and eminent way to the nature of God, so as to make him the proper object of a feeling similar in kind to that which we entertain for good men, but infinitely magnified in degree. This position, or something like it, is adopted by divers modern theologians. It is free from to add that the moral law appertains in
the metaphysical absurdity pointed out by Spinoza in the cruder
form of moral theology, but
The
objects
raises
difficulties
of another kind.
of morality being particular and relative to man,
there appears to be no convenient
mean between
refraining from
the application of moral ideas to the order of nature as a whole,
and asserting that the universe exists for the sake of man. This last position was formerly thought acceptable or even obvious, but for several reasons there is a growing disinclination to defend it. Again, it is not impossible to deny in terms that morality is But those who do this must be relative to human society. prepared to show us the universal morality of which human morality
is
only a particular case, or at
least
to bring forward
some probable evidence of it. They should be able to explain, for instance, in what sense morality existed in the world before any human society was formed. So far, however, from feeling any difficulty on this score, they would in general be the first to proclaim the dignity of exalt
On
him above this
all
point also
man
as the
only moral creature, and to
other finite beings precisely on that ground. it
is
hard to be sure whether people really
The universality of the moral accept everything they profess. law may be asserted in words, while the real meaning is only that
324
SPINOZA
there are
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
:
permanent elements
human
in
nature and society to
which there correspond permanent moral relations, or that the broad groundwork of morality could not be different from what it is unless human nature were also different. But this is a proposition which at the present day nobody will dispute, least of all any one who has apprehended the lessons of Spinoza's Ethics. In the same way the principles of right and wrong may be called eternal and immutable in a sense to which no serious exception can be taken, namely, that these principles are necessary consequences of the constitution of man, which universal
mankind
order of nature, and that itself.
It
is
itself
they are
part of the
is
permanent
as
some of those who speak
possible that
as
as if
they thought the scientific discussion of ethical theories dangerous
may imagine that these and may wish only to
to morality
last-mentioned propositions are
attacked,
defend them
forward statements of apparently wider scope.
an
uncommon
mistake to fancy that every one
some transcendental theory of
ethics
when they
Certainly
who
it is
put
not
does not accept
must regard morality
as casual
and conventional, and variable in every new set of circumstances whereas if it were possible to regard morality as casual and conventional, it would be by means of the assumption that moral law is nothing but the commandment of a being who gives no :
reason for his commands, but will crush us
But we cannot here attempt indeed the task might prove illusions
would be
to get rid of than
we
disobey.
to pursue this topic farther,
There
endless.
and
no harder
are
anthropomorphic ones (or perhaps
better to say anthropocentric)
to suppose that the possible
if
;
and more or
and there less
is
it
no reason
plausible forms of
As to the modern such illusion are either exhausted or exhaustible. transcendental theories of superhuman morality which claim to be founded on a strictly philosophical method, it may be a sufficient excuse for saying nothing of them that they have no point of But one may observe that a transcendental contact with Spinoza. theory
may
is
by
its
very nature a kind of deus ex machina.
be impossible
;
Disproof
in fact, I should be disposed to say that if
transcendental theory
is
capable of actual disproof,
the result of bad workmanship.
it
any
can only be
But the burden of proof
lies
on
SPINOZA AND THEOLOGY
325
the transcendentalist to show that his deus ex machina is necessary ; at least that is the opinion of people who have not the transcendental faculty.
We God
now
have
seen that according to Spinoza the actions of
are not directed
by a will that can even be supposed mutable, or by anything that can be called choice, or towards a moral end.
But he further says that they are not directed towards ends at In more technical words, he wholly rejects Final Causes.
all.
To
most English minds it may possibly seem that the exclusion of deliberation and choice from the order of the universe would of itself imply the exclusion of final causes. But recent speculation in
Germany
has
shown
that
it
does not
to the First Part of the Ethics
:
and Spinoza's appendix
not only a vigorous piece of
is
which as a work of art one would be sorry it is by no means philosophically superfluous. His professed object is to expose the prejudices which lie at the root " All the of most confused thinking about the order of nature. controversial exposition to lose, but
prejudices," he says, this point
only
;
"which
to wit, that
mean to lay bare depend on men commonly suppose all things in here
I
nature to act as themselves do for a purpose
insomuch that they
;
God himself orders all things for some fixed end (for they say that God made all things for man's sake, and man to worship him)." The origin and the groundlessness of this make
sure that
accordingly to be explained.
belief are free,
Men
and act with a view to some desired end.
think themselves
Thus they come
to regard the purpose of an action as a necessary and sufficient
no positive information of the purpose, they form a conjecture from the analogy of the motives by which they have themselves on other occasions been determined to actions of the same kind. explanation of the action.
Then, finding regard
all
so
many
ruler
make
;
Proceeding to guess they
they
these conveniences, they infer that
made them of
analogy of their own,
life,
and knowing that
of the world, having freedom like that
agents, must have
mankind.
things in nature useful for man's
things as instruments for man's use
they found and did not
some
If in a particular case they can get
set
of
human
purpose for the benefit of
at this ruler's
motives from the
form the opinion that the Gods
SPINOZA
326
:
HIS LIFE
AND PHILOSOPHY
ordered the world for man's use that so they might acquire men's gratitude and have honour and worship of them.
"And
grown to a superstition and struck which was a reason moving every one
so this prejudice hath
root deep in their minds
;
to extreme diHgence in considering and explaining the final causes
of
all
not
But whereas they sought
things.
anything in vain (that
Mark,
selves. last.
find
if this
I
Among
so
were
as
it
that nature doth for
the use of
seems, but that nature
should be as distraught as them-
so,
pray you, to what a pass the matter comes at
many
conveniences of nature they must needs
not a few things contrary,
and the
show
without regard
is,
mankind) they have shown nothing, and the Gods,
to
as storms,
earthquakes, plagues
and these they affirmed to happen because the Gods were angered for wrongs done them by men, or faults in performlike,
ing their
rites
;
and though experience did every day
protest,
showing by numberless examples that good and ill turns befall the obedient and the disobedient indifferently, nevertheless they ceased not from their confirmed prejudice." For it was easier to assume
unknown
that mischievous things had their habits of
thought
:
uses than to reconstruct
and so the further assumption was made
Gods were beyond human understanding " which cause would have alone sufficed to hide the truth for ever from mankind, had not the mathematics, which are concerned not that the counsels of the
:
with designed ends, but only with the nature and properties of figures,
made manifest
to
them another
Spinoza then argues, in doctrine of final causes it is
is
usual
his
in itself
pattern of truth."
concise manner,
inconsistent with the perfection of
for a designed end,
it
which he hath not."
must needs be
And
it
the
:
that he desireth
observed that a
is
that
among other reasons, God: "for if God acts
untenable
something
common way of
defending final causes is by a method otherwise unknown of " reduction, not to impossibility but to ignorance." For example,
from a roof on a man's head and kills him. It shall be for if proved by this method that it fell on purpose to kill him that had not been God's design, how could all the conditions for
a
tile falls
:
the event concur then and there
because the wind blew and the
?
You may
man was
answer,
it
happened
passing that way.
They
SPINOZA AND THEOLOGY
with another question why did the wind blow, was the man going by just then ? If you assign fresh
will stand to
why
and
327
it
:
new
reasons, they will again ask
since of questioning there
is
questions, as they always can,
no end:
"and
so they will never
cease asking for the causes of causes, until you take flight to that
sanctuary of ignorance which they
happens that
to
wonderful, and to aim
at
thus
it
instead of staring in dull
For
heresy.
seek
amazement,
And
of what
seems
the
causes
is
to incur the suspicion of
commonly esteemed the sole well know that the destruction of
are
expounders of divine truth ignorance
out
the will of God."
understanding the operations of nature
who
those
call
the destruction of fear, on which their power
is
is
built.
It
is
how
then explained
current notions of beauty, ugliness,
This part of the appendix is a rapid sketch in anticipation of what is given at large in the following books of the Ethics^ and we theresome expressions, however, are fore need not dwell upon it
and the
men's organs and dispositions.
like, are relative to
:
remarkable
their
for
recent
to
affinity
psychological
theories
" If
independently worked out from the side of physical science.
the motion impressed on the optic nerves by the objects that the eyes perceive be such as promotes health, the objects which cause it
named
are
motion are
common is
beautiful
many
disorder, evil, sin
with
human
The
the result
is
But
?
this
of God's
answer to the
perfection,
If, it
whence ugliness,
to confuse the nature of things
is
delight
;
is
more the sense of men, or
or
offend
man
hath not so created
only by reason
?
be reckoned only from their
to
and things are not therein
convenient for the nature of
why God
the
imperfections of nature,"^ corruption,
perfection of things
they
appears
imaginations of them.
nature and power that
Hence
touching the perfection of the world.
difficulties
the
those which excite the opposite kind of
ugly."
called
asked, everything
come
;
I give
not matter for creating
all
that
them no answer but all
that
or repugnant thereto.
men
things,
own
or less perfect
they
are
If any ask,
they should be governed this
:
Because he lacked
even from the highest degree of
SPINOZA
328
Or more
unto the lowest.^
perfection
own nature were so which can be conceived
laws of his things
aliquo injinito intellectu
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
:
vast as
to
by an
Because the
:
producing
for
suffice
understanding
infinite
all
{ab
mind which must be which we have met with as
a hypothetical
:
exactly thus
infinite
distinguished from the infinite intellect one of the things " immediately produced by
God
").
the universal point of view perfection
is
fulness of being,
and has nothing to do with the perfection that
is
relative to
From
man's
use or convenience.
So
far
Spinoza's
general
of theological
criticism
ideas.
It
enables us to say with reasonable certainty, up to a certain point,
what the God of Spinoza is choice for all his works ;
necessity
is
free,
is
but not exercising the law of their
are necessary, and
own
the law of his
He
not.
His acts do not spring
being.
from design where there is no choice there can be no deliberation, and a being which embraces the universe is sufficient to itself. He is not a moral being in the sense of having preferences ; for with respect to God all things are perfect in their kind. ;
Even understanding and
will
cannot be said to belong to his not the personal
God
often said to be required by the innate religious sentiment of
man.
In short, the
nature.
This
is
not
the
importance to
God
place
to
this alleged
of Spinoza
is
how
inquire
far
who
those
attach
universal sentiment are satisfied with
the proposition, perfectly orthodox
not even ranking
if
as a
" pious
opinion," that no attribute whatever, not even unity or existence, But if can be predicated of God " univocally " with any creature. for
Spinoza
God
is
thus i-mpersonal,
it
would be misleading, and
not in accordance with Spinoza's turn of thought, to say that he unconscious.
is
mode
It
is
true that understanding, as a determined
of thought, belongs only to determined things.
infinite intellect
particular thing.
which includes
The
all
"
It
is
thought and consciousness
all
the Attributes, of
related that once the ass complained to
God, saying,
me, seeing that thou hast already created the Turk? created the
Turk
in order that the excellence of thine
Sheykh Ibrahim of Kirman, ex
is
object of these distinctions, however,
partly to secure the equality of ^
Even the
re/at.
Why
a is
which we
hast thou created
Answer came. Verily we have
understanding might be apparent."
E. G. Browne, yf Tear amongst the Persians, p. 511,
SPINOZA AND THEOLOGY have already spoken. that
God
is
It
remains a cardinal point of the system
who
a thinking being
ways {Eth.
Pr.
2,
can think infinitely in infinite
This does not
3).
involve,
supposition of a consciousness analogous to
Such a supposition for
human
is
a state of a
is
human body
;
been found to
true, the
consciousness. ;
mental organism, answer-
human body
in
And
the Attribute of extension. if
is
quite inadmissible on Spinoza's principles
consciousness
man's only
it
human
ing in the Attribute of thought to a state of the like
329
God's consciousness could be the material universe were organized like a
which some enthusiasts have indeed in later times affirm. It is stated however in one of the latest
propositions of the Ethics^ already cited (Pt. 5, Pr. 40), that the
human mind "
an eternal mode of thought which together with endless other such modes " makes so far as
understands "
it
is
up the eternal and infinite understanding of God." All human knowledge, then, is not only contained but in some manner united and as it were incorporated in this " infinite understanding." The mind of God gathers up into an eternal unity the true ideas And also, since every idea or of all finite minds in all time. mode of thought is said to be " true with respect to God," in that and corresponds to a really existing mode of it really exists Extension,^ it would seem that every finite mode of thought whatever, whether in a conscious finite mind or not, must have its due place somewhere in the infinite chain. All this will doubtless
appear obscure.
and that
it
I
can only say that Spinoza has
does not seem to
me worth
difficulties
it
so,
while to attempt to force
an illusory definiteness upon that which
The
left
is
incapable of definition.
of Spinoza's theory of the eternity of the mind,
which of course would recur here, have already been pointed out. It is clear, on the whole, that the real difference between Spinoza and the common forms of orthodox philosophy is not that or that he denies consciousness to God, for this he never does ;
he denies God's consciousness to be like man's, for this many orthodox philosophers would also deny, and theologians of the weightiest authority have in fact denied it as strongly as Spinoza The speculative point of his heterodoxy is that he will himself. 1
See
p.
183, above.
AND PHILOSOPHY
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
330 not
God God is
call
that
To
exclusively or eminently a thinking being. a spirit
is
man
misleading as to say that being, but he
is
view just
in Spinoza's is
also a corporeal or
as
inadequate and
Man
a spirit.
say
extended being
a thinking
is ;
and thought
only one of the infinite Attributes of God.
But here there recurs another point of w^hich we have already treated, namely the latent idealism of Spinoza's metaphysical system, which may have coloured his thought on this subject almost without his knowing it. is
Perhaps he regarded the infinite variety of the universe (including as
does in his view countless forms of existence to us wholly
it
and redoubled, and at the same time a single whole, in the " infinite intellect of God."
unimaginable) grasped as
But
all this,
again,
The
words.
as reflected
comes
which was the
practical point,
Leibnitz's final hostihty to Spinoza's ideas,
Causes, which
The logy
not pursue farther.^
modern
consciousness^
bearing on theo-
and generally not regarding
In one passage of his early work,
things from that point of view. Cogitata
its
complicated by his having no philosophical term
equivalent to the
the
decisive reason of
the denial of Final
is
discussion of Spinoza's metaphysic in
much
is
we need
mere playing with
perilously near to a
Metaphysica (Part
2,
c.
8,
i)
ยง
he does mention
the term Personality as being used by theologians to explain their distinction of qualities or attributes (in the
He
adds that the term
is
as
common
sense) in
God,
mysterious to him as the mystery
intended to explain, and that further light
is
to be
hoped
for
it is
only
("quamvis constanter credamus in visione Dei beatissima quae fideHbus promittitur Deum hoc suis revelaturum"). in the beatific vision
Now
an appeal to revelation, either here or hereafter,
lightenment on to
Spinoza's
Tractatus
a philosophical question
later
principles,
is
this
not expressing his
passage
own
from
occurs
the in
a
opinions, except
as he can suggest them in a professedly Cartesian com-
mentary without actually contradicting Descartes. passage
en-
a thing utterly contrary
abundantly appears
And
Theologico-Politicus,
work where Spinoza so far
as
is
for
is
ironical, hinting to the disciple ^
See
p.
325, above.
Either the
of Descartes that his
SPINOZA AND THEOLOGY
331
master has brought him to a theologico-philosophical deadlock whence nothing but a revelation will help him out or (as I think more probable) it was written by Spinoza at a very early time, when he was still disposed to believe in mysteries. At the date :
Essay of God and Man he seems to have thought it possible that new Attributes might become known to man by revelation ; for in one place (Part i, c. 7, note) he speaks of
of the
Thought and Extension
as the
only Attributes as yet
known
to us.
remarkable that the theological colouring of Spinoza's philosophy becomes fainter as we proceed in the Ethics^ and in the third and fourth Parts Deus appears more and more like a bare It
is
synonym
for natura.
But then,
one might begin to think
just as
that the verbal disguise has been completely thrown
God
off,
we come
upon the
intellectual love of
has not
been reduced to Nature, but Nature exalted to God.
in the fifth Part.
Spinoza begins and ends with theological terms
we
;
After
and
all
yet,
God
when
modern language, we find a view of the world standing wholly apart from those which have been translate his doctrines into
propounded or seriously influenced by theology. His earlier writings help us to understand the seeming riddle. He started with the intention of making theology philosophical, but with the determination to follow reason to the uttermost. Reason led him
beyond the atmosphere of theology
was was hardly perceived by
altogether, but his advance
so continuous that the full extent of
it
himself.
whom
names are important may be left to settle as best they can by what name Spinoza's doctrine shall be called. Most people call it Pantheism. There is no particular harm in this, except that Pantheism is so vague a term as to be applicable
Those
to
and applied to theories diametrically opposite in their bearing on the conduct of life, and very widely different in their purely philosophical foundations.
For example, the Hindu philosophers
of the orthodox Brahmanical schools are in a general way panBut they hold that all finite theists, and are commonly so named. existence
is
an
and Hfe mere vexation and mistake, a a view which Christian of the Absolute
illusion,
blunder or sorry jest schools developing Christian theology in a pantheistic direction :
SPINOZA
332
:
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
have once and again approached, or more than approached. need hardly repeat that Spinoza holds nothing of the kind.
We So
when somebody talked a while ago of " Pantheism from the Vedas to Spinoza," he might as well have talked of the law of evidence from Manu to the Indian Evidence Act, as far as any that
connexion went
logical
the Vedas are
to say nothing of the circumstance that
:
many
centuries
Again, the Stoics were
them
pantheists
also
than
earlier
philosophy, and the earliest parts of
Hindu
systematic
not pantheistic.
are
only they went to the
:
other extreme and held that the universe was the product of perfect
A
and in an absolute sense good.
reason
description
includes these opinions as well as Spinoza's cannot be of for
And
conveying exact information.
how
Theism
far
then
it
is
before this book was
first
published
much
difficult
does or does not overlap Pantheism.
which use
to say
Not long
Mr. Fiske of Harvard produced
a very lucid and systematic work, setting forth a view of the
nature of things identical in the main with Mr. Herbert Spencer's,
and he
called his
Now
view Cosmic Theism.
Mr. Spencer's and Mr.
is
excludes
doctrine
Fiske's
it
certain that
popular
the
behef in a so-called Personal God, and the particular forms of
Whether any large number name of Cosmic Theism for such
emotion dependent on
religious
of people will agree to use the
it.
know, and cannot pretend to care very much. evident that Spinoza must be called a Theist by such
a doctrine I do not
But
it is
persons, be they logical than
Mr.
many
and
Fiske's,
Goethe was prepared is
or few
to
go
since his ideas are not less theo-
;
his
as far as this,
and
This
is
persons
intelligent
just as well, as
intelligible
At
meaning.
that I can suggest
is
it
is
and
so.
name of Atheism, which however
the facile and once frequent
polite
What is more, further.^ Then there
language more
have
lately
shrunk from
not only an ugly name, but has no
least the nearest
that an atheist
approach to a definition
means anybody who disagrees
with one on any theological question of importance 1
Goethe
to Jacobi, in
1785,
^/>.
Grunwald, Spino%a
beweist nicht das Daseyn Gottes, das Daseyn
Atheum preisen."
schelten, so
mbchte
using.
ist
Gott.
ich ihn Theissimuni
in
;
the speaker
Deiitschland, p.
Und wenn
119: " Er
ihn andere deshalb
und Christianissimum nennen und
SPINOZA AND THEOLOGY
333
being, of course, the judge both of what questions are theological
and whether they are important enough to call names about. Probably the historical meaning is definite enough, namely, a citizen who refuses to worship the Gods appointed to be worshipped by the authorities of his city. But to apply this in England at the present day would
towards
of persons
classes
fluential,
obviously lead
who
us
into
great
incivihty
are not only respectable and in-
but quite orthodox as orthodoxy has been understood
ever since the
Act of Toleration
ages of Christianity,
when
as its application
;
in the early
the Christians were called atheists by
the vulgar, led to proceedings which no reasonable or
humane
person, orthodox or not, would at this day think of justifying.
As
for
Agnosticism,
of this
last
we may
be allowed to put off any discussion
addition to the vocabulary of sects and persuasions
some one has
called
Spinoza an Agnostic.
In
fine,
till
we conclude
on these matters of nomenclature is unprofitable and we decline, for similar reasons, to enter on the question, on which chapters if not volumes might be spent, whether Spinoza's way of looking at the world and man is to be called a religion or If it is fitted (with allowances and additions according to not. the state of knowledge for the time being) for the use of reasonable men in the conduct of life, sooner or later reasonable men If it is not, will find it out and use it, under whatever name. reasonable men will not be persuaded to use it by the most positive that to dwell
:
and formal proof that
it
satisfies
at all
points the best possible
definition of a rehgion.
We
may now go on
to consider
Spinoza's
utterances as to
the particular revelations on which the claims of Judaism and Christianity, the only historical religions with which he was acquainted, are
commonly made
to stand.
It
is
needless to say
that the materials for a comparative study of religions were not The religions of the East were accessible in Spinoza's time.
only by loose and superficial report, and this was especially Spinoza the case with Buddhism, the most important of all. probably knew of its existence (in his letter to Albert Burgh he
known
specifies India as the seat of divers religions) its
;
but of
fundamental doctrines, and the personal character of
its its
origin,
founder
:
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
334
AND PHILOSOPHY
preserved by tradition, he can have
as
known
Indian
nothing.
Buddhism, indeed, remained a sealed book to European scholars long after his time.^ This has to be borne in mind if we undertake to reduce Spinoza's judgments to the measure of our own In the
time.
chapter of the
first
Tractatus
Theologico-P oUticus^
where the nature of prophecy is discussed, the revelation of the Decalogue occurs as a question to be specially dealt with. It is the opinion of some Jewish authors, Spinoza says, that the words of the commandments were not actually pronounced by God, but the Israelites heard an inarticulate noise, while at the same time the commandments were inwardly perceived by them.
And
this (he
proceeds)
words of the decalogue
whence
it
seems
myself once thought, since I found the
to follow (since
down
logue was to lay
meaning.
I
Exodus
in
However,
if
different
God
from those in Deuteronomy
not the very words of
we
must certainly be allowed
are
;
spoke but once) that the deca-
God
but only the
not to do violence to Scripture,
it
that the Israelites heard a real voice.
This voice we must suppose to have been created for that But this supposition is by no means free from difficulty for how could this finite and created voice give the Israelites any rational certainty of the existence or nature of God beyond what occasion.
they had before
?
And moreover
not only that there was a in the fashion of a
more it
lies
at large afterwards."
God
but that
real voice,
man.
concludes, " that herein
the whole narrative suggests
"Wherefore Are we
doubt not," Spinoza
I
a mystery, of
himself spoke
which we
will speak
to infer that Spinoza
thought
proper on this point to follow the example set by Ibn Ezra on
other points of historical criticism does he simply mean, as Ibn Ezra
?
By
talking of a mystery
meant beyond question,
he does not choose to explain himself further
?
that
Certainly he has
brought together precisely the kind of evidence, and suggested precisely the kind of considerations, which a modern critic would bring forward to show that the whole narrative 1
The Buddha
an anthropo-
appears in Montesquieu (doubtless through Jesuit accounts of Chinese
Buddhism) as " Foe, l^gislateur des Indes." to Bayle's article
is
on Spinoza.
Esprit des
lois,
book
14, c. 5.
^Cp.
note
B
SPINOZA AND THEOLOGY The
morphic myth.
rationalized miracle
hypothesis he actually gives
since
:
have specially ordained
words pronounced tremely
difficult
as
God
that
is
a
sort
of
does not speak like men, he must
the Israelites should hear certain
by a magnified human voice.
It
commended
to believe that this really
Again,
335
is
ex-
itself to
from other parts of the treatise that in Spinoza's eyes the pre-eminence of the Jews as the chosen people was a fact to be studied and explained on the The ordinary principles of historical and political reasoning. Spinoza.
it
sufficiently appears
divine election of the
now
Hebrew
nation
scope of revelation, in the view parts of the treatise,
is
to assure
identified, as
we
should
Again, the whole and only
with natural selection.
say,
is
forth by Spinoza in various
set
men
that there
is
a
way of salva-
And this by obedience without speculative knowledge. obedience does not consist in following any particular set or tion
precepts, but in the exercise of justice and charity.
necessary and really catholic faith
is
summed up
The
in this
:
only
" that
supreme being, loving justice and charity, whom all men are bound to obey that they may be saved, and to worship by showing justice and charity to their neighbours" (c. 14, ยง 24). Philosophical questions as to the nature and attributes of God are
there
is
a
indifferent to faith.
Whether he be account to faith
;
fire,
spirit,
light,
thought, or otherwise,
nor yet in what manner he
is
is
of no
the type of the right
example, whether because he hath a just and merciful mind, or because by him is the being and operation of all things, and through him therefore we also have understanding, and through him perceive to faith it is all one what every that which is true, just, and good life, for
:
man
holds touching these things.
whether one believe that God
is
So again
it
is
indifferent to faith
everywhere essentially or potentially
;
by the necessity of his own nature ; that he dictates laws as a prince, or shows them as eternal truths ; that men obey God from absolute free will, or by necessity of the divine ordinance ; that the reward of good and punishment of wicked
that he governs nature freely or
men
is
natural or supernatural.
not the business of revelation to give rational And here is the demonstrations but to move men to obedience.
Thus
too,
it
is
SPINOZA:
336
answer to the
HIS LIFE
difficulties
AND PHILOSOPHY
formerly raised about the voice from
Sinai.
Although the voice which the
them any philosophical God, yet it sufficed to (such as
Israelites
heard could not have given
or mathematical certainty of the existence of
them with amazement at God's power, they already knew him), and to impel them to obedience ; ravish
which was the purpose of that display. For God's will was not to show the Israelites the attributes of his nature as they are in themdid not as then reveal
(seeing he
selves
stubborn mind and draw
it
to
obedience
any), but ;
with them not with arguments, but with the
and
so
break
he went
to
their
work
of trumpets, thunder,
lightnings.
This,
The or
and blast
to
it
other half
elsewhere.
PoUticus
much
is
be observed, removes only half the difficulty.
will
a
is
not touched either in the chapter on miracles
Remembering that the Tractatus Theologicowork of conciHation, we may conclude without
hesitation that Spinoza did not himself regard the circum-
stances of the
When
Mosaic
revelation as historical.
in the following chapter
he speaks of the necessity and
authority of revelation, he passes over the thunders of Sinai,
and
only adduces in general terms the testimony of the prophets. And the prophets he regards (herein pretty much following
Maimonides)
as
men
gifted with a particularly strong and vivid
imagination, which became the instrument of a kind of special insight ; the prophet's individual character, education and habits
colouring
all
his visions
which they the question occurs whether
and determining the form
in
were recorded. On this point also Spinoza is giving his own opinion, or only aims at giving the most rational theory within the Hmits of certain assumptions he has It is almost impossible imposed on himself for a special purpose. to draw the Hne between these two positions in the Tractatus Theologico-P olhicus^ and I doubt whether Spinoza always drew it himself.
The
passage on the general necessity of revelation to which
It attention has just been called deserves further consideration. has been seen that the foundation of theology and the sum of faith
SPINOZA AND THEOLOGY is
men
that
Not same But
can be saved by mere obedience without knowledge. that obedience is the only way for knowledge leads to the -,
and the same salvation,
life
of obedience
this efficacy
asked then,
then
337
we
why
do
we beheve
act foolishly
proof, theology
Now
is
to this I
Spinoza
is
careful to explain.
not demonstrated
is
answer,
no man been found
I clearly
hold that
to
demonstrate
accept the revelation once
moral certainty
:
be
it is
capable of
this
fundamental doctrine
for
made with
we cannot
than the prophets themselves to certainty was yet but moral, as
so use our
at least a
judgment
moral certainty.
as to
I say
look to have greater certainty herein
whom
it
was
we have
who endeavour
those go clean astray
it,
hath
at least there
and therefore revelation was
we may
but nevertheless
;
may
it
absorbed in philosophy.
of theology cannot be discovered by natural reason, highly necessary
:
If blindly and without reason,
?
on the other hand we say
if
;
it
as
to
first
whose Wherefore
revealed, and
already shown.
prove the authority of Scripture
And we may reasonby arguments of the mathematical kind ably embrace this fundamental position of theology and Scripture, though
cannot
it
be mathematically proved.
which many prophets, from which flows merely excel
for this cause that
is
folly
to
reject
confirmed by the witness of so
great comfort to
understanding, and to the
in
men who do
commonwealth ensues no
not
small
and which we may believe without any hurt or danger the rational conduct of life we could admit nothing as truth
advantage as if for
is
It
:
;
which on any
plausible ground
may be
called in doubt, or as if the
greater part of our actions were not uncertain and hazardous.
