BOKO HARAM by Don Michael Adeniji

Boko Haram: Designing Effective Counter-Terrorism

Programme

Acknowledgement Work like this take a lot from people around you, task them more than it tasks the writer. For the completion of this work, I will like to thank God Almighty for His Benevolence and Mercies that were with me from the at the beginning to the end. I acknowledge the supports and contributions of the Inspector General of Police, Mr. Mohammed Abubakar, the entire Police Force Management Team for bringing a new lease of life to policing in Nigeria and the gallant officers and men of the Nigeria Police Force. Not forgetting the supports of the officers and men of the Police Public Relation Officer’s Office, as well as The Presidential Security Team, State House, Abuja, which remains our first constituency. People whose contributions and critiques are essential to this work: My direct supervisor DCP Moses Ambakina Jitoboh, Chief Personal Security Officer (CPSO) to the President, C-In-C, Federal Republic of Nigeria, Lt. General AbdulRahman Dambazau, Immediate past, Chief of Army Staff (COAS) and Fellow, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, AVM Gbolahan Adekunle Ade (Rtd.), AIG Solomo Arase, AIG Force Intelligence Bureau, all fellow Alumni of the Harvard Kennedy School, Harvard University, Cambridge, Boston, US for their encouragement and supports. Mrs. Barbara Jitoboh, who was there from the beginning and made the first main corrections; Miller Gajere Dantawaye, Commander 24 PMF and the officers and men of the 24 PMF, PRESCORT State House, Abuja for being part of our lives; DSP Kareem John Musiliu, Staff Officer, CPSO’s Office, State House, for his several contributions to content and planning of this book; Staff of the Chief Personal Security Officer’s office, State House Abuja: SP Charles Onoh, Mr. Ibrahim Tanko Yusuf, Mr. Uche Okoroafor, ASP Nwosu Godson, Insp. Bernard Agada, Corp. Attajiri Mary and others who form the first contributors to these researches. Many thanks to the first line editor, Miss Noela Kings and the editors at PANAF for their tireless efforts in making this almost readable. To our families and friends, who were also part of this and to those people we unintentionally missed their names here, whose efforts also translated into this: “Thank God you were with me to made it happen” Thank you all! Don Michael Adeniji

Abuja, January 2014

Dedication To the families of our real heroes: Officers and men of the Nigeria Armed Forces, Nigeria Police Force and State Security Service.

Introduction ‘Rebellion: an act of armed resistance to an established government or leader, …the action or process of resisting authority, control, or convention’

(Free Online

Dictionary 2013)

’The struggle for the dominance of races started at the onset of modern societies. … terror has been a tool in the hands of leaders and conquerors and has been exploited by terror groups to spread political and religious ideas’ (Phares 2008).

Despite huge numbers of rebellions recorded in medieval historical volumes and the ever present news of several ongoing rebellions in the world today blamed: on poor governance; lack of basic infrastructures; repressions of citizenry and high poverty incidence; its quite surprising that huge numbers of citizens still remain law abiding and abhors challenging the power of the state. The successes recorded in several rebellions in modern time -like the Arab Spring that swept through and reshaped history in several countries the Middle East and Africa- many reasoned should have been the tonic for citizens’ lack of tolerance for suppressive and despotic regimes. 4

The lack of interest by most citizens in rebellion is traced to the fact that relative rational human beings instinctively abhors state of continuous warfare and always prefer to walk away than risk intentional exposure to life threating situations. Rebellions against tyranny have been far in between because citizens are wary of the strain on cost (human and resources), time needed to pursue such rebellion to a logical conclusion and the effects of such rebellion on their families and cherished values.

To top these, what are the success rates for such rebellions given the huge state armies in the 21 st century? Why then do people rebel giving the high risk and emotional threats involved? What strengthens insurgents to take up arms against the state damming all consequences even without any chance of success? These questions have continued to flummoxed majority of analysts, historians and social scientists for ages.

Ted Robert Gurr tried to explain this phenomenon through the â&#x20AC;&#x153;grievance theoryâ&#x20AC;?. He explained that people have a threshold of patience and can only bear oppression and bad

situation up to a point. That means if a system maltreat and oppress the people for a long period of time, some of them might take the risk of taking on the system regardless of chance of success. The grievance theory have been expressed as the motivations for several anti-state elements mutating from verbal attacks on the state to militant and guerrilla warfare to drive their demands home.

It is important to reflect on reasons why some people rebel and others continue to bear the pressure. Every citizen always holds grudges against the state one-way or the other. Not all grievances are worth of rebellion but grievances that touch on family, cultural values, religion and human dignity have been known to ferment rebellion. Many have argued that insurgencies, which started for other reasons have continued to strive, based on grievance theory. The longer their challenge on the state last the more disgruntled members of the society they attracts to their side due to stateâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s heavy handedness in retaliation to their attacks. The accidental slaughter of a farmerâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s family during military counter-insurgency operations could motivate him to pick up arms against the state.

Most scholars concluded that human greed and hunger for 6

power remains the chief motivator of rebels. Promises of rewards and better living conditions for youth in many rebel camps have been a tonic for recruitment into rebel groups. Youth from Northern Nigeria where poverty reign supreme may easily be lured into radical groups through avarice of existing members. Rebellions strives in areas where there are natural resources (crude oil, diamond, Gold) are in abundance and areas where existing illicit economies are booming (oil bunkering, smuggling, drug trade). The pattern of persistent rebellion in Nigeria remains in the Niger Delta, an oil rich environment and Southeastern Border States of Borno, Adamawa, and Bauchi known as path of ancient trans-Sahara Trade and slave route during the 17th century; now converted as drug route to European market.

Apostles of human greed as a tonic for rebellions expunged the love of religion as the tonic for modern Islamic zealots. The promise of â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;immeasurable wealth in heaven and attendance of 70 virgins for martyrs of the struggleâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; are greater impetus for a desolate unemployable youth without a future to hang on to in his fight for the Lord.

On the other hand many analysts dismissed the theories of grievances and human greed and posited that humans will 7

only rebel where there are perceived â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;reasonable chance of successâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;. Itâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s no huge surprises that successful rebels are always based in easily defensible terrains. Areas where the government will find it difficult to attack like the vast desert areas of Northeastern Nigeria and the inaccessible creeks of the Niger Delta.

There are basically three reasons why people rebel: Grievance against the state, insatiable human greed, and a reasonable chance of success. Then it became more reasonable that 80% of rebels are youth with lots to prove and hungry for control of power and resources and willing to take huge risks to achieve these. Greed for power and resources has become the bane on human society development. African states have continued to exhibit all the indices of filing states, in fact most of the frailest states in the world are found in the continent: From Banjul to Chad, Maiduguri to Kinshasa, Kigali to Maputo: fratricidal wars, insurrections, civil disobedience, persistent conflicts and despotic leadership prevails the continent. In a continent experiencing burgeoning youth population: unemployment, poverty, lack of inherent abilities for expression of personal views, oppression of the peasants by the elites, high handed and arrogant security forces, high incidence of political 8

corruption, religious intolerance and nepotism persists in an area with high incidence of pre-colonial ethnic rivalry between over 4000 ethnic nationalities.

Weak government, inequalities of tribes, and lack of equity in sharing of national resources is a recipe for revolt. Rebellions in several forms have occurred in most African states within 10 years of independence and countries like Congo and Angola have recorded over 30 years of political insurrections. African fought for independence employing guerrilla and terror as tactics to suppress the dominance of the Europeans, and with the same spirit continued the fight against the states charted for them by the colonialists. Terrorism can then be seen as a form of rebellion in Africa. These rebellions which have been founded on the greed of the over 4000 ethnic nations for control of political and economic power has been enhanced in recent years by the perceived weakness of the state and its security apparatus. These public grievances have escalated by low economic indices and inequalities in national polity.

Repeated conflicts are a reflection of an inherent lack of trust in stateâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s institutions and capabilities to ensure equity. Stateâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s capabilities to reduce grievances through adoption of 9

humane policies and decrease public humiliation have thoroughly been lacking in several instances in Africa. The people generally perceive the security agents and state’s officials as instrument of oppression. Hence, rebellion then becomes a means of public expression, which reflects off national policy of the state.

Greed, grievance and opportunity for success make rebellions a passionate selfish business undertaking. It is an avenue for groups to hijack control of state resources and oppress the weak for political and economic gains. Rebellions don’t normally favour the society, it destroy the link between people and bring destruction to culture and cherished values. Rebellions can only be critically analyzed and understood, through the exploration of the economic and political interests of the insurgents.

Armed groups from all regions of Nigeria have continued to ferment trouble and challenge the state. The Odua Peoples’ Congress (OPC) hold reign in the South-West, MASSOB is championing the South-West independence state of Biafra agenda, South-South Militants continued the struggle for 25% derivation or separation from the country, the Arewa Peoples’ Congress holds the touch for Northerners agitations. 10

Boko

Haram has surpassed all rebellion groups in Nigeria in recent years due to its vicissitude from a group of Islamic preachers to fully armed anti-state insurgent group within 10 years of existence. Factually, the Nigerian state is in a state of flux; component nations are at war with each other on one hand and the state on the other; politically and otherwise. The economy has continued to nosedive as public spending on fictitious projects spiral upward. Infrastructures have depreciated and the Human Development Index (HDI) is one of the lowest in the world. Increase in poverty has occasioned agitations from citizens and radicalization of the growing youth population continued from the late eighties. Religion and ethnicity has been employed as political tool in the hands of an elite without sound political argument and economic policy in angling for power. The growth of nepotism and tribalism aided the expansion of corruption in the government and the civil services. Religion and ethnicity gradually became qualification for office and basis for negotiation of all issues in Nigeria. Surprisingly, Nigeria is a religiously secular state by the letters of its constitution, yet billions of state funds are expended annually on religious jamborees and pilgrimages while poverty expanded in the rural areas of the country. 11

Given that security is important to the development of any state then there exists a need for critical study of the security need of Nigeria towards designing a viable security policy that will guide its politics and economic development. Understanding the meaning, types and roles of security in nation building then become a critical issue in nation building. Planning for security as state expands should replace current high military spending. The burgeoning youth population in Nigeria makes the society a viable environment for radical thoughts and criminal activities; there is a need for a proactive policing system to tackle these challenges. The United Nations General Assembly at its 65 th Session adopted and passed Resolution 65/1 on the Millennium Development Goals on 19 October 2010. The section three (3) of this Resolution outlined the major security need for people of any state in the world as: â&#x20AC;&#x153;...freedom, peace and security, respect for all human rights, including the right to development, the rule of law, gender equality and an overall commitment to just and democratic societies for developmentâ&#x20AC;? (2010)

These factors: Freedom, peace and human security; has been the major issues in Nigeria security today. The object of security in Nigeria has continued to evolve as threats morphed in recent 12

years. Tests have shown the increase in threats to security and continue drop in value of life in Nigeria. Security entails more than mere survival and existence of individuals and groups within the Nigerian economy.

For the people of a state to be really secured, the state has to provide the stable environment for human development and self-actualization for all citizens. Due to continue nepotism, corruption and divisible policy of the elites, self-actualization in Nigerian society is perpetually tied to ethnic and religious agenda. Limited resources in an environment of unlimited needs and the struggles by diverse tribes to lead, has created men who are predators, perpetually hunting for games to satisfy their insatiable urge. Due to competition for resources, in an environment without equity, justice and peace, every Nigerians today, faces basic survival threats of: poverty, Infectious diseases and environmental challenges.

Security issues are function of dynamism of process through which pressure schemas are expressed. Group aspiration in society determines the evolution of threats in any state. Natural characteristics of cultures are the conscious will for dominance and annihilation of others for socio-economic advancement and gain. This pre-modal instinct is a major problem in multi-ethnic 13

environment like Nigeria.

Security denotation remains essentially contested by many experts and non-experts in social sciences. Since the 1956 work by W. B. Gallie introduced the ’essentially contested concept in defining certain terms used in social theory’ the general meaning of security has become personal and based on the needs and requirements of the state involved. Also, Booth acknowledges that security; politics and economy are interrelated and should not be treated in isolation (2005).

Given the general agreement that “security matters” in the development and elimination of threat, and that proper management of security remains the antidotes to criminality in any state, it is thence inferable that repeated violence in Nigeria is a product of a failed security system. As no area of political stability in any state can be measured without reference to security, notion of socio-economic well being in Nigeria should be predicated on a robust, viable and responsively driven National Security Policy. Security failure is an albatross weighing down the development of Nigerian economy.

Boko Haram insurgency has led to over 1,300 from a total of 7,000 deaths globally in 2012 (USDS), making Nigeria fourth behind Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. The picture is indeed gloomy if viewed against the record of less than 100 mortality recorded in 40 years period between 1970 and 2010. Armed rebellion has never really been a security challenge in Nigeria before the turn of the millennium. Several ethnic and religious uprisings in Nigeria have been generally wiped out using the Nigerian Armed Forces as the battering ram.

In and around 1998, the first major challenge to Nigeria security in the Niger Delta youth resource control agitations led to a full scale rebellion which defeated the full deployment of armed forces in the region. The rebellion, which has resisted all form of state, designed solutions and has persisted in the past 14 years in several forms. The Boko Haram challenge on the state has persisted, leading to over 5,000 deaths in five years and destroying the economy of Northern Nigeria in its wake. The lack of concise control of the rebels has led to call for suspension of elections in the areas in 2015 by the electoral commission chairman, Professor Attahiru Jega. Apparently, the four years old counter-insurgency programme led by the Nigerian Armed Forces is not working and may lead to future problem in the country if not redirected. 15

Uncertainty currently hangs over Nigeriaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s political and economic future. Economic activity has been severely disrupted, especially in the North, and Nigeriaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s credibility with foreign investors has been profoundly undermined. Political upheaval and divisions in Abuja and across communities across north and the south run deep. Credible national political process is required to address the roots of conflict and grievance, reconcile communities and rebuild the legitimacy of the state in Northern Nigeria. This will require the engagement of all key elements in the conflicts in an all-inclusive fair and just negotiation. The persistence of these conflicts shows the need for a change of method of engagement.

Without any gainsaying, this conflict has exacerbated grave humanitarian situation in an environment fraught with recurring droughts and food crises. An estimated 5 million persons are at risk of food insecurity and malnutrition in the Northeast Nigeria if present engagement is sustained. The conflict in northern Nigeria has further affected the already impoverished communities in the area. The livelihoods of the communities have been severely disrupted by a slowdown in cross-border trade and remittances and by the disruption of seasonal livestock migration to summer pastures. Insecurity has 16

hampered market access. Price increases and losses of livelihoods have reduced householdsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; means to purchase needed food.

There are an estimated 350,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Bauchi, Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states and chances are this will increase as lack of resources sets in. With more than 60 percent of the population under 25 years of age, it is estimated that youth (15-40 years) constitute the majority of displaced persons and refugees. The presence of refugees is creating additional pressure on land and water, especially where refugees outnumber the local community in several areas.

Increased radicalization and conflicts in Nigeria could be a function of the lack of trust in state institutions. Growing challenge to state has been fuelled by a burgeoning youth through a sustained population growth of over 3% per anum since the 1980s. Recognizing that youth comprises the majority of Nigerian population, and sustained military engagement will exacerbate current situation, there is need for design of appropriate solution for ending current military engagement in the region. The lack of constructive future prospects or options for employment and other income-generation opportunities

could increase the already high risk of youth turning to violence or influencing recruitments into militia groups in the area.

Government roles in reducing conflicts and challenges of state power by radical groups have to be realigned. Corruption, nepotism and economic failure has been advocated severally as the factors influencing rebellion in Nigeria, there exists need for a pragmatic approach to governance that may checkmate these evil and create a more united state. The growth and resilience of radicalism need to be challenged through sustainable rigorous growth of opportunities for employment and access to fair hearing for the citizens of Nigeria. Conflicts management process should involve processes of negotiation, mediation and other conflict management processes. Democratic principle of fair and just hearings should direct future engagements and the establishment of institutions for managing disputes may help reduce appeal to self-help by the citizens and discourage radicalism.

ISSUES IN NIGERIA NATIONAL SECURITY

Militarization of Security Persistent violence and violent response from states trying to protect their geographical areas from dissidents has continued to influence threat escalation in Nigeria. Militarization of security operations in Nigeria has continued to escalate and extend several proto-conflicts into major rebellions. Expertsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; position that the military are not suited for establishing peace in intra-state conflicts has been vindicated in Nigeria. Several years of military interventions in Jos, Plateau state, Niger Delta and North Eastern Nigeria have revealed the error of military policing of insurrections.

The failure of the Nigeria Police has been highlighted as the reasons for inherent employment of military in policing duties. Rather than integrating programmes for strengthening policing

and law enforcement capabilities in Nigeria, public funds are being used in financing military scale operations in several regional conflicts. It is glaring that the capacity of policing will not improve if the state continues to fund the military to perform policing duties. Increased reliance on soldiers to maintain orders from around 1983, demystified the Nigeria Mobile Police Force through incessant harassments and assaults on mobile men by the soldiers.

Aside from not being trained to perform civil security operations the presence of soldiers escalates threats and makes negotiated settlement clearly unattainable. Curiously, the Nigeria Armed Forces cannot sum up the right numbers of men for proper policing of areas of violent activities. As military cannot continue to undertake policing duties, resources on operations today may not guarantee proper alleviation of threats.

Terrorism can only be reduced through proper patrol, intelligence gathering and wining the â&#x20AC;&#x153;hearts and minds of the peopleâ&#x20AC;? sustained violence reactions escalates threats. Military intervention in conflicts aggravates and increases civiliansâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;

exposure to risk. The hearts and mind of the people has been lost by the state in current counterinsurgencies response. The avenue for community intelligence gathering is locked and barred against the perceived state’s occupying forces.

Maintaining public trust in volunteering information to security agency is the first step in counterinsurgency. This is not achievable in an atmosphere of violence state reaction. Reactions to Odi, Sakin Biam and Boko Haram crisis have all being criticized by both international and local media. The high handedness of security agencies was reminiscence of colonial repression of erring communities. Higher casualties have always resulted from security operations than from insurgents’.

States development plans are normally tied to performances of economic factors, thoughts and macro-economic indicators. The over reliance on defense at the expense of the development of human capital has been revealed to actually ’exacerbate insecurity’ (Kaldor 2008). Increase state investment on military operations employs most of the resources needed for human resources development and development. The need for states to eliminate threats to survival has been termed basic and the 21 st century definition of security encompasses survival, existence and unrestricted human facilities for growth without fear. 21

One major issue in orthodox security has been the equalization of security and absence of war. Physical security was stressed by most African states from independence. The need for strong state armies led to an over blotted security spending on armed forces without definite campaigns to test their efficiencies. Nigerian states armed forces of over 100,000 men aside from fighting in the Civil War that ended 43 years ago has never been called to arm to defend the national territorial integrity before now.

This edifice has the highest allocations of all annual budgets since independence at the expense of development of other sectors of the economy and services delivery to the people. The militarization of security operations has expanded operational cost of running a bludgeoning military without direct operational effects on the country.

Operational failure of most military interventions in conflict in Nigeria should normally form the basis for development of a more viable response system. Military on the street stresses threat of high insecurity, insecurity begets fear, which is a precursor to violent behaviours. Current security challenges in

Nigeria has been attributed by experts to the failure of security institutions operations in the country. The posturing of ethnic militias to defend local people from attacks, is never allowed in any stable and normal states. The resonance of these actions can be traced to the lack of trust in national security arrangements.

Based on reports, the Armed Forces have not really fared better than the police in stemming the violence of insurgents. It is alleged that the presence of the military men could even be a stressor in persistent violence and violent reactions in Nigeria.

Security is seen, as a reflection of political will to equitably allocate resource efficiently amongst competing units to satisfy groupâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s wants. The concept of equity in resources allocation bring about issues of â&#x20AC;&#x153;politics and ethnicismâ&#x20AC;? in Nigerian politics. Society is apolitical and politics determines resources allocation, hence politics remains a major factor in security (Booth 2007).

Achieving security in a state involves the understanding of the past interplay of politics and struggles for allocation of resources by the leaders and adhering to those historical precedents at all time to create balance.

National Security equations in any state are dynamic, like politics prone to ever changing values. The old theory of security emphasizing the need for protection of the state from internal and external aggressions has changed. Military and law enforcement agencies were designed for state protection duties.

The need to defend statesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; â&#x20AC;&#x153;territorial integrityâ&#x20AC;? through the suppression of internal nations needs for self-actualization drove the strategic security policies in many African states as economic and social security of citizens was wantonly sacrificed. Despite huge spending on security and an unprecedented 29 years rule by a strong and expensive military, it is instructive to note that violent crime has continued to escalate in Nigeria in the past 30 years.

Absence of major ingredients in Nigeria security for adequate citizen protection is serious issues, which need to be addressed by the state to reduce violence and radicalization. Presence of armed security men on all major streets with assault rifles at the ready is threats on their own. Lack of peace and threats of vulnerability from attacks on every members of the public while government offices are barricaded has further deteriorated the

trust between state and the people.

Statistical evidences have shown that huge spending on security in the past 50 years since independence has resulted in negative indicators. Criminal activities and incidence of violent deaths in Nigeria have more than tripled in the past 10 years. Average Life Expectancy Index has continued to drop; employment rates have plummeted in 20 years period from 1990-2010 in a country with annual growth rate of over 2.5 percent. In a country with current population estimated at 180 million people, over 40% of the working population are reportedly unemployed and

private

investment is also on the decline (World Bank Indicators 2012).

Worsening economic situation has continued to lay emphasis on need for a better security mix to meet the problem of an expanding unemployable youth population in Nigeria. Need for reorientation and reform of all security agencies towards adoption of people oriented maneuvers is important in alleviating threats in the Nigerian state.

Security needs in Nigeria have continued to intensify as population expands and mega-cities emerged from small towns. Increasing

rural-urban

migration

and

growth

youth

unemployment have led to an upsurge in criminal activities in most areas of the country. Slow stateâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s reactions, policy stagnation and lack of proper planning on security development have led to several laws enforcement conundrums in Nigeria.

Increased and uncontrolled violent crimes, insurgencies and corruption eroded the trust in state institutions by the masses. Nigerians not satisfied with security agencies in assurance of security, resorted to engaging traditional, registered Private Security Companies (PSC) unregistered security concerns for provision of security in their homes and properties (Baker 2008).

The Nigeria Police Force has the mandate to defend and protect the lives and properties of Nigerians, but increase use of the organ as a state oppressive mechanism has turned it against the people.

The Nigeria Police have the misfortune of operating without basic 21st century instruments of law enforcement operations in an environment devoid of community supports.

The Law

enforcement operation in Nigeria lacks basic 21st century communication facilities and forensic equipment are not readily 26

available, stations are designed as mere holding cells, there are no basic suspect interrogating capacity and equipment, men and officers are not properly housed, no justifiable insurance policies and an ever-changing state policing laws.

Corruption and statewide nepotism have continued to erode professionalism and reduce value of this important institution in peopleâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s domain. The Nigerian police have continued to operate in an environment of pure intentional neglects and stagnation of operations orchestrated by the state since the 1980s. Apparent need to reduce police psyche by succeeding military juntas has led to the relegation of police development and modernization. State neglect of the police in favour of the military and other security agencies in internal defense operations is at the root of the rot in crime prevention in Nigeria.

Soldiers are not trained to prevent crimes, they are trained to respond to threats not mitigate it. Military operations are designed to counter the enemies moves and not for civilian intelligence law enforcement operations. Proper counter insurgency operations involve painstaking policing patrols, investigations and intelligence analysis and preemptive attacks. Failure of military operations in Nigeria could have a lot to do with the lack of proper intelligence and arrogance of men in the 27

field.

Poverty and Absence of Human Security

The need for provision of avenue for choice and selfactualization of citizen has become a major issue in national security. The expansion of resources allocated to territorial defense mechanism at the expense of development of social infrastructure remains one of the major security challenges in African states (Gyimah-Brempong, 1992: 1998)

â&#x20AC;&#x153;Security entails more than mere survival of individuals and groups within the Nigerian economy. To be really secured the state has to provide the environment for human development and self-actualization for all citizens. Due to continue nepotism, corruption and divisible policy of the elites, self-actualization in Nigerian society is perpetually tied to ethnic and religious agenda. Limited resources in an environment of unlimited needs have made men predator perpetually hunting for games to satisfy and insatiable urges. Due to competition for scarce resources every person faces basic survival threats of: poverty, Infectious diseases and environmental

challenge” (UNDP/HR 2013).

’Poverty remains the most predominant source of threat to Nigerian security. Growing government spending has literarily no direct effects on the majority of the population’ (Danjuma 2013)

“Many Nigerians still live at below hunger level, malnutrition remain high in over 80% of the population, unemployment rate is above 40% of the population and basic infrastructures are lacking creating a deep gulf between the rich and poor class” (UNDP Reports 2008).

The Nigerian elite in order to navigate successfully the labyrinth of the struggle for political power has always resorted to ethnic and religious leaning for populous advantage. In the preindependence period, elite in Nigeria manipulated ethnic issues to completely divide and harness local supporters’ base for fear 29

of ethnic domination and marginalization in securing access to the “national cake”. Muhibbu-Din Mahmudat concluded that the elites in Nigeria consciously propagated ethnic differences and enshrine it in the constitution merely to “achieve class interest” (2010).

Nigerian elite in the period before the 1980’s perfected the ethnic arguments in all political and economic interaction thereby increasing the divide between constituting units and conveniently undermined the legitimacy of the state. Owolabi reiterated that ethnic division was created and conserved through the elites need to preserve the division of the people for manipulative

reasons.

The

elites

depend

ethnic

manipulations to increase their benefits from the state as ethnic leaders (2003).

Poverty and unemployment evidently played a fast role in creating the problem of radicalisation and insecurity in Nigeria today. Poverty remains a major issue in Nigeria as most families are recorded to be living below poverty line. The advent of religious renaissance in the teaming youth all over Nigeria as economic nose dive and austerity measures were imposed on

the country by the Sheu Shagari led government in 1982 due to a drop in the price of Brent Crude and Gross National Income from Oil dropped by $9.6 billion in 1982 from $22.4 billion in 1980.

The resource shortage in the country led to industrial shut down and high unemployment bringing about the need for religious expressions in the country. Equally, it has been posited that poverty and inequalities in resources distribution influences viral organized violence in states and that post conflict environment can only be stable through economic development and growth of access to wealth. Though many writers have tried to discount this hypothesis.

Kolawole Simon in his byline “SIMON KOLAWOLE LIVE” in ThisDay Newspaper of Sunday March 3, 2013 penned a critique of the speech of Bill Clinton - former American President and Guest Lecturer at the 18th THISDAY Award- on the prevalence of terrorism where poverty abounds as trite and inconsistent with the current situation in Nigeria. Yet, a closer analysis of areas of incidence of high prevalence of terrorism shows that: Terrorism really thrives where poverty reigns, states’ service delivery is poor and avenue for self-actualization are fewer. Examples abound in the in the Niger Delta Creeks and the dusty streets of 31

northeastern Nigeria.

Religious renaissance in the Nigeria took a fervent pace as traditional religious bodies and thoughts were discarded for more radical approach by youth eager for new avenues for personal expression in the society as career objectives became shattered in the melee that resulted.

Economic downturn of the 1980s led to increase agitation for self-determination by Nigerian ethnic nationalities. The advent of youth rebellion was revealed in the Niger Delta areas of Nigeria where youth picked up arms as the “Egbesu Boys” to fight first their leaders and the oil companies within the region and later challenged the state for “revenue control” in the early 80s. Allocation and control of state resources became a major security threats in the Nigerian state.

The relevance of religion and poverty in development of youth radicalism in Nigeria cannot be over emphasized.

Rivalry

between religious groupings filled with unemployed youth is always a recipe for utter chaos. The language of teachings of most Christian and Muslim leaders is definitely ungodly and unfit for peace building. Religion remains the most virulence issue in

Nigeria politics today.

Internal Conflicts:

Conflicts within the Nigerian state spiraled from basic interethnic of the pre-1980s to religious pogroms in the eighties and morphed into a fusion of religious, race and economic emancipation struggle s from the nineties. Continued reliance of the state on elite securitization and clamp down on agitators become a contributive factor to growth of these struggles. Support base for agitations seems to spiral in most areas of the country as economic downturn in the country influences a need to source for self-determination by youth in either religion or championing ethnic causes. Observably, as unemployment increases violent activities in the country also expand.

In the 1990s Nigerian political leanings moved from basically geo-political division to geo-religion political strata. Elites like the Roman Emperors and Islamic Berbers saw the importance of religion in politics and the need for politicians to control religions for pecuniary interests. Ethno-religious diversity now becomes a potent force in political mobilization and maneuvering in Nigeria. Renaissance religious thoughts in

Nigeria spread and polluted the ethnic pools. Northern Nigeria once thought hegemony and born to rule because of the unity of its perceived large population witnessed a strong religious movement and suddenly the one Arewa North was dive into a Christian and Moslem North.

