Operation Ironclad Madagascar 1942

Operation IRONCLAD The Madagascar CAMPAIGN 1942

Colonel Dudley Wall MSM. MMM

DEDICATION This book is dedicated to Company Sergeant Major Stanley Wall FOREWORD The campaign on Madagascar is one of the truly forgotten campaigns of World War Two. Despite this fact it was of strategic importance to the Allies and both Sir Winston Churchill and General Jan Smuts deemed it necessary to gain full control of the island. There were periods of short sharp fighting and also periods of painstaking advances in difficult terrain. It is a tribute to all who served there, but especially to Company Sergeant Major Stanley Wall who was the signaller attached to 5 Commando when they were tasked to deal with the Japanese midget submarine crew.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, copied, stored, manipulated in any retrieval system or be transmitted in any electronic digital or mechanical form or by any other means without the prior written permission of the author. Any person who engages in any unauthorised activity in relation to this publication shall be liable to prosecution and claims for and criminal damages.

Copyright: Dudley Wall 2006 ISBN NUMBER: 978-1-4457-8462-5 Email address: dudleywall@yahoo.co.uk

(Errors and Omissions Accepted)

CAMPAIGN ON MADAGASCAR OPERATION IRONCLAD 5 MAY TO 6 NOVEMBER 1942

Communications.

On 12th February 1942 General Smuts cabled Prime Minister Winston Churchill and expressed his opinion that Madagascar was the key to the safety of the Indian Ocean and that it could play the same significant role that Indo China had just recently played for the Japanese in their campaign in the Far East. At the same time General de Gaulle also approached the British and encouraged them that the Free French launch an attack on Madagascar to free it from the Vichy French.

In 1941 Madagascar was populated by 50 000 French, Chinese and Indians and four million Madagascans. The Madagascans were generally anti French. In 1941 M. Annet was appointed as Governor General of the island. He was very anti British and this feeling seemed to be the same amongst most of the population.

The fact that the Vichy French were part of the Axis forces immediately created the implication that Madagascar could be used by the Japanese for a number of purposes, including that of springboard to the African mainland, or to cut off the vital supply routes around the Cape of Good Hope and through the Suez Canal. The war in the Western Desert was the focus of the Allies and the Axis at the time. The main supply routes to the Middle East were via the Cape of Good Hope up the east coast to Suez.

Due to the fact that Madagascar was of such strategic significance the British government deemed it necessary for their intelligence organisation to closely monitor the situation. British agents picked up information that both German and Japanese submarines were docking in the port of Diego Suarez. They were accompanied by ships which were building up logistical supplies, typical of the operations launched to sustain submarines far from home. The situation resulted in commercial ties being established between Madagascar and Japan. In retaliation Britain instituted a naval blockade of Madagascar.

The Mediterranean Sea was dominated by the German navy and Luftwaffe who were operating from Italy and this prevented the Allies from using the direct sea route to Egypt. By now Japan had invaded Malaya, the Dutch East Indies and Burma. The situation in the Far East was critical. The Royal Navy ships “Prince of Wales” and “ Repulse” had been sunk. The British government needed to maintain a strong naval presence in the Indian Ocean to prevent the Japanese from expanding westwards. The Japanese navy was now able to operate from harbours in Burma but did not have the necessary tactical “reach” to get to the vital British logistical Lines of

The threat was considered very serious.

Southern Rhodesia established a commando type unit known as the Southern Rhodesia Commando which operated on Rhodesia’s eastern border with Mozambique. The unit was recruited from the local farming community and underwent commando type training to react to a possible invasion

by Japan from Mozambique.

The harbour of Diego Suarez on the 1

northern shores of Madagascar was well constructed, deep and well fortified. It had been under the control of the Vichy French and was ideal for the Japanese and the Germans to use. The Axis forces wanted to use Madagascar as a safe haven for its submarines operating in the vital southern African waters providing a vital logistical link to the Far East. This would bring the Axis presence much closer to British territory in Africa and directly influence the British interests in Burma, Singapore, Australia and New Zealand which were now being threatened in this way. Due to this threat it was decided that Madagascar would be occupied by a British military force.

THE PLAN

The forces on Madagascar were aware of a possible air threat and were relatively ready for defending against air attacks. The troops consisted of Frenchmen, Senegalese, Indo Chinese and local Madagascans.

The motivation for this political action was in keeping with South Africa’s pledge to support Great Britain on the war but even more so, it was out of necessity because both Germany and Italy as well as Japan had deployed their navies off the South African coast. Great losses in merchant marine shipping had been

Britain’s military planners sat down to devise a method of achieving their aim of preventing the Japanese from taking advantage of the position of the island. South Africa was also aware of the strategic importance of Madagascar; working in conjunction with the British. In early 1942 two Maryland aircraft of the SAAF were deployed to Lindi airfield in Tanganyika. The aircraft were flown

by Major J.A.G. Rademeyer and Captain M.J. Uys with photographers Sergeants van Rhyn and Lombaard aboard. The two aircraft flew a series of air reconnaissance sorties over Diego Suarez on 1st March 1942.

This operation was classified top secret but was not very successful due Madagascar’s Defences. The French to the adverse cloud cover. had realised the importance of Madagascar for some time and had On the 20th April 1942 another air recce was done over Diego Suarez. deployed the following defences: The two Maryland aircraft were flown

by Major K.S.P. Jones and Captain Diego Suarez M.J. Uys (his second trip!). This 7 x coastal batteries. recce was more successful and vital 1 x mobile artillery unit. corrections were done to British Sea mines along the west coast. drawn maps of northern Madagascar Fortifications in the town. which were to be used for the planned 8000 troops, mainly Madagascans. amphibious landings.

Rest of the Island On 23rd April 1942 South Africa 3000 troops.

Approximately 50 military aircraft of broke off relations with Madagascar as it continued its pro German stance. various types at various airfields.

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led by Rear Admiral E.N. Syfret CB. T h e campaign w a s codenamed Operation Ironclad. It was to be the first seaborne operation of the Second Diego Suarez town.

World War French Detention Barracks (left) and Military Hospital (right) Photo from DoD Documentation Centre and, in fact the first since experienced and the war effort in the the landings at Gallipoli in 1915. The Middle East and the Far East was assembly area for the campaign was at being severely harassed. See also the Durban.

Its harbour was most paragraphs on the War in the Indian suitable for the assembly of a division Ocean below. size force. From there the force would sail up the Mozambique British High Command planned a Channel and disembark the land seaborne amphibious landing to be forces off the west coast and then

NORTHERN MADAGASCAR OPERATION IRONCLAD

Destroyer HMS Anthony embarks Royal Marines for attack on Antsirane

Indian Ocean

XX

X

5 Comdo and 1 X coy E Lancs

Courrier Bay

Orangea

Diego Suarez

Ft Caimans Ft Bellevue

E and S Lancs

Ambararata Bay RWF RSF

HMS Anthony lands 50 Royal Marine for attack in rear

Ansirana

3

advance on the harbour of Diego Suarez and capture it. From there another amphibious landing would be put in at Majunga and Tamatave on the east coast. From there the ground forces would advance to the capital of Tananarive.

The military commander for the campaign was South African born Rear Admiral Syfret RN. He would use his Gibraltar task force for the campaign. Maj Gen R.G. Sturges CB of the Royal Marines was appointed commander of the forces to be landed and Captain (RN) G.A. GarnonsWilliams DSC of the Royal Navy, detached from Combined Operations Command, was the Naval Commander of the assault landing craft. Admiral Somerville RN was tasked to use his British Eastern Fleet to prevent any interference from the Japanese.

Landing ship about to disembark 5 Commando soldiers at Courrier Bay. Photo DoD Documentation Centre

supporting troops which would then be an additional brigade for the campaign.

THE LANDINGS AND INITIAL ASSAULT

The naval convoy left Durban for Madagascar escorted by the cruiser Devonshire on 25th April 1942. It comprised a fast convoy and a slow convoy and the plan was to get the force to Madagascar simultaneously.

The naval vessels included:

The first stage was for British 5 Division to set sail from the United Kingdom with 13 Brigade on board.

The naval convoy would stop off at Freetown on the west coast of Africa.

A second brigade was embarked later and both arrived in Durban. In total the 5th Division would consist of 13 Bde, 17 Bde, 29 Bde and 5 Commando. Due to the heightened actions of the Japanese in the Far East any further operations to secure the entire island had to be postponed as 13 Bde would probably have to be redeployed to India.

HMS Illustrious. An aircraft carrier from which the Fleet Air Arm would launch air operations.

HMS Indomitable. An aircraft carrier from which the Fleet Air Arm would launch air operations.

HMS Devonshire. An escort cruiser.

HMS Auricula. A corvette. Sunk by Vichy French sea mine.

HMS Ramillies. A destroyer. Was damaged by a French sea mine HMS Anthony. A destroyer which

South African 7 Motorised Infantry Brigade consisting of the Pretoria Regiment, First City Regiment and the Pretoria Highlanders with 4

landed 50 Royal Marines at Antsirane as a diversion in order to attack the Diego Suarez harbour from the eastern rear.

HMS Manxman. A mine sweeper.

A variety of landing ships and landing craft to land 5 Commando and the other troops. The force landed on Madagascar on the 5th May 1942.

While this was going on the SAAF was moving bomber and transport aircraft to Lindi in Tanganyika for the flight over the Mozambique Channel to Madagascar in order to support the ground forces.

his notes in his possession. The police police handed him over to the senior Vichy officer Colonel Clarebout at Vichy Military HQ. There the Vichy interrogated him, analysed his notes and then charged him with espionage. By 21h30 the next night the British were in charge of the area and he was released.

Aerial Actions. The aircraft from HMS Illustrious and HMS Indomitable dropped pamphlets stating the strategic reasoning for the assault on Madagascar. They also encouraged the Vichy French not to resist and thus avoid unnecessary casualties. If this did not work then the aircraft were tasked to bombard military targets ashore.