Once more, attaches
at the
end of the chapter Spinoza repeats that he
the highest value to revealed religion in the sense
we
have just explained. Since is
a
way
we cannot
perceive by the light of nature that mere obedience
to salvation, but only revelation teaches that this
is
brought
to pass by the singular grace of God, which our reason cannot attain, it appears by consequence that the Scriptures have brought exceeding comfort to mankind. All men without exception can obey, and there
be but a very few, compared with the whole of human kind, who so that if we acquire a virtuous disposition by the guidance of reason :
had not this witness of Scripture, nearly
all
we
men.
z
should doubt of the salvation of
SPINOZA
338
Two
of some interest
points
statement, namely,
how,
saved, and
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
:
the
if at
precise
the
all,
are
unexplained by this
left
meaning of
salvation
of revelation or the truth
facts
revealed can be expressed in philosophical language.
question there
nothing to detain
is
cannot mean anything
else
being
or
In the
first
For Spinoza salvation than that deliverance from the passions us.
which the other way, the clear but arduous way of reason, is shown in the Ethics, But of revelation what are we to under-
to
stand is
How can God as conceived
?
by Spinoza, the being
whom
in
the infinite reality of infinite worlds, whose freedom
necessity of the universe, to
the
is
whose nature neither understanding
nor will must be specially ascribed, reveal particular truths or duties to
men by
particular acts of grace
Again, the alleged
?
contents of revelation are hardly adequate to the machinery.
It
seems paradoxical, or at least not consistent with Spinoza's general
way of
thinking, to
call in
the
Law
and the Prophets
to assure us
mind may be earned by righteousness and goodwill without philosophy for this is what the message of Scripture seems to come to, when we substitute for the term salvation the meaning almost certainly attached to it by Spinoza. that the reward of a tranquil
:
Is this a
matter to learn from signs and wonders
and saying what he does of signs and wonders
?
or,
thinking
in general,
can
Spinoza really mean to assert the supernatural communication of
one point of practical knowledge words are express and even emphatic
this
sacrifice Spinoza's
which has
good
arisen, as I
faith to the
?
:
On
the other hand, the
we
and
dogma of
have no right to
his rigid consistency,
have already had occasion to point out, from
attaching exaggerated importance to the geometrical form used in
Perhaps
the Ethics. revelation
as
we
are free to suppose that Spinoza regarded
the manifestation of a
particular
kind of
human
genius, the disclosure of moral truth by an insight natural in
presence and operation, but occurring only in a few men. if
prophecy be simply a kind of genius,
And why
much
why
should
it
its
But
have ceased
?
on the necessity of the In order to true prophet's doctrine being confirmed by a sign ? But dispose of modern impostors, one might think at first sight. does Spinoza lay so
he must have well
known
stress
that professing prophets are never at a
SPINOZA AND THEOLOGY
339
and moreover he has a much shorter way with new propounders of revelations, as we saw in considering his theory of poHtics. Altogether the difficulty remains considerable. for a sign
loss
There
;
an unexplained gap between the rationalizing criticism
is
of the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus^ which goes a long way, but refuses to
go
lengths, and the thorough-going speculation of
Difference of dates will not account for
the Ethics.
know
all
Spinoza's
that
since
it,
we
philosophy was matured long before the
Theologico-political Treatise was published.
The
difficulty,
however,
personal
opinions.
Spinoza's
applies
For
only
our estimate
to
philosophical
criticism
of the
may be taken by by it may be adopted or left aside on its propounded or suggested own merits. And the view of revelation there put forward seems Tractatus Theologico-P oliticus
itself,
to contain at least this truth
organizing
of merely
miracles, indulgences,
The the
religion
first
that the appearance of a religion
a moral law before ceremonies, and organizes morality
which puts instead
:
and anything
is
sacrifices,
processions,
penances,
a capital fact in the history of the world.
which reaches
whether gradually or by and has the means of victory.
this height,
impulse of a founder,
is
vital
Judaism, Buddhism, Christianity, to some extent Mahometanism, It is true that religion possess or have possessed this power. always tends, in the hands of its ordinary ministers (who cannot
more than ordinary men),
as a rule be
stage.
It
is
also
to revert to the ceremonial
true that the opposite danger of antinomian
But when a religion has once been or become moral, there is always room for men of moral genius to This they do at the arise within it and revive the latent power. risk of being misunderstood and disowned ; in some cases they mysticism
ever present.
is
find themselves cut off altogether, and found a
communion is
;
in others the
Church
openly or tacitly accepted.
is
new
religion or
wise in time, and their
Thus Judaism underwent
work
a great
moral transformation in the hands of the prophets, but not without great struggles ; and again, at the very time when the Jewish polity was doomed to final destruction, the moral side of Jewish religion
received
have never been
a
further
lost.
On
development the the other hand
results
of which
Buddhism owes
its
— SPINOZA:
340
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
independent existence to Brahman jealousy and exclusiveness
Buddha had
appears, at least, that the
for
who
Wesley,
country
new cosmopolitan As concerning sect.
was driven to leave his Francis the Church of Rome
order,
name
St.
was wise ianity
we have
scale
and extent not greater
the greatest of
movement not
much
with not
in time, but
In our
elsewhere might have become the
founder of a to a
to spare.
And
examples (though
all
than
in Christ-
as to its actual
Buddhism) of
a
religious
new
aggressive assuming an entirely
originally
it
himself no intention of
going outside the very large bounds of Hindu orthodoxy.
own
;
character under the stress of opposition, and becoming at
last a
power of the first magnitude. It is curiously parallel with Buddhism in the circumstances that it has been reduced to insignificance in the scenes of
early conquests,
its
among men
strength in distant lands and
its
and has found
of alien races and
traditions.
What
has Spinoza to say of the power of Christianity and the
person of
founder
its
But we must attempt
own
language of our
His
?
own words
find an
to
time
:
on Jesus
a
as
man
be given.
them
equivalent for
in
the
leaving aside the question of
and,
revelation in the abstract, I think
shall presently
we may
say that Spinoza looked
of transcendent and unique moral genius,
standing out above Moses and the prophets in some such
way
as
Moses was conceived by the Jewish doctors to stand above all But he did not regard him as otherwise of a other prophets.^ The mysteries propounded by different mould from mortal men. Christian theologians appeared to him scarcely to deserve express contradiction
:
they were not so
much
untrue as unintelligible.
In discussing the nature of prophetic vision [Tract. Theol.-Polit. c. I, §§ 22-24) Spinoza says :
we
Though
understand
clearly
men
immediately with
(for
Cp. Tract.
as noted
by Leibnitz
Spino-za, p. 2
Theol.-Pol. c.
That
:
i,
in our ordinary
;
yet that a
man
communicate nature to our mind ^ can
should purely in his
§ 21, and Tschirnhaus's account of Spinoza's philosophy ait fuisse summum philosophum " Stein, Leiini^ u.
" Christum
283. is,
God
he communicates his
without any bodily instrument) ^
that
knowledge.
:
SPINOZA AND THEOLOGY mind
perceive matters which be not contained in the
our knowledge, nor can be deduced therefrom, surpassing excellence and beyond man's capacity. not that any
man
Christ, to
whom
revealed,
not
in
ever
came
to
principles of
first
mind must be of Wherefore I believe
his
that singular height of perfection but
the ordinances of
words or
341
God
men
that lead
to salvation
but immediately
visions,
so
:
manifested himself to the apostles by the mind of Christ, to
Moses by means of
may be called, In this sense we may Christ
And
a voice in the air.
that
were
God
formerly
as
therefore the voice of
which Moses heard, the voice of God. wisdom of God, that is, a wisdom above man's, took man's nature in Christ, and that Christ is the way of salvation. But here it is needful to explain that of those things which sundry churches determine concerning Christ I have naught to say, neither do I deny them ; for I am free to confess I comprehend them not. What I have now said 1 collect from like that
likewise say that the
Scripture alone.
And
again in the chapter on God's laws
Moses
even
and
received
understood
(c.
4)
it
is
said
revelations
his
that
not
as
declarations of eternal truth but as positive laws or precepts, and
regarded
God
under the
human
This, I say [adds Spinoza],
who
deliver laws in the
though he too appears
is
attributes of a prince
to be affirmed only of the prophets
name of God
to
and lawgiver.
;
Of
but not of Christ.
Christ,
have delivered laws in the name of God,
are yet to think that he perceived things truly and adequately.
God
Christ was rather the very mouth of (as
we showed
in the
first
by the mind of Christ, voices and visions.
And
if
as
chapter)
God
than
a
prophet
;
we For
since
gave revelations to mankind
aforetime by angels, that
is,
by particular
Christ ever declared after the fashion of a lawgiver the
which he perceived in their eternal been from regard to the ignorance of his
must have
necessity,
it
hearers.
Spinoza thus
truths
appears to ascribe to Christ not only a surpassing power of moral intuition,
but a corresponding strength and clearness of under-
standing in relation to the truths thus perceived. already have observed, what
Tractatus
Theologico-Politicus
is
at
still
more
large,
plain
that
The in
reader
may
reading the
Spinoza
takes
no
SPINOZA
342
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
:
account of the historical development either of morality or of religion.
was hardly possible that he should be noted and borne in mind. It
simply to
These opinions of even
unacceptable
the omission
;
Christ's office and character
were naturally
orthodox readers.
moderately
to
is
In
1675 Oldenburg asked Spinoza (Ep. 71) to explain himself farther on this and other points. The answer on this head is as follows (Ep. 73):â&#x20AC;&#x201D; by no means necessary to salvation to know Christ after the flesh ; but of the eternal Son of God, that is, the eternal wisdom of God, which has shown itself forth in all things, and chiefly in the mind of man, and most chiefly of all in Jesus Christ, we are I say that it
is
to think far otherwise.
of blessedness
and
since this alone
;
And
evil.
For without
no one can attain the
this
what is true and false, good wisdom was chiefly shown preached the same as by him
teaches
because, as I have said, this
forth through Jesus Christ, his disciples it
was revealed
to
them, and showed that in that
As
could exalt themselves above others.
sundry churches, that
God
distinctly stated that I
know
they seem to
state
me
to
speak
as
spirit
of Christ they
added by
for the proposition
took on himself the nature of man, I have
not what they mean.
improperly
as if
To
one should
speak plainly, tell
me
that a
circle had assumed the nature of a square.
on the necessity of keeping a certain amount of miracle and mystery as the foundaThis leads to an answer where tion of Christianity (Ep. 74).
Oldenburg
and
unsatisfied,
is
insists
of modern
Spinoza comes very near to the
specific conclusions
theological criticism, and (what
more remarkable) by much the
is
same road (Ep. 75). As
to
my
opinion of miracles,
I
have sufliciently expounded
mistake not, in the theologico-political
much
:
if
you consider these matters,
to the Sanhedrin, not to
only
to
the saints
;
that
Pilate,
God
treatise.
I
now add
to wit that Christ
it,
if I
but this
appeared not
nor to any of the unbelieving, but
hath
no right or
left
hand, nor
is
any one place, but everywhere ; that matter is everywhere the same, and that God cannot display himself outside the world in the imaginary space men feign lastly, that the fabric of the naturally in
;
SPINOZA AND THEOLOGY
343
human body bounds
:
after his
is restrained by the mere weight of the air within certain you will then easily perceive that the appearance of Christ death was not unlike that in which God appeared to Abraham,
when Abraham saw men and asked them say, surely
all
in
Abraham
likewise
believed
Mount
with him.
You
will
the Apostles believed that Christ had risen from the truth ascended into heaven ; which I deny not. For
dead and Israel
to dine
God had dined with him, and had come down from heaven in fire
believed that
that
God
Sinai and spoken to
them
in his proper person
;
all
to
whereas these
and sundry other matters of the like sort were appearances or revelations adapted to the capacity and conceit of the men to whom God was minded thereby to reveal his counsel. I conclude therefore that the resurrection of Christ from the dead was in truth spiritual, revealed only to the faithful, and to them after their capacity ; consisting in this, that
dead,
I
Christ was gifted with eternity and rose from the dead (the
mean,
in that sense
their dead), in that
by
in
his life
which Christ said and death he gave
let
:
a
the dead bury
singular
example
of holiness; and he raises his disciples from the dead in so much as they follow this example of his life and death. And it were no hard matter to explain the whole doctrine of the Gospel according to this
Nay, the fifteenth chapter of the first Epistle to the Corinthians can be explained by no other, or Paul's arguments understood, for on the common hypothesis they are evidently weak and may be confuted with little pains ; not to mention that in general the Christians have interpreted spiritually what the Jews have interpreted hypothesis.
materially.
Oldenburg again resurrection
be
taken
is
continuous,
otherwise
(Ep. 25) by repeating
With you
rejoins that the narrative of the passion
I take
but his resurrection
than
lively,
and
and circumstantial, and cannot
literally
Spinoza replied
throughout.
his opinion yet
more
explicitly.
the passion, death and burial of Christ literally, I take allegorically.
I
admit that
by the Evangelists with such circumstances
as
that
this also
we
is
told
cannot deny
body to have risen and ascended into heaven, there to sit on the right hand of God ; and that he might have been seen by unbelievers, had any such been in but in this they the places where Christ appeared to his disciples that the Evangelists themselves believed Christ's
:
might well be mistaken without prejudice
to the
Gospel doctrine,
as
344
SPINOZA
happened former
:
to other prophets also,
letters.
boasts that he
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
whereof
I
my
have given instances in
But Paul, to whom also Christ appeared afterwards, knows Christ not according to the flesh but according
to the spirit.
Oldenburg was not content with this, but once more pro(exactly as an English Broad Churchman might now protest if he fell into a similar correspondence with a Dutch
tested
theologian of the liberal school) that the Hteral historical fact of
the Resurrection
is
the indispensable foundation of Christianity.
we know, he had the last word. It is needless to dilate on the wonderfully modern character of Spinoza's criticism ; it So
far as
speaks for
As guide
itself.
regards the practical problem of reHgion considered as a
of
life,
Spinoza seems
to
make
a
distinction
between
For the philosopher religion is acquiescence in the order of nature, with the delight in knowledge thereby engendered, and living a righteous Hfe at the bidding of Questions about particular revelations and supernatural reason. narratives are for him nothing else than historical and critical questions of more or less interest in themselves, but not affecting God and the world stand sure for him withthe conduct of life. But for the majority religion is out miracles or prophecies. a rule which can and ought to be obedience to a revealed rule reduced to the simplest terms, and almost or entirely freed from philosophers and the majority.
;
requirements of beHef in specific supernatural events. pretty clear that Spinoza
is
And
it is
not only describing what he deems
own time, but deems that it must be so for all Now that we have come to regard human thought as the of a continuous process of growth, we cannot think distinc-
practicable for his
time. result
We
permanent necessity of human nature, however inevitable it may seem for a long time to come, that there should be one creed for the few and another or others for the many. The state of things contemplated by Spinoza is an artificial compromise which could not last even tions of this kind maintainable.
in the
most favourable conditions.
cannot hold
it
a
In what manner reHgion will
whether by the be transformed in the future we cannot tell gradual widening and purifying of existing forms, or by some new :
SPINOZA AND THEOLOGY
345
manifestation of individual genius, or by the diffused working of strong and subtle thought, dissolving forms and leaving no vocation for prophets.
man's
It has hitherto
ideal in life
thought
once
for
been the aim of religions to
We
all.
now
find that
man's
life
fix
and
will not be fixed, that our ideals themselves are shifting
and changing shapes, figures of "the shade cast by the soul of man." One after another the advancing tide reaches them, rises above them, and they disappear. Must we simply acquiesce in this perpetual flux of our aspirations
new form
will
emerge which,
or
?
may we
not absolutely permanent,
if
be as constant for us and our children generations were for them
It
?
suppose that some
in a kind of vision to the clear-headed
bygone once seemed
the ideals of
as
conceivable, as it
is
may
and truth-loving friend to
whose memory I have dedicated this book, that the sense of natural law might become an organic intuition and fill the world with a new beauty that would leave no room for questioning or, to ;
express it in Spinoza's language, that the "intellectual love of God " should become a constant power and delight in the daily life is
of our successors.
Difficulties
always unlikely that the
first
one can see with ease; and
it
expression of a great hope should
closely correspond to the fulfilment.
But
difficulties are
made
to
Such visions and hopes as these are not to be lightly deemed of, shadowy though they may appear. For men will not seek without high longings ; and if seeking they find not what their imagination longed for, still they beget daring, not to nourish despair.
find,
and the search Lo,
And
worthy.
itself is
the cloud-veil cast
still still
athirst the spirit's
Sleep not,
The Cup, my ^
Bar
O
love,
soul
ru-i
gut
among
the flowers,
inmost powers
what time
while daylight
!
a-z
;
this for sleep
is
still is
?
ours.^
abr niqab-ast hanu'z^
dar taUa iva dll-am mail-i-sharab-ast hanu%^ dar kJiab ma-ra'v. chi ja-i-kh'ab-ast hanu%? 'J ana
!
mai
dih, ki aftdb-ast hanu-z.
The " veil " Q. 96, ed. Heron-Allen (read in the esoteric sense). Other the shadow of passing clouds, a poetic evidence of the sun being still high.
Omar Khayyam, is
texts read khur for dih in the last line,
which
spoils
it.
;
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
346
But howsoever see
light
no cry or complaint
it,
wait, but above
who would
all
work.
entreat or
Neither the
forward.
come, or we are to be enlightened
to
is
AND PHILOSOPHY
will hasten
Least of
command
all
we must work and must we listen to those it
:
go backward instead of courses nor the working of
us to
stars in their
man's thought will go back for any man's word, or
To
for threatenings.
tual enterprise,
those
whose
and hopeful
who
Haeckel
:
for ourselves, that so
we
shall
Impavidi progrediamur.
They
them but must be. But to
it
show,
if
for
need be, a bold
Science, they cry,
is
irreverent
made the world profane and
In the face of such language
bear the lamp
the world the
answering to their denunciations with
front,
she has laid hands on mysteries and
common.
entwined with the
who would fain recall for we can only say, sorrowing
chide and reproach
and even a warlike
have not the temper of intellec-
feelings are indissolubly
days of peaceful belief,
those
for prayers, or
and
traditions of the past,
steadfast
who
it
is
of knowledge to apologize
and speak humbly.
need no excuse and have no occasion to do their work by
it
They
is
the makers of articles and dogmas
Nay,
who
are irreverent.
have desecrated the glory of the world with dark habitations
and dwelHngs of
when
who
not for those
the good leave of the letter-worshippers and article-makers.
but
to
idols,
not enduring to
live in the
open Hght
;
and
down, and the sun in his strength the unclean fumes of their censers and their sacrifices,
their tabernacles are broken
quells at last
their eyes are blinded with that splendour, and they cry out that the
world
is
darkened.
Contaminata
est in operihus
eorum^
et
fornicati
Reverence will never be wanting from those who study nature with a whole heart ; reverence for the truth of things, and for all good work and love of the truth in man. And for the great leaders of men who have conquered them not with the sword but with the spirit, who, seeing above their
sunt in adinventionibus
fellows
what man's
suis.
life
is
and might
be, have given their
own
make it worthier, for these chiefly shall our reverence be Whether such an one was named among his people unfailing. Socrates the son of Sophroniscus, or Gautama who is called the lives to
Buddha, or Jesus who is honour and worship of
called the Christ, free
he
men, and not
shall
least
have endless
of those
who
SPINOZA AND THEOLOGY have learnt most from Spinoza
their
for
347
thoughts of
man and
the world.
Forward, then, we must ever go, finding what light we may and he that most surely finds will be he that least fears danger and ;
The
loss.
old
Northern
tale
tells
how Brynhild
lay
on the
enchanted mountain, cast in a deep sleep and clad in mail of proof, with a wall of lire round about her. But Sigurd came and rode through the fire, and cut through the armour, and delivered her ; for
he was
fearless
of heart, and rode Odin's horse, and bare Odin's
sword, wherewith he had slain the treasure.
And now men,
worm
that guarded the great
being afraid to look on the living face
of truth, have charmed her asleep and, for that she was not strong
enough by
herself,
have imprisoned her in a grievous weight of
armour, clothing her with creeds, and confessions, and
And
the great and deadly serpent Superstition, bred of fear and
ignorance, keeps watch on the treasure of knowledge.
who
articles.
has slain the serpent and
knows not
horse and ride through the wall of
fire
;
fear
Only he
can bestride Odin's
only he
who
wields Odin's
sword can draw near to that sleeping might and beauty, and sunder the stifling links of mail, and show the divine face to men.
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
CHAPTER
XII
SPINOZA AND MODERN THOUGHT For such men of
them and
again others
is not the end of life. They live on in our remembrance Their thought animates others who come after them, and
as these death
in their
works.
who come
after these.
Were not
that the true immortality
P. A. S. I
saw the body of Wisdom, and of
And And And
I stretched out
my
hands
prayed her to
I
woke and might
was she wrought. a
for
my
mote of the dust they caught came in the midnight dream
teaching, and she
not remember, nor betwixt her tangle deem
knew, and how might
To
and
Akbar.
:
;
come
I
She spake, and how might I
shifting guise
to hold her,
?
VAN LiMBURG Brouwer
I
hearken
I fashion, or
?
I
heard, and
how might
show ? William Morris
:
know ?
I
her hidden glory
:
Sigurd
the
Vohung.
give an account of the reception and fortunes of Spinoza's
thought
;
when
was
to trace the signs of
its
acceptance by a few in the time
most part rejected with indignation or contempt to follow its working in the various fields of literature and speculation where, having at last risen to the due height of its it
for the
;
worth,
it
has
more
lately
undertaking equivalent, of modern philosophy.
made
if fully
We
itself felt
this
would be an
should not go beyond the truth in
who
have in our
own
time
make Spinoza's work better known and understood, Spinoza's mind has fed the thoughts of two centuries. And
done most
we we
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
performed, to writing the history
saying with Auerbach, one of those
that
:
should
to
much
err if in considering Spinoza's influence in
confined our view to the marks which his system has
the formal theories or discussions of later philosophers.
more than once been remarked
that, while
much
Europe left in
It
has
recent philosophy
manners and degrees pervaded by Spinozism, there has never been a Spinozist school as there has been a Cartesian and a is
in divers
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; SPINOZA AND Kantian school. not in the system
The
truth
MODERN THOUGHT is
349
that the strength of Spinozism
is
method and habit of mind. Hostile critics have attacked the system ever since it was made knov^^n, some vv^ith real power, some with desperate captiousness ; as such, but in its
but even
when they
only will
it
are successful the spirit eludes them.
not be driven from philosophy, but in
like
Not
manner it unwelcome
works its way into regions where formal philosophy is or unknown. Religion and poetry become its carriers unawares, and it might not be too fanciful to trace its presence even in the fine arts. It is more or less true of every great philosopher, but eminently true of Spinoza, that the history of
it is is
interwoven with the general history of culture.
his philosophy
What
has been
written about Spinoza or directly adopted from him represents but
power
a part of his
in the world,
and a
still less
part of the activity
which Spinoza clearly discerned and firmly grasped when they were as yet too hard even for strong men. All that I can attempt here is to show in outline how it has
and power of the
ideas
fared with Spinoza's philosophy in the world of science and letters
down
to our
materials
own
seem
to be
of the Continent. to
time, and especially in England, for the English still little
We
end, with Spinoza's
known
to the professed philosophers
may conveniently begin, as we shall have own country. The first effect of his
writings in Holland was to raise a storm of controversial indignation, chiefly against the
Tractatus
Theologico-Politicus
;
not that
was more obnoxious to orthodox criticism than the Ethics^ Books and but it had more general and practical interest. pamphlets were poured forth in abundance by writers of various degrees of notoriety and abihty, and were esteemed at the time
it
so at least
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
are told by Colerus,
who
gives the titles of several
have accomplished the refutation of Spinoza with I suppose there is nobody the success that could be desired.
of them all
we to
no enormous presumption in suspecting that the reading of them would not now be found profitable, though it might possibly be amusing now and
now
living
who
has read
them
;
and perhaps there
is
This zeal for refuting the blasphemous, atheistic, deceitful, such were the epithets with soul-destroying works of Spinoza which the authors garnished their arguments, in the usual taste of then.
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
SPINOZA
350
the time
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;was
:
HIS LIFE
AND PHILOSOPHY
by no means confined
to the theological faculty.
Several of these writers
were laymen at least one, Spinoza's correspondent Blyenbergh, had no pretension to be a scholar. Medicine produced its champions too. The Jewish physician Isaac
Orobio was
;
good time with a tract against Spinoza and his apologists j and Dr. Bontekoe, in the course of an extremely quaint work on the numberless virtues of tea, published only two years after Spinoza's death, took occasion emphatically to renounce Spinozism. Some one had accused him, " it appears, of atheism. I will one day show the world," he " exclaims, what sort of an atheist I am, when I refute the godless in the field in
works of Spinoza, and likewise those of Hobbes and Machiavelli, three of the most cursed villains that ever walked this earth." ^ The variety of Dr. Bontekoe's other pursuits and quarrels (which were many) appears to have prevented him from fulfilling this rather comprehensive promise. It happened afterwards, curiously enough, that the career of the greatest of Dutch physicians, and the leader of European medicine in his time, was in a manner determined by the blind fury of orthodox company against Spinoza. was in the particular case at least, as the story will show. Boerhaave was in his youth intended for the ministry. While he was a theological student, he was travelling one day with a person who abused Spinoza in violent language, something like Boerhaave, though himself no Dr. Bontekoe's, we may suppose. follower of Spinoza, could not refrain from asking the speaker if This was enough to fasten he had read any of Spinoza's writings. on Boerhaave the name of Spinozist and accordingly he betook himself to medicine, seeing himself cut off from all prospect of advancement in the Church. ^ Only one writer, so far as we know, Abraham CuiFeler, had the courage to stand forth in open Blind
it
:
defence of the Ethics.^ 1
Tractaat van het excellence
Kruyd
Thee, etc,
In's
Gravenhage, mdclxxix.
p.
349,
cp. p. 199. 2
H.
J.
Betz, Lcvensschets 'van Baruch de Spino'za,
(The Hague, 1876),
Aa, Biographisch Woordenboek der Nederlanden, s.'v. Boerhaave. he had actually disputed against Spinoza in an academical thesis. <!er
2
151C,
Specimen ards ratiocinandiy
etc.,
1684.
Van
p.
25
}
Van
It appears that
der Linde, Bibliografie^ nos. i$\a^ I5i^>
SPINOZA AND
MODERN THOUGHT
351
So many were the refuters of Spinoza that before long they fell out among themselves, and two or three of them incurred the suspicion of being no better than Spinozists in disguise. Such accusations
are
familiar
in
zealous champions seeing an all
lengths with
them
j
theological
At
the same time undoubted
Spinozism arose within
of
more to go
in every one who fails and the grounds were probably as slight
in this case as they generally are.
manifestations
the
controversy,
enemy
generation
a
after
Reformed
Spinoza's death in the most unexpected quarter, the
Church of the Netherlands itself. The local disturbance produced by the movement was considerable and it is said that ;
traces of
it
remain even
now
in small isolated societies
who
find
their spiritual comfort in mystical doctrines once formally con-
demned by
the
Church
as Spinozistic heresies.
One
of the
first
was Pontiaan van Hattem of Bergen-op-Zoom, whose works soon acquired fame enough for Hattemist and Hattemism leaders
become current terms of vituperation. Van Hattem had several disciples of more or less note, among whom we may here mention the female enthusiast Dinah Jans, and Jacob Bril, who pushed Probably the movement his master's mysticism to extremes.
to
came
at this stage
German
mystics
Bohme
under the influence of
;
and
we must remember
and the earher
that
apart
from
Spinoza's writing a considerable mystical and pantheistic tendency,
leading to results curiously like Spinoza's in some points, already existed in the theology of the too,
had
its
Low
mystical developments.
Hattemism with Spinoza seems
Countries.
But the
to be free
original connexion of
side.
of sin
is
its
apparently
Faith was defined as the knowledge of man's
absolute union with perfection, to
Hattem-
from doubt.
ism, in fact, was an exaggeration of Spinozism on
mystical
Cartesianism,
which
Christ, this
who
is
God
union belongs
;
conceived in his
full
while the foundation
the error of regarding God's being as separate from or
opposed to that of man.
The
true Christian
is
the
man who
attained beatitude by the consciousness of this identity.
has
Evil
regarded, with Spinoza, as a negative and relative conception
is ;
nay, the sin against the Holy Ghost is explained to consist in Van Hattem's attributing any positive existence to evil and sin.
