The Many Faces of Legal Positivism Author(s): W. J. Waluchow Source: The University of Toronto Law Journal, Vol. 48, No. 3 (Summer, 1998), pp. 387-449 Published by: University of Toronto Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/826047 . Accessed: 30/05/2014 11:33 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
.
University of Toronto Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The University of Toronto Law Journal.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 190.81.38.110 on Fri, 30 May 2014 11:33:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
W.J.Waluchow*
THE MANYFACES OF LEGAL POSITIVISMt
I LegalPositivism and 'LegalPositivism' as therulingtheoryoflaw.1 Ronald Dworkinonce describedlegal positivism Since at least the timeof Benthamand Austin,positivismwas the theory held,in one formor another,bymostlegal scholars.It wasalso arguablythe It makes (largelyunarticulated)workingtheoryof mostlegal practitioners. both in theoryand in practice,the law a good deal of sense to distinguish, and whatwe thinkit oughtto be, the realityand the ideal. Such a division, usuallycalled the separationthesis,accordswithour sense that:the law is morallyfallible;thatwe can sometimesbe underobligation(moralor legal) to obeyor applyan unjustlaw but neverunder obligationto obey or apply an unjustmoralprinciple(whateverthatmightbe); thatthelegal reasoning in which lawyersand judges engage is differentin crucial respectsfrom moral reasoning;and finally,thatunlike our moral principlesforwhich each of us mustbe preparedto offerjustification, legal rulesand principles can oftenbe discoveredin authoritative sourceswhichwe can just look up and applywithoutconsideringwhetheror not theyarejustified.Legalityis markedbya claim to authority, moralitybyautonomy. Despite itsconsiderableinfluenceand appeal (to some), positivismhas been undervigorousattackin the20thcentury.2 Amongtheclaimsofitscritics are thatpositivism is descriptively and/orconceptuallyfalse,thatitis trivial, thatitis an amoraldoctrine,thatitis an immoraldoctrine,and thatit is fullycompatiblewiththecentralclaimsofnaturallawtheory.The opponents *
t
1 2
Hamilton,Ontario Departmentof Philosophy,McMasterUniversity, A reviewarticleof: S. Guest,ed., Positivism Today(Aldershot:DartmouthPublishingCo. Ltd., 1996) (xiv + 152) ISBN: 1 85521 689 2; TheAutonomy ofLaw: Essayson LegalPositivismed. RobertP. George (Oxford:ClarendonPress,1996) (viii + 339) ISBN: 0-19Tom D. Campbell (Aldershot:Dartmouth 825786-4;TheLegal Theory ofEthicalPositivism PublishingCo. Ltd., 1996) (xii + 286) ISBN: 1 85521 171 8 R. Dworkin,TakingRightsSeriously, 2d ed. (Cambridge,MA: Harvard University Press, 1978) at vii. One recentcritichas gone so faras to claim thatpositivismitselfis among itsown worst enemies.AccordingtoJ.D. Goldsworthy, See 'The legal positivismhas 'self-destructed'. of Legal Positivism'(1990) 10 OxfordJ.Legal Stud. no. 4, 449. Self-Destruction
OF TORONTOLAWJOURNAL387 (1998), 48 UNIVERSITY
This content downloaded from 190.81.38.110 on Fri, 30 May 2014 11:33:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
388 UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LAWJOURNAL
of positivismhave included legal realistssuch as JeromeFrank and Karl thesisthatthe properresolutionof a Llewellyn,who denied the positivist's be determinedby the morallyunbiased applicalegal disputecan typically tionofauthoritative legal rulesvalidatedbysomethinglikethewillofthesovKelsen's ereign, grundnorm,or Hart's rule of recognition.In more recent the realist times, challengehas been pursuedbyvariousmembersof thecritical legal studiesmovementwho followtheirrealistpredecessorsin denying the coherentrule-governed qualityof legal decisions.But the criticaltheoon to add that and mutuallyinconsistent ristsgo ideologicallyconservative oflaw,and politicalforcesare at workin theapplicationand administration thattheseare largelyresponsibleforthebad decisionsand oppressivelawsof mostmodem legal systems. The criticaltheoristshave been joined byfeministauthorsin theirassaultupon currentlegalpracticeand thepositivist theories thatare thoughtto underlieit.Accordingto feminists like Catherine and patriMackinnon,theoppressiveforcesatworkin thelaware misogynist archaland are maskedbytheliberalpretensionsto equalityand impartiality characteristic ofmodernpositivism.3 Yet anotherchallengeto positivism is to be foundin thewritings ofmodern naturallaw theoristswho disputethe truthand/or significanceof the positivist'sattemptto separate law and morality,the so-called 'separation thesis.'4Included in thisgroupis Lon Fuller,whoseproceduralnaturallaw theorywasmeantto establishthatthereis an internalmoralityto lawwhich fuseslawwithwhatit oughtto be in a waywhichthe positivists were apparentlyanxious to deny.Fullerwas of course also concernedto establishthat is a morallyperniciousdoctrinewhicheitherrequiresor encourpositivism blind deferenceto law,a claimhotlydisputedbymodernpositivists like ages H.L.A. Hart,JosephRaz and Leslie Green.5Accordingto Fuller,positivism encouragesus to viewlawas an 'amoral datum'whichsomehowmysteriouslycreatesforus an obligationto obeyit. A second influentialnaturallaw challengeto positivism has been spearheaded byJohnFinnis,whosemoretraditional naturallawtheoryincludesthe claimthatthe animatingidea of positivism, the separationthesis,is startling 3
4 5
See e.g., C. Mackinnon,Towards a Feminist Theory oftheState(Cambridge,MA: Harvard UniversityPress, 1980) and Only Words(Cambridge, MA: Harvard UniversityPress, 1993). See also D. G. R6aume, 'What's DistinctiveAbout FeministAnalysisof Law', (1996), 2 Legal Theory,no. 4, 265. As we willsee shortly, the 'separationthesis'is used to marka numberof verydifferent theoreticalclaims. See H.L.A. Hart, 'Positivismand the Separationof Law and Morals', 71 H.L.R. (1958) 593; L. Fuller,'Positivismand Fidelityto Law - A Reply to ProfessorHart', 71 H.L.R. (1958) 630; J. Raz, TheAuthority ofLaw (Oxford:Clarendon Press,1979), ch. 12-15;Leslie Green, TheAuthority oftheState(Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press,1990).
This content downloaded from 190.81.38.110 on Fri, 30 May 2014 11:33:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
THE MANYFACES OF LEGAL POSITIVISM 389
wouldeverwishtodeny.6No somethingwhichno sensiblenaturallawtheorist such theoristwould (or did) everdenythatlaw and morality are distinctenthat valid laws can sometimes be it oftenmakes that terprises, positive unjust, law from the law which perfectly good sense to distinguish positive oughtto exist(because itis requiredbythenaturallaw),and finally, thatwe are often morallyobligatedto obeyunjustlaws.It is also thecase,Finnisargues,thatthe naturallawrequires,in practice,a system oflawsinwhichmorality and legality are separatedin thewaysmanypositivists have stressed.As we shallsee later, thislatterclaim,strippedof itsreferenceto naturallaw theory,is one upon whichself-proclaimed suchas Neil MacCormickand Tom Campbell positivists are in fullagreementand withwhichat leastone otherself-proclaimed natural law theorist, RobertGeorge,fullyconcurs.This pointitselfmayleave one whatitis thatseparatespositivists fromtheirtraditional natural wonderingjust lawrivalsandjust whatpositivism stands for. ultimately The final,and perhaps most influential,contemporarychallenge to positivismlies in thejurisprudentialwritingsof Ronald Dworkin.Dworkin is well knownforhis full-scaleattackon the sophisticatedversionof legal positivismdeveloped by Hart in his now classic text,The ConceptofLaw.7 AmongDworkin'sprincipalassertionsis thedescriptiveclaim thatthe separation of law and morality,to whichpositivists such as Hart subscribe,is not in factcharacteristicof modern legal systems.Determiningwhat the law is in such systemsnecessarilyrequiresresortingto moral argumentsof the sortprecluded bythe theoreticalcommitments of positivism. Whether in does this moral as we shall positivism see, a waypreclude argumentsis, which is and alike. question hotlydisputed by positivists anti-positivists Some, such as Raz, agree withDworkinthatpositivismis committedto denyingthatmoralitycan be a determiningfactorin establishingwhatthelaw is and whatit means8.Others,such as JulesColeman, Tom Campbell and myself, firmly denyDworkin'scharacterizationof positivismas being theocommitted to the exclusionof moralfactorsfromdeterminations retically of law. Despite itsprofoundinfluenceon the developmentof legal theoryand of some the(arguably)legal practice,and despitetheconsiderableefforts oriststo underminethatinfluence,controversy and confusionabound conare supposed to be saying.Those cerningjustwhatit is thatlegal positivists 6 7 8
In thisviewFinnisisjoined byRobertGeorgewhosecontributionto TheAutonomy ofLaw we willexamine below. TheConcept ofLaw,(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1961). Dworkin'scritiqueofHart is found principallyin TakingRightsSeriously, supra,n. 1. Henceforthwe will referto such attemptsto determinethe existenceand meaning of validlawsas 'determinations of law.'