British Intelligence Actions. British Special Operations Executive (SOE) agents cut the telephone lines between Ansirana, Ambararata and Courrier Bay which effectively prevented the Vichy French HQ from finding out what was going on with the landings.

Agent DZ6 was a business man who was staying in an hotel in Ansirana.

He controlled a network of other agents and was able to submit a report on the enemy activities of the sub region of the island which was very Useful for the planning of the amphibious landings. They also established a secret radio link with Durban to pass on information. DZ6 visited Majunga and other locations of importance to collect information.

On the night of the landings DZ6 was supposed to be entertaining Vichy French senior officers at a cocktail party in order to keep them out of the way. His intention was to drug them to render them ineffective when the British troops landed. This did not take place however. On the night of the attack he left his hotel in an attempt to assess the damage done by Allied aircraft in their bombing sortie o v e r t h e h a r b o u r.

He was apprehended by the Vichy police with

The naval convoy used the small islands and reefs off the northern west coast as cover to split up. HMS Anthony and the Royal Marines sailed around the northern tip of Madagascar to gain access to the bay and land at Antsirane across the inner mouth opposite Diego Suarez.

Amphibious Force. This was the northern element which landed on the 13 BDE

Y Y Y Y Y 2nd Camaronians

2nd Wiltshire Regt

2nd Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers

5

northern shores of Courrier Bay on Red Beach and disembarked 5 Commando and a company of the East Lancashire Regt at 0430 on 5th May. The bay had been mined but the Royal Navy swept for them and eliminated the problem. From then on the beach landing went well.

29 INDEPENDENT BDE

Y Y Y Y Y Welch Fusiliers

Their task was to silence two coastal defence artillery batteries at Orangea which covered the mouth of the harbour. From there they were to secure the peninsular in which the village of Diego Suarez was situated along the inner mouth of the bay. 5 Commando and the company of the East Lancashire Regt found only one battery at a place called Windsor Castle and captured it without any resistance. The crews were caught unawares in their beds.

South Lancashire Regiment

Royal Scots Fusiliers

water. Diego Suarez fell into Allied hands at 16h00.

Main Assault Brigade - 29 Independent Bde. This brigade was the force responsible for the main attack to the south at Ambarrarata Bay and on to Ansirana. It comprised the Royal Welsh Fusiliers, Royal Scots Fusiliers, South Lancashire Regt and the remainder of the East Lancashire Regt supported by tanks. The Main Assault Brigade landed on the beaches at Ambarrarata Bay

However a number of machine gun nests were encountered. The Vichy French soldiers manning them put up a great deal of resistance and it took the rest of the entire day to put them out of action.

Deception Actions. A successful deception plan was put into action by means of Fleet Air Arm aircraft bombing the airfield six miles south of Antsirane and also the ships in the harbour.

Several aircraft were destroyed on the ground thus preventing the Vichy French from conducting an aerial recce of the situation. The naval vessels off shore fired star and smoke shells at 04h40 at Ambodivahibe Bay (the most likely place for a beach landing) as their contribution to the deception plan.

The commandos of 5 Commando could easily see the town of Antsirane on the other side of the inner mouth of the bay separated by 1200 yards of

17 BDE

Y Y Y Y Y 2nd Royal Scots Fusiliers

6th Seaforth Highlanders

2nd Northampton Regiment

6

Main Assault Brigade task was to advance eastwards along the single existing road via Anamahia and capture Fort Caimans on the west of the peninsular, Fort Bellevue on the east of the peninsular and then the airfield and Antsirane town.

Support Brigade (17 Bde). Comprised of the remainder of the Royal Scots Fusiliers, Northamptonshire Regt and the Seaforth Highlanders. This force was to land after the Main Assault Brigade and reinforce the Main Assault Brigade as a follow up on the capture of Antsirane and the peninsula.

5 Commando on the beaches at Courrier Bay Photo DoD Documentation Centre

designated Blue Beach (northern most) White Beach (central) and Green Beach (southern). Resistance from the Vichy French was light except for one area where a group of fifty Senegalese colonial troops were totally surprised and captured before they knew what was going on.

Difficulty was experienced in landing the armoured vehicles and tanks however.

The Advance to Antsirane. Once formed up on the road to Antsirane the Main Assault Brigade was led by an advance guard of Bren Gun The 29 Bde HQ was established at Carriers. The advance guard came Conlieux. 17 Bde was approximately under attack at 11h00 from well a kilometre to the rear of 29 Bde. The defended positions. Two companies of Vichy French motorised infantry supported by artillery and three tanks opened fire on the British forces.

The Vichy French lost two detachments of the infantry. This contact was successfully concluded by the British and they continued by 15h00.

Ta n k s w e r e t h e n brought forward to lead the advance.

Antsirana Port Later the forward Photo from DoD Documentation Centre 7

Combat Support for 5th Infantry Division

Y Y YY Y Y Y Y Y Royal Army Medical Corps

Royal Artillery

Royal Engineers

Royal Army Service Corps

Royal Corps of Signals

Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers

narrowest stretch of the Isthmus of Antsirane. The trenches were well established and covered the 2000 metres between Fort Bellevue in the east and Fort Caimans in the west. A formidable anti tank ditch had been constructed in front of the trenches.

The roads entering the positions were protected by concrete pillboxes which were armed with 75mm artillery guns and machine guns. A first light attack was to be launched. In the meanwhile the naval crews were still working hard using the landing craft to disembark the remainder of the vehicles, equipment and logistical supplies required by the 5th Division for the campaign from the ships anchored at sea. The fairly rough state of the sea allowed for only one beach to be used for the purpose.

The Support Brigade was disembarked by 11h15 despite the adverse sea conditions and the presence of many sea mines. 19 Field Battery of 98 Field Regt RA (howitzers) was eventually off loaded from the ship Antsirana deep water quay Photo from DoD Documentation Centre Bachaquero that evening at

elements of the Main Assault Brigade reached the main positions of the Vichy French. Concealed 75mm artillery guns opened fire on the advancing British troops. This fire effectively halted the British and when nightfall arrived heavy fire continued to pin the British down.

Logistical lines were somewhat stretched from the beaches Inland and the commanders on the ground realised that if the Vichy French were to be cleared of their defensive positions then a Brigade attack would have to be launched.

The Vichy French positions faced southwards overlooking the

8

allow the support brigade to come forward. In the meanwhile Fleet Air Arm aircraft continued to attack ground targets in coordination with naval gunfire support from the destroyers offshore.

By now nightfall had arrived and the commanders re-planned for a night attack at 20h30.

Fifty Royal Marines on HMS Anthony sailed around the Northern tip of Madagascar into Antsirane harbour as a diversion for the night attack.

The Royal Marines were to land on a jetty and make an attack on the town from the rear.

Courier Bay and the Gunners engaged targets in the Antsirane defences. Another battery was off loaded from the Mahout just afterwards. The British corvette HMS Auricula hit a Vichy French sea mine and sank in the early hours of the next morning.

Attack on Main Defensive Positions.

At dawn (05h00) on the 6th May, the next day, three battalions formed up on the front for the assault. The South Lancashires (on the right) were able to penetrate the thick bush and rocks comprising the difficult terrain between Fort Bellevue and the sea in a flanking movement. They captured several hundred prisoners in the successful move.

The Royal Scots Fusiliers in the centre and the E a s t Royal Marines Lancashires on Cap Badge the left launched a frontal attack over open ground. They came under heavy fire and suffered several casualties in the process. The Vichy French kept up the heavy fire and forced these two battalions to withdraw to safer ground. To begin, with due to poor communications, General Sturges was unaware of the successes and actually thought that the attack was unsuccessful. He only got the good news much later! The artillery support consisting of 2 x 25 pounders and 4 x 3,7 inch howitzers for the attack was hindered by the fact that the shellfire had set the bush alight and the artillery observers could not see what was going on. The assault brigade was forced to halt to

Night Attack on Antsirane. A battalion of the Northamptonshire Regt and a battalion of the Seaforth Highlanders with an additional company of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers started to advance at20h30.

Their objectives lay approximately 2 kilometres ahead.

The advance route took them past the two forts of Bellevue and Caimans and the pillboxes. The Vichy French were taken unawares.

A delay in taking the Orangia peninsula was the only temporary setback. By 23h00 the infantry sent a rocket signal to indicate that they had succeeded in taking Antsirane.

The rest of the British brigades followed up into the town. By 01h00 in the early hours of the next morning the Residency had been captured and was in British hands.

Losses for this Phase The British losses suffered during the capture of Diego Suarez and Ansirana were relatively light. One corvette (HMS Auricula) was sunk and a few tanks and troop carriers were damaged. Approximately one hundred troops were killed in action 9

20 Torpedo, Bomber, Recce Squadron

MARTIN MARYLAND The Martin Maryland bomber and reconnaissance aircraft was made in the USA. Of the several hundred that were made 72 were delivered to the South African Air Force and saw service in 12 and 21 Squadrons in Madagascar and in the Mediterranean theatre.

taken; one thousand of these were Frenchmen. The rest were colonial troops.

and three hundred wounded. Vichy French artillery destroyed seven of the twelve British tanks in support of the infantry. The Vichy French lost two submarines and two ships sunk.

19 aircraft were destroyed.

Approximately one hundred troops were killed and four hundred wounded.Four thousand POWs were

C O N S O L I D AT I O N M AY TO AUGUST 1942

Despite the hopes of the British that the Vichy French would surrender, they refused to give up and f u r t h e r operations had to be launched to dominate the island. The next step SAAF cap badge was to capture the harbours of Majunga on the SAAF Pilot’s wings west coast and Sweetheart brooch Tamatave on the east coast.