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
352
AND PHILOSOPHY
only criticism on Spinoza was that he arrived at his results by speculation instead of finding
were elaborately condemned ecclesiastical authorities of
required
of suspected
them
in a
kind of
Middelburg. ran
persons
His doctrines
in Scripture.
as
syllabus
official
by the
Part of the declaration follows
" Especially
:
I
renounce the doctrine taught by P. van Hattem in his writings, and account the same blasphemous and soul- destroying. I testify that
I
hold in abomination these Spinozistic opinions, in
what words or language soever they may be expressed." At the same place, and I presume at or about the same time, a number of anonymous works were burnt by order of the authorities of Middelburg as being " full of the abominable and blasphemous sentiments of the Libertines, modern Spinozists, Hattemists, and Free-thinkers." ^ Another conspicuous figure in this episode appearing somewhat later than Van Hattem is Frederick van Leenhof, a minister of Zwolle. publication of a
book
entitled
and
His offence consisted in the
Heaven
on
Earth
;
or
a short and
of (1703) ; which was in fact an attempt to construct a rationalized system of clear
account
true
constant
blessedness
Christian ethics embodying most of Spinoza's doctrines.
Leenhof
accepts from Spinoza not only determinism (in itself an orthodox
doctrine enough) but the ethical condemnation of sorrow and passions involving
of pleasure, and
it.
He
all
expressly adopted Spinoza's definition
justified this in
an apologetic work on the ground
improvement on those language closely copied from
that Spinoza's ethical definitions were an
of Descartes.
He
also set forth in
Spinoza's the doctrine that painful feelings cease to be painful in so far as
we form
adequate ideas of them and contemplate them
Withal he steadily protested that his opinions were not amenable to the charge of but the authorities of the Reformed Church thought heterodoxy otherwise, and continued to denounce the Leenhoffian heresy all as
part
of the eternal order of the world.
;
through the eighteenth century.
For the
rest, this theological strife in
the Netherlands had no
on the knowledge or criticism of Spinoza's and it was soon so much forgotten that it
effect, so far as appears,
doctrine elsewhere 1
Van
:
der Linde,
No. 169,
note.
This was
in 1714.
SPINOZA AND
MODERN THOUGHT
escaped the notice even of historians of philosophy
till,
353 towards
the beginning of the most recent period of Spinozistic criticism, it was opportunely brought to light by Dr. van der Linde in a
monograph which he has particulars
in
thrown upon
his
since corrected and completed in certain
The
Bibliography of Spinoza.
this episode
makes no
standing of Spinoza's philosophy that the immediate effect of his
;
light he has
direct addition to our under-
but
it
is
work was
interesting to
so
much
know
greater than
had been supposed. I do not know how far Spinoza may have been similarly taken up by readers of a mystic turn at other times and places. An attempt has been made to show that
Swedenborg, the most considerably from him.
illustrious
On
this
of modern mystics, borrowed
ground, however, nothing
is
more deceptive than general resemblances.^ Let us turn to the reception of Spinoza's work by the larger world of European thought. It is quite possible to exaggerate the neglect of it which prevailed for about a century after his death
it is
;
quite possible also to exaggerate the misunderstanding
which accompanied and
Spinoza was
partly caused this neglect.
rejected, but never forgotten
;
and rejected not so
much
because
were wrongly apprehended as because few of his readers were educated up to the point of tolerating them. The rejection, Spinoza was for the time thrown clean however, was complete. out of the stream of European speculation, and philosophers in all countries went their way without taking any serious account of him. A variety of circumstances combined to produce this result. his ideas
First and most obvious all
denominations.
is
the enmity of orthodox theologians of
But Spinoza had
the philosophical party which,
churches, had
many
now won
seats of learning
forgive Spinoza
for
itself
of
recently under the ban of the
for itself a respectable position,
was supreme.
his
also incurred the hatred
The
independence.
and in
Cartesians could never
To
have improved on
Descartes and gone the length of openly contradicting him was On the other hand, the in their eyes the worst heresy of all. affinities
1
of Spinozism were plain enough to give a handle for
See
Van
der Linde,
No, 331
j
R. Willis, Benedict de Spinoza,
2
A
p.
187.
AND PHILOSOPHY
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
354
ugly-sounding accusations of Descartes' teaching in if
not in
its
actual contents
and thus
:
to
many
denouncing
to be of their
own
tendency
became almost necessary
it
for Cartesians, anxious to vindicate their
to be zealous in
its
new-fledged orthodoxy,
strange growth which seemed
this
Spinoza's philosophy had to
stock.
contend with the whole weight of the Cartesian school as
There was one man who
with the power of the churches.
perhaps had the power,
the will had been
if
justice to Spinoza and seeing
capable of understanding Spinoza
certainly
with him, seen and
respondence
he had held cor-
a careful and probably a
But,
repeated study of Spinoza's works.
-,
Leibnitz was
with him, and been
talked
He made
admitted to his confidence.
present, of doing
done by others.
it
well
as
as
we
have seen,^ he
gradually passed from regarding Spinoza as a possible master or ally
to
regarding
him
as
enemy
dangerous
a
and
;
the
later
repulsion was in proportion to the earlier attraction.
In the
final result
Leibnitz not only
Spinoza, but encouraged injustice.
works
his published
was Leibnitz who expanded
by
The
to do justice to
failed
references to Spinoza in
are in a tone of systematic depreciation.
It
started the shallow dictum, since repeated
and
many
imitators,
Spinoza did
that
nothing
but
some of the seed sown by Descartes. His personal intercourse with Spinoza, which could not be denied, is extenuated But in general Spinoza is simply ignored, as much as possible. even where one would most expect to find reference to him, as in Not that I can regard the theory of pre-established harmony. the pre-established harmony of Leibnitz as borrowed from But when Leibnitz is professedly reviewing the Spinoza.^ various attempts already made to explain the relation of mind and matter, it is surprising to find all mention of Spinoza's theory There would be no great cause for surprise if the omitted. cultivate
theory were mentioned without Spinoza's
only in the manner of the time.
cannot
well be an
quoted, and
still ^
accident.
more,
P. 37, above.
his
name
;
that
But the omission
Then
is
would be total,
and
Leibnitz's saying already
other epigrammatic judgment that ^
See
p.
179, above.
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; SPINOZA AND
MODERN THOUGHT
" Spinoza begins where Descartes ends,
much
355
have very
in naturalism,"
the air of being ingeniously contrived to disparage in one
Spinoza for having only developed Descartes, and the philosophy of Descartes breath
such a
They
development.
point
sentiment uttered in perfect good faith
of
being capable of
for
way
the
philosophy
the
charitable
the
to
by a modern French
" Let us forgive writer after a careful study of both systems Descartes for having raised up Spinoza " Leibnitz's attitude is :
!
now
sufficiently accounted for,
his
with
relations
that
without
Spinoza,
deHberate intention of exalting his expense.
It
we know
the real nature of
ascribing
own
had
a consider-
able share in keeping Spinoza out of his rightful place.
have
said,
and sunk
philosophy went in
its
any
originality at Spinoza's
certain, however, that his action
is
him
to
way without
So, as
we
giving ear to Spinoza,
the hands of Leibnitz's successors into dogmatic
formalism.
Meanwhile possibly have
a
new
school was arising in England
who might
recognized in Spinoza's teaching the voice of a
But it fell out otherwise. The English philosophical school grew up in perfect independence, and Locke, Berkeley, Hume all make some perhaps it was better so. but in every case it is so slight and little mention of Spinoza desultory as to show plainly that they had never thought of Locke Spinoza as a writer deserving to be seriously considered. brackets him with Hobbes in loose condemnation as " those justly friend
if
not
of a
master.
;
decried authors."
Berkeley speaks of " those wild imaginations
of Vanini, Hobbes, and Spinoza ; " and of " modern Atheism, be Collins, or whom you will " and he it of Hobbes, Spinoza, :
seems to have accepted the popular view of Spinozism as a merely The following passage from Alciphron (Seventh formal system. Dialogue,
I
have
§
29,
Works,
heard,
said
ii.
I,
334, ed. Eraser) Spinosa
is
worth quoting
represented
as
a
man
:
of close
argument and demonstration.
He as
did, replied Crito, demonstrate
one may
demonstrate anything.
;
but
Allow
a
it
was
man
after
such
a
manner make
the privilege to
SPINOZA
356 his
own
:
definitions of
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE common
words, and
it
will be
no hard matter be true and in
which in one sense shall once seeming paradoxes and manifest truisms. For example, let but Spinosa define natural right to be natural power, and he will easily demonstrate that "whatever a man can do" he hath a
for
him
to infer conclusions
another
false, at
Nothing can be plainer than the
right to do.^
ing
our pretenders
but
:
prejudiced against religion, sophistry of
It appears,
which
so
passionately
writers for demonstration.
however, that Berkeley had really read Spinoza
more than can be
is
are
swallow the grossest nonsense and
to
as
weak and wicked
lumen siccum
the
to
proceed-
folly of this
said of either
Locke
or
Hume.
It
;
is
Locke, taking the general Continental estimate on set down Spinoza as a kind of erratic Cartesian ; and we that from Cartesianism in any form he expected no solid
possible that trust,
know profit.
As
to
Hume,
Huxley has pointed out that he making himself acquainted with
Professor
was pretty uniformly indolent in philosophical literature even on points that immediately concerned If he ever did take up Spinoza, it is unHkely that he his work. had the patience to pierce through the rind of definitions and Indeed
axioms.
and
critics
But
it is
it
common
has been the
of Spinoza to stick
also possible that if
fast in
Hume
of
fate
many
readers
the First Part of the Ethics.
enough into mind, as would have
had looked
far
Spinoza to find other things more to his been, for example, the appendix on Final Causes, and the
pitiless
onslaughts made in various places of the Ethics on the current
and the
logical doctrines of universals
cared to leave any evidence of
it
like,
he would not have
The
in his work.
open defence
of opinions commonly reprobated was not at all consistent with Besides, to profess any particular his attitude of pure scepticism. interest
in
oneself into
Spinoza was the
troubled
time equivalent to
that
at
waters
polemics, which was exactly what
of theological
Hume
wanted
throwing
and sectarian
to avoid.
For the misapprehension of Spinoza's philosophical importance
was not only consistent with
his
making
theological department of the world of ^
We
have seen, in discussing the
of secondary importance.
great
a
letters,
stir
in
the
but was to a great
Tractatus Politicus, that
this
point
is
at
most
SPINOZA AND
MODERN THOUGHT
357
extent the natural consequence of the repulsion excited by the theological bearings of his doctrine.
Divines
filled
with horror
who denied an extramundane Deity, final had not the time or temper to examine his
at the impious writer
causes,
and
free will,
contributions to the science of Tractatus
human
the Ethics to be fairly dealt with.
We
Moreover, the
nature.
Theologico-PoUticus had already
made
it
impossible for
have already seen
how
it
was received in the Netherlands when it first appeared. In England it does not seem to have been much known till some time after Spinoza's death; though as early as 1678 Cudworth gave a contemptuous paragraph to it in his True Intellectual System of the Universe (p. 707). Cudworth declares that "as for " politician theological who contended that " a miracle is that late nothing but a name which the ignorant vulgar gives to opus naturae insolitum^ any unwonted work of nature, or to what themselves can assign no cause of," he finds his discourse "every
way
so
weak, groundless, and inconsiderable,
confutation."
A
translation
was published
as
not to deserve a
in
1689, not very
elegantly written, and not disclosing either the translator's or the author's name.
The
chapter on miracles appeared separately in
English (without acknowledgment of its origin) in 1683, sub tit. " Miracles no violation of the Laws of Nature." The source
was recognized by some one who hastened to answer it (" Miracles Works above and Contrary to Nature"). In 1763 the chapter was reprinted in London in the original sub tit. " Tractatus de MiracuUs^ " with such alterations as the adapter thought required to make it appear an independent essay, with a dedication to
David Hume. press.
I
know
Possibly this was a production of Wilkes's private
of only one copy, and have not been able to learn
anything more about Latin the
treatise
it.
Either in the old translation or in the
must have obtained
a
good
deal of currency, as
1697 we find one Matthias Earbery coming forward to demolish with more valour than wisdom ("An answer to a book it Earbery admits with a intitled, Tractatus Theologico-PoUticus'^''). " Nor am I sort of apology that Spinoza had some scholarship. in
io-norant," he says in his Preface,
" that the author of
this
was very well versed (pardon so favourable an expression)
book in the
SPINOZA
358
:
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
Moses and the Prophets."
But he soon makes up for any excess of civility he may have been guilty of: "I thought it v^ould be at least some punishment, as it w^ere, to the very shades and Manes of this author to shew the world that he, who so long has found a place in the libraries and hands of very learned men, writings of
does scarce for his stupidity, and trifling
way
of arguing, merit to
obtain a place amongst the lowest forms of inferiour animals."
In course of time other champions of weightier metal attacked the Ethics also, but
Howe,
still
John
in distinctly theological interests.
a great light of English nonconformity, devoted a chapter
of his book. The Living Temple^ to " animadversions on Spinoza."
His
of
refutation
metaphysical
Spinoza's
principles
a
is
fair
specimen of the dry and windy jangling over verbal definitions
which then passed muster
for philosophical discussion
No
help of the reader's foregone conclusion.
esteemed
at the time,
and may be so
He
by
it
was much
who
are able
mental condition of Howe's original
to reproduce in themselves the
audience.
still
doubt
readers
with the
never gets beyond the definitions of Substance and
Attribute, and shows no sign of really understanding Spinoza.
My
own
impression
is
The most
the First Part.
much
that he had not so serious
as read
beyond
and capable polemic against
Spinoza was that of Clarke in his Boyle Lectures, otherwise known as the Discourse concerning the Being and Attributes of
God. He is little more courteous, if at all, than Earbery and Howe. Spinoza is described as " the most celebrated patron of atheism in our time " exposed hardly
;
fit
and
his
;
" vanity,
his
argument against
to be gravely refuted
man comes
:
"
I
folly,
final
and weakness " are
causes
suppose
it
is
dismissed as
will not be
thought
is to be disputed with any from the prominence given to It is nevertheless clear longer." Spinoza, as to Hobbes, that Clarke practically thought both of them more formidable than he was willing to admit. Clarke's
that
when once
a
to this he
on the conception of Substance, the doctrine of final causes (on which, as just mentioned, he is curt and superThe Discourse was translated into French cilious), and free will.^
criticism turns
1
ib.
Cp. L. Stephen, English Thought
104.
in the
Eighteenth Century, 120
;
and
as to
Toland,
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; SPINOZA AND in 1717,
and into Dutch
blast to the
German
MODERN THOUGHT
359
1793, I presume as a counterrevival of Spinozism.i less famous divine, as late as
A
by name Brampton Gurdon, likevi^ise formally attacked Spinoza " in a later series of Boyle Lectures, in 172 1 and 1722. "Spinoza, says Mr. Gurdon, " is the only person among the modern Atheists, that has pretended to give us a regular scheme of therefore I cannot act unfairly in
Two
of their party."
making him the
whole sermons and
others are given to demolishing so as
In
much
supposed by the preacher to be
is
1
71 2
Richard
Sir
philosophical
poem on
Blackmore Creation
curiosity as a specimen of
philosophy and poetry
Atheism
passages in
of Spinoza's philosophy in
still
need of demoHtion. a
Spinoza.
It
passage is
what then passed muster
of
England
in
:
to his Side th'
For Heav'n
unwary
to incline,
his Ensigns treacherous displays,
Declares for God, while he that
whom
For
As
he's pleas'd such
saves the
Now No
Name, while
hear his labour'd
it
God
Evidence
betrays
:
to bring,
subverts the Thing.
Scheme of impious Use
;
Substance can another e'er produce.
Substance no Limit, no Confinement knows.
And its Existence from its Nature flows. The Substance of the Universe is one, Which is the Self-existent God alone. The And The
Spheres of Ether, which the World enclose, all th'
With
Apartments, which the
Whole compose
lucid Orbs, the Earth, the Air, the Main,
every difF'rent Being they contain,
Are one prodigious Aggregated God, Of whom each Sand is part, each Stone and Clod. Supream Perfections in each Insect shine. Each Shrub is Sacred, and each Weed Divine.
^
Van
der Linde, Bibliogr. Nos. 292, 293.
his
not without
Spinosa next, to hide his black design,
And
and
representative
several
devoted
to
;
;
as
360
AND PHILOSOPHY
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE Sages,
no longer
Egypt''s
Sons despise,
For their cheap Gods, and Savoury Deities
No To
more
their course
Divinities revile
^
!
!
Leeks, to Onions, to the Crocodile,
You might your humble Adorations pay, Were you not Gods your selves, as well as
they.
As much you pull Religion's altars down. By owning all Things God, as owning none. For should
Beings be alike Divine,
all
Of Worship if an Object you assign, God to himself must Veneration shew, Must be
And
the Idol and the Vot'ry too
Who own Unorthodox
;
their assertions are alike absurd.
no God, or none
to be ador'd.
writers, as a rule, either neglected or affected to
neglect Spinoza for reasons which
may
Toland,
easily be divined.
however, speaks of him with considerable respect, and
Criticizing Spinoza's physics, which he
himself for so doing.
seems to have understood very unphilosophical,"
Spinoza was as
may
justifies
superficially, as
Toland maintains
his
right to say that
and good
for all that a great
" undigested and
man
in
many
"yet
respects,
not only be seen by his works, but also by the account of
his life since that
time publishM by Colerus, a Lutheran minister,
though as contrary to some of his sentiments as any man breathing." Such language from Toland would only confirm Spinoza's general reputation as an atheist of the worst kind, or perhaps a deist
mattered
little
which),
judgment of the crudeness in a
among orthodox
religious world
little
on him
The
readers. is
(it
popular
given with amusing
dictionary of religions and sects, for the most
which was published century and went through many
part written with fairness and moderation,
about the beginning of
this
In this book we read under the head of Atheism, that " Spinoza, a foreigner, was its noted defender." So far as I know, editions.
there was no serious
England
until
it
general stock of
philosophical consideration
was brought
German
in
of Spinoza in
by Coleridge along with
his
Thus
the
Hterature and philosophy. 1
Sic.
^
SPINOZA AND modern study of Spinoza restoration of his
MODERN THOUGHT
361
England depends ultimately on the fame by Lessing in Germany, of which we have in
presently to speak.
Meanwhile we must turn to the fortunes of Spinoza in France on which ground the reader who wishes for more detail than we ;
can here give will find an excellent guide in
M.
Paul Janet.
Refutations of Spinoza were prepared by theologians in France
even before the appearance of the Opera Posthuma. Massillon declaimed against him Cardinals,
De PoHgnac
and
De
as a
Afterwards
monster of impiety, and two
Bernis, published versified refuta-
French ^ De Bernis's performance is commended by Ste.-Beuve as combining vigour with discretion. But perhaps the two cardinals should rather count as showing that the name of Spinoza was the centre of a certain excitement in the general world of letters. It appears on the whole that Spinoza was more written and talked about in France than in England during the eighteenth century but he was no less completely excluded from the order of seriously recogAs in this country, he was rejected with nized philosophers. abhorrence by the orthodox, and, with few exceptions, slighted by tions of him, the one in Latin, the other in
:
-,
Bayle gave a long
freethinking writers.
article to
Spinoza in his
and unequal mixture of anecdote, but it Little of it is now of any value gossip, and criticism. was for a long time the only accessible and comparatively readable Dictionary, which
is
a curious
-,
account of Spinoza's system. The alleged affinities of Spinozism with other ancient and modern systems, including Siifism and
Chinese Buddhism (known to Bayle and his ]:authorities as Foe Spinoza Kiao) are traced with an enormous display of learning. is called an atheist all through, and the philosophy of the Opera
most absurd and monstrous theory, contraIt is surmised that most French dicting self-evident truths. philosophers of the eighteenth century had no other knowledge of Spinoza than they could derive from this article, which was closely
Posthuma described
as a
copied by Diderot in the Encyclopaedia. de Systemes^
first 1
2
Condillac, in his Traite
published in 1749, criticizes in some detail the Re'vue des
Deux Mondes, July
Specimens of both are quoted
15, 1867.
in Voltaire's notes to his
poem, Les
Systemes.
SPINOZA
362
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
:
First Part of the Ethics.
He
thinks Bayle's criticism superficial^
but arrives at a result quite as unfavourable to Spinoza. He v^^rites from an anti-metaphysical point of view and under the geometrical
may
fallacy, if I critics.
so call
Spinoza
it,
which has misled
so
treated as a dogmatic trifler
is
many of Spinoza's who deceives him-
with an unintelligible scholastic jargon. What Condillac undertook to do and thought he had done was (nearly in his own words) to show that Spinoza talked about things of which he had
self
no clear conception, that his definitions are loose, his axioms far from being true, his propositions fantastic and barren. He challenges the followers of Spinoza as if there was at that time supposed to be some considerable number of them to choose between abandoning the system as having no real meaning, and providing a distinct explanation of the meaning they profess to find in it. Voltaire discusses Spinoza more or less deliberately in various
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
places.
Of his
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
person he speaks with high respect
;
in the criti-
cism of his philosophy he goes in the main with Bayle, though his language is not wholly consistent. Like Bayle, he seems to find a certain pleasure in the paradoxical contrast
supposed impious doctrines and his moral principes de
les
la
life.
between Spinoza's " II renversait tous
morale, en etant lui-meme d'une vertu rigide."
Again, he speaks of "le sophiste geometrique Spinosa, dont moderation, d'Epictete."
desint^ressement, et
le
Elsewhere Spinoza
is
la
la
generosite ont ete dignes
used by Voltaire
as
an example
The
of virtue apart from belief in supernatural dogmas.
mixture
of personal generosity with philosophical narrowness in Voltaire's estimate
mind
in
is
at first sight strange, but ceases to be so
when we bear
that the form of pure theism strongly and even
vehemently
maintained by Voltaire made him a champion of natural theology
and
The
causes.
final
Tractatus
Theologico- Politicus^
where
Spinoza's opinions on these points are not developed, seems to
have been read by Voltaire with attention and something approval ; at least his expressions of dissent are of the most
and formal kind, and coupled with marked and 1
Lettre sur
meilleur qu'il
Spinosa, in
ait fait
;
j'en
Melanges Litteraires
condamne sans doute
d'en estimer I'erudition," etc.
:
les
" Get ouvrage
like faint
specific praise.^ est tres-profond et le
sentimens, mais je ne puis m'empecher
:
SPINOZA AND MODERN As
to the
he
calls
THOUGHT
363
Opera Posthuma^ Voltaire had probably not read them Spinoza's Latin dry, obscure, even bad and when he ;
;
wants to discuss Spinoza's metaphysics he quotes from the so-called refutation by the Count de BoulainvilHers.
This work
may
is
curious enough to deserve special mention, and
be introduced by Voltaire's significant remark that under the
of Refutation of Spinoza BoulainvilHers gave the poison and forgot to give the antidote. The book is a popular exposition of
title
the Ethics^ in which
little is
language of the original.
De
the
lines
Some
passages appear to be inserted from
Emendatione^ and occasionally
Intellectus
terms and
preserved of the arrangement or the
we meet with
of argument which are not in Spinoza at
was not published
till
after BoulainvilHers' death
;
but he
an apologetic preface which thinly disguises the
it
He
professes
to
all.
left
It
with
purpose.
real
have met with the Opera Posthuma quite by
accident, and bought the
book
for the sake
of the
then, he says, having nothing else to do in the
Hebrew grammar country, he made
acquaintance with the philosophical writings, and, thinking
it
of
high importance that they should be properly refuted, conceived the plan of expounding their contents in a
" afin que
more generally
intehigible
systeme rendu dans une langue commune, et reduit a des expressions ordinaires, put etre en etat d'exciter une indignation pareille a la mienne, et procurer, par ce moyen, de
form
:
le
ennemis a de si pernicieux principes." The volume also contains, I presume to save appearances, reprints and extracts of sundry controversial publications relating to Spinoza and Spinozism. It further includes the Hfe of Spinoza by Colerus, with large interpolations from the biography by " Lucas," which In that form the book BoulainviHiers knew only in manuscript. appears to have had some currency in freethinking society on the veritables
Continent,
it
seems within twenty years
after Spinoza's
death,^
oddly enough became associated (perhaps by BoulainviHiers' contrivance) with a certain Traite des trois imposteurs^ which occurs
and
it
together with " Lucas," and also alone, under the
U Esprit
de Monsieur Benoit de Spinosa^ or Liibeck and the Hague
1
Dated MSS.
at
2
MSS.
Royal Library
in the
at the
:
see
Hague.
Grunwald,
title,
de Spinosa."
U Esprit As
for
Sp. in Deutsc/iland, p. 292.
The combination had
been printed in
SPINOZA
364
this last-mentioned production,
Spinoza, nor yet
is
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
:
it
it
has nothing whatever to do with
a translation of the Latin
book
De
tribus
which the true date and origin have long been a standing puzzle of bibliographers. For us the only interest of it is that the circumstances show Spinoza's name to have become a sort of catch- word for anti-theological as well as theological polemics, and with about equal ignorance on both sides of what his philosophy impostorihus^ of
really was.
would be difficult to say to what extent Spinoza may have been read in a more judicial spirit by people who kept themselves clear of polemics altogether. Montesquieu, having ventured to treat historical and political problems in a scientific manner, was accused as a matter of course of Spinozism. He had no difficulty in showing that the charge was absurd. ^ There is pretty strong internal evidence, however, that Montesquieu had read the Opera Posthuma ; not in his great work indeed, but in the Lettres It
Persanes^ a place at
first
sight less
Letter the following sentence occurs triangles faisoient
les
This appears
un
dieu,
:
"
lui
ils
In the fifty-ninth
likely.
On
a dit fort bien que,
donneroient
trois
to be an unmistakable allusion to a passage
cotes."
we have
already quoted in a former chapter from Spinoza's letters.^
the rest, the Lettres Persanes are
much
To
less
si
For
guarded in other respects
what they entitle us to conclude as to Montesquieu's real opinions would take us too far. While Voltaire and the Encyclopaedists were still at the head of European thought, and happy in the conviction that Spinoza might be left alone as an enthusiast who had the personal merit of than the
Esprit des Lois.
discuss
being a virtuous heretic and odious to orthodox authorities, but
was philosophically quite hopeless, the movement had begun
Germany,
as yet
in
unobserved, which was to restore him to his true
1^ 17 19, but was shortly afterwards called
The MSS. There
is
are in neat
another in the British
various libraries.
in.
See
Van
French handwriting of the
I possess
Museum, and
der Linde, Bibliogr. Nos. 99-104.
first
probably
half of the eighteenth century.
many
other unexamined ones in
an example, apparently of French execution, by the kindness
my friend Mr. A. J. Butler, whose praise is otherwise known among Dante scholars. The handwriting and contemporary binding are of the beginning of the eighteenth or end of the seventeenth century. And see Ed. Bbhmer, Spinozana, i860, pp. 156 sqq. of
^
Defense de
I'
Esprit des Lois, ad
init.
"
P. 61, above.
SPINOZA
365
modern Spinozism, must be Lessing's conversation with Jacobi in 1780. But many If a date
place. it
AND MODERN THOUGHT
is
to be fixed for the birth of
years before that time Lessing had been in correspondence with
Moses Mendelssohn about Spinoza, and, what
is
of more import-
ance, had thoroughly assimilated Spinoza's ideas and used
own
them
in
he had written thus of Mendelssohn, then quite a young man, to another friend " His sincerity and
his
work.
Still earlier
:
mind make me look on him as one that second Spinoza. To make him altogether like the
philosophic turn of
will
be a
first
nothing but
his errors will be
wanting."
^
It
is
clear that
Lessing
had carefully studied Spinoza, and understood him better than many later philosophers and critics it is also clear that Lessing never fully accepted Spinoza's point of view as applicable to the Not only do theory of human nature and the conduct of life. the words just quoted show this, but it appears from Lessing's ;
statement and
indications
of
his
own
There were
philosophical
opinions,
on which he came But his intellectual sympathies were all with nearer to Leibnitz. Spinoza, both as against the common orthodox denunciation and as against the half-intelligent criticism of the free-thinking French A man thus disposed, and standing at the head of German school. literature, if indeed he may not be called the founder of modern
unsystematic as they
are.
points
was eminently fitted to render to Spinoza's It was not the justice that had been so long delayed. That was done, it is true, by openly preaching Spinoza's merits. left by Lessing to the coming generation who had learnt from him and he taught them much better than he would have done
German memory
culture,
;
by direct preaching.