This content downloaded from 190.81.38.110 on Fri, 30 May 2014 11:33:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
390 UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LAWJOURNAL
who thinkit a simplematterto determinewhatpositivismstandsforneed onlyread thethreebookswithwhichthisreviewessaydeals. The label 'legal positivism'is understoodin so manydifferent waysthatit has become almostmeaninglessto speak of legal positivism withoutstatingpreciselythe sense or meaningin whichone takesthatterm,the kindoflegal positivism one has in mind.It maybe timeto stop referring to 'legal positivism'perse, and to speak insteadof thevarietyof different formsof legal positivism. As KentGreenawaltsuggests,'the label 'legal positivism'maybe mainlya matterof rhetoricalforce,nowusuallynegative,ratherthanone thatgenuinely clarifiesseriouspositions.'If thisis so, Greenawaltadds, 'it maybe best to advance actual disagreementsfree of thislabel. At a minimum,theorists should explain very how theyare usingthelabel.'9Withthislatcarefullyjust tersentimentI am in completeagreement. This multiplicity of meaningsrendersthe taskof presentingand evaluthe contained withinour threebooksverydifficult indeed. ating arguments The problemis compounded bythefactthattwoof thevolumes,Positivism writTodayloand TheAutonomy ofLaw, are collectionsof essaysbydifferent erswhosebackgrounds,interests, and understandings of theissuesat stake, are quite varied.This difficulty is furthercompounded bythe factthatnot all of the authorsare interestedin engagingpositivism directlyat the philosophicallevel.Althougheach believesthathisobservationsand arguments bear in some wayor otheron theplausibility ofpositivism as a philosophical of the forward some of the law, theory authors,particularargumentsput by lyin Positivism Today,are oftennot themselves philosophicalin nature.They are more historicalor sociologicalin nature. Taken together, all thesefactorsmakeitvirtually impossibleto pursuethe normalpracticein criticalreviews. Insteadofoutliningand thensubjectingto critiquethe main themesof the threebooks underdiscussion,I propose to followa somewhatdifferent course.I shallbeginbyoutliningthevariety ofdifferentthesesforwhichthelabels 'legal positivism' and 'theseparationthesis' are sometimesthoughtto stand.As we shall see, there is littlecommon and theircritics, groundamongpositivists leavingone withlittleoptionbutto conclude thattheirargumentsare too oftenmountedat cross-purposes and thattoo littleis gained bytheconsiderableefforts of thedebaters.The same would be trueherewerewe simplyto delveintoa discussionof the authors' contributions withoutfirstclarifying the termsof theirdebates.Myhope is thata betterunderstanding oftheconceptualterrainwillfacilitate botha betterappreciationofwhatis containedwithinthesethreeverydifferent books, as wellas a betterappreciationof therichnessof thepositivist heritage. 9 10
TheAutonomy ofLaw,19. HenceforthI willreferto thisvolumeas AofL. HenceforthI willreferto thisvolumeas PT
This content downloaded from 190.81.38.110 on Fri, 30 May 2014 11:33:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
THE MANYFACESOF LEGALPOSITIVISM 391
I LegalPositivisms set of Let's begin witha preliminary Justwhatis it to be a legal positivist? questions.Is commitmentto legal positivismcommitmentto a conceptual thesis,a factualor descriptive thesis,a moralthesis,an interpretive thesis,a meththesis,or some combinationof these?Put anotherway,in arguing odological foror againstlegal positivism, is one engaged in conceptual clarification, theoreticalexplanation,normativemoral philosophy,normativepolitical definitionalstipulation,or somephilosophy,constructive interpretation, thingelse? And here's a relatedquestion: In debatingthe meritsof legal positivismis our goal the moral improvementof legal practice,its philoor somethingelse entirely? In otherwords,is legal sophicalunderstanding, positivismto be recommended,or rejected,ifitleads people, perhapsjudges, to behave wellor badly?Or is legal positivismto be commended,or rejected, onlyifand to the extentthatit leads us to a better,or worse,philoof the natureof law and its connections (if any) to sophicalunderstanding social phenomena like moralityand force?In short,is our aim in debating the meritsof legal positivismmorallyimproved legal practice, or the achievementof philosophicalunderstandingand insight?If the answeris thatit is both,how are we tojudge successor failurein our theoreticalendeavours?Is it possible thatone of our goalsis improvedpractice,but our is betterphilosophicalunderstanding? method If so, would it be valid to reject a philosophicallyilluminatingtheoryifforsome reason itsarticulation and defencedid not lead to improvedpractice,or led to morallybad practices?Surprisingly (at leastto me) some authorsdo believethatit is correct to rejecta philosophicaltheoryon some such grounds.Myownviewis that thiswould be a serious philosophicalmistake.One of the goals of philosophical theoriesof law is improvedmoral practicethroughbetterunderstanding;butitwouldbe invalidto rejecta philosophicallyilluminatingtheoryjust because it somehowled people to behave badly,perhaps because theymisunderstoodthe theory'simplications.But more on thislater.11 These are some of the manyquestionswhichdividelegal philosophers, and our threeauthorsproveno exception.It is importantto appreciatethat how one answersthese questionswilllargelydeterminethe natureof the claimsforwhichone arguesand thekindsofevidence (understoodin a very widesense ofthatterm)thatone willcountas relevantin establishingor disendless. Considerjust putingone's claims.The combinationsare virtually one example. Some self-avowed likeNeil MacCormickappear to positivists believethattheirclaimsare conceptualin nature,and thatargumentsof a 11
I defend this view of legal theoryin Chapter 2 of InclusiveLegal Positivism (Oxford: ClarendonPress,1994).
This content downloaded from 190.81.38.110 on Fri, 30 May 2014 11:33:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
OF TORONTO LAWJOURNAL 392 UNIVERSITY
decidedlymoralnatureare required,or can be used, to substantiatethem. likePhilipSoper,agree thatthe claimsofpositivismare inOther theorists, stancesof conceptualanalysis,but rejectthe use of such moral arguments in assessingthose conceptualclaims.12Stillothersagree thatmoralfactors can have a place in conceptual theories,but deny thatparticularkindsof moral argumentare theoretically acceptable. Argumentspointingto the supposed causaleffectsupon moralpracticeofwidespreadcommitmentto a theorylikelegal positivism are,on thisview,as invalidas argumentsopposing the truthof Galileo's theorieson the ground that theiracceptance threatenedsocial stability.'3 Then thereare those,likeTom Campbell,who claim thattheapparentlyconceptualclaimsofpositivists are betterthought of as normativein nature,and thatmoral argumentsare thereforenecessaryin defendingthem.And finally,thereare othersstillwhose viewsare just not clear enough forus tojudge withconfidencewhethertheirclaims are conceptualbut are being defendedon moralgrounds. Enough has been said,I believe,to substantiatetheclaimthata staggeringlylarge numberof theoreticalpositionsreferredto bythe phrase 'legal positivist'are possible.Manyof theseare nowin existence;manyare represented, in one formof another and for one purpose or another,in our threevolumes.At the riskof oversimplification, we mightbegin bydistinguishingthe variouskinds of positivisttheoriesin termsof the different kindsof thesessketchedabove.We mightdistinguishthe different kindsof propositionsthatcan be, and oftenare, expressedbyAustin'sfamousseparationthesis,that'the existenceof lawis one thing;itsmeritor demeritanother thing altogether.'Depending on whetherthe separation thesis is viewed as a normative,conceptual, factual,interpretive, definitional,or meta-theoretical kindsof 'positivism,'and verydifclaim,one getsdifferent ferentkindsof strategiesin assessingtheirvalidity. A. A Conceptual Claim The separationthesisis oftenunderstoodas a claimabout theveryconcept of law. In the same wayas one mightprovidean analysisof the concept of a promisebyaskingwhatit is necessarilyor typically to engage in the social practicewe call 'makinga promise,'one mightalso providean analysisof 12 13
See Soper,'Legal Theoryand theClaim ofAuthority', 18 Philosophy and PublicAffairs, no. 3, (1989), 214. In InclusiveLegalPositivism I referto thiskindof argumentas a causal-moralargument. Bentham argued against natural law theoryby using a causal-moralargumentciting whathe took to be the anarchicaltendenciesof naturallaw theory.Fuller,on the other in arguingthatpositivismencourages blind deferenceto hand, used a similarstrategy law.As we shall see below,argumentsof thissort,ifdirectedat conceptual versionsof are invalid. positivism,
This content downloaded from 190.81.38.110 on Fri, 30 May 2014 11:33:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
THE MANYFACES OF LEGAL POSITIVISM 393
the concept of law byaskingwhatit is necessarilyor typically to engage in the social practicewe call 'law.'14Some theorists, such as Hart,believe that providinga conceptual analysisof law involvesone in explicating the meaning and typicaluses of variousphrases and sentencesin which the term'law' and associatedterms(e.g. legal,lawful,obligation,and rule) appear. Their belief is thatthe concepts thoughwhichwe understandourselvesand the worldabout us are best revealedto us in the meaningsand implicationsof the wordswe use to expressthose concepts.These words reveal our conceptual commitments.As a result,analysisof concepts involvesus in analysingthe use of language. But it is much more than that, and thisis one reason whyit is misleadingto call thisparticularversionof positivisma semantic theory,or an attemptsimplyto define the word 'law.'15Analysisof the concept of law equallyinvolvesattemptsto provide theoreticalmodels whichhelp us to understandvarioussocial practicesto whichwe make referencewhenwe use termslike 'law' and 'legal.' AsJules Coleman observes,' [p]hilosophical theoriesaspire to help us understand the practicesin whichwe are engaged byofferingaccountsor analysesof their theoreticaland conceptual commitments."'6 Hart's theoreticalaccount, of course,includes such theoreticalconstructsas rules of recognition, the union of primaryand secondaryrules, and the distinctionbetween obligationand being obliged. Most importantly forour purposes, 14
15
16
Notice thatone can ask whatit is to make a promisewithoutaddressingdifficult moral questions about the conditionsunder whichone is obligated to keep one's promises. One can providea conceptualanalysisof the practiceof promise-keeping withoutdeciding whetherit would be rightto returnthe promisedgun to Plato's madman.Whatever one's conceptual analysisof promising,it willbe possible to identifythata promisewas made independentlyofwhetheritscontentis such as to makeit binding.In otherwords, itsexistenceis one thing;itsmeritor demeritanother.Likewise,accordingto positivists committedto the conceptualversionof the separationthesis,it is possibleto ask whatit is to have law withoutaddressingdifficult moral questionsabout the conditionsunder which one is obligated to obey it or the conditionsunder which it has the authority whichmostmodernpositivists now believelaw necessarilyclaimsforitself.The verypossuch morallyneutralanalysesof lawand promise-keeping is hotly sibilityof constructing As disputedby Ronald Dworkinwhose viewis thatsuch analysesmustbe interpretive. such,theyinevitably requireresortto moralargumentsabout the 'point' of the practice. On thissee R. Dworkin,Law's Empire(Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversity Press,1986), Dworkin'sdiscussionof the concept 'courtesy.' passim,particularly Ronald Dworkinappears to characterizeHart'stheoryas a semantictheoryin thissense. He then goes on to show thata philosophicaltheoryof law mustbe much more than this,somethingwithwhichHartwould have been in fullagreement.He would not,howis a normatively ever,have agreedwithDworkinthattheonlyviablealternative richinterpretivetheoryof law.On Hart'srejectionof Dworkin'sclaim thatHart'stheoryis semantic,see TheConcept 244-48. ofLaw,2nd ed., Postscript, AofL,287.
This content downloaded from 190.81.38.110 on Fri, 30 May 2014 11:33:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
394 UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LAWJOURNAL
Hart'sconceptualversionoftheseparation thesisasserts thatinconceiving ofa practiceas legalwein no wayconceiveofitas something whichis necmoralin nature. essarily Hartwas,untilveryrecently, somewhat Unfortunately vagueas towhich oftwoverydifferent theseshe meanttoassertin proposing hisconceptual versionoftheseparation thesis.Did he meanto suggest, asJulesColeman are necessarily succinctly putsit,'thatlawand morality separated'?Or was hisclaimthelogically muchweakerproposition 'thattheyarenotnecessarThe first whichelsewhere I havecalled'Exclusive thesis, ilyconnected'?'7 andwhichsomewriters tocall'hardpositivism' or LegalPositivism,' prefer the'separationthesis,'wasneveradvancedbyHart,despiteDworsimply kin's(unfortunately claimthatitwas,andthefactthatExclusive influential) Positivism does havethesupportof Hart'sfamousand influential pupil, JosephRaz.'8The secondthesis,whichI call 'InclusiveLegal Positivism,' and whichsome writers call the 'separability thesis,''incorporationism' towhich (Coleman),or 'softpositivism' (Hart)is theversionofpositivism Hartsubscribed and towhichhe is theoretically committed as a legalpositivist. It is also theversionofpositivism advancedbyAustinand Bentham, as wellas theonlyconceptualversionofpositivism whichprovidesa theoretically adequateaccountofAnglo-American legalpractice.19 So theconceptual version oflegalpositivism comesinatleasttwosharpvarieties: Inclusiveand ExclusivePositivism. The theoriesof lydifferent and Benthamareversions oftheformer, Raz'stheory an inHart,Austin, stanceofthelatter. Attheriskofoversimplification, wemightcharacterize thesetwoconceptualversions ofpositivism as follows: ExclusiveLegal Positivism: As a matterof conceptual necessity,determina-
tionsoflawcan neverbe a function ofmoralconsiderations.