Southern elites had continued to expand as education permeates the environment. Increase access to quality education by a large number of people reduced influence of ethnic maneuvering but these walls fell with the advent of religions as tools in the hands of desperate political elites (Ojo and Fawole 2004).

Boko Haram and other insurgencies:

Terrorism succeeds when the state play according to their scripts. The aim of terror groups is to heighten fears and maintain high perception of threats on the psyche of the people. Perpetual combat situation worsen threats perception, increases

IDP and distracts the state from optimal performing in all areas of governance. The resultant effect of all these factors is that a state loses the trust and cooperation of the people. Blames and counter accusations sparks in all directions, state loses face while the insurgents become more tolerable and accepted to the people than the stateâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s occupying army.

Boko Haram has continued to be part of the national discourse and dictate public opinion because security has failed to handle the problem professionally. Use of military in propagating the war on terror in Nigeria is seen by most analysts as playing to the scripts of the Shekau led group. The international community recently alluded to the â&#x20AC;&#x153;human security issues in terrorism held areas of Nigeriaâ&#x20AC;? and the growing human rights abuse in the country.

Military operations are swift, total and sweepingly destructive, the use of sustained military operations in

Nigeria civil crime

enforcement operations is not ideal, against international rule of engagement and should really be discouraged.

No country fights a war within its own territory, if it can be 35

avoided. The Boko Haram insurgency has led to over 5000 death and millions of IDPs in northern Nigeria. Billion Naira worth of properties and businesses have been vandalized, burnt and shut down. The real economic implication of these to Nigeria has been mellowed due to the relatively low industrialization within the Northeastern region. The post-conflicts costs of rebuilding and reintegration of combatants and noncombatant when the crises are over will surely be huge and will affect the planned infrastructural development of important areas of the economy at that time.

Increasing calls for amnesty for the Boko Haram sect has been traced to the failure of security. Inconsistent reports and direct mediatisation of security operations has occasioned the spread of unchecked information to the public. Military leadership completely turned the killing of insurgents into celebrated triumph for the cause. The state completely allowed the Boko Haram sects to turn it into a killing machine.

Given the fact that the military have consistently been used to manage insurgencies in Nigeria there should have by been a complete rules of engagement drawn up to guide such interventionism by now. For Nigeria to win the war against insurgencies, there has to be comprehensive well-designed 36

institutions that studies the psychology of insurgencies and employ such understanding in design of well-structured stateâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s response to insurgencies.

This response should entail proper dialogue mediated engagement campaign to determine the strength and weakness of the group and analyses proper ways of managing such groups. The answer to proto-conflicts has never been armed combats. Conflicts are important in formation of relationships, if well managed. Unmanaged conflicts are the premises for explosive behaviours. The Nigerian state needs to setup conflict management mechanism that is apolitical and professionally based.

Increase employment of political class in mediating conflicts has been a major faux move by the Nigerian state over the century. Politicians who are always part of, and are willing to gain from such crises can never be good arbitrators, mediator or negotiators. Most conflicts like the Jos Crises have been allowed to fester by succeeding government due to constant resort to political jobbers as mediators. The Niger Delta crises situation is still delicate and there are pockets of proto-insurgencies gathering storms in the southwest and southeast of the country.

As 2015 election approaches, the ghost of the 2011 elections conflicts still haunts the state. Unresolved conflicts overtime leads to aggressive actions; there exists needs for a robust mediation of conflicts and settling of misunderstanding as Nigeria approaches another electioneering activity.

Corruption and Impunity

Factually the persistent struggle for economic domination has led to the creation of an elite â&#x20AC;&#x153;schooled in political intrigue, insincerity, deceit, and the manipulation of ethnic and regional sentiments to sustain them in powerâ&#x20AC;? (Political Bureau Reports 1987).

The inexcusable grouping of the masses into religious and ethnic strata to gain political relevance has become one major threat to the legitimacy of modern state governance in Nigeria. Ethnic loyalties and religions remained the points of expression of most individuals in the society. Building Nigeria into a homogenous and autonomous state able to drive change and growth is compromised by political elites need to perpetuate class division and reserve juicy appointments for their kith and kin in 38

justification of the â&#x20AC;&#x153;Federal Characterâ&#x20AC;?.

Failing economy and a corrupt civil service -based on a federal character and equity in sharing of offices- have contributed greatly to dwindling service provision by government leaving rooms for ethnic and religious based organization to provide basic social supports for members has continued to shift citizens political allegiance from the central government (Ake 2000:98).

The impunity of the political class and the law enforcement agencies in Nigeria have eroded public trust in all institutions, and has served as bedrock for the violent radicalization of youths in Nigeria. Increase incidence of youth sponsored violence has been witnessed in all the six regions of Nigeria. Security threat has continued to grow in all area of the country due to failing economic and social services delivery expectation by the masses and the political class continued to loot with sheer abandon. The shame of the nation is in the lack of any reliable institution in Nigeria, increased agitation for control of resources and power are based on greed.

Lack of Proper Policing Process Armed groups from all regions of the country have continued to 39

ferment trouble and challenge the state. The Odu’a Peoples’ Congress (OPC) hold reign in the South-West, MASSOB is championing the South-West independence state of Biafra agenda, South-South Militants continued the struggle for 25% derivation or separation from the country, the Arewa Peoples’ Congress holds the touch for Northerners agitations.

Given the general agreement that “Security Matters” in the development and elimination of threat and that proper policing process remains the antidotes to criminality in any state it is inferable that repeated violence in Nigeria is a product of a failed policing system. As no area of political stability in any state can be measured without reference to security, notion of socio-economic well being in Nigeria should be predicated on a robust, viable and responsively driven National Security Policy.

Booth acknowledges that security; politics and economy are interrelated and should not be treated in isolation (Booth 2005). Security failure is an albatross weighing down the development of Nigerian economy. Given that security is important to the development of any state then there exists a need for critical study of the security need of Nigeria towards designing a viable security policy that will guide its politics and economic development.

Understanding the meaning, types and roles of security in nation building then become a critical issue in nation building. Planning for security as state expands should replace current high military spending. The burgeoning youth population in Nigeria makes the society a viable environment for radical thoughts and criminal activities; there is a need for a proactive policing system to tackle these challenges.

The United Nations General Assembly at its 65 th Session adopted and passed Resolution 65/1 on the Millennium Development Goals on 19 October 2010. The section three (3) of this Resolution outlined the major security need for people of any state in the world as:

â&#x20AC;&#x153;... freedom, peace and security, respect for all human rights, including the right to development, the rule of law, gender equality and an overall commitment to just and democratic societies for developmentâ&#x20AC;? (2010)

These factors: Freedom, peace and human security; has been the major issues in Nigeria security today. The object of security in Nigeria has continued to evolve as threats morphed in recent years. Tests have shown the increase in threats to security and continue drop in value of life in Nigeria.

Security entails more than mere survival and existence of individuals and groups within the Nigerian economy.

insatiable urge. Due to competition for resources, in an environment without equity, justice and peace, every Nigerians today, faces basic survival threats of: poverty, Infectious diseases and environmental challenges.

Scarce resources in a society with obvious abundance lead to high wire struggle to control power and resources. Ethnic and political divisions are employed to create advantage in securing access to power to control resources. Security issues are function of dynamism of process through which pressure schemas are expressed. Group aspiration in society determines the evolution of threats in any state. Natural characteristics of cultures are the conscious will for dominance and annihilation of others for socio-economic advancement and gain. This premodal instinct is a major problem in multi-ethnic environment like Nigeria. Policing has been proven as the only way to maintain social balance and restore order in chaotic societies. Most states employ huge policing of areas of violence to reduce criminalsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; access to easy movements.

Current employments of checkpoints only limit security to points of location of security personnel. Proper use of policing processes will in short run reduces local crimes and in the long run gain enough resilience to muster proto-insurgencies. 43

Failure of the state policing system to guarantee and maintain security in the Nigerian society has resulted in general clamour for an overhaul of the current system by all stakeholders. The Nigerian policing system has been reputed for its brutality and wanton disregard for human rights. Over thirty years of military rule has reportedly created a bullish police. The police in Nigeria have turned against the people and become instrument of oppression and intimidation by the government and the elite in the society.

Policing reforms in Nigeria become urgent as all

major counter-insurgency operations in Nigeria are failing while insecurity increases.

It has been proven by experts that only proper policing can alleviate security threat in any state, the Nigeria Police Force currently does not possess the requisite abilities to tackle this challenge, the force may be reformed through critical assessment of the challenges and a thorough institution of modern policing programme that are flexible enough to generate renaissance of professionalism.

Instability in Nigeria Instability in Nigerian politics since 1960 has always been a Product of either ethnic or religious rivalry and a fusion of the two factors. (Danjuma 2013) Nigerian stateâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s position in African economy remains vital when viewed against the population and economic potentials. Nigeria remains the most populous Black nation in the world and happens to be the largest state in the West African region as it relates to its economy, population and resources. Population of Nigeria by UNDP 2012 estimates stands at about 180 million, extrapolating from the 2005 Census figure of 128 million and an annual growth of more than 3%. Despite over 50 years of trillion dollars oil earnings and great potential for agricultural boom; over 60% of Nigerians continue to live below the poverty line, the country remain poor and corruption is at its zenith (Gyimah-Brempong 1998; 1992). The state continued to suffer from the scourge of ethnic and religious mistrust that has persistently led to crisis, deteriorating all state institutions and increasing threats to the public (Danjuma 2010; Ake 1981). Conflict in Nigeria has been traced to the interplay of dynamic of mistrusts by the ethnic nations. Lack of real integration of the constituent units and religious agenda that structurally divided the nation, has ensured a tradition of

perpetual inter-ethnic fratricidal struggle for control of power in Nigeria. Nigeria is a perfect setting for utter chaos. Three main ethnic groups; Hausa (North), Yoruba (South-West) and Ibo (SouthEast), were haphazardly divided into over 300 nations with different cultural belief, languages and religions. According to the 1963 census figure, Muslims constitute about 40% of the total population; Christians about 40% and over 15% of Nigerians still practise their indigenous beliefs. The current nation-state structure, which was inherited at independence, was promulgated by Britain in 1914 based on the administrative amalgamation of Northern and Southern Protectorates without proper consultations with the local ethnic groups forming the new state (Ogbunwezeh 2005). The Republican constitution of 1963 recognized three regional structures â&#x20AC;&#x201C;North, West and East, with a central government in Lagos. This arrangement survived till the first post-independent election of 1964. The central government led Sir Tafawa Balewa of the Northern Peoplesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; Congress and in alliance with the Sir Nnamidi Azikwe led National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) was virtually collapsing due to internal wrangling based on ethnic postures for relevance.

The depth of ethnic division in Nigeria was revealed by the political structures and electoral results. Political tussle within Action Group (Western Nigeria), between Chief Obafemi Awolowo (opposition Leader in Federal Parliament) and Sir Ladoke Akintola (the Premier of Western Nigeria) had led to riots in Western Nigeria and eventually culminated in the creation of the Mid-western Region by the Tafawa Balewa administration before the 1964 elections. Five years after independence,

Nigeria

was

turmoil.

Crash

political

insensitivity, ethnic based propaganda and a lack of proper conflict management machinery led to sectional riots in several cities in Northern and Western Nigeria.

Military coup of January 15, 1966, planned and executed by 5 Nigerian Army majors led by Major Kaduna Nzeogwu, finally truncated the First Republic in Nigeria. The coup which succeeded in Kaduna, the Northern Region capital; failed in Lagos, the Federal Capital; Ibadan, the Western Region capital; and barely extended to Benin the Mid-western Region capital, and Enugu the Eastern Region capital. Hence, Northern Nigeria where the coup was successful suffered more casualties than any other regions of the country.

Confusion reign supreme after the announcement of military takeover from Kaduna and the reported Killing of Alhaji Tafawa Balewa, the Prime Minister, Sir Ladoke Akintola, Premier of Western region and Sir Okoti-Ebo, Cabinet Minister of Finance. On January 16, the cabinet meeting held in Lagos deadlocked; the general adoption of motion by ministers to present Alhaji Zanna Bukar Dipcharima -the most senior NPC Minister- as acting Prime Minister, was rejected by the Acting-President, Nwafor Orizu -The president, Sir Nnamidi Azikwe was reportedly abroad for medical treatment-. Nwafor citing pressures from Major-General JTU Aguiyi-Ironsi, the GOC of the Nigerian Army, and reported high-level breakdown of order and rioting in most cities in Nigeria caved and handed government over to Gen. Ironsi. Increased public display of displeasure at military rule in Nigeria came to a head on May 27th 1996 after General Ironsi's broadcast of a Unification Decree 34 on Tuesday May 24, making Nigeria a Unitary State. Pressure within the armed forces and political environment led to the counter coup of July 25 1966 led predominantly by officers from the northern Region led by Lt. Col. Murtala Mohammed, Major T. Y. Danjuma and Captain Martin Adamu. The coup that was based on lack of inter-ethnic trust and understanding was undertaken to punish officers of

Eastern origins for the sins of the January 1966 coup by Northern Officers.

General Yakubu Gowon, the elsewhile Chief of Army Staff replaced General Ironsi as the Head of State and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of Nigeria on Saturday July 30, 1966, at Ikeja, Lagos after several days of negotiations with the coupists. The aftermath of the continued pogrom on easterners in living in northern Nigeria and other crises in Nigeria led to the declaration of the Republic of Biafra in Eastern Nigeria led by Col. Odumegwu Ojukwu which eventually led to the 3 year long Nigerian Civil War (1966-1970).

Between 1966 and 1979, succeeding military juntas ruled Nigeria, until on October 1st, 1979, when General Olusegun Obasanjo, GCFR concluded a hasty transition to civilian rule. Nigerians adopted the 1979 Presidential Constitution and a civilian government led by an executive president based on the American system was introduced in Nigeria. First Republic Cabinet Minister, Alhaji Sheu Shagari was elected President in a much celebrated beginning of the second republic. 49

The second Republic lasted only four years; a junta led by Gen. Mohammed Buhari overthrew President Shagari after several post-election crises. The military this time, stayed in power for over 16 years before returning the country to constitutional democracy in 1999. Retired General Olusegun Obasanjo (former military head of state 1976-79) of the People Democratic party (PDP) was declared winner of the elections and became the President, of the 36 states and a Federal Capital Territory structured Nigeria on 29th May 1999. Austerity measures introduced in the early 80s brought with it a lot of agitation by ethnic units in the south for the control of stateâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s resources while the low income northern states insisted on more resources for their states from the Federation accounts and always voted against resource control agitations. Economic indicators showed a Southern Nigeria which is more developed in resources, infrastructure and has a higher literacy level comparable with the Northern areas of Nigeria. Disparity in resources and growth between these two regions of the country has become a source of protracted political agitations in the country. Political need to control resources by ethnic nationalities has become compounded by difference in religious inclinations. Unfortunately, clear division of Northern and Southern Nigeria 50

regions into Moslems and Christians’ domination respectively, through natural occurrences has greatly contributed in muddling understandings of the dynamics of conflicts in Nigeria (Campbell 2011). The educationally and economically disadvantaged North have always try to balance power through tenaciously control of security apparatus, civil service and political power in Nigerian politics before now (Campbell 2011). Between independence and 2010, record showed that Northern elite have led Nigeria central government for more than 38 years before handing over power to Obasanjo in 1999. The return of power to the south in a power sharing agreement was truncated by the sudden illness and death of President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua in 2010 drastically changed the political equations in Nigeria (Campbell 2011). Political power, which transited to the North after eight (8) years of Southern rule through President Olusegun Obasanjo, was drastically terminated at the death of President Yar’Adua in 2010. Power transited constitutionally to the erstwhile vicepresident, Dr. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, —from the minority Ijaw nation in Niger Delta area of Nigeria- This incidence is instructive in the fact that, Dr. Goodluck Jonathan was the first person from any minority tribe to rule Nigeria since independence in 1960. 51

Agitations for the return of political power to Northern Nigeria has been blamed for most of the current religious and political hate crimes in Nigeria. Political necessities always arise from fundamental issues of survival in political environment devoid of real issues. Politics is a major industry in Nigeria due to low capital formation, unemployment and high corruption of government officials. Strive for control of state resources has increased violence and covert struggles within the state. Employments of ethnic and religious divisions by politicians to fester disagreements and encourage chaos to the advantages of political actors, has become the main challenge to peaceful coexistence of the several ethnic nationalities in Nigeria. Lack of institutional resources for managing conflicts arising from within Nigerian social and political environment have empaneled burly violence struggles and counter-strikes that have bestrode the nation. Proper management of proto-conflicts in Nigeria is a major challenge in a country where military have been employed severally by sitting government as instrument for suppression of oppositions. Fallout of ethnic crises that bestrode Nigeria after the death of Yarâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;Adua and the swearing in of President Goodluck Jonathan was reportedly hijacked by different anti-state elements, culminated in the open breakdown of law and order in the Northern radical group called Boko Haram by the end of 2009. 52

Political wrangling fostered an environment of violent activities that are beyond all institutional controls, giving rise to development of strong radical thought in the youth as economic downturn bit hard. Global development in communication has enhanced access to global communication. The Nigerian state has witnessed tremendous development in telecommunication infrastructures since the late eighties. From less than 400,000 telephone lines by a sole service provider in 1990, telephone service providers are more than 6 with rolled out lines topping over 30 million by 2010. The media have also expanded. The Internet media has been enhanced by the GSM carriers’ ability to deliver data, video and voice over the same network. International happenings are delivered at speed of light to all family’s living rooms via these mediums. Advancement in international transportation has afforded several Nigerian youths to tour other countries. Increase awareness normally leads to youth questioning of the state’s achievements and using parameters from other nations to justify such inquisitions. Unfortunately, the average age of political office holders in Nigeria has continued to grow, from less than 30 in the 1960s to over 52 by 2011. State’s tolerance of oppositions have also continued to regress as decades of military government has

grown a fierce security system tuned to elites securitization at the expense of the public. Growing poverty and lower access to resources by the public as state’s resources dwindled in the late 80s has resulted in the revival of ethnic polarization in full force. Several ethnic militias suddenly emerged in Nigeria. Northern states youths formed religious bodies to protect their Islamic cultural heritage as Western culture gradually creep into their cherished “Umma”. Poverty and unemployment created a huge uprising in form of youth based crimes in the eighties, as violent activities became a norm in Nigerian societies. Riots, strikes and rallies against state and its institutions increased as economic depression bit in harder. Extreme radicalism could have resulted from untreated grievances expressed over time by ethnic leadership. As poverty spread, the people blamed the state system and structure rebellions to change the structure of governance. The growth of ethnic militias like the Egbesu Boys, Bakkasi Boys, Odu’a Peoples Congress (OPC), Arewa Peoples Congress (APC), Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) and Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) in the late eighties and early nineties were clear signs of needs for policy reevaluation which was clearly ignored.

The search for meanings by the youth supposedly influenced the growth and expansion of religious awareness in Nigeria from the late eighties. The evangelical reawakening in southern Nigeria resulted in growth of several lucrative employments for the youth in the expanding worship centers in the areas. The church became a major industry in Nigeria employing over 1,000,000 youths directly or indirectly by the end of 2010 and the everpresent need to maintain the spread of the gospel created room for new converts with apostolic skills to establish new churches.

Religious adherent in Northern Nigeria have no such successes. Though numbers of religious adherent increased in the Islamic environment, the resources from such endeavors are meager comparable with what was obtained in the Christian south. The lack of cohesion between different Islamic sects over dominance and proper ways of worship in the north restricted the elites from openly becoming members of any of these groups.

The need for resources to champion each sectâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s causes would have contributed to alliances with the Saudi Arabian Wahhabi sects and the Shia in Iran by competing groups. To justify the resources from these sources, several Muslim groups organized

riots and pogroms against purported infidels and the tolerated to cleans the north of the anti-Islam elements in the eighties.

The clear signs of full-scale anti-state rebellion originating from northern Nigeria became obvious since the nineties. When in 2009, Boko Haram took on the force of the Nigerian Police Force and the Nigerian Armed Forces in a direct challenge, expert believe that the time for a full-scale rebellion has arrived in Nigeria.

2 UNDERSTANDING TERRORISM Terrorism exists because of hatred and greed. Terrorism is a product of hate. The people involved cannot begin to be tolerant of others who are different. The hatred is usually so ingrained, that this is all these people know. Greed also plays a big part because some people will do anything for money. Terrorism is 56

big business.’ (Wentzel 2009)

Terrorism is actually a form of rebellion; a form of anti-state movement popular among small groups intending to influence political policies through the employment of organized violence. Despite long history and evidence of terrorism in most human societal development, analysts are still stymied and diverse in asserting a concise definition for the term “terrorism”.

Terrorism has been severally alluded to as both a; tactic’ or ‘strategy’ employed by small unit of people without reference to legal pursuits in achieving political goal. Hence, it has been considered severally as a: crime against state or Holy war; justified opposition to oppressive regimes or an inexcusable destruction of peace. The seasoned argument has been in the maxim; ‘one man freedom fighter, is another’s terrorist’. Proper analyses of terrorism are perpetually disrupted by the political interpretation of what constitutes acts of terror. State’s political machinations create terrorism. States directly proclaims groups agitating against its power and programmes as “terrorists”. No group has ever agreed to the term; even the globally acclaimed Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah and Hamas have persistently refused the toga of “terrorists” imposed on them by 57

the United States (Hammond 2010). Political nature of terrorism makes it extremely had to ascertain and label properly. The political correctness of actors generally accorded rights to fight for their rights like we have in the Syrian crisis where rebels agitations is being given international supports and the impetus of global actors to employ the label of terrorist on freedom fighters like the Mau-Mau sect in Kenya and African national Congress (ANC) in South Africa during their independence struggles, tend to blur the lines between civil war and terror acts.

Groups need for self-expression and angling for control of stateâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s resources have made conflicts of integral units a reoccurring decimal in national politics. Conflicts have been expressed as a major index in developing a mutually beneficial relationship in all societies. Untreated conflicts impose great strains on any relationship, increases frictions and lead to direct confrontations and violent breakups.

Terrorism is defined by the United State Airforce as -â&#x20AC;&#x153;the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideologicalâ&#x20AC;? (Airforce Print News 58

Today 2008)-

The United Kingdom MI5 (Secret Service) define it as; “The use or threat of action designed to influence the government or an international governmental organisation or to intimidate the public, or a section of the public; made for the purposes of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause; and it involves or causes: •

Serious violence against a person;

•

Serious damage to a property;

•

A threat to a person’s life;

•

A serious risk to the health and safety of the public; or

•

Serious interference with or disruption to an electronic system.”

Clear understanding of terrorism could have been plagued by its evolving nature and lack of concise internationally agreed usage of the term yet what is clear from above definitions is that terrorism involves the employment of instrument of force and threat of violence to influence policy in a state.

Though, terrorism has been part of human societies since the beginning, development in communication and technology has created a new form of international terrorism, which is more brazen and attacks locations far from its base. Evolving from a theological frenzied reign of terror by hired assassins and groups without political ideologies, through a state introduced reign of terror against anti-government elements in France during the “transient anarchical period of turmoil and that followed the uprisings of 1789”, terrorism was equally employed to achieve many revolutions and nationalist moves as political thoughts emerged to beach at the states sanctioned political terrorism of the cold war era. The Palestinian challenges to Israel statehood in Palestine and the mujahedeen led Afghanistan war had culminated in the ongoing ‘international Jihadi’ by Islamists. These struggles have imposed terror on human societies and men have continued to struggle to understand, comprehend and analyze the meaning of the term “terrorism” (Hoffman 2006:3; Phares 2008). Several definitions exists by analysts on this topic, to peruse a few we have:

”… terrorism means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational 60

groups or clandestine agents; and ”terrorist group” means any group practicing, or which has significant subgroups which practice, international terrorism’

(USDS 2012).

”An anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-clandestine) individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby - in contrast to assassination - the direct targets of violence are not the main targets” (Schmidt, Jongman, et al 1988:36) “The unofficial or unauthorized use of violence and intimidation in pursuit of political aims’ (Oxford Dictionary, 2013)

Many terms were introduced into the definitions of terrorism to differentiate it from other crimes in the society. Terror groups’ acts must qualify as having “political or religious goals” intent before being classified as terrorism. In an environment where political and religious intents are behind every actions and inactions of the elite a thorough analysis of terrorism becomes imperative. Trying to get a concise definition of terrorism, Alex Schmidt in “The Definition of Terrorism” 2011 collated the 61

following as the Revised Academic Consensus Definition of Terrorism: •

•

Terrorism is expressed as a form of tactics that is aweinspiring and elucidates fear from the state to influence political change. Employing direct violent action without legal or moral restraints, directed and structured to amplify threats to civilians lives and properties and structured to have wide reaching propagandistic and psychological effects on the public far flung from area of impact. Terrorism as a tactic is usually employed by; non-state actors to forestall state’s repression, as means of driving for change by non-state actors in times of peace, and; as a tactic of irregular warfare by state and non-state actors. The physical violence or threat thereof employed by terrorist actors involves single-phase acts of lethal violence (such as bombings and armed assaults), dualphase life-threatening incidents (like kidnapping, hijacking and other forms of hostage taking for coercive bargaining), as well as multi-phase sequences of actions (such as in ‘disappearances’ involving kidnapping, secret detention, torture and murder). Public(-ized) terrorist victimization initiates threat-based communication processes whereby, on the one hand, conditional demands are made to individuals, groups, governments, societies or sections thereof, and, on the other hand, the support of specific constituencies (based on this of ethnicity, religion, political affiliation and the like) is sought by the terrorist perpetrators. At the origin of terrorism stands terror – instilled fear, dread panic or mere anxiety – spread among those identifying, or sharing similarities, with the direct victims, generated by some of the modalities of the terrorist act its shocking brutality, lack of discrimination, dramatic or

•

symbolic quality and disregard of the results of warfare and the rules of punishment. The main direct victims of terrorist attacks are in general not any armed forces but are usually civilians, noncombatants or other innocent and defenseless persons who bear no direct responsibility for the conflict that gave rise to acts of terrorism The direct victims are not the ultimate target (as in classical assassination, where victim and target coincide) but serve as message generators, more or less unwittingly helped by the news values of the mass media, to reach various audiences and conflict parties that identify either with the victims’ plight or the terrorists’ professed cause. Sources of terrorist violence can be individual perpetrators, small groups, diffuse transnational networks as well as state actors or state-sponsored clandestine agents (such as death squads and hit teams). While showing similarities with methods employed by organized crime, as well as those found in war crimes, terrorist violence is predominantly political – usually in its motivation but nearly always in its societal repercussions. The immediate intent of acts of terrorism is to terrorize, intimidate, antagonize, disorientate, destabilize, coerce, compel, demoralize, or provoke a target population or conflict party in the hope of achieving from the resulting insecurity a favourable power outcome, for example obtaining publicity extorting ransom money, obtaining submission to terrorist demands and/or mobilizing or immobilizing sectors of the public. The motivations to engage in terrorism cover a broad range, including redress for alleged grievances, personal or vicarious revenge, collective punishment, revolution, national liberation and the promotion of diverse ideological, political, social, national or religious causes and objectives. 63

•

Acts of terrorism rarely stand alone, but rather form part of a campaign of violence which alone can, owing to the serial character of acts of violence and threats of more to come, create a pervasive climate of fear that enables the terrorists to manipulate the political process.” (2011)

Terrorism still is a contestable act, politically motivated for change that perpetrators are inclined to justify as important to save the masses from future calamities, intention of most groups are always seen as pure, justified and lofty, many are often see themselves as freedom fighters.