It
is
but one example,
if I
mistake not, of
the characteristic method of his work. After Lessing's death a discussion arose between Jacobi and
Moses Mendelssohn as to what Lessing's opinions had been. Mendelssohn was preparing a memoir of Lessing, and Jacobi communicated to him, as a matter of interest he might perhaps not know, that Lessing had been a Spinozist. Mendelssohn deCp. Letters to J. D. Michaelis, Oct. i6, 1754 j to Mendelssohn, April 17, 1763. des Spinoza^ Frankfurt-am-Main, %ur Philosofhie Stellung Lessing's Dr. Karl Rehorn, G. E. 1
1877
J
J.
Sime, Lessing, vol.
ii.
p.
296,
etc.
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; SPINOZA
366
HIS LIFE
:
AND PHILOSOPHY
clined to accept the statement, and there ensued a correspondence,
long,
now
and
desultory,
The
ended in a personal controversy. interesting
is
He
Spinoza.
to
part of
it
which
follow,
which
is
still
account of his talk with Lessing about
Jacobi's
wrote
tedious
sufficiently
it
down
for
Mendelssohn, apparently from
memory, three years after it took place but the impression it had made was obviously deep, and his report may be taken as in substance correct. It was on the 5th of July, 1780, that Jacobi :
paid a long desired visit to
many
Lessing
they talked
:
much and
of
morning they fell into more talk over Goethe's Prometheus^ which Jacobi had with him, and Lessing saw for the first time. "You have shocked so many people," said Jacobi as he gave it him to read, " that you may as well be shocked things, and the next
once yourself." " Not at all," replied Lessing after reading " I know all that at first hand." Let us interpose a the lines warning before we follow up the dialogue as given in dramatic for
:
form by Jacobi. Judicious readers have before now observed that Lessing seems to have had a mind to disport himself with Jacobi, to put things paradoxically, to shock him a little, and never to let him fully see if he were serious or not. Jacobi, however, took it seriously
all
Jacobi. Lessing.
You know I
is
my
me
;
poem ? the poem
before, but I like
its
way, or
would not have shown
is
I
The
not what I mean.
:
it.
it
you.
point of view of that
poem
orthodox conceptions of Deity will do no longer for
cannot stomach them
I
my
is
The
own.
Such to
That
conversation proceeds thus
the
never read
Jacobi. So do I in Lessing.
The
and solemnly.
the drift of
this
;
poem
eV kol irav
too
;
and
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
I
I
know no more
than that.
am
free to confess
it is
much
mind.
Jacobi. Lessing.
Jacobi.
Why, that makes you pretty much in accord with Spinoza. If I am to call myself after any master, I know of no other. but 'tis a sorry kind of Spinoza is good enough for me :
salvation one can find in his Lessing.
Well, so be
it.
name. But, after
all,
do you
know
of any better?
Before Jacobi had time to recover from his astonishment, they
were interrupted.
Lessing renewed the conversation the next
MODERN THOUGHT
SPINOZA AND
367
Jacobi explained that he had rather hoped to get some
morning.
help against Spinoza from Lessing.
Then
Lessing.
know him
Jacobi, I think I
Then
Lessing.
him
friends with
know him.
seems you
it
there
very few can have done.
you you had better make There is no other philosophy than
no help
is
good and
for
as
all.
for
:
the philosophy of Spinoza.
Jacobi
is
then drawn into a pretty
full
putting in a stimulating question every
exposition, Lessing only
now and
At one
then.
point Lessing suggests that the eminently respectable Leibnitz
was
"
in truth a Spinozist.
"Do you doubt
Jacobi.
it
Do
you mean
seriously
?
it
seriously
" answers Lessing.
Jacobi comes back to the suggestion and develops
?
" cries
Presently it
at
some
length. I shall leave
Lessing, parallel a
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
to
dead dog
you no peace
you come out with that
think that people go on talking of Spinoza
as if
he were
!
same afterwards. To grasp Spinoza too long and too stubborn for them. And no
They would do
Jacobi.
till
requires a mental effort
one has grasped him
just the
whom
to
a single line in the Ethics has
remained
obscure.
Notwithstanding this brave saying, Lessing appears to have had his doubts whether Jacobi really understood Spinoza, and
modern at
his
critics
own
have certainly not taken his mastery of the Ethics
The
valuation.
long-winded observations
is
general purport of Jacobi's rather
that Spinoza's philosophy
is
logically
unanswerable but morally unacceptable ; Spinozism, he says, is For practical purposes he takes refuge in an act of faith, atheism. salto mortale as
he
calls
it
in the conversation
with a certain irony declined adventures ; being unable, he heavy head
The could
for
strife
not
doctrines.
fail
In
such a
at his said,
with Lessing,
who
age to follow in any such to
trust
his
old
limbs and
leap.
of Jacobi and Mendelssohn over Lessing's body to fact
concentrate
attention
on Spinoza and
almost every one of note in the
his
German world
368
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
of letters was more or
less
drawn
AND PHILOSOPHY into
Goethe,
it.
who was
then
on intimate terms with Jacobi, stood aside not without difficulty. Some notion of the effect that was produced is given by Herder's preface to the second edition of his dialogues on Spinoza's system, published in 1800. It is there said that the edition might have been ready several years earlier, but was delayed for various reasons. In particular, Spinoza had become so popular (being taken up by some even with extravagance) that an unpretending attempt to remove the common misapprehensions about him seemed to have lost its point. Since 1787,
when
dialogues were
these
first
printed,
much had The name
Germany. mentioned with a shudder of abhorrence, had since then risen so high with some persons that they could never name it except for the disparagement of Leibnitz and other excellent
been changed
in the philosophical outlook of
of Spinoza, which used
to be
authors.
We
may
take
it,
then, that
some ten
Lessing's death the tone of educated to Spinoza
or
twelve years after
German
society with regard
had undergone a complete change.
Herder's dialogues
themselves give a version of Spinoza's doctrine, or rather of what
might have been, which may be described as a sort of idealized Their general aim is curiously like that of some naturalism. writers of our own day who, accepting the theory of evolution as estabHshed by science, but not content with its purely scientific it
aspect, have endeavoured to
make
it
the vehicle of
new and
refined
forms of teleology. Some of Herder's points and phrases might The general tendency of his reading still be found suggestive.^ of Spinoza is thus opposed to Jacobi's, and not unlike that which has on
the whole prevailed
among
later
undercurrent of anti-Kantian polemic
is
German
traceable in
critics.
An
many
parts
of the dialogues. 1
For example, he meets the objection that Spinoza does not account
dividuality of things by saying that
strong point in his system.
The
when Spinoza
is
rightly understood this
principium indi'viduationis
is
identified
for is
with
capable of degrees which depend on the degree of organization attained.
the in-
a specially life,
and
is
"Je mehr Leben und Wirklichkeit, d. i. je eine verstandigere, machtigere, voUkommnere Energie ein Wesen zur Erhaltung eines Ganzen hat, das es sich angehorig fiihlt, dem es sich innig und ganz mittheilet, desto mehr ist es Individuum, Selbst,"
— SPINOZA AND MODERN Kant himself was
THOUGHT
369
unaffected by the rising influence of Spinoza.
Either he never considered Spinoza seriously, or he came to the consideration of him too late. What mention there is of Spinoza in Kant's philosophical writings is but slight and occasional. In
one place he
is
criticized
on the one point of
The
lucidly or adequately.^
reader of
final causes,
Kant may
but not
indeed find here
and there curious approximations to Spinoza's lines of thought. One such has been pointed out in a former chapter. But these are on the face of them accidental ; they are such that if Spinoza's corresponding work had been present to Kant's mind the resemblance must have been that
Kant's
less
or more.
way of approaching
It
hardly needful to add
is
the problems of philosophy
is
from Spinoza's. Only the generation succeeding Kant felt the full power of the revived Spinozism in philosophy for the time its work was more in the semi-philosophical regions Lessing's mantle fell in a great measure of literature and poetry. and for Goethe, as for Lessing, Spinoza was a upon Goethe By Goethe even more richly and living and eloquent guide. variously than by Lessing the ideas put forth by Spinoza were refashioned in less technical forms, endowed with new life, and Goethe too, like spread abroad among the educated public. altogether in speculative agreement with Lessing, was not The direct, Spinoza, but nevertheless assimilated and used him.
entirely different
;
;
one may indeed say
decisive, influence of
own word Goethe himself. He
for
it is
his
—
is
Spinoza on his mind
no matter of conjecture
:
had long sought unsatisfied
it
is
for
told
by
guidance
and sustenance at last he came on the Ethics of Spinoza, and there found something he could repose in. ;
What
the book
may have
given to me, or what I
may have put
into
own, it is impossible for me to say enough that I found a wide and free prospect over here that which stilled the emotions But what the physical and moral world disclosed itself before me. chiefly drew me to Spinoza was the boundless unselfishness that shone That marvellous saying *' Whoso truly loves forth in every sentence. expect God to love him in return," with all the proGod must not
it
of
my
:
:
:
^
Kritik der Urtheihkraft, § 73.
2 B
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; SPINOZA
370
HIS LIFE
:
positions that support
the burden of
of
all
my
my
all
is
you
that to
thoughts.
my ?
was everything, most
the consequences that flow from
all
and friendship, was
in love
exercise, so that
what
it,
AND PHILOSOPHY
To be unselfish in my highest pleasure, my
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;was
truly felt by
matical
striving
me when
I
life,
The
endeavour in
method was the complement of
wrote
I
it.
must
the truth that the
as in others
closest unions are the result of contrast.
my
rule of
foolhardy saying of a later time. If I love you,
not forget to acknowledge in this case
stood out against
it,
serene level of Spinoza
all
directions
my poetical way
;
his
mathe-
of observation
and description, and his formal treatment, which some could not think appropriate to moral subjects, was just what made me learn from him with eagerness and admire him without reserve.
In another passage, tells
how
quoted but not
less
remarkable, Goethe
the sight of an old attack on Spinoza
been Kortholt's /nA\^
less
De
(it
tribus impostoribus magnis) led
seems to have
him
to take
up
Opera Posthuma again, after a long interval. He well remembered the effect of the first reading, and this time again he seemed to attain an extraordinary clearness of intellectual He goes on to say what was the lesson he found in vision.^ The whole of our education and experience bids us to Spinoza. " Dass wir entsagen sollen." The problem renounce and resign
the
:
of man's
life
is
to reconcile himself to this.
the superficial
way of
One
the many, to proclaim that
But the path of wisdom, sought only by
vanity.
ready
all
way
is
things are
a few,
is
to cut
short the pains of resignation in detail by a resignation once for
mind on
which is eternal, necessary, and uniform, and possess ideas which remain undisturbed by the contemplation of a transitory world. This was the secret of
all
;
to rest one's
Spinoza
for
Goethe.
letter of his
one
man
Not
that
that he ever assented in detail to the
He knew
doctrine.
to enter into another's
how difficult it is for thoughts, how easy misunder-
too well
standings are, even to flatter himself that he thoroughly under-
For some time he meant to introduce a visit to Spinoza into his unfinished poem on the Wandering Jew. The over, but thought never much written. was scene stood Spinoza.
1
die
" Ich ergab
Welt niemals
The
mich
dieser
Lektiire und glaubte, indem ich in
so deutlich erblickt zu haben."
passage above translated
is
Aus meinem
towards the end of book xiv.
mich
selbst schaute,
Lcben, book xvi.
ad
init.
SPINOZA AND MODERN
THOUGHT
371
Against Jacobi's reading of the Ethics Goethe protested in emphatic language. own way of looking at nature," he wrote, " is not Spinoza's ; but if I had to name the book that of all
"My
I T
know
agrees best with
my
view,
I
could only
name
hold more and more firmly to worshipping
God
and gladly leave to you and your
allies
called atheist,
which you
give, as
you needs must, the name of
the Ethics.
with
this so-
everything to
religion."
He
returned again and again to Spinoza for spiritual light and strength,
and the Ethics continued to be the companion of
his old age.
But, though Goethe's purpose of paying an express poetical
was not executed, the place filled by Spinoza in his thoughts makes itself known in his writings in manifold In dramatic and lyrical poetry, in romance and in proverbs, ways. in Faust and in epigrams, the same presence meets us. In fact Spinozism is so widely spread and pervading an element in tribute to Spinoza
Goethe's works, that for that very reason
it
is
useless
to
give
one would be launched The series of poems entitled into a commentary on Goethe. Gott und Welt may be referred to as showing Goethe's speculative
specific instances
:
if
one were
to begin,
tendencies in a concentrated form.
It
was Lessing and Goethe
more than the philosophers by profession who secured the place The of Spinoza in modern German thought and literature. v/ork of tracing his influence and recognition down to the present time would need a monograph to itself. Novalis, Schleiermacher, and Heine may be mentioned as leading names among those who from divers quarters and on divers occasions have celebrated Heine in particular has given to Spinoza Spinoza's memory. More lately, a thorough some of his most charming pages. philosophic study of Spinoza has, in one remarkable instance, been united with great powers of literary expression. the translator of Spinoza's works, also stands in the
German
novelists.
One book
Auerbach, first
rank of
[Spinoza^ ein Denkerleben) he gave
expressly to a story of Spinoza's early Hfe, in which the outlines
of fact then available were filled in by a skilled and sympathetic For those who can read German,^ but fear to attack hand. 1
The book
i%
now
accessible in English.
course, give the results of later research.
It
was written long
ago, and does not, of
/ ''-
SPINOZA
372
technical works
Spinozism
;
AND PHILOSOPHY
on philosophy, there can be no better introduction
More
to Spinoza.
HIS LIFE
:
and
than
Auerbach's other work
this,
one of
at least
his
is
of
full
books carries on the face of
it
the purpose of showing the value of Spinoza's philosophy as a
working view of
hfe.
In philosophy Spinozism, to which Kant remained a stranger,
was largely taken up by his successors. Fichte's teaching is widely different from Spinoza's in its method and conclusions, but it is evident that he had studied Spinoza and felt his power.
Some of Fichte's metaphysical the
appearance of being
We
alteration.
taken
from Spinoza with
but
all
little
him also a short criticism on Spinoza's Hegel and Schelling were more explicit.
find in
theory of Substance.^
They
interpretations of theology have
both spoke of Spinoza with high admiration.
To
be a
must first be a Spinozist if you have not Spinozism you have no philosophy at all such were Hegel's repeated sayings. To the same effect Schelling said that no one can attain true and full knowledge in philosophy who has not at least once plunged into the depth of Spinozism. But when Schelling and Hegel had occasion, in expounding their own systems, to show how much they had improved on Spinoza, they not only became critical, but their criticism was hardly respectful. Hegel even allowed himself a bad pun on the manner of Spinoza's death.^ Their chief objection to Spinoza's philosophy, so far as it can be made briefly inteUigible, is that his system of the world philosopher you
;
:
is lifeless,
rigid, motionless.
statue before ^
Schelling compares
had been breathed into
life
it.
it
to Pygmalion's
Nevertheless
it
admitted that Spinoza was the founder of modern philosophy
and
this
has been confirmed
criticism ever since. 1
Werke^
i.
121,
ed.
The
1845.
by the general voice of
is ;
German
continuance of philosophical interest
For resemblances
see
especially
Religiondchre^
lote
Vorlesung. ^
"Abgrund der Substanz ... in dem AUes nur dahin schwindet, alles Leben in verkommt Spinoza ist selbst an der Schwindsucht gestorben." Hegel's
sich selbst
j
and Schelling's criticisms are collected and discussed
und Lekre, Aarau, 1850.
I
now
incline to
think that
in C.
von
much
of the Hegelian criticism
Orelli's Spinoza's
valid as against the formerly current interpretation of Spinoza, but not as against
Spinoza really said or can be proved to have thought.
Leben is
what
SPINOZA AND MODERN THOUGHT among
Spinoza
in
shown by
sufficiently
given
specially
these
German
This
first, it
an optimist
would seem,
whole
is
Yet Spinoza
to be called
any opinion
pleasure in
the world.
for
to
the
anywhere commit of pain and
balance
actual
He
materialist,
among
makes an end of Spinoza in three or criticism, calls him an unconscious
gross insult
on Spinoza's
way
other names, and goes out of his
teleological or nothing,
is
to cast a
Schopenhauer's philosophy, being
race.^
of course radically incompatible with
why
but that was no reason
decent civility of a
with him
possible (for these
Schopenhauer does not trouble himself
dashing
of
and necessarily
essentially
is
neither maintains that the universe as a
as
with these distinctions.
;
and the more
Schopenhauer could not abide being a Jew, and next for being
good or the best
himself to
Spinoza's
con-
the charge of optimism being established by the
;
pages
is
when
Spinoza with
are purely relative conceptions), nor does he
four
popular
indeed,
regards
simple assertion that " pantheism
optimism."
time
the school of Pessimism, founded
of Hartmann.
methodical system
this
which has been
extravagances of Schopenhauer
brilliant
Spinoza,
is
to
discussion
school,
published,
first
siderably less favour.
on the
One
him.
to
were
pages
amount of
the
down
thinkers
373
man at least much more
he should not speak with
good
as
as
himself.
Hartmann
soberly, neither vituperates nor with Spinoza misrepresents him, and sometimes quotes him with approval.
deals
But Spinoza's general habit of mind to
dogmatic pessimism
as to
no doubt as entirely opposed dogmatic optimism and those who is
;
find their philosophic satisfaction in pessimism cannot be expected
have
to
much sympathy
estrangement, whatever
for
its
him.
On
amount may
the other be,
hand,
this
seems likely to be
compensated or more than compensated by increased appreciation Miiller's testimony as to his of Spinoza from the scientific side.
Even more account of the passions has already been quoted. important is the striking likeness between Spinoza's results and those ^
reached in our time by workers who, like
Die Philosophie der Neueren^
ed. Frauenstadt).
care to repeat,
is
The almost on
p,
78.
in
Fragmente
"zur
Wundt
Gesch. der Philosophic (vol. v. of
incredible piece of bad taste referred
to,
which
I
and Works do not
X
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
374
AND PHILOSOPHY
Haeckel in Germany, and Taine in France, have come to the psychological questions through physiology, or taken equivalent precaution of informing their philosophic judgment with competent physiological
instruction.
affirmed, I think, that Spinoza tends
the philosopher of
men
The German V
It
may
more and more
be to
safely
become
of science.
restoration
of
Spinoza
w^as
w^hen
new^
yet
Coleridge, foremost in transplanting hither the fruits of the great
began to speak and write of him in England. The immediate effect, it is true, was nothing conspicuous ; nevertheless the present appreciation of Spinoza in
revival of
German
culture,
country must be ascribed to Coleridge more than to any
this
other one man.
but (in this
For the bulk of readers he spoke in parables j resembling Lessing) he did something even better
than teaching the public
His written
he taught their teachers.
;
and spoken words were treasured by a select circle of those who formed the literature and literary habits of the next generation.
At one time he
know from the
first
talked
much
a droll anecdote told
fever of the great
as
we
was
in
of Spinoza with Wordsworth,
by Coleridge himself.
It
war with France, when the minds of
were haunted by red spectres of Jacobin clubs and Coleridge and Wordsworth were staying corresponding societies. peaceably enough in Somersetshire, with no manner of treason in But at that time whoever was not a Tory was their thoughts. held little better than a Jacobin, and they fell under suspicion.
loyal subjects
The
rest shall
The a soil
in
be told in Coleridge's
own
words.
dark guesses of some zealous Quidnunc met with so congenial the grave alarm of a titled Dogberry of our neighbourhood,
that a spy was actually sent
down from
the government pour surveillance
There must have been not only abundance but
of myself and friend.
for variety of these "honourable men" at the disposal of Ministers After three weeks' truly Indian this proved a very honest fellow. perseverance in tracking us (for we were commonly together) during ;
all
which time seldom were we out of doors but he contrived
within hearing (and
all
could such a suspicion
the while
utterly unsuspected
;
how
to
be
indeed
enter our fancies?) he not only rejected Sir
Dogberry's request that he would try yet
a little longer,
but declared
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; AND MODERN THOUGHT
SPINOZA to
him
his belief that
He
dominions.
behind
my
both
he could discover
for aught
bank
a
friend and myself were as good subjects,
any in
to the contrary, as
had repeatedly hid himself, he
his
said, for
His Majesty's hours together
the sea-side (our favourite seat) and overheard our
at
At
conversation.
375
he fancied that we were aware of our danger ; of one Spy Nozy, which he was inclined to interpret of himself, and of a remarkable feature belonging to him ; but he was speedily convinced that it was the name of a man who had for
first
me
he often heard
made
a
talk
book and lived long
What
is
to be gathered
made by him
pencil note
works runs
thought
Coleridge
philosopher
ago.^
as follows
I believe in
my
in
with his
letters
importance
Spinoza's
depth of being that the three great works since the as
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; Bacon's
Novutn Orgajium^ and
they are commentaries on
and other pieces,
it
;
his
Spinoza's Ethics^
they are comments on his
as far as
;
At
a
from various scattered notices. A a copy of SchelHng's philosophical
and Kant's Critique of the Pure Reason, and commentaries on and applications of the same.^ Ethics
as
:
introduction of Christianity are
other works, so far
of
his other
works
as
the same time Coleridge was neither a Spinozist nor a
Kantian.
His
position as
regards
Spinoza was not altogether
unlike Jacobi's, though he would never have expressed himself so
crudely
as
Jacobi did on the consequences of the system.
he admired Spinoza both fully accept his
way of
intellectually
thinking.
While
and morally, he could not
Even
at a
time
when he was
" For a very but convinced by Spinoza, he was not satisfied. long time, indeed," he writes, " I could not reconcile personality
all
with infinity ; and my head was with Spinoza, though my whole Crabb Robinson tells in heart remained with Paul and John."^ his Diary * of an interview with Coleridge at which he spoke of the Ethics as a book that was a gospel to him, explaining at the
same time that he nevertheless thought Spinoza's philosophy false. " Spinoza's system has been demonstrated to be false, but only by that philosophy which has demonstrated the falsehood of all other 1
Biographia Literaria, ch.
3
lb. ch. X.
x.
note 17 to ch.
^
lb.
*
Vol.
i.
p.
ix, ed.
208, 3rd ed.
1847.
AND PHILOSOPHY
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
376
Did philosophy commence with an it is instead of an / am^ Spinoza would be altogether true." But somehow this particular utterance of Coleridge's (which would be more memorable if Coleridge had ever made a system of his own) does not seem philosophies.
quite so genuine as the others.
It
is
difficult to
think the
little
scene reported by Crabb Robinson altogether free from affectation.
There
a touch of deliberate display in Coleridge's kissing the
is
frontispiece of the
The
occasion was his
Had
Opera Posthuma ; it is almost theatrical. borrowing the book of Crabb Robinson.
he then no copy of his own ? However, there can be no doubt that Coleridge's feeling about Spinoza was in itself deep and constant. may be sure that
We
when
he spoke of him to Wordsworth,
And
eloquence.
this,
English literature,
is
when we
was with earnestness and
it
consider Wordsworth's position in
a matter not
without importance.
It
seems
not too fanciful to suppose that Coleridge's expositions of Spinoza
may have counted for something in the speculative strain that runs through so much of Wordsworth's works, and thence, at one more remove,
in the study
now
cultivated persons
and reverence of nature which most
accept as a matter of course, but which
Wordsworth's time was new, and
in
appeared
The
ridiculous.
artistic
his critics
nature-worship,
in the English art
supposed
Spinozist.
that
The
systematically Spinoza's, parallels
in
saying
in
views
of
expressed
though detail
it ;
^
and poetry of this
we
this century.
claim
one
source, in
or another, of nearly everything that has had real
power be
impulse of
few of
Wordsworth, has been the
derived mainly from
way
to not a
and
life
Let
Wordsworth
it
not
as
a
man and the world more or less him are wholly different from
by
would not be difficult to find apparent and on the other hand there are only the
slightest hints in Spinoza himself of the possible artistic bearings
But here we are considering not opinions or propositions which can be followed or discarded, nor even an intellectual habit, but an aesthetic temper which may be induced of Spinozism.
imaginative minds
in 1
Compare,
by contact with forms and systems of
for instance, Spinoza's
with Wordsworth's Lines
ivrittcn in
"omnia,
diversis
Early Spring.
tamen
gradibus, animata sunt,"
SPINOZA AND MODERN
THOUGHT
377
thought aiming in the first instance at quite other ends. This kind of influence is consistent with indifference or even opposition
And, whatever may be thought of the influence
in other regions.
on Wordsworth of Coleridge's modified Spinozism, it is certain that Coleridge and Wordsworth, above all others, so transformed the intellectual atmosphere of England as to make it possible that Spinoza should in due time be studied with care and intelligence even by those who did not go with him in his conclusions. Sir
Humphry Davy came
sufficiently
write a copy of verses entitled
On
under Coleridge's influence to Spinosism^
though there
no
is
obvious reference to Spinoza.^
Another foremost poet of
that time
is
now known
to have
been an eager student of the Tractatus Theolog'ico-P oliticus^ if not of the metaphysical part of Spinoza's work. A quotation from the Tractatus appears in the notes to the original edition of Shelley's
and he began an English translation of it. A fragment of the MS. came by some means into the hands of Mr. C. S. Middleton, the author of a book on Shelley and his Writings (London, 1858). Mr. Middleton took this for an original work of Shelley's, one of the "school-boy speculations alluded to by Medwin," and considered it " too crude for publication entire " ^
^een Mah^
!
In the winter of
1
821-2 Shelley was
at
work on
and obtained a promise from Byron to write a
way of
preface to
The
it.^
this translation,
life
of Spinoza by
Tractatus Theologico-Politicus translated
by Shelley and introduced by Byron would have been
But the
addition to the philosophizing of poets.
cut short by Shelley's death
some way ^
See Paris's Life of Davy,
^
The
true source
i.
i.
126
plan was soon
and though he seems to have made
;
none of
in the translation,
Coleridge's letters in vol.
a striking
5
it
has been found, save the
Carlyon, Early Tears,
etc.
(1856),
i.
236, and
of Davy's works.
of the fragment
was pointed out by Mr.
Middleton, in acknowledging the correction, suggested
that
J.
Oxenford.
Shelley had
used,
Spinoza's Latin, but a French version {Athenaum, Jan.-June, 1858, pp. 211-243).
Shelley cites the Latin in his notes to ^ueen nearer to the Latin than to the old
Mab
,â&#x20AC;˘
and
I
Mr. not -^"t
find his English distinctly
French translation of 1678, the only one then
in
existence. 2
The
authority for this
Lerici in 1821-2
:
is
R. Garnett
a
diary kept
in Furtn,
Rev.
by Shelley's friend Williams at Pisa and xxiii.
N.
S. p.
858.
SPINOZA
378
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
:
fragment above mentioned (perhaps a rough probably
which he had
draft),
with other papers in England.
left
Nearly half a century passed from the time when Coleridge was overheard talking of the mysterious " Spy Nozy " before Spinoza
way by English philosophical criticism* Among the first to draw attention to him were two men of extremely different habits of thought, F. D. Maurice and G. H» was taken up
in a serious
They
approached Spinoza from their diverse points of view, the one holding a transcendental philosophy which almost merged in theology, the other thinking (at least when he first
Lewes.
wrote of Spinoza) that philosophy was impossible. They naturally criticized Spinoza's system on widely different grounds ; but they nevertheless agreed in something really more important, for they vied with one another in appreciating his moral and intellectual
Lewes's work on
grandeur.
and, though
owe
to
it
it
is
now
ranges over a long time,
this subject
many English
out of date,
their first conception of Spinoza's worth,
determined
by
to
it
study
him
at
first
hand.
writers distinguished in other fields of literature,
must
readers
and have been
Two
EngHsh Mr. Matthew
Arnold and Mr. Froude, made brilliant contributions to the knowledge of Spinoza in this country. Matthew Arnold's essay on the Tractatus Theologico-P oliticus is open to one serious ground of complaint, that he did not write another on the Ethics. In France the study of Spinoza was taken up from Germany by the school of philosophical criticism of which Victor Cousin was the chief. The tendency of the school was hostile to Spinoza's philosophy and all ways of thinking allied to it, and remains so to this day so
Nothing effect
else
a revival
ancestry.
far as its
But
of French Cartesianism and was proud of if
Spinoza met with
philosophers of the official school
considered extinct
duction to
traditions have been kept up.
could be expected from a philosophy which was in
—he
Saisset's
—which,
met with
translation
little
Spinoza was handled by spirit
M.
as a school,
careful discussion.
of his works
adverse criticism of Spinoza with which
I
its
sympathy from French
am
is
may
be
The
now
intro-
about the best
acquainted.
Later
Paul Janet in the candid and impartial
of the scientific historian, and by
M. Renan with
delicate
SPINOZA AND insight and sympathy, and
disinterested
France,
in
as
and
earnestness
379
the eloquence of which he was an
Meanwhile philosophy
master.
unrivalled
more followed
MODERN THOUGHT
well as
with
a
more and
being
is
elsewhere,
a
in
faithfulness
to
spirit
of
scientific
method of which much may be expected in no distant future. In this movement there is yet another assurance that Spinoza will not
due from the best and most vigorous thought of modern France.