InclusiveLegalPositivism: It is conceptuallypossible,but not necessary,that
determinations oflawcan be a function ofmoralconsiderations.
17 18
19
AofL,290. In the Postscript to TheConcept verifiedthathiscommitment to positivofLazt Hartfinally ism had neverbeen to the exclusiveversion,somethingwhichI had earlierattemptedto establishin Inclusive Otherswho arguedin a similarfashionincludeJules LegalPositivism. Coleman in 'Negativeand PositivePositivism'11 Journalof Legal Studies (1982), 139; Philip Soper in 'Legal Theoryand the Obligationsof a Judge:The Hart/DworkinDispute', 75 MichiganLaw Review(1977), 477; andJohnMackie,'The ThirdTheoryofLaw', 7 Philosophyand PublicAffairs, no. 1, (1977), 3. Raz's ExclusivePositivism is defendedin a numberof places, includingTheAuthority ofLaw (Oxford:ClarendonPress,1979) and Law and Morality',68 TheMonist,no. 3, (1985), 295. For myresponseto Raz's 'Authority, Exclusiveversionof positivism, see Inclusive LegalPositivism, especiallychs. 4 & 5. See InclusiveLegalPositivism, passim.Many criticsof legal positivismidentifypositivism withitsexclusiveversion.This is unfortunate because itskewsour understandingofwhat Hartand the earlypositivists wereattempting to establish.
This content downloaded from 190.81.38.110 on Fri, 30 May 2014 11:33:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
THE MANYFACES OF LEGAL POSITIVISM 395
our conceptoflaw,as revealed (partAccordingto ExclusivePositivism, ly) in a conceptual analysisof our linguisticand legal practices,excludes moralityfromthe considerationswhichcan determinewhethera standard existsas validlaw (itsexistence)and whatitsaysand requiresof us (itscontent). Accordingto InclusivePositivism,our concept of law, as revealed (partly)in a conceptual analysisof our linguisticand legal practices,includes moralityas a possible,thoughbyno meansnecessary,basisfordeterminationsoflaw.Accordingto modernversionsofInclusivePositivism, itis the accepted rule of recognitionthatdetermineswhich,ifany,moral considerationsfigurein determinations oflaw.So whether countsin demorality terminations of law is not itselfa matterof morality.Rather,it depends on whichcriteriaof validityexistas a matterof accepted social practicewithin a legal system'sruleofrecognition.Butthereis nothingto preventthesecriteria frombeing moral in nature.The Canadian Charterof Rightsand Freedomsarguablyservesto illustratethisverypoint.20WhatunifiesInclusive and ExclusivePositivismis theircommitmentto the conceptual claim that,in conceivingof law,we are conceivingof a convention-basedsocial sanctionedcriteriaforwhatcountsas a valid practicewithitsowninternally theseinternal legal standard.Whether,as a matterof conceptualnecessity, criteriacan evermake referenceto morality, and thereforebe moral criteria,is whatseparatesthe twoconceptualversionsof legal positivism. B. A DescriptiveClaim H.L.A. Hart is famousfordescribingTheConcept ofLaw as 'an essayin deIn so describinghismonumentalwork,Hartmeantto scriptivesociology.'21 distancehimselffromnormativetheoriesabout whatlaw (and laws) should be like,as well as fromtheoriespurportingto offeror defendsemanticor stipulativedefinitionsof theword'law.' His theorywas descriptivein so far as it attemptedto providea descriptively accurateand theoretically illumiand of theconceptswe actuallyuse in pracnatingaccountof legal systems, tisingand (in variousways)talkingabout law. In thissense, the theorywas both conceptualand descriptive.The theorywas sociologicalin so faras it was meantto be an accountof an actuallyexistingsocial phenomenonwith whichhis readerwas familiar. Owingto itsnature,Hart's theoryis, to some degree,susceptibleto emHart's theoreticalclaim (that all syspirical confirmationor refutation.22 temswe conceive of as legal include a foundationalrule of recognition) stands,forexample,onlyifone can findsuch a rulewhereverone encounterslaw.Severalauthorshavedenied thatsucha rulecan everbe discovered; 20 21
For argumentthatitdoes, see InclusiveLegalPositivism, ch. 5. TheConcept ofLaw,1sted., v.
This content downloaded from 190.81.38.110 on Fri, 30 May 2014 11:33:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
396 UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LAWJOURNAL
others,whoseworkwe willbe examining,denythatsuch a rule can be discovered withinthe modern worldof trans-national legal relations;others still(notablyDworkin)denythatsuch a rule can everserveto explain the use withinlegal systemsof legallybindingprinciplesof politicalmorality. The presenceofsuch principlesofmorality servesto falsify Hart'ssupposed claim in that determinations of law never fact descriptive depend on moral considerations.As we saw above,however,Hart nevermade anysuch claim. The descriptive claimthatdeterminations oflawneverdo in factdepend on an of Raz's ExclusivePositivism.It is also moralityis, however, implication takenby manyto be the centralclaim of positivism.In otherwords,some theorists viewpositivism notas a theorypurportingto revealand explainour theoreticaland conceptualcommitments, but ratheras a theorypurporting to describe And some theorists just existinglegal practices. mightbalkat the that their had do with to suggestion descriptions anything conceptualanalor It be to ysis theory. may useful,then, distinguishpurelydescriptiveversionsof Exclusiveand InclusivePositivism. Exclusive As a matterof observablefact,thereis no sysPositivism: Descriptive temoflawin whichdeterminations oflaware evera functionof moral considerations. InclusivePositivism: As a matterof observablefact,thereare sysDescriptive temsoflawin whichdeterminations oflaware a functionofmoralconsiderations. ExclusivePositivism, in bothitsconceptualand descriptiveforms,is falsifiedbytheexistenceoflegal systems in whichdeterminations oflawsometimesdepend on moralfactors.InclusivePositivism, in both itsconceptual and descriptiveforms,is supportedby the existenceof such systems.It is perhapsworthnotingthateven ifit were truethattherewere no such systhe conceptualversionof Inclusive tems,thiswould not invalidateor falsify Positivism.AsJulesColeman observes,thisversionis vindicatedso long as we can conceiveofat leastone possible worldin whichsuch a systemexists.23 C. A NormativeClaim The descriptiveclaim thatlegal validityis neverin factdependenton moral considerations,and the opposingviewthatitis sometimes(even always)so 22 Aswithanytheory, themannerinwhichone characterises or recalhowever, supporting citrant 'data'isatleastas important as whatitshowsusabouttheadequacyofthetheory. Hence thereis an intimate betweenthedescriptive and conceptual claims relationship ofpositivism, between thedescriptive andconceptual justas thereisa closerelationship claimsofquantum mechanics. Thisisa pointstressed andPositive Positivism.' byJulesColemanin 'Negative ?23
This content downloaded from 190.81.38.110 on Fri, 30 May 2014 11:33:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
THE MANYFACES OF LEGAL POSITIVISM 397
dependent,mustbe distinguishedfromanalogous normativeclaims.Tom Campbell defendsa viewaccordingto whichdeterminationsof law ought neverto depend on moralconsiderationseven thoughtheyin factquite often do so in modernlegal systems.Campbell believeshis thesisto be fully of the descriptiveformsof ExclusivePositivism, compatiblewiththe falsity and also withthe soundnessof the conceptualversionof InclusivePositivism.This fullynormativeversionoflegal positivism he dubs 'EthicalPositivism.' As a matterof sound politicalmorality, EthicalPositivism: the 'identification and applicationoflawoughtto be keptas separateas possiblefromthe moraljudgmentswhichgo into themakingof law.'24 Campbell's normativethesisconcernsthe actual practiceof identifying and applyingvalidlaws,i.e. thepracticeofmakingdeterminations of law.It positsand defendsan ideal to whichlegal systems ought,morally,to aspire even thoughCampbell acknowledgesthatoftentheydo not do so. Sometimespositivismis characterisedas makingnormativeclaims not about thepractice of law but about legal theories or definitions of 'law.' Klaus FiiBernotes a confusionbetweenthe 'object-level'and 'meta-level'claims of positivists and theircritics.25 Crudelyput, object-levelclaims are about law itself;meta-levelclaimsare about theoriesof law,or the word 'law.' As an example of an object-levelclaim,FuiBerciteswhathe calls the 'Fallibility Thesis,' the claim that'Law does not necessarilyhave (positive)moralvalue.'26As an example of a meta-levelclaim Ffiuercitesthe 'NeutralityThesis,' the claim thatin defendingour conceptual claimsabout law - which some describe as offeringa theoreticaldefinitionof the word 'law' - we oughtto steerclear ofmoralfactors.We oughtto do so in one (or both) of twoways.First,we oughtnot to endorse a concept or definitionof law accordingto whichit is possible formoralityto figurein determinationsof law.Second, we oughtnotto defendthechoice ofa conceptoflaw,or a theoryabout our presentconceptualcommitments concerningthe natureof law,on moral grounds.The latterFfiBercalls the 'Neutral-RationaleThesis,' theformerhe calls the 'Neutral-Content Thesis.'27It is importantto be clear thatitis possibleto hold one ofthesetwoversionsoftheneutrality thesis while rejecting the other. Neil MacCormick,for example, follows Benthamin developingwhathe calls a 'moralisticcase foramoralisticlaw.' 24 25 26 27
TheLegal Theory ofEthicalPositivism, p.3. HenceforthI willreferto thisbook as LER Klaus FiiBer,'Farewellto 'Legal Positivism': The SeparationThesis Unravelling',in AofL. As we shall see, thisconfusionplaguesmuch of theliteratureon legal positivism. Thesis could be interpretedas makingeithera conceptualor a AofL,122. The Fallibility descriptiveclaim. AofL,134.