States’ prerogatives to identify and label terror group has been a major challenge to definition of the term (Hoffmann 2010). The Apartheid government in South Africa for a long period until the late 80s labeled Nelson Mandela and key members of the African National Congress (ANC) as terrorists, while the Black people hailed them as “Freedom Fighters” (US Today 2008; Bevins and Streeter 1996). The Mau-Mau sect fighting for freedom of Kenya from British colonialisation were labeled and prosecuted as terrorists in the fifties. The Hamas, PLO and Hezbollah still termed terrorist organisations by the International community but enjoy heroic admiration from the people of Palestine (Owens and Dumbrell 2008). 64

Truth be told, the line between terrorism and freedom fighting is blurred and the lines are sometimes drawn by the state with active indulgence of the crafty media. The United States and Britain attempt to topple the government of Saddam Hussein in Baghdad in March 2003 was influenced by trumped charges of Iraqi ownership of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Labeling Iraqi as a rogue nation with links with terror organisation, the NATO and US led alliance was formed and the government of Saddam Hussein was eventually toppled on April 9 2003 after several day of Allied forces of over 170,000 bombing raids on Baghdad. (Coughlin, J. et al. 2005)

Terrorists and freedom fighters tag now become a function of the sides one belong in the arguments. Terrorists’ rationalization of being at war with the state becomes the justifications for their “acts of war” which regrettably targets defenseless noncombatants. The only agreements by the states and terror organisations are that terrorists’ groups’ actions constitute a “rebellion action against the state”. The al-Qaida has severally announced its rebellion against all Western interests in any Islamic country, the Boko Haram insurgency is directed at the purification of the Islamic north from the grasp of the ‘infidel’ rulership of the Nigerian government. 65

The fact that terrorism is an act directed at a change of position by the state, made it distinct from other crime which locus remains in personal gratification of the perpetrators (Godwin 2007). Terrorism is not alien to Nigeria; ancient clans have been recorded in history to impose reign of terror to subdue other clans within their environment. The Oyo and Kanem-Bornu Empires and were Sokoto Caliphate were built and maintained by the edge of swords and mortals. Nigerian tribal warlords waged several years of fierce wars and plundered neighboring clans up to modern areas of Benin Republic. To maintain these vast kingdoms, state terrorism were tactically employed; all means of oppositions were summarily dealt with. Dissenting villages were burnt and sacked for slaves by warriors whose rewards were loots from wars. Colonialisation imposed a miasma of calm on the level of intertribal war in West Africa. By the beginning of the 20 th century, inter-clan wars had somehow disappeared. The clans have a new enemy to fight in the colonialists, the clans double their efforts to shake of the shackles of British colonialism through the use of organized rebellion within their areas. What remains poignant at this period was the uncoordinated approach to fighting even the common enemy by the Nigerian ethnic nationalities. What should be noted at this point was the spirit of rebellion and lack of trust has been a part of inter-clan relations in Nigeria from the 66

pre-integration of the clans. Rebellion in Nigeria has continued to evolve; the inter-ethnic distrust and the need to effect political argument with violence was displayed in the Kano riots of 1953; Kano people had started a riot to protest and compel a change in the Sir Anthony Enahoro (AG) proposal of a bill on Self Governance for Nigeria by 1956 in the Federal Parliament. The riots which started on May 16 1953 lasted three days before been stemmed by the declaration of a state of emergency and deployment of troop by the colonial government. What is noteworthy was that the riots led to a compromise between the political elites and a staggered date for self-governance was agreed for each regions of the country.

The use of separationist agenda to influence politics was reflected in the Action Group (AG) clashes with Sir Ladoke Akintola’s Nigerian National Democratic Party from 1963 created a “reign of terror” in Western Nigeria with the ‘Wetie” riots. These disturbances and others has been attributed as the “reasonaire” for the delineation of the Mid-Western Ngeria Region in 1964. Modern terrorism is aptly capture by the Terrorism Prevention Act of 2011, it is defined as: ”… the calculated use of unlawful force or threats of unlawful 67

violence and religious preaching by anti-state elements to inculcate fear, incite the people or intimidate the government in pursuit of political, ethnic and religious goals’ “ … the calculated and extreme use of violence or threatened violence, perpetuated by malice, to cause serious harm or violence against individuals, governments and their assets with the intention to attain political, religious or ideological goals, through intimidation or coercion or instilling fear on civilian population”. Terrorism in Nigeria according to these definitions is aimed at achieving political, ethnic and religious agitations. Most commentators unduly categorise all group violence as acts of terrorism. While there are several means of rebellion, terrorism is wantonly violent and is directed at creating threats of insecurity to lives and resources of the civilian populace. There should be clear lines drawn between terrorism and crime. Not all crimes are terror based but some terrorists could still be labeled as criminals.

Abridge History of Terrorism States, organizations and groups of zealots have continued to through history caused the weak to tremble and fear, through the calculated use of terror. Despots and tyrants 68

have always based their totalitarian regimes on the foundation of threats of huge capabilities to deploy terror and maintain fear and trepidation in the populace.

Nature itself made the order of the world to be a function of coercion and control through the use of subjugation of others. Beast and humans societies are ordered based on the rule of the strongest and the mighty.

Security in most

modern societies relies on the stateâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s sole control of instrument of coercion, force and power to maintain law and order. Hence, it could easily be surmised that terror was an instrument for building and maintaining normal societies (Chaliand and Blin 2007)

Terror employed by states and groups has shaped and might continue to influence changes in human civilization, philosophy and development. The powerful scepters of American war machine capabilities has since the end of the Second World War, maintained United States as the most feared and respected country in International Relations. Constraining smaller nations arguments through display of humongous military might like the Mongols and Tamerlane did in mediaeval time.

The annihilation of cultures and maintenance of such victory with fierce powerful terror grip is normal in history of human societies (Hewitt 2008). Cultures and races were completely obliterated and history of the world authored to favour winners in a continuous evolution of ideologies and civilizations through the superior use of force.

History of terrorism started from basic acts of zealots and folk heroes in preservation of local cultures and religions. The use of terror as an instrument in preserving religion and way of life by zealots resounded throughout human history. The Jewish zealots (Scarii) led and uprising to regain Judea from Roman occupation

Beginning of modern terrorism has always been traced to the heroes of the French revolution in the late 18 th century. The â&#x20AC;&#x153;Reign of Terrorâ&#x20AC;? instigated by Maxmilien Robespierre, -one of twelve heads of the new state- had enemies of the revolution killed, and installed a dictatorship to stabilize the country. He justified as necessary in the transformation of the monarchy to a liberal democracy. Many analysts have agreed that Robespierre's sentiment is the maxim for

modern terrorists. They are convinced that rebels always believe that existing political order cannot be revamped and reorganized to include their philosophy, hence the resort to violence to usher in a better system at al cost. Eschewing the “Propaganda of Deed” they putout all resources in bitter struggles under the Maxmilien’s charge: “Subdue by terror the enemies of liberty, and you will be right, as founders of the Republic” (Maxmilien Robespierre 1793). Conflicts have been central issue in all human societies from the time of Cain and Abel, the need to control and rule societies with force is as old as human societies. The center point of argument in all wars lies in the perpetuating a superior moral, religious or ethnic stand. Hitler’s belief in the superiority of an Arian race led to the extermination of the Jews and all other inferior races during the Second World War (Hitler 1926).

The advent of religion expansionism gave a better reason for deployment of terror to awe and conquer states for God and mankind. Religious extremism was at the root of all terrorism in the period before the 18th century. Religion was the main reason for elimination of cultures before the advent of distinct political thoughts. Christian missionaries, Muslim 71

Hashashims, Jewish Zealots and Hindu thugs employed the use of burning and assassinations in the name of God to repress adversaries in different periods before the 18th century (Phares 2008).

Emergence of clear political thoughts and imperialism in the 18th century, led to a new form of wars and terrorism now based on political ideologies of Marxism, communism versus capitalism (Frayman 2006). As religious influence in terrorism waned, terror acts by groups now assumed more brazen tactics with wider repercussions. Guerilla tactics, sustained insurrections, bombing, kidnapping and propaganda are now employed in terrorism to spread the point of effects of attacks.

Nationalism and struggle for independence from the colonialists in the late 1940s led to the growth of ethnic based armed resistance groups in Africa. Ethnic and labour groups were mobilized towards challenging the authorities of the colonial masters. They were used in sponsoring direct attacks at its personnel and resources in the hinterlands.

â&#x20AC;&#x153;The political conďŹ&#x201A;icts of the late 1940s in Ghana and

Senegal had quickly spread to all colonies in diverse forms, with various degrees of intensity. By the end of 1959, a dozen African countries had experienced long, protracted rural insurgencies. This was the case in Kenya with the Mau Mau rebellion (1952-1960), one of the bloodiest episodes of British colonialism, and in Cameroon with UPC rebellions during which, according to estimates, half-a-million civilians and insurgents were killed. There were similar conﬂicts in Algeria (1956-1962), later in Angola, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau and in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. There were other less signiﬁcant rural insurgencies in Morocco, Somalia, Sudan, and Chad. In total, 45 % of African independence movements were rural armed rebellions” (Wantchekon and García-Ponce 2011).

Stories of the African National Congress (ANC) militia wing successes against the apartheid regime in South Africa and the Kenya Land and Freedom Army (KLFA) popularly called the “Mau-Mau” led by Dedan Kimathi, a powerful terror group in Kenya in the 1950s; actively engaged in covert insurrection: assassination and kidnapping of British colonialists and their supporters (Kanogo 1992). In Nigeria and Cameroun, ethnic groups formed the basis of struggles against Colonialization. The political pressure groups that 73

morphed into parties like Egbe Omo O’dua, Arewa Youth Congress were all ethnic based and operated only within their own environments. These groups’ youth wings espoused radical challenges to colonialists and carried out several protests and direct attacks on the state in their fight for independence.

Mamdani (1996) assuaged pre-colonial state violence as the basis for emergence of a "warrior mentality" in several parts of Africa. This had reportedly paved way for the perennial adoption of guerilla tactics by anti-states insurgents. He maintained that the pre-colonial struggles might have shaped current democratic institutions through their eﬀect on the nature of rebellion movements’ strategies.

The harsh realities of anti-Semitism during the general state sponsored terrorism in the Nazi Germany had the worst effect on the African soldiers from the colonies fighting on the sides of the allies in the Second World War. The attendant freedom experience in European cities visited on tour of duties by these African soldiers provided a bond for the formal challenge for freedom after the war. The unity of purposes and common front employed in the fight for independence by states in Africa had barely concretized, 74

when the political ideology influences of the Cold War era settled in.

The cold War provided means for further balkanization of African societies. Many believe that the geopolitical divisions adopted by several African states clearly influenced growth of public grievances. While states like Nigeria, adopted capitalism,

-the

American

economic

structures-, the

bludgeoning youth populations were biased towards communism and socialism. These polarizations created the first forms of anti-state rebellion in Africa and countries like Ethiopia, Somalia and Namibia became victim in the proxy war.

Increased global attention was reverted to the Middle East in the 1970s as modern terrorism became global. Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) championed a deadly guerrilla campaign against the State of Isreal and its allies. Terrorists from the PLO employed guerilla tactics, plane hijacking, selected assassinations, kidnappings and hostage taking, economic sabotage and mayhem without borders to gain global attention to their causes. The declaration of the state of Palestine by Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1967 after the Arab statesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; failure to obliterate Israel in the 75

Six Day War redefined global terrorism and set the place for a modern global terrorism without any borders (Frayman 2006).

Focus of terror attacks thence became global, completely shifted from local and national motives towards affecting international politics and citizens of other countries. This new form of terrorism employs religious, ethnic and political agenda in a hybrid form, making negotiation more intricate (Cilliers 2000; Buzan 1997).

This modern international terrorism is characterized both by the secular nature of the organizations and by its lethality, indiscriminating in choice of targets and with mad intention to create massive havoc and fear among targeted noncombatants in far flung countries (Phares 2008). The Palestine Liberation struggles became the fore runner for religious based, better organized, more lethal terror organizations such as the Hamas, Al-Qaeda and Hezbollah which now employs the reach of the internet and global media to spread terror in the name of Islam globally (Phares 2007).

Al-Qaeda and Bin Laden became the center point of global terrorism when he declared ‘fatwa’ -Holy War- against all Western states for the occupation of Saudi Arabia Holy Lands during the fight for the Liberation of Kuwait from Iraqi Saddam Hussein’s armies in 1998. The fatwa then released now form the basis for all subsequent Islamic based declaration of war against their assumed enemies:

’This was revealed by Imam Bin-Qadamah in ”AlMughni,” Imam al-Kisa’i in ”Al-Bada’i,” al-Qurtubi in his interpretation, and the shaykh of al-Islam in his books, where he said: ”As for the fighting to repulse [an enemy], it is aimed at defending sanctity and religion, and it is a duty as agreed [by the ulema]. Nothing is more sacred than belief except repulsing an enemy who is attacking religion and life.” On that basis, and in compliance with God’s order, we issue the following fatwa to all Muslims:The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies -- civilians and military -- is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and 77

unable to threaten any Muslim. These is in accordance with the words of Almighty God, “and fight the pagans all together as they fight you all together,” and ”fight them until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in God.”’ This is a text extracts from the fatwa published on Feb. 23, 1998, to declare a holy war against the West and Israel. It is signed by Osama bin Laden, Head of AlQaeda; Ayman al-Zawahiri, Head of Jihad Group in Egypt, and other Islamic terrorist groups. <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/military/janjune98/fatwa_1998.html>

This fatwa was adjudged the turning point in international Islamic radicalism. It formally requires and ascribe as duty to all Muslim ‘Umma’ wherever they are and of all tribe and nations; to hunt down all Westerners. Failure to do this was ascribed a ‘mortal sin’ of which is punishable by death for any Muslim who shirk this duty by Allah. This declaration is considered a major contributive factor for the growth of Islamic radicalism in most countries today (Phares 2008).

Terrorist groups seek to cause widespread disruption, fear and intimidation. They use violence or the threat of violence as a means of publicizing their causes, motivating those who might be sympathetic to them and intimidating those who do not sympathize. They often aim to influence government 78

policies and they often reject existing democratic processes, or even democracy itself, as a means of achieving their objectives.

Since rebellion is universal and unpreventable, as it occurs due to conflict in human co-existence and terrorism could be a result of unmanaged conflicts. There exist needs for the understanding of terrorism as a form of rebellion and draw up a systematic way of preventing conflicts generating into terrorism. These should form a national anti-terrorism plans. A concise understanding of: “What is terrorism and who is a terrorist?” become important in the design of a workable “anti” and “counter” terrorism procedure. CRIME AND TERRORISM Some commentators have stressed the differences between terrorists and ordinary criminals, arguing that terrorists are motivated by a higher cause than criminals and are better trained and organized. In reality, criminals may vary greatly in their motivation and commitment, some serial murderers, for example, plan their crimes just as carefully as any terrorist and may be equally as determined to succeed at their task.

The differences between terrorists and criminals might not be greater than the differences between various types of crimes. Certainly there exist many similarities between terrorists and organized criminals, especially those engaged in transnational crimes. In addition, terrorists often commit ordinary crimes, drug trade, smuggling, hijacking, kidnapping and fraud. Returns from these crimes are employed in furtherance of their goals and to provide resources for maintaining the group. Though, most police officers maintain that there are no clear distinctions, they disregards terrorists claim of being criminals with political intentions. Most police officers insist that terrorism remains a crime against the state and humanity, which should be treated as such. Paul Pillar, a former Deputy Chief of the CIAâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Counter-terrorist Center, USA posited on four elements that distinguished terrorism from other crime thus: Premeditation: Attacks are always planned in advance, rather than an impulsive act of rage and carried out with military precision. Terrorists spend considerable time in choice of target, design the attack taking cognizance of security level and importance of targets and set up secondary targets in case of failure to achieve plan A.

The 1st October 2010 Independence Celebration attacks in Abuja involved the use of timed explosive devices set to off at intervals to achieve maximum destructive effect. Terror attack on June 16th 2011, at the Police Force Headquarters Abuja were clinically executed, beat all security apparatus at the gate and would have achieved its primary aim -the annihilation of the troublesome IGP Mr. Hafiz Ringim- whose convoy the suicide bomber followed into the compound (PPRO/NPF 2011). Cold-bloodedness of terror attacks differentiates it in all ways from other crimes. The object of attacks is employed as mere pawns in high wire political maneuvering. Choice of targets compromises all the society as the threat of terror attacks cannot easily be mitigated. Attack on Luxurious Buses Park in Kano during peak loading hours, which led to over 45 people dead and several hundred maimed paint a picture of a wellarticulated attack for maximum effects by the sect (RABIU AND IBUKUN 2013). Premeditation and a need to amplify their successes stand terrorism from other crimes. Most criminals hide during and after their operations while terroristsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; gloats and boast publicly of their success.

Designed to Affect Political Equations in a State: Terrorism is not just for money or personal gains. Terroristsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; acts are committed with political intentions beyond the area of attack. Their ploy is centered on the use of force to achieve political or religious change in a state. All terrorists adhere to the Clausewitz declaration of war as a continuation of politicking by other means. Their action itself is directed at creating panic and undermining the power of the state to provide security hence the need for actions to effect changes in the status quo. While organized criminal groups like the mafia are motivated to use violent actions to perpetuate their hold on people but they are different from the terrorists in their motive, which rested in profiteering.

Terrorists targets non-combatants and soft targets: Terrorist aim is to affect the psychological wellbeing of the public. Terrorists are liable to attack civilians and soft targets in the country using stealth and not always ready to face combatready troops unless caught in action or cornered. Civilians are targeted to cause fear, increase threat perception and panic in the environment. The use of car bombs and suicide bombers are intended to 82

defeat most security apparatus deployed to check terrorism in most countries. The lessons the American Marines learnt in Cambodia (1955), Mogadishu (1993) and Afghanistan (2001) were the resilience of terror groups and big armies almost never win wars against insurgents. Experts have concluded on a decade-by-decade analysis that terrorism; hate crime and other violent crimes have continued to spiral upward globally. The 20th century has really been cruel; death of non-combatant from attacks from terror groups and counter terrorism operations have more than doubled the number in the whole of 19 th century. Equally, threats from terrorists have continued to evolve over the decades, as terror groups try to outmaneuvers states through increased violence. Terror groupsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; main target in the late 60s to early 90s were commercial aircrafts and government structures, but current statistics signify the increase in the use of stealth bombing and covert operations

targets

at tactically important

state

institutions and the public.

This change in operational pattern shows a descent into depth of desperation by insurgents and terrorists to spread violence and fear in the heart of all locals by all means. Increasing desperation to make a mark have increased the means of delivering terrors messages by terrorists. The Nigerian â&#x20AC;&#x153;Under 83

wear bomberâ&#x20AC;? Abdul Mutallab was deluded into carrying explosive in his under-pants exposing the vulnerability of, and the need for high degree caution in security method employed in all airports. Terror groups are sub-national groups: Terrorists groups do not usually have standing armies. They make use of civilians volunteers with or without substantial knowledge of explosives and guns to undertake attacks. The flexibility of operations of these groups makes it easy for them to survive intense military campaign against members. Most members of the Al-Qaeda caught and imprisoned by America at the Guantanamo Bay were ordinary men pumped full with religious zeal and hatred for Western civilization (Sands 2012; Cody 2009).

Type of Terror Groups in Nigeria Terrorism is sub-divided into categories to differentiate the area of agitations. The media to achieve proper tagging in news releases does most delineation of terrorists groups. Note that all terror groups are radical and rebels, as the employment of terror tactics is never a norm in any society.

Separatist: Groups with separatist agenda are those with the goals of achieving a new identity from current state. Separatism advocates the creation of a state of cultural, ethnic, tribal, religious, racial, and governmental or gender separation from the larger group. They aim to achieve political autonomy, religious freedom and group’s independence. This type of terror group is prevalence in Nigeria, They subscribed to social justice and equity, equality of race, anti-imperialism and resistance to any form of oppression. Separatist groups like the OPC, MASSOB and MEND have continued to engage the Nigerian state with their agenda since independence.

Most rebellion in Nigeria today are based on separationist struggle by ethnic groups lumped together in proto-states through colonial edicts. These agitations could have been motivated by: •

Traditional feud and emotional resentment of rival communities.

•

Protection from ethnic cleansing and genocide.

•

Justified resistance by victims of oppression, including denigration of their language, culture or religion.

•

Propaganda by those who hope to gain politically from intergroup conflict and hatred. 85

•

The economic and political dominance of one group that does not share power and privilege in an egalitarian fashion.

•

Economic motivations: seeking to end economic exploitation by more powerful group or, conversely, to escape economic redistribution from a richer to a poorer group.

•

Preservation of threatened religious, language or other cultural tradition.

•

Destabilization from one separatist movement-giving rise to others.

•

Geopolitical power vacuum from breakup of larger states or empires.

•

Feeling that the perceived nation was added to the larger state by illegitimate means.

•

The perception that the state has failed in its duties to protect and support their group.

•

Lack of trust in current political structure that rely on people of different tribes, located far away center to govern them without equity.

Religious/Ethnocentrism

The intensity of ethnocentrism and religious influence in intercommunal conflicts are indeed tricky and frightening one: it transforms long-time neighbors into mortal enemies overnight based on their ethnic affiliations. Long-time neighbors become marauding killers, and ethnic (or religious) differences become reasons for denying humanity to others, and all prior social relations and interactions cease to matter.

In Nigeria, the persistence of ethnocentrism â&#x20AC;&#x201C; also known as tribalism â&#x20AC;&#x201C;in governance and politics has been one of the challenges of the post-independence period as efforts have been focused, sometimes unsuccessfully, on building nations and nationalisms that relied less on ethnicity and ethnic patronage; this post-independence period therefore has become a project tracking the challenges of nationalism and the bane of ethnic allegiances.

Religion has become a major factor in rebellion in Nigeria since the late seventies. Attempt by political actors to express their aspirations through patronage of religious leaders and increase use of religious leanings for political advantage has increased the roles of religion in Nigeria political expression. The balancing of political candidacy as Muslim/Christian tickets as exemplified in the Yar-adua/Goodluck in 2007, Obasanjo/Atiku 1999 and 87

Goodluck/Sambo 2011 is a direct opposite of the successful Moshood

Abiola

(Southern

Muslim)

/Babagana

Kingibe

(Northern Moslem) 1993 presidential ticket. Increased agitation for religious control of state gained prominence as corruption and nepotism became national issues. The Boko Haram insurgency is based on a form of supremacy of Islam and the need for Islamization of Nigeria through the use of force and terror.

AIMS OF TERRORISM: The main aim of terrorists is to instill fear and trepidation, sharp and overwhelming fear- causing high degree of consternation, uncertainty and insecurity among the population, to achieve their political and ideological goals. Given the randomness of choice of location and timing of attacks, terror attacks leave the general public highly vulnerable and apprehensive. Always wondering when another attack will happen, where it will happen and who will be next. This fear is fueled by the observed capacity of the terrorists to use any violent means conceivable to achieve their goals.

Terror groups intentionally attack areas with high population density and select innocent civilians as targets to instill fears in

the general public and attract foreign attention to their cause. Radicals normally become extremists, who in turn mutate into terrorists to drive his philosophy and take over the control of states through any means possible. Once the extremist crossed the line and becomes a terrorist, he cannot back down again and must continue to perpetuate violence until he is killed or takes control of the state, which rarely happen. The terrorist is a desperate person, whose desperation has overcome his fear and respect for humanity. Desperation makes it possible for terrorists to make any sacrifice or commit any crime to achieve their goals. Terrorists cannot be seen as fighting for the people, as the elimination of the people are only his means to an end. Terrorists are killers and selfish spoilers that must be brought down through concerted efforts before they destroy the environment and peace of our communities. The fight against terrorism should not be left to the government agencies, all should become involved, because as long as terror groups thrives among us, we all remains target for their next attacks. As long as the public believes in their vulnerability to attacks at any given time and the terror groups understanding the potential in the maintenance of this â&#x20AC;&#x153;grip of fearâ&#x20AC;? on the public, terrorists will always be willing to engage in violence even in the face of overwhelming odds to stay in public glare and remain 89

illusive, omnipresent and unconquerable. Hence the aim of terrorism could be deduced as the intent to hold people’s attention through perpetual fear.

TERRORISTS OPERATIONAL METHOD

To successfully deliver their message of fear, terror groups may employ several tactical ways to achieve their goals. Some of their operations are small scale involving only one or two operatives and easy targets while others may be large scale and involve tactical designs and executions, which may take days, weeks or months to plan and execute depending on the vulnerability of the target and the level of “terror effects” the terror group aims to achieve. The 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center, New York and other targets in US reportedly took over five years to plan and execute.

Security agents and first responders have to understand the principle of terrorists’ attacks and methods of attack have to be studied to prevent loss of personnel during Post-attack Rescue and Evacuation Operations (PARE). First responders and crowd

may sometimes be the primary target of terrorist bomb attacks. The October 2010 Independent Day Celebrations bombers made use of two well- timed explosives to achieve a maximum damage effect. The use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) has evolved terror organizationsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; attack methods making them able to target and set more than one explosions in and around the same areas, detonating each independently at specific intervals.

Security agents well trained in managing explosives and identifying bombs and incendiary signatures should always be first responders at any terror attack location. Given the high security alerts in most of their barracks, the best way to get them remains in creating a diversionary bombing and delaying a more lethal payload for the responders during PARE.

The use of multi-layer explosion timed for delayed explosions employed during the October 1st 2010 bombing leading to multiple casualties should always be avoided. First responders and members of the public drawn to the scene of terrorist bombing are always exposed to further attacks through: ambushes, assassinations, bombings, booby traps and sabotage by the group. Hence, members of the public are warned to avoid rushing into scenes of attacks before security agents.

TERRORIST TARGETS To prepare against and prevent attacks from terror groups we must understand the principle of terrorist bombing targets. Apparently. The inability of security agents to stop terroristsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; attacks might be due to the lack of proper intelligence to identify the signatures and trends in terrorists operations to be able to plan ahead of them. Each terrorist operation may be connected but they all have distinct features and signatures, which may be studied and used in tracing and stopping the group. Unfortunately, given current development in local security operations, what can only be surmised is that we are all targets and must individually put in place plans for frustrating and mitigating attacks through systematic security policies put in place in all organizations and in every home.

Terroristsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; targets are selected for specific reasons and are always a representative of; political, ideological or religious importance to the people. The Independence Day attack could have been set up to deflate the national pride. Targets choices are subjective and may not be easily predicted, except through thorough analysis of evidences and trends. Hence, terrorist strikes can only be prevented through direct information on the

location, timing and the person of the attackers.

Also, the level of inexpensive unregulated small arms and light weapons circulating freely on the black market since the end of the Cold War have led some observers to argue that in â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;poorerâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; states where security is weak and governments are unstable, stockpiles of arms only worsen community clashes by extending the duration of violence.

Primary Targets (PT):

To achieve their aims terror groups identify a critical target and several back-up targets in case of failure at the point of primary target. The primary target is always the most critical or valuable target for a specific terror campaign attack. The required effects of the terror campaign always determine the point of the PT. In Nigeria currently, most attacks are directed at government establishments, military and polices barracks, churches and crowded public places. The choices of these locations are never random and terrorists go through a lot of preparations and reconnaissance to identify and prepare such locations for attacks.

To choose a target, efforts are made by the terror organisations to define three (3) concepts: Criticality: The importance of the site of attack to national pride and citizensâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; well being. The choice of the Abacha Barracks, Independence Day bombing and the NPF headquarters was probably intended to drive home the power of the terror groups to strike anywhere, and put the fear of insecurity in the heart of the people. The message was clear: â&#x20AC;&#x153;if the police and army are not safe, are ordinary citizen safe?â&#x20AC;?.

To lure in international attention to their causes, the terror groups chose to bomb the United Nations Building in Abuja. There could be no direct objectives to these attacks than to spread the fear and expand perceived capabilities of the terror group that can strike anywhere, and at will in the heart of the people of Nigeria.

Vulnerability: Terror groups choose targets based on the level of perceived security. The higher the security in place, the juicier for their campaign to strike such sites. Strikes at easy targets are only achieved when attacks at secured facilities fail. Terror groups 94

want to be feared and striking at defenseless objects do nothing to advance this fear in the people. Attacks on Police Stations and Army Barracks fall in this category.

Recovery Ability and Impact on the State and People: Targets are also chosen based on the importance of such targets to national or religious pride, the level of pain that will be felt and the time it will take to replace such structures are also major factors. The psychology behind the destruction of national or religious monument hurts the psyche of the public and spreads pain whenever people remember such monuments.

The attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon was designed to in one-go reveal the vulnerability of apparently secured environment to attacks, effect the psyche of insecurity on the whole country and at the same time gave Al-Qaeda global reverence.

Recovery from this single attack has turned

American security round and shaped global perception of American security.

Secondary Targets:

Secondary or Follow-up Targets are never the main focus of terroristsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; attacks, they may have some significant overall importance but only constitute fallback targets in the events of failure, elimination or abortion of the PT for security related reasons. Secondary target become Follow-up Targets when they are set-up to go off several minutes after initial blasts.

These attacks are directed at luring security agents and responders to a blast thereby creating maximum damages to responders. First Responders are always at risks of these types of attacks and there is always need for a thorough sweep of the scenes of bombing by experts before actual rescue efforts begins.

Targets of Opportunity: Some terroristsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; attacks may not be really planned, but may occur because the group observes vulnerability in the security system and immediately take advantage of them. This kind of attack can be describe as any attack that takes place as the opportunity presents itself. Sometimes, if attempts at Primary and Secondary targets fail, the rigged bomb may be delivered to any public place to create any level of success they can achieve through this action.

The compelling part of this is the fact that this form of attack is highly unpredictable. The terrorist decisions are always made on the field in desperation and cannot easily be blocked.

MODE OF TERROR ATTACKS Terrorists employ different modes of attack to drive home fear. In recent times; Incendiary Devices, Improvised Explosive Devices and firearms have been employed severally in recent terror attacks in Nigeria.

Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) IEDs are one of the most effective weapons in current terror attacks in the country. IEDS have become the weapon of choice in guerrilla warfare as it can be delivered covertly and triggered from a distance. They are also capable of delivering a large quantity of explosives to a target causing a great deal of damages without exposing themselves to danger. Once assembled, the device can be delivered at a time of the terroristâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s choosing and with reasonable precision, depending on defenses. It can be detonated from a safe distance using a timer or remote control, or can be detonated on the spot by a suicide bomber. 97

Building IEDs requires a significant investment of time, resources and expertise. Because of this, terrorists will seek to obtain the maximum impact for their investment. Terrorists generally select targets where they can cause most damage, inflict mass casualties or attract widespread publicity. The attacks at the United Nationsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; Building, and the Nigeria Police Force Headquarters in Abuja, were done using Vehicular Based IEDs.

INCENDIARY DEVICES: Incendiary devices have remained a major and cheapest attack tool by terrorist for centuries. Fire remains a flexible and easy way to arrange tool for causing mayhem, loss of property and spark panic among the people. It has the ability to continue to spread until all available fuel is consumed or the fire can be brought under control. Arson is generally a criminal act and has been used as tools of control and repression by terror gangs for ages. The terroristsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; use of IEDs could be designed as incendiary agents to cause more damages after the initial blast. Niger Delta Militants and Boko Haram have perfected the use of IEDs and Incendiary devices in their attacks in Nigeria.

FIRE ARMS Terror groups when cornered employ the use of direct gun

attacks on military and police patrols. Most of these attacks are designed to enable the group raid the security agenciesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; offices of firearms and ammunition during such attack. Direct attacks on security forces and prisons have been a major signature of the Boko Haram sect in Nigeria.

3 FACTORS INFLUENCING RISE IN TERRORISM IN Nigeria Growth of International Crime Network and Proliferation of Small and Light Arms in West Africa West African states have been identified as a major route for drug trafficking for decades and the lack of resources for control of this menace by local law enforcement agencies have been a major source of global concern (Ellis 2009). Most of global cocaine supply originated from three Latin American Countries (Columbia, Peru and Bolivia) these three countries solely accounted for about 700 Metric Tons of cocaine produced in 2009 (Felbab-Brown 2010; Rothberg 2004).

About fifty percent of this drug is transported to the United States through the Pacific/Central American Route (Chalk 2011). Challenges of security along this corridor due to more efficient 99

US DEA patrols enhancing drug busts and the increasing prices in expanding European market for cocaine have created the need for exploration of more suitable, safe and operationally efficient route to European markets from Latin America bypassing the dreaded Central American blockade (UNDOC 2008).

The West African coastal line is wide, deep and good for landing crafts, relatively unpoliced; law enforcement is weak and corruptible where available, high level of unemployment and willing youths and above this West Africa shoreline is close to the high end European drug market (Sheu 2009; UNODC 2008: 2010; Block 2007).

The use of West African states as drug hub is due to the relatively low risks and the short hop it gives to Europe. As security improves, the smugglers have continued to vary their methods of choice. Nigeria has been a major hub in the drug trade because of the huge traffic at her ports, which makes direct general checks impossible. As one of the biggest travelling hub in Africa, the country is renowned as having the highest number of Drug related arrest both home and abroad.

Despite

100

huge

investments

scanning

and

detecting

equipment’s most carriers or “mules” arrested in European Cities of Spain, Portugal and Italy originated from Nigeria. Ghana has in the past Decade become a victim of the New Drug trade, the country currently rank behind Nigeria, in numbers of drug arrests in this region (Wannenburg 2005).

The syndicates have become more effective and efficient in ensuring local supply, as due to a “more efficient interdiction of cargoes, drugs are shipped smaller but more numerous volumes” in “go fast” surface boats and semi-submersible with capacity to handle between 2MT and 10MT at a time with a standard nautical mile range of between 500 and 1,500 (Chalk 2011).

Traditionally reputed for its weakened state structures, wars, political strives and economic woes Guinea-Bissau, a tiny West African country of only about 1.5 million people, fifth state at the bottom of the United Nations’ World Development Index, without a strong law enforcement agencies and resources to fight traffickers has been overran by a conglomerate of drug Columbian cartels. This country without water, lights and good road is today the main hub for the West African Cocaine trade originating from Columbia, via Venezuela enroute European put at over £1billion annually (Felbab-Brown 2011; Vulliany 2008; 101

UNODC 2008). Other states used for landing of these drugs are Senegal, Mali, Guinea, Sierra Leone and Ghana (UNODC 2008). These states with failing economy, high level of politically corruption and some of the lowest Per Capital Index in the world have been cleverly chosen by the Columbian and Venezuelan drug cartels as their base for the new West Africa Drug Route. The attraction for this route -the UNODC maintained- was the relatively low cost of transportation and high potentiality of success. The UNODC concluded that these countries were clearly not prepared for the onslaught and were at the mercy of the drug lords from beginning (UNODC 2008).

Tough states laws and an improvement in security apparatus lead to a high level of drug seizures at Nigerian airports in the late eighties and early nineties and the movement of traffickers to other West African countries as the 21 st century approached (Wyler and Cook 2009; Felbab-Brown 2010).

The pattern

became wider and seizures expanded even beyond West Africa. Non-traditional drug trafficking countries like Angola, Algeria, Morocco, Libya, Mali, Mauritius, Guinea and Ghana became major drug hubs with hundreds of tons seizures annually (UNDOC 2008)

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Today transnational crime syndicates with presence in over 80 countries in Europe, America and West Africa control drug trafficking through West Africa. The trade in Cocaine in West Africa 2008 was estimated to be around $1 Billion and growing by the UNODC. West African coast importance to the global drug trade is established and the movement of drug syndicate operating centers and laboratories to the regions has been reported (UNODC 2008)

Natural resource and commodities are the major products of West African states. Sierra Leone has continued to attract global attention because of its rich diamond deposits. Local syndicates in conjunction with international crime syndicates have continued to pillage this country. Civil wars, unrest and agitations for the control of local deposits since the 1980s, has left this country without any form of development. Control of Illicit diamond trade with tactic western supports, allegedly funded the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) over 12 yearâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s rebellious campaign against the government (Wannenburg 2005).

Ghana, Ivory Coast and Liberia have a common persistent problem in control of illegal gold mining syndicates; the rise in global demand for gold has led to a vibrant market for illicit gold 103

from West Africa. Many unemployed youth have flocked to these new foreign exchange earners; unlicensed gold mines operations are springing up faster than the few law enforcement officers can cope with. Alleged tactic political supports for these operations have ensured their success in eluding local laws (Wannenburg 2005). Illicit trade in rubber exists in Liberia, Ivory Coast and Equatorial Guinea. Illegal fishing by European and Asia trawlers have been reported of the West African Coasts and trade in Ivory and animal skins still flourish all over Africa.

Togo and Benin Republic are favourite ports for products smuggling syndicates from Nigeria. These ports act as transit point for banned goods in Nigeria from European and American markets. Three out of every five person in West Africa are Nigerians and Nigeria syndicates control most of the criminal activities in the West Africa region. Commodities from these ports are smuggled into Nigerian streets through over 1,840 identified smuggling routes (Perouse de Montclos 2005; NCS 2013).

Subsidized fuel from Nigeria is smuggled to most West African states and sold for premium prices. The Sahelian countries (Mali, Niger) affected by drought and displaced by wars are much active in smuggling of cattle, foodstuff and cigarettes to and 104

from several neighboring countries and armed robbers smuggled hijacked cars from Nigeria to Togo and Benin users (Wannenburg 2005). Illegal commodities trade has continued to rob the states of tax revenues, Nigeria customs has maintained that the country currently lose over 85billion Naira annually due to commodity smuggling.

Annual crude oil theft of about 55 million barrels has been reported from Niger Delta pipelines in Southern Nigeria oil fields. Bunkering activities and illegal trade in crude oil by criminal syndicates generates in excess of $1billion annually, rivaling drug trade as the major illicit economy in West Africa. Increase productions expected from Ghana oil wells will surely up this figure in future years (UNDOC 2013). Oil bunkering-Theft and Smuggle of oil from the supply vessels, Bridgerâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s and oil pipelines have continued in Nigeria despite huge Amnesty payment to Niger Delta militant since 2009. Reports have shown that sophistication of these operations point to a tripartite political conspiracy involving: some prominent elites, Niger delta Militants and security forces -deployed for peacekeeping and securing the pipelines- collusion to rob the natural resources of the state.

105

Increased policing of pipelines and an ongoing amnesty agreement has led to the reduction in pipeline vandalisation and crude theft from the supply side since 2009. Reports showed a reduction in declared bunkering figures to about 80,000bpd from the pre 2010 figures of over 150,000bpd. Production of crude oil in Nigeria has also stabilized at around the 1979 peak figure of about 2.2mbpd (million Barrels per day) (NewAfrican 2013).

Black market in crude oil continued to grow in the Gulf of Guinea (the length of Atlantic Ocean between Cape Palmas in Liberia and Cap Lopez in Gabon) as criminals shifted from supply side pillaging to direct attacks on loaded crude oil trailers in international waters (NewAfrican 2013). Tanker hijacking by pirates has increased in recent years in Gulf of Guinea to necessitating United Nation Security Council Resolution 2039 in February 2013, expressing deep concerns on happenings in the region and directing states in the gulf of Guinea to secure the areas before it become a major international problem like the Horn of Africaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Gulf of Arden. International syndicates from China, North Korea, Israel and South Africa in collusion with West African pirates have turned the Gulf of Guinea into one of the most dangerous waters in the world. These pirates are reported not to just hijack vessels for 106

ransom, as the Somalia pirates in the Gulf of Arden are wont, but seize and plunder all goods on board and siphon oil from the tanker holds for resale in to other tankers in the international waters.

Statistics showed that illegal crude oil smuggling syndicates has continued to evolve; ’ …there were 42 attacks against supply vessels in 2008 (one of the worst years of the Niger Delta insurgency), but only 15 in 2012. Conversely, there were just eight attacks against tankers and cargo ships in 2008, but 42 attacks in 2012’ (NewAfrican 2013). Increase spread of attacks by pirates in West Africa from Nigeria to Ivory Coast and Angola has led to an international call on the government of states in West Africa to deploy troops to guard their seas against this trade put at over $2billion annually.

Crude oil sales have become the major export commodities in West African states; the challenge of bunkering and piracy may lead to buyers’ boycott of this region. Low government revenue is bound to lead to further economic problem and escalate violence in those weak states if not properly checked.

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“Trafficking in Person (TIP) is a process where an intermediary: for a fee, through violence threats of violence or persuasion, displaces an individual within or outside the national boundaries of a state” (IRIN 2012) .

Despite the ancient nature of trade in human beings that existed even before the advent of the European slave trade. Globalization of sex trade and prostitution has expanded the illicit trade in human being. Reports have concluded that persistence in Traffic in Persons (TIP) will surely continue regardless of legislation in societies where there are lack of selfachievements and human security. West African states have continued to be a major region in supply of willing and unwilling persons for the trade (Ahiave2010).

Poverty and lack of resources for personal growth has influenced Trade in Persons in West Africa. Organized syndicates within West Africa smuggle destitute women and children from one country to another to work as ’slaves’, domestic servants and prostitutes within West Africa and in European states. Most of the transported were not aware of the crime being committed.

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They are promised better lives and working conditions in country of destination. In the period before the 1990s, vibrant economy in Nigeria made the country destination point for children smuggled from other neighboring countries (Salah 2001). Cultural perceptions allegedly influenced the growth of trade in children and woman across Africa and have also inhibited concerted efforts to limit the operation of these cartels (Sachikonye 2010).

In 1995 figures: Benin Republic showed the presence of over 400,000 children put to work at young age by cartels, Ivory Coast have a total of 625,000 child labour figure and in Nigeria about 12 million underage children are reportedly on the streets vending for themselves and contributing to the wealth of the cartel (Truong 2006: 23; Olateru-Olagbegi 2004).

The allure of better lives in Western countries has influenced the development of new wave of voluntarily transported persons. West African states have continued to contribute high numbers of young ladies into the lucrative international sex industry said to be worthy several billion dollars. The bludgeoning sex industry in Middle East and Europe has continued to consume many African illegal immigrants forced into the trade by the cartel and maintained through heavy use of illicit drugs. Many 109

die before reaching their destinations and others became addicts (Olateru-Olagbegi 2004). Nigerian girls dominated the sex trade in most European cities. UNDOC believe that over 3800 and 57000 women are smuggled into Europe annually and 60% of prostitutes in Italy are from West Africa (UNDOC 2010; Ahiave 2010). In Italy, government sources revealed that there are over 10,000 Nigerian prostitutes in Italy alone (OlateruOlagbegi 2004). Increase poverty and lack of employment in West African states has contributed to the explosion in TIP in the region.

“Out of the estimated 500million Small Arms and light Weapons (SALWs) worldwide, 100 million are to be found in Africa. Easy to use and easy to conceal they are the weapons of choice for non-state actors such as insurgents and criminal groups. The unregulated flows of arms throughout the continent has, according to the African Union (AU), led to ’the development of a culture of violence that has destroyed the social fabric of many countries in Africa’ and undermine efforts at economic development,

governance

and

democratization”

(Quirke Paul 2012)

West African states have been a theater of violence fueled by 110

an avalanche of easily accessible Small and Light Weapons (SALWs) in the region. Small arms which are built to be easily handled and operated by one person such as; Revolvers, Pistols, Rifles, Carbines, sub-machine Guns, assault Rifles and Machine Guns, and Light Weapons, which are more sophisticated arms that required more than one individual handling like: Heavy Machine Guns, portable anti-aircraft guns and portable missile launchers, are the most commonly used weaponry in conflicts in Africa since 1956 (Onigbinde 2012)

Estimated cost of annual import of arms in to African states is put at about $18million, with West African states accounting for more than 40% of these costs currently in 2008. This amount translated to over N2.8trillion about the annual cost total budget of Nigerian state on capital expenditures and about 80% of total foreign aids to West African states in 2008. The trade in arms has conveniently negated foreign aids from European states into West Africa leading to negation of the development aims intended for these aids (Hopkins 2012).

African states have continued to bear the brunt of surplus arms from the Cold War era in unregulated illicit arm trades that has created an environment devoid of development, poverty, loss of lives and highest volume of Internally Displaced Person (IDP) this 111

century than any other continent (Quirke 2012). The ease of access to light weaponry due to porous borders and Western gun running syndicates in need of access to West African mineral resources there has always be a striving black market for SLAWs in the region. Increase conflicts in West African states like Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Guinea and Burkina Faso has led to recycle of SLAWs between insurgents groups in the region. Proliferation of SLAWs has become heightened and many local actors have continued to benefit from the growing trade in firearms (Onigbinde 2012). Increase access to international syndicates from Eastern Europe and Asia in the Gulf of Guinea has created a new trade in crude oil for arms for most militant groups in the region. SLAW became a medium of exchange as need for personal protection from violent criminals, increase in numbers of ethnic militias and politicians need to equip standing armies to prosecute elections increased demand for weapons in the late eighties. The fact that most of the arms traded on black market in West Africa originated from state sanctioned trade and from states licensed factories point at the collaboration of states in arming of gangs and local militias which in turn provide training and weapons for insurgent groups in the region.

One 112

major

factor

about

illegal

economics

there

interrelatedness. TIP and commodity syndicates used the same route and resources for operations as drug and arm smugglers and Pirates provide resources for smugglers and arms for drug and arm trafficking syndicates. The organized way of operation of these syndicates have continued to affect states economy in West Africa. Illicit Arm trade and Bunkering activities has been reported to contribute to shrinking local economy by over 15%. Insurgencies and criminal activities increases threats level and is contributive to the level of insecurity in Nigeria (Quirke 2012)

Control of Resources: One major index in the survival of rebel groups has been the availability of resources or opportunities for financing. High volume of resources goes into the process of setting up, managing and control of armed groups. Resources expanded into attacks may be few and membership fewer than any standing army, yet the process of managing members, creating camps, training of recruits, planning and executing attacks, creating safe houses and maintaining cells in several areas at the same time, are costly venture. Terror groups need a lot of resources to achieve these. Presence of major resources like crude oil and gas influenced the survival of the Niger Delta militants and oils the conflict in

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perpetuity. The Islamic ideology base of the Boko Haram could have attracted high volume of financial resources from international Muslim brotherhood. The fight for the control of Nigeria has been an ongoing battle, Nigeria though a secular nation has living within its borders 1 in every 3 Muslim in Africa and is reputed as the third largest Muslim population in the world. Clash Of Civilizations (Religion): Almost all the pre-independence empires like Songhai, Kanem Bornu, Sokoto, and even Oyo predominantly practices Islam. The spread of Christianity from Southern Nigeria through rural evangelism has gradually eroded this spread from the 20 th century. Islam traditional environment, which had been kept through segregation of strangers in Muslim states, were gradually worn down and replaced by a rampaging Western culture. The growth of a Western culture influenced Muslim youth with lots of financial resources to spread around enhanced the hatred on the street for the â&#x20AC;&#x153;Yan Bokosâ&#x20AC;? the new Westernized Muslim, educated, rich, and arrogant bourgeois. The challenge on the Muslim ways of live was the last straw on the back of the depraved, poor and hopeless itinerant Islamic scholars. Renaissance in religious ideology and quests for expansion

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through force of religious teachings suddenly appeared in the 20th century. The rise in global communication technological development made possible a new network of international religion organisation with huge resources posturing and sponsoring youth and organisations willing to take the up the jihadi to the Western states and liberate Islam from Westernization. Organisations like Al-Qaeda achieve the internalization of terror through the exploitation of the advancement in global communication to initiate an all out war to preserve Islamic culture. The geo-economic division of states during the Cold War era was replaced by an new division based on religious leanings. The end of the cold war heralded the beginning of failure of states economic, religious renaissance and expansions replaced former geo-political leanings. The new enemies of states morphed from other states to nations within the state. Extremists movements like the Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, and Talibans sprung up to defend their states, and religion from influence of Westernization, and also spread Islam all over the world with tactical supports from oil-rich Islamic states like Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq; terror groups now have access to unlimited resources to propagate Islam declaring “intifadah” or “holy wars” in “Infidels” controlled countries. Boko Haram has been credited with association with several 115

identified international terrorist organisations like; AQIM, ElShabab, Ansar Al-Dine in training, logistics and supply of resources. High cost of warfare: New wars have come to replace ancient forms of warfare due to high cost of equipping large armies for full scale warfare has gone beyond the purse of many would be guerrilla freedom fighters. Terrorist groups are smaller; more compact and live on little resource, hence relatively less expensive to run than a standing army. Terror groups avoid direct attacks at security agents unless when cornered and mere explores stealth attacks to spread fear factor and make the state seem impotent. Economic Downturn and High Unemployment: The end of the Cold War signaled the beginning of a gradual decline in resources available to developing states from Western and Eastern power bloc. These states had relied on inflow of financing from superpowers to maintain their economy and armies developer at the behest the superpowers. The sudden fall in foreign grants and investments in most states in Africa, led to the declaration of economic emergencies in the late eighties and the attendant high cost of maintaining over blotted military institutions with no war to fight in most African countries. The fall in standard of living occasioned a new value system and 116

created several illegal economies; states institutions fell gradually to the lure of corruption, youth radicalization increased due to low employment rates, prostitution and hate crimes suddenly spiraled as people looked around for sources for their trauma; and resources for law enforcement that has been left undeveloped for years, failed in coping with the new surge in crime nationally. As

the

illegal

economies

expanded

through

perceived

inefficiencies in law enforcement the unemployed youth turned to violence and radicalism as a means of striking back at the state. Given the lack of resources to fight their wars, it was inevitable that that group could eventually mutate into terrorist organizations. Philosophical Justification: Terror organizations have always justified the martyr of themselves and many non-combatants as sacrifice for the common good. They justified their actions, as an “act of war” in which there will surely be causalities in any war. They usually lay claim to being “freedom fighters” or “fighting in the name of God”, leading to the contemptible saying that: “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” and using the argument of “justification of the deeds” and that “the end justifies the means” in denying the fact that they are terrorists. Morally, even terrorists abhor the term “terrorism” and do not 117

want to be addressed by it. Boko Haram has continually based its jihadi on the need to sanctify the Nigerian society and impose a pious Islamic Caliphate in Northern Nigeria. The chanting of Islamic ideology of the needfulness of jihadi against Western oppressions has created a willing followership in idle youths and secured local Muslim population grudging support. Despite the fact that the public remains the main target of terror attacks; the disruption of peace and creation of chaos remain the mean to achieve the rebels ends, they still finds cover among the people they kill. International Politics: Many states in international politics anonymously sponsor rebel groups against other states covertly to destabilize the political structure. To control resources in some resource rich states, Western countries have been known to give tactical and material supports to anti-state groups to fight and overthrow non-cooperating ruling government in states, which are of strategic economic importance to them. Several international religious sects send aids and grants to their affiliated organisations to finance their operations. Equally states like Saudi Arabia, Iraqi and Iran have continued to spread the growth of their sects in Nigeria. The fight for supremacy between Sunni and Sufi Islamic adherent has continued to

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spread violence within the nation of Islam in Nigeria. Apparently to justify their leadership in Islamic development and eradication of western culture, some of these groups undertake criminal acts against fellow Muslims, Christians, and the state. New Media “Without massive news coverage the terrorist act would resemble the proverbial tree falling in the forest: if no one learned of an incident, it would be as if it had not occurred.” (Nacos 2000: 175). “Modern terrorism is media terrorism. The media are attracted by extreme terrorist acts not only because it is their duty to report on any major event but also because the dramatic and spectacular aspect of terrorism fascinates the general public. Today’s terrorists exploit this and act in a way which will attract maximum attention around the world” Source: The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Committee on Culture, Science and Education Report on “Media and Terrorism” Doc.10557. (20 May, 2005).

The end of the Cold War heralded the need for new justification 119

for realignment and juxtapositions in the new world by Western democracy. As new alignment and regionalization takes place, the need for coaxiallation of power has led to the constant need by leaders for justification of interventions and war in order to secure power bases in the new world arrangement (Laidi 1998). African states used by their colonial masters to prosecute a war they has no basic ideas of its principles were suddenly discarded and required to manage over-blotted debt burdens resulting from managing huge expenditures on proxy armies for their superpowers. The perceived strong economy financed through negative budgeting and aids from Western countries resulted in unmanageable public debts (Moyo 2010; Sachs 2005; Cooper 2004). Nigerian economy like most others fell through the crashed oil prices in the eighties leading to sever depreciation of the Naira The need for projection of images and words that may portray the states as strong and viable led to news management through â&#x20AC;&#x153;media poolingâ&#x20AC;? by government agencies towards projecting positive images for failure of states. Employing the same medium of propaganda decimation perfected during the 196770 Civil War, the Nigerian media reportedly became an extension of states operational arms.

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As the state controls most of the expenditure on media development and the fact that the most prominent news service in Nigeria the Nigerian Television Authority (NTA) is state owned, the state took over the use of the old media. Copying the war propaganda perfected by the United Statesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; Army during the Second World War: Images and words were used as defining point in all military operations in Nigeria to reflect success even while the armies surfers huge losses in their trenches. Changes in modern governance since the end of the Cold War and the need for states to rationally justify all policies in the sight of the public, has led to the development of a viable ministry of communication, and states investment in all forms of media to twist and manipulate traditional media towards positive image in news releases. Gradually, the states has perfected the use of press releases and doctored interviews to friendly press to manage public opinion on national and international issues. Unfortunately, most members of the public are really unaware of the roles played by the media in manipulating public opinions and determining acceptance of government policies. While governments have continued with their grips on the traditional media and use it in justification of its policies and actions, the

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advent and popularity of the â&#x20AC;&#x153;new mediaâ&#x20AC;? since the late nineties has led to a new form of failing struggle by the states to control and manage media information successfully (Hammond 2010). The growth of new media through the Internet, YouTube, websites, blog space, social networks, blackberry and other androids have stepped up the game in news dissemination. The new media make news available directly whether we need it or not. The new media in most countries are not controlled, free, cheap, easy to set up and remain in the hands of the youths. Many revolutionists and terror groups have taken advantage of the new media to spread their messages of hatred and religious bigotry. Public indulgence in hard-hitting, unrestricted and emotionally induced reports from media has contributed in the expansion of insecurity and panic. This has contributed effectively in aiding the spread of fear as envisioned by terror groups and increased pressures on governments (Udapa 2009). Media blizzards of the Boko Haram attacks gave justification to many of the actions that are being taken by the state in the current counterinsurgent operations employing military operations in civilian environments.

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The US and its allies anchored the ’War on Terror’ on a wellfuelled media campaign (Kellner 2005). The narrativisation of terror as exemplified in the media reports of Boko Haram suicide bombings were designed by the terror group and executed by the media to shock, create and spread “fear, frustration, panic and anger effectively amongst the public”. The role of the media in unbiased and well researched reports have been criticized by the public as been laden with sensationalism, circulation of speculations, eliciting panics, frustration and national horror through biased reports and unverified stories. The April, 2012 bombing of This Day Newspaper offices in Abuja and Kaduna by Boko Haram was allegedly orchestrated to protest the perceived bad press from the local media. The use of the media by both sides of the conflicts for propaganda and justification are evident in the current image war going on. The role of media in propagating wars have become increasingly important, as reasons for wars have suddenly become puzzling to ordinary citizens and the emergence of new medium of information and communication technology in this century have succeeded in breaking down national walls as previous divisions based on geospatialism (Geographical East and Western groupings) have continued to

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make ways for sociopatial (Social and religious groupings) thinking in international affairs. The new wars have moved from the trenches to the control of the media in the 21st century leading to a complete â&#x20AC;&#x153;mediatisationâ&#x20AC;? of all modern conflicts (Hammonds 2010). The major interest of Boko Haram has shifted from old media like the newspaper, radio and television to the use of Internet, websites, blogosphere, and satellite television to reach a larger audience at a fast trot. The message of radicalism has continued to spread in a new media war that the state seems to be losing. The strain is on the local press that has resolved to gather its news from government speeches and press release, shunning all forms of serious investigative journalism. The Nigerian media have continued making scoops from mere scandals in the political arena. The media has become an ally though unconsciously, in aiding the spread of threats from terror groups in Nigeria. The age of insurgencies has continued enjoyed unrivalled media frenzy that has given credence to distortion of facts and figures in the violence theater. Government agencies and insurgents in the country have benefitted from these furors, identifying the roles of media in perpetuating perception of threats through

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acknowledgment of potency of threats and power of oppositions is important. * Spreading Fear and Anguish A cursory looks at the front pages of Nigerian daily newspapers will reveal shouting headlines of doom and portends of doom. Images of decapitated torsos, lifeless bodies strewn all over streets, and scattered debris of buildings the gruesome handiwork of the dreaded Boko Haram sect. Television and radio stations are equally guilty of shocking display of gruesome images of terror on national networks. The public are daily inundated with words and pictures of terror delivering the message of Boko Haram attack in one small Kano, Maiduguri or Bauchi village- to the whole country, increasing threats to the public and anguish of victimsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; families. Insurgents do not commit murder for the sake of the acts. Their acts are targeted at creation of general fear in the public through threats to public security. Fear of their invisibility and ability to strike at anytime and anywhere, are the message of any terror group. Gaining fear and reverting public attention to their cause are the major strategies of terror group and this is achievable only through the help of the media. â&#x20AC;&#x2122;The aim of terror attacks is to intimidate targeted public and

125

government through a perceived ever presence threat to security’ (Nacos 2007: 20-174). Boko Haram has persistently struck on important celebrations days like Christmas and New Year, and targets are chosen to deliver specific messages and maintain high publicity for all actions. The bombing of the Police Force Headquarters in 2011, followed the reports of IGP’s announcement in Borno of the Police readiness to end Boko Haram’s exploits, given the equipment donated by the state government to the Police. The bombing of the Military Barracks Abuja during New Year celebration in 2011 could be traced to the need to ingrain on the public that all are vulnerable to threats from the Boko Haram. Since terror groups need to always be in public attention at all time and the media is the mean for achieving this end. The media is enrolled as the mouthpiece for spreading terror messages by terrorists. Reporters are drawn to violent activities and negative stories are what headlines are made of. Terror groups increase their attacks to hold media attention and become object of daily news scoops. The need to satisfy the media thirst for damning news and achieve constant public attention lie in terror groups committing greater act of violence (Nacos 2000:21). Generally, media unwittingly allegedly encourages the growth of terror groups’ violence.

