Monsanto Conquers with Deception

Monsanto Conquers with Deception Taking the example of the old 16th Century Spanish Conquistadores, Monsanto's warriors conquered the land with a campaign oflies and deception. Because Argentina's national Seed Law did not protect Monsanto's patent on its glyphosate-resistant genetically modified soybean seed, the company could not legally demand a patent royalty when Argentine farmers reused their soybean seeds in the next harvest season. Indeed, not only was it traditional, but also legal, for Argentine farmers to re-plant seeds for their own use.

Collection of such a royalty or "technology license fee" was at the heart of the Monsanto marketing scheme. Farmers in the USA and elsewhere had to sign a binding contract with Monsanto agreeing to not re-use saved seeds and to pay new royalties to Monsanto each year-a system which can be seen as a new form of serfdom.

To get around the refusal by the nationalist Argentine Congress to pass a new law granting Monsanto the right to impose royalty payments against severe court-imposed fines, Monsanto adopted another ploy. Farmers were sold the initial seeds needed to expand the soybean revolution in Argentina. In this early stage, Monsato deliberately waived its "technology license fee:' favoring the widest possible proliferation of its GM seeds across the land, and in particular, of the patented glyphosate Roundup herbicide that went along with it. The insidious marketing strategy behind selling glyphosate-resistant seeds was that farmers were forced to purchase the specially matched Monsanto herbicides.

GMO soybean planted land increased 14-fold, while the smuggling of Monsanto Roundup soybean seeds spread across the Pampas and into Brazil, Paraguay, Bolivia and Uruguay. Monsanto did nothing to stop what it saw as the illegal spread of its seeds.18 Monsanto partner Cargill was itself accused of illegally smuggling GMO soybean seeds secretly mixed with non-GMO seeds, into BrazQ from Argentina. Amusingly, in Brazil, the smuggled Argentine GMO soybean seeds were called "Maradona" seeds in reference to the famous Argentine football player later treated for cocaine addiction.

Finally, in 1999, three years after its introduction of GMO soybeans, Monsanto formally demanded farmers to pay up the "extended royalties" on the seeds, despite the fact that Argentine law made it illegal to do so. The Menem government made no protest against Monsanto's brazen orders, while farmers ignored it altogether. But the stage was being set for the next legal act. Monsanto claimed the royalties were necessary for it to recover its investments on the "research and development" of the GMO seeds. It began a careful public relations campaign designed to paint itself as the victim of farmers' abuse and "theft".

In early 2004, Monsanto escalated its pressure on the Argentine government. Monsanto announced that if Argentina refused to recognize the "technology license fee;' it would enforce its collection at points of import such as the USA or the EU, where Monsanto patents were recognized, a measure which would spell a devastating blow to the market for Argentine agribusiness exports. Moreover, after Monsanto's well-publicized threat to stop selling all GMO soybeans in Argentina, and the claim that more than 85% were illegally replanted by farmers in what was branded a "black market:' the Agriculture Secretary, Miguel Campos, announced that the government and Monsanto had come to an agreement.

A Technology Compensation Fund was to be created and managed by the Ministry of Agriculture. Farmers would have to pay a royalty or tax fee of up to almost one percent on the sale of GMO soybeans to grain elevators or exporters such as Cargill. The tax was to be collected at the processing site, leaving farmers with no choice but to pay up if they were to process their harvest. The tax would then be paid back to Monsanto and other GMO seed suppliers by the government. 19

Despite fierce farmer protest, the Technology Compensation Fund was implemented at the end of 2004 . .

By early 2005, the Brazilian government of President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva had also thrown in the towel, and passed a law making planting of GMO seeds in Brazil legal for the first time, claiming that the use of GMO seeds had spread so widely as to be uncontrollable anyway. The barriers to GMO proliferation across Latin