This content downloaded from 190.81.38.110 on Fri, 30 May 2014 11:33:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
398 UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LAWJOURNAL
On thisaccount,we have compellingmoral reasons to adopt or choose a conceptionof law accordingto whichlaw and moralityare,both conceptuallyand in practice,separatedin thewaysin whichExclusivePositivismsays theyalreadyare separated.In so arguing,MacCormickhas endorsed the NeutralContentThesis but rejectedthe NeutralRationaleThesis. I suggestwe followFfiBerin distinguishing theobject-leveland meta-level claimsofsome positivists (and theircritics).We need to distinguishfrom (a) the descriptiveand conceptual,object-levelclaimsof Inclusiveand ExclusivePositivism, and (b) the normativeobject-levelclaimsof EthicalPositivism,the followingmeta-levelclaim: TheNeutralRationaleThesis:One oughtnot to defendthe adoptionof a definitionor conceptionof law,or claimsabout our presentconceptual and theoreticalcommitments concerningthe natureof law,on moral regrounds.Once again,itis importantto be clear thatsome positivists ject the NeutralRationaleThesis,whileothersseem to embraceit. The NeutralRationaleThesis is byno means the onlymeta-levelclaim foundwithinpositivistjurisprudence. Positivists oftendefendfurthermetalevel claimsconcerningthe verypossibility of describingversusevaluating betweenwhatare sometimescalled 'analytic'and 'normative' legal systems, jurisprudence.In his attemptsto unravelthevariousstrandswithinthe positivisttradition,Hart notes thatpositivists ofteninsiston distinguishing between (a) descriptionof a legal systemas it is, and (b) normativeor moral evaluationof the lawwhichis thusdescribed.28He furthernotes thatmany Hartincluded,who embracethisdistinctionbelievethatdescribpositivists, ing a legal systemas it existsis bothvaluable in and of itselfand usefulfor otherpurposes,among themthe moralevaluationof law.In order to evaluate the law,one mustfirstknowwhatit is. We would do well then,to add to our listof positivist thesesthefollowingfurthermeta-levelclaim. TheNeutralDescription Thesis:It is both possible,desirable,and philosophicallyenlighteningto describe(and explain) a legal systemas itis without at the same timeengagingin itsmoralevaluation. The NeutralDescriptionThesis is itselfa normativeor evaluativeclaim about thepossibility and value ofa particularkindofjurisprudential theory. It is importantto realize thatmodernadvocatesof theNeutralDescription Thesis believe thatdescriptionof a legal system,thoughdifferent fromits evaluation,can be influencedand to some degree governedby evaluative considerations.Meta-theoretical values like simplicity, comprehensiveness, 28
See Hart, TheConcept ofLarupassim.Neil MacCormickonce characterisedlegal positivism 'minimallyas insistingon the genuine distinctionbetweendescriptionof a legal systemas it is and normativeevaluationof the lawwhichis thusdescribed.' LegalReasoning and Legal Theory, (Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press,1978), 239-40.
This content downloaded from 190.81.38.110 on Fri, 30 May 2014 11:33:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
THE MANYFACES OF LEGAL POSITIVISM 399
and coherence governthe developmentand assessmentof descriptiveaccountsof a practicelike law. It is even possible thatmoralvalues can playa varietyof roles in descriptiveaccounts.For instance,the moral beliefthat a descriptiveaccount autonomyis valuable mightlead one, in constructing of legal systems, to focusin one's descriptionon thoseaspectsof lawwhich make it a threatto our moral autonomy.Thus one might,as Joseph Raz in describinghow lawsfunctionin does, focuson the concept of authority the practicalreasoningof citizensandjudges. Raz's descriptive/explanatorytheorythatlawsfunctionin our practicalreasoningas 'exclusionaryreasons' is an attemptto describeand explain how the conceptof authority is centralto our understandingof law.And thereis no reasonwhyhe cannot assertthatitsimportanceis due, in partat least,to concernsmostofus have about our moralautonomy.Acknowledging such a concerndoes not,howRaz's theoryinto a moral evaluationof law or ever,in some waytransform into a Dworkinianinterpretation of law.29 D. An Interpretive Claim It is a fundamentaltenetof Dworkin'sjurisprudencethatthe NeutralDescriptionThesis is false.Accountsof a legal systemare necessarilyinterpretive,and interpretations necessarilyinclude both descriptionand evaluation.In thecase oflaw,interpretation necessarilyincludesbothdescription and moralevaluation.We mightthereforeaskthefollowingquestion:Could the claimsof legal positivismbe sensiblyviewedas interpretive in Dworkin's sense of thatterm?BythisI mean: Could theseparationthesis,read in one ofthewaysoutlinedabove,be viewedas partofan interpretation or account of the practiceof law whichattemptsto put thatpracticein itsbest moral light?Such an account would, in effect,blend the descriptive,normative and conceptualversionsof positivism.In principle,I see no reason whya positivisttheorycould not be advanced in thisway.Withthe exceptionof the Neutral Rationale Thesis, any of the versionsof positivismoutlined above could be re-configured as elementsin an interpretation oflegal practicewhichattemptsto put thatpracticein itsbestmorallight.Whetherany would agree to such a re-configuration is doubtful, contemporary positivist comes close. But there thoughas we shallsee, Campbell'sethicalpositivism is no reasonwhyitcould not be done, and whyplausiblerivalsto Dworkin's 'law as integrity' could not in thiswaybe fashioned.I hastento add, however, thatthese Dworkinianversionsof positivismwould likelybear littleresemblance to the versionsDworkinhimselfconstructsin Law's Empireand elsewhere. 29
For furtherdiscussionof thiscrucialpoint about the role of moral elementsin descriptheoriesof law,see InclusiveLegalPositivism, ch. 2. tive/explanatory
This content downloaded from 190.81.38.110 on Fri, 30 May 2014 11:33:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
400 UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LAWJOURNAL
III PositivismToday
Positivism Today,edited byStephenGuest,containseightessaysbyteachers ofJurisprudencewithinthe Facultyof Laws at University College London. The essaysrangefromhistoricalstudiesof the originsof legal positivismin the writings ofAustinand Bentham,throughto discussionsof the connectionsbetweenlinguisticsand legal theory,objectivity and truthin law,and thefeasibility oflegal positivism in theworldofmodem globalization.Virtuallyall thewritersrepresentedare in some wayopposed to legal positivism. The volume beginswitha shortpiece byRonald Dworkinwho,despite Hart'srepeatedobjections,once again seeksto transform intoan positivism In Law'sEmpire Dworkin theory.30 interpretive thatlegalpositivism is bestunderstood as an affirmative suggested interpretively, normative thatwe makemostsenseoflegalpractice, and see itin theory claiming thebestpossible[moral]light, thatconvention bysupposing playstheroleinfixing whatthelawofa society is thatpositivism describes.3' In thismore recentoffering, and Law,' Dworkin'saim is to 'Indeterminacy considerthephilosophical basisofanother as following wayofregarding positivism: from... theideaofindeterminacy On thisview,propositions oflawcan bydefault. trueorfalsewhentheycanbe demonstrated as oneortheothonlybe determinatively er [viasomething likeHart'sruleof recognition] .... Positivism thenclaimsthat thatcannotbe demonstrated tobe trueinsomesuch'positive' nothing way... can be true.32 Having thus transformed positivisminto 'the defaultthesis,'Dworkin withindeterminacy. From the goes on to showthatit confusesuncertainty factthata propositioncannot be demonstrated,we cannot inferthatits truthvalue is indeterminate;at bestwe can inferthatit is uncertain.Thus positivismrestson a fundamentalconfusion.It is hard to imagineanypositivistwishingto dispute Dworkin'sattackon the defaultthesis.What the positivistwilldispute,however,is Dworkin'sattempt,once again, to redefinehisopposition.As we haveseen,positivists embracea rangeof different theoriesand different kindsof theories,conceptual,descriptive,and normative.But none, so faras I know,wishesto presenthis project as an atcoercionin itsbestmorallight. temptto put the legal practiceofjustifying At theveryleast,no positivist believesthatwe makemostsense oflegal practicein thewayDworkindescribes. 30 31 32
Hart'slatestobjectionsare foundin the Postscript.See TheConcept ofLaw,2nd ed., 248250. PT p.1. Ibid.
This content downloaded from 190.81.38.110 on Fri, 30 May 2014 11:33:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
THE MANYFACES OF LEGAL POSITIVISM 401
As noted above,manyof thearticlesin Positivism Todayhave a decidedly historicaldimension.Two primeexamplesare PhilipSchofield's'UtilitariThe RejectionofContractarianism an Politicsand Legal Positivism: in Early UtilitarianThought' and AndrewLewis' 'Legal Positivism- Some Lessons FromLegal History.'Lewisdescribesthehistoricalconnectionbetweenthe on the one hand, developmentand widespreadacceptance of positivism, and theriseofa professionalclassoflawyersin thirteenth centuryEngland, on the other.'[T] he emergenceof a professionof specialisedlegal practitionersis of criticalimportanceto theriseof theoreticalunderstandingsof law.'33As in ancientRome, themostimportantdevelopmentin the history of thecommonlawwas theemergenceof a specialistclass of lawyerswhose expertiselies in 'the manipulationand determinationof issueswhichare avowedlylegal in nature.'34Giventhishistoricalemergence,it was inevitable thatconceptionsoflawwouldbe developed 'whichemphasizeitsautonomous natureand itshouldbe no surpriseto findpositivistic theorieswhich supportsuch conceptionsdominantin both traditions.'35 Lewis' accountis bothinteresting and instructive, butit is farfromclear whatphilosophicalor practicallessonsone is to drawfromhis historicalobservations.Conceptionsoflawotherthanpositivism'undoubtedlyexist'we are told,but we are givenlittleidea whatthesemightbe, or whethertheir 'existence'suggestspossibilitiesforfundamentalchange in our legal practicesor thewaysin whichwe conceiveof legal practices.Lewisbrieflymentions,withapparentapproval,themodernnaturallaw theoryofJohnFinnflavourofFinnis'theory.36In the is,but also notesthedecidedlypositivistic end, one is leftwonderingwhat moral one is being asked to draw from Lewis' historicalaccount. Schofieldremindsus thatthe earlypositivists attemptedtojustifytheir utilitariangrounds.Bentham jurisprudentialtheorieson straightforwardly and Austinwishedto distinguishlaw as it is (a matteroffact)fromlaw as it ought to be (according to the principleof utility)in order to avoid what theybelieved were the anarchical tendenciesof naturallaw theory.37As such, Schofiedargues,the positivismof Benthamand Austinwas not the kindof apoliticalor amoral doctrineoftenassociatedwithmodem positivism. Ratherit was a fullynormativetheoryof law whose acceptance was 33 34 35 36 37
PT 71. Ibid. Ibid. See PT p.74. For an interesting(and amusing) account of the 'anarchical' tendenciesof naturallaw WorksofJeremy theory,see Bentham'sdelightful'AnarchicalFallacies', in 2 TheCollected Bentham, (London, Bowringed., 1843).