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Justifying Insurgents Actions

Terroristsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; motives, aims and agendas are always left for the media editorials to either justify or thrash. Media sometimes creates news from minor issues to maintain sustained audience attention (Hoffman 2006). Media enforces much public attention on the gory side of terrorism and skewed reporting increases public perception of threats (Austin 2002). Media allegedly in favour of scoops to the detriment

professional

ethics

sometimes

publishes

unconfirmed reports as breaking news only to retract them later. The breakneck competition for audience in a globalized news media has turned the media into entertainment directors and not researchers of events (Brooke 2003). Terrorists have learnt to employ the media to sensationalize and justify their demands and operations (Shobinye 2013). Muslim and Christian leaders in Nigeria have used the media repeatedly to spread hatred and sentimentalism without proper stateâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s vetting (Ayansina 2013; Shobinye 2013). The Nigerian media have persistently prod unending mediatisation of security and open rivalry within national security agencies on. Media reports of the Police/NSCDC Ikorodu shooting saga turned out several unbalanced and clearly misleading stories in

127

different newspapers, depending on the side interviewed by reporters. The need for media men to investigate and follow proper publishing ethics before publishing reports is always ignored. Releases need to be verified before being published, to create proper balanced stories. The process of publishing only one side of a story in any conflict put the press neutrality to test. Balanced reporting in most conflicts could reduce further damages and help in conflict resolution. There are three fundamental forms of media and terrorist relations: Terror groups could consciously ignore the media in order to perform their gory acts and expect the press coverage. In this case they usually have no contributions to media reports order than taking credit for the attack. The second form of the relationship is when terror groups directly partners the media in news delivery. They usually deliver prepared messages to the media for onward publications. This is when the insurgents want to make specific demands on the state, claim responsibility for an attack or announce the start of its operations. MEND through Jomo Gbomo and Boko Haram using Abu Qaqa employed this method. Terror groups understanding the importance of the media in getting the attention of large audience always partner with the media in their cause (Austin 2002).

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The third form of media and insurgent groups’ relationship is in the use of the Internet. With the use of internet, terrorist has become the ’new media’. Terrorists now have unfettered control over the news delivery, in a medium that is cheap and easy to deploy. These crude, unedited and vile messages are transmitted and deliver into individual homes, schools and androids instantly at the press of a button. TERRORIST AND THE INTERNET Many writers have alleged that the growth of terrorism in the 20th century was influenced by technological development in areas of satellite television and widespread internet penetration. Hate propaganda, plans for bomb building, recruitment and training of members and public messages are deliverables through the World Wide Web. Internet users cannot be easily garnished, they are large and expanding daily, as internet has no geographical boundaries and it also have limitless applications, internet is the most important medium for terror decimation (Hammond 2010). From blogosphere, to websites, social networks, Chat Rooms and YouTube, the power of internet and its attractions for the youth has made this medium the ultimate choice in insurgents’ media management. Through the use of internet as a form of media, the insurgents can easily spurn government releases 129

against the group, tell their own stories, so as to win public sympathy and supports and equally release graphic images and video of its operations and demands to the public to enforce its threats. The youth in Nigeria allegedly have totally shunned local news media, taking preference in international satellite stations and the social media for news. The National Television Authority (NTA) and Radio Nigeria Networks are believed to be mere instruments of government propaganda hence unreliable. The internet is the means for quality and uncensored news. Average citizens respects and believe news items only if its confirmed by the new media. The new media is where the challenge of state security is. The obvious lack of censorship on the use of this media in Nigeria has made it easy means for terrorist organisations and radical preachers to spread their message of doom and recruit the youth to their causes through delivery of images and messages of violence and terror. Experts believe that the old media have a set of codes for practitioners but the new media users are relatively ignorant of the roles that images could have in defining public reactions to issues. The effects of spreading images of burnt victims of the Dana Airline crash on 3 June 2012 aside from its shock and long time psychological effects on friends and families of the

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deceased, emotionally stroke the ember of public outcry that occasioned subsequent probes and counter-probes that followed. The insurgents have gradually become major players in the new media operations. Old media by association have also become an intrinsic part of modern day insurgency operations. Media attention nudged by new technology has helped to shape an evolving terror system in our globalized world. Old media already losing its appeal to modern public in need of fast and accurate news, suddenly gained notoriety from their new association with terror groups.

The state in its duties of

maintaining laws and orders need to design appropriate censors to manage the media field. Free press could be a major index in the perfection of democracy but it will be disastrous if the media, through its failure in maintaining its set ethics brought the world to another big war. Infringement on freedom of speech and association has been alluded to if the state establishes a system of media censorship in Nigeria but in curbing terrorism there is a need for some sort of garnishee for the new media and some sections of the old media. European states and the US have since 2005 had implemented

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major internet control measures (EU Rapid 2005). Several satellites stations that preach negative religious mantras, race hates and violence like al-Manar were all together banned. Censoring media might improve security and reduce influence of terror groups on the society. Increased watch on the Internet may help reduce the radicalization of the youth through this medium. There exists need to manage the media as it evolves in Nigeria to protect youth from teachings that pollutes and radicalized. The current war against insurrections maybe won if the state is able to control the spread of hate ethnic and religious pollution in our new media. China, UAE and Japan monitor and control Internet usage within their state. Equally old media should be managed to reduce the glorification of radical groupsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; attacks. Terrorism should not undermine the importance of freedom of expression and information in the media as one of the essential foundations of democratic society. This freedom carries with it the right of the public to be informed on matters of public concern, including terrorist acts and threats, as well as the response by the state and international organizations to them. The fight against terrorism should not be used as an excuse by states to restrict the freedom of the press. As far as journalists

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are concerned, they should also avoid playing into the hands of the terrorists by restricting the dissemination of graphic photos and over-sensational information. Equally, members of the public should be made to be aware of effects of images and messages in fueling anger through anxiety and fear. The need for a more cautious approach to handling information especially through the social network should be stressed. Forwarding information about crises situation may be good but wrong information may cause panic and aid terrorists in getting people to involuntarily accede to their demand. The United State and British Armies led coalition in Afghanistan used pooling of media resources successfully in news decimation to control press releases. Favorable press releases by emphasizing on those areas of positive signs in crisis might mitigate threats perceptions and reduce public perception of threats from insurgents. The state has to selectively use the media positively in stemming the current descent to anarchy in Nigeria.

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4 RADICAL GROUPS IN NIGERIA “Group identities have been recognized as major issue in development of groups. All kinds of groups create identities for their members by offering the opportunity to identify with insiders and distinguish themselves from outsiders. Families, organized religion, the companies or organizations we work for, political parties and cliques we form out of shared interest work this way. However, it’s a fact that none of these groups ordinarily push members to commit violence” (Hoffmann 1993; Gurr 1993).

The ever-present lack of trust and political need for control of power has led to formation of different radical groups by youths in Nigeria. This structure has created the emergence of a new political class in these youth groups (Kalu 2008). Pressures between youth groups angling for positions held for over 60 years by the same groups of elite and their children have materialized as current threats to the society. Marginalized Nigerian youth in groups have severally employed rebellions as the only means of expressing ’their identity and cope with

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insecurity through a rich interplay of ideas about power and identity along with often violent strategies to seek accountability from patronsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; (Pratten 2007).

Ethnic mistrusts and elites struggle for dominance in an environment of growing radicalism and youth restiveness made it easy for the elites to set up and run ethnic based political and armed groups in every regions of Nigeria since the preindependence era (Pratten 2007). Armed youth groups have continued to mutate over time and have continued to become strong agitators for power based on strength and political patronage. Groups formed by the elite for electoral violence have been reportedly hijacked and turned into guerrilla and terror groups, now used in violent agitations for change in different areas of the country.

Nigeria is a nation with the bludgeoning youth problem; the youth constitutes more than forty percent of the population with unemployment at above thirty-five percent of total employable population by 2008. Rebellion feeds on the youth population to thrive and large numbers of unemployed youth are fuel for revolutions.

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Radical groups in Nigeria are ethnic and religious based. But regardless of their base they all have political intentions. Some of the more prominent radical groups are: The Hisba: This is the name used to refer collectively to several youth based Islamic fundamentalist vigilantes in Northern Nigeria. These groups are reported to be the major overseers and police for proper conduct of the citizens and the implementation of the â&#x20AC;&#x153;Sharia lawâ&#x20AC;? in most cities in Northern Nigeria. The adoption of the Sharia Code of law for Northern Nigeria was granted after series of riots and pogroms on Christians and followers of other religions. (IBILEKE 2012).

The Hisba are seen as encompassing the powers of the Police and Judicial officers in the Sharia states. They have the power to accuse, reprimand, arrest, judge and deliver basic judgments on moral offenders immediately on the streets. The oppression of non-moslem and state apparatus are done without any reverence by this group.

The group allegedly formed by Islamic scholars in the late 70s to counter the influence of western based voluntary organizations, has grown to become a major force in security and politics of 136

modern northern Nigeria. The effects of the group’s operations have extended beyond religious enforcement it was set out to achieve. The Hisba has led in several pogroms of Christians and strangers living in the north and is reputed for its hard stance on non-Muslim. The Boko Haram group found a willing allies in the Hisba youths in developing its ideologies and propagation of its anti-state theory in Maiduguri and Bauchi (Azania 2012; Danjibo 2011).

The Izala Movement The Izala Movement, or the “Jama’at Izalatil Bidiawa Iqamatus Sunnah” literarily translated as “Movement against Negative Innovations and for Orthodoxy”, is an Islamic moderate organization concerned with the purification of Islamic Umma, and abolition of practices that are not “Sunnah” in Islam. They abhor and teach against any Moslem behaviour that are not according to the Koran and the “Hadith” of the prophet Muhammad (SAW).

Sheikh Ismaila Idris from Jos started the movement

with few

moderate Islamic scholars like Sheikh Mahmoud Gummi in 1978. Though, the Izalas are not directly anti-state and do not strive for establishment of an Islamic state, they are only interested in 137

purifying the supposed sullied practice of the faith. The ultraconservative nature of Izala movements leadership has stood them out, yet, they are always involved in intra-religious conflicts with groups preaching unorthodox Islamic principles (Best 1999). The Maitatsine The Maitatsine is a radical, anti-establishment Islamic movement that rose from the poor neglected masses in Northern Nigeria to challenge the elite domination and rulers control of resources in Northern Nigeria in the late 70s. This group led by a Cameroonian itinerary preacher, Alhaji Marwa Maitatsine, rallied against northern bourgeois that continued to oppress the poor and needy in the society while they grow fat in pure opulence.

The

group

challenged

the

socio-economic

disadvantages suffered by its memberâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s vis-Ă -vis the well to do in northern society.

Alhaji Marwa Maitatsine was killed in Kano during the 1980 disturbances in which 4,177 people perished within less than 30 days of uprising. The Maitatsine represented a major challenge to the Nigerian state and to other Muslims. It is believed by many Nigerian Muslims that the movement is a heterodox grouping which deviates from orthodox Islam. The members

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exhibit intense hatred for agents of the state such as the police and members of the armed forces, largely because of their repeated violent encounters with these agencies. The Maitatsine was a major challenge to the Nigerian state and to other Muslims. It is believed by many Nigerian Muslims that the movement is a heterodox grouping which deviates from real orthodox Islam.

The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) MEND remains an active umbrella body for active Niger Delta based militant groups formed under the leadership of Henri Orkar in 2004. The group that has resisted the use of the term “terrorists” avowed to being “freedom fighters’ fighting for the rights of the ethnic Ijaw people in the Niger Delta to control their natural resources. In contrast to the healthy profit margins enjoyed by foreign oil companies operating in Nigeria, most Nigerians in the Delta region live in poverty, and many feel that the government is neglecting them. These conditions have led to the proliferation of local terrorist groups, which at last count, numbered around 120 (Pratten 2007).

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’Militant groups, which are primarily composed of young men dissatisfied at their inability to find jobs, proliferated beginning in the 1990s. The first Delta insurgent group to receive international attention was the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP). Led by Ken Saro-Wiwa, the group launched a nonviolent campaign in 1990 against the government and Royal Dutch/Shell to protest environmental degradation and the area’s economic neglect. The group’s efforts led Shell to cease production in Ogoni in 1993. Saro-Wiwa and eight other MOSOP members, the “Ogoni Nine,” were executed by the military regime in 1995’ (Hanson 2007).

Of these organizations, MEND is one of the largest, the best run and its educated leadership works closely with other militant groups, coordinating and conducting joint operations. Notably, MEND has joined forces with the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF) led by the notorious Alhaji Asari Dokuboh, the Coalition for Militant Action in the Niger Delta, and the Martyrs Brigade to form the strongest anti-foreign oil Multi-nationals terrorist alliance in the region (Hanson 2007).

Led by a notoriously shadowy and secretive elite cadre, MEND’s ultimate goal was to expel foreign oil companies and Nigerians not indigenous to the Delta region from Ijaw land. The groups 140

plan was the increase exploitation of local resources by youths in Niger Delta and to engineer proper compensation for previous injustice to the people of the Niger Delta region by Multinational Oil Companies (MOCs). The organization has continued to press for payments of compensation for environmental damages caused by MOCs in Niger Delta and other areas of the country. MEND also wants the central government to provide basic services such as running water to the region and increase government investment in the areaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s infrastructure (Stratfor 2010).

MENDâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s tactics have evolved from crude kidnapping-for-ransom operations, pipeline vandalisation, illegal bunkering and refining of petroleum products into more sophisticated and effective methods that combine actions such as hostage-taking and bombings with the effective use of local and increasingly international media propaganda campaigns (Hanson 2007; Asuni 2009, Nodland and Hjellostad 2007). Security authority failure to check mend was exposed in the January 28, 2007 attack by fifty mend militants on the police state command headquarters in Port Harcourt, Rivers State, led to the release of Sobomabo George (detained MEND Local Commander) after hours of gun battle with Nigerian security forces in broad

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daylight (Hanson 2007)

MEND argues that it was fighting for justice and rights to control the resources of Ijaw nation (Hanson 2009). MEND bombings until 2010, usually target key points in oil pipelines and facilities in the Delta to maximize disruption and cost to foreign oil companies. By January 30, 2010 MEND activities spiraled from the creeks of Niger Delta to cover most parts of Nigeria. The groups’ spokesperson ’Jomo Gbomo” announced the rebuttal of their ceasefire agreement reached on 25 October 2009 (ThisDay 2010).

This announcement was followed by two bombs attacks at Government House, Warri, Delta State during a conference on Amnesty in the Region. Another reported car bomb attack at Army barracks in Port Harcourt, Rivers State was followed by the October 1st 2010 when two bombs exploded barely 100 meters from the Eagle Square Parade Ground, Abuja where the President Goodluck Jonathan and several international dignaries were celebrating the 50th Independent anniversary (Stratfor 2010; The Punch 2010).

The militants insurrections from the 90s, culminated in an Amnesty Programme in 2009. MEND is currently on a ceasefire 142

agreement with the government is enjoying a cash and training amnesty regime but has been reportedly linked to pirate operations in the Gulf of Guinea (NewAfrican 2013).

Odu’a People’s Congress (OPC) The years 1992 to 1999 were instructive in Nigerian politics and were generally heralded as turning point in Yoruba activism. Chief Moshood Abiola -a Yoruba leader- was popularly declared as winners of the cancelled June 12, 1993 Presidential Elections by the military ruler General Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida. This action led to the struggle for actualization of the mandate led by the Yoruba Democratic activists. National pressures and riots in Lagos, Port Harcourt and other major cities in Southern Nigeria by the masses led to the end of the Babangida government on August 26, 1993 (World History Archives 2013). The treasonable Presidential declaration and installation of Chief Abiola by Yoruba Activist in Lagos led to his arrests and imprisonment for 4 years by the General Sani Abacha (HRW 2003).

This struggle led to the formation of several pro-democracy groups in Nigeria, especially in Southern Nigeria. Dr. Frederick Fasheun and some prodemocracy activists formed the Odu’a

143

Peoples’ Congress in 1992 as a nationalist Yoruba advocacy group. The militant arm of OPC was seized in 1998 by one Gani Adams and since has become dominant over its peaceful parent organization. OPC in its newly avowed militancy stance was involved at this period in many altercations with other ethnic nationalities residence in western Nigeria and the Police 1999 after several altercations with the police (HRW 2003). Gani Adams transformed his faction of OPC as the formal Yoruba vigilante group with high dependency on traditional weapons and magic. Adams though barely literate, pursued a separatist agenda, seeking full independence and establishment of the Odu’a Republic for the Yoruba people. He employed the use of crude force to achieve these goals with tactic endorsement of some Yoruba leaders (Bego 2007, HRW 2003) Arrest, detention, extra-judicial killings and division in ranks of the leaders of the Odu’a People’s Congress (OPC) of Southwestern Nigeria by the Police and other security forces, during Gen Olusegun Obasanjo’s presidency (1999-2007) led to the gradual loss of steam for this group’s violence (HRW 2003).

The MASSOB: The Movement for the Survival of the Sovereign State of Biafra

144

(MASSOB) is a southeastern Nigeria based militant group with separationist agenda. The group formed and led by Ralph Nwazuruoke has its mandate as the independence of Igbo lands from Nigeria and the establishment of the Republic of Biafra, that was proscribed after the Civil War in January, 1970. MASSOB agitates for a Republic of Biafra comprising the SouthEast and some part of the South-South regions of Nigeria. The group’s philosophy is hinged on the principle of non-violence as propagated by Mahatma Gandhi. At its inception, MASSOB concentrated on organizing rallies and peaceful protests which culminated in hoisting Biafran flags at different locations in the South East. In recent years, this practice has been reserved mainly for celebrating key dates and events or in commemoration of dead members. MASSOB members embark on protests to protest arrests and killings of its members. In one of these protests, the house of the late Nigerian leader, Nnamdi Azikiwe, was torched. The then Secretary-General of Ohanaeze Ndigbo, Col. Joe Achuzie (rtd) exonerated MASSOB from blame and accused the security agents of ”carelessness and irresponsibility.” In 2005, MASSOB was reported to have re-introduced the old

145

Biafran currency into circulation. This sparked a lot of excitement at the time especially as one Biafran pound was said to exchange for two hundred and seventy naira at the border communities of Togo and the Republic of Benin. In his reaction, the then President of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo, likened the Biafran pounds to a collector’s item and attributed its high exchange value to its relative rarity. MASSOB allegedly launched the Biafran passport in 2009 as part of the programme to celebrate its 10th anniversary. MASSOB leader, Ralph Uwazuruike, said the introduction of the Biafran passport was in response to persistent demands from Biafrans in diaspora. Since its inception, MASSOB has continually alleged mass arrests and killings of its members by government forces. In May 2008, the group released a list of 2,020 members alleged to have been killed by security agents since 1999. MASSOB leader, Ralph Nwazuruoke, has been arrested on several occasions and charged with treason. In 2011, Nwazuruoke and 280 MASSOB members were arrested in Enugu while attending a function in honour of Ojukwu. Few days later, President Goodluck Jonathan ordered Uwazuruike’s release as well as all other MASSOB members in detention” (Wikipedia 2013) Boko Haram 146

The purported war for overthrow of the Northern elite “Yan Boko” by a ruthless deprived group of “talakawas” of Northern heritage is purported by many as the root of the current upheaval in these area.

Observed success of the Boko Haram

sects’ operations made it apparent that their invisibility -even in big towns like Maiduguri, Damaturu and Bauchi- and the choice of people of interest as targets, points at an aggression towards eliminating the ruling class (Pratten 2007). Though many have argued that Boko Haram should not be called a “terror group” but insurgent group like OPC and MASSOB employing “terror tactics” to achieve their aim. Terror tactics stood out in the statement and this classification of Boko Haram in this group may be vain in this argument; given the level of destructions the Boko Haram has unleashed on the Nigerian public in the past 3 years. Nigerian government has labeled this group an “Islamic terrorist group” with intent to overthrow the sitting government and impose an Islamic Republic in Nigeria. What really need to be determined is the origin and causative factors leading to the emergence of the Boko Haram phenomena, what the ends of the group struggles are and what to do to prevent further proliferation of such groups in Nigeria. Other issues to be discussed should be the identification of end of the Boko Haram “Intifada”. A clear analysis of Boko Haram insurgency will reveal if it was designed to overthrow the 147

corrupt hegemonies in Northern Nigeria or it is a collective northern mutiny against the subsistence of the Nigerian state?

5 148

Religion and Terrorism â&#x20AC;&#x153;In the context of general interest in Islam and the Muslim world, Nigeria has become a focus of attentionâ&#x20AC;? (Sanusi, 2007: 198).

From the day of the time of Roman religious expansion, humans have waged war in the name of their Gods and in defence of civilizations. The name of God had been used as justification for political assassinations, hostage taking, suicide bombing, and violent revolution. Moderates have been forever impugned and have rarely been able to unconditionally condemn the acts of divine violence perpetrated by its radical elements. While the foundations of Islamâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s religious texts and traditions may be inherently peaceful and cooperative, they are also vulnerable to the powers of subjectivity and manipulation.

Religious bodies have been known to employ and sponsor terrorism in propagating their doctrine and sometimes annihilate a whole culture to perpetuate their doctrines or forcefully convert others to imbibe its ways. The Roman Catholic caused many to burn at stakes and sponsored assassinations of many leaders to spread the influence of the church all over the 149

world in the middle age. The Islamic Jihads were fought in Asia and some part of Africa to establish the religion of Islam.

The location of Boko Haram attacks in Northern Nigeria has completely wavered peoples conclusions on Islamic religion as the root of current extremism. Islamic leaders have complained of the erroneously vilification of their religion by the United States and other European states in their policy against Islam in the 20th century as religion that propagates hatred and extremists. Many have also concluded in the aftermath of the terroristsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; attacks of September 11, 2001, that Islam is indeed a threat to world peace and will never allow democracy to grow.

However studies have revealed that Islam could have been

150

bastardized by a few zealots without a clear understanding of the tenets of the religion and that:

“Islam, Judaism and Christianity have the same origins. All three religions are based on the same theological evidences. They all proffer the same one God and respects common prophets. Clear readings of the Koran showed high correlations in most areas where the Bible and the prayer time now used by the Moslems are the same the old Christians used before the advent of modern churches (Russell 2008) ”

Noah Feldman, in his book “After Jihad, America and the Struggle for Islamic Democracy” (2003), maintains that Islamic democracy might be possible and that many Muslims indeed desire this. He posits that many democratic voices are currently being suppressed by autocratic regimes in the Middle East (many of these regimes still enjoys support of Western governments), whom through fear of loss of power, continued to suppress democratic movements and thereby encouraging insurrections by the populace.

The backlashes against these oppressive regimes are used as

151

evidences of Islamic extremism; wish the rulers always used in threatening global leaders may occur if they were out of power. This could be a pointer that the northern Nigeria elite could be using public hatred of religious extremism to suppress justifiable internal agitations for change of current political system and the establishment of a real Islamic state in northern Nigeriaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;

The Boko Haram scrounge have been blamed on the elites corruption that has led to high incidence of poverty and unemployable youth in northern Nigeria. As it is clear that no religion preaches extremism, people become lured into radicalism through societal failure to provide avenues for achieving human dignity.

Islam in Nigeria

Islam first emerged in Nigeria around the beginning of the eleventh century in the areas known today as Borno State, Northeastern region of Nigeria. The spread of Islam from these predominantly Kanuri areas in the Kanem Borno Empire to mainland animist Hausa tribes in the northwest began in time before the 12th century. The Kanem Bornu Empire waned around the late 18th century, leading to freedom for many Hausa tribes

152

in and around Northern Nigeria.

Islam was imposed as state religion in the whole Northern Nigeria up to areas around Ilorin, Kwara state, after the 1804 Jihadi led by the Sunni Fulani religious leader, Uthman Dan Fodio (the first Amir Mumuni). The Jihadi was directed at achieving Islamic political and economic dominance over the Hausa and Kanuri tribes in the Kanem Borno and Sokoto Caliphates, through the eliminating of none conformist Muslim leadership and destroying all animalistâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s practices thereby strengthening Islam as the state religion in the whole Northern Nigeria. Unfortunately, the Kanuri tribes resisted the Jihadi and a truce was reached leading to independence of the Shiites Islamic based Kanem Bornu from the Sokoto Caliphate.

By the beginning of the 19th century, areas around Northern Nigeria were predominantly Muslim and ruled by the Islam Caliphate structure divided between the Sokoto Caliphate; which extended from Sokoto to most of northwest and north central, and Kanem-Borno Caliphate: covering the most of the northeastern areas of the country.

Despite huge challenges by the local Hausa and Kanuri tribes in

153

the areas, the caliphates had continued to flourish. Interestingly, the seed for problem within Muslims in Nigeria dated back to the emergence of sectarianism in practise between these two major Islamic sects, Shia and Sunni in Nigeria.

Colonialization in the 19th century rather than affect the status quo in northern Nigeria, the British Government chose to employ indirect rules, using the Sultan and Emirs to govern and control the people of Northern Nigeria. Gradually through social and commercial interactions, Islam had spread to the predominantly Christian Southern Nigeria. Today, there are about 76 million Muslims in Nigeria, with Northern Nigeria accounting for more than 70% of this figure (Abdu 2008). Nigeria states Muslim population constitute more than one third of the total Muslim population in sub-Saharan Africa region and the state has the 4th largest Muslims population in the world.

Nigeriaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s roles in sub-Saharan Africa Islam movement can only be understood when viewed against these values. Northern Nigeria currently constitutes the second highest number of active Muslim in any single country in Africa. The need for Nigerian Muslims to lead in Islamic activism in Africa has continued to put pressure on Northern Nigerian Muslims (Abdu 2008). 154

Current political leadership of Nigerian state is termed by some core Moslems in the north as “unislamic” and remains unacceptable to Islamic leaders in the region. Nigerian religious leaders have never wavered at any time to exploit the religious agenda in all political situation and discourse. To most northerners, religion and the state are fused and inseparable; hence Muslims should never stay in country ruled by “Kaffirs”. Understanding Islam in Nigeria becomes complex giving the numbers and arrays of various schools of thoughts, traditional influences and challenges on proper forms of worship as different sects strive for dominance. The constant intra-religious argument has continued to create lots of tensions and conflict between Islamic sects. Islam in Nigeria, -as in Christianity and other adopted religions- has grown and incorporated cultural contexts and belief systems forming local orthodoxies. Religious adherence and thoughts in Nigeria has never been static, it is constantly evolving, molded and reformed to meet prevalent socio-economic and political trends in the country. Hence, issues in Nigerian religious environment are influenced by both local and global scopes. Though Moslems in Nigeria do not subscribe to international bodies to regulate proper practices but they actually maintain strong ties with the global 155

Muslim Umma. Global Islam has continued to surfer huge loss to fratricidal wars between adherent of Sunni and Shia sects based on differing interpretation of the Quran. Ministry of Health in Iraqi was quoted to have announced over 85,000 casualties from sectarian violence in the in 2009. Nigerian Muslims have continued to face internal struggles on the future directions of the faith as proliferation of radical unorthodox teachings permeates the community. The growth of an intense radical group with the mandate to upturn the old order has been blamed on the latest crises since the emergence of ‘Maitatsineism’. Majority of Muslims in Northwest and southwest Nigeria belonged to the Sufi or Sunni sect; - The Sunni emphasis and belief in the spiritual elements of Islam, they belief in the saints and revers religious marabous and has faith in their Imams-. This sect remains most popular in West Africa and Sudan. The Sufis in Nigeria includes the Quaddiriyya and Tijjaniya. The “Salafist” and Shia Sects are modern form of conservative Islamic sect based on Saudi Arabia’s “Wahhabism”. The Salafist growth in Nigeria has been attributed to the influences of financially strong Muslim NGOs from the Middle East like: the World Muslim League (WML), World Assembly for Muslim Youth

156

(WAMY), the Federation of MAB and Islamic Schools. These NGOs -allegedly flushed with funds from Saudi Arabian Government- have built mosques and Islamic centers in several cities in Africa, and many are staffed by puritanical African Muslims, often trained in the Middle East. They also offer academic scholarships to youth to further Salafist teachings and reduce the influence of Sufis teachings and practices, which they termed â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;heterodoxâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; and too cheap for the worship of Allah (Robinson 2004). The Sufis worship involves a lot of chanting of Holy Quran, singing, dancing and meditations. Struggles for religious dominance in Africa between these two major Islamic powers; conservative Saudi Arabia (Wahhabis) and the radical Iran (Shias) has further created problem for Muslims in Africa. The need for financing of development of Islamic teachings in Nigeria has been fulfilled through funds from Saudi Arabia and Iran. While Saudi Arabia sustained its influence through sponsorship of mosques and religious institutions, Iranian government maintained closer ties not only through funding but by assimilation of local youth groups into Shias Islamic radicalism ( Kane 2007). The Sufi sect also staggers from internal wrangling aside from

157

challenges from Salafism. The major groups of Sufi order never fully agree with each otherâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s practice. The Quaddiriyya and the Tijjaniya have distinct forms of teachings and have perpetually excluded the Hammadiyas from southern Nigeria from their enclaves. Many analysts agrees that constant changes in the evolution of Islamic thoughts and insurgency attributed to Islam in the late 20th and 21st century can be traced to the emergence of young radicals with western education and eloquent leadership oratory skills in several Islamic sects like Mohammed Yusuf founder of the Boko Haram sects. Islamic tradition of respect for spiritual leadership authority was breached by thisnew group whom belief in need for immediate changes by all means necessary. Many analyst have concluded that the prevalence of competing doctrines and teachings, the ambivalence of the African cultural environment and the prevalence of ethnic and political struggles in Nigerian state has led to the growth of intense conflicts within Islamic brotherhood in Nigeria (Kane 2007). The state and religion remain fused and undivided in Islam. The state is seen as dictating the bearing and direction for religious expressions. Muslims are pained when under any form of leadership that eschews Islamic teachings and doctrines. Moslems has over the course of time use Islamic organizations, 158

sects, movements and other forms of associations to respond to states issues. The growth of carefree elites with so many riches amongst poor and hopeless millions has been seen as many as panache for radicalism and insurgency (Abdu 2008).