M.
receive
to
fail
Taine,
who
his
school, has given in his principal work,
sion of the relations of
accordance with the the coincidence
thesis,
complete, or
is
"
I refer especially
nature a deux faces," where
la
all
thoroughly in
but complete.^
Flaubert, at
letters abound in admiration of the Ethics mere man's and no schoolman's work.^
His
philosophers.
as a real
Turning our last
of Spinoza's doctrine.
is
a discus-
sight an unexpected votary, gave honour to Spinoza beyond
first all
spirit
scientific
De P Intelligence^
mind and matter which
development of the
to his
French
stood at the head of the
eyes again to Spinoza's
own
land,
generation or thereabouts a revival of interest
though
late
The way
in
was
its
led
we find in the in him which,
beginning, obtained considerable importance.
by Dr. van Vloten,
publication of _Spinoza's Essay of
to
whom
is
due the
God and Man^ and of
first
several
which had been withheld by the original Other scholars and critics followed editors of the Opera Posthuma. him with good effect, and the two-hundredth anniversary of Spinoza's death, which fell in 1877, S^^^ occasion for a sort of It was decided to invite subscripconcentration of their activity. letters
tions
and parts of
from
Spinoza
all
at the
letters
civilized
Hague,
countries in order to erect a statue of
in sight of the spot
where he passed the
This project could not be carried out in time for the anniversary itself, which was nevertheless fitly celebrated, M. Renan contributing a discourse of which something has already been said. At the same time Professor Land of Leyden latter years
of his
life.
on Spinoza's philosophy in the regular academic course, which was printed with illustrative and critical o-ave
a special
1
lecture
De V Intelligence^ 2
Part
I. Blc. 4, ch.
ii.,
and Part
Flaubert, Lettres a G. Sattd, Paris, 1884, pp.
II.
Bk.
no,
2, ch.
184,
etc.
i.
380 notes,
graphs
SPINOZA and in
this
we now
:
AND PHILOSOPHY
form constitutes one of the most valuable mono-
possess
on the
own
fared better in his before.
HIS LIFE
subject.
country of
Altogether, Spinoza has
late years
than he ever did
Neither was reaction wanting to prove the solidity of the
movement,
if
recrudescence
more proof were needed.
among orthodox
There was
journalists, critics,
of the old polemic against Spinoza.
Some
a pretty sharp
and theologians
of these criticisms were
able and dignified, but the greater part copied with
little
alteration
the violence and ignorance exhibited by their predecessors centuries earlier.
I
had the advantage of seeing a
set
two
of articles
from a certain Flemish ultramontane journal, which not only pronounced Spinoza a second-rate sophist, but would not allow M. Renan to be capable of writing French. His style was gravely described as " flasque et enerve." For any one tolerably acquainted with French prose this should have been more than enough. However, the plan formed by a committee of Dutch scholars to do honour to Spinoza in his dwelling-place met with no serious obstacle beyond a certain
worth noting
that,
amount of unavoidable
Out
were
competitors,
by
It
is
next to the Netherlands, Great Britain bore
the chief part in this work. furnished
delay.
several
of the designs for a statue which that
of
M.
Frederic
Hexamer, a young Parisian sculptor, was chosen by the Committee. On September 14, 1880, the monument, completed in bronze, was unveiled and handed over to the municipal authorities of the Hague.
Meanwhile, by a happy coincidence, the house in the Paviljoensgracht where Spinoza lodged had been identified beyond doubt, though the fabric has been rebuilt since his time. The spot is now marked by a tablet let into the wall, and inscribed with a A word must be said of M. Hexamer's work it short record. :
presents the philosopher
in a
sitting posture, his
head bending
down on one hand as if making a pause in his writing to think The figure, as befits the subject, is over some new question. by idealized features or any conventional pose, but The pedestal bears for simply by being natural and unaffected. Spinoza. This is as it should be, all inscription the one word dignified, not
:
for thus the beholder has
no particular
gloss
on Spinoza's teaching
SPINOZA AND
MODERN THOUGHT
381
upon him, and may rest undisturbed in that way of regarding Spinoza's worth which suits him best. Thus, too, it is made manifest, as was from the first the earnest desire of all concerned, that the homage paid to Spinoza is not that of any particular school or sect. There appeared as fellow-workers in this cause men whose general philosophical opinions, whose readings of Spinoza's doctrine, and whose estimate of its value as a finished system of thought, were widely difierent. The names of men
thrust
illustrious in philosophy
and
Germany, men otherwise
literature in
England, France, and
separated from one
another in their
occupations, pursuits, and beliefs, were inscribed side by side on the
roll
of supporters.
work
And
thus the nature and the power of
most fitly symbolized thus he would himself His aim was not to leave have desired to be commemorated. behind him disciples pledged to the letter of his teaching, but to lead men to think with him by teaching them to think freely and said at the beginning of this chapter rightly for themselves. Spinoza's
are
;
We
that Spinozism, as a living and constructive force,
is
not a system
And, as science makes it plainer every day but a habit of mind. that there is no such thing as a fixed equilibrium either in the world without or in the mind within, so it becomes plain that the genuine and durable triumphs of philosophy are not in systems but in
ideas.
greatness, and its
rank
Wealth by
among
in vital ideas
this test the
the greatest.
is
name
the real test of a philosopher's
of Spinoza stands assured of
We who have
thus far endeavoured,
however imperfectly, to follow the working of Spinoza's mind, and to explain his thoughts in the language of our own time, honour him even more for that which he suggested, seeing the far-off dawn of new truths as in a vision, than for that which his hands made perfect. Not even from those whom we most reverence can
we
of art
;
accept any system as it
is
an attempt to
final.
fix
an
A
speculative system
ideal,
and
in
is
a
work
the very act of
thought which marks it off with individual form the ideal is transformed and drawn up into a still unexplored region. Experience and science combine to warn us against putting our faith in symbols which should be but aids to thought. The word that lived on the master's Hps becomes a dead catchword in the mouth
382
SPINOZA
of scholars will
still
who
:
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
have learnt only half his lesson.
be in time to come that
when men
And
therefore
of impatient
it
mind cry
out for systems and formulas, demanding to possess the secret of all
wisdom once
for
all,
than was given long ago by the son of Sirach her not perfectly
-,
no
sea.,
:
The first
For her find her out. and her counsels profounder than the
more shall the
thoughts are more than the
great deep.
them man knew
there will be no better answer for
last
APPENDIX
THE
LIFE OF SPINOZA By COLERUS
The I
do
sale,
English version of Colerus
not
know
though
it
of any
is
earlier
is
an indifferently printed small octavo of 92 pages.
reprint
j
nor have
I
ever
met with
not described as scarce by English bibliographers.
a
copy for
In the present
reprint obvious errors and misprints in English words, such as absurd for absurd,
Jugd-
ment^ Preson, for Judgment^ Person, and the like, as well as obvious errors of the press in
punctuation, have
punctuation,
been
tacitly
corrected
5
have been preserved, even
etc.,
These things belong
but
all
genuine
peculiarities
of spelling,
to such blunders as essensually for essentially.
to the character of the time
no
less
than the
style of the writing
itself.
Another
little
book, entitled
(London, 1720, 8vo, translation, pp. 20-96.
pp.
Van
1-27,
An
Account of the Life and Writings of Spinoza,
der Linde Bibliogr. no. 105)
followed
by
an
is
a
servile
epitome of the Tractatus
abridgment of
etc.
this
Theologico-Politicus,
THE
LIFE OF
BENEDICT DE
S P
I
N O
Written by John
Cole7nts,
S A.
Minister
of the Lutheran Church, at the
Hague.
Done
out of French.
L O ND O N. Printed by D. L. at the
Raven
And
Sold by Benj. Bragg,
in Pater-Noster-Rozv,
2 c
1706.
THE
LIFE OF
D
J5.
OPINOS^,
S p in
e
that Philosopher,
s a.
whose name makes
the World, was originally a
yeza.
so great noise in
His parents,
a
little
while
named him Baruch. But having afterwards forsaken Judaism, he changed his Name, and call'd himself Benedict in his
after his
birth,
He
Writings, and in the Letters which he subscrib'd.
was Born at What is com-
Amsterdam the 24th of November^ in the Year 1632. monly said, that he was Poor and of a very mean Extraction, is not His Father, a Portuguese Jew, was in very good Circumstances, true. Merchant at Amsterdam, where he lived upon the Burgwal, in and a Besides, his civil a good House near the Old Portuguese Synagogue. and handsome behaviour, his Relations, who lived at ease, and what was left to him by his Father and Mother, prove that his Extraction, as
well as his Education, was above that
Samuel Carceris, Sisters.
a
Portuguese
The name
of the
of the
Common
Jew, married the Youngest of Eldest was
Rebeckah,
People. his
two
and that of the
Youngest Miriam, whose Son Daniel Carceris, Nephew to Benedict de As it Spinosa, declared himself one of his Heirs after his Decease :
appears by an Act past before Libertus Loef, a Notary, the 30th of March i(>jy-, in the form of a Procuration directed to Henry Vander Spyck, in
whose House
Spinosa
Lodged when he
died.
388
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
AND PHILOSOPHY
SpinosaV first Studies. Spinosa shewed from his Childhood, and in his younger years, that Nature had not been unkind to him. His quick fancy, and his ready and penetrating Wit were easily perceived. Because he had a great Mind to learn the Latin Tongue, they gave him at first a German Master. But afterwards in order to perfect himself in that Language,
he made use of the famous Francis Vanden Ende, who taught it then in That Man taught A?nsterda?n, and practis'd Physick at the same time :
with good
Success
and
a
great
Reputation
;
so
that
the
Richest
Merchants of that City intrusted him with the instruction of
their
Children, before they had found out that he taught his Scholars something else besides Latin. the
first
For
it
was discovered
Seeds of Atheism in the Minds of those
at last, that
Young
Boys.
he sowed
This
is
which I cou'd prove, if there was any necessity for it, by the Testimony of several honest Gentlemen, who are still living, and some of whom have been Elders of the Lutheran Church at Amsterdam. Those good men bless every day the Memory of their Parents, who took care in due time to remove them from the School of so pernicious and so impious a Master. Vanden Ende had an only Daughter, who understood the Latin Tongue, as well as Musick, so perfectly, that she was able to teach her a
matter of
fact,
Fathers Scholars in his absence.
Spinosa having often occasion to see
and speak to her, grew in Love with her, and he has often confest that he design'd
to
marry her.
She was none of the most Beautiful, but
she had a great deal of Wit, a great Capacity and a jovial
Humour,
which wrought upon the Heart of Spinosa, as well as upon another Scholar of Vanden Ende, whose name was Kerkering, a Native of Hamburgh. The latter did soon perceive that he had a Rival, and grew Jealous of him. This moved him to redouble his care, and his attendance upon his Mistress ; which he did with good success But a Neck-lace of Pearls, of the value of two or three hundred Pistoles,. which he had before presented to that Young Woman, did without She therefore promised to doubt contribute to win her Affection. Marry him Which she did faithfully perform, when the Sieur Kerkering had abjured the Lutheran Religion, which he profest, and See the preface of Kortholt de embraced the Roman Cathoiick. tribus Ifnpostoribus, of the 2nd Edition. As for Vanden Ende, being too well known in Holland, to find any :
:
APPENDIX
389
Employment there, he was obliged to look for it somewhere else. He went into France^ where he had a Tragical end, after he had maintained himself for some years with what he got by practising Physick. Some say that he was Condemn'd to be hanged, and Executed, for having attempted upon the Dauphin's Life but others, who knew him particularly in France^ own indeed that he was hanged, but they give another ;
reason for
it.
They
say,
that Vanden
Ende endeavour'd
to
cause an
Insurrection in one of the Provinces of France^ the Inhabitants where-
of hoped by that means to be restored to their Ancient Priviledges
;
and that he designed thereby to free the United Provinces from the oppression they were under, by giving so much work to the King of France in his own Country, as to oblige him to keep a great part of his Forces in that Kingdom. That in order to facilitate the Execution of that design, some Ships were fitted out, but that they arrived too late. However it be, Vanden Ende was executed, but if he had attempted upon the Dauphin' s Life, 'tis likely that he wou'd have expiated his crime in another manner, and by a more rigorous Punishment.
He
applies
Spinosa having
Himself to the Study of Divinity^ and then Natural Philosophy. learn'd the
Latin
Tongue
the Study of Divinity for some years.
Judgment encreased every day
:
So that
to
well, applied himself to
mean time his Wit and finding himself more disposed
In the
to enquire into Natural Causes, he gave over Divinity, and betook
himself altogether to the Study of Natural Philosophy.
He
did for a
long time deliberate about the choice he shou'd make of a Master,
whose Writing might serve him as a Guide in his design. At last, having light upon the Works of Descartes, he read them greedily and ;
afterwards he often declared that he had ledge from him.
Which
says.
He
his Philosophical
was charmed with that
That nothing ought
proved by good and
all
solid Reasons.
to
Maxim
be admitted as True, hut
Know-
of Descartes,
what has been
From whence he drew
this
Conse-
quence that the ridiculous Doctrine and Principles of the Rabbins cou'd not be admitted by a Man of Sense ; because they are only built upon the Authority of the Rabbins themselves, and because what they teach, does not proceed from God, as they pretend without any ground for it, and without the least appearance of Reason.
From
that time he began to be
very
much
reserved amongst the
SPINOZA
390
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
:
Jewish Doctors, whom he shunned as much as he cou'd He was seldom seen in their Synagogues, whither he went only perfunctorily, ;
which exasperated them against him
to the highest degree
did not doubt but that he wou'd soon leave them, and a Christian.
:
And
make himself
some learn'd Mennonites,
as
tho he had frequent conversa-
well as with the most eminent
Divines of other Christian Sects, yet he never declared
himself to be
for they
Yet, to speak the truth, he never embraced Christianity,
nor received the Holy Baptism tions with
;
a
Member
for,
nor profest
of any of them.
Francis Halma says, in the Account of Spinosa, which he published Dutch} that the Jews offered him a Pension a little while before his Desertion, to engage him to remain amongst 'em, and to appear now and then in their Synagogues. This Spinosa himself affirmed in
and to some which the Rabbins design'd to give him, amounted to looo Florins. But he protested at the same time, that if they had offered him ten times as much, he wou'd not several times to the Sieur Vander Spyck, his Landlord,
other Persons
;
adding, that the Pension,
have accepted of motive
;
it,
nor frequented their Assemblies out of such
a
because he was not a Hypocrite, and minded nothing but
Monsieur Bayle tells us. That he happen'd one day to be assaulted by a Jew, as he was coming out of the Playhouse, who wounded him in the Face with a Knife, and that Spinosa knew that But the Jew design'd to kill him, tho his wound was not dangerous. Spinosa s Landlord and his Wife, who are still living, give me quite They had it from Spinosa himself, who did another account of it. often tell them, that one Evening as he was coming out of the Old Portuguese Synagogue, he saw a Man by him with a Dagger in his Truth.
Hand
whereupon standing upon his guard, and going backwards, he avoided the blow, which reached no farther than his Cloaths. He kept still the Coat that was run thro' with the Dagger, as a Memorial ;
of that event.
Afterwards, not thinking himself to be safe
at Ajnster-
dam, he resolved to retire somewhere else with the first opportunity. Besides, he was desirous to go on with his Studies and Physical Meditations in a quiet Retreat.
He was He
had no sooner
left
cuted him Juridically ^
excommunicated by the Jews.
the
Communion
according to
of the Jews, but they prose-
their
[This was a translation from Bayle's Dictionary^
Ecclesiastical
as Colerus
Laws, and
himself afterwards says.]
APPENDIX
391
Excommunicated him. He himself did very often own that he was Excommunicated by them, and declared, that from that time he broke all Friendship and Correspondence with them. Some Jews o^ Amsterdam^
who knew
of that
fact,
me
Spinosa very well, have also confirmed to
adding, that
Sentence of Excommunication was
the
Man
publickly pronounced by the Old great Reputation amongst 'em.
I
Chacham Abuabh^
it
me
amongst
;
-x-
Rabbin of
they answered me,
the Papers of their Father, but I
cou'd easily perceive that they had no mind to impart
*
a
have desired in vain the Sons of that
old Rabbin to communicate that Sentence to that they could not find
the truth
-x-
it
to
me.^
-x-
-x-
Spinosa learns a Trade or a Mechanical Art,
The Law and
the antient Jewish Doctors do expressly say, that
not enough for a
man
to be learned, but that
he ought besides
it
is
to learn
Mechanical Art, that it may be a help to him in case of necessity, and that he may get wherewith to maintain himself. This Rabbin Gamaliel does positively say in the Treatise of the a Profession or a
Talmuel Pirke avoth Chap.
Law a
is
2.
a very desirable thing,
Mechanical Art
where he teaches,
when
that the study of the
attended with a Profession or
it is
For, says he, a continual application to those
:
Man from doing Evil, and Man who neglects to learn
exercises keeps a
makes him forget
every Learned
a
turn a loose
And Rabbi Jehuda
Man.
adds,
it
;
two and
Profession, will at last that every
Man, who
does not take care that his children shou'd learn a Trade, does the
how
become High-way-men. Spinosa being well versed in the Study of the Law, and of the Customs of the Ancients, was not ignorant of those Maxims, and did not forget them, tho he was separated from the Jews^ and excommusame thing
taught them
as if he
Because they are wise and reasonable Maxims he
nicated by them.
made
a
good use of 'em, and learned
embraced
a quiet
and
and succeeded
a retir'd Life,
make
learned therefore to uses,
to
a
as
Mechanical Art before he
He
he was resolv'd to do.
Glasses for Telescopes, and for some other
so well therein, that
People came to him from
all
Colerus proceeds to discuss the Jewish law and practice of exconimunication, and The shorter form actually used inserts a form communicated to him by Surenhusius. 1
in Spinoza's case, and first text, p. 17 above.
A
made known by Van Vloten, has
already been given in the
revised version of that set out by Colerus
Lewes's Eht. of Philosophy,
ii.
165 (3rd
ed.).
may
be seen in
G. H.
SPINOZA
392
buy them
Parts to live
HIS LIFE
:
which did
;
A
and maintain himself.
which he had
polished,
sold pretty dear, as
who was
it
AND PHILOSOPHY
him wherewith to considerable number of those Glasses, sufficiently afford
were found in his Cabinet after his death, and appears by the Register of the Publick Cryer,
present at the Sale of his Goods.
After he had perfected himself in that Art, he apply'd himself to
Drawing, which he learn'd of himself, and he cou'd draw a Head very well with Ink, or with a Coal. I have in my Hands a whole Book of such Draughts, amongst which there are some Heads of several considerable Persons, visit
who were known
Among those
him.
Draughts
I
very
is
Rebels of
me
much
'Naples^ as it
occasion to
find in the 4th Sheet a
having only his Shirt on, with a Net on Attitude
who had
to him, or
his
Fisherman
Right Shoulder, whose
like that of Massanello^ the
famous Head of the
appears by History, and by his Cuts.^
Mr
Which
whose House Spinosa lodged when he died, has assured me, that the Draught of that Fisherman did perfectly resemble Spinosa, and that he had certainly drawn himself. I need not mention the considerable Persons, whose Heads are likewise to be found in this Book, amongst his other
gives
occasion
to add,
that
Vander Spyck,
at
Draughts.
Thus he was able to maintain himself with the work of his Hands, and to mind his Study, as he design'd to do. So that having no occasion to stay longer in Amsterdam, he the House of one of his Acquaintance,
Amsterdam working to
to
When
his Glasses.
send for them, to
He
went
to live
at
years
;
left
all
from the Hague,
all
Fr. "
He
'^
il
to
him.
that place, and retired to Rynsburg near
as
he himself
says, in his
lived there, as I
distinguisht
comme
Money
the Winter, and then he went to Voorburg,
by
est represente
30th Letter written
am informed, many Friends
their Quality, or 1
2
upon the Road from time there in studying, and
they were polished, his Friends took care
during which time, he got a great
who were
and took Lodgings in
Rynsburg, afterwards at Voorburg, and at last at the Hague.
Ley den, where he spent to Peter Balling?
spent his
it,
lived
'em, and to remit his
sell
In the year 1664 Spinosa a league
He
Auzuerkerke.
left
who
three or four at the
Hague,
by Civil and Military
S\c.
dans I'Histoire et en Taille-douce."
Misprinted Railing in the English version.
APPENDIX They
Employments.
393
were' often in his Company, and took a great
him discourse. It was at their request that he Hague at last, where he boarded at first upon the Widow's whose Name was Van Velden, in the same
delight in hearing
himself
settl'd
at
Veerkaay, at a
House where
the
The Room wherein
I lodge at present.
I study, at the
further end of the House backward, two pair of Stairs, is the same where he lay, and where he did work and study. He wou'd very often have his Meat brought into that Room, where he kept sometimes two or three days, without seeing any Body. But being sensible that
he spent
a little too
much
Pamlioengracht, behind
Room upon the Mr. Henry Vander Spyck^s, whom
for his Boarding,
my
House,
at
he took
a
have often mention'd, where he took care to furnish himself with Meat and Drink, and where he lived a very retired Life, according to
I
his fancy.
He was It
is
scarce credible
how
very Sober^ and very Frugal. sober and frugal he was
the time.
all
Not
that he was reduced to so great a Poverty, as not to be able to spend
more,
him
if
he had been willing
their Purses,
and
all
very sober, and could be
;
manner of satisfied
People shou'd think that he had of other
may
Men.
What
he had Friends enough,
I say
assistance
with
little
lived,
;
:
who
offered
But he was naturally
and he did not care that
even but once,
at the
expence
about his Sobriety and good Husbandry,
be prov'd by several small Reckonings, which have been found
amongst
his Papers after his death.
by them, that he lived Milk-soop done with Butter, which amounted to It appears
whole day upon a Another three pence, and upon a Pot of Beer of three half pence. nothing but done and that he eat Gruel with Raisins and Butter, day Dish cost him fourpence half penny. There are but two half pints of Wine at most for one Month to be found amongst those Reckonings, and tho he was often invited to eat with his Friends, he chose rather to live upon what he had at home, tho it were never so little, than to sit down at a good Table at the expence of another Man. Thus he spent the remaining part of his Life in the House of his He last Landlord, which was somewhat above five years and a half. which he did, Quarter Accounts every was very careful to cast up his that he might spend neither more nor less than what he could spend a
;
every year. that he
was
And he would like the
say sometimes to the people of the House,
Serpent,
who
forms
a
Circle with his Tail in his
394
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
Mouth
;
AND PHILOSOPHY
he had nothing
to denote that
left
added, that he deslgn'd to lay up no more
him
necessary for
had
him nothing,
left
much by
get
have
to
decent Burying; and
a
so his Heirs
He
end.
than what would be that, as his Parents
and Relations should not expect
to
Death.
his
His Person^ and As
at the years
Money
his
way of Dressing
himself.
and the features of his Face, there are still many people at the Hague, who saw and knew him particularly. He was of a middle size, he had good features in his Face, the Skin somewhat black, black curl'd Hair, long Eye-brows, and of the same Colour, for his Person, his Size,
so that one might easily know by his Looks that he was descended from Portuguese Jews. As for his Cloaths, he was very careless of 'em, and they were not better than those of the meanest Citizen. One of the most eminent Councellors of State went to see him, and found him in a very slovenly Morning-Gown, whereupon the Coun-
blam'd him for
cellor
it,
and
him another.
oiFer'd
Spinosa answer'd
Man
was never the better for having a finer Gown. To which he added, It is unreasonable to wrap up things of little or no value
him, that a
in a precious Cover?-
His Manners^
and
his Conversation.^
his Uninterestedness.
way of living, his Conversation was also He knew admirably well how to be master of his
If he was very frugal in his
very sweet and easy.
He
was never seen very melancholy, nor very merry. had the command of his Anger, and if at any time he was uneasy in mind, it did not appear outwardly ; or if he happen'd to express Passions
:
by some
grief
^ fit
we
But
see the Treatise
are even
bound
whereby he might ill
men's
common
ii.
cap. 12,
feelings
to abridge our otherwise lawful
mere show and
costly apparel for
clad,
or
of God and Man, part
for us to take notice of
selfish pride
profit his neighbours,
is
:
as
offends
them
not."
We
where Spinoza says that
it
freedom if
a
:
thus
man
it is
wrong
sees that his
to
wear
wisdom,
despised and trodden under foot because he
may
is
and prejudices, and that sometimes
" but
then he does well to furnish himself (from
such clothing
his
his
by some words, he never fail'd to retire He was besides, of doing an unbecoming thing.
gestures,
immediately, for fear
He
desire to help his neighbours)
therefore believe Lucas
when he
is
with
tells
us
that Spinoza, so far from being habitually careless of his appearance, was scrupulously
neat
:
"
il
ne sortoit jamais qu'on ne
un honnete
Homme
d'un Pedant."
vit paroitre
en
ses habits ce qui distingue d'ordinaire
APPENDIX
395
very courteous and obliging, he would very often discourse with his
Landlady, especially when she lay in, and with the people of the House, they happen'd to be sick or afflicted ; he never fail'd then to confort^ 'em, and exhort them to bear with Patience those Evils,
when
which God assigned
them as a Lot. He put the Children in mind of going often to Church, and taught them to be obedient and dutiful to their Parents. When the people of the House came from Church, he wou'd often ask them what they had learn'd, and what they cou'd remember of the Sermon. He had a great esteem for Dr. Cordes, my Predecessor who was a learned and good natured Man, and of an exemplary Life, which gave occasion to Spinosa to praise him very often. Nay, he went sometimes to hear him preach, and he esteem'd particuto
;
larly his learned
way of
he made of
tions
explaining the Scripture, and the solid applica-
He
it.
advised at the same time his Landlord and
the People of the House, not to miss any
Sermon of
so excellent a
Preacher. It
happen'd one day,
that
his
Landlady
ask'd
him whether he
believed, she cou'd be saved in the Religion she profest
Tour Religion that you
you
a good
is
may he saved
live at the
When
in
one,
you need not
answered.
for another, nor doubt to
Piety,
same time a peaceable and quiet Life.
he staid to
He
provided, zvhilst you apply your self
it,
at
home, he was troublesome
the greatest part of his time quietly In his
happen'd
look
:
to
no Body
;
he spent
own Chamber. When he much to his Philo-
be tired by having applyed himself too
went down Stairs to refresh himself, and discoursed with the people of the House about any thing, that might He afford Matter for an ordinary Conversation, and even about trifles. or, when he had of Tobacco a Pipe in smoaking a Pleasure ; also took mind to divert himself somewhat longer, he look'd for some Spiders, and made 'em fight together, or he threw some Flies into the Cobweb, and was so well pleased with that Battel, that he wou'd sometimes sophical Meditations, he
break
into
Laughter.
He
observed
also,
with
a
Microscope,
the
of the smallest Insects, from whence he drew such Consequences as seem'd to him to agree best with his Discoveries. He was no lover of Money, as I have said, and he was very well
different parts
contented to
who his
live
from
Hand
to
Mouth,
^imon de Fries o^ Jmsterda?n,
expresses a great love for him, in the 26th Letter, and calls
most
faithful Friend, 1
8ic.
Amice
integerime,^ presented '
8ic,
him one
him day,
X-
AND PHILOSOPHY
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
396 with
summ
a
him
of two thousand Florins, to enable
more
to live a
but Spinosa, in the presence of his Landlord, desired to be ; excused from accepting that Money, under pretence that he wanted
easie Life
nothing, and that divert
him from
The same
if
wou'd
infallibly
and Occupations.
his Studies
never consent to Estate to any
it
Simon de Fries being like to die, and having no Wife nor
make him
Children, design'd to
he was
much Money,
he received so
it,
his general
Heir
;
but Spinosa wou'd
and told him, that he shou'd not think
Body but
to his Brother,
he proposed
as
lived at Schiedam, seeing
and natural Heir.
his nearest Relation,
This was executed,
who
to leave his
it
;
but
it
was upon condition,
Brother and Heir of Simon de Fries shou'd pay to Spinosa
that the
a sufficient
Annuity
for his
wise faithfully executed.
maintenance ; and But that which is
was
that Clause particular,
like-
that an
is,
Annuity of 500 Florins was offered to Spinosa by virtue of that Clause, which he would not accept, because he found it too considerable, so that he reduc'd it to 300 Florins. That Annuity was regularly paid him during his Life ; and the same de Fries of Schiedam took care after his death to pay to Mr. Fander Spyck what Spinosa owed him, as it appears by the Letter of John Rieuwertz, Printer at Amsterdam^ who was employed in that Affair. It is dated the 6th of March, 1678,^ and directed to Fander Spyck himself.