This content downloaded from 190.81.38.110 on Fri, 30 May 2014 11:33:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
OF TORONTO LAWJOURNAL 402 UNIVERSITY
thoughtto be 'mostconduciveto increasinghappiness.'38In so faras posicommittedto the NeutralRativists are oftencharacterisedas theoretically tionaleThesis,Schofield'spaper is a welcomereminderthatthe founders of positivismwere themselvesopposed to any such thesis,as are many present-daypositivistslike Neil MacCormickand Tom Campbell. But it in thiswayfolwouldbe a seriousmistaketo thinkthatall modernpositivists low the lead of theirdistinguishedancestors.There are some, the present authorincluded,who denythevalidityofmoraldefencesofconceptualtheoriesof law like Exclusiveand InclusivePositivism.39 Michael Freeman's 'Positivismand Statutory Construction:An Essayin theRetrievalof Democracy'and David Hutchinson's'Positivismand International Law' are partlyconcerned to challenge the descriptiveadequacy ofconceptualand descriptiveformsofpositivism. Freemanaims to demonstratean historicallinkbetweenthe rise of positivismand such fictionsas the beliefthatthereis a legislativewill;thatit can be discoveredbyhistorical methods;thatit shouldbe so discoveredbyjudges; thatit should be deferredto byjudges when theyinterpretthelaw;and finally, thatjudicialinterpretationcan thereforebe politicallyand morallyneutral.Againstthis misguidedviewof modern adjudication,Freemanwishesto place his own more Dworkinianview thatlegislationshould not be viewed as a 'single dateable event which ends upon enactment;'40thatjudges should be viewedas 'collaboratorswithlegislatorsin producingstatutory meaning;'41 and that'judges can be a powerforgood,' 'can redressimbalancescaused bythefailuresof thepoliticalprocess,'and 'can rescuelegislationfromthe deadhand [sic] of history.'42 '[I] twasjudges who createdour constitution, who the invented so-called rulesof statutory construction... judges judges who have created and expanded the powers of judicial review' in ways which are inconsistentwiththe positivist'stheoryof judicial interpretation.43 Freeman'sdefenceoftheviewthatjudgesare suitablecollaboratorswith legislatorsin producingstatutory meaning,and thatsuch a collaborativeeffortis called forbydemocratictheory,is both interestingand instructive. And he maybe rightthatmore conservativeapproaches to statutory constructionaccompanied theriseoflegal positivism in themiddlethirdof the nineteenthcentury.Where he is wrong,however,is in his suggestionthat 38 39 40 41 42 43
PT 114. See InclusiveLegalPositivism, pp.86-98. PT, 15. Ibid. PT 22. Ibid.
This content downloaded from 190.81.38.110 on Fri, 30 May 2014 11:33:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
THE MANYFACES OF LEGAL POSITIVISM 403
thislinkagewas anythingmore than historical.What reason is thereto believe that the literalrule, or other conservativeapproaches requiringrecourse to thehistoricalintentionsoflegislators, mustbe advancedbya legal Whymustthese be advanced in preferenceto more liberal appositivist? proaches,perhapseven the highlyliberalapproach of Dworkin'sHercules which Freeman himselfendorses?There is no such reason - unless one identifiespositivismwithExclusiveor Ethical Positivism.Yet as we have And as we shallsee belowwhen seen, theseare onlytwoformsofpositivism. we examineRaz's essayon interpretation, thereis reason to thinkthateven ExclusivePositivism is consistentwithliberalapproachesto interpreting legislation.Whetherin theend thisis trueofExclusivePositivism, thepointremainsthattheconceptualversionofInclusivePositivism, towhichBentham and Austinwere committed,is fullycompatible with more 'liberal' apconstruction.InclusivePositivismis compatiblewith proaches to statutory rulesofinterpretation whichpermitmoralconsiderationssometimesto figure in determiningthe meaningand applicationof valid laws.A positivist theoriesof statutory theoryof law can be wedded to all kindsof different In short,Freeman'scritiqueofliteralismhas merit;itslinkage construction. to theviability ofpositivism does not.Anyonewho believesotherwiseis himselfrelyingon a fiction,i.e., a fictionabout the natureof legal positivism. David Hutchinsonbeginshis 'Positivismand InternationalLaw' withan observation:'Internationallaw serveslegal philosopherswell.It interesting acts as a testingground forthe various'definitions'and accounts of 'law' whichtheypropose.'44Hutchinson'saim is to discreditpositivismbydemaccountsof 'the law-finding onstratingthatpositivist process'failthe testof internationallaw.Accordingto Hutchinson,positivist accountsof the lawlawand nothfindingprocess,accordingto whichthelawjustis black-letter ing else, oftenresortto closureruleswhen thereappears to be no black-letterlaw to be found.An example of such a rule is thatwhateveris not prohibitedis permitted.Alternatively, sometimessuggestthatifthere positivists is no black-letter law on the matter,therejust is no law period,and the internationaltribunalmustresorttojudicial legislation.But as Hutchinson seems to be pursuedwithintheinternanotes,neitherof thesealternatives tionalsphereanymore thanit is at thedomesticlevel.A claim to the effect thata particularsortof conduct is illegal because it violatesfundamental principlesofjustice or human rightscan succeed at the internationallevel, even when thereis no agreed,black-letter law directlyon point.It willsucceed if,among otherthings,such a claimcan be shown,to 'fit'(to some delawofnationstates.The trickis to find greeat least) theexistingblack-letter 44
PT, 45.
This content downloaded from 190.81.38.110 on Fri, 30 May 2014 11:33:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
404 UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LAWJOURNAL
an acceptable theoreticalaccount of thisphenomenon,and it is Hutchinaccountsnecessarilyfail.He applauds Denson's contentionthatpositivist of positivism in affordinganyplausiningwho 'recognisedthe bankruptcy ble solutionto the problemin hand.'45'Naturalistaccounts,'on the other hand,whichin some wayblend the requirementthatnovelpropositionsof internationallaw 'fit'the lawsof the statesit governs,withrequirementsof justice and othermoralvalues,standa much betterchance of success.But even these are not freeof difficulty. No naturalisthas yetprovidedan acceptablejustificationforthe requirementof fit. There is much in Hutchinson'spaper whichlegal philosopherswould do well to heed in developingtheoriesof law. His critiqueof various atand usetemptsto defendthe requirementof fitis particularly interesting ful.But his claim thatPositivismis bankruptin explainingwhyappeals to but rather principlesofjusticein internationalcourtsare notdiscretionary, tolaw,seems to reston a particular attemptsto determinejustice according pictureof positivism,namely,ExclusivePositivism.Yet as we saw earlier, thereare alternatives, InclusivePositivism forexample,whichacknowledge a possibleroleformoralfactorsin determinations oflaw.There is no reason to denythatsuch factorscan playa role in determinationsof international law. - Three ChapWilliamTwining's'Generaland Particular Jurisprudence ters in a Story'contains manyacute observationswhich positivistsof all stripes,descriptive,conceptual and normative,would do well to ponder. the impactof modernglobalizationon the heritageof Twininginvestigates ideas and conceptual tools of legal positivism,arguing that the former presentsa seriouschallengeto thelatter.It is a centraltenetof all formsof thata legal systemis unifiedbysomethinglikeobedience to a sovpositivism or ereign, acceptance of a rule of recognitionor grundnorm.But thistheoreticalpictureofwhatlaw eitheris,mustbe, or oughtto be, is radicallyat odds withmodern 'trans-national and global relationsand to legal pluralism.'46On theworldstage,lawseems to be practisedin the absence of anythingremotelylike a sovereignrule ofrecognition.On thisstage,law's subjects are not identifiedby theirshared relationshipto a sovereignrule of recognition;law's subjectsare themselvesindependentsovereignstates.If Twining'sobservationsabout the absence of a foundationalrule or recognitionare correct,theyconstitutea seriouschallengeto modernpositivism and its commitmentto the systemic, convention-basednatureof law. Perto consider whether internationallaw can be modhaps positivists ought elled on federalstates,or whetheran analysissuch as one findsin the final 45 46
PT p.50. PT 139.
This content downloaded from 190.81.38.110 on Fri, 30 May 2014 11:33:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
THE MANYFACES OF LEGAL POSITIVISM 405
be used in defendingagainst chapterof TheConcept ofLaw can successfully Twining'sobjections. Twiningalso describesthe developmentofviewson theverypossibility and importanceofgeneralversusparticularjurisprudencein theworksof authors such as Bentham,Austin,Holland, Hart and Dworkin.In Twining's view,generaljurisprudence strivesto account for the general featuresof all legal systems, whileparticularjurisprudenceattemptsto articor ulate, defend, critiquethe theoreticaland normativecommitmentsof a particularlegal systemwithitsdistinctivestructureand laws.According to Twining,Englishpositivismsince Benthamhas placed considerableemphasis on general jurisprudence, despite the concerns of Pollock and Buckland thatsuch an overly-abstract approach was detrimentalto legal education. TwiningfollowsPollock and Buckland in arguingthatgeneral jurisprudenceencourages an approach to the studyof lawwhichis expository,ahistorical,decontextualizedand uncritical.This is amplyillustrated, in Twining'sview,bythe generallegal theoriesof Hart and, somewhat Dworkin.The jurisprudentialtheoriesof Hart and Dworkin surprisingly, are oftendistinguishedin termsof theircommitmentto general versus particularjurisprudence respectively.Hart is characterizedas offeringa descriptive,general jurisprudence,while Dworkinis thought to be defendingparticularjurisprudence,thatis, ajurisprudence about, and pursued fromthe insider'sperspectiveon, the normativecommitmentsof a particularlegal system,in thiscase, the Americanone. In Twining'sview, thiscommon wayof contrastingHart and Dworkinis seriouslymisleading ifonlybecause Dworkin'scentralideas have 'general,ifnot universalsignificance'and Hart's 'focusand agenda forjurisprudencewerequite narrow.'47 One can agree withTwiningthatmanyaspects of Dworkin'stheories have general, if not universalapplication. But it is important,nevertheless, to keep firmlyin mind Dworkin'sfundamentalclaim thatthe insider's perspectiveis the onlycoherentperspectivefromwhichlegal theory can be done; and the insider'sperspectiveis thatof a participantin a particularlegal systemwho offersan interpretive account of his own legal system. Dworkin'smeta-theoreticalclaims about how legal theorymust be done are universal;but the claims of a legal theoryare not. They are insider's claims which originatefromand are about a particularlegal system. As forHart, we can agree thathis theoreticalconcerns mighthave been narrowin one sense: he was not out to constructan historical, normativeor interpretive theory,eitherabout legal systemsin generalor about any 47
PT 138, 139.