The 1980s witnessed the renaissance and emergence of numbers of Islamic radical groups in most part of Nigeria. The propagation of religious ideas by these groups led to several riots in the cities of Kano in 1980, Kaduna in 1982, Bulum-Ketu in 1982, Jimeta in 1984 and Gombe in 1985. Most of these riots were caused by rural urban migration problem caused by lack of employment in rural communities due to desertification. Islam group loyal to and inspired by the teachings of Alhaji Mohammed Marwa Maitatsine, a Cameroonian migrant preacher started an Islamic holy war in northern Nigeria that led to government persecution and arrest of the leaders in 1975 (Danjibo 2011). â&#x20AC;&#x153;One of the reasons given by the Commission of Inquiry for the Maitatsine riots was the economic situation of the country that left millions of people, especially the youths, without jobs or any means to live a decent lifeâ&#x20AC;? (Danjibo 2011)

159

The late Alhaji Bala Usman had consistently maintained that violence in the garb of religion has always been a manipulation of the elite and the political class to cover their failure in leadership roles.

Westernization of civilization, which is

generally regarded as Christian influenced by the Moslem Umma become a threat to the Islamic religion as freedom of expressions, human rights and education become more readily available in the third world states in the late 70s. Most Western security analysts, generally ignored warnings of imminent clash of civilization between the Western culture of unrestricted freedom and the Eastern Islamic hegemony at the end of the Cold War in 1989.

Islamic Radicalization Many analysts made mockery of Samuel Huntington 1999 work in the imminent ’Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order’. He had concluded that the growth of religious radicalism in Arab world would surely pose serious challenges to Western civilization expansion aside from the obvious communist China posturing. “The West is and will remain for years to come the most powerful civilization. Yet it’s power relative to that of other civilization is declining. As the West attempts to assert it values

160

and to protect its interests, non-Western societies confront a choice. Some attempt to emulate the West and to join or to “band-wagon” with the West. Other Confucian and Islamic societies attempt to expand their own economic and military power to resist and to “balance” against the West. A central axis of the post-Cold War world politics is thus the interaction of Western power and culture of non-Western civilization” (Huntington, 2011: 29).

Arguably, Analysts posited the existence of several internal and external factors responsible for current problem in Islamic north of Nigeria. These problems might be traced to: * Control of religious teaching and harmonizing religion practices * Westernization of Islam culture * High incidence of poverty and an indifference of the elite class These problems are being manifested in current insurgencies. Leading to conclusions by analysts that there might be a school of thought, which believes and wants to solve these problems through usurping present political and religious elite in Northern 161

Nigeria. Conflicts between Christians and Muslims Koranic students called ’almajiri’ or ’gardawa’ and unemployed migrants has been part of the religion-based violence in Northern Nigeria. Maitatsine and his followers became separate from orthodox Islam, condemning the corruption of the religious and secular elite and the wealthy upper classes’ consumption of Western goods during the petrol boom in 1974-81. The Boko Haram movement has been connected to the Maitatsine movement that seeks to implement sharia law across the Northern Nigeria. Extreme leaders who were able to rally young, educated group of individuals who have fears that the state would not be able to protect their religious group propagated radical Islam in Nigeria. The leaders were able to polarize

their

followers

through

speeches

and

public

demonstrations. The activities of some of these sects has in recent times led to the loss of lives and properties as they move about destroying government facilities which they see as legacies or replica of western cultures in their various communities. These religious campaigns has seen an increase in gun battles between the members of these sects and security forces were rare, tensions did flare between the two groups as each group radicalized. 162

There were clashes in October 1982 when Muslim zealots in Kano were able to enforce their power in order to keep the Anglican House Church from expanding its size and power base as they saw it as a threat to the nearby Mosque, even though the Anglican House Church had been there for more forty years prior to the building of the Mosque. Additionally, there were two student groups in Nigeria who came into contestation, the Fellowship of Christian Students (FCS) and the Muslim Student Society (MSS). In one instance there was an evangelical campaign organized by the FCS and brought into question why one sect should dominate the campus of the Kafanchan College of Education. This quarrel accelerated to the point where the Muslim students organized protests around the city, which culminated in the burning of a Mosque at the college. The Christian majority at the college retaliations led to burning of several Mosques and 12 dead. Media reports were biased on each side based on religious leanings of the media managers. Exploitation of the media in propagating separationist ideas embedded in most local conflicts, aided further strengthening and radicalizing each side of the divide.

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Understanding the problem Islam faces in the twenty-first century is instructive in any structural analyses of current problem in Nigeria. The Boko Haram insurgency should not be misunderstood. Many experts have professed it as a reflection of perennial ethnic-political and economic problem. Yet, the real issue here cannot be restricted to the local environment; it is part of an international problem that has risen out of the fear of religious and cultural domination of the global Muslim â&#x20AC;&#x153;Ummaâ&#x20AC;? by the western states civilization. The dominance of western culture has occasioned the need for the faithfuls to rein in and fight the breakdown of traditionally cherished religious borders and possible extinction of the faith through corruption of the youth. In Nigeria, agitations for control of power and resources allegedly sponsored by northern elites, has been hijacked by the radical youths and turned from political war to an intifadah for the soul of Islam, insurance of survival of civilization and culture of people northern Nigeria. Facts from researches have identified roles of the elites in creating the current problem as poignant. The use of ethnic violence to achieve political point is as old as Nigerian politics. The same means were used to rejuvenate religious rivalry in 1978 during the constitutional conference on the 1979 Constitution, leading to several walkouts and crises 164

(Walker 2012). Monsters created during previous agitations for entrenchment of Sharia and the Maitatesein riots in northern Nigeria in the late 1980s was reawakened in Boko Haram. Islam in Nigeria has become heterogeneous with the springing up of many Islamic sects notable among these are the Izala, the Shiite, Sufi and other smaller sects that are localized to their environments. One major feature of these new sects is their attacks on traditional Islamic Sufism and has today become radicals and anti-state elements (Abdu 2008). Groups of Islamic schools with differing religious teachings many incorporating the Salafist separatists Islamic controlled antiKaffirs state ideologies grew in Nigeria with supports from Salafist from all over the world. The supports for radical teachings exploded with endowments from tainted Islamic clerics and youth by the Al-Qaeda after the 9/11 bombing of the US. The psychology of the Sufi Islamic sects that has always adhered to the teachings of the late Uthman Dan Fodio on the need to purge the Kaffirs from leadership of Islam states was replaced by radicals quoting the Holy Qur’an collective obligation in 9v5, to the Muslim community “to wage holy war, ‘Jihad’ against polytheist and unbelievers in order to subject them to Muslim rule suddenly became the major text of all radical Imams

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preaching”. Religious tensions between Evangelical Christians and Islamic groups have long existed, but the anticipated extension of Sharia law in a number of northern states has occasioned increased religious tension since December 1999. For example, in Ilorin, Kwara State, fourteen churches were burnt to the ground by suspected Islamic fundamentalists. News of the introduction of sharia law on 1 January 2000 in Zamfara State led to widespread violence in February/March 2000 in which property were destroyed and more than 1,000 people killed (BBC News 2000). Kano State, adopted Islamic Sharia law in June 2001 and in 2002, ten other northern states followed suit immediately. Though the Nigerian central government has openly recognized the incompatibility of sharia law with the federal constitution, President Olusegun Obasanjo purportedly avoided intervening in decisions taken by these states that applied Islamic law, merely calling for moderation in its application (indepthafrica.com 2012). The US attack on Afghanistan and the “War on Terror” led to local sympathies from local Muslim faithful. Many admirers of the Osama Bin Laden school of thought that “justifies violent actions to win back the Muslim Umma from Western influences” 166

began to set up “madrasa’ Islamic schools and training centers in most urban areas of northern Nigeria. Increased access to Internet and satellite televisions made possible inflow of updated teachings from international commentators and Islamic left wing preachers. As group ideology gradually replaced personalities and family affiliations, psyche of most youths progressively transformed from cultural ideals and personal achievements towards, upholding religious and group agenda. Groups’ martyrdom now ranks higher than all worldly achievements and personal glory for youths without hope. The poor environment has a lot of influence on the aspiration of youths. Group identities now lead to qualifying their groups as being superior and above other groups, which they viewed as worldly, indecent and corrupt, hence not clearly worthy of Islam”. This radicalism further worsened the fragile peace in Islamdom. Religion expressions now become an excuse for destruction of other civilizations. The seed for glorification of self through delusionary religion defense was planted in the youth hearts through radical religious teachings and manifested in the willingness for martyrdom. Religious sacrifice of self is seen by many youth without worldly aspirations as means of cleansing

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the anomaly in their spirits and returning to heaven without sin to live forever in utter luxury. Failure of the elite to provide room for hope and aspiration through addressing growing youth unemployment and lack of infrastructure drove the youth towards radicalism in other to address these malaises. The radical youth have continued to express their faith in violent acts against their leaders who had failed them and the state by extension as the perceived protector of the leadership.

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6 BOKO HARAM “By Dealing with Conflicts, we continue to help build the framework for its prevention, mitigation, and Rebuilding of peace… the logical conclusion of (all) war is the reestablishment of peace” (Hughes 2013)

Formed by the militant group of the Sufi Islamic youth group from Northeastern areas of Nigeria, the Boko Haram sect started as religious educational groups with radical ideas for change in Northern Nigeria. The formation of this group and many others can be traced to unbridled growth of religious fanaticism due to poverty and growing unemployment in Nigeria and West African states from the late 1980s. Religious renaissance in youths with identity problem blossomed in religious circle as many thronged to religion in search of hope as economic recession hit hard and poverty increased. Creation of many schools and sects with different religious ideologies and teachings in Nigeria in this period has been attributed to the loss of identity by youths and the beginning of sheer radical activism.

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A group of radical Islamic youths under the tutelage of an intemperate Islamic scholar, Alhaji Muhammed Ndimi of the Ndimi Mosque in Maiduguri, Borno State in northeastern area of Nigeria formed the core of the Boko Harm sect. Alhaji Ndimi was an apostle of the Muhammed Marwa School founded in Kano in and around 1945. Marwa was a Cameroonian migrant zealot Islamic preacher who settled in Kano and preached against the Westernization of Northern Nigerian Elites and its corrupt effects on Islam. This group’s ideology was radical and went against the Islamic teachings of infallibility of the leadership of states and unquestionable loyalty by the followership. “In the Bayan Wujub al-Hijra, the Shehu stated that to maintain order is essential and to safeguard the public interest is an indispensable necessity; for this reason it has been forbidden to revolt against an Imam (i.e. the ruler) whether he be righteous or sinful” (El-Masri 37; Majuk 2011). His direct challenge on the Emirates led to his expulsion from Kano by the Emir, Alhaji Sanusi Lamido. Marwa returned to Kano after the death of the Emir in the late 60s and continued his anti-establishment preaching. Boasted by rampaging poverty, unemployment and healthy source of

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students in the Almajiri, the sect he formed grew in rank and spread all across northern Nigeria. One major characteristics of this group that swell its rank was the lack of control in the choice of Imams and preachers. Imams and Clerics were chosen and ordained haphazardly in contrast to hereditary Islamic Sufi principles (Falola 1990: 143). Students of the Alhaji Ndumi Schools were reportedly part of the members of the Ahlusunna wai’jama’ah Hijra sect, established in the University of Maiduguri, Borno State in 1995 by moderate Malam Abubakar Lawan. The sect was then relatively nonviolence but committed to orthodox practices in Islam. This moderate group was taken over and militarized by Mohammed Yusuf in 2002 became completely sectarian and adopted the name ‘Yusufiyya’ after his leader. Professing the practise of orthodox Islam and abhorrence of Western cultural influence in tandem with Al-Qaeda principles, Yusuf declared war on prominent Islamic Scholars such as Jafar Adam, Abba Aji and Yahaya Jingir and challenged the established political institutions in Borno state as corrupt and evil. (Danjibo 2011) Mohammed Yusuf was against the ways of the established elite. They surmised they are corrupt and indecent hence they should

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be removed by force and replaced with a supreme Islamic leadership that will stamp out Western cultural corruptions, be above worldly corruption, judge with kindness and treat the people with love (Chothia 2012). The group known as Boko Haram today, pride themselves as “Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad” which in English means “People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad” ( Chothia 2012). The name “Boko Haram” has been literarily translated by many to mean, “Western education is evil” thereby denouncing the group’s ideology, as negative, retrogressive and against any kind of Western development influences in their environment (Walker 2012). Contra view has positioned that —the fact that the group had no contribution to the coinage of the translated name or because it has no direct bearing on the group and the fact that there has been several direct rebuttal of this name by the sect- a clear reading of the name might suggest another meaning for the mission of this sect. Given that Boko Haram’s first challenged the deviation from Islamic culture by the elites or ‘Yan Bokos’ “Educated Elite” in Bauchi and Borno states, the locals could have christened this sect’s as “war against the elites” in Northeastern Nigeria known for their excesses and avarice.

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Favouring some unconfirmed reports claims that “Boko Haram” could be an abbreviation of the “Yan Boko Haram” which could be literarily translated to mean “the educated are bad”. These areas and many others on the Boko Harm imbroglio remain clearly unexplored and are beyond the limit of this work. It has been argued that the apparent lost in translation of the meanings of the name of this group, could have been deliberate and influenced by the elites to further confused researchers in assuaging meanings to the Jihadi by the group. Equally, lack of concise data on activities of this group, made issues about them clearly undefined. Reportedly tired of the level of elite corruption in Maiduguri and Nigeria, the Boko Haram sect announced a “Hijra” -a religious withdrawal- and led a movement of the faithful from the “sinful city” of Maiduguri, to Kanama town, in the outskirt of Yobe State. There they set up a separatist Islamic community supposedly ran only by the strict adherence to the tenets of the Holy Quran and the Hadiths of the Prophet Mohammed (Walker 2012).

The group preached and taught in the areas around Kanama -the hometown of Mohammed Ali- wining many locals to their camp 173

through social welfare support to the poor people of the area. The sect ulterior political goals rapidly manifested as base for recruiting future “jihadist” to fight the state. Given the strategic location of the camp at the borders with Niger Republic, the anti-state teachings and nonconformist attitude of the leaders and their avowed loyalty to other international radical groups lack of proper monitoring by security agencies contributed to the growth of this sect in its earlier years. Unconstrained and given its welfares agenda in a relatively poor environment, this group expanded rapidly with members from local communities and immigrants from neighboring Chad and Niger (Chotia 2012) Membership Mohammed successfully changed the attitude of his followers and imposed Arabic as the only language of communication amongst members. This move attracted followers from the unemployed “Almajiri” youth who find comfort in the camp welfare programmes. Preaching against the evil of elitism and corruption of politicians supposed enemies of the growth of Islam; this group thrived and prospered with lots of local supports and patronage. Membership of Boko Haram is mostly drawn from radical youths, Islamic scholars, unemployed graduates and the poor street urchins, the Almajiri who lives and study under strict

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Islamic teachers in several northern cities. The high numbers of unemployed and the level of poverty in northern Nigeria make recruitment into welfarist groups like Boko Haram easy. Records showed there are over 9 million Almajiri in northern Nigeria as at 2010. Foreigners from war torn West and Central African states formed a bulk of the foot soldiers. The low life expectancy and famine predominantly existing in countries like Chad, Niger, Sudan, Mali and Cameroon had created a lush of migrants through Nigerian unguarded northern borders and swelled the ranks of this group. Soldiers returning from several wars without home and families to return to, easily found roots in some of the madrasahs run by the Boko Haram in Nigeria. As in Most insurgencies in Africa, several insurgent groups are also known to deliberately kidnap and train youth for use in their operations. Descent to Extremism The clamp down by the security agencies in December 2003 resulting from community dispute over fishing rights in the local pond was important in the transformation of Boko haram from preaching to direct attack on state institutions. Adhering to their now avowed anti-state philosophies, the sect challenged the authorities of the Nigerian security services and resisted 175

interventions of officers of Nigeria Police Force in the affray.

The group termed “the Nigerian Taliban” by the Nigerian media went on the rampage, reportedly sacked the Local Police Station, disarmed and overpowered some officers in the station and fled back to their camp with the arms and ammunition collected (Walker 2012))

The Nigerian Army was later deployed in the camp to arrest “the Talibans” and shut the camp down. The barricade lasted several days, the sect counter attacked and dug in. After several days of the siege, the sect faltered and was sacked by the soldiers. The sect leader, Mohammed Ali and most members lost their lives in scrimmage, the camp was burnt down and surviving members of the sect were displaced. The small group of “Talibans” that survived this purge apparently journeyed back to Maiduguri to join forces. They reportedly reformed the group with colleagues from the Ndimi Mosque and several students. The sect supported by locals built a mosque with Islamic learning center on a land donated by one Baba Fugu Mohammed —Mohammed’s father in-law- around the northern outskirts of Maiduguri town. Muhammad Yusuf

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activities and vehement attacks on Western civilization brought the groupâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s activities to national highlights and gained notoriety as a major radical group in northern Nigeria (Chothia 2012) The media coverage enjoyed by this group during and after the 2003 attacks on the Police force put them unto international lime light and the group have refused to leave the stage since then. One major issue that ponders many analysts is the fact that this group has never hidden its anti-state tendencies from the beginning and the state security agencies should have been aware of volatile nature of religious hates teachings in breeding of extreme behaviours to institute a proper surveillance on the sectâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s activities at this early period (Walker 2011). Many people in these areas are known beneficiary of the Boko Haram center of learning. Lack of proper security check availed this group of unrestricted inroad into every areas of Northeastern Nigeria with its anti-state preaching, recruitment and training of radical youths for fatwa against the elites and the states. That this group preaching a message of religious hatred and with separationist agenda was allowed to grow and expand by security agencies to poison the minds of the people in an environment with high numbers of unemployable youths, high incidence of poverty, low life expectancy and in a town

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bordering the ever-volatile Islamic states of Chad, Mali and Niger Republic is a reflection of the qualitative level of security operations in Nigeria. Even claims by sources that the group receives huge donations from Salafist groups in Saudi Arabia and Iran and also obtained weapon training from the Touareg Resistance group’s camps in Mali and Chad equally went completely uninvestigated by the authorities (Walker 2012). On September 21, 2004, Boko Haram staged several attacks against Police Stations in Bama and Gworza in Borno State, which led to the death of several security operatives and looting of the armouries in these stations. It was in 2006, that the Department of State Security (SSS) arrested Mohammed Yusuf, detained and interrogated him for several months over the group’s activities. Yusuf was released in 2007 to return to his camp in Maiduguri, a free man and allowed to continue his teachings in peace. This short place in the news equally profited the sect, as more curious northerners reportedly joined this sect in spreading the evil radical teachings throughout Northern Nigeria. The group reportedly held and control political power in Borno State and enjoyed patronage from the state government and elites of the area during this period (Walker 2012). That the Sheik Ja’far Mahmoud Adam -a renowned, prominent and respected Islamic scholar, a pillar of the Ndimi Mosque

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Islamic scholars- one of the few scholars who dare speak against the activities and preaching of the Boko Haram group- was assassinated in 2007 was instructive. The highlight of this assassination was the fact that it was carried out in a Mosque while Jaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;far was praying, a complete sacrilege in Islamic society. Security agents ignored this major indicator of Boko Haram evolving from a religious sect to an extreme terror group. This killing sent out a clear message to all Muslims to either come on board or get killed through interference. This message was lost on the state security agencies. Desecration of religious place is clearly unislamic and the fact that the sect can kill a renowned Imam in a mosque was clearly a huge message to all believers (Walker 2012). Operational modification of this group moved from radical teachings towards direct violence and assassination of antagonists was a clear sign of the breakaway from traditional Islamic teachings and espousing its own radical tenets (Majuk 2011). The privation of preventive law enforcement system became ominous in lack of monitoring of religious groups in the country. Preventive security maneuvers would have prepared the mechanism for handling this group membersâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; documentation through proper surveillance and intelligence collection, analysis

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and profiling would have help abetted in comportment of current state counter-insurgency operation against the sect. Experts maintained that current jamboree and mediatisation of security might not have been necessary if there were conscious efforts towards intelligence gathering on various radical groups in the country since 1985. Intelligence failure has been the bane of security engagement with the Boko Haram sect. Surprisingly, the USIP, United State Embassy and other international intelligence community, have more information on the Boko Haram sect than all local security agencies in Nigeria. Returning from the burial of a colleague in July 2009, traffic infringement check by Police Officers on the sectâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s convoy led to a mother of all violence in Borno State. The resultant unrest led to several hours of exchange of gunfire between the police and members of the sect. In a complete deviance of the state, Boko Haram loyalists clearly defiled the authority of the State and challenge its sovereignty in an open confrontation.

Several

Police officers were killed in this attack and the group declared itself a sub-state, decreed a fatwa charging all faithfuls to take up arms in a â&#x20AC;&#x153;Jihadâ&#x20AC;? against the government of Borno State led by Senator Ali Modu Sheriff (Okocha and Ogbodo 2012). The Killing of police officers and the challenge on state authority drew the ire of the Borno and Bauchi States Governments who

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called in military troop to disperse the sect. This action lead to the sacking of the Boko Haram Community in Kanama by the Nigerian Army and Police retaliatory killings of several members by Police. Many of the followers including the Yusufâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s father-inlaw were later killed in the skirmish. Yusuf and other members arrested by the soldiers that led the siege were handed over to Police authority for interrogation and further investigations. Within twelve hours of the arrest and detention of Yusuf and his group, police announced the death of Yusuf and his groups while trying to escape from custody. The public saw the killing of Yusuf and his men as one of the several extra judicial killings by the security agencies in Nigeria. These killings went principally uninvestigated by police authorities and the government at that time (Chothia 2012; Walker 2012). From 2009, the covert purge of members of the sect by the northern elite and security agencies continued till late 2010, leading to members going completely underground. Security reports reportedly showed the beginning of inter-border operations of Boko Haram operatives in and around 2010. Prominent members of the sects like Abubakar Shekau was reportedly seen in Touareg freedom fighters camps in Mali and AQIM camps in Niger Republic during weapon training by international security agents.

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In and around May 2010, the sect unleashed a fresh reign of terror targeted at the elites and â&#x20AC;&#x153;Yan Bokoâ&#x20AC;? in Borno State. The sect started hit-and-run shooting and assassination of community and religious leaders in the state. Attacks on police stations, security agencies and security agenciesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; collaborators continued in Northern Nigeria. These were percussion to the grand attacks on October 1st 2010 when the sect struck outside its comfort zones for the first time (Dickson 2010).

Despite pre-warnings of a planned bomb attack, law enforcement agencies were unable to prevent double explosions in Central Business District, Abuja close to Eagle Squares, during the 50th Independence Anniversary Celebrations heralding the beginning of real terror operations in the Nigerian Ethnopolitical struggles. Two bombs explosions timed few minutes apart killed over 12 people and wounded several in central area of Abuja, Nigerian Capital. The bombing was attributed to the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) -though several reports blamed it on the Boko Haram- this action opened the flood gate to series of bombing and terror attacks by insurgents groups in Nigeria (Okah 2012, Ogunlana 2011; Iroegbu 2012)

Security activities to unravel the source of these bombing ended

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in mystery. Many media show of arrests, accusations and counter-accusations later all trail got cold. All moves to blame Boko Haram and the north for this bombing were exterminated by the arrest and charge of MEND leader, Henry Okah in South Africa with sponsoring insurgency in Nigeria. The SSS also made some arrest and the case are still pending in the Nigerian courts (Abidde 2013; Okah 2012).

Boko Haram announced its return to full-scale insurgency with the Christmas Eve, 2010 bombing of twelve locations in Jos, Plateau State. The group struck again barely 7 days later on New Year’s Eve December 31st 2010; bomb detonated by persons suspected to be Boko Haram member at the Abacha Barracks, Mogadishu Cantonment’s Mammy Market, Abuja led to over 12 mortalities and several injuries. The bombing strikes at the eve of two popular Christians’ holidays are indicative of the religious inflections in the supposedly ethno-political agendas of the Boko Haram sect.

The descent of this group bomb attacks onto the realm of employing suicide bombers or “martyrs of Jihadi” was shocking and expressed the desire of the group to pursue their demand employing any means possible. The devolvement of this group to this level could be a means of imposing a reign of absolute

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terror on Nigerians and clampdown any contrary messages from any other Islamic organizations against the group. The new regime of fear was confirmed through suicide bombing at the Nigerian Police Force Headquarters and later at the UN Buildings in Abuja in 2011 (Emsaro 2011).

The message was clearly aggravation of threats, “no security agency can protect the public from us” was the new directive from Boko Haram and the northern elites were cowed. It is glaring that a lack of concise demand by the Boko Haram group was due to the lack of proper organization of its operations after the 2009 attack by the security forces. The loss of its astute leadership in Mohammed, led to a great vacuum in operational organization and execution. Shekau and other avowed leaders were reportedly foot soldiers, radicals with only arms and bombing experience, which could not articulate and plan the survival of the organization. This group of radicals took over the now scattered group and adopted the “Propaganda of Deed” vowing to put down the Nigerian nation by every means possible, the new agenda of Boko Haram.

Within the first five months of 2012, Boko Haram shooting and bomb attacks have led to over 400 deaths and left about 600 injured in a move to annihilate non-Muslims and moderate

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Muslims in northern Nigeria (Walker 2012). A new video released via YouTube in June 18 2012, came with chilling news, the Boko haram evolution has morphed into an African Muslims protective body under a new name:

“Jama’atu Ansarul

Musilimina Fi Biladi Sudan”, it states as its goal; ‘to protect Muslims in Africa”(Campbell 2012)

Structure of Boko Haram Before his death in July 2009, Mohammed Yusuf had succeeded in organizing the Boko Haram into a complete hierarchical structure for the sect. Employing a centralized coordination of several strata under him. He appointed himself as the Commander-In-Chief (Amir ul-Aam), the leader of the faithfuls. Directly under him are two (2) deputies (Na’ib Amir ul-Aam I & II). Yusuf and the deputies are part of the Shura Consultative Council that acts as the legistlative organ for the sect and control activities of state operational commanders or Amirs. For each state was appointed an Amir to direct the affairs of the faithful in those area and control activities of Local Cells Ops Commanders. Below the Cell Operational Commanders (COCs) are the Operational Cells consisting of soldiers and other members.

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Courtesy: Onuoha, F., (2013) â&#x20AC;&#x153;The cost of Boko Haram attacks on Critical Telecommunication Infrastructure in Nigeriaâ&#x20AC;? Online e-international Relations. Available at <http://www.e-ir.info/2013/11/03/the-costs-of-boko-haram-attacks-oncritical-telecommunicat ion-infrastructure-in-nigeria/> [02-12-2013]

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After the death of Muhammed Yusuf in 2009, Ustaz Abubakar Shekau became the spiritual leader of Boko Haram in Nigeria. He took over the control of the Shura Consultative Council, which have the power to authorize various attacks by the sect in the country. Under Shekauâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s leadership, Boko Haram sophistication in operation has greatly improved, become better organized and nervier in its target elimination in the country. The sophistication of Sekau is reflective in his use of the internet to propagate and deliver his messages to the public. Of importance is the elusiveness and high secrecy of this sect. The once open organisation under Yusuf has completely gone underground. Members of the Shura and the executives are supposedly being hunted by the national intelligence and security organisation in the past 3 years without any significant success.

DOCTRINES OF BOKO HARAM:

1. Supremacy of Islam:

This sect believes in the sanctity of Islam as the only religion recognized by Allah and his Prophet Mohammed (SWAT) to be worshipped and respected. The group belief that Western culture negates the teaching of the

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Prophets, which must be discouraged by all Muslims.

The sect was against the high level of political crime, civil service corruption and high avarice of northern elite that have continued to corrode Islamic teachings and corrupt the clerics. To achieve a proper Islamic state, which will be above corruption, the sect initially moved from the town to secluded villages to withdraw its members from societal influences.

The group later declared a fatwa to rid Northern Nigeria of sinners and establish a just Islamic state in the region. Supposedly believe in the eradication of current democracy that allows for infidels control of Nigeria and the expansion of the Islamic “umma” through a sustained “Jihadi”. Bringing all Muslim under one umbrella without Western influence through imposition of Islamic rule in all areas of Nigeria inhabited by Christians and other kaffirs currently dubbed “Dar el Harb” or “land of War” thereby achieving a “national caliphate” under a supreme Islamic leader.

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2. Establishment of Sharia Rule in Northern Nigeria:

The sect believes in the supremacy of the Holy Quran and Hadiths of the Prophets as the only means of managing a society. They seek the abrogation of the current Western political structure and institutions like the Talibans in Afghanistan practiced. They seek to establish an Islamic state to be ruled by a supreme leader and all the citizens shall be converted to Islam.