Intelligence for future operations on Madagascar Shoulder title was of vital SAAF Pilot’s wings importance. For Shoulder title this reason Air Sea Rescue British SOE agents continued to operate on the SAAF Navigator / Observer’s wings island once Diego Suarez SAAF Air Gunner’s wings and Ansirana had 10

been captured. SOE also provided guides for the assault parties to get inland.

the Indian Ocean aptly proved his point.

SAAF DEPLOYMENTS

The urgent need for British forces to focus their attention on the growing successes of the Japanese in the Far East influenced the redeployment of the brigades of 5 Division. On the strategic level Britain wanted to establish a naval base on the island of Ceylon off the southern tip of India to deal with the Japanese threat. If Majunga and Tamatave were not to be captured immediately then 13 and 17 Brigades were to be shipped to India to counter the Japanese threat to Burma.

Wi n s t o n C h u r c h i l l approached General Smuts about the dilemma he was in. Churchill wanted to leave a few intelligence agents in the various Madagascan harbours to keep an early warning eye on things.

Smuts was not agreeable to this suggestion realising full well that the threat to Southern Africa was rather more important than to have the region’s safety in the hands of a few SOE agents!! Smuts had made an accurate appreciation of the global strategic value of Madagascar to the Axis in view of the war in the Middle East, the threat to the Persian oil fields and the supply routes to India and the Far East. In fact the actions of Japanese and German submarines in

The SAAF provided air support from the beginning of the campaign.

By the 3rd May three flights nicknamed the “Sugarcanes Wing” under the general command of Lt Col J.T. Durant left South Africa for the campaign.

They were 32 Coastal Recce Flight, 36 Coastal Recce Flight and 37 Coastal Recce Flight under the command of Major D.G. Meaker, Major J.A. Clayton and Major K.S.P. Jones respectively.

This contingent consisted of 17 bomber aircraft; 11 Beauforts and 6 Marylands as well as 18 transport aircraft. The aircraft moved from Durban and Cape Town to Swartkops Air Force Base in Pretoria. From there they flew via Lusaka to Lindi in Tanganyika wherethey were to be serviced for the flight and operations over Madagascar. The aircraft left South Africa on the 3rd May. On the 6th May one of the transport aircraft in a three aircraft flight had to force land at Liwale some 200 km from Lindi.

Its freight was than transported by road to Lindi. A Beaufort crashlanded on 6th May at Lindi and was

French pilot’s badge

Potez 631 bomber and reconnaissance aircraft. It was French made and looked very similar to the German Bf110. Due to this fact several were shot down by the Allies in Europe. Vichy France inherited several of these aircraft and a contingent of them were based on Madagascar.

11

RAF pilot’s wings

Fairey Swordfish Mk 1 of the Royal Navy Fleet Air Arm 810 Squadron aboard HMS Illustrious. Both the aircraft carriers HMS Illustrious and HMS Indomitable had Fairey Swordfish aboard for the campaign.

written off. A second Beaufort crashlanded in a marsh 50 km south west of Kasama and was also written off. The crew of the second crashed Beaufort managed to walk to a local mission station. Both aircraft were replaced from South Africa by the 9th May. The transport of fuel was a critical problem. South Africa did not have the ability to do so and thus made arrangements with the senior British naval authorities stationed in East Africa under the command of Admiral Tait.

Lodestar transport aircraft were used to transport equipment and when this task was completed these aircraft returned to South Africa.

On the 29th May six Lysander light aircraft of the RAF arrived to replace the SAAF aircraft. They were obviously unsuitable for the long distances needed to be travelled and the SAAF aircraft therefore remained.

In preparation for the forthcoming operations the SAAF aircraft were fitted out to conduct air reconnaissance and to deliver bombs.

Oxygen equipment was also fitted for Once the SAAF contingent arrived at high altitude flying. Internal fuel Lindi the logistical section discovered tanks were replaced by bomb racks t h a t t h e r e h a d b e e n a for offensive actions. misunderstanding between the local British military authority and the Sorties were flown to take air photos Union Defence Force. There was of the harbours at Majunga and only 900 litres of fuel (for two Tamatave for forthcoming operations. aircraft) to continue to Madagascar Air recce flights were also flown to and not the 35 aircraft which had obtain information of the terrain and arrived! Plans were made to obtain anti submarine patrols were flown on fuel locally at Lindi over a distance of a daily basis as part of SAAF routine.

20 km and this sorted the problem out.

Another problem resulted in the fact F U R T H E R S T R A T E G I C that there were only three hand pumps DEVELOPMENTS to refuel the 35 aircraft. It took four hours to refuel only one aircraft in this General Smuts wanted the entire manner!

The innovative ground island of Madagascar captured. Vice crews overcame the problems and Admiral Syfret agreed with Smuts. once the aircraft had been serviced the At least Majunga and Tamatave next leg of the journey to Arachart should also be captured. Syfret knew airport at Antsirane, Madagascar was the vulnerability and the value of the completed on the 12th and 13th May. harbour at Diego Suarez. In order for 12

him to protect this valuable harbour against a possible threat from Japanese and German submarines three brigades as well as coastal artillery and anti air defence would be needed. SOE agents in the south of Madagascar felt the same. This directly implied that there were not enough forces to conduct the envisaged operations on Madagascar. On 20th May 1942 13 Brigade was redeployed to India. 17 Brigade was to follow as soon as South African reinforcements were available to replace them. An East African brigade was also to be redeployed to Madagascar.

29 Brigade would remain behind to defend Diego Suarez. The clash of priorities was felt.

On 27 May 1942 a Vichy French representative from the capital, Tananarive visited the GOC British forces in Diego Suarez in an unofficial capacity. He put forward a request to share the administration of the central and southern part of Madagascar.

The British then suggested a show of force to strengthen Barnett’s hand and give the impression that the Vichy French had no choice in the matter. The German capture of Tobruk in June 1942

5 Commando foot patrol Photo DoD Documentation Centre

resulted in the further realisation of the strategic importance of Madagascar and the southern sea routes to sustain the war in the Western Desert. The unofficial approaches by the Vichy French thus came to nought.

AIR DOMINATION Between 5th and 7th May nineteenVichy French aircraft had been destroyed by Allied forces in the initial invasion. On 13 May a SAAF Maryland aircraft flown by Captain Lagerwey of 32 Flight strafed Majunga airfield and destroyed a French Potez 631 bomber.

On the same sortie valuable air photos of the airfield were taken. On the 14th May a Beaufort flown by Lt Nicholas of 37 Flight was conducting an air photo

SAAF pilot’s wings

Bristol Beaufort of 20 Torpedo, Bomber, Recce Squadron of the SAAF 13

recce of Tamatave when it was forced to land at Sambava due to engine trouble. The badly damaged aircraft was torched and destroyed by its crew who then made for the coast. They were all arrested by the Vichy French but were released a few days later except for the three officers who were exchanged for French prisoners on the 19th May. On 29th May at 21h30 an unidentified aircraft flew over Diego Suarez harbour. It appeared to be of Japanese origin (a Nakajima 93).

Admiral Syfret was on board his flag ship, HMS Ramillies and gave orders to upgrade security measures throughout his command and especially in the vicinity of the harbour.

On 30th May a Royal Navy Torpedo

Air Attack on Tananarive. On 31 May two SAAF Maryland aircraft of 37 Flight strafed Tananarive airport and destroyed one French military aircraft and damage two others. Major K.S.P. Jones aircraft was hit by Vichy French anti aircraft fire. Jones was forced to crash land on the return flight. The crew recovered the machine guns on board and made their way northwards in an attempt to link up with British forces from Diego Suarez. A Vichy French patrol attempted an arrest but a few rounds fired from the recovered machine guns scared the troops off and the French officer surrendered!

Discovery of Japanese Submarine Crew.

On 1st June local

7 SA MOTORISED INFANTRY BRIGADE 7 MOTORISED BDE

1st City Regiment

Pretoria Highlanders

Pretoria Regiment

boat entered the harbour followed closely by a Japanese two man submarine using the torpedo boat’s entrance to the harbour as cover. The Japanese submarine managed to avoid all anti submarine obstacles and at 21h00 HMS Ramillies and HMS British Loyalty (a tank ship) were hit and damaged by torpedoes from the submarine.

At 23h00 another unidentified aircraft flew over the harbour.

Two corvettes were immediately deployed to search for the submarine.

A Sqn 1 SA Armoured Car Commando

Madagascans on the northern point of Madagascar reported that two Orientals had come from the sky and wanted water. A search party consisting of members of 5 Commando and a South African signaller were deployed to look for the two Japanese sailors. The search party eventually caught up with the enemy who opened fire on them with pistols. The 5 Commando men returned fire, killing both Japanese.

In the pocket of one of the Japanese sailors the commandos found a sketch 14

of the bay indicating the position of HMS Ramillies and a letter to the captain of submarine 20, the mother ship of the two man mini submarine.

HMS Ramillies was temporarily patched up and sent to Durban for more permanent repairs. On 17 June a British Lysander spotted another two man Japanese submarine on a coral reef but nothing came of this sighting.The attack on Diego Suarez harbour was the start of an offensive by the Japanese 4th Submarine Flotilla under the command of Rear Admiral Ishizaki.

The flotilla consisted of five large submarines, two of which were equipped with miniature submarines and two with aircraft. These submarines operated in the vicinity of Madagascar for two months and were responsible for sinking 35 ships comprising 150 000 tons of Allied shipping in this area alone. Other air activities took place over the next months. A “half way” air field was established at Issessy airfield ten km north of Ambilobe. A SAAF aircraft spotted the downed crew of a Albacore aircraft from the aircraft carrier HMS Indomitable who had crash-landed on the Comoros coral island of Ille Glorieuses and had been stranded with minimal food and water since the attack on Diego Suarez on 5th May. They were successfully rescued by a torpedo boat. On 22 June the Vichy French hijacked a Greek cargo vessel the Duchesne (8050 ton). A SAAF Maryland spotted the vessel in Mayotte harbour off the Comoros.