This content downloaded from 190.81.38.110 on Fri, 30 May 2014 11:33:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
406 UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LAWJOURNAL
particularlegal system.Rather his aim was to constructan enlightening account of the general featuresof legal systems. descriptive/explanatory But in another,more importantsense, Hart's theoreticalconcerns were anythingbut narrow.The scopeof his theoryis nothingless than most if not all legal systems.As Hart explains in the Postscriptto The Conceptof Law, his 'aim ... was to providea theoryof whatlaw is whichis both general and descriptive.It is generalin the sense thatit is not tied to any particularlegal systemor legal culture,but seeks to give an explanatoryand account of law as a complex social and politicalinstitutionwith clarifying a rule-governed ... aspect.'48
PhilipRobertsbeginshis 'Observationson Methodin Legal Theoryand Linguistics'withtheremarkthat"Legal Positivism'is a termwhichhas been used to describea familyofdifferent theoriesoflaw.'49His aim is to unravel some of thedifferent of different levelsof types positivism bydistinguishing commitmentto (whatwe earlier called) the Neutral DescriptionThesis. Robertsstartsout withan interesting discussionofhow theconceptofdeep structurecan be used to explicateKelsen'spure theoryoflaw.He thenprovidesan accountofhowthefurther Chomskiandistinctionbetweencompetence and performance,originallyintroducedas an analogybyRawlsin A Theory of ustice,has since been utilizedin studiesof ethicsand rationality. For our purposes,Roberts'mostinteresting discussionconcernswhat,folhe calls 'three of normative involvement towhichthelowingQuine, grades can be These three of commitment mark committed.'50 [of law] ory grades threedifferent of the Neutral Thesis. ways understanding Description Neil MacCormick once characterised legal positivism '... minimally as
insistingon thegenuinedistinctionbetweendescriptionofa legal systemas it is and normativeevaluationof the law whichis thusdescribed.'51Neverare fullyaware thatlaw is fundamentally a normativeaftheless,positivists fair.Law is thoughtto create obligationsand rights,and necessarilyto involve its participantsin processes of justification.As Roberts notes, withoutjeopardizing their positivists attemptto recognizethisnormativity commitmentto the NeutralDescriptionThesis. They attemptto do so by as an objectofstudywithouttakingon a normativeap'treatingnormativity As Hartwould have said, one describes,fromthe exthemselves.'52 proach ternalpointofview,whatitmeans to have an internalpointofviewtowards 48 49 50 51 52
TheConcept ofLaw,2nd ed., 239. PT, 77. PT p.89. C.f. Quine, 'The Three Grades of Modal Involvement'in The WaysofParadox, Press,1976). (Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversity and LegalTheory, PT 77, quotingMacCormick,LegalReasoning supra n. 28. PT, 89.
This content downloaded from 190.81.38.110 on Fri, 30 May 2014 11:33:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
THE MANYFACES OF LEGAL POSITIVISM 407
law. This firstgrade of normativeinvolvementin no wayjeopardizes the NeutralDescriptionThesis,unless,as some theorists would insist,theexternal pointofviewis a myth.53 A second grade of normativecommitmentoccurs where one offersa theorywhichprovidesa certainsortofguidanceto thoseinvolvedin a rulebut whichin no wayaddressesthe moral or politicalcorgovernedactivity rectnessof theguidancethusoffered.The guidanceprovidedis like theadvice a pro-choiceatheistmightgive to a Catholic friendwho is puzzled about what,as a Catholic,she oughtto do. The atheistmightadviseagainst an abortionwithouttherebycommittingherselfto the correctnessof that particularmoralstance.Legal theorieswhichoccupythisstageofnormative commitment are,accordingto Roberts,'descriptive-normative theor[ies].54 do not They merelydescribe,in general,whatitis toadopt an internal(normative)pointofview;theyattemptto describewhat,froma particularinternal pointofview,participantsoughtto do. It is in thissense thatone might advisea Frenchcitizenthatshe is obligatedto assistaccidentvictimsifshe is in a positionto do so. One mightoffersuch advice even ifone believed thatgood Samaritanlegislationis morallyunjustifiableor had no viewon the matter.Again, thereare thosewho willdeny the veryintelligibility of supposing thatsuch advice could be offeredwithoutmoral commitment. one can no moreinterpretthelawsofa particAccordingto thesetheorists, ularlegal systemwithoutmoralcommitment thanone can theinterpretthe general phenomenon of law and its 'internalpoint of view' withoutsuch commitment.But mostpositivists would denythatthisis impossible. to Roberts there is a thirdgrade of normativeinvolvement. According Here a theory connects withsomeformofmoraland politicalargumentation. explicitly For a theoryof law,thismeansproviding a unifiedtheoryof lawthe normative ofwhichis 'embedded'ina moregeneralpoliticaland moralphilosocomponent involvement fora theory isnowfartoo 'impure' phy.Thisthirdgradeofnormative forpositivists to tolerate, sinceitmeansabandonment ofthestrict theseparation sis.55
It is farfromclear thatpositivists are necessarilybarredfromthisthird level of commitment. the present Althoughit is truethatmanypositivists, 53
54 55
In effect,thisis Dworkin'scriticismof Hart'smethodinjurisprudence.In insistingthat and thereforepursued formthe point of viewof legal theoryis necessarilyinterpretive, an internalparticipantwho mustnecessarilyattemptto place the object of studyin its bestmorallight,Dworkineffectively denies the possibility of thisfirstgrade of normative commitment. PT, 90. PT, 90.
This content downloaded from 190.81.38.110 on Fri, 30 May 2014 11:33:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
OF TORONTO LAWJOURNAL 408 UNIVERSITY
author included, explicitlyargue againstadopting thislevel of moral involvementin defendinga theorylikepositivism, thereare manyotherswho are happyto occupyitsground.Defendersof EthicalPositivismprovidean obviousexample. And thereare thosewho attemptto argue forExclusive Positivismon explicitlymoral grounds.Recall once again MacCormick's moralisticcase foramorallaw.We woulddo wellhere to heed FiiBer'swarningabout theperilsofconfusingtheobject-leveland meta-levelclaimsofleThe separationoflawand morality called forbysome positivgal positivists. istsat theobject-level(e.g. Exclusiveand EthicalPositivism)isverydifferent fromthe separationof moral argumentsfromconceptual theoriesof law called forat the meta-levelbysome positivists. A main themeof thisreviewessayis thatconfusionabounds iftheorists failto appreciatethe wide varietyof verydifferent thesesforwhichpositivismcan be takento stand,and theverydifferent kindsofargumentspositivistsput forwardin defendingtheirtheories.One who seekssupportforthis contentionwill find ample evidence in Stephen Guest's 'Two Strandsin Hart's Theoryof Law: A Commenton thePostscriptto Hart's TheConcept of Law.' Guest's analysisof Hart's Postscriptascribesto Hart viewswhichhe neitherdid offer,would have offered,nor should have offered.A thorough analysisoftheflawsin Guest'sanalysisrequiresmorespace thanthepresent formatallows.I shall have to restcontentwitha discussionof one central themein Guest's account: the supposed moral natureof Hart's theoryof law. Guest begins by observingpositivism'sappeal among law students.He furtherobservesthat thesestudentsunderstandthattheythinkof law,as an unanalysedmatteroffact,in the wayHart describes.He saysthatwe naturallydrawa distinctionbetweenour thisnaturalfactbeing discerned judgmentsof law and ourjudgmentsof morality, bya close examinationofour linguisticpractices.His 'essayin descriptivesociology' thewaywe (so famouslyreferredto in thePrefaceto his TheConcept ofLaw) describes talkabout law and, therefore, the waywe both thinkand engage in the practicesof law.56
But these students,Guest goes on to suggest,'also understandthat,indein the pendentlyof the facttheythinkthatlaw and moralityare different
waylegal positivismsupposes, it is a good thingto thinkin thisway.'57Further-
more, it is Guest's contentionthat Hart shared this understandingwith Guest'sstudents.DespitewhatHartasserts,hisessayin descriptivesociology is in actualfacta thorough-going Dworkinianinterpretation. The reasoning 56
PT p.29.
57 Ibid.
This content downloaded from 190.81.38.110 on Fri, 30 May 2014 11:33:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
THE MANYFACESOF LEGALPOSITIVISM 409
leading up to this startlingconclusion reveals the extent of Guest's misunderstanding of Hart and the positivisttraditionof which he was the most sophisticated defender. Guest acknowledges the aim of some positiviststo remain at what is essentially the firstor second level of Robert's grades of normative involvement. In the view of these theorists, ... a theoryof law is about 'law' and anytheoryshould be an explanationat a sufficientlyhighlevel (employingbreadthplus an economyof concepts) of whatthelaw is.There are people who findthattheycan makethefirstleap - understandlawdeas a normativeenterprise- but not understandtheorisingas a normative scriptively enterprise.58 According to Guest, it is natural to read Hart in such a way. But '[i]f we leap to Chapter 9' of The ConceptofLawwe see Hart acknowledging that '[p]lainlywe cannot grapple adequately withthisissue ifwe see it as one concerning the proprieties of linguistic usage.'59 Hart clearlyoffersmore thana descriptiveaccount of the law ....For whathe must be offering are moralviewswhichjustify hisaccordingmoralpriority overotherpossible conceptionsoflaw and thesejustifications mustbemoralones.I am in no doubtthat thisis whathe does ... first, byopenlyinvestinghiscentralset ofelementsconstitutofa societywhich ing lawin termswithcharacteristics showingthemoralsuperiority has adopted a set of ruleswhichallowforprogress... forefficient handlingof dis- criof publiclyascertainable- certain putes ... and rulesthatcreatethe possibility teriaof whatis to countas the law."o Guest's final step is to link Hart's methodology with Dworkin's. To cut a long storyshort:ifHart is talkingmorals,we can join the argumentfrom morals ... It also means, I think,thathe has conceded thattheoriesof law are, in Dworkin'sextremely wide sense, interpretive.61 The inferences contained withinthis line of reasoning are astonishing. Ifwe are to accept Guest's account we must accept that Hart did the following: (a) Inferred from the proposition that linguistic analysis is insufficientfor legal theory that more than a descriptive account of the law is re(b)
58 59
quired; Inferred from the factthat more than a descriptive account is required that one must defend a legal theoryby showing that it is morally superior to its rivals;
PT p.30. Ibid.,quoting TheConcept ofLaw,p.209.
60 Ibid. 61 Ibid.
This content downloaded from 190.81.38.110 on Fri, 30 May 2014 11:33:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
410 UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LAWJOURNAL
(c) Believedthatthewayto demonstratethathisconceptionoflawis morof a society ally superiorto its rivalsis to show the moral superiority which adopts Hart's fundamentalsecondaryrules of recognition, change and adjudication; (d) Offereda defenceof his wider,positivist concept of law whichin fact itintoa Dworkinian transforms fortheimpositionof state justification coercion; and finally, (e) That he did so despiteexplicitlysayingin the Postscriptthatthiswas notwhathe was doing. Let's look at each of thesein turn.In responseto (a), one need onlysay thatHartwas notfoolishenough to believethattheonlykindofdescriptive theoryone mightofferis one 'concerningthe proprietiesof linguisticusage.' As Hart has alwaysmade plain,his aim was to use linguisticanalysisas one of many tools for developinga descriptive/explanatory, conceptual theoryof law.That is why,forinstance,he repeatedlybalked at anysuggestionthathis theorybe viewedas a semantictheory.His theorywasintended to be descriptivesociology, not descriptivelinguistics. Regarding(b), it mustsurelybe noted thatthereare countlessalternativesto linguisticanalysisof legal terminology overand above theoriespurportingto establishthe 'moralpriority'of one conceptionoverthe otherwhateverthatcould possiblymean. There is thereforeno reasonat all to believethatHartsawhisrejectionoftheformeras a sufficient methodin legal theoryas entailinga commitmentto the latter. That havingbeen said,thereare some groundsforascribingto Hart- at least in his earlydays- theviewthathis conceptionof lawcould be defended on moralgrounds.In 'Positivism and theSeparationofMorals,'Hart followed Benthamin suggestingthatpositivism, in contrastwithnaturallaw theory,allows us to avoid the extremesof anarchistor reactionarythinking.62The formeramountsto 'mischievousnonsense'63whilethelatter'stiflescriticismat itsbirth.'64 MacCormickechoes Benthamand Hartwhenhe to 'manipuargues thatnaturallaw theoryenables statesand governments late the idea of law.' 'The argumentof last resorthere is an argumentfor the finalsovereignty of conscience,and how bestto preserveit.'65 Such a defenceofpositivism, whichI haveelsewherecalled 'Bentham's causal-moralargument',clearlyviolatesthe neutralrationale thesis.It is 62 See 'Positivismand the Separationof Law and Morals',supra n. 5. 63 JeremyBentham,'AnarchicalFallacies',in 2 TheCollectelWorks Bentham, (LonofJeremy don: Bowringed. 1843). 64 'Positivismand the Separationof Law and Morals',supra n. 5. 65 MacCormick,'A MoralisticCase forAmoralisticLaw?', 20 ValparaisoLaw Review,no. 1 (1985), 10.