3. Anti- corruption:

The sect eschews any type of corruption and preaches against it especially in government. The endemic corruption of the Nigerian elite is one of the major problems the sect was out to eradicate.

4. Postulate the principle of ’Propaganda of the deed’:

The sect subscribes to the justification of civilian and non-combatants’ killing as necessary martyrdom for actualization of the struggle. Deaths of civilians are blame on the state and the elites that causes the struggle in the first place. They argued that killing of civilian non-

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combatants is religiously justified during jihadi as prescribed by the Holy Koran.

5. Jihadi through Suicide Terrorism:

Actualized the need for human sacrifice of present life for eternal glory. But unlike most sects that employ power of persuasion to induce suicide bombers, Boko Haram was reported to also pay the family of the martyrs huge sum of money for the deed.

6. Against Foreign Influence:

The Boko Haram has declared in a fatwa a set of directive for a jihad to expel all Western occupational forces and foreign interests from Nigerian states. Following the precepts of modern terror groupsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; demand for the end of Western intervention in Islamic states local affairs, Boko Haram believe that western culture pollutes the Islamic culture and should be avoided at all cost.

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MODE OF OPERATION:

Suicide Attacks: Boko Haram has repeatedly employed suicide bombers to achieve its aims. The first recorded attack using human suicide bomber was at the Nigeria Police Force Headquarters, Abuja bombing attack in 2011. The attack was audacious and speaks volume of the level of security in Nigeria public offices. The attack at the United Nations Building in Abuja also involved the use of a suicide bomber.

Sporadic

Shooting:

Several

cases

shooting

into

government offices and police barracks by Boko Haram have been recorded. The use of motor bike for attacks is also a trait of this group. These attacks have been reduced due to high presence of security operatives in most cities where Boko Haram operates. The group has been known to dare security agencies and challenge them squarely in broad daylight attacks. The group has been reported to engage combined security teams in gunfights in Kano, Maiduguri, Bauchi and Portiskum severally. The open attacks on security agents has led many to believe that Boko Haram trains and armed a small group of standing army to be used in open warfare, when necessary.

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Bombing of major government buildings, schools, police and military barracks and churches: The Boko Haram sect has continued to perform acts of terror through indiscriminate bombing of major government buildings, local schools and security buildings in northern Nigeria. The January 1 st 2011 bombings at the Abacha Barracks, Abuja, was reported to be one of the most fatal attacks in any military installations in the country, the Police Headquarter s bombing followed barely six months later and since then several security buildings has continued to succumb to attacks from the sect.

The group efficiently employed the use of car bombs rigged with Gas Cylinders for maximum effects. The crude and basic natures of bombs have been the major saving grace for the Nigerian state. The Bombing of schools and telecommunication masts has been blamed on their need to end the Western influence in their area. Church bombings have been reported by many analysts as a means to provoke the Christians in the country to retaliatory actions that might lead to civil wars in the country.

Use of Internet and media publicity to spread message of fear and coverage: The new media (Internet) has become the choice of most insurgents in perpetuating their ideologies and spreading messages of fear to the public. The emergence of an

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international media system that disperses information at the speed of a click has brought so much importance to terror organisations operations (Hammonds 2007, Phares 2008). Today terrorism operations are borderless and terror groups operate internationally (Buzan 2007, Kaldor 2008)).

The Boko Haram group led by Shekau has also bought into prominence the use of YouTube and blind email addresses to advertise the operations of their group; deliver new ultimatums or accept responsibilities for attacks in the country. As internet penetration in Nigeria kept growing, the reach of terror keeps expanding

Recruitment and training of religious zealots as foot soldiers:

The propagation of the ideas of any insurrection assures its survival beyond the lives of the founders (Phares 2007). The current existence of Boko Haram campaign is hinged on the continuous recruitment of newer religious zealots and youths into the group. Terror groups have been known to attract youths to their teachings and hoodwink them into negative actions against the state. The â&#x20AC;&#x153;underpants Bomberâ&#x20AC;?, a Nigerian youth, was recruited by Al-Qaeda, influenced by the teachings of the leaders he agreed to the mission as suicide bomber in the bomb

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attempt on a flight into United States from Amsterdam. Training camps has been set up in Boko Haram and other supporting territories for these new recruits. The availability of unemployed youth has continued to swell the ranks of the insurgents.

Employment of mercenaries for attacks.

Countries bordering Nigeria -Chad, Mali, Cameroun and Nigerare reputed to having poorer economy than Nigeria. The large porous borders between Nigeria and these countries have made easy the illegal movement of people and trade between these countries and Nigerian state. Most Northern Nigerian tribes have ethnic alignment with people in those border countries (Adeoye 2012). This is being exploited greatly by the Boko Haram sects as they recruit heavily soldiers from these states to fight their wars in Nigeria. Unfortunately, most of these countries has been on wars and instable for years leading to large surplus of unemployed soldiers and crop of youth devoid of a future.

FINANCING OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO INSURGENTs

Most terrorist leaders have claimed that they donâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t need large amount of fund to finance a bombing, but they still need huge

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amount of resources to finance; the dry runs, maintain experts and sleeper cells in each state of operation, and to recruit and train new men into the organization. To finance their operations, the Boko Haram has been able to secure funding and supports from these sources:

Personal income of members and their families:

The Boko Haram insurgency obviously began with funds from members and gradually reached out to supporters of the movements in Borno and Yobe States for financial supports. The patronage by the government of Borno State, Senator Ali Modu Sheriff and other elite in Borno, Bauchi and Yobe states greatly enhance the growth of this sect. The reported donation of land by Mohammedâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s In-law in Kanama was also instructive of the supports enjoyed by this group in the region. Exploitation of the elite: Kidnapping for ransom and extortion of the rich elite has become a major instrument for funding of illegal violent groups in Nigeria. Rise in violent crime in Nigeria has been traced to the activities of organized terror organisations need for financing. Many elite has been kidnapped in the past five years and huge ransoms were paid before they were released to their families. The security agencies have continued to battle these attacks and

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reduce these attacks.

Smuggling and Armed Robbery: Organized terror groups in Nigeria have been involved in bank and police installation attacks for money and arms respectively. Banks have been indiscriminately attacked and huge cash carted away by hoodlums in recent years. The pattern of attacks on Police stations in Nigeria has shown that these attacks could have been planned to rob the armory of such stations of guns and ammunition.

Allied with organized crime gangs and International Terror groups. Increase reports of Boko Haramâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s alliance with Sahel Terrorist group like AQIM, MOJAT and Somalia Hisbah has continued to open this group to international financings. The relationship with the Touareg groups that allegedly controls the trans-Sahara trade in illicit drugs and human trafficking has led to the UNDOC insistence on high incidence of drug trafficking through Nigerian borders UNDOC 2009: 2010). Destabilization of states increases their vulnerability to international crimes; states institution become corrupts and allows for corrupt officials to collaborate with criminals.

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Aside from reported funds from international religious NGOs, Islamic humanitarian bodies and other states sponsoring terrorism Boko Haramâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s association with these organizations could ensure its logistics supports for a long time (Yonah 2013, UNDOC 2009).

Reasons for Survival of Insurgencies In Nigeria Rebellion survives when the state and the people reacts according to the dictates of the rebels.

Supports from Community: Suicide terrorism is a poignant reflection of the value of life in any environment. The belief that the value of life in one society is lower than what is obtainable in religious heaven has been a motivation for people to kill themselves in the name of God to achieve â&#x20AC;&#x153;nirvanaâ&#x20AC;?. The increase in numbers of people ready to kill themselves in the country points to real socio-economic failure that rings beyond mere religious extremism. As the value of life (Human Development Index) falls in a society, radical behaviours normally increases radicallisim (UNDP/HR 2013).

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‘Experts have argued that the only area of the world with the highest propensity for suicide terrorism remain the Arab world. Given that average life expectancy in the Middle East is normally below 40 years, worth of life is relatively low and poverty is endemic; hence it is considered worthier to be a “martyr” than to live short uneventful lives of “impecuniousness”.

Northern Nigeria has continued to wallow in absolute. Poverty level in this area is unrivaled in any area of the country. Most people lived on less than N100 a day. The literacy level and human capacity development remained the lowest in the country. Youth without skills and education are unemployed, married and have several children, who in turn are sent to the local “Tsanya” to become “Almajiri” and continue to live the same vicious poverty circle their parents went through in the area.

Analysts have tried to draw the line between absolute poverty and tendency for insurgencies and have proven that areas where the cost of return on employment is far less than what is obtainable from illicit economy, people tends to become highly corrupted. If unchecked corruption precipitates radicalism and negative behaviours in youth then growth of violent activities in northern Nigeria can easily be traced to the poverty in the area

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(Majuk 2011; Saviano 2008; Phares 2007).

Regrettably, side-by-side within this society, while the poor continued to battle insufficiencies, a cream of well-fed, fabulously rich aristocrats with western education and western lifestyles -â&#x20AC;&#x153;Yan Bokosâ&#x20AC;?- struts, feeding off the carcasses of the poor to feather their nests.

Many admits that the Almajiris have watched for centuries the children of the elite grow up in luxury and wait in turns to take over the resources of state from their fathers and siblings, while the poor farmers are being put out of work through desertification and harsh weathers, the elites continued to excel and prosper through the abuse of government resources and their commonwealth. As poverty expanded and hunger ravages over 97% of the population while few elite controlled the wealth of the state and live in sheer luxury, it was just a matter of time before the bubble busted.

â&#x20AC;&#x2122;The Almajeris could take no more bashing, they reared up in a final battle to unseat the Yan Boko and create a new group of islamic leaders in the society. The end of the Boko Haram insurrection might be in the change of political equation in northern Nigeria and have nothing to do with the governance of

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Nigeria. It has been argued that the northern elites in desperate move to sustain its hegemonies and subjugations of the talakawas have continued to link the class insurrection in the areas to a move to destabilize Nigeriaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; (Adeoye 2012).

Insurgency in Nigeria could be the only means of self-expression for the poor and down trodden in Nigeria. The lack of system for public expressions and justice has made it paramount for the lower cadre of the society to adhere to violence as the only means of settling disputes (Kalu 2010). In Labour and other business negotiations, there is so much dependence on violent means of strikes, demonstrations and attacks on the Nigerian state to achieve any meaningful results. Regional groups have continued to fight their ways to get the attention of the authorities. The amiable spirit that may aid fair discussions; negotiations and mediation are deficient in the society (Adeoye 2012; Hills 2008).

Regrettably, the state has persistently exhibit great ignorance of the underlining issues in current struggle. The deployment of tanks and soldiers to kill and maim are based on mere postulation that higher force crushes all oppositions. Lack of proper understanding of process of fighting insurgency is reflected in the state employment of brute force at all time. The

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inabilities of the state to handle prior insurrections from other regions, Like Niger Delta, through the establishment of strong institutions to control these threats have continued to put strain on state’s law enforcement resilience. The principle of “bandaid” and “stop gap” policies in addressing conflicts and fire brigade approach to issues has been the hallmark of crisis management in Nigeria.

The Niger Delta agitations are being managed through the use of an amnesty programme for militants and development of the region. The gains of these groups have reportedly reinforced the reality that violent agitations against the state might be the only way to achieve results. Many Nigerians are of the opinion that Niger Delta militants’ use of force has secured the region: the presidency, a special federal ministry (Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs), 13% revenue generation retention, amnesty programme and many accelerated development projects at the expense of all other regions (Asuni 2009, UNODC 2009; Nodland and Hjellostad 2007). The call for a general amnesty programmes for Boko haram and other insurgents by northern leaders is a pointer ( Olawale 2013)

The Northern elite lost the control of power in the country in 2010 and with it most lucrative federal appointments. The

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reorganization of most federal ministries under the Dr. Goodluck Jonathan government has put paid to most leakages from the federal accounts. Losing out in Abuja for the first time in over 20 years, the Northern elites reportedly had to fall back on their states resources for survival.

The Northern elite would have been shocked at the paltry amount accorded their states, which they had completely ignored while they partying in Abuja. Most Northern states currently receive about 2 billion Naira from the Federation Account monthly, while their counterparts in the South-south receive more than 7 billion monthly (RMFAC 2012). The news the elite have is states in the north without viable industries and low internally generated revenue, made salary payments monthly while some are reported not even viable.

The state of infrastructure in northern Nigeria belied the fact that the region had ruled Nigeria more than 35 years out of the fifty-three

years

independence.

High

incidence

unemployment caused by vast number of unemployable youth without basic education and skills permeates the region (NBS 2012). In a region with annual birth rate of over 4.8% per anum, the attendant â&#x20AC;&#x2122;youth bulgeâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; in an environment devoid of basic industry, resources for formal education, low capital formation

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and high level of unemployment is a recipe for radicalism and violent struggles. There exists urgent need for development programmes

that

targets

youth

skills

acquisition

and

entrepreneurship development.

Superciliousness of Clueless Law Enforcement Agencies: The traditional security apparatus in Nigeria are not designed for anti-insurgency operations. Increase dependence on soldiers in security operations that is supposed to be more of intelligence and covert revealed the need for a complete reform of the security apparatus in the country. The clear decimation of the Nigerian Police Force through gradual dearth of proper funding, lack of equipment and training of men from 1983 by succeeding military government has begot the nation an inefficient, stroppy and brutal policemen. The lack of proper trainings for Nigerian security operatives has turned them into dangerous brutes unleashed at the whim of the elites to plunder the masses. The policing authority has failed to indoctrinate the principle of service to the people on the men (Adeoye 2012).

Recorded brutality by the Nigerian policemen and security officers has occasioned the negative reactions from most groups. The police were employed to break strikes by workers during colonial eras and protect the colonialist, the killing of the 203

21 Enugu Miners in November, 1949 by the Colonial police, set the mood for repressive law enforcement operations and the countless records of extrajudicial killings by the Nigerian Police and Armed Forces (Grambel 2013; Azuakola 2013;). Indecorous role of security agencies in handling conflict management can be traced to the explosion of the Niger Delta and the Boko Harm conflicts.

The people have lost hope in the security agencies and they are object of fear and ridicule by the masses (Adeoye 2012). The apathy of the people can be traced to the invincibility of Boko Haram insurgents in northern cities. The current military assault against Boko Haram is a means of growing new armies for the jihadi, families and friends of innocents caught in the crossfire are potential recruits. Boko Haram has gradually become the hero of the underprivileged in a fight against the Northern hegemonies and the marauding invading armies of the Nigerian states (Adeoye 2012: Phares 2008). The continuous bombing in Kano and other cities showed that the soldiers pillaging are either not killing the right insurgents or these killings are tonic for recruitment for the sect. Uncoordinated security operations and lack of intelligence supports for security operatives by the people might have enhanced the survival of the Boko Haram in recent time.

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Religious Ideology

All terror groups are proponents of certain ideologies, which are designed to outlive the proponents. The Boko Haram announcement of ’Jihad’ is based on religious teaching of the need for Moslems to struggle and strive in the way of God to promote goodness thereby enhances collective humanity. This is one of the basic duties of every Muslim. Jihad is of five types: soul; tongue; knowledge; hand and sword (Phares 2008). Contrary to popular view, Islam commands Muslims to strive towards doing good deeds in the hierarchy showed, the last being by arms, and even then, under strict conditions —mostly in self defence (Cole and Cole 2008).

Religious teachings made it ‘Sunnah’ for Muslims to defend fellow Muslims when in fight with non-Muslim the Umma has to be seen united. This is reflective in the Mujahedeen that fought the Soviet in Afghanistan in late 90s were collection of Moslems from all over the world. Religion remains a major bound of the Islamic north. The religion agenda have been used severally to win political arguments and snare resources by elites from the center. The declaration of Jihad by an Imam is tantamount to a general call to arm that cannot be ignored by any real Muslim. The challenge in Boko Harams call to arm remained in even

205

moderate Muslims cannot criticize the groupâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s basis for jihadi. The religion is the covering for the groupâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s operation and shields it from government forces. Terror groups are adept at growing new recruits through direct recruitment contacts and underground preaching. The Boko Haram sect grew in time of despair more than while preaching openly. There is always natural support for the underdogs in most human. The killing of one group just made them go underground and put together another one. There are always scores of people ready to die for an ideology or their religion, Ayman al-Zawahiri could not wait to step into the shoes of Bin Laden. Same has been the case with Boko Haram, Mohammed Yusuf death was a tonic for Shekau and his cohorts to take up the gauntlets and continue the war. Extermination of Terror groups has been known to work when there were no human right restrictions alone. Hence no democratic institution can successfully engage terror groups in free for all warfare without discarding the principle of human rights protection (Cole and Cole 2008). Towns were torched and government officials annihilated inhabitants during the 17th century rule of terror in France, yet

206

the résistance still outlived that government. As a matter of records, blanket extermination in areas where terrorists operate is always counterproductive in the long run (Neumann 2009). Most people in such areas might be moderates that just don’t want to get involved, as they trust neither the state nor the sect. Harming such people’s family in the fight against terror group may turn them towards supports for the group. Large-scale killings by the state always lead to sympathy by the people for the weaker group. In mono-cultural environment like northern Nigeria, the sect may use this as point for recruitment of new members. The issues could be turned to the state want to annihilate our culture and we need to join forces and fight back (Adeoye 2012). Mosques and Islamic schools are major areas for recruitment of lieutenants. The groups are aided by radical Imams that continue though negative preaching, imbibed youths with teachings on Islamic jihad, Aljana and the duties of Moslems to defend the umma (Cole and Cole 2008; Phares 2008). Killing of members of sects may become a positive spin by terror groups and is used for recruitment and re-enforcement of the resilience of the group. Religion like Islam enamored martyrdom and many youth without worldly aspirations will always be

207

available for recruitment. Terrorists are known to show their dead counterparts as martyrs. They are declared martyrs and believed to have gone to “Aljana” -the Holy heavens- for believers of allah. This may continue to embolden the spirit of poor youths without hope of any worldly riches, the spin on a heaven with countless opportunities and peace, makes dying for God a better prospect. Equally, the charge that to qualify for heaven you have to fight the Kafirs in Jihads and spread religion through any means possible has equally made assassination easy things among Muslim youth.

The use of religion and ethnic shield has made it tougher for security operatives to get clear information on the Boko Haram sect. One of Nigeria’s greatest problems is the suspicion with which adherents of the two major religions -Islam and Christianity- hold each other. While it may be morally wrong to blame a faith for a misdemeanor or atrocity committed by few of its adherents, the reported tactic supports of some religious bodies and groups for the Boko Haram sect is condemnable and atrocious.

208

The level of inter-religion hatred being preached in the country by religious leaders remains unchecked and the utterances of political elites remain clearly unmonitored. Huge attention need be directed towards preaching for forgiveness, reconciliation and harmony. Men of God, should act as role models, be more circumspect in making unguarded utterances. Their sermons and messages should be for the common good of all and not divide the country further towards hate crimes and retaliations. Political: Terror acts are politically intended and have direct political effects after the acts. Directing attacks on non-combatants are designed to cause stampede and national uprisings. Ethnic leaders in Nigeria are reported to employ direct political manipulation of the youth through hate messages towards achieving political advantages. The youth used for these operations are hyped with ethnic and separation agendas, which may not be on facts but mere speculations. Ethnic and political agenda of few brought about the destruction of the national economy of Nigeria, which occasioned the growth of these groups initially. Political division of the elites has continued to negate security operations to root out the sect.

209

Adaptability and flexibility of operations: Terror groups are small hence easily adaptable to any situations fast. The flexibility of Boko Haram operations makes it easier to strike and move away from point of attacks to regroup and reorganize in other areas. This has made the work of security operators seem tedious. Attacks by this group are disjointed and distributed over large areas making patrol and check inadequate. Terror groups have no large armies that may be difficult to maneuver and move to other campaigns. They operate in cells of about five to six men; these tight groupings make operations easy to plan over long period without information leak to the authorities. Equally, members are made to meet on operational basis thereby increasing their security. Members caught can only compromise members of his cell and not the entire group. Borderless Operations Fear from the elite in most areas of operations of the terror groups makes possible steady supply of untraceable funds to terror groups. The numbers of contributors to current insurrections in Northern Nigeria may include senior politicians and influential members of society. The more the group spread

210

fear, the easier it is for the supports pipelines. People are coerced into contributing to the groupâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s purse or face its wrath. Kidnapping and extortion crimes in the Nigeria have risen in recent years due to the pressure on revenue by these groups to finance operations. Terror groups have supports from other international terror groups for training and supply of arms. The rise of terrorism in Sahel states has been attributed to the long-standing Touareg resistance in the region, which the illicit drugs and arm trades through the porous borders of these states. The resilience of this group fighting for the dominance of the tribe in three major countries in Mali, Niger and Chad has chiefly been responsible for growth of violence and illicit economies in the Sahel region (UNODC 2010). The challenge to sovereignty of weak African states become more compounded in the 21st century as fratricidal wars persists in Sudan, Libya, Chad and Niger. Proliferation of small arms in this region has led high security alert from the United Nations on the need to reduce the stockpile of arms in the region. Nigeria security has continued to be threatened by the regional states problems, aside from the migration issues as displaced persons from these war torn countries settled into Nigeria, the problem of armed robberies in Nigeria by terrorists from other countries 211

in the name of raising funds for their cause has become a security concern. The Niger Delta areas known for its high reserves of crude oil and gas has become a major point of sustained insurrections, youths groups armed with high end arms have become laws to theirselves and hijack oil tankers on the Gulf of Guinea on daily basis. This new development has threatened the source of revenue to the country and necessitated United Nationsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; Security Council Resolution 2039 on the need to curtail the activities of the Pirates and armed sea robbers in the Gulf of Guinea (New African 2013). This problem is huge and threatens the economy of all West African states and itâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s expanding yearly. Boko Haram group in Nigeria has been known to have training and supply of suicide bombers from the AQIM and other Touareg Militant groups, the reflection of the growth of international crime groups in West African states also controlled by the Touareg traders and AQIM have reportedly being a source huge resources and logistics finances for insurrections in West and Central African countries (Yonah 2013, UNDOC 2009). Effects of NATO well-funded Libyan war have equally supplied much-needed surplus arms for current Islamization wars in Sahel

212

Sates. Current cooperation between these groups and Boko haram leaders has secured huge areas of financing for the sect (Ban KI Moon 2012: Goita 2011). The fact that UNDOC in its recent analysis of drug trade in Africa confirmed that Nigeria still lead as African Drug distribution hub is a great cause for concern (UNODC 2010) Lack of ethics in operations Ability to strike without any remorse and respects for human lives have expanded fear of threats from terror attacks by Boko Haram even in areas beyond their influence. Terrorists do not respect any knowing convention on warfare. The Geneva Conventions set the rules for international engagement and protection of non-combatants during wars are never adhere to by terrorists in planning attacks. Rules of engagement are never followed in terrorist operations posing threats to everyone in a state. Bombing of the United Nations Building in Abuja came out of nowhere and has no direct bearing on the Boko Haramâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s demands. The apparent lack of concise direction and bearing makes terrorism not easy to understand and frustrate counterterrorism operations even in areas with proper resources and planning. Having no respect for human life which are they termed expendable and instruments to achieve spread of terror, terror groups are quicker to employ new technology 213

(Hewitt 2008) Given the apparent lack of societal controls and limitation, these outlaws have continued to put the whole world at risks of chemical or nuclear attack without thinking of the repercussions. The Islamic movements are currently running over well-known and established government institutions using IEDs with intentions of causing widespread harms. New orders are challenging old orders in our societies. New radical leaders are usurping recognized leaders with obvious support of faceless groups have taken reigns in troubled of Nigeria. Fear and trepidation has sent the elites â&#x20AC;&#x153;Yan Bokoâ&#x20AC;? running while the Boko Haram sects calls the shots riding shotguns. These campaigns are thorough, purposeful and well orchestrated to achieve an end.

214

7 SECURITY REACTIONS TO TERRORISM: Terrorism succeeds when states respond to it the same way. Aim of terrorist is to create wide spread panic and threat to live and existence of the people. Armed resistance by state especially through the used of the armed forces exposes noncombatants to high degree of trepidation, fear and anxiety. Hope for alternative conflict management options such as negotiation and mediation evaporates in the face of direct military operations. Over militarization of state’s operations to the Boko Haram operations has obliterate the face of the sect. The era of Muhammed Yusuf was categorized by open negotiations and preaching by the sect. The attack on the Kanama camp and killing of the supposed leaders of the sect, created the new phantom of today. Boko Haram went underground and the room for negotiated settlement fizzled away. The body of “Tactics, strategies and Policies” employed to combat insurgents and the other security challenges attributable to such problem in a state are formally called Counterinsurgency. Current programmes employed by the Nigerian law 215

enforcement agencies in combating insurgency involved preemptive strikes, arrest and intimidation towards crushing the group. Nigerian Government reactions have been a mixture of counter violence and political maneuverings:

Violent Peace Theory (Offensive attacks)

Aping the United State, this has been the trend in most countries facing insurgency. The state without opening room for proper dialogue always sends in troops to quash the dissident factions. State violence unleashed this way may work if properly arranged and follow through on proto-insurgents not when the group has become rooted in the community (Abbas 2012). Nigeria has through a Joint Task Force “Operation Restore Order” in Borno state has been in state of a perpetual combat with the Boko Haram insurgents since 2010. Jos, Plateau state conflict is still being managed by another Special Task force “Operation Rainbow” since 2001 and the Niger Delta operations have a Joint task Force in “Operation Restore Hope” since 1999 (Crisis Group 2012, Amnesty Int. 2012).

The general consensus about the efficiencies of all these operations has been negative. The Nigerian government had to 216

resort to negotiations to solve the Niger Delta imbroglio, Plateau state is still under threats and the Boko Haram have recently being invited to enjoy amnesty (ICP 2012; BBC 2013). Most states have tendency of labeling all insurrections or campaign against the state as terrorist acts and use the excuse to violently engage the group (Kaldor 2008). The use of blanket force by Nigerian Government in the fight with Niger Delta militants had never recorded real success as current records reveal the fact that the group still strive and has expanded to become major threat to the Gulf of Guinea security (Danjibo 2008; Enweremadu 2008). Militarization of reaction to challenges to state has been known to create local supports for rebels. Terrorism can only survive with tactic and overt supports of local populace, neutrals and moderates in the environment, who are tends to suffer from skirmishes occasioned by attacks between the state and the terror group always turn to support the supposedly weaker side, creating the â&#x20AC;&#x153;freedom fighterâ&#x20AC;? appendage for the rebels. The fact remain that few states have really lost the war against insurgents, but records have shown that insurgencies always lasts at an average of 10 years before the state could formally control the spread.

217

Counterinsurgencies operations occur within states borders against enemies that are citizens of the state, killing insurgents frightens, shocks and alienates the public in a long drawn war. British Government learnt through dire consequence the futility and huge lost attributive to fighting a war within its own state during the IRA conflict years (Hewitt 2008). Recent all out attacks by the JTF on Boko Haram in Northeast Nigeria has led to complaints by leaders of the areas and International community on the high numbers of extra-judicial killings; businesses have been shut down for over 3 years of the active engagement; telecommunication and access to global development and education by the youth have been curtailed for over two years; the prevailing armed patrol and intimidation of locals by supercilious security officers since the proclamation of a â&#x20AC;&#x153;state of emergencyâ&#x20AC;? in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states by the President Goodluck Jonathan on May 14 2013 and the effect of ever present threats to the psyche of non-combatants living within the areas is quite traumatizing (Amnesty International 2013).

The hope that heralded the announcement of the creation of the 7th Infantry Division with over 8000 men in Maiduguri to fight and flush out the Boko Haram rebels from its stronghold in and around Bama town and its environment by the Chief of 218

Army Staff, (COAS) Lt. Gen. Oyeabor Azubuike Ihejerika had barely died down when the Boko Haram struck. Stealth Boko Haram fighters attacked the airstrip of the 79 Composite Group of the Nigerian Air Force at Jimilito, close to the Maiduguri International Airport, damaging about 5 planes and two Helicopters. Another attack on the 202 Tank Battalion, based in Bama, Maiduguri by the same group of insurgents barely a few days after a previous attack showed the resilience and determination of the sect to increase threat within the area.

The challenge to security posed by Boko Haram has continued to escalate despite the employment of high amount of security and resources in its eradication. The Joint Task Force in Borno state led by Major General Ewansiha, has over 3, 200 men, before the creation of the 7th Division, the Nigerian Armed Forces currently have deployed asset in Northeastern Nigeria of over 18,000 officers and men over 10% of its total asset. Given the fact that the Nigerian Armed Forces are concurrently in full time security operations in over 32 states and Abuja, the challenge to national security planning is enormous. Equally, the continuation of this engagement of armed forces personnel in civil operations is great challenges to the defence of the nation from any form of external aggression. The need for recruitment of over 9000 men into the army late 2013 as against the normal average of 3000 219

annually portrays the dent on security asset by prolong conflicts in the country.