Another instance of the Uninterestedness of after
death of his Father.
the
His Father's
Spinosa,
is
Succession
what was
past
to
be
which they were condemned in Law, tho they had left no Stone unturn'd to exclude him from it. Yet instead of dividing that Succession, he gave them his share, and
him and
divided between
his
Sisters, to
kept only for himself a good Bed, with
He was
known
to
its
furniture.
several Persons of great Consideration,
had no sooner published some of his Works, but he grew very famous in the World, amongst the most considerable Persons, who look'd upon him as a Man of a noble Genius, and a great Philosopher. Monsieur Stoupe, Lieutenant-Collonel of a Regiment of Swissers, in Spinosa
the service of the in
1673
;
King of
France,
commanded
in the City of Utrecht
he had been before Minister of the Walloon
London, during the Civil 1
Wars of England
Sic in the original -
Dutch
" Ministre de
:
a la
in
mistake Savoie."
Church,'^
Cro?nwePs time for
1677
?
;
in
he was
APPENDIX made
397
afterwards a Brigadeer, and was killed at the Battel of Steenkirke,
Whilst he was at Utrecht, he writ a Book entituled. The Religion of the Dutch, wherein he upbraids the Reformed Divines, amongst other things, for neglecting to confute or
answer a Book, which was published under their Eyes, in the year 1670, entituled Tractatus TheologicoPoliticus, whereof Spinosa owned himself to be the Author, in his nineteenth Letter. This is what Monsieur Stcupe says.i But the
famous Braunius, Professor of the University of Groningen, shewed the contrary in his Answer to Monsieur Stoupe^s Book And indeed so many Books published against that abominable Treatise, do evidently shew :
that
Monsieur
At
Stoupe\N2iS mistaken.
whom
Letters to Spinosa, from
he desired him to repair
that very time he writ several
he received several Answers
and
;
at
Monsieur he shou'd come thither, because the Prince of Conde, who took then possession of the Government of Utrecht, had a great mind to discourse with Spinosa : And it last
Stoupe was so
much
the
was confidently reported
commend him
Utrecht at a certain time.
to
more
desirous that
that his Highness
to the King, that
for him, provided
he hoped
he wou'd be willing
was
so well disposed to re-
Pension
to obtain easily a
to dedicate
one of
his
Books
to
Majesty. He received that Letter with a Passport, and set out from the Hague a little while after he had received it. Francis Raima says, in his Dutch Account of Spinosa^ that he paid a Visit to the Prince of Conde with whom he had several Conversations for several days, and
his
with some other Persons of note, particularly with Lieutenant Colonel Stoupe. But Vander Spyck and his Wife, in whose House he did lodge,
and who
are
still
at his return, that
living,
have assured me, that he told them positively
he cou'd not see the Prince of Conde, because he
But that
out from Utrecht some days before he arrived there. discourse he had with Monsieur
set
in the
had assured him,
Stoupe, that Officer
wou'd willingly use his Interest for him, and that he should not doubt to obtain a Pension f from the King's Liberality, at his Spinosa added that, because he did not design to recommendation. dedicate any Book to the King of France, he had refused the offer that was made him, with all the civility he was capable of. After his return, the Mob at the Hague were extreamly incensed that he
1
Extracts from his book are given in Freudenthal, Die Lebensgesch.
t The King of France gave
at that time Pensions to all learned
Strangers, %vho presented or dedicated some Books 2
Fr.
Bayle."
"La
Vie de notre Philosophe,
to
Sp.'s, p.
Men,
195.
especially
to
the
him.
qu'il a traduite et extraite
du Dictionnaire de Mr.
SPINOZA
398
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
:
upon him
against him, they look'd
Spy, and whispered in one
a
as
Man, who
anothers Ears, that they ought to
kill so
without doubt, of State
keeping so publick a Correspondence
with the Enemies.
affairs,
and perhaps plunder
a
Landlord was alarm'd
Spinosa^s
not without reason, that the
afraid,
dangerous
Mob
at
and was
it,
wou'd break into the House,
and then drag Spinosa out of
it,
treated,
put him in heart again, and remov'd his fears
But Spinosa
:
well
as
Fear nothing, said he to him, upon my account, I can
it
he could.
as
my
easily justify
self-'
There are People enough, and even some of the most considerable Persons of the State, who know very well what put me upon that Journey, But however, as soon as the
^em, tho^ they
am
were
Mob make
your Door, Vll go and meet
/ and Welfare of the
me, as they treated poor Messieurs de Wit.
to treat
a good Republican, and
the least noise at
I always aimed
at the Glory
State,
In
that
same year
Charles Lewis, Elector
Memory, being informed of
of glorious
Palatine,
the capacity of that great Philosopher,
was desirous that he shou'd come
to Heydelberg to teach
Philosophy
knowing nothing, without doubt, of the Venom concealed in his Breast, and which was more openly manifested afterwards. His
there,
Electoral
Highness ordered the famous Dr.
of
Professor
Fabritius,
Divinity, a good philosopher, and one of his Councellors, to propose to Spinosa.
He
ship, a
Liberty of Reasoning according to his Principles,
full
shou'd think
fit,
offered
him
in the Prince's
Name, with
cum amplissima Philosophandi
was attended with
a Condition,
which
so great, yet
use of :
As
as
all.
He
Letter, with the Title of most Acute and most
For
he was not
it,
to the prejudice
it
appears
by Dr.
from Heydelberg the i6th of February.
Spinosa^ Opera Posthuma Epist. 53. pag. 561.
he
that Offer
Spinosa did not like at
him was never allowed in any manner whatsoever to make of the Religion established by the Laws tho the Liberty granted to
Fabritius^s Letter dated
that Professor-
But
libertate.
it
is
honoured
See
in that
Famous Philosopher,
Philosophe acutissime ac celeberrime.
This was to use
a
Mine,
to
which he
such an Expression
:
He
easily gave
Vent,
if I
may be allowed
perceived the difficulty, or rather the
impossibility of reasoning according to his Principles, without advanc-
ing anything that shou'd be contrary to the Established Religion. return'd an Answer to Dr. Fabritius the 30th of March 1673, refused civilly the Professorship that was offered him. that
The
instruction
of young
Men
He
wou^d prove an Obstacle
to
He and
told
him
his
own
APPENDIX Studies,
But
and
had
that he never
399
the thoughts of embracing such a
Profession,
meer pretence, and he does plainly enough discover his inward thoughts by the following words. " Besides, (says he to the " Doctor) I consider that you don't tell me within what bounds that " liberty of Philosophizing must be confined, that I may not publickly this
was
a
" disturb the established Religion. bus libertas
ilia
Cogito deinde
me
nescire quibus limiti-
Philosophandi intercludi debeat, ne videar publice Stabilitam
Religionem perturbare
See
velle.
his
Posthumous Works, pag.
563
Epist. 54.
His As
his works, 'there
for
it is
JVritings^
not certain that he
are
and
his Opinions.
some, which are ascribed to him, but
the Author of 'em
is
least are not to be found,
others are
:
Some
are lost, or at
Printed and exposed to every
Body's view.
Monsieur Bayle
tells
us in his Historical
and Critical Dictionary,
Apology in Spanish for his leaving the Synagogue He adds, that Spinosa inserted several Printed. never was but that it things in it, which were found afterwards in his Tractatus Theologico-
that Spinosa writ an
Politicus
:
But
I
;
have not been able to hear any thing concerning that
Apology ; tho in my enquiries about it I have consulted some Persons, who were familiarly acquainted with him, and who are alive still.
He
published in the year 1664, Descartes^s Principles of Philosophy
Renati Descartes principiorum Philosophise Geometrically demonstrated Geometrico demonstrate ; which were soon pars prima et secunda more :
followed by his Metaphysical Meditations, Cogitata Metaphysica : and had he gone no farther, he might have preserved to this day, the deserved
Wise and Learned Philosopher. In the year 1665 there came out a little Book in Twelves entituled, Lucii Antistii ConAlethopoli apud Caium Valerium stantis de Jure Ecclesiasticorum. The Author of that Book endeavours to prove that the pennatum. Spiritual and Political Right, which the Clergy ascribe to themselves, and which is ascribed to them by others, does not belong to them in the least ; that Clergy-men abuse it in a Profane manner, and that all Reputation of
a
depends upon that of the Magistrates or Soveraigns, who are in the place of God, in the Cities and Commonwealths wherein And therefore, that the the Clergy have established themselves their Authority
:
Ecclesiasticks ought not to take
Religion, but that
upon themselves
which the Magistrates order 'em
to teach their to Preach.
own
All that
SPINOZA
400
Doctrine
is
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
:
upon the Principles, which Hobbes made use of
built
in his
Leviathan.
Monsieur Ba^le tells of Antistius\ Book were
the
that
us,
of Spinosa^ which
that
like ;
the Author of
first
Book came out
write his
and tho' the
Politicus
Tho' the
it.
began
Spinosa
to
was published soon
;
after
;
yet
it
is
the one was the fore-runner of the other.
two
Men
and
tho' their
is
entituled,
but this does not prove that Spinosa was
Tractatus Theologico-Politicus
that
and Design
Principles
Style,
just at the
same time
Tractatus
Theologico-
not a proof neither, that
may
It
very well be, that
and advance the same impious things
will undertake to write
Writings shou'd come out
much
about the same time,
;
it
cou'd not be inferred from thence, that they were written by one and the same Author.
Spinosa himself being asked
Consideration, whether he was the Author of the it
positively
;
I
two Books, the pretended
he speaks
have
a
Person of great
first
Treatise, denied
from very good Hands.
it
Style,
by
and the Expressions
The former expresses of God he calls him
The
Latin of those
are not so like neither, as
'tis
when Optimum Maximum.
himself with a profound respect,
:
often Deu?n ter
:
no such Expressions in any part of the writings of Spinosa. Several Learned Men have assured me, that the impious Book Printed in 1666 in Quarto, and entituled. The Holy Scripture explained
But
I find
Sacra Sciptura i?iterpres, and the above-mentioned Treatise were both written by one and the same Author, viz. L. M. and tho the thing seems to me very likely, yet I leave it to the by Philosophy
:
Philosophia
judgment of those who may be better informed. It was in the year 1670 that Spinosa published
He who
logico-Politicus. it.
The judicious and
political
it
it
Divine;
his Tractatus Theo-
into Dutch, thought
De
Regtxejininge^
Spinosa does plainly say, that he
Godgeleerde Staatkunde.
of
translated
in his 19th Letter, directed to Mr. Oldenburgh
in that
same Letter,
raised against his
to
Book
to add some remarks
to
:
fit
to entitle
Theologant, of is
He
the Author desires
send him the Objections, which Learned ;
for
it.
he design'd then If
we
to get
it
him
Men
Reprinted, and
believe the Title Page of that Book,
Hamburg, by Henry Conrad. But it is certain, that the Magistrates, and the Reverend Ministers of Hamburg had never permitted, that so many impious things shou'd have been Printed and it
was printed
at
publickly sold in their City.
There
is
no doubt but that Book was Printed 1
Sic.
at
Amsterdam by
APPENDIX Christopher Conrad.
Being sent
Business, Conrad himself brought
presented
me with
401
Amsterdam
for to
in
some Treatise, and
1679
me some
for
Copies of that them, not knowing that it was a very pernicious
Book.
The Dutch
Translator was also pleased to honour the City of Bremen with so noble a Production as if his Translation had come from the :
Hans Jurgel Vander Weyl, in the year 1694. But what is said of those Impressions of Bremen and Hamburg is equally false and they would have met with the same difficulties in either of those Towns, if they had undertaken to Print and Publish such Books therein. PhiloPress of
:
pater,
whom we
have already mentioned, does openly say in the con-
tinuation of his Life, pag. 231, that old John-Hendrikzen, Glasemaker,
whom
knew very
assures us at the
well, was the Translator of that Book and he same time, that he had likewise Translated into Dutch
the Posthumous
Works of
I
extols so
much
never saw the
:
that Treatise of Spinosa, that one like.
The
Author, or
tinuation of Philopaters Life, at Amsterdafn,
Insolence, as
Aard
he may have repented of
some
his fault
Printer, of the con-
Wolsgryk, heretofore a Bookseller
he deserv'd, and confin'd for
values and
would think the World
at least the
in the corner of Rosmaryri-Steeg,
which he was condemn'd
He
Spinosa, Published in 1677.
years.
was punish'd for
House of Correction,
to the
I wish,
with
all
my
his
to
heart,
during the stay he made in that place
;
hope he came out of it with a better mind, and that he was in such a disposition, when I saw him here (at the Hague) last Summer, whither he came to be paid for some Books, which he had Printed heretofore, I
and
deliver'd to the Booksellers of this
To say
Town.
return to Spinosa and his Tract at us Theologico-Politicus,
what
I think
of
it,
after I
have
set
down
the judgment,
I
shall
which two
famous Authors made of it, one whereof was of the Confession ef Ausburg^ and the other Reformed. The first is Spitzelius, who speaks of it thus, in his Treatise entituled Infeiix Literator'^ p. 363. " That impious
"author {Spinosa) blinded by
"and
so full
of Impiety,
a prodigious
as
to
presumption, was so impudent
maintain that Prophecies were only
and thatthe Prophets and the *' Apostles wrote naturally according to their own light and knowledge, " without any Revelation or Order from God That they accommodated "Religion, as well as they cou'd, to the Genius of those who lived at " that time, and established it upon such Principles as were then well
"grounded upon the fancy of the Prophets
;
:
1
Sic.
^
Van
der Linde, Bibliogr.
2
D
No. 358,
k.
SPINOZA;
402
HIS LIFE
"known, and commonly
received.
AND PHILOSOPHY Author stupenda
Irreliogissimus^
^
fidentia plane fascinatus^ eo pj'ogressus impudentice
sui
impietatis fait, ut pro-
phetiam dependisse dixerit a fallaci imaginatione prophetarum, eosque pariter ac Apostolos non ex Revelatione l^ Divino fnandato Scripsisse, sed tantum ex
ipsoru?nmet naturali judicio ;
accommodavisse
Religionem, quo
insuper
ad
fieri pot uit, hojninum sui te??iporis ingenio, illafnque fandamentis turn temporis
maxime
notis
l^ acceptis super
Spinosa pretends in his Trac-
cedificasse.
same Method may and ought to be observed still for explaining the Holy Scripture ; for he maintains, amongst other things, that, as the Scripture, when it zu as first published, was fitted to the established opinions, and to the capacity of the People, so every Body is firee to expound it according to his Knowledge, and make it agree
tatus TheoIogico-PoUticus^ that the
with
his
own
If this
Scripture
That
it
opinions.
vv^as
How
?
a sure
is
Authors of
it,
good Lord
true,
cou'd
we
!
What
respect cou'd
maintain
and firm Prophecy
;
that
it
we have
for the
Divinely inspired
is
Men, who
that the holy
?
are the
spoke and wrote by God's order, and by the inspiration
of the Holy Spirit
same Scripture is most certainly true, and Testimony of its Truth to our Consciences ; and lastly, that it is a Judge, whose Decisions ought to be the constant and unvariable Rule of our Thoughts, of our Faith, and oi our Lives. If what Spinosa affirms were true, one might indeed very well say, that the Bible is a Wax-Nose, which may be turned and shaped at one's will \ a Glass, thro' which every Body may exactly see what pleases a Fool's Cap, which may be turned and fitted at one's his fancy pleasure a hundred several ways. The Lord confound thee, Satan, and stop thy mouth Spitzelius is not contented to say what he thinks of that pernicious Book but he adds to the judgment he made of it, that of Mr de that
;
that the
gives a certain
it
;
!
;
Manseveld heretofore Professor
Book Printed ought
to
at
Amsterdam, in 1674.
who
My
speaks o^
opinion
be buried for ever in an ceternal oblivion
aternas damnandum tenebras, &c. that
at Utrecht,
Wicked Book
Which
is
is, :
it
thus, in a
that that Treatise
Tract at um hunc aa
very judiciously said
;
seeing
does altogether overthrow the Christian Religion,
by depriving the Sacred Writings of the Authority, on which it is solely grounded and established. The second Testimony I shall produce is, that of Mr. Willia?n van Blyenburg of Dordrect^ 1
Sic.
who
kept a long correspondence with Spinosa, 2
Sic.
APPENDIX and who
in his 31st Letter to him, (See
403
Spmosah Posthumous Works
pag. 476) says, speaking of himself, that he had embraced no Profession,
and that he lived by an honest Trade, Liber sum nuUi adstrictus professioni, honestis mercaturis me do. That Merchant, who is a learned Man,
Book entituled. The truth of the Chjristian Religion, Ley den, in 1674, gives his judgment about the Treatise of Spinosa in these words. Lt is a Book, says \vt, full of curious, but abomin-
in the Preface of a
Printed
at
able discoveries, the Learning
fetched
from
Hell.
and
Man
Every Christian, nay, every
abhor such a Book. Religion,
and Inquiries whereof must
The Author endeavours
of Sense, ought
to
overthrow the Christian
to
which are grounded upon
baffie all our hopes,
needs have been
it
:
In
the
room
whereof he introduces Atheism, or at most, a Natural Religion forged according to the humour or interests of the Soveraigns. The zuicked shall be restrained only by the fear of Punishment ; but a neither fears the Executioner nor the himself,
Man
of no Conscience, who
Laws, may attempt anything
to satisfy
&c.
I must add, that I have read that Book of Spinosa with application from the beginning to the end ; but I protest at the same time before God, that I have found no solid arguments in it, nor anything that
cou'd shake, in the reasons,
it
least,
my
belief of the Gospel.
contains meer suppositions, and what
The
we
Instead of solid call in the School,
which the Author advances, are given for Proofs, which being denied and rejected, the remaining part of his Treatise will be found to contain nothing but Lies and Blasphemies. Did he think that the World wou'd believe him blindly upon his word, and that he was not obliged to give good reasons and good proofs for what he advanced ? Lastly, several Writings, which Spinosa left after his death were They are called his Printed in 1677, in which year he also died. Posthumous Works, Opera Posthuma. These three Letters B. D. S. are to be found in the Title of the Book, which contains five several
petitiones principii.
works.
The
Ethica more
The De
first, is
a Treatise of
Morals demonstrated Geometrically,
The
Geometrico demonstrata.
third, treats of the
it,
things
second,
is
about Politicks.
Understanding, and of the means of rectifying
emendatione Intellectus.
The
fourth,
is
a
Collection of Letters,
^
Responsiones. The fifth, is an and Answers to them, Epistolce Abridgement of the Hebrew Grammar, Co?npendium Gra?nmatices The Printer's name and the place wherein that Book Linguae Hebraes. which shews that was Printed, are not mention'd in the Title-page ;
SPINOZA
404
who
the Person
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
:
published
But Mr.
did not care to be known.
it,
Vander Spyck, Spinosa^ Landlord, who
is
alive
me
tells
still,
that
which con-
Spinosa ordered, that immediately after his death, his Desk,
tained his Letters and Papers, shou'd be sent to John Rieuzvertzen, a Printer at Amsterdam
:
according to his Will.
Which Vander Spyck did not fail to perform And John Rieuzvertzen acknowledged that he
had received that Desk, as it appears by his Answer dated from Amsterdam the 25th of March, 1677. He adds towards the latter part of his Letter, that The Relations of Spinosa wou^d fain knozv
was
because they fancied that
directed^
wou^d with
not fail to enquire about
But, says he,
it.
not registred at the
and indeed his Letter
to
it
they
it
they
intrustea
how
shou'd know it
they can
be informed about
nothing of
it,
&c.
He
it,
ends
does clearly appear by that Letter,
are beholden for so abominable a Production.
Men
Learned
Several
was full of Money, and that
Waterman^ who had been
don''t see
with those words, and
whom we
whom
Packets, that are sent hither by water, are
if the
Hague, /
better
is
it
of the
it
to
have
already
sufficiently
discovered
the
impious Doctrines contained in those Posthumous Works, and have
Body
given notice to every
beware of 'em.
to
I shall only
add some
what has been said by them. The Treatise of Morals Who begins with some Diiinitions ^ or Descriptions of the Deity. would not think at first, considering so fine a beginning, that he is
few things
to
reading a Christian Philosopher ally the sixth, is,
wherein Spinosa
All those Difinitions are fine, especi-
?
says,
a Substance, which contains in
it
that
God
is
self an infinity
whereof represents and expresses an Eternal and
when we enquire more narrowly
God less
of Spinosa
an
infinite
Being; that
of Attributes, every one infinite
into his Opinions,
But
Substance.
we
find that the
meer Phantom, an imaginary God, who is nothing And therefore the words of the Apostle, Tit, i. 16. con-
is
than God.
cerning impious
a
Men, may be very well
applied to that Philosopher
:
know God, but in Works they de?iy him. What They profess David says of ungodly Men Psalm 14. i. does likewise suit him The This is the true Opinion of Fool has said in his Heart, there is no God. that they
:
Spinosa,
whatever he might
God, and to take
it
He
say.
in a sense
unknown
confesses himself in his 21st Letter to says he, that of the
I have a
Modern
notion of
Christians.
I
to all
God and Nature, God is Sic.
Christians.
Mr. Oldenburg: I
believe that 1
word This he
takes the liberty to use the
acknowledge,
very different from that the
Immanent, and
not
APPENDIX the
Transient Cause of all things
â&#x201A;Źntem,
?ion z<ero
of St Paul ; In
hi?n
we
and move, and have
live,
Act. 17. 28.
we must
In order to understand him, Cause
Deum rerum omnium Causam immanAnd to confirm his Opinion, he
:
transeunte?n statuo.
Words
alledges these
our Being.
405
that^ the
is,
consider that a
Transient
Productions whereof are external, or out of
it
Man, who throws a Stone into the Air, or a Carpenter, who builds a House Whereas the Im?nanent Cause acts inwardly, and is confined within itself, without acting outwardly. Thus when a Man's self; as a
:
Soul thinks desire,
of, or desires
something,
without going out of
it,
it is
and
is
or remains in that thought or
the
immanent Cause
thereof.
God of Spinosa is the Cause of the Universe and he is not beyond it. But because the Universe has some bounds, it wou'd follow that God is a limited and finite Being. And tho he says that God is infinite, and comprehends an infinity of Perfections ; he must needs play with the words Eternal and Infinite, seeing he cannot understand by them a Being, which did subsist before Time was, and before any other Being was created, but he calls that infinite, wherein the Humane Understanding can neither find an End, For he thinks the Productions of God are so numernor any Bounds In the same manner, the
wherein he
is,
:
ous, that
Bounds
Man, with
in
them.
all
Mind, cannot conceive any solid, and so well settled and
the strength of his
Besides, they are so
connected one with another, that they shall last for ever. Nevertheless, he says, in his 21st Letter, that they were in the wrong, who charged him with asserting that God and Matter, wherein
God
Acts, are but one and the same thing.
forbear confessing, that Matter is
is
and works only in Matter, that
Spinosa
is
But
after all,
he can't
who The God of
a thing essential to the Deity, is,
in the Universe.
therefore nothing else but Nature, infinite, but yet corporeal
and material, taken
in general,
supposes that there are two
and with
all
its
Modifications.
Eternal Properties in
God,
For he
cogitatio
i^
By the first of those Properties, God extensio. Thinking and Extension is contain'd in the Universe ; by the second, he is the Universe itself, and both joyn'd together make up what he calls God. As far as I am able to understand Spinosa, the dispute between us :
Christians and
him runs upon
this,
vi::,.
Whether
the true
God
be an
and distinct from the Universe, and from the whole Nature, and whether by a free Act of his Will Eternal
1
Substance,
different
According to modern practice the sense would require the
comma
to be after that.
;
SPINOZA
4o6
produc'd
he or
World,
the
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
:
and
Creatures
all
nothing
of
out
whether the Universe, and all the Beings it comprehends, do ^ belong to the Nature of God, being considered as Substance, whose Thought and Extension are infinite? Spinosa
essensually a
maintains the pag. is
1
and
8.
seq.
The
proposition.
last
may be
the general Cause of
Thus he owns
consulted.
all
things
of
Antispinosa
_
L?
indeed, that
but he pretends, that
;
Vittichius^
God
God
produces
*em necessarily without freedom and choice, and without consulting his Will. In like manner, everything that happens in the World, Good or Evil, Virtue or Vice, Sin or good Works, does necessarily proceed from him and consequently there ought to be no Judgment, no Punishment, no Resurrection, no Salvation, no Damnation. For if ;
were so, that imaginary God wou'd Punish and Reward his own Work, as a Child does his Baby.^ Is it not the most pernicious Atheism And therefore Mr. Burmanus^^ a that ever was seen in the World ? Reformed Minister, at Enkhuysen calls Spinosa, with great Reason, the
it
most impious Atheist, that ever liv'd upon the Face of the Earth. I don't design to examine here all the impious and absurd Doctrines of Spinosa; I have mention'd some of the most important, only to inspire the Christian
have it
Reader with the aversion and horror he ought But
such pernicious Opinions.
for
I
must not forget
to
to say, that
does plainly appear by the second part of his Etkicks^ that he makes
the Soul and expresses
Manner
it.
Body but one Being,
the Properties whereof are, as he
Thinking and Extension
"When
pag. 40.
I
;
for
he explains himself in that
speak of the Body,
t
mean only
a
Mode,
" which expresses the Essence of God in a certain and precise manner, " as he is considered under the notion of an extended thing. Per corpus intelligo
modum
qui
certo 13 determinato
in the Body,
it is
Dei
essentiam,
modo exprimit.
quatenus ut res ex tens a consideratur,
As
which is and acts manner of being, pro-
for the Soul,
only another Modification or
duced by Nature, or manifested by Thought It is not a Spirit, or a particular Substance no more than the Body, but a Modification, which expresses the Essence of God, as he manifests himself, Acts and Works by Thought. Did ever any Body hear any such abominations :
among 1
Sic.
2
Sic,
Christians
!
At
that
rate
God
cou'd
neither
an error for Ch. (Christopher), as rightly given in the original and the French. confounded with James Wittichius, cf. 254, n),
(Bibliogr. 384, often 3
i^e^
Punish the
doll.
^
Bibliogr. 492.
APPENDIX
407
Soul nor the Body,
unless he would Punish and Destroy himself. the latter part of his 21st Letter, he overthrows the great
Towards
Mystery of Godliness,
as
we
find
it
taining, that the Incarnation of the
expressed
Son of God
Eternal Wisdom, which having appeared in
Hearts and Souls, was Jesus Christ
he says
at last
Tim.
i
is
3.
16.
nothing
by main-
else
but the
things, particularly in our
all
manifested in an extraordinary manner in
some Churches indeed add to it, that God made himself a Man ; but says he, / have declared in express terms, that I donU know what they mean by it. Quod qucedam Ecclesi^e his addant, quod Deus naturam humanam assumpserit, monui expresse me quid die ant nescire, Sec He goes on, and says, That Doctrine seems to me to be as strange, as if any one shou'd teach that a :
a little lower, that
Circle has taken the nature of a Triangle or of a Square.
him occasion towards
gives
Word was made Flesh 14. by a way of speaking very common amongst the Eastern and to render it thus, God has manifested himself in Jesus
plain
the
Chap.
i.
Nations,
Which
the latter part of his 23rd Letter, to ex-
famous passage of St
John
The
Christ, in a most particular manner. I
his
have shewn plainly, and in
23rd and
24.th Letters,
a
few words,
in
my
Sermon,
how
in
he endeavours to destroy the Mystery of the
Resurrection of Jesus Christ, which
is
a Capital Doctrine
and the ground of our Hopes and Comfort.
I
amongst
us,
need not spend more
time in setting down the other impious Doctrines, which he teaches.
Some Writings
(p/'Spinosa,
which have not been Printed,
He, who took care to publish the Posthumous Works of Spinosa, reckons amongst the Writings of that Author, which have not been Printed, a I know some Men of great note Treatise concerning the Rain-Bow. in this Town, (at the Hague) who have seen and read that Treatise ; but they did not advise Spinosa
to publish
it
:
Which
perhaps gave him
and made him resolve to burn it half a year before he died, as I have been informed by the people of the House, where he lived.i He had also begun a Translation of the Old Testament into Dutch, about which, he often discoursed with some Men learned in the Languages, and enquired into the Explications which the Christians He had finished the five Books of Moses, a give to several Passages.
some
trouble,
1
See
p.
20, above.