British naval ships were sent to recover the Greek vessel and in the process a mine sweeper got stuck on a reef. The vessel was taken back to Diego Suarez.

OPERATION THROAT On 30 June 1942 General Smuts and the British commander of the British Eastern Fleet planned an operation to capture the Vichy French islands of Mayotte, Pamanzi and Dzaodzi.

SAAF aircraft conducted air recces of the islands and surrounding reefs in preparation. The landing force comprised of an element of the Royal Marines, 5 Commando and a company of 5 King’s African Rifles (5 KAR). By 2nd July the islands had been captured with minimal resistance.

Coastal Patrols. A SAAF Beaufort spotted two unidentified submarines on the surface off Nossi Be island on 13th July.

The submarines immediately dived and made good their escape.

The Beaufort then strafed and destroyed a steam trawler which was with the submarines. On17th July information was received that German staff officers were to fly by amphibious aircraft to Tananarive (landing at Alaotra Lake). Air patrols did not pick up anything as the information was one day late!

One SAAF Beaufort of this search patrol crash landed in a river near Majunga. The crew survived to be captured by the Vichy French and taken to the town of Ambatolompy south of Tananarive.

They later escaped but were recaptured. Their second escape w a s s u c c e s s f u l , h o w e v e r.

Thereafter the SAAF contingent reorganised itself due to pressures in the Middle East. The Beaufort aircraft proved unreliable and this also contributed to the reorganisation of the SAAF 15

contingent.

Bde. 7 SA Bde consisted of 229 officers, 2291 white other ranks and 1686 non white auxiliary troops who embarked from Durban on 15th June 1942 in the troop carrying vessels Empire Woodlark, Empire Trooper, and MoretonBay. The journey to Diego Suarez took nine days by sea.

The ships transporting the South Africans formed part of convoy WS 19 going around the southern tip of Africa. The forward elements of 7 SA Bde arrived safely and disembarked to the welcoming music of one of the bands of the British units deployed on Madagascar and then moved to Camp des Sakaramy on the 25th June. By the end of June 7 SA Bde took over the extensive role of British 29 Independent Bde who had been tasked to defend the area south of Antsirana.

SOUTH AFRICAN GROUND REINFORCEMENTS ARRIVE

On the 7th April General Smuts offered a fully equipped motorised brigade for operational duty on Madagascar.

General Smuts was worried about the security of Madagascar as it could easily be used as a springboard for operations against Southern Africa by the Japanese. The German navy had been operating in southern waters since late 1940 and had been quite successful.

This situation could escalate and have dire consequences for South Africa and the strategic position it held on the southern tip of continental Africa.The only problem that arose was that South Africa required assistance to transport the brigade. This was agreed to by Churchill who arranged for Royal Navy ships to assist.

The threat emanated from the large (6000) Vichy French force that was The Brigade was named 7 Motorised estimated to be still at large as well as Infantry Brigade Group and was placed the strong possibility of an invasion under the command of Colonel(later by the Japanese. The main HQ and Brigadier) G.T.Senescall.

The support units remained in Sakaramy Brigade Group was allocated 571 protected by the First City Regt. The vehicles and three infantry battalions Pretoria Regt was based in nearby with support elements. The intention A n a m a k i a a n d t h e was for 7 SA Bde to replace British 17 PretoriaHighlanders at Mahagaga. A S q n 1 S A SA 7 MOT BDE Armoured Car Commando was sent out on ground reconnaissance to confirm if the Vichy French were advancing on the Allied positions as 88 Field Coy information had 2 Bde Sigs Coy SA Engineers recently indicated.

Bde Postal A bridgehead was 19 Field Ambulance Section 6 Field Regiment established over Mobile Dental Unit SA Artillery SAMC the Ifasi river 130 16

SA 7 MOT BDE

7 Bde “Q” Coy QSC “S” And “T” Field Park

9 Bde Workshop TSC

6 Bde Provost Unit SACMP

km south of Antsirana thus creating the most southern part of the Allied defensive area. Snipers regularly shot at the South Africans during this time.

At the same time recce patrols were sent along the east coast as far as Antalaha. Local Madagascans were most friendly towards the South Africans during the conduct of these tasks. An active and successful civic action operation was introduced with the specific purpose of obtaining the co-operation and respect of the local people. In turn they supplied accurate information.

white troops, however did get a bit upset when fully armed black soldiers of the KAR arrived from East Africa as part of 22 East African (EA) Bde. The South African non Cape Corps white troops were u n a r m e d .

However this did not develop into a major problem that could not be solved.

Planning was done to launch an amphibious landing to capture the harbour of Majunga to the south.

Due to the fact that 7SA Bde was not yet fully mobile General Smuts and the British commanders decided to deploy 29 Bde and 22 EA Bde for the task. The operations to be launched were code named Stream, Line and Jane. While this planning was being conducted the German Africa Corps captured Tobruk in North Africa and 2SA Div suffered losses and was captured. This blow forced a rethink in the deployment of forces in the Middle East and had a direct impact on the withdrawal of forces from Madagascar for other theatres.

However planning for operations Stream, Line and Jane was completed with the intention of commencing on the 9th September 1942.The operations were as follows:

Further Reinforcements. 22 East African Bde arrived to relieve British 13 Bde in June - July. 22 East African Bde consisted of the 1/1 KAR, 1/5 KAR and 1/6 KAR. From 18th August 7 SA Bde had taken over guard duties at Arrachart airfield and the protection of the harbour at Diego Suarez. The SA Engineers commenced with road repairs and elements of 6 Field Regt SAA commenced with the manning of some of the coastal batteries. The South Africans maintained high morale despite irregular postal deliveries and ration problems. They kept fit by way of conducting route marches and playing sport. The non

Operation Stream Occupation of Majunga harbour on the west coast. To commence on 9 September. Units - 29 Bde and 5 Commando under command of Brigadier F.W. Festing.

5 17

Commando was also to capture/occupy the harbours of Morondava and Tulear.

This operation was code-named Tamper.

SMLE rifle. Calibre .303 inch.

10 round box magazine.

Operation Line . Occupation of the capital Tananarive and capture of Nossi Be island.

To commence on 9 September. Units - 22 EA Bde with the SA Armoured Cars attached under overall command of Brigadier W.A. Dimoline. The capture of Nossi Be island was to be done by elements of 7 SA Bde and the Royal Marines.

Bren Light Machine Gun. Calibre .303 inch.

30 round box magazine.

Operation Esme Once Operation Line was successfully completed then this force was to advance into the central occupied parts of Madagascar.

Lewis Light Machine Gun. Calibre .303 inch.

47 round drum magazine.

Operation Jane.

Occupation of Tamatave harbour on the east coast. To commence on 18 September.

These operations were intended to neutralise the Vichy French forces on Madagascar.

The Vichy forces comprised of 10 000 troops of which approximately half were reservists.

They were deployed as follows:Tananarive - 5700.

Majunga - 800.

Tamatave and Brickaville - 1780.

Nossi Be Island - 20 French white reservists.

The rest were deployed in small detachments throughout Madagascar.

Most Vichy aircraft had been destroyed by the SAAF by now. However there was one bomber andtwo fighters at Ivato airfield at Tananarive. Rumour had it that there were another three bombers possibly still serviceable at the same airfield.

Vickers Medium Machine Gun. Calibre .303 inch. Belt fed water cooled MMG.

Sten Sub Machine Gun. Calibre 9 mm.

30 round magazine.

Thompson Sub Machine Gun. Calibre .45 inch. 25 round box magazine.

18

CONTINUED SOUTH AFRICAN ACTIONS

machine guns. Captain R. Struben, the commander of the force deployed a platoon into the village to occupy the administrative buildings on the island. By 08h00 all was o v e r.

The local French administrator (Chef de District) and the Vichy troops surrendered, having suffered only one fatal casualty.

SA Armoured cars supported British actions for Operation Line but the larger part of 7 SA Bde took an active part in the capture of the island of Nossi Be and then went on to take part in Operation Esme. Several columns were formed for the tasks that lay ahead.

GETCOL Capture of Nossi Be Island. Specific columns were formed to conduct operations. Each column was given a name and NOSCOL under the command of Captain A.B. Inglis was responsible for this specific task.

Nossi Be was approximately three hundred square kilometres in size and the main population concentration comprised a settlement of 6400 people at the harbour of Hellville.

The harbour was deep enough for large ships but the quay could only accommodate small vessels.

This column was formed at Sakaramy and Beramanja on the 9th September a battalion group supported by 16 Field Battery 25 pounders, 8 Marmon Harrington armoured cars, a field engineer squadron and 19 Field Ambulance.

The column had a totalof 180 vehicles for their task. GETCOL left for Beramanja at 20h00 on 9th September led by SA Engineers who were tasked to construct a bridge over theSiranana river to replace the one destroyed by the Vichy French.

By 11 September the column crossed this river and continued on its slow journey. The column was hampered by temporary road blocks constructed from cut down trees.

NOSCOL A contingent of Royal Marines were transported on the minesweeper HMS Manxman as at 02h00 on the 8th September, disembarked at Hellville and captured a sugar mill. Shortly after moving from the mill they found themselves in a swamp and came under machine gun fire.

Three marines were wounded and they were forced to withdraw.

The second large river to cross was the Ambazoana. This had already been identified as key terrain and on 30 August a company from First City Regt with attached signallers and medics was formed into SEACOL to prevent Vichy French troops from destroying the 60 metre bridge over the river. Their first task was to capture the small island of Nossi Mitsio to ensure that the Vichy French would not use it as a firm base from which to operate against the South Africans advancing southwards. They were transported

The 7 SA Bde elements of the Pretoria Highlanders were also transported by rowing boats towed by the same minesweeper. The South Africans arrived ashore at 02h45 under covering fire from the guns of HMS Manxman supported by their own

19

in six dhows and were successful in their mission. From there SEACOL was to get back onto the mainland and capture the bridge over the Ambazoana river ahead of the main advancing force.