This engagement have equally robbed other parts of the country of capable security operatives as all security agencies have standing platoons in the operation; The Nigerian Police Force through the deployment of its Mobile Police Force, State Security Services and the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps are all part of the JTF engaging the rebels. Three years after declaration of full-scale engagement of Boko Haram in 2010, the result obtainable from reports indicated a system failure in the operations. Like Operation Rainbow in Plateau state; where after over 10 years of patrols and engagements, violence actions has continued in the Rock City leading to persistent conflicts and escalation of threat and the protracted engagement of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) in the Niger Delta has also not resulted in peace 15 years after.

Aerial reconnaissance, bombardment and targeted drone strikes might have been effective in Boko haram held camps in the period before 2009 when the Islamist fighters were holed up in the desert or camped in the Kanama area. But now they have moved into the villages, towns and cities across their region. And 220

their number has reportedly been swelled due to the arrival of foreign fighters, recruitment of economically impoverished locals and the forced recruitment of children.

This state of maintaining peace through perpetual war would have been ideal if it really curbed the violence (ICG 2012). Escalating terror through imposition of soldiers and heavy equipment in chasing guerrilla fighters only work in states without democracy and rule of law. The British Army initially handled the IRA insurgency without real success until the MI6 and MI5 the British Intelligence organisation were deployed to Northern Ireland to lead the counter Intelligence operations. The armies are trained to sack the enemies and take no prisoners hence cannot operate to selectively eliminate rebels. Rebels live among public and it is intelligence that can easily infiltrate, identify and set up process towards eliminating such threat.

Target Execution of Leaders: Targeting leaders of insurgency has been a major form of warfare employed in fighting insurgents globally. The need to scattered rebellion through selected elimination of the leaders has always been a major part of the Israeliâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Mossad since the

221

late fifties. Security forces arrested and harassed several leaders of OPC, Bakkasi Boys, MEND and Niger Delta Militants in efforts to stifled discordant voices and violent struggles in Nigeria. Ken Saro-Wiwa and the Ogoni 7 suffered arrest, detention and executions on 10 November 1995 in the heat of struggle for emancipation of the Niger Delta areas, 18 years later the struggles have continued to expand and endure. The execution of insurgents’ leaders like Muhammad Yusuf at the Kanama Police Station in 2009, only contributed in driving the sect under the radar and escalated violence threats to live in the country.

The Israelis in their struggles against the Hamas and Hezbollah taught the world a new lesson in countering terrorism, “selected elimination of enemies’ leaders”. The United States has equally borrowed and perfected a counter-insurgency policy directed at employing ’unmanned Drones’ to strike selected enemies where and when they least expected. While this has been effective in elimination of known leaders of the revolutionaries, regrettably other die-hard revolutionary with clearly unknown credentials always immediately fills the gap created sometimes with dire consequence. The Killing of Osama Bin Laden in May 2011 was supposed to end the reign of terror by Al-Qaeda but what we are witnessing today is the strengthening and expansion of the operations of 222

this group. Currently, the war in Middle East against terror has shifted to one of the continent with the highest level of malnutrition, unemployment and growing youth population in the world, sub-Saharan Africa (UNDOC 2010). The AQIM has continued to spread its tentacles through Niger, to Somalia, Nigeria, Sudan, Mali, Chad and Libya. In a continent where the structure of security and law enforcement operation are still basic: the increasing level of illegal economies and inter-border crimes, rising unemployment and low disposable income and proliferation of small arms posses greater threats to the sovereignty of the countries of the Sahel region and as these threats continue to exists, wining the war against terrorism in Africa will surely be an uphill task.

Investigation and intelligence; The Nigerian states have four distinct agencies involved in intelligence operations in the country; the State Security Services (SSS), the National Intelligence Agency (NIA), the Military Intelligence Agency (MIA) and the Force Criminal Investigation Division (FCID). All these agencies are supposedly involved in covert operations against Boko Haram. Increased attention on Boko Haram operations by the SSS and the MIA has really led to the reduction in the sects operations but the

223

elusiveness of the leadership of Boko Haram after 3 years of intense attacks on the nation showed a complete lack of coordinated professional intelligence operations. As quality intelligence remains the bedrock of a perfect counterinsurgency operation, without good intelligence counterinsurgency will surely fail.

To achieve a long run hold on terrorism, there has to be a conscious

plan

develop

flexible

blue

for

counterinsurgency operations in Nigeria. Lack of quality intelligence operation by local institutions has continued to frustrate counterinsurgency operations in Nigeria. Current efforts at countering terrorism are ad-hoc and crude and should not be used as the template.

The British MI5 had to take over from the military in Northern Ireland before Britain could wrestle control from the IRA. The big lesson learnt by America in Afghanistan and Mogadishu is that â&#x20AC;&#x153;big armies do not win fight against extremists and terroristsâ&#x20AC;?. Deployment of over 30,000 men in Somalia operation Restore Hope by Bush compounded the problem in Mogadishu more than it was before their arrival (Clark and Herbst 1996). Towards achieving successes in counterinsurgency, there is a need for

224

proper attention is paid to developing a national strategy for law enforcement intelligence gathering, analysis and policy making in Nigeria.

Legislation To address terrorism, most states adopt the use of harsh legislation system. The Nigeria Terrorism Prevention Act was crafted to make terrorism and insurgencies unattractive and makes the risks involved in the crime higher than the gains. In an environment where life expectancy continues to fall and illegal economies strive; youths have been known to take huge risks for fewer resources (Saviano 2008). The high unemployment rates and lack of social supports services in Nigeria has grown a new class of youth ready to take any risk (Danjibo 2011). The growth of lucrative illegal economies in Nigeria has contributed to failure of legislation in reduction of most violent crime. Rising waves of Drug and arms trades in West African states have become a pointer to the inefficiency of the legal and law enforcement system.

Pape Eric maintains in his article on West African Smuggling and effect of legislation that: â&#x20AC;&#x153;[West African] governments â&#x20AC;Ś are too weak, too corrupt or too consumed by their own problems to

225

enforce laws or adequately monitor their coastlines and airports. Add to that are tens of millions of poor potential ’mules’ and the picture becomes all too clear.” (2005).

Boko Haram could remain an issue because the cause, interests, and need of the group have not been clearly defined and discussed. Talking to the enemy has been heralded as more effective this method. Killing the leaders of the enemy is a tactic in violent engagement, definitely some extremists insurgents “...cannot be co-opted or won over, they must be hunted down, killed or captured and this is necessary a ruthless process conducted with the utmost energy that the laws of war permit.” (Kilcullen 2008). Counter insurgency tactics must incorporate identification and proffer different treatments for irreconcilable and reconcilable. Carpet killings lead to human rights abuses and make hardened insurgents of moderates (Hewitt 2008). The Boko Haram sect has lost two distinct leaders to security agencies and the sect is still more potent than ever. Killing one leader has been proved as a tonic for more martyrs to step in and continue the assault.

Mediation: 226

Mediation involves the process of intervention by trusted and impartial third parties in negotiating a settlement between warring groups. Most insurrections have ended through dexterity of the mediators in handling negotiations. Regrettably, most conflicts in Nigeria have festered for years due to the prevalence of the government in appointing politicians as negotiators. It has become a trend in international relations to appoint diplomats and politicians as mediators and negotiators disregarding the professionals.

The United Nations has over the years continued to employ the same tactics of appointing mediators for conflicts without permission of the warring parties. In Nigeria, most conflicts are about ethnic struggle against the state for political and economic survival in an environment perceived to be devoid of justice and equity. Appointing mediators by the state for a conflict between her and a faction has already compromised the result of such negotiations from start.

The Jos crisis in spite of over 10 years of negotiated settlements and an expensive military peacekeeping still fester today due to the lack of professionalism in handling the crisis management, empaneling of several politicians as mediators have been proven

227

to be counter productive in several instances (Crisis Group 2012, Amnesty Int. 2012). The Niger Delta struggle is costing the country more than 4% of GNI National Income- in current values to maintain a group of “ex-militants” in comfort enough not to return to the creek in a first of its kind “multi-billion Naira Amnesty Programme”, yet, kidnapping and unrest still prevail in the South-South (Amnesty Group 2012; NewAfrican 2013; Enweremadu 2008).

Lack of trust in state’s approved negotiators and politicalisation of conflicts has been blamed on the failure to reach an early agreement with Boko Haram insurgents (Walker 2011) Negotiations will always fail in an environment of clear distrust. The prevailing socio-cultural situation in the country has continued to expand the gulf between ethnic groups. The polarization of the country into 36 states and six geopolitical zones has created new identities and new convergence of expressions and agitations. This would have been easier to navigate if the issues of religious distrusts are not beclouding even ethnic and cultural predilections.

Compromises and conciliations have become the main thrust of

228

politicians in resolving crises in Nigeria. The use of huge amount of money as negotiation tools without a look at interests, underlining factors and effects of conflicts on the people has been a norm. Most leaders have persistently adopted the “settlement culture” pushing the problem forward without setting up enduring institutions to manage and solve them in the long run (Enweremadu 2008).

Many analysts have posited that the Boko Haram menace might have been a reaction to the success of two major struggles in Nigeria. The Yoruba’s struggle for control of state after the death of Chief MKO Abiola that commenced in 1996 through the Odu’a People’s Congress (OPC) culminated in the consensus for an Obasanjo Presidency in 1999 and the Niger Delta militants struggle that was settled by the state through, an Amnesty Programme and Creation of the Niger Delta Ministry.

Challenges to Current Counter-Insurgence Operations.

229

Counter Insurgency (CI) operations in Nigeria are insurgents oriented, reactive and are not based on an explicit structure. Led by the Nigerian Armed Forces, the only definite effect of the operation is in the area of elimination of the insurgents. The armed forces are not trained as civil enforcement organisation, hence cannot maintain peace. It is centered on finding and neutralizing the insurgents using all necessary force available to the state. Unfortunately, fighting insurgents is a long-time guerrilla warfare fought with utmost stealth by clearly covert means amongst citizens of a country. The armed forces operations in Northeastern states of Adamawa, Yobe and Borno has continued for over 3 years putting great strain on local population.

Alienate Locals:

The main challenges of militarization of stateâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s response remain in the fact that it alienates the local population that is always caught in between the actions. Communities in and around major towns controlled by rebels have been known to surfer direct obliteration by the Nigerian Army operations against the rebels; Odi Village in Niger Delta was leveled by security mortals to dislodge militants in 1999; In October 2001, in Sakim Biam 230

over 100 residents were killed, few hundreds were brutalized and terrorized by the armed forces after 19 soldiers sent to restore peace in the area were killed by irate youth. Increased dependence on arms for peacekeeping has persistently pitch the state as the aggressor in most cases. Cordon, search and execution of Boko Haram members disturb relative peace in the areas and escalate threats to lives of noncombatants living within the area. Amnesty International and other human rights advocate groups have maintained that the Nigerian offensive against the rebels have led to several human rights violation. Non-combatant deaths have been recorded in military assaults on Boko Haram camp in Kalama, Yobe state in 2009, the assault on Bama, Maiduguri by the Joint Task Force has led to several claims and counter-claims on the exact figure of non-combatant deaths, current reports by Amnesty International contend that over 900 persons died in military custody and over 3,000 thousand lost their lives in direct combat in 2003.

The ever-present military patrols and search system affects the movement of persons and create impediments to businesses in the areas. Businesses continued to close down as threat escalation and security restriction of movements leads to lower patron. Given that the rebels and insurgents need the help of 231

the local populations to shield and protect their operations; the group that wins the heart of the local populace may win the war. Hence, the need for state security to be aware of the challenges demanded from them in fighting insurrection.

Defensible Terrain Insurgencies survive in areas where there are defensible terrains for shielding the rebels from government forces. The likely hood of a sustainable insurgency in the plain, densely populated areas of southwest and southeast Nigeria is close to nil. The risk of success in such terrain has been a challenge to most uprising in west and eastern Nigeria. The Nigerian Army easily broke and neutralized threats to the Nigerian state by the OPC and MASSOB militias in southwest and southeast area of Nigeria.

The easily defensible terrains enhance the persistent violence in South-south

and

Northern

Nigeria.

The

clear

lack

understanding of the desert areas in northern Nigeria by the military has been employed to the advantage of the local rebels. Superior

understanding

the

terrain

influences

the

compactness and flexibility of attacks and evasion of military attacks by the rebels.

232

REACTIVE OPERATION The main challenge of the current CT operations in Nigeria is revealed in the apparent lack of concise strategy for operational deployment. The states security operations are based on containment, cordon and search operations. Apparent lack of concise intelligence on the activities of the rebels has reduced the operations of the Joint task force to mere reactive to rebels assault. Lack of initiative by the state force has increased the boldness of the rebels attack and increase assaults on military bases in the area.

The dearth of intelligence has led to several-recorded offensive without warnings on military bases in the areas of engagement. These successful raids have continued to bolster the Boko Haram group and reduce the trust in the military operations among the residents. Counter terrorism operations should be pro-active and take the fight to the rebels and be sustained to have any effect. Intelligence plays a great role in control and muscling rebels. Rebels cannot be allowed to take initiatives at all time, the state has the resources to flush the rebels and these equipment should be employed properly.

233

GOVERNMENT

ROLES

CURBING

BOKO

HARAM

INSURRECTION: The federal government should be ready to accommodate and allow for dialogue between the elite and the rebel sect. There exists need for a plebiscite in Northern Nigeria on the type and system of leadership the people want in their society. The state should not be seen to be protective of the northern elite against the poor. Proper avenues should be provided for discussions towards a change of current allocation and application of resources in northern Nigeria. Also the state may adopt some of these suggestions: Tackle the underlying social issues that cause conflict: Poverty and unemployment has been identified as precursor to radicalism and insurrections in Nigeria. Development and maintenance of social programmes directed at reduction in poverty through job creation in northern Nigeria will enhance security in the area in the short run. Identifying local stressors such as chieftaincy, citizenship and land ownership structures could also help in alleviating threats.

Make Policing More Prominent and Transparent: 234

Make policing a joint operation with the communities. Employ and deploy locals to patrol and handle crises within their communities. Reduce the factors necessitating alternatives to state police through introducing a viable system that will make policing more transparent. The judicial system should equally undergo a complete reform. The police should be independent of all political or ethnic leaning and sympathies. Policing can only be effective when not bogged down with too many considerations and restrictions. Develop the Civil Society Capacity: Civil society remains the basis for growth and development of public interaction with state. The citizens feel safe when there are means of civil contact with the state. Functional civil societies are employed to educate and train the people on new policies and how it will affect the people. Peoplesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; grievances and challenges are easily channeled to the state through functional civil societies. People are often wary of government agencies but feel safe with supposed private institutions hence civil societies may be used to create goodwill for the state with the people.

Create functional complaints ombudsmen with powers to

235

supervise and control policing in all states. Develop civic education in all areas of the country to promote knowledge of the laws and rights of the people. Reform the judiciary to provide better access to justice in state and federal courts, and simplify procedure for justice delivery through a thorough system overhaul of the judiciary. Legalize Non- State Security Providers: Lay legal and policy foundations for a better partnership with non-state policing providers through official recognition, active collaboration, support and coordination; and provide quality oversight of non-state policing through a single supervisory body and a national policy (Baker 2007). Sponsorship and Finance of Community Based Development Organisations (CBDO) and Development Non Government Organisations (NGO): Stabilize the society through introduction of community development

organizations

with

inherent

capacity

for

236

The uses of sports and entertainment groups have helped to reduce incidence of youth crimes in American streets. Gangs are being converted to sporting and dancing groups to attend competitions like X-Factor and Idols. Voluntary associations like Boys Scout, Girls Guide and Man â&#x20AC;&#x2122;O War should be revived sponsored and become part of school curriculum. As communities developed the ethnic components changes due to migration, conflicts arises when these groups refuses to cohesively become a new community. Breaking down ethnic dependence for personal survival should be a policy for community integration. There is a need for employment of professional development and integration professionals to lead in the assimilation process in Nigeria communities through interactions and co-dependency ethnic integration. Equally there is need for introducing development programme to be carried out using local Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO), Faith Based Organisations (FBO), Community Based Organisations

(CBO)

and

Voluntary

Organisations

(VO).

Introduction of grants for development in areas of education, youth empowerment and re-orientation will aside from providing jobs to locals with basic education working for these organisation, will also create form of hope for the unemployable mass. The job of educating the Almajiri should not be left for

237

formal education system. Increase government direct attention could be rebuffed as cosmetics but the use of these local organisations could assure easier appreciation. In control of youth violence and gang crime in Peckham and Coventry area in London, UK the state have in the past 12 years introduced employment development grants to NGO and CBO working in these areas. These development ideas have continued to reduce the numbers of unemployed youth on these streets and create lively hood for thousands. Reduce Militarization of Counter-Terrorism Operations (CT): To fight insurgency effectively, the initiatives on CT in Nigeria should be handed over to the Police and the Intelligence services. The Military should take the back sit and be employed to do he heavy work and not reduced to patrol and guard duties in cities. The initiative for successful US counter terrorism international has always been drawn by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and locally by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Armed Forces have always provided the needed supports for find, fix and eliminate programme for rebels. Intelligence driven attacks reduces the level of collateral damages and safeguard local populace from undue stress.

238

Military operations are not designed for taking prisoners, intelligence for fighting Al-Qaeda was gathered through interrogation of captured rebels and informants set within the organisation by intelligence agencies of the United States. Management of most rebels operations in Nigeria is directed by the military, which leaves no room for alternative conflict resolution programme. Proper CT programme should encourage local

Institute People Centered Approach to Counter Terrorism. Current CT operations have been anti-people and insurgents centered. This has continued to lead to high suffering and displacement for locals. The hardship on the locals is not ameliorated by the fact that they continued to lose their loved ones in the skirmishes. The peopleâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s safety and wellbeing should be the direct focus of any internal security operation. The high handedness of security operatives has been reported severally and there are no clear signals of any rules of engagement that protects non-combatant in areas of combats. The people are assets in CT operations and should always be protected at all times. Only in states where democracy and rule of law is not installed that the violent theory is always applied successfully in counter terrorism operations. It is the states duty to protect all its 239

citizens regardless of any threat to their lives and properties. Increased migration from areas of conflict shows the negative feelings of the people towards their supposed liberators, the Nigerian Armed Forces. There has to be a private review and assessment of all operations and its effects on the civilians. The US Army sorted this out through the introduction of live recording of all engagements for review after operations. The fact that each soldier is aware of being recorded and punishment that might arise from infringement on the rights of the people are constrained to act right during such operations. The apparent lack of proper supervision of military operations in the areas of conflicts has tactically produced an army of occupation with its own rules of engagement that is beyond the national constitution. Flexible and Adaptive Initiative Flexibility and adaptability has been the hallmark of rebel groups survival, there is a need for breaking stateâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s operations in areas of conflicts into small and easily manageable units. The use of large number of troop and vehicles in patrol and engagement with rebels apparently delay response time and exposes troop movements to the rebels, which give rebels apple time to organise proper attacks. The US Rangers and Marines used in anti-terrorism operations are normally trained in unit of 6 men.

240

This allow for easier deployment and generally adaptive operational process. Smaller troop move faster and are more efficient in close combat warfare than large forces. The use of these light efficient formations will allow for mobility and efficiency of operation. Elimination of insurgents will be more efficient when proper intelligence have identified and class the area of engagement into hostiles and friendly forces. The deployment of two or three teams for hostile neutralization should be easier as they already know the lay of the land and can plan the engagement properly before attacks.

Establish Local based Policing and Intelligence Units: The only lesson learnt from many counter insurgency operations is the needs for enhanced policing of post-conflict environment. Youth corrupted by violence activities during rebellions are wont to become criminals if not well managed. Increase capacity for local policing organs will help in reducing incidence of repeated conflicts as police officers will be able to manage proto-conflicts in time to reduce implosions. Local based policing will surely provide jobs for local youths, reduce feeling of angst and challenges to supposedly occupying forces sent by state to oppress. Local security operative will

241

show perfect understanding and reflect proper empathy in dealing with cases than non-local colleagues. Use of indigene will build trust in the security services and reduce the exploitation of non-local security operatives by residents. Education of local populace and tackle basic issues leading to repeated conflicts The level and access to education in most areas of conflict in Nigeria is quite low. Areas in Northeast and South-south Nigeria are bereft of basic infrastructure, school attendance and enrollments are low, unemployment is high; due to low industrialization and relatively burgeoning unemployable youth populations, and high mortality rates due to lack of basic health facilities.

Lack of access to proper employment by the youth increases exposure to illegal pursuits. Increase need for development of youth empowerment programmes by all tiers of government could reduce current radicalization progress. Local conflicts often grow to become national if not well managed, the Boko Haram rebellion started as a challenge to local elite. Increase of equitable and transparent alternative dispute resolution avenues for the citizens may reduce violence reactions and conflicts. Access to fair and equitable justice has been proven as a major stabilizing index for states. Security of the people is a 242

function of the perceived level of justice, fairness and equity assured by the state.

8 243

Designing Effective Counter-Terrorism Programme Analysis of the causes of conflict and war has been an area of growing academic interest. Both theoretical work and empirical analyses substantiate the many ways in which poverty and unemployment can trigger, fuel, or sustain conflict. Most researches have concluded that an effective counter-insurgency programme must aside from wining the war against the rebels, build reputable institutions to checkmate and prevent future rebellions. Nigerian society have continued to witness high level of conflict persistence in the past 30 years, regrettably, the state have failed severally to institute institutions that may militate against growth of rebellion.

The need for intelligence operations to get to the roots and eliminate the flow of resources to this group should be employed. The tendencies for Boko Haram to be hijacked by other groups have started manifesting in the declaration of Ansaru and other splinter groups from the main Boko Haram. The need to mutate must be tackled and an end to this misery should be found.

Socio-political and economic situation in Nigeria view against political agitations of elite from northern Nigeria for the control

244

of Nigerian state, apparent disdain, lack of supports for current executive president in the Aso Rock Villa, several inconsistencies in operations and unverifiable information about the existence of the Boko Haram members has made many to agree that the Boko Haram pogrom may not even exist as a group but a mere political maneuvers by some undesirable elements, employing several aliens from poor neighboring Sahel states on ad-hoc basis to foment attacks in Nigeria.

Some analysts have suggested that some of the current attacks do not reflect a coordinated operation. It has been projected that some elites might be involved in maintaining the tempo of the attacks to keep security in place and maintain their hold in the region. Many attempts at understanding the phenomenon have remained unsuccessful. Writings about this group are scarce and the few around are contradictory making the accuracy of this work on the issue primarily subjective. Further works on this group is important and may reveal the true issue at stake in this insurrection.

The wide unpoliced borders between countries of the West African region allow for ease movement in and out of the states by radicals and lack of control over the use of new media, growing internet penetration and use of android phones has

245

make possible ease of spreading messages of ethnic and religious hate online.

Threats are prioritized for security policy and funding, Islamic radicalism is a threat to Nigerian state and must be checked. To check the growth of radicalism, Nigeria need well designed and value oriented security policy. A system that is robust enough to take the war on terror to the root causes of radicalism, eschew phantom strides in information and communication technology management, organize and control the new media and suppress the free use of internet to attack the state and spread misinformation and propaganda by local and international terror groups in the country. All these might not work if proper attentions are not placed on development of facilities that enhances human development and the creation of employment for youth in the country. Towards conflict prevention the Nigerian state could employ any of these method; Tackle the underlying social issues that cause conflict: Poverty and unemployment has been identified as precursor to radicalism and insurrections in Nigeria. Development and maintenance of social programmes directed at reduction in poverty through job creation in northern Nigeria will enhance 246

security in the area in the short run. Identifying local stressors such as chieftaincy, citizenship and land ownership structures could also help in alleviating threats. Make Policing More Prominent and Transparent: Make policing a joint operation with the communities. Employ and deploy locals to patrol and handle crises within their communities. Reduce the factors necessitating alternatives to state police through introducing a viable system that will make policing more transparent. The judicial system should equally undergo a complete reform. The police should be independent of all political or ethnic leaning and sympathies. Policing can only be effective when not bogged down with too many considerations and restrictions. Develop the civil society Capacity: Create functional complaints ombudsmen with powers to supervise and control policing in all states. Develop civic education in all areas of the country to promote knowledge of the laws and rights of the people. Reform the judiciary to provide better access to justice in state and federal courts, and simplify procedure for justice delivery through a thorough system overhaul of the judiciary. Legalize Non- State Security Providers: 247

Lay legal and policy foundations for a better partnership with non-state policing providers through official recognition, active collaboration, support and coordination; and provide quality oversight of non-state policing through a single supervisory body and a national policy (Baker 2007). Sponsorship and Finance of Community Based Development Organizations (CBDO) and Development Non Government Organizations (NGO): Stabilize

society

development

through

organizations

introduction with

inherent

community capacity

for

attainment of public honours for the youths to replace current ethnic and religious organizations. The need for self-expressions could be attained through such bodies. Competitions could be encouraged between community groups bringing them to national focus. The uses of sports and entertainment groups have helped to reduce incidence of youth crimes in American streets. Gangs are being converted to sporting and dancing groups to attend competitions like X-Factor and Idols. Voluntary associations like Boys Scout, Girls Guide and Man â&#x20AC;&#x2122;O War should be revived sponsored and become part of school curriculum. As communities developed the ethnic components changes due

248

to migration, conflicts arises when these groups refuses to cohesively become a new community. Breaking down ethnic dependence for personal survival should be a policy for community integration. There is a need for employment of professional development and integration professionals to lead in the assimilation process in Nigeria communities through interactions and co-dependency ethnic integration.

Conflict Management Conflict management connotes a mechanism that is concerned with defining (a) a conflict as ended (at least temporarily), and (b) deciding on the distribution of values and resources. To that extent conflict management is a rational and conscious decisional process whereby parties to a conflict, with or without the aid of outsiders, take steps to transform, deescalate or terminate a conflict in a mutually acceptable way. This is the case with intractable or other conflicts. The full range of methods and instruments that constitute conflict management is quite wide (see Fogg, 1985). It varies from coercive measures, through legal processes to third party intervention and multilateral conferences.

For analytical

purposes it is useful to divide all these methods to (a) unilateral methods (e.g. one-party threats), (b) bilateral 249

methods (e.g. bargaining and negotiation, deterrence), and (c) multilateral methods (e.g. third party intervention).

particular interest would be the role of factors that affect the choice of a response, or an approach, to conflict, and how in particular certain conditions, such as being in an enduring conflict, and all that it implies, impact on the choice of conflict management method or its outcome.

Mediated settlement could be achieved through the use of professional mediators and not politicians. Increase use of politicians by the state to mediate in crisis has always been counter-productive. Many conflicts have remained unsolved in Nigeria because of this process. Jos, Niger Delta, MASSOB and all festering issues might never be resolved until professionals are employed to process the cases.

Build Institutions for conflict prevention through monitoring The institutional goal should be directed towards enhancing early intervention, through monitoring of people, groups and organisations with high radicalization activities or preaching. The data gathered may be analyzed and employed in fostering 250

thoughtful and timely responses to frictions and proto-conflicts and thereby averting violent conflicts. The operations of the institution should include Designed Regular Assessments (DRA), to tracks â&#x20AC;&#x153;Red Flagsâ&#x20AC;? over time, conduct appropriate investigations using established threat assessment procedures, determines the best mechanisms for support, intervention, negotiation or mediation and deploy resources towards settling disputes The institution should be empowered to also monitor intervention process, coordinates post-conflict agreements and reconciliation of disputants. Membership of such institutions must be non-political, broad based and professional conflict managers. Be open to all ethnic, religious and political groups Build Institutions for conflict prevention through monitoring The institution goal of such institution should be towards enhancing early intervention, foster thoughtful and timely responses and thereby averting violent conflicts. Conclusions The need for intelligence operations to get to the roots and eliminate the flow of resources to this group should be employed. The tendencies for Boko Haram to be hijacked by other groups have started manifesting in the declaration of

251

Ansaru and other splinter groups from the main Boko Haram. The need to mutate must be tackled and an end to this misery should be found.

Socio-political and economic situation in Nigeria view against political agitations of elite from northern Nigeria for the control of Nigerian state, apparent disdain, lack of supports for current executive president in the Aso Rock Villa, several inconsistencies in operations and unverifiable information about the existence of the Boko Haram members has made many to agree that the Boko Haram pogrom may not even exist as a group but a mere political maneuvers by some undesirable elements, employing several aliens from poor neighboring Sahel states on ad-hoc basis to foment attacks in Nigeria.

Some analysts have suggested that some of the current attacks do not reflect a coordinated operation. It has been projected that some elites might be involved in maintaining the tempo of the attacks to keep security in place and maintain their hold in the region. Many attempts at understanding the phenomenon have remained unsuccessful. Writings about this group remain scarce, and the few around are contradictory making the accuracy of this work on the issue primarily subjective. Further works on this group is important and may reveal the true issue

252

at stake in this insurrection.

253

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254

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