Âť
SPINOZA
4o8
great while ago,
Work
in his
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
:
when some few
days before he died he burnt the
whole
Chamber. Several Authors confute his Works
God
His works were scarce published, but
raised to his Glory,
the defence of the Christian Religion, several Champions
who
and for
confuted
them with all the Success they cou'd hope for. Dr. Theoph. Spitzelius names two of 'em in his Book entituled Infelix Literator, viz. Francis Kuyper of Rotterdam whose Book printed in the same Town, in the ,
year
1676,
is
entituled Arcana Atheismi revelata,
Misteries of Atheism discovered.^
Professor, at Utrecht^ a
who
Book upon the same
The
The
second
is,
1674 Printed
in the year
Sec.
The profound
Regnier de Mansveld in the
same place
Subject.^
next year 1675,
^
Confutation of the same Treatise of Spinosa^
came out of the Press of Isaac N^eranus : It was written by Jo/m Bredenburg, whose Father had been Elder of the Lutheran Church at Rotterdam. George Mathias Konig was pleased in his Bibliotheque of ancient and modern Authors, pag. 770, to call him a certain Weaver of Rotterdam^ Textorem quendam entituled, Enervatio Tractatus Theologico-P olitici^
Rotterodamensem.
If he exercised such a Mechanical Art, I
am
sure
that no Man duced such a Work ; for he does Geometrically demonstrate in that Book, and in a clear and unanswerable manner, that Nature neither is, Being not very well nor can be God himself, as Spinosa pretends. skill'd in the Latin Tongue, he was obliged to write his Book in Dutch, and to make use of another Man's hand to Translate it into Latin.
of his Profession did ever shew so
Which he
did, as
end, that Spinosa, in case he
ability, or pro-
he himself says in the Preface to his Book, to the
who was
made no
still alive,
reply to
are convincing.
might have no excuse or pretence,
it.
Nevertheless, I don't find that
Man
much
all
the Arguments of that Learned
Besides, he seems to incline to Socinianis7n in
some parts of his Book. This is at least the judgment I make of it, and I believe it does not differ in that respect from the judgment of knowing Men, to whom I leave the decision of it. However, it is certain, that Francis Kuyper and Bredenhurg published several Writings one against another, and that Kuyper in his accusations against hi Adversary, pretended to no less than to convince him of Atheism. In the year 1676, Lambert Veldhuis of Utrecht, published a Book, 1
BibViogr. 365.
2 Bibliogr,
363.
'^
Bibliogr. 2o8.
APPENDIX
409
^
entituled,
Tractatus Moralis de Naturali pudore, dignitate hominis} overthrows, in that Treatise, the Principles whereby Spinosa pretends to prove, that all the Good or Evil, which Men do, is produc'd
He
by a Superior and necessary operation of God or Nature. I have already mention'd William Van Bleyenburg, a Merchant of Dordrecht, who enter'd into the List in the year 1674,2 and refuted the impious
Book of
Spinosa, entitul'd, Tractatus Theologico-Politicus.
I cannot forbear comparing him with the Merchant, whom our Saviour speaks of, Mat, XIII. 45, 46. Seeing he does not present us with worldly and
perishable Riches, by the publishing of his Book, but with a Treasure
of an
that there da?n
and which
infinite value,
shall never perish. It were to be wish'd, were many such Merchants upon the Exchanges of Amster-
and Rotterda?n.
Our Divines of
the Confession of Augsburg have also distinguisht themselves amongst those, who have refuted the impious Doctrine of
His Tractatus Theologico-Politicus was scarce come out, but they took Pen in hand and wrote against him. We may name first Dr Musaus, Professor of Divinity, at Jena, a Man of a great Genius, Spinosa.
and who perhaps had not Spinosa, viz. in the year
Sheets,
1704, he publish'd a Dissertation of twelve
Tractatus
entitul'd,
During the Life of
his like in his time.
Theologico-Politicus
ad
Veritatis
Lu7nen
The Theological and Political Treatise examin'd by "the Light of Reason and Truth. He declares, pag. 2, 3. his aversion and horror for such an impious Production, and expresses it in these "
examinatus.^
words, "Jure merit
quis dubitet,
num ex
quos ipse
illis,
Daemon ad humana
divinaque jura pervertenda magno numero conduxit, repertus
f
tier it,
qui in
depravandis operosior fuerit quajn hie Impostor, magno Ecclesice malo
lis
Reipublica detrimento natus,
" amongst the
"
One may
many Men, whom
very well
^
doubt, whether,
the Devil has hir'd to overthrow
all
"
Humane and Divine right, any of 'em has been more busy about it, " than that Impostor, who was born to the great Mischief of Church
"and
He
State.
sets
down
(pag.
5,
6, 7.)
with great clearness the
Philosophical Expressions of Spinosa, he explains those which are capable of a double sense, and shews in
may the when Spinosa
what sense
Spinosa
He
made
shews
use of
'em, that one
better understand him.
32.) that
published that Book, he design'd to teach that
every
(p.
Man
§.
has the right and liberty of fixing his Belief in point of
1
Bibliogr. 358, ÂŤ.
3
Bibliogr.
256) says
(pag. 16.
362. it
2
V.
d.
Bibliogr. 364.
Linde gives "lumen" with Colerus, but Dr. Freudenthal
should be "lancem."
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
410
Religion, and of confining reach,
it
AND PHILOSOPHY
only to such things
He
and which he can comprehend.
are not above his
as
had already
(pag. 14.
very clearly stated the Question, and shewn wherein Spinosa
from the Christians
And
:
in the
same manner he continues
that Treatise of Spinosa, and confutes every part of
There
is
of Dr. Musaus, seeing
it
solid Reasons.
Tho'
several
Authors writ against the Theological and
my
yet none in
;
ment of him
entituled, Origo Atheismi, says in another
" I do very
"Dr. Musaus shou'd be
"That
learned Divine,
examine
so scarce,
who
and
judg-
Treatise,
Book, entituled, Pru-
little
much wonder
my
Author, who,
small
a
Political
Opinion has
and
;
The
is confirmed by that of many others. under the name of Theodorus Securus, published
dentia Theologica.
differs
with good and
it
with more Solidity than that Learned Professor
it
28.)
no doubt but Spinosa himself read that Book was found amongst his Papers after his death.
Treatise, as I have already observed
done
to
ยง.
that the Dissertation of
known
so little
here in Holland.
writ upon so important a Subject, shou'd
" have more justice done him ; for he has certainly had a better Success " than any other. Mr. Fullerus, {in continuatione Bibliothecce Universalis expresses himself thus, speaking of Dr. Musaeus
Sec.)
:
" That most
" famous Divine of yena has refuted the pernicious Book of Spinosa with " his usual solidity and learning.
Celeberrimus
ille
Jenensium Theologus
Job, Musseus Spinosse pestilentissimu?n foetu?n acutissi?nis} queis
solet, telis
confodit.
The same Author
does also mention Frederic Rapoltus, Professor of
who
Divinity, at Leipsick,
in a
Speech which he pronounced when he
took Possession of his Professorship, did likewise refute the Doctrine
of Spinosa.
him but
I
have read
indirectly,
Speech, and I find that he has confuted
and without naming him
contra Naturalistas, habita
found
his
in the Theological
ipsis
Kalendis Junii
Works of
:
It
a?in.
is
entituled, Oratio
1670, and
Rappoltus tom.
i.
it is
to
be
pag. 1386 and
Seq. published by Dr. John Benedict Carpxovius^ and Printed at Leipsick
Dr. J. Conrad Durrius, Professor at Altorf, followed the same Plan in a Speech,^ which I have not read, but I have heard it 1692.
in
highly
commended.
Monsieur Aubert The impious ^
The
Man
Bibliogr, 358, n.
in
168 1 a Book, entituled,
convinced, or a Dissertation against Spinosa, wherein the
printing of this in the original
fissium, accutissimis. 2
de Verse published
is
almost
a curiosity
;
it
gives Spinosa, pestilen-
APPENDIX
411
Grounds of his Atheis?n are confuted} In 1687 Peter Tvon, a Kinsman and a Disciple of Labadie, and Minister of those of his Sect at Wiewerden inFriseland, writ a Treatise against Spinosa which he published under Title,
this
Impiety Vanquished, &c.2
In the Supplement to Moreris Dictionary, in the Article of Spinosa, there is a Treatise mentioned, entituled, de concordia Rationis
That Book was Reprinted
written by Monsieur Huet :^
Fidei,
iff
Leipsick in 1692, and the Journalists of
at
that City gave a good Abstract of
it,
Acta Erudit.
(see
395) wherein the Doctrine of Spinosa is set and refuted with great Force and Learning.
an. 1695, pag.
down with great clearness, The Learned Mr. Sirnon^
and Mr. de la Mottef Minister of the Savoy in London, have both of 'em writ upon the same subject I have seen the Works of those two Authors, but I don't understand French enough to judge of 'em. Mr. :
who lives now at Reinsburg near Leyden, published a Treatise against Spinosa in the second Edition of his Book, De Deo, anima, l^ malo : That Treatise is entituled, Fundamenta Atheismi eversa, Peter Poiret
sive
specimen absurditatis
Spinosian^.^
It
is
a
work which very well
deserves to be read with attention.
The at
Work, I shall mention, is that of Mr Wittichius, Professor which was Printed in 1690, after the death of the Author,
last
Ley den,
with
this Title, Christophori Wittichii Professoris Leidensis ^;^//-Spinosa,
Examen
sive
into
Wonder after
Ethices B. de Spinosa.*^
Dutch; and Printed to see
death,
his
Philopater.
It
that great in is
correspondence and had a
after
translated
Amsterdam by Wasbergen.^ 'Tis no defamed, and his Reputation stained Book as the Continuation of the Life of
at
that
in
Book,
that
Mr.
Wittichius
was an
Philosopher, and a great Friend of Spinosa, that he kept
excellent
in
was sometime
Man
such a said
It
a great
many
him That Mr.
private Conversations with
word, that they were both of the same Opinion.
;
Wittichius writ against the Ethicks of Spinosa, for fear of being reputed a Spinosist,
and that
his
Confutation was Printed after his death only,
Honour, and the Reputation of an Orthodox These are the calumnies, which that insolent Author has Christian. advanced I don't know from whence he had 'em, nor upon what How came he to know appearance of truth he can build so many Lies. Correspondence strict together, kept such a Philosophers two that those that he might not lose his
:
The name
should be de Verse.
^
Bihliogr. 301.
-
Bihliogr. 368, 369 (Latin and French edd.),
â&#x20AC;˘^
^/are.
°
Bibliogr. 382.
^
Bibliogr. 358, n.
^
Bibliogr. 384, 385.
AND PHILOSOPHY
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
412
saw and writ
that they
one another
so often to
We
?
don't find any
among
Letter of Spinosa to Wittichius, nor of Wittichius to Spinosa
the
which have been Printed ; and there is none which remain to be Printed So that we have
Letters of that Author,
among
neither all
those
:
World
the reason in the
to believe, that this strict
and the Letters which they writ of that Calumniator.
I confess, I
to
Correspondence,
one another, are a meer
fiction
never had occasion to speak to Mr.
am pretty well acquainted with Mr. Zimmerman, his Nephew, who is now Minister of the Church of England, and who lived with his Uncle the latter part of his Life. What he told me Wittichius
;
but
I
upon that Subject, is altogether contrary to what has been Published by the Author of Philopater's Life ^ Nay, he shew'd me a Writing, which his Uncle had dictated to him, wherein the Opinions of Spinosa :
and confuted. What can one desire more last Work which he writ ? There we
are both well explained his justification, than
what he
the
believed, and there he makes, as
it
for
see
were, a Confession of his
Will any Man, that has any sense of Religion,
Faith before he died.
was all meer Hypocrisy, that he did it only that he might go to Church, and to salve appearances, and avoid being accounted an Impious Man and a
be so bold as to think and even to publish, that
Libertine
?
If any such thing
cou'd be inferred,
Correspondence between two Persons safe
;
I
when
there has been some
shou'd not find
and few Ministers wou'd be secure from the
;
it
niators, seeing
sometimes impossible
it is
with some
converse
Persons,
my
self very
Tongues of Calummanner of none of the most
for us to avoid all
whose Belief
is
Orthodox. I shall willingly
name him with
all
mention William Deurhof, of Armsterdam, and
That
the distinction he deserves.
I
Professor has
all his Works, Mr. Francis Halma does Dutch account of Spinosa;^ when he says, that he
always vigorously assaulted the Opinions of Spinosa in but especially in his Lectures of Divinity.^
him
justice in his
has refuted the Opinions of that Philosopher with so
none of
his Partisans durst hitherto
that that subtil Writer, pater'' s
Life,
and
is
to stop his
1
Bibliogr. 72-76.
2
Bibliogr. 190-207, see 194,
as to 3
Deurhof s
able
?;,,
solidity, that
vye strength with him. to confute the
He
adds,
calumnies of Philo-
mouth. where Dr. van der Linde
Spinozist tendencies.
Bibliogr^ 70, 71.
still
much
retracts his
former opinion
APPENDIX
413
but one word of two famous Authors, and I'll put 'em together, tho' they are now set one against the other. The first is Mr I shall say
known in the Common-wealth of Learning, that I need not make his Encomium in this place. The second, is Mr Jaquelot heretofore Minister of the French Church at the Hague^ and now Bayle^ so well
to the King ol Prussia. They made both of 'em learned and Remarks on the Life, Writings, and Opinions of Spinosa, which
Chaplain solid
have been Translated into Dutch by Francis Halma, a Bookseller at Amsterdam, and a Scholar. He has added to his Translation, a Pre-
and some judicious Remarks upon the Continuation ol Philopater's which deserve to be read. ; There is no need to mention here some Writers, who have very lately opposed the Doctrine of Spinosa, upon account of a Book, entituled, Hemel op Aarden, Paradice on Earth, written by Mr van Leenhoff, a Reformed Minister of Zzvol, wherein 'tis pretended that he builds upon the same foundations with Spinosa. Those things are I therefore proceed too fresh, and too well known to insist upon 'em to mention the Death of that famous Atheist.
face,
Life
:
Of the There
has
last Sickness^
been
so
many
and Death
various
and
(j/'
Spinosa.
false
Reports
about
the
Death of Spinosa, that 'tis a wonder how some understanding Men came to acquaint the Publick with it upon Hearsays, without taking One may find a care to be better informed of what they published. Pattern 0I those falsehoods in the Menagiana, Printed at Amsterdam in 1695, where the Author expresses himself thus.^ " I have been told that Spinosa died of the fear he was in, of being " committed to the Bastille, He came into France at the desire of " two Persons of Quality, who had a mind to see him. Mr. de Pompone " had notice of it, and being a Minister, very zealous for Religion, he "did not think fit to permit that Spinosa shou'd live in France, where he " might do a great deal of Mischief ; and in order to prevent it, he " resolv'd to send him to the Bastille. Spinosa having had notice oi it, his escape in a Fryar's Habit ; but I will not warrant this last " Circumstance. That which is certain, is, that I have been told by "several people, that he was a little Man, and of a yellowish complex-
"made
" ion, and that he had an
Look, and bore
ill
" bation in his Face. 1
Bibliogr. 98.
a
Character of Repro-
SPINOZA
414
There
is
not
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
:
one word
of truth
in
this
certain, that Spinosa was never in France:
And
Account ; for it is tho some Persons
of great note endeavoured to have him there,^ as he himself confest to
Landlords,
his
yet
he
them,
assured
at
same time,
the
that
he hoped he wou'd never be so great a Fool as to do such a thing. One may also easily judge from what I shall say hereafter, that it is alto-
Wherefore
gether false that he died of Fear.
Circumstances of his Death without nothing without proving it died, and was buried here
which
;
at
I
partiality,
can the
more
I
shall
and
I
set
down
shall
the
advance
easily do, because
he
the Hague.
was a Man of a very weak Constitution, unhealthy and lean, and had been troubled with a Pthysick above twenty years, which oblig'd him to keep a strict course of Dyet, and to be extreamly sober Spinosa
Meat and Drink. Nevertheless, his Landlord, and the people of House did not believe that he was so near his end, even a little
in his
the
For while before he died, and they had not the least thought of it. the 22nd- of February^ which happen'd to be then the Saturday before
week of the Carnaval, his Landlord and his Wife went to the Sermon which is preach'd in our Church, to dispose every Body to receive the Communion, which is administered the next day according The Landlord being come from to a Custom established amongst us. Church at four a Clock, or thereabouts, Spinosa went down Stairs, and had a pretty long Conversation with him, which did particularly run upon the Sermon and having taken a Pipe of Tobacco, he retired into his Chamber, which was forwards, and went to Bed betimes. Upon Sunday Morning before Church-time, he went down Stairs again,
the last
;
and discoursed with his Landlord and his Wife. He had sent for a Physitian from Amsterda?n, whose Name I shall only express by these two Letters, L. M.^ That Phisitian ordered 'em to boil an old Cock immediately, that Spinosa might take some Broth about noon, which he did and eat some of the Meat with a good Stomach, when his Landlord and his
L.
M.
to
Church.
much
In the afternoon the Physitian
Wife came from Church.
staid alone
But
House being returned they were coming from Church, they were very
with as
Spinosa, the people of the
surprized to hear, that Spinosa had expired about three a Clock,
in the presence of that Physitian, 1 'â&#x20AC;˘^
who
Probably on the occasion of his It should be 20th. 3
"
that very
visit to
Evening returned to
the French
camp
in 1672.
Colerus corrects himself afterwards, ad Jin.
Een zeker Medicus L.
M. van Amsterdam."
APPENDIX
415
Amsterdam by the Night-boat, without taking any care of the Deceased. was more willing to dispense himself from that Duty, because immediately after the Death of Spinosa he had taken a Ducatoon and a little Money, which the Deceased had left upon the Table, and a Knife with a Silver Handle ; and so retired with his Booty. The particularities of his Sickness and Death have been variously reported, and have occasioned several Contestations. 'Tis said, ist.
He
That during
his Sickness
he took the necessary Precautions
to avoid
being visited by those whose Sight wou'd have been troublesome to him. 2dly,
That he spoke once and even
when he pronounced those, who were present,
sigh,
the
O God That they heard him often of God. Which gave occasion
several times these words,
have mercy upon me miserable dinner.
3dly,
Name
whether he believed, at last, the Existence of a God, whose judgment he had great Reason to fear after And that he answered 'em, that he had dropt that word his death ? 'Tis said, 4thly, That he kept by him some Juice of out of Custom.
to
to ask him,
Mandrake ready at hand which he made use of, when he perceived he was a dying, that he drew the Curtains of his Bed afterwards, and then lost his Senses, fell into a profound Sleep, and departed this Life in that manner. Sthly, That he had given express orders to let no Body come into his
Room, when he
shou'd be near his
finding he was a dying, he
call'd for his
no Minister to come to him peaceably and without disputing, l^c. suffer
;
End
And
:
likewise, that
Landlady, and desired her to
because he was willing to die
have carefully enquired into the truth of all those things, and ask'd several times his Landlord and his Landlady, who are alive But they answered me, at all times, that still, what they knew of it I
:
they
knew nothing
stances were
of
it,
and were perswaded that
all
those Circum-
For he never forbad them to admit any Room, that had a mind to see him. Besides, when he
meer
Lies.
body into his was a dying, there was no body
in his
Chamber
but the Physitian of
No
body heard the words, which 'tis said, he spoke, O God, have mercy upon me ?niserable Sinner : Nor is it likely that they shou'd come out of his mouth, seeing he did had not think he was so near his Death, and the people of the House Amsterdam^
whom
I
have mentioned.
He did not keep his Bed during his not the least suspicion of it. went down Stairs, as I sickness ; for the very day that he died, he 1 in a Bed made according to the have observed He lay forwards :
1
Sa chambre etoit celle de devant.
SPINOZA
4i6
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
:
fashion of the Country,
which they call Bedstead. His Landlady, and House know nothing of his ordering to send away the Ministers, that shou'd come to see him, or of his invocating the Name of God during his Sickness. Nay, they believe the contrary, because the people of the
ever since he began to be in a languishing condition, he always exprest, in all his sufferings,
others, little
when
a truly Stoical
constancy
even so
;
Courage
to
reprove
or too great a Sensibility.
Lastly, as for the Juice of Mandrake^ which,
of
as
they happened to complain, and to shew in their Sicknesses
when he was
which made him
a dying,
circumstance altogether
unknown
to the
said,
'tis
lose his Senses
and the Remedies which he took from time Bill,
;
to time.
who was
also a
it is
people of the House
yet they us'd to prepare every thing he wanted for his
mention'd in the Apothecary's
he made use
And
:
Meat and Drink, Nor is that Drug
the same to
whom
the
Physitian of Amsterdam sent for the Remedies, which Spinosa wanted the last days of his Life.
being dead, his Landlord took care of his Burial.
Spinosa
Rieuwertz, a Printer at Amsterdam, desired him to do
him, at the same time, that he shou'd be paid for
and past
should be
at,
him upon
that Subject,
He
his is
word
for
The
it.
it,
all
mentioned, to
who
to
Letter which he wrote to
his late
him,
as
whom
shew how dear and precious the memory of
him, paid exactly to Vander Spyck,
from
the charges he
dated from Amsterdam the 6x^01 March 1678.^
does not forget to speak of that Friend of Schiedam,
was
John and promised
The Money was
Lodger.
Rieuzvertz himself had received
As they were making
all
at the it
I
have
Spinosa
that he cou'd pretend
same time remitted
by the order of
to
his Friend.
everything ready for the Burial of Spinosa, one
Schroder, an Apothecary,
made
a
Protestation against
it,
pretending to
be paid for some Medicines wherewith he had furnished the Deceased
His Bill amounted to sixteen Florins and two some Tincture of Saffron, some Balsam, some Powders, i^c. but there is no Opium nor M^7?^r^/^^ mentioned therein. The Protestation was immediately taken off, and the Bill paid by Mr. during his Sickness.
pence.
I
find in
it
Vander Spyck.
The dead Body was
carried to the
Grave
in the
New
the Spuy, the 25th of February, being attended by
Persons and followed by
six
Coaches.
The
Church upon
many
Illustrious
Burial being over, the
particular Friends or Neighbours, were treated with some Bottles 0^ 1
A
mistake
for
1677
j
cp, p.
396, above.
APPENDIX Wine, according
to the
Custom of
417
the Country, in the
House where
the Deceased lodged. I shall observe by the bye, that the Barber of Spinosa brought in after his Death, a Bill exprest in these words " Spinosa, of Blessed " Memor;^} owes to Abraham Kervel, for having shaved him the last :
" Quarter, the
summ of one
Mr
Florin and eighteen Pence.
The Man, who
invited his Friends to his Burial, two Ironmongers, and the Mercer, who furnished the Mourning Gloves, made him the same Complement in their Bills.
If they had
Religion
known what were
the Principles 01 Spinosa in point of
would not have made use of the word Or perhaps they used that word according to Custom, which
;
Blessed:
'tis
likely that they
permits, sometimes, the abuse of such Expressions, even with respect to those, who die in despair, or in a final Impenitence. Spinosa being buried, his Landlord caused the Inventory of his
form
The Notary he made
made.
to be
Goods
use of, brought in a Bill, in this
William van Hove, Notary, for having made the Inventory of the Goods and Effects of the late Sieur Benedict de Spinosa. His Bill :
amounts to
to seventeen Florins and eight pence, which he acknowledges have received the 14th of November, 1677. Rebekah of Spinosa, Sister of the Deceased, declared her self his
But because she refused to pay, in the first place, the charges of the Burial, and some Debts wherewith the Succession was clogged Mr. Vander Spyck sent to her at Amsterdam, and summoned her to do it, by Robert Schmeding, who carried his Letter of Attorny drawn up and signed by Libertus Loefth.^: 30th of March, 1677. But, before she paid any thing, she had a mind to know, whether the Debts and Heir.
;
Charges being paid, she might get something by her Brother's InheritWhilst she was deliberating about it, Vander Spyck was authorance. iz'd
by Law,
to
was executed
;
make
a
and the
publick Sale of the Goods in question
Money
arising
the usual place, the Sister of Spinosa
from the
sale
which
;
being deposited in
made an Attachment of
it.
But
perceiving that after the payment of the Charges and Debts, there wou'd be little or nothing at all left, she desisted from her pretentions.
The
Attorny, John Lukkats,
brought him
who
served Vander Spyck in that Affair,
and sixteen pence,
a Bill of thirty three Florins
for
which Goods
The Sale of the said Receipt the ist oijune, 1678. was made here (at the Hague) the 4th of November, 1677, by Rykus van he gave
1
his
Fr.
'
Mr. Spinosa
de bienheureuse
memoire
2 E
'
:
in original
'Spinoza Zaliger.'
SPINOZA: HIS LIFE
41 8
Stralen, a
sworn Cryer,
as it
AND PHILOSOPHY
appears by his Account, bearing the same
Date.
One needs only cast one's Eyes upon that Account, to perceive that was the Inventory of a true Philosopher It contains only some small Books, some Cuts, some pieces of polished Glass, some Instruments to
it
:
polish them,
If^c.
It appears likewise, by his Cloaths, how good a Husband he was. A Camlet Cloak, and a pair of Breeches were sold for twenty one Florins and fourteen pence, another grey Cloak, twelve Florins and fourteen pence, four Sheets, six Florins and eight pence, seven Shirts, nine Florins and six pence, one Bed iiveteen Florins, nineteen Bands, one Florin and eleven pence, five Handkerchiefs, twelve pence, two red Curtains, a Counter-pain, and a little Blanket, six Florins And all his Plate, consisted of one Pair of Silver-Buckles, which were sold, two Florins. The whole Sale of the Goods amounted to four hundred Florins and thirteen Pence ; and the charges of the Sale being deducted, there remained three hundred ninety Florins and fourteen pence. These are all the particulars I cou'd learn about the Life and Death of Spinosa : He was forty four years, two months and twenty seven days old, when he died ; which happen'd the 21st of February^ '^^77 ^rid he was buried the 25th of the same month. :
â&#x20AC;˘>
FINIS.
[This reprint has been newly collated with one of the three copies in the British
Museum, and some minute
errors corrected.]
INDEX "
Sir^
my friend John Baynes
index ought nettles.'''
to
be
damned
— Henry B. Wheatley
to say that the man ivho published a book ivithout an beyond Hell, ivhere the Devil could not get for stingingJVhat is an Index ? p. 27.
used
ten miles :
Abarbanel, Leon, 96 Aboab, Isaac, de Fonseca, chief of the sterdam synagogue, 6
Balling,
Am-
— deluded by Sabbatai Zevi, 28 Amsterdam, foundation
of Jewish settlement
Ben
—
mention of
Sp.,
im-
270
mortality,
Arnold, Matthew, his essay on Tract. TheoLPol., 31,
Manasseh ben
Sp.,
355
in nature,
359
. .
— published
refutations of Sp., 55 identity of, and parallelism
Body and mind,
378
phenomena,
in Sp.'s system, 8
— correspondence
Attributes, Sp.'s definition of, 149, 152 parallelism of, 156, 160
Body, the human,
of,
criticised
of
of, a special
i
case of paral-
lelism of Attributes in Sp.'s system, 157 in a certain sense eternal,
by Tschirnhausen,
Boerhaave,
Auerbach, Berthold, his translation of and his Spinozism in literature, 372
Sp.,
Auxilia imaginationis, 171 Avenarius, Dr. Richard, his essay on Sp.'s philosophical development, 86 Averroes, on "active intellect" and immortality, 271 Avicebron (Ibn-Gebirol), Jewish Neo-Platonist ; his Fons Vitae, used and cited by
Giordano Bruno, 96 Bacon, Francis, Lord Verulam, his belief in an art of discovery, 299 surmised influence of, on Sp., 119, n.
—
232
Blyenbergh, William van, of Dort, his correspondence with Sp., 45
Association, doctrine of, in Sp., 183 Atheism repudiated by Sp., 66
— — theory
Israel
of Cloyne, his
Bernis, Cardinal de, refutes Sp., 361 Blackmore, Sir Richard, his confutation of
.
doctrine of intellectual
him on omens, 56
George, Bishop
— on waste
3" his
See
Israel.