This was also completed successfully.

camouflaged enemy machine gun positions. The enemy strength was approximately 100 Senegalese and Madagascan troops led by French officers and NCOs. One Frenchman was wounded and seventeen troops killed.

117 enemy troops were captured.

GETCOL relieved SEACOL on 11 September 1942 at the Ambazoana river.

As GETCOL continues southwards it found more destroyed bridges over the myriad of rivers Flowing west east into the Mozambique Channel and tree trunk blockades as well as a landmine on the route. This slowed the column down a great deal.

GETCOL reached Ambanja situated on the banks of the Sambiramo river; the largest town between Ansirana in the north and Majunga on the west coast to the south and found the local Chef de District cooperative. The 200 metre bridge was repaired and the entire column continued once again encountering the odd bit of sniper fire.

A platoon of Pretoria Highlanders and the Royal Marines were landed byHMS Manxman on the 15th September to the rear of the Vichy forces in an attempt to get them to could speak fluent French was pu make contact.

This did not materialise and GETCOL was able to make good progress in their advance despite many bridges having been destroyed and tank ditches being dug across the roads.

GETCOL met up with a column from Majunga (Operation Stream had been successfully completed by 29 British Bde) and thus cleared the Ansirana Majunga road.

The Battle at Jojahely. A motorcycle platoon was sent ahead as a recce party on 15th September and 12 km south of the Jangoa river at Jojahely, met with fierce Vichy resistance. The local Vichy representative made contact with the South Africans to arrange a temporary cease fire. Instructions from Tananarive were to fight to the last man and the fight continued. The South Africans came under machine gun fire but continued. That night an engineer officer went on a recce and detonated a booby trap. He was never seen again! The Vichy had prepared defensive positions in this area and had planted many booby traps. Contact was made with the Vichy and South African artillery was brought up and fired 120 rounds on the well

VOLCOL ACTIONS. This small South African force of armoured cars, and elements of the Pretoria Regt and supporting signallers and medics successfully got through to Antalaha on the east coast and secured the town and harbour without mishap.

Operation Tamper. This operation was launched on 10 September from

Bren Gun carrier. Section vehicle armed with a 303 inch Bren Gun 20

OPERATION STREAM

Morondava harbour some 500 km south of Majunga.

The force comprised of 50 members of British 5 Commando on board HMAS Napier.

On 10 September Operation Stream Commenced. The purpose was to c a p t u r e Majunga on 22 EAST AFRICAN BDE BADGES the west coast.

29 Indep Bde with the South A f r i c a n armoured car Shoulder Title squadron Ist Bn u n d e r Supply and Transport King’s African Rifles command of King’s African Rifles M a j o r F. W. Vos in support embarked for Driver Mombasa in Kenya from Light Diego Suarez Artificer Machine Gunner Marksman o n 2 3 r d August. The purpose was to No resistance was met and the French conduct manoeuvres in preparation governor was arrested. As part of a for the forthcoming operation.

In deception plan a British sergeant whot Mombasa the armoured cars were ashore in a French colonels uniform. prepared for amphibious landings.

He made a phone call to the Major Vos attended the final authorities in Tananarive on behalf of planning session and was informed the local authorities stating that a that he armoured car squadron was large British force had landed nearby. given the responsibility of capturing The answer from Antatanarive was the Kamoro and Betsiboka bridges that no assistance could be expected between Majunga and Tananarive. from the capital. This was just what the Allies wanted to know! From there 5 Commando troops withdrew.

The force left Mombasa on 5th September 1942. Major Dawson, commander of B Coy 1/1 KAR was made commander of a composite force including the SA Armoured Car Squadron and support troops and was given the task to lead the attack with 29 Bde, all of whom were to conduct an amphibious landing to capture Majunga.

The maritime component consisted of 49 ships including an aircraft carrier and formed up

Marmon Herrington Mk III armoured car armed with a Vickers 303 mchine gun.

A Sqn SA Armoured Car Commando 21

OPERATION LINE

approximately 150 km from Majunga.

The South Africans were to land on Red Beach. They got into their landing craft at 05h30 after quite a delay in the timings and then went in to land on the beaches. Difficulties were experienced with the speedy landing of the South African armoured cars due to the fact that the planners of the operation had not done their appreciations in depth but these were eventually overcame.

From Majunga the force was to advance on the capital Tananarive 575 km away. This was allocated to 22 East African Bde, to which the South African Armoured Cars were attached. The delay in landing the South African armoured cars protracted the schedule of the advance. The route was along a tarred road with well constructed bridges over the many rivers flowing to the coast. Two suspension bridges over the Kamoro and Betsiboka Rivers were of key importance in the advance. Due to this reason a troop of the South African armoured cars under command of Major Dawson was sent ahead to secure them. The bridge over the Kamoro was reached at 16h00 on the 10th September and was found intact. Minimal resistance from the protection element was quickly dealt with. By 06h00 the Betsiboka bridge was reached. The South Africans found that it had been partly sabotaged.

Elements of 29 Bde including the Royal Welsh Fusiliers and East Lancashires followed by 29 Bde HQ landed on Red Beach. Their task was to flank the coastal battery and attack the town. Elements of 5 Commando and the South Lancashires landed on Green Beach directly west of the town at 05h18.

Slight resistance was encountered from the enemy. While the amphibious landing and first attacks took place, aircraft from the aircraft carrier gave air support. The British troops carried red umbrellas as a recognition sign for their own aircraft!!

This was not really a surprise as even the local radio stations had commented on the strategic importance of the bridge to the Vichy in the defence of the capital. The bridge was defended and comprised three sections spanning the river and using islands as anchors for the pillars.

The central suspension bridge section had been damaged. At 07h30 a French Potez 631 bomber aircraft flew over the South African defensive positions overlooking the bridge sections and dropped six bombs. Major Dawson requested air support by radio and a Fulmar aircraft was sent to intervene. However the French aircraft had already gone.

The landing and attack was a complete surprise for the Vichy French. By 06h05 the airfield was captured and by 06h33 the military barracks and local post office were also in Allied hands.

The Vichy French senior officers surrendered. They marched towards the Allied forces with a white sheet tied to a broom as a token of surrender.

29 Bde suffered only 20 casualties in the process. One of the major reasons for the low number of casualties was the fact that most of the French forces had been deployed in the vicinity of Ta n a n a r i v e a n d t h e F r e n c h commander at Majunga had been caught totally unawares.

22

cars came under fire and infantry were sent forward to recce the situation.

A section were sent over the river under close fire support from the armoured cars to create a mini bridgehead. A couple of KAR troops were wounded in the process.

Two more sections were sent over but came under effective machine gun and small arms fire. A platoon under command of Lt R.K.J Fraser was ordered to occupy the enemy’s right flank. The enemy strength

After this incident a KAR platoon commenced with a crossing over the bridge already gone.

After this incident a KAR platoon commenced with a crossing over the bridge sections.

A bridgehead was established on the far bank after a few skirmishes with the enemy using machine guns and mortars. Ten enemy were killed and six KAR members were wounded.

Forty prisoners were captured.

The Vichy then began a general withdrawal, burning huts as they went.

The Allies then got their armoured cars and the rest of the main force over the river and continued with a follow up. An element was left at the bridge to secure it. That night Sir Winston Churchill made a national radio broadcast explaining the good successes made, thus emphasising the importance of the campaign on Madagascar for the Allies. From there 29 Bde advanced further southwards to a pont over the Ikopa river near Maevatanana. Further resistance was encountered and with armoured support the infantry cleared the way forward. A petrol depot at this town was blown up and caused some consternation amongst the locals. In proceeding the force encountered more temporary road blocks which were removed.

Slouch hat of 1st Bn KAR

Beret of the Royal Marines

Universal steel helmet

On 14th September the vanguard reached the town of Andriba. Later the rest of the main force arrived and the next leg of the advance started towards Fihaonana on 16th September. Approximately 16 km from Andriba the forward elements came upon the sabotaged and damaged bridge over the Mamokamita river. The armoured

Forage cap of the RAF

Forage cap of the Royal Signals 23

was underestimated and further fighting continued. Fraser and three KAR troops were killed. Eight others were wounded as was another officer.

Sgt Odilo of the KAR took over command, flanked the enemy position and captured it. He was awarded the Military Medal for gallantry for his actions. 22 Vichy soldiers were killed in the entire action.

the companies were able to deliver small arms fire on an artillery position. The Vichy destroyed a 75mm gun as they could not save it and then withdrew.

The KAR suffered one soldier killed and five wounded. By the next morning 22 September the armoured cars continued leading the advance. Road barricades were encountered along the route southwards. While clearing on of the barricades Sgt Smith came under artillery fire from close by! An infantry attack supported by armoured cars was launched. On troop carrier was hit by artillery fire.

Allied artillery supported by two Lysander air observation aircraft gave support. This effectively neutralised the enemy which consisted of three companies of the Vichy French 1st Bn “de Marche� and artillery support in the form of 2 x 65mm guns, 1 x 75mm gun, 2 x 80mm guns and 1 x 37mm gun from an unserviceable tank.

Eventually the Allied force had Mahitsy securely under its control.

Ten French, twelve Senegalese and eighteen Madagascans were captured by the Allies.

The force again advanced and in the vicinity of the Manankazo river another contact developed. Mortar and machine gun fire persuaded the Vichy to withdraw and the advance continued. Further bridges were found destroyed and this with temporary roadblocks delayed the advance somewhat. Eventually the Allied force reached the bridge at Fihaonana. By the 21st September the force was on its way again.

