EU AFFAIRS

Germany’s New Government Upends the Status Quo

A new coalition in Germany has ambitious plans to modernize a country that slipped into complacency and risk aversion. Its newfound energy could give the EU a much-needed impulse

by Judy Dempsey*

Akind of ritual takes place after every German federal election. The biggest parties huddle together for several weeks to thrash out a coalition agreement. Leaks are few. Speculation is rife. The talks were wrapped up successfully on November 24, 2021. Olaf Scholz steps into the chancellery, ending Angela Merkel’s sixteen years at the helm.

German analysts warn that the coalition agreement is more for domestic consumption. The parties concerned have to get the final say from their members or at special conferences so as to receive the ultimate mandate to govern.

It’s not entirely true that a coalition agreement is just for the supporters. And particularly not now, when a new coalition—and the first of its kind—led by the Social Democrats (SPD), the pro-business Free Democrats (FDP) and the Greens is saddled with changing the status quo.

Under Merkel, the status quo shunned modernizing the German economy, society, migration procedures, digitization, not to mention the functioning of the EU.

This is why what happens in Germany, Europe’s biggest economy and one of the world’s leading exporters, matters beyond its borders. Its views on security, values, migration, and climate change can have a profound influence—positive or negative—on Germans themselves but also on Berlin’s allies.

In this context, the whopping 177-page coalition agreement is not about ticking off the boxes about Germany’s commitment to the transatlantic alliance and NATO, or strengthening the EU, or supporting the multilateral order.

It is something deeper and more complex. The traffic light coalition (named after the colours of the three parties) is about modernizing the country in a way that will upend the status quo, said Christian Lindner, Free Democrat leader and finance minister-designate.

On security and foreign policy, there’s quite a lot on arms control that includes the nuclear disarmament of short and medium-range systems. This is not only aimed at the pacifist—if not anti-NATO—factions among the Social Democrats and the Greens. It is also about recognizing the need to revive arms control talks and this cannot be done without bringing in China.

Furthermore, the coalition text doesn’t shy away from the commitment to nuclear sharing and deterrence— one of the bedrocks of NATO security for European allies. These security considerations feed into foreign policy. With the Greens’ co-leader Annalena Baerbock becoming the country’s first female foreign minister, the status quo in this regard is bound to change.

In the ebbing days of the Merkel coalition, Merkel’s interest and commitment to human rights and values waned. Interests often took precedence.

Baerbock has no illusions about China, Beijing’s clampdown in Hong Kong, or Russia’s unremitting pressure on civil society activists and organizations, with the closing of Memorial the latest development. Nor have the Greens illusions about how Russia uses its energy

as a geopolitical weapon to divide Europe and increase its dependence on Russian gas.

The Greens are still against the highly controversial Nord Stream 2 pipeline through which Russia will send more gas to Germany via the Baltic Sea. The pipeline is all but completed.

But a final legal hurdle by the German energy regulators and renewed pressure from the United States means that Russian President Vladimir Putin now has to deal with the Greens even though incoming Chancellor Olaf Scholz is pro-Nord Stream 2 and, well, not a firm Russian critic.

This element of foreign policy links to human rights and climate change. Both matter hugely to the Greens but also to the other coalition partners.

With the EU’s COVID-19 recovery fund slowly being disbursed, the coalition agreement makes the rule of law an issue. With an implicit reference to Poland and Hungary, the text states: “We urge the European Commission ... to use the existing rule-of-law instruments more consistently and in a timely manner.” Berlin will sign off payment of these funds to those countries “if preconditions such as an independent judiciary are secured.”

As for climate change, the coalition contract is radical. Coal will be phased out by 2030. The expansion of renewable energy will be speeded up so that the share of renewable energies in electricity will be 80 percent by 2030. Among other measures, freight trains and electric cars will be increased.

Digitization, an issue that Merkel talked a lot about but did very little, is another major plank of the coalition. The agreement refers to a “comprehensive digital awakening” for people’s “prosperity, freedom, social participation and sustainability.”

In his deadpan manner, Scholz said: “We are expanding the digital infrastructure so that there is fast internet and reliable cell phone reception everywhere.” And state and local services will go digital. Finally!