Berkeley,
building and opening of synagogues, 4 Apparitions, Sp.'s opinion of, 58 Aristocracy, Sp.'s ideal scheme of, 311 his conjecture as to historical origin of,
Aristotle,
Principia
Bayle, Pierre, his article on Sp., 361
at, 3
—
—
of
translator
Peter,
Philosophiae, 55 letter of Sp. to
his will,
Hermannus, Spinozist 350
Bbhmer, Ed., his Modes, 176 Bontekoe, Dr. Sp.,
—
discussion of the Infinite his intention of refuting
350
Boulainvilliers,
of
C,
against
life
Henri Comte
de, his edition
of Sp., Introd. xi
his professed refutation of Sp.,
363
Boxel, Hugo, consults Sp. on ghosts, 58 Boyle, Robert, his scientific correspondence
with Sp. through Oldenburg, 27 Hattemist, 351
Bril, Jacob,
Bruder, C. H., his ed. of Sp., Introd. ix Bruno, Giordano, his influence on Sp., 12
1
SPINOZA
420
Bruno, Giordano, work, 97
:
use of Avicebron's
his
AND PHILOSOPHY
HIS LIFE
Descartes, Rene,
— Descartes perhaps
indebted to him, 99 mention of desio di conservarsi, 109 Burgh, Albert, announces to Sp. his reception into Roman Church, 72
—
his
•
Byron, Lord, intended to write preface to
from
Shelley's translation
Sp.,
377
Causa proximo, as element of definition with Sp.,
—
—
138
Causa su! [Eth. part i. def. i), 149 Cause, why not defined by Sp., 150 Causes, Final, Sp.'s attack on, 325 Charles Lewis, Elector Palatine, invites Sp. to chair of philosophy at Heidelberg, 33 Christ, Sp. on his office as compared with prophets, 341
— appearances
of, after
resurrection, 343
— —
stated by, 109, n.
Clarke, Dr. Samuel, his criticism on Sp., ' .358
W. K., on causation, cited, 150, «. Coleridge, S. T., his appreciation and exposition of Sp., 374 life
of Sp., Introd.
Appendix Conatus, meaning of, in Sp.'s use, 203 Conde (Louis H. de Bourbon, Prince invites Sp. to French headquarters
ix,
reprint in
at
use by
its
his conception of matter criticised
See
Energy
his
statement of First
partial
Motion, and of it, 108
Law
Sp.,
of
Sp.'s philosophical extension
from
his search for truth distinguished
116 his theory of the passions
Sp.'s,
criticised
by
200
Determinism,
—
206
Sp.'s doctrine of,
189
distinguished from fatalism, 190 De Vries, Simon, pupil and friend of Sp., his early death, and intended bounty to
22
Sp.,
De Witt, John and with
Sp.,
Cornelius, their relations
34
Dort, synods of, 16, 32 Duration, distinguished by Sp. from measurable time, 170 Earbery, Matthias, his criticism on Sp., 357 Education, hint of Sp.'s view of, 118
Emotions,
Sp.'s definitions of,
— can 236 — only the
216
emo-
tion,
89
Cudworth, Ralph, his criticism on Cuflfeler, Abraham, 350
by
108
Sp.,
be restrained only by stronger
Creskas, Chasdai, of Barcelona, independent Jewish philosopher j points of resemblance to Sp. ; a determinist ; quoted by Sp.,
and
104
de)
Utrecht, 35 Condillac, E. B. de, his criticism on Sp.,
361 Conservation of Energy.
his doctrine of motion, Sp.,
on pineal gland, criticised by Sp., 261 Design, the argument from, 230
Clifford,
Colerus, Johannes, his
scientific
Sp.,
—
Amst. 1663), 29 element in Sp. mostly due to
Philosophiae, etc.,
Desire, Sp.'s definition of,
Chrysippus, principle of self- preservation
his Principles
him, 10
—
—
Casearius, 22
handbook of
of Philosophy prepared by Sp., enlarged and published [Renati Des Cartes Principiorum
357
active are good, 248 Ende or Enden, Francis Affinius van den, Sp.'s
—
master in Latin, 10
his migration to France, implication
in
De Rohan's
conspiracy, and execution, 14 Ende, Clara van den, daughter of Francis
m. Theodore Kerckrinck, 1671, have jilted Sp., but the tale im-
V. d. E.,
Da
Costa, Uriel, his career, excommunication by the synagogue of Amsterdam, and death, 7 Dante, self-preserving effort of all things mentioned in his " De Monarchia," 109, n.
Davids, T. Rhys, on Buddhism, cited, 202
Davy,
Sir
Humphry,
his verses,
377
Decalogue, Sp. on revelation of, 334 Definition, Sp.'s theory of, 137 De la Court, Peter, mentioned by Sp., 315 Democracy, Sp.'s definition of, 313 Descartes, Rene, handbook of his Principles of Philosophy prepared by Sp., 28
said to
probable, 13
Endowments,
Sp.'s opinion of, 311 Energy, conservation of, not discoverable a priori, 105 not anticipated by Descartes or Sp., 107 Erdn:ann, E., cited, 161 J.
—
Error,
— —
how
distinguished
from
fiction
[De
Em.), 130 belongs to imagination, not understand-
Int.
Sp.'s explanation of, 184 " Eternal things " of Sp. {De
what, 142
Int.
Em.),.
1
INDEX Eternity, perception of things under form of,
144, 173
— — by — knowledge under —
of, in self-understanding, the intellectual love of,
149
Sp.
from duration, 170 of, 273, 277
the form
of the mind, 269 of Sp., definitions
•
of
Part
I.
translated, 148 preface to Part III. translated, 199 definitions of emotions translated, 216 preface to Part IV., 229
IV.
to Part
translated,
_
253
by Sp, in letters
Explanation included by Sp. in Definition, 138 Extension, as one of known Attributes, 153
Thought, 158
relation to
Fabritius,
sqq.
John Lewis, of Schaffhausen,
1632-1697
;
theology
at
official letter to Sp.,
33
of
professor
Heidelberg, writes
Fichte, J. G., traces of Sp. in his work, 372 Fiction, Sp.'s theory of (in De Int. Em.)., use
of, in science,
of,
in
physics, 78 Freedom, Sp.'s definition of, 149 Free-will, Sp. on, 193
Froude, J. A., his essay on
Sp.,
Garnett, R., publication by
chief, Sp.'s
distinction of,
him
of Shelley's
Sp.'s theory of Attributes, 163 Gersonides (Levi ben Gerson), most Aristotelian of Jewish philosophers, 88 his doctrine of immortality, 271 Geulinx, Arnold, on occasional causes, 179 God, in what sense cause of evil, etc., 52 human afl^ections not to be ascribed to,
—
—
61 theory of knowledge and love essay De Deo et Homme, 86
of, in
the
opinions of Maimonides concerning, 88 by," 10
— "things immediately produced
— Motion
and Understanding called Sons et Hom'me), 102
by Sp. {De Deo
— perfection
•
117, 140
of,
how
235
conception
from
of,
241
right.,
303 Government, Sp. and Hobbes on origin
— — —
of,
294 as defined
by Sp., 305
perfection of, 306 federal, Sp. on, 311
Graevius, professor at Utrecht, 32 Gratz, Dr. H., his Geschichte der Juden used and cited, ch. i. passim his opinion that Sp. was born in Spain,
— —
75; «• his remarks on history of Kabbalah, 9, lo
Brampton,
Boyle
lecturer,
his
359
Harmony, pre-established, Hartmann, Eduard von,
179, 354 his
criticism
on
373 Hate, Sp.'s definition of, 210 and derived emotions, always bad, 246 Hattem, Pontiaan van, his Spinozist mysticism, 351 Hegel, G. W. F., his criticism on Sp., 372 Heine, Heinrich, celebrated Sp., 371 Helvetius (J. F. Schweitzer), (1625-1709), alchemist, his supposed production of
—
378
377 Geometrical method, Sp.'s purpose in using, 201 Geometry, non-Euclidean, bearing of, on
of,
Sp.'s definition of,
Sp.,
diary,
•
— the —
criticism on Sp.,
modern
—
369 Good,
131
Flaubert, Gustave, on Sp. 379 Force, comparative insignificance
—
infinite
Gurdon,
130
— lawful
rule,
of Sp.'s conception
of, 328 understanding " of, what? 329 Goethe, J. W. von, Sp.'s influence on him,
—
its
summary
—"
—
—
predicablc
subject to a
—
to Blyenbergh, 47 Sp.'s definition of, 235 knowledge of, inadequate, 251 Evolution, theory of, Sp.'s relation to, 110
•
will
of,
— — —
Evil, nature of, discussed
be destroyed,
intellectual love of,
of,
Ethics
— Appendix
Sp.'s definition of,
149 — 269 — 281 — cannot 283 — freedom and omnipotence 319 — and understanding not 320 — not moral 322 love
Sp.'s definition of,
distinguished
God,
421
understood by Sp.,
gold,
62
G., his dialogues on Sp., 368 J. Hobbes, Thomas, of Malmesbury, Sp.'s master in politics, 288 mention of, by Sp., 291 his political system compared with Sp.'s,
Herder,
— — — 293 agreement
with Sp.
as to
supremacy
of
State,
297 Hodgson, Shad worth H., on Causation, cited, 150 "Homo Politicus " (pseudonymous book),
290
Howe, John, his criticism on Sp., 358 Hume, David, his Idea of a Perfect Comntonivealth.,
300
SPINOZA
422
:
HIS LIFE
Hume,
David, ignored Sp., 356 Huxley, T. H., on Berkeley, cited, 158 Huygens, Christian, his just estimate of the labour
awaiting scientific
still
dis-
coverers, 71
AND PHILOSOPHY Kant, Immanuel, difference of his view of time and space from Sp.'s, 174 neglected Sp., 369 Kerckrinck, Theodore, physician, of Amsterdam, m. Clara Maria van den Ende,
—
supposed a rival of Sp., 13
Ibn Ezra, his biblical criticism, 88 sometimes deliberately reticent or ob-
—
scure, 88, n.
Ibn-Gebirol.
See
Avicebron 124
—
Idea^ Sp.'s use of the word,
— 125 — ambiguous —
Knowledge, degrees of, enumerated by Sp., 119, 187 Knowledge, power of, towards controlling passions, 268 "under the form of eternity," 269 Koerbagh, Adrian and John, 23-25 Kranen, professor of philosophy, 72
ideae^
word by Sp., 125 term in relation to the eternity of the mind, 269 Idealism, implicit, of Sp., 164 use of the
Sp.'s use of the
some necessarily adequate, 122 Identity of person, Sp.'s remarks on, 245 Images, generic, Sp, on, 187 Ideas,
Imagination,
distinguished
standing, 135 Immortality, Peripatetic
from
of,
Impost eurs. Trait e des Infinite
Averroist
men
of, in
of
philosophy, cited, 89, 91 Judah, the Believer (Don Lope de Vera, etc.), Spanish convert to Judaism, burnt 1644 j his constancy mentioned by Sp., 75
Kabbalah, prevalence its
ancient sources
of, in Sp.'s
time, 9
influence on Sp., 92 of,
165
Positive,
59
of,
244
etc.,
d.
1585,
304 his
Spinozistic
— — 37recommended by Tschirnhausen, 39 69 — thought an method 77 — of Descartes' motion, 105, — note on "eternal things," 142, — on harmony, 179 — 354 study of Lessing, G. — conversation with Jacobi on365
Sp.'s
infallible
time,
scientific
possible,
his correction
error as to
Sp.'s
pre-established
his depreciation of Sp., E., his
Sp.,
his
Sp., 366'
Lewes, G. H., advanced knowledge of Sp. in England, 378 on Causation, cited, 150 Lewis, Sir Geo. Cornewall, on acquiescence in established governments, 309 Life, Mr. H. Spencer's definition of, 206 Linde, Dr. A. van der, his Bibliography of Sp., Introd. vii, and passim Locke, John, his slight knowledge of Sp.,
—
355
93
allusions to, by Sp., his
94
Lotsy,
opinion of
Love,
them, 93 Kant, Immanuel, the value of his work, 78 on possible subjectivity of Ding an sich^ cited,
Sp.,
n.
M., of Breslau, on Sp.'s Jewish forerunners, 89 his monographs on mediaeval Jewish
—
— — duty
his
at
success of Sabbatai Zevi's imposture, 28
of
spectris,
n.
Joel, Dr.
Kabbalists
Boxel to
to Sp.
Amsterdam, 6 censure and final excommunication Sp. by synagogue of Amsterdam, 17
question of
book De
Wilhelm, Freiherr von, corresponds with Sp. on optics, 20 visits and discusses philosophy with Sp.,
Netherlands, 3 their settlement recognised by law, 4
— — — supposed
Vloten's
Leibnitz, Gottfried
discussion of Sp. with
Jews, establishment
—
a
cited by
363
Lessing, 366
their chief
v.
379
of obeying, 306 Frederick van, heresy, 352
Janet, Paul, on Sp. in France, 361 Jans, Dinah, Hattemist, 351 Jesus, son of Sirach, on finality in philosophy, 382
— — — —
Sp.,
Leenhof,
Modes, 142
H., his
monograph on
Law, general nature
and
Infinity, Sp.'s doctrine of, 169
Jacobi, F.
his
al.)
Under-
275
trois,
—
and
P. N., his J. ed. of Sp., Introd. viii
Lavater, Lewis, of Zurich, author of {jnter
theories of,
271 — popular opinion
Land, Prof.
—
M. C, on
Sp.,
276 210
Sp.'s definition of,
God
in self-understanding, 268 the intellectual, 280 Lucas, biogi'apher of Sp., his life of Sp.,
of
Introd. X, xi
INDEX Lucas, his anecdote of Sp.'s
equanimity,
whether made up from Epictetus, 42
423
More Nebuchim,
Maimonides,
of
cited,
88,
95 Morteira, Saul Levi, Sp.'s reputed teacher, 6, 16 Moses of Cordova, passage of his Kabbalistic commentary supposed to be referred to by Sp., 94 Motion, Cartesian theory of, 103 quantity of, assumed constant by Descartes and Sp., 105 one of Sp.'s "eternal things," 142 Miiller, Johannes, on Sp.'s account of the passions, 201 .
Machiavelli, Niccolo, Sp.'s remarks on his Prince,
309
Mahometanism, no schism Sp.,
in,
according to
75
Maimonides (Moses ben Maimon), relation to
Sp.'s
him, 88
— Nebuchim, 89 — on
philosophical
doctrines
in
his
More
immortality, 271
Maine,
Sir Henry Sumner, his correction of the theory of sovereignty, 298 Manasseh ben Israel, his work and character, 6
Marranos, persecution of, and foundation of Jewish settlement in Netherlands by, 3 Materialism, Sp.'s avoidance of, 158 Matter, one of Sp.'s "eternal things," 142 Cartesian definition of, 108 Maurice, F. D., his admiration for Sp., 378 Maxwell, James Clerk, his criticism of Cartesian material substance, 108
—
Memory,
Sp.'s definition of,
183
Mendelssohn, Moses, Lessing's and Jacobi's correspondence with, 365 Method, object and definition of, in De Int. Em., 115 sqq. Meyer, Dr. Lewis, of Amsterdam, edits Sp.'s
Principia Philosophiae and
Cogitata
Metaphysica, 28 present at Sp.'s death, 40 writes preface to 0pp. Posth., 41 Middleton, C. S., published fragment Shelley's translation
from
of
Sp.,
certain reality,
284 Mode, Sp.'s definition of, 149 Modes of Substance, 153
—
of,
244, 307
302
of,
Necessity, doctrine
of,
advantages, ac-
its
cording to Sp., 195
Neustadt (?), common friend of Sp. and L. van Velthuysen, 68 New Christians Jewish converts in Spain :
so called, 2
— — exodus
persecution
of, 3
to Netherlands, 4 Nominalism of Sp., 49, 137, 142
von
Novalis (F. Sp.,
Hardenberg),
celebrated
371
Number, Objecti've,
Sp.'s
account
of,
171
meaning of term first
Sp.'s
time,
secretary of
Royal
in
Society, 25
377 164 and Matter, the gulf between them, 178 attempts to explain correspondence, 179 human, composite, 182 eternity of, 269 its knowledge of the body " under the form of eternity," 277 eternity of, paired with capacity of body,
— — — —— —
Nature, state
— Law
121 Oldenburg, Henry,
— —
Mind, the only
— —
— correspondence with exhorting — correspondence with his
Sp.
:
valiant in
Sp. to publish his works, 25 Sp. on the Resur-
rection, etc.,
Omens,
342
letter of Sp. concerning, 58
Omnipotence, involves necessity according to Sp., 320 Oosten, Jacob, 63 Opera Posthuma of Sp., their publication, 41 condemned by authority, 42 Orobio, Isaac, de Castro, Spanish-Jewish former mistaken attribution physician
—
•
:
the Infinite, of Sp.'s system, 142, 154,
—
of a letter to, 63 anti-Spinozist, 350
176
Monarchy,
Sp.'s ideal
scheme
of,
310
Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat, Baron de, allusion to Sp.'s letters by,
364
Morality, essentially social in Sp.'s view, 82
— — not dependent on
social character of, 239,
243
philosophy, 266
Morality, Positive, what, 303 not distinctly recognised by Sp., 304
Pain, Sp.'s definition of, 208 as such, always bad ace. to Sp., 209
—
Pantheism,
a
vague term, 331 of, 201
Passions, Sp.'s theory
Paulus, H. E. G., his edition of Sp., Introd. X, xi
Perception, no
197
definite
theory
of,
in
Sp.,
— 1
SPINOZA
424
:
Perfection, identified with
—
Sp.'s definition of,
HIS LIFE reality by Sp.,
Personality of God, Sp. on, 330 Philosophy, general aim of, according
to
separation of, from faith by Sp., 318 Sp.'s system of. See Spinoza (Philo-
—
Self-conservation, as first spring of action,
sophy)
—
Hobbes' and Sp.'s theory See Spinoza (Theory of Politics) Prophecy, Sp.'s view of, 340
of,
as foundation of virtue,
237
Tract. Theol.-Pol.,
377
Sigwart, Prof. Chr., his opinion as to Sp.'s "eternal things" considered, 141 Society necessary to man, 243
— foundations
244
of,
Sovereignty, Hobbes and Sp. on, 294 Space, measurable, relation of to extension,
Pleasure, Sp.'s definition of, 208 as such, always good ace. to Sp., 209 Polignac, Cardinal de, refutes Sp., 361
Politics,
201
Shelley, Percy Bysshe, began translation of
115
Sp.,
AND PHILOSOPHY —
234
;
170 etc.
Spencer, Herbert, coincidence with Descartes in illustration of relativity of
— view of the with 122 — on meaning of — of — on and his
motion, 103
of truth compared
test
Sp.'s,
Rapp, Christopher, 291, n. Read, Carveth, cited, 150, ;;. Reason, the life according to, 238 supremacy of, in Sp.'s system, 241 source of active emotions, 248 Rehorn, Dr. K., on Lessing and Sp., 365 Religion, what Sp. understood by it, 66
— — —
consists in obedience, according to Sp.,
318, 337
Remonstrants, Sp.'s life with, about the time of his excommunication, 17, 20 Renan, Ernest, on Sp., 379 Resurrection of Jesus Christ, Sp. on, 342 Revelation, private, not to be alleged against the law, 298 object of, according to Sp., 335 nature and authority of, 337
— — — —
difficulty in ascertaining Sp.'s of,
real
view
338
existence,
his definition
pleasure
204
206 pain, 209 life,
Spijck, van der, Spinoza's landlord at the
Hague, 41, 43 Spinoza, Baruch or Benedict de
Biography
:
:
Portraits of Sp., Jutrod.
xiii
His birth and parentage, i His early studies at Amsterdam, 10
from Van den knowledge of languages, 1
Latin learnt
Ende
Story of Spinoza's love for his daughter, 13
Censured by synagogue, 16 Attempt on his life, 16
Excommunication, 17 Civil sentence of banishment (?), 19 His conduct in partition of inheritance,
to Christ, peculiar, 341 Right, natural, what, 301
Work as optician and intended scientific
Robinson, T. Crabb, anecdote of Coleridge and Sp. reported by, 375
Friendship with Simon de Vries
Sabbatai Zevi, of Smyrna, pseudo-Messiah, after deceiving many, turned Turk, 28
on
writings,
— —
spondence, 25 of the
Publication
Savigny, Fr. Carl von, cited for model de-
sophjae
Sp.,
finition, 139 Schaarschmidt, Prof.
Deo,
etc., Introd.
Schelling, F.
W.
J.
his ed. of Sp.
De
xiv von, his criticism on Sp.,
372
de-
Principia
Philo-
and Cogitata Metaphysicay 28
Publication
C,
j
from him, 22 with the brothers Koerbagh, 23 with H. Oldenburg, and corre-
clines bequest
378
Saisset, E,,
20
Politicus,
of
Tractatus
Theologico-
30
Declines invitation to professorship at Heidelberg, 32 Visit
to
the
Schleiermacher, F. E. D., celebrated Sp., 371 Schopenhauer, Arthur, his criticism on Sp.,
invasion
373 SchuUer, Dr. G. H., of Amsterdam, 38, 41 See Helvetius Schweitzer, J. F. Self-conservation, in what sense first law of moral nature with Sp., 81
Arrangements
of
French
camp
1672, and
in
danger
the
on
return, 35
broken
off,
for publication of Ethics
36
Leibnitz's visit, 37
His last illness and death, 39 His manner of life, 42
—
—
INDEX Spinoza, Baruch or Benedict de
Spinoza, Baruch or Benedict de
:
Letters and Writings List of works j modern :
directly,
publication of
letters,
as
to
67
Leibnitz,
Letter to on alleged converJ. Jellis sion of silver into gold, 62 The essay Of God and Man, its date
and character,
how
far Cartesian,
84
Contrasts to Sp.'s later work, 86
Philosophy
:
Philosophy Complexity of philosophical problems, :
editions and Translations of, Introd. Opera Poztliuma published, 41 Correspondence with Oldenburg, 25 with William van Blyenbergh, 45 with P. Balling, 56 with H, Boxel, on ghosts, 58 with Velthuysen, through J. Oosten, 63
— ~ — — — with Velthuysen former — with 69 — with Tschirnhausen, — with Albert Burgh, 7270
425
underrated, 123
Theory of
definition, 137 "Eternal things," 140 Geometrical form of exposition, 147 Definitions of Part L of Ethics, 148 Theory of causation, 149 Of Attributes, 152 Modes, what, 154 Parallelism of Attributes, 156 How far idealist? 162 Infinity, time, measurable space, 169 Part II. of Ethics considered, 177 Correspondence of human body and mind, 180 Association of ideas and memory, 183 Determinism, 189 Nature of free-will, 191 Absence of theory of perception, 197
The
:
Slight acquaintance with ancient philo-
sophy, 62 Reconciliation of God's freedom and moral law with necessity of things.
Leading ideas Unity and uniformity of nature, 80 :
Monism, 81
passions
(Part
III,
of Ethics)
:
springs of action, 199 Definition of desire, 206
Of
pleasure and pain, 208 Relation to Darwinism, 208
Treatment 212
of
compound
emotions,
Definitions of the emotions, 216 Part IV. of Ethics : notions of perfec-
Self-maintaining effort, 8 i Relation to Jewisii philosophers Generally, 82 Maimonides, Ibn-Ezra, Gersonides, 88 Chasdai Creskas, 89 Influence of Kabbalah denied, 92 Relation to Giordano Bruno, 97 Adoption from Descartes of doctrine of Conservation of Motion, 104 Suggestion of modern physical ideas in his language, 106 Criticism of Cartesian physics, 107 Derivation of the principle of self-con-
tion and imperfection, 234 Leading ethical ideas, 237 Resemblances to Stoicism, 238 Virtue founded on self-maintenance,
servation from Descartes, 109 Does not prophesy theory of evolution,
Mastery of the passions, 264 Power of knowledge, 265 Knowledge " under the form of
:
1
10
Divergence from Cartesian dualism, 112 Relation of the De Intellectus Emendatione to the Ethics, 115 His conception of the chief good in De Int. Em., 116 The degrees of knowledge, 119 The test of truth, 121 Aims and problems of doctrine of
Method, 115
240 Its intellectual character,
241
Social grounds of morality,
Society and
242
Law, 244
Useful and hurtful emotions, 246
Enjoyment
of life, 247 Passive and active emotions, 248
The
free
man, 251
Collection of maxims, 253 Part V. of Ethics, 260
nity,"
eter-
273
Eternity of the mind, 274 Sp.'s use of idea in relation doctrine,
to
277
Intellectual love of
God, 280
Excellence of body and mind, 284 Virtue and blessedness, 286 Theory of Politics Affinity to English School, 289 :
Views on
practical legislation,
292
this
— SPINOZA
426
:
HIS LIFE
Spinoza, Baruch or Benedict de Theory of Politics Theory of sovereignty and
Stoics, self-preservation recognised as first
:
impulse by, 109,
:
govern-
ment, 295 Limits of government, 295, 306 allowed, 297 Scientific treatment of political facts,
«.
mentioned by
209 239 coincidence of Sp. with, 287 Subject and object, division of, 178 Subjecti've^ meaning of term in Sp.'s time,
of, 148 Swedenborg, Emanuel, his alleged borrowing from Sp., 353
Taine, Hippolyte-Adolphe, his
with
Sp.,
Sp. differs
of
Sp. on.
Rejection of final causes, 325 Difference in conception of God from orthodox theology, 329 revelation,
334
Scope of revelation, 335 Distinction of Christ from
Moses and
prophets, 341
Resurrection
not
literally
cepted, 343 view of practical religion,
Sp.'s
Modern
ac-
344
:
from
natural,
of,
230
Stoics on,
some
239
difficulties of,
— — —
Sp.'s view,
173 no relation to, 274 Toland, John, his remarks on Sp., 360 eternity has
—
and
— —
>
Theologko
- Politicus,
30 Sp. attempted to stop translation condemned by authority, 33 Sp.'s position in,
of,
32
236 of,
289
sqq.
Treaties, obligation of, 307
Cartesians and Leibnitz, 353
Berkeley and English school,
Theological criticism, 357 Theologians and EncycloFrance paedists, 361 Voltaire, 362 Boulainvilliers, 363 Germany Lessing's appreciation, 365 Goethe, 369 Auerbach, 371 Modern German philosophy, 372 Coleridge, 374 English revival Recent study in England and France, :
:
:
378 Study and commemoration
publication
effect of,
Tractatus Politicus, Sp.'s, account
Church, 351
230
See Spinoza (Theology)
Thing, what we mean by, 204 Thought, as one of known Attributes, 153 really swallows up other Attributes, 164 Time, Sp.'s account of, 170 rational knowledge independent of, in
Tractatus
Criticism, etc, Early attacks on Sp. in Netherlands, 349 Influence on mystical sects in Reformed
:
— Theology, —
accordance
379
Teleology, difficulties
:
The Mosaic
132
Sp.,
to Sp. in their ethics,
Substance, Sp.'s definition
Necessity of God's operations, 320 Sp.'s relation to popular notions Deity, 322
England
of,
121
300 "Natural right," 302 General ethico-legal ideas, 303 The best government, 308 Ideal monarchy, 309 Aristocracy, 311 Democracy, 313
The
— materialism — resemblances — —
difference in teleology,
Ecclesiastical claims against State dis-
Theology
AND PHILOSOPHY
Trendelenburg, Adolf, on Sp.'s "eternal things," 142 on Causation, cited, 150, 7z. Truth, the test of, 121, 131 Tschirnhausen (Ehrenfried Walter von) Bohemian nobleman, worker in science, and optics, friend of Sp., 39, 70 borrowed largely from Sp., 70 metaphysical correspondence with Sp.,
—
— — — —
his correspondence
with Sp. on Cartesian
physics, 107 criticises Sp.'s
theory of Attributes, 160
Holland,
Understanding, its distinction from Imagination fundamental, 135
Spy Nozy, anecdote of Coleridge concerning,
Uniformity of nature, leading principle with Sp., 128 Universals, Sp.'s treatment of, 186
in
379
374 State, formation and
— supremacy —
of,
power of
power, 295 of resemblance
limits of
the,
306
Universe, a conception
297
sui generis,
133
its
Stoicism, doctrine to, 238
Sp.'s
ethical
V. H. See De la Court Veldhuysen or Velthuysen, Dr. Lambert
INDEX van, of Utrecht
on Tractatus
— —
j
his
controversial letter
Voltaire, his various remarks on Sp,, 362
T/ieologico-Politicus,
63 subsequent letter of Sp. to him on proposed publication thereof, with answer, 68 enlarges and publishes his arguments against
427
Tractatus Theologico- Politicus
in-
Wachter, J. E., his attempt ism in Sp., 92
Women,
Sp.
on
their
to find
political
Kabbal-
capacity,
dependently, 68
Don Lope de, y Alarcon de San Clemente (Judah the Believer), his conversion to Judaism and martyrdom, 75 Virtue, essentially active, 248 its own reward, 286 Vloten, Dr. J. van, his work, on Sp., Introd.
Vera,
—
viii,
Wordsworth, William, Coleridge's with him about Sp., 374
— influence
Zohar, the Kabbalistic book so
94
THE END
Printed
Spinozism on,
376
forgery,
379
of Coleridge's
talk
byK.ScK. Clark,
Limited, Edinburgh
called, a
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