This content downloaded from 190.81.38.110 on Fri, 30 May 2014 11:33:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
THE MANYFACESOF LEGALPOSITIVISM 411
also invalid.But puttingthatparticularissue aside, it mustbe noted the respectsin whichHart's defence of positivismchanges in his laterworks. In The ConceptofLaw the argumentsin favourof positivismno longer include a causal-moralargumentin favourof a conceptual theory.66Nor, contraryto Guest,do theyinclude the clearlyinvalidargumentthatpositivismis superiorto naturallaw theorybecause it givesus rightanswersto the moralquestionssurroundingRadbruch'sgrudgeinformer.Hart's aim was not to defend positivismbyarguing'thatpositivismsettlesthe moral issue of whata legal systemshould do witha grudgeinformerbetterthan naturallaw.'67Ratherhis claim was thatpositivismfacilitatesclearer thinking about that issue. It reveals the complexityof the various moral and practicalquestionsto whichthe issue givesrisebetterthan theorieswhich attemptto paper themoverwithsloganslike 'an unjustlaw is not a law at all'. Such slogans encourage the viewthatpunishingthe informerwould simplybe an instanceof bringinga criminaltojustice. As Hart saysin a passage cited byGuest as evidence of Guest's (skewed) interpretation,'A of law to be distinguishedfrom Concept of law whichallowsthe invalidity its immoralityenables us to see the complexityand varietyof these separate issues;whereasa narrowconcept of law whichdenies legal validityto such rules may blind us to them.'68Deontic logic helps clarifycomplex moralquestions;itis notforthatreason a moraltheorywhichtellsus what to do. Likewise,commendinga legal theorybecause ithelps clarifyand reveal the complexityof certainmoralquestionsis decidedlydifferent from commendinga theorybecause it somehowprovidesus withthe rightanswers. Proposition (c) calls fora numberof responses.First,Hart's observations about the 'defects' of uncertainty,inefficiency, and immunityto change inherentin pre-legalsocieties are byno means intended to show the 'moral superiority'of legal over pre-legalsocieties. As Hart makes abundantlyclear on countless occasions, cures for these defectsare often purchased at a heavymoral cost. These are costswhich it mightwell be prudentfora societynot to pay. In anyevent,thereis a second point to be made here. The defectsoutlined by Hart are not obviouslymoral defects,and so their alleviation need not be viewed as an instance of moral progress.Finally,Guest has here clearlydemonstratedthe perils 66
67 68
In a privatecommunication,Hart acknowledgedthat'Positivismand the Separationof Law and Morals' contained a causal-moralargumentfor positivism.He also acknowlof attemptingto defenda descriptive/explanaedged thathe came to see the invalidity tory,conceptualtheoryon such moralgrounds. PT, 36. PT 38, citingTheConcept ofLaz~ 208.
This content downloaded from 190.81.38.110 on Fri, 30 May 2014 11:33:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
OF TORONTO LAWJOURNAL 412 UNIVERSITY
of ignoring the distinctionbetween object-leveland meta-levelclaims. Let us assume, for the sake of argument,that Hart meant to argue for the moral superiorityof legal societies in which one findsfundamental rules of recognition,change, and adjudication. Let us furtherassume thatHart's argumentsare persuasive.It in no wayfollowsfromthe moral is theory superiorityof such a societythatHart's descriptive/explanatory in some waymorallysuperior to natural law theories. There is also no reason at all to believe thatHart thoughtit did. And withouta verygood reason to ascribe such a fallacyto Hart, the principleof charitydemands thatwe not saddle him withsuch a view. This leavesus with(d) and (e). As Guesthimselfacknowledges,Hartexplicitlyrejectsthesuggestionthathis descriptive/explanatory theoryof law is a Dworkinianinterpretive theoryoflaw.He further rejectsthesuggestion thatDworkinianinterpretation is theonlyformwhichlegal theorycan take. The same is trueof thesuggestionthatthisis theonlyvaluableformoflegal theory.Hart explicitlysaysthathis theoryis descriptive,explanatory,and conceptual,and he explicitlyembracesthe neutraldescriptionthesis.He does so whilerecognizingthatevaluative(but notnecessarilymoral) factors can playa role in descriptivetheorieswhichremainneutralin the relevant sense. In lightof theabove observationsof Guest'smistakes,we have ample reason to takeHart at hisword. IV TheAutonomy ofLaw TheAutonomy ofLaw is a collectionof essaysbylegal philosopherson a wide range of topicsall havingto do, in one wayor other,withthe natureand plausibilityof legal positivism.For the mostpart the essaysin thisvolume are considerablyricherand moresophisticatedphilosophicallythanthe articlescontainedin Positivism Today.And unlikethelatter,whose articlesare almostexclusively criticalofpositivism, TheAutonomy ofLaw containsseveral articleswhichdefendthe theory.Some authorsattemptto correctmisconofpositivism, ceptionsconcerningthenatureand theoreticalcommitments whileothersaim to develop new,sophisticatedversionsof positivism.The criticalarticlespursue threebasic themes:thatpositivismis hopelesslyconfusedand/or misguided;thatit is trivial;and thatitscentralclaims are in factfullycompatiblewithnaturallaw theory. KentGreenawalt's'Too Thin and Too Rich: DistinguishingFeaturesof Legal Positivism'combinesmanyof the themesmentionedin the preceding paragraph.The classicdebate betweenpositivismand naturallaw has, in Greenawalt'sview,become trivial.In responseto criticismsof theirview, modern positivists have developed elaborate theorieswhose richnessand depth have been purchasedat a substantialcost. '[W] hat actuallydividesa
This content downloaded from 190.81.38.110 on Fri, 30 May 2014 11:33:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
THE MANYFACES OF LEGAL POSITIVISM 413
plausible modern legal positivismfromplausible competingviewshas become too thinto have greatimportance.'69Both positivists and theirrivals agree thatunjustlawscan neverthelessbe validlaw;thatsomethingofmoral value is to be foundin everylegal system, whetherit be Hart's minimum moral content,Fuller's internal'morality',or the virtuesassociated with the rule of law; thatmoralitydoes figurein legal decisions,even in whatwe have been calling determinationsof law; and thatmoral criteriaforlegal validityare both conceptuallypossible and existentwithinmodern legal systems.With respect to this last claim, Greenawalt observes that [theExclusivePositivists] '[a]lthough some positivists mayclingto theidea thatmoraljudgmentis separatefromlegal criteria,mostpositivists do not or thatthispossibility is realized in denyeitherthatthe twomayintertwine modern legal systems.'70 In otherwords,mostmodernpositivists embrace the conceptual and descriptiveversionsof InclusivePositivism.Given this and theirrivals,and the factthat convergencein viewsbetweenpositivists criticsof positivismoftenutilizecaricatureswhichignore the richnessof modern positivism, it is Greenawalt'sbeliefthat'perhapswe could reduce the confusionsand misconceptionsthatattachto thatlabel and see more clearlysubstantialissues about law and about courtsthatinterpretlaw' if we did awaywiththe theoryaltogether.We may'do betterto discussissues on theirown,not relyingso much on labels thatnow mislead and irritate more than theyclarify.'71 Despite theabove,Greenawaltgoes on to displaya sympathetic appreciation forwhatis in factdistinctive about positivism. At the heartof positivism is the propositionthat law is determinedby 'social facts.'Positivists agree that these social factscould be factsabout the community'smoral convictions(itspositivemorality)and thatas a matterof social fact,moral factorsoftendo figurein legal decisionswhichare discretionary and thereforelaw-creating. defendExceptforthosewho defenditsexclusivevariety, ers of positivismeven agree thatfromthe point of viewof an externalobserveror outsider (i.e. fromHart's externalpoint of view) we can offer descriptionsofthelawwhichare based on our ownfactualbeliefsabout the moral beliefsof the system'sparticipants(i.e. thosewho have Hart's internal point of view) and our beliefsabout how theyare likelyto apply their system'ssubstantivemoral criteriaof legal validity.But it is Greenawalt's viewthatthe moralfactorswhichparticipantsuse in determinationsof law are not alwaysreducible to social factswhich the externalobservercan recordin his externaldescriptionof law. 69 70 71
AofL,1. AofL,17. AofL,24.
This content downloaded from 190.81.38.110 on Fri, 30 May 2014 11:33:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
414 UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LAWJOURNAL
ofinterpretation [P]artofthelawis thetechniques judgesusetodecidemoreconcretelegalissues.Every has at leastslightly different ofinterpretajudge techniques tionfromeveryother... The techniques eachjudge usesto interpret willinclude thatdo notreston agreement, elements authoritative oranyothersocial statement, facts... [A]s important as conventional and other'socialfact'aspectsmaybe, the lawis notwholly tosocialfacts... lawis notseparablefrommorality.72 reducible Greenawalt'saccountofthediversity and richnessofpositivist views,and his attemptto articulatewhatitis thatunifiesthem,are bothclear and enlightwardoffcertainstraw-man attacksrestening. His analysishelps positivists ing on caricatures.And he has leftitsproponentswitha seriouschallenge. It is notenough to saythattheidentification ofvalidlawsrestson something likean agreed,social ruleofrecognitionand thatlawis,in thatsense,a matterof social factswhichcan be describedwithoutviolatingthe NeutralRationaleand NeutralDescriptiontheses.73 Ifthereare no agreed methodsor conventionsbywhichdeterminations ofthemoralcontentofsome of these lawscan be distinguishedfromdiscretionary appeals to morality,then the mustaccept 'the truththatwithinsystems of lawsome officialstyp positivist icallydecide whatthe law is on the bases thatreach beyondsocial facts.'74 The challenge for the positivistis to develop a theoryof interpretation whichacknowledgestheseaspectsofjudicialreasoningwhilepreservingthe of lawsis heavily positivistinsightthat,in the end, the existenceand content dependent on social facts. R. George Wright,in 'Does PositivismMatter?',also pursues the line thatpositivismis trivial.'[T] he debate overlegal positivismturnsout not to be distinctly related,logicallyor in any otherinteresting way,to much of genuine philosophicalor practicalsignificance... [itis] to a surprisingdeand practicallymarginal,isolated,inconsequengree ... jurisprudentially tial, and sterile.'75In supportof this troublingconclusion,Wrightdocumentsthe lack of any 'interesting'relationshipsbetweenlegal positivism and questionssuch as whetherthereis a generalprimafacieobligationto obey the law;whethercivildisobedience is everjustifiedmorally;whether judges should apply seriouslyimmorallaws; whetherthere can be evil, 72 73
74 75
AofL,22, 23 & 24. In an earlier piece, Greenawaltseriouslychallenged this aspect of positivist jurisprudence byarguingthatthereis no identifiablerule of recognitionin the Americanlegal of validlawsin the UnitedStatesis thereforenot reducibleto social system.The existence facts.See his 'The Rule of Recognitionand the Constitution',85 MichiganLaw Review thisline ofattackbysuggestingthatthereare no (1987), 621. The presentpiece furthers identifiablesocial rulesof interpretation in termsofwhichthe content of theserulescan be determined. AofL, 24. AoJL,57.