The coalition agreement includes quite a lot on how to make the EU more accountable and more efficient, which will be welcomed in Paris. The text refers to developing a “federal European state,” more qualified majority voting at the expense of unanimity (which often paralyses decisionmaking and waters down statements), and transnational candidates for some of the top EU posts.

The coalition is well aware of how difficult it’s going to be to give a new impulse to Europe. It starts at home by considering a points-based immigration system and introducing dual citizenship, with immigrants able to apply for citizenship after five years.

The voting age has been reduced from eighteen to sixteen. These social measures are long overdue and are about changing the status quo.

If the coalition sticks together and communicates its policies, Germany’s newfound energy might be contagious. But as Scholz said, the first challenge is ending the contagion of coronavirus.

*Judy Dempsey

nonresident senior fellow at Carnegie Europe and editor in chief of Strategic Europe

The EU and Western Balkans: a friendship through thick and thin

Over half (57.4%) of young people in Western Balkan countries support EU accession, according to the recently published UNICEF U-Report, but only 9.4% think that their country will join the EU within the next five years

by Alesia Alldervishi*

It’s time to shift our narrative and approach to the Balkans. It’s always been about joining the EU, but the process drags on, frustrations grow and steps falter. Perhaps it’s time that both sides focused on strengthening and developing the Balkan region and closing the gap to the EU by taking a new people-centred approach to the Balkans. Robust democracy, stable economy and social evolution should be goals in themselves. It’s time to recalibrate the talking points.

A greater focus on inclusion and amplifying the voices of women, young people and alternative leadership in the region is one clear path forward, and so we turn to one of the youth delegates of our annual Balkans Summit for her insights on the region’s future.

Western Balkan countries have faced complicated disputes throughout history but always shared one common aim: becoming member states of the European Union, a supranational organisation characterised by dynamism.

This goal is not only shared among countries in the Western Balkans, but the EU as well. The EU is the region’s largest funding partner, with the aim of improving monitoring mechanisms and guiding the EU accession process. This relationship is one based on shared principles, collaboration, and above all, the rule of law.

Now is the time for more concrete steps in the EU accession process, with a greater focus on labour migration, career opportunities, social policy and education for young generations.

Articles 3, 4 and 6 of the Treaty of Functioning of the European Union do not mention these areas as exclusive or shared competences of the EU. As interpreted by the European Court of Justice, unwritten competences fall under the purview of member states and a binding common policy or regulation is not possible. However, nonbinding recommendations are a legal tool that can be used by the EU when member states have exclusive competences. The ability to nudge states to take certain actions into account could be used when it comes to EU integration.

Moreover, Western Balkan countries need to continue to show their commitment to the accession process and must prove that they can work and grow with each other. The Open Balkan initiative is a big step forward in proving that the region can create and operate within a customs union, which is one of the most fundamental principles of the EU.

Another step to move Balkan countries closer to the EU would be creating an institution, based on competition and merit, that will have certain exclusive and shared competences. Under the guidance and supervision of such an institution, the Open Balkan initiative could go even further and create an internal market. This will build trust among the younger generation that everyone will have access to opportunities.

The young generation is the engine of every country, and their trust is crucial for any political representative. Yet, 24.4% think that their country will never get into the EU, and 60.5% strongly disagree that political representatives heard their voice, according to 2021 data collected by UNICEF’s U-Report.

These two statistics show the immediate need for Western Balkan countries and their governments to recognise the youth perspective and reconsider how the youth is involved in decision-making processes.

Loyalty, trust and commitment to change are key attributes of the Western Balkans but must be enhanced in order to make integration into the European Union not just a wished dream but a living reality.

For the EU, it should remember its origin as a peace project bound by the values of human and universal rights underscored by a common economic area. Its enlargement is too often mired in processes that often miss the reality of the circumstances, experiences and feelings of people and communities.

For too long, communities have been left out of the equation in the accession process of Western Balkan states. Improving public governance can’t be a tick box exercise and producing slews of policies and legislation that have no meaning or effect on the ground won’t cut it.

The EU should adopt a different mindset to accession which moves from a focus solely on political structures to one of community dividend. Investing more heavily in strengthening civil society, connecting more directly with younger generations, women and alternative voices that share the principles of the world’s most successful peace project would achieve this goal.

*Alesia Alldervishi

International and European Law Student at the Europa Institut, Saarland University *first published in:www.friendsofeurope.org