The Battle of Mahitsy. Three km north of the town of Mahitsy the Allies came up against heavy resistance from the Vichy who were using the high ground and hills to effect. They opened fire with an artillery bombardment using 75mm guns. An Allied infantry company moved forward supported by the SA armoured cars which gave covering fire. The advancing infantry (KAR) was pinned down by enemy fire for a while, during which time the armoured cars continued fighting and also collected as much information on the Vichy French positions as possible.

Advance to Tananarive. The Allied force then began their advance on the capital on 23rd September. The defensive position at the village of Ambohidratrimo was outflanked and a short skirmish put paid to any resistance. Several POWs were taken and 2 x 80mm guns neutralised.

Amongst the prisoners was the local District Chief who indicated that a group of government officials from the capital wanted to meet with the Allies.

Brigadier Dimoline, Brigadier Lush and General Platt’s political advisor met the Vichy French contingent.

The Vichy French declared Tananarive an open city but

A night attack by three KAR infantry companies was launched against the Vichy positions in the hills. Veld fires contributed to lighting up the battlefield. During the attack one of 24

refused to surrender the entire island.

Two KAR infantry companies accompanied by a South African armoured car squadron each were ordered to enter the city. On doing so 68 officers, 230 French and 280 colonial troops were taken prisoner. The rest of the Vichy forces withdrew to the south of Madagascar. The artillery barracks were occupied by the Allies.

The advance over 575 kilometres took 13 days to complete. General Smuts sent General Platt a telegram of congratulations on the successful completion of the operation.

However the Vichy had not yet surrendered the entire island and it was important to stop any further Vichy resistance.

Once ashore 29 Bde then used the road and rail line to move inland to Brickaville village to the south.

From there rail movement was restricted due to the destruction of two rail bridges and the troops then continued on foot. Recce parties soon discovered that there were many barricades over the main road to Tananarive for some 200 km.

These were cleared by the troops by 22 September. In the mean while Tananarive was occupied on 23 September and an armoured car troop and an infantry company were deployed from Tananarive to Tamatave to link up with 29 Bde. This small force met with 29 Bde elements at Moramanga. On 26 September general Platt set up his headquarters in Tananarive.

T H E F I N A L E F F O RT S T O CAPTURE MADAGASCAR

The Allied advance further southwards from Tananarive was continuing. An operation was then planned by the Allies to occupy the rest of Madagascar. The operation was codenamed Rose and the leading elements to take part was SA 7 Bde. Lt Col Engelbrecht was ordered to report aboard the British cruiser HMS Birmingham in Diego Suarez. He attended an order group of general Platt and other senior commanders. Orders were given to the Pretoria Highlanders to form a grouping known as ENCOL (Engelbrecht’s Colony) and were to capture Tulear, its harbour, airfield and radio station with the Royal Navy in support. The naval vessels allocated for the operation were the Empire Pride troop ship, HMS Inconstant, HMAS Napier.

(Australian vessel), HMNS Vangalen. (Netherlands vessel), and the Gascony.

Operation Jane.

Capture of Tamatave. The operation to capture the east coast harbour town of Tamatave was planned for the 18th September 1942.

Three naval cruisers, torpedo boats, mine sweepers and an aircraft carrier as well as the flag ship HMS Warspite were available for the operation and deployed off the harbour in a show of force on the 18th September.

Wireless messages were sent to the Vi c h y F r e n c h i n Ta m a t v e encouraging them to surrender or a naval bombardment would commence. The Vichy requested a very short postponement while they deliberated. It took three minutes for a white flag to appear! Allied troops of British 29 Bde landed in the harbour and no resistance was met. The harbour was found to be better than the one at Majunga and all equipment was disembarked easily.

25

The Pretoria Highlanders were embarked in the troop ship Empire Pride and were accompanied by the cruiser HMS Birmingham and two torpedo boats. ENCOL comprised a force of 24 officers and 297 men with elements from the Bde Sigs Coy, Second Echelon, 88 Field Coy, 19 Field Ambulance and the Bde Workshops.

This force was to be supported by 84 Royal Marines who were placed under command.

Tulear was lightly defended by approximately 210 Vichy Madagascan troops with no known artillery or air support.

Kepi of a French Colonial Major

The shallow waters of the area forced the offloading of all equipment at the piers of the harbour. The town and its facilities were to be captured intact and minimal force was the order of the day.

In fact the orders to the troops were on the lines of - “The correct attitude to adopt is that of a London policeman. It is our duty to create good feeling�.

Orders were also to shoot looters on sight.

French Casque Adrian helmet.

Standard issue for all French forces

a platoon of the Pretoria Regt captured the radio station intact at 09h00. Another platoon advanced to the military barracks and captured a Vichy French officer Lieutenant Voisin and thirty three men. The police station was also captured and the policemen captured. The Royal Marines then occupied the town.

Lt Col Engelbrecht met with Vichy French officials and explained that Tulear had been occupied and not annexed. The French flag was lowered and the South African flag raised. Directly afterwards the French flag was raised again alongside the South African flag. No damage was done to any of the infrastructure. Not one round had been fired during the operation.

The Plan. One platoon of A Coy Pretoria Regt was to make a tactical Landing and establish a bridgehead and capture the radio station. This would then be followed by the rest of A Coy who, in turn would be followed by B Coy and the Royal Marines. Once the town had been cleared of resistance then a small force would advance one hundred km to Sakaraha and capture the radio station there. British Walrus aircraft were to conduct recce flights to obtain information on terrain and enemy positions.

Information indicated that a group of approximately 200 Vichy French troops had moved inland and others had gone to Ihosy. A local resident gave out information that the Vichy French had stored petrol at the

The convoy of Allied ships entered the harbour at 06h30. Troops were put ashore on the beaches with landing boats. A bridgehead was established as per plan and while it was being secured 26

abattoir on the outskirts of town.

17289 litres were recovered. Another patrol went to St Augustin where nine soldiers were alleged to be hiding.

The soldiers were not found and there was no resistance at all their weapons had been left in the safekeeping of an American missionary by the name of Rossing.

engine French aircraft was shot at by ground forces. There were rumours that it eventually crashed but no evidence of this was found. The South African contingent remained for some time conducting patrols and routine guard duties. They assisted the local population with minor humanitarian aid type tasks.

ENCOL was renamed and became known as “Troops in Tulear” on 25 October. On 31 October “Troops in Tulear” were relieved by a battalion of the KAR. The South African force redeployed to Ihosy where they took part in a parade and from there returned to Diego Suarez.

Other patrols were conducted over the next few days and a few Madagascan soldiers were taken prisoner and a 1879 dated 80mm gun and a few rounds of ammunition was recovered.

The occupation of Tulear was completed well within the time allocated. 54 prisoners of war were taken in total. 180 rifles and a large quantity of ammunition was recovered.

Thus completed Operation Rose. Admiral Tennant sent a message to General Smuts which stated - “I have just had the good fortune to lead a combined operation made up exclusively of SA troops and the Royal Navy. This is probably the first time this has happened in history. I would like to say how much we appreciated working with the soldiers of the Union. We have been impressed with their quiet efficiency and determination and we look forward to further combined operations with them. With a little more practice we will make them completely webb footed. I would like also to mention that over 100 men of the ships company of my flagship come from South Africa and all have been impressed with the readiness and keenness with which they have become sailors”.

While the South Africans were returning to Diego Suarez the Third Combat Group of the Allies, consisting of the 6th Bn KAR were deployed in the Vicinity of Tananarive towards Antsirabe.

Contact was made with the enemy in the vicinity ofBehenju where the enemy had prepared three defensive positions.

The attached South African armoured cars under the command of Major Vos were in support.

After an artillery bombardment delayed the KAR they were able to continue. The route was blocked by a miriad of barricades and these were lifted as the column progressed.

Ambatolampy was reached on 28 September.

On 30 September the Allied column came upon an enemy position at Sambiana. The access route had been blockaded and while the troops were clearing them a Vichy French aircraft strafed their positions. One KAR man was lightly wounded in the process. Sappers lifted the occasional mine which had been

On 1 October three unidentified aircraft flew over the general Tulear area and on 10 October a single 27

laid and two companies made a left October the Second Combat Group flanking turn to continue towards (with all the armoured cars) was then Sambiana village. given the task to advance on the town of Ambositra. Several blockades Once in open ground near the railway were lifted and the Combat Group station the two companies came under were ambushed once in the process. mortar attack and machine gun fire. Two KAR askaris were killed and One British officer was killed and five eight wounded. Later that day at KAR Askaris wounded in this 15h00 the Combat Group came under skirmish. The enemy then withdrew fire again. This resistance was dealt southwards. On 2 October the column with quickly. reached Ansirabe.

The Battle of Antonjona. The next On 3 October information of a force of day saw further actions taking place Vichy French troops under the again. The Combat Group was command of commandant Machefaux ambushed at a distance of 70 metres was received. An ambush was laid for by a concealed 65mm gun. It scored a them by a troop of South African direct hit on one of the leading South armoured cars and a KAR infantry African armoured cars. Three KAR company. The French recce element askaris were killed and a KAR officer entered the ambush at midnight and by the name of Lt Williamson was edgy KAR troops opened fire badly wounded. A second armoured prematurely. Two prisoners were car was also directly hit. Lt Meyer t a k e n b u t t h e Vi c h y F r e n c h and the driver of the hit armoured car disappeared into the night. were also wounded.

The third A follow up produced only Machefaux occupant of the armoured car Trooper briefcase with valuable maps and his F.B. Joubert jumped out of the diary as well as a two way radio and a damaged vehicle as the Vichy French message pad. The next day a recce of fire intensified and another transport the area to the east was done. This force vehicles were hit. The remaining was strafed by a Vichy French aircraft a r m o u r e d c a r s r e t u r n e d f i r e but there were no casualties. On 9 effectively. Trooper Joubert then

French 7,5mm MAS 36 rifle.

5 round fixed box magazine

French 7,5mm Chtellerault 24/29 light machine gun.

26 round box magazine 28

dragged Lt Williamson into a ditch parallel with the road. He then went to the assistance of Lt Meyer and also got him into the same ditch. Once that had been accomplished he ran back to the armoured car to get the first aid box to treat the two wounded officers.

From there he returned to the armoured car to radio the current positions of the concealed Vichy French gun. In this process he was lightly wounded himself.

An armoured car then opened fire with its machine gun and temporarily neutralised the Vichy French gun until the armoured car ran out of ammunition. A sergeant then stormed the concealed gun and took the crew prisoner. The enemy position was then cleared up. Trooper Joubert was awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal for bravery and the sergeant was awarded the Military Medal.

minimal and approximately a hundred POWs were taken. They included a major. The total Vichy French losses included approximately 250 POWs. Occupation of Ambositra. A KAR company occupied Ambositra on the morning of 14 October. A destroyed bridge was repaired by sappers during the night to allow the advancing troops to reach Ambositra by the 15thOctober.

While here the armoured cars were given the opportunity to be cleaned and maintained for further operations. On the 17th October contact was made with the enemy and a transport vehicle suffered a direct hit from an enemy 65mm gun.

Attack on Enemy Main Position at Antonjona. Five Vichy Frenchmen were captured and the advance continued. By late afternoon on 13 October more Vichy French positions were encountered at Antonjona. A KAR company attacked but was pushed back. One British officer and three KAR askaris were killed and several Vichy French troops were captured. Later on a contingent of 5 Commando joined the column as reinforcements to assist with the attack on the enemy main position.

5 Commando deployed eastwards and the KAR company deployed westwards.

The Battle at Andriamanalia. The Vichy French had prepared a very strong U shaped defensive position at Andriamanalia over a distance of approximately ten km using the mountains to good advantage.

Brigadier Dimoline, the Allied commander now had the opportunity to deliver a crushing blow against the Vichy French as the majority of the remaining enemy forces had been concentrated here.

The main attack would take place from the north at the same time thus completing the pincer movement.

The main force was supported by South African armoured cars and three artillery batteries from Ambositra.

The South African armoured cars under command of Major Vos advanced; preceded by an artillery bombardment. The bombardment was lifted at 17h25 and the infantry went in. Vichy French resistance was

At 03h00 in rainy weather the armoured cars started their advance.

At zero hour the artillery commenced with a twenty minute bombardment of the enemy positions. As the armoured cars 29

While the Third Combat Group was advancing along the one road to Fianarantsoa the Second Combat Group was advancing on the other.

Rain hampered progress in the advance. Where the two roads joined was a Vichy French position.

Whenthe Allies reached this junction on the 27th September they attacked the enemy, killing seventeen and wounding seven. Five KAR men were wounded in the attack. The next morning saw the capture of Vichy French Colonel Tricoire at Alakamisy. He refused to order the Vichy French position at Mandalahy to surrender. The Second Combat Group then attacked it (at 09h00 on the 28th September) while the Third Combat Group gave support. The armoured cars came under fire which Was returned. An infantry platoon was ordered to clear up the machine gun nests after an artillery bombardment of the enemy positions.

advanced they encountered a bridge which had been blockaded. The delay in clearing the barricade was exacerbated by enemy machine gun nests opening fire on the troops clearing the barricade.

The rest of the attack was precisely carried out and by 09h30 the Vichy French had given up the will to fight.

Positions were consolidated and the next morning the South African armoured cars were ordered to advance to Fianaransoa as part of the advance guard of the Third Combat Group. At 18h00 the armoured cars reached the village of Ambalamanakana having captured an intact 37mm AT gun and ammunition.

At this village the armoured cars came under very inaccurate fire. An infantry platoon was sent ahead and they cleared the area and captured another 37mm AT gun. At one stop to clear barricades a British soldier wandered into the bush and stumbled onto a Vichy French position. He was taken prisoner and sent to Ambalavao where he was found later by the Allied forces. On the morning of the 29 t h September the South African Contact with the Vichy French in the armoured cars advanced with the Vicinity of Fianarantsoa. Very slow intention of clearing blockades and progress was made in the advance to then occupying a position on Fianarantsoa. Many blockades had to dominating high ground.

An be removed. On the 25th September a r t i l l e r y b o m b a r d m e n t w a s Ambohimahasoa was reached. On the delivered on the enemy’s western outskirts of the village at abridge the positions but because of poor column came under machine gun and visibility in the rain the infantry sniper fire. Two enemy positions were attacked the eastern positions. cleared by the infantry under cover of Several POWs were captured and armoured car fire. Later another halt the enemy positions were cleared. was called for in order to repair a The next day the Allied forces bridge. Askaris took the opportunity regrouped and checked equipment. to wash in the river but came under fire from the enemy. The enemy fire was While this battle took place effectively dealt with by the armoured approximately 800 enemy soldiers cars. were taken POW at Mandalahy and a 30

company of the KAR were transported by rail to the harbour town of Manakara which was captured without resistance.

The Second Combat Group was supported by 88 Field Company of the SAEC under command of Lt Drummond in repairing bridges on their route of advance.

On 1 s t November the advance continued with the Second Combat Group in the lead. They encountered several road barricades which were removed. The next day Lt Evans of the KAR was shot and killed by a sniper.

Heavy rain hampered patrols but at the village of Talata Ampana captured seventy enemy soldiers hiding in the local church. As the advancing South African armoured cars travelling in heavy rain reached the valley near Uatoava village they came under heavy mortar and machine gun fire. Artillery support was called in and the Vichy French positions were bombarded.

The Vichy French General Staff gave the order to stop fighting and on 5th November a delegation led by Commandant Bernasconi met the Allied forces at Ambalavao handed over a request by General Guillemet for a cease fire. Conditions for the cease fire were agreed upon and at one minute after midnight on 6th November 1942 it came into effect.

Clean up operations with the assistance of the local Madagascans then took place to restore the road network and the South Africans as well as 22 East African Bde withdrew to Durban for further deployment to North Africa and the Far East respectively.

WAR IN THE INDIAN OCEAN The valuable maritime route around the southern tip of Africa attracted the attention of the Axis forces.

They fully realised the strategic value of the region and the position of Madagascar. Madagascar is an ideal stepping stone to southern Africa. It allows for a naval strike force to operate in the southern Indian and Atlantic oceans against maritime convoys from Europe, whether they pass around the Cape of Good Hope or through the Suez Canal.

This advantage inevitably allowed for an extensive sea war to develop in an effort to destroy the Allies sustainment of operations in both the Middle East and the Far East.

German raiders and submarines as well as their Italian and Japanese counterparts sent flotillas to the southern Atlantic Ocean and the Indian Ocean to sink Allied ships.

Within a short space of time the South African Navy and Air Force were put to the test. Coastal patrols operating from the Natal north coast near St Lucia as well as from Durban and other air strips were the order of t h e d a y.

Maritime air reconnaissance patrolled the Southern African waters constantly.

Naval vessels conducted counter mine operations and ensured that South African harbours were kept free of mines. SAAF air sea rescue units were on standby and were responsible for rescuing downed air crews when needed.

This naval activity was a concerted effort to disrupt the Allied war effort in the Far East. It was also intended to place pressure on the Allies to

31

force them to divert their precious and limited military resources to South Africa to protect the routes to the Middle East and the Far East as the war with Japan intensified.

Shipping Sunk and Damaged off the Coast of Madagascar and in the Mozambique Channel. Both the German and Japanese navies deployed submarines and armed raiders in this vicinity in order to disrupt or destroy Allied shipping to the Far East and along the east coast of Africa. The following tables refer: Sunk directly south of Madagascar Date 27/8/40 27/8/40 27/8/40 10/7/43 17/8/43

Name - Tonnage Filefjell - 7617 British - 6901 Commander Norvinen - 5008 Alice F Palmer - 7176 Empire Stanley - 6921 (damaged only)

Origin Norway Britain

Lat/Long 29 38s. 4511e 29 30s. 46 06e

How Sunk German raider German raider

Norway USA Britain

30 08s. 46 15e 26 22s. 4352e 27 12s. 47 25e

German raider German sub G e r m a n s u b

25 20s.

28 52s.

27 21s.

22 05s.

21 00s.

52 17e 52 51e 53 30e 08 05w 50 50e

German raider German raider German raider German sub G e r m a n s u b

22 36s.

21 40s.

24 54s.

23 00s.

51 30e 57 15e 48 35e 53 11e

Sunk directly east of Madagascar 12/9/40 Benavon - 5872 Britain 29/11/42 Swokla - 5887 USA 7/12/42 Eugenie Livanos - 4816 Greek 8/2/43 Roger B Stanley- 7191 USA 27/6/43 Sebastion Seratino - 7194 USA (damaged only) 16/7/43 Fort Franklin - 7135 British 29/7/43 Cornish City - 4952 Britain 5/8/43 Efthala Mari - 4195 Greek 12/8/43 Dan Macarthur - 10528 British

German sub German sub German sub German sub

Note: At least three ships were sunk by German submarines off Mauritius Island Sunk directly west of Madagascar in the Mozambique Channel 5/6/42 Elysia - 6757 Britain 27 33s. 37 05e 5/6/42 Melvin M Baker - 4998 USA 21 44s. 36 39e 5/6/42 Atlantic - 2639 Panama 21 03s. 38 03 e 5/6/42 Johnstown 5085 Panama 13 12s. 42 06e 6/6/42 Wilford - 2158 Norway 2020s. 36 41e 6/6/42 Susan - 3089 15 42s. 40 58e 8/6/42 Agios Goergio - 4847 Greece 16 12s. 41 00e 11/6/42 Mahronda - 7926 Britain 14 37s. 40 58e 11/6/42 Hellenic Trader - 2052 Panama 14 40s. 40 53e 2/6/42 Clifton Hall - 5063 Britain 15 25s. 40 10e 12/6/42 Supetar - 3148 21 49s. 35 50e 20/6/42 Queen Victoria - 493 Britain 21 15s. 40 30e 29/6/42 Goviken - 4854 Norway 13 25s. 41 13e 30/6/42 Express - 5136 USA 23 30s. 31 30e 1/7/42 De Weert - 1805 Dutch 25 12s. 35 36e 6/7/42 Nymphe - 4504 Greek 15 48s. 40 42e 8/7/42 Wartismere - 5458 Britain 18 00s. 41 22e 10/3/43 Richard D Spaight - 7111 USA 25 30s. 40 10e 4/7/43 Michael Livanos - 4174 Greek 22 40s. 36 50e 4/7/43 Breiviken - 2669 Norway 21 54s. 31 30e 11/7/43 Mary Livanos - 4111 Greek 22 40s. 40 50e 32

Jap raider Japanese sub Japanese sub Japanese sub Japanese sub Japanese sub Japanese sub Japanese sub Japanese sub Japanese sub Japanese sub Japanese sub Japanese sub Japanese sub Japanese sub Japanese sub Japanese sub German sub German sub German sub German sub

14/7/43 17/7/43 23/7/43 2/8/43 ` 23/10/43 5/8/44 18/8/44 19/8/44

Robert Bacon - 2191 City of Canton - 6692 Pegasus - 9583 City of Oran - 7323 Faneromeni - 3404 Empire City - 7295 Nairung - 5414 Wayfarer - 5064

USA Britain Sweden Britain Greek Britain Britain Britain

15 48s. 41 10e 13 40s. 41 40e 28 05s. 37 40e 13 31s. 41 17e 16 21s. 40 04e 11 33s. 41 25e 15s. 42e 14 30s. 42 20e

German sub German sub German sub German sub Japanese sub German sub German sub German sub

The Italian built German crewed U22 submarine was sunk off the south of Cape Town at approximately 42S. 17E on 11/3/1944 and the German U179 was sunk off Saldanha Bay on 8/10/1942.

Sunk directly north of Madagascar in the vicinity of Diego Suarez 5/5/42 HMS Auricula 30/5/42 HMS Ramillies damaged only 30/5/42 British Loyalty damaged only

Britain Britain

12 17s. 49 00e French mine Diego Suarez harbour Japanese sub

Britain

Diego Suarez harbour Japanese sub

Other Shipping that was Sunk in the Madagascar Area. Approximately 24 ships were sunk in the vicinity of Lorenco Marques (Maputo). German submarines were responsible for all but two. One was sunk by a Japanese submarine and one by a German raider. These have not been listed in this document. There were also approximately 33 ships sunk and 3 ships damaged

by German submarines off the coast of South Africa between Mossel Bay and the Natal - Mozambique border.

The German submarine groups operated in conjunction with ten armed raiders which were relatively successful in attacking and sinking Allied shipping in the southern oceans. Ship 16, the Atlantis, was responsible for the sinking of 22 Allied vessels and held this record for this theatre of operations until the end of the war. All of these vessels were supported by a number of supply ships and fuel tankers which made rendezvous in the middle of the Indian Ocean to provide vittles and fuel as well as to give the submariners a short respite from the cramped quarters of their boats.

German vessels known to have deployed off the southern African coast and Madagascar (per deployment group Group

Boat no / type U68 (IX C)

Time at sea Ships sunk / damaged 1/9/41 - 23/12/41 2

U68 (1X C) U159 (IX C) U172 ( IX C) U504 (IX C) U179 (IX D 2) U178 (IX D2) U181 (IX D2) U177 (IX D2)

20/8/42 - 6/12/42 24/8/42 - 5/1/43 19/8/42 - 27/12/42 19/8/42 - 11/12/42 15/8/42 - 8/10/42 (sunk) 8/9/42 - 9/1/43 12/9/42 - 18/1/43 17/9/42 - 22/1/43

6 8 6 8 0 7 11 7

U506 (IX C) U516 (IX C) U182 (IX D2) U160 (UX C) U509 (IX C) U180 (IX D1) U195 (IX D 1) U181 (IX D 2) U177 (IX D2) U178 (IX D2) U198 (IX D2) U196 (IX D2) U197 (IX D2) U511 (IX C)

14/12/42 - 8/5/43 23/12/42 - 3/5/43 9/12/42 - 16/5/43 (sunk) 6/1/43 - 10/5/43 23/12/43 - 11/5/43 9/2/43 - 2/7/43 20/3/43 - 23/7/43 23/3/43 - 14/10/43 1/4/43 - 1/10/43 28/3/43 - 29/8/43 9/3/43 - 25/9/43 16/3/43 - 20/10/43 3/4/43 - 7/8/43 10/5/43 - 7/8/43

2 4 3 8 2 2 1 3 5 6 6 2 3 1

U532 (IX C) U852 (IX D2) U198 (IX D 2) U861 (IX D2) U862 (IX D2)

9/1/44 - 10/5/45 18/1/44 - 3/5/44 20/4/44 - 12/8/44 20/4/44 - 22/9/44 8/6/44 - 10/9/44

1 1 2 2 4

Eisbar

Seehund

(sunk off Sumatra 1944) (sunk off St Lucia) (went to Japan)

Monsun (went to Liverpool) (sunk off Horn of Africa) (sunk NNW off Seychelles)

I16

Japanese I class submarine. This submarine carried a small seaplane used for reconnaissance and participated in operations in the Indian Ocean off Madagascar and South Africa.

33

ARMED RAIDERS WHICH DEPLOYED IN THE SOUTHERN OCEANS NAME Atlantis

DEPL 31/3/40 - 22/11/41

SHIPS SUNK 22

Orion Widder Thor 4/4/41

6/4/40 - 23/8/41 6/5/40 - 31/10/41 6/6/40 - 30/4/41

6 + 7shares 10 11

14/1/42 - 9/10/42 15/6//40 - 8/5/41

10 RTU Germany 9/10/42 17 + 11 whalers Sunk by HMS Cornwall 8/5/41 3 + 7 shares Sunk in English

Pinguin Komet Channel

3/7/40 - 30/11/41

Kormoran 3/12/40 - 19/11/41

11

Michel

14

Stier

13/3/42 - 1/3/43 21/4/43 - 17/10/43 12/5/42 - 27/9/42

4

Togo

unknown

unknown

Other ranks cap insignia German Navy mustering badges

Line

Sickberth

Gunnery Artificer

COMMENT Sunk by HMS Devonshire on 22/11/41 RTU Bordeaux 23/8/41 RTU Brest 3/10/40 Sank HMS Voltaire

4/10/42 Sunk by HMAS Sydney; also sank in the action Sunk by US sub Tarpon Yokohama 17/10/43 Sunk by US Liberty ship Stephen Hopkins which also sank 27/9/42 RTU Germany and damaged by RAF in English Channel

Chest eagle Tropical uniforms

Torpedo Artificer

Officers cap insignia

Gunnery

Submarine Combat Badge

Class IX German submarine U159, belonging to Eisbar Group 34

Telegraphist

GERMAN SUBMARINE DETAILS The German Navy operated three types of submarine off the southern African coast and Madagascar. Their details are: U IX C Crew - 48.

Range at 12 knots - 11000 m surfaced 1120 Cubic Metre tonnage.

Speed submerged - 7,3 knots.

Surface speed - 18,2 knots.

U IX D 1 Crew - 57.

Range at 12 knots - 9900 m surfaced 1610 Cubic Metre tonnage.

Speed submerged - 6,9 knots.

Surface speed - 16,5 knots.

U IX D 2 Crew - 57.

Range at 12 knots - 23700 m surfaced 1616 Cubic Metre tonnage.

Speed submerged - 6,9 knots.

Surface speed - 19,2 knots.

Armament for all Three Submarine Types 6 x tubes.

1 x 105 mm gun.

1 x 37 mm AA gun and 1 x 20 mm AA gun.

Medals for Bravery and for Service

British Military Cross for bravery

British Africa Star for service

French French Medaille Militaire Oriental Medal for bravery for service 35

German German Iron Cross War Merit Class II Cross Class II for bravery for merit

INDEX Aircraft Bristol Beaufort Martin Maryland Nakajima 93 Potez 631 Westland Lysander

10, 12, 14 10, 13, 14 12 11, 12 11, 12, 13

Allied Plan

2

Diego Suarez

3, 4, 9,

Formations 5 Division 5 Commando 7 SA Motorised Inf Bde 13 Bde 17 Bde 19 Bde 29 Indep Bde 22 East African Bde

6, 16, 20 16

Personalities Churchill Sir Winston Colonel Clarebout Smuts General J.C. SyfretRear Admiral

1 5 1, 9, 15 3, 11

4 5, 13, 16, 20 4,16, 17 4 6, 9, 11

Ships HMS Anthony HMS Auricula HMS Devonshire HMS Illustrious HMS Indomitable HMS Manxman HMAS Napier HMS Ramillies

4 4, 9, 4 4 4, 14 4, 17 19 4, 12, 13

1/1 KAR 5 KAR A Sqn 1 SA Armd Car Comdo East Lancashire Regt First City Regt (SA) Northamptonshire Regt Pretoria Highlanders (SA) Pretoria Regiment (SA) Royal Artillery Royal Marines 36

20 14, 16 15, 20 6 4, 15 8 4, 15, 17 4, 15 7 8, 17

Units

Royal Welch Fusiliers Royal Scots Fusiliers Seaforth Highlanders South Lancashire Regt SOE Vichy French

6 6 8 8 4, 8 2, 12, 17, 18

BIBLIOGRAPHY Official records of the SANDF kept at DoD Documentation Centre, Pretoria Anecdotes of the authors’ father who served with the SA Corps of Signals with 7 SA Bde

37