This content downloaded from 190.81.38.110 on Fri, 30 May 2014 11:33:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
THE MANYFACES OF LEGAL POSITVISM
415
thoughvalid, laws; and whetherethical principlesare 'objective'. On all these importantquestionslegal positivists divide,some agreeingwithanswersprovidedbysome naturallawyers,and some not. Of particularinteresttoWrightis thelatterquestion:theobjectivity ofmorals.Wrightbelieves thatthereis a 'superficialanalogybetweenthedebate overlegal positivism and over the relationshipbetween 'is' and 'ought' but that this 'hardly guarantees that the two debates will be equally consequential.'76I must confessI failto see whya positivist wouldwantto drawan analogybetween Hume's distinctionand legal positivism,but Wrightthinkshe should. In any event,Wrightdoes come to the rightconclusionon this:anydefence oflegal positivism whichdrawssupportfromthissupposed analogyiswhollyinconsequentialbecause, as Wrightobserves,'legal positivismis compatible witha wide rangeof meta-ethicalviews.'77 Wrightis correctto observethelack of directconnectionbetweenpositivismand the moral and meta-ethicalquestionshe outlines.That one is a positivistdoes not in itselfmean that one has ready made answersto them.Whether,as a result,positivismis trivialand of no consequence, depends, however,on one's aim in articulatinga philosophicaltheoryabout law. If one's aim is to defenda versionof ethicalpositivism,according to which determinationsof law ought never to depend on moral factors, then one's theoryhas tremendouspracticalinterest.It supportsthe creation of a particularkind of legal systemwithparticularkindsof laws. But ethicalpositivismis not Wright'starget.The targetis positivismin itsconceptual and descriptiveforms.Yet even here one must take issue with Wright'sutterdismissalof positivismas of no interestor value. Manywho defend theirconceptual or definitionalversionsof positivismon moral groundsquite obviouslybelieve thatthereis much at stakein the soundness of theirtheoreticalaccounts.Whetheror notwe agree withthevalidityof his approach to legal theory,it remainstrue,afterall, thatBentham believed thatnaturallaw doctrineleads to anarchismand thatpositivism supportsrecognitionof the propositionthatwe mightsometimesbe morallyobligated to obey lawswithwhichwe morallydisagree. Hart,who did not share Bentham'salarmism,neverthelessthoughtthathis positivistaccount facilitatesclear understandingof Wright'squestions,even though he would be the firstto admit that the account provides no answersto them. The above pointsall concernwhatWrightwouldcall the'practical'value of positivism.But it is importantto recognizethattriviality is a functionof the particularinterestsof the audience to whichone's account is directed. 76 77
AofL,68. Ibid.
This content downloaded from 190.81.38.110 on Fri, 30 May 2014 11:33:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
OF TORONTO LAWJOURNAL 416 UNIVERSITY
In the presentcase, the audience need not be judges who are puzzled over how theyshould respondto an immorallawor an act of civildisobedience, or citizenswhowantto knowwhethertheyshouldaccept a moralobligation to obey thelawsoftheirownparticularlegal system.The audience could be otherphilosophersand theoristswhose puzzlementlies in the verynature of law,legal systemsand legal reasoning.That a philosophicaltheoryabout the natureof law does not entailanswersto specific,practicalmoral questionsneed in no waydetractfromitsphilosophicalsignificanceforsuch an audience. A theorywhichattemptsto enrichour understandingof law by our theoreticaland conceptualcommitments revealingand systematizing law its and forceand so on, can be of concerning relationshipto morality, interest to such an To audience. greatphilosophical suppose otherwisewould be on a par withrejectingquantummechanicsbecause itfailsto tellour local mechanic,Tony,how bestto fixour carburettor, or rejectingthe value ofAristotle'smetaphysics because itfailsto informus about the differences betweenapples and bananas. Philosophicalenlightenment is worthyin its own right,as wellas fortheclarityit can provideforthosepuzzled bymoral questions.That a theorywhichclarifiesquestionsfailsto answerthesequestionsis no reason to rejectthe theoryas trivial. is lackingin theoreticaland practicalimManywho claimthatpositivism share Greenawalt's belief thatthereis little,ifanything, whichdisportance modern from natural law Those attracted tinguishes positivism theory. by thisline ofargumentwillfindsupportin RobertGeorge's 'NaturalLaw and PositiveLaw' andJohnFinnis''The Truthin Legal Positivism.'Bothwriters are concernedto stressthat'lawis a culturalobjectthatis createdfora moral purpose.'78Bothagree withtheExclusivePositivist Raz that"'The identificationof the existenceand contentof law does not requireresortto any moralargument."'79 bothagreewiththecentralclaimsofethFurthermore, ical positivismthat: constitution-makers havea moralresponsibility toestablish sourcesoflawwhichcan be identified without resort tomoralargument, andjudgesandothersubjectshave a moralresponsibility to defer(withinlimits)to suchsources.Whenthesources solutionall concerned havetheresponsibility ofsupplementyieldno determinate offairness and other ingthesourcestofillthegapbya choiceguidedbystandards trueprinciples and norms, wherepossiblebystandards whichalreadyhave morally inthecommunity andlendmoralforcetothosepartsofpositive lawwhich currency aremorally acceptable.80 78 AoJL, 330. 79
80
Finnis,AofL,204 quotingRaz 'The Purityof the Pure Theory',in RichardTur and William Twining(eds.), EssaysonKelsen(Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press,1986), 81-2. Finnis,AofL,204-5.
This content downloaded from 190.81.38.110 on Fri, 30 May 2014 11:33:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
THE MANYFACES OF LEGAL POSITIVISM
417
But whatabout lawswhichactuallydo providea determinatesolution,but appear to violate the naturallaw? Surelythese are invalidand judges are free,indeed obligated,by naturallaw to disregardthem entirely.Not so. Consider thefollowingobservationsmade byGeorge: To theextentthatjudgesare notgivenpowerundertheConstitution to translate ofnatural law,thatpoweris notone theyenjoy;nor principles justiceintopositive isitone theymayjustlyexercise. Forjudgestoarrogate suchpowertothemselves in defianceoftheConstitution isnotmerely forthemtoexceedtheirauthority under thepositive to law;itis to violatetheverynaturallawinwhosenametheypurport act.81 On theseaccountsof naturallaw theory,thereis farless dividingpositivism fromits traditionalrivalthan one mightinitiallyhave thought.Neither George nor Finnisaccepts that'an unjustlaw is no law at all'. Neitheraccepts thatunjustlawsmay,in virtueof theirinjustice,be disobeyedor not of law can deapplied byjudges. And neitheraccepts thatdeterminations on moral factors other than those in conventional rulesof pend recognized and So what is left? What does recognition interpretation. distinguishpositivismfromtheso-callednaturallawtheoriesofFinnisand George?The answer,I believe,can be foundin thefollowingobservation: andartifice, andnota conclusion frommoralpremisThoughhumanlawisartefact andtherecognition ofitspositivity cites,bothitspositing (byjudges,professionals, andcritical without izens,andthencebydescriptive scholars)cannotbe understood reference tothemoralprinciples thatgroundandconfirm itsauthority orchallenge itspretention.82 In otherwords,the distinctionseems to lie in the modernnaturallawyer's NeutralDescriptionThesis.Accordingto Finnis, rejectionof thepositivist's one cannot understand law independentlyof the moral principleswhich A morallypurposivepracticelike ground and confirmitsmoral authority. lawcannotbe understood,and hence properlydescribed,withoutseeing it as conceptuallylinkedto thepursuitofmorallyvaluablepurposes.Law may not alwayssucceed in achievingitsmorallyvaluablepurposes,but one cannot understandit withoutconceivingof it as somethingwhichnecessarily attemptsto do so. Ifthisis correct,one's attemptto describelawis inevitably infusedwithits moral evaluation.Of course,one who sees the pursuitof morallyvaluable proposes as partof our veryconceptionof law can go on to add thatthe achievementof such purposesrequiresthe exconsistently istenceof a systemmodelled on Raz's ExclusivePositivism. His pointwould 81 82
AofL,332. Finnis,AofL,205.
This content downloaded from 190.81.38.110 on Fri, 30 May 2014 11:33:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
418 UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LAWJOURNAL
remain,however,thatone cannotunderstanda systemmodelled in thisway withoutunderstandingit as a requirementof the naturallaw. Understoodin some such a wayas this,the classicdisputebetweennatural lawyersand positivists does not concern the contentand structureof actual legal systems, or the obligationswe have under law. Neitherdoes it concernthepossibility thatlawnecessarily has moralvalue. BothFinnisand MacCormickbelievethatlaw necessarilydoes have some moralvalue. MacCormicksuggeststhat'the stateofaffairsbroughtabout bytheexistenceof and authoritative institutional law is one whichmaywell be judged to have value froma moralpointofview.I judge itso myself, as maybe obvious.'83 What dividesMacCormickand Finnisis not whetherlaw,forsome reason, necessarilyhas some moralvalue. Rather,whatdividesthemis the possibilityof conceivingof law independentlyof itssupposed moral purposes or any moral values it necessarilyinstantiates. According'tomost (if not all) positivistsone can so conceive law; hence the neutraldescriptionthesis; hence thepossibility ofa wickedlegal system.Once thedescriptiveand conare recognizedas consistentwiththe ceptualversionsofInclusivePositivism positivisttradition,and once the correspondingversionsof ExclusivePositivismare seen to be consistentwithmodernnaturallaw theories,one gets a clearerpictureofwhereinlies themoderncontroversy. Whetherthatconis thereforetrivialdepends on one's viewsabout thevalue of philotroversy sophical enlightenmentforits own sake, and forthe sake of the clarityof moralquestionsposed thoughtitcan bringto the resolutionofthedifficult by the existenceof law. From myown pointof view,I findthesequestions But thenI like hamburgerstoo. fascinating. One of themostvaluablearticlesin TheAutonomy ofLaw is Klaus FiiBer's The SeparationThesis Uncarefullycrafted'Farewellto "Legal Positivism": ravelling.'Among FilBer'sachievementsis his clear demonstrationof the manydifferent thingspeople mean when theyspeak of the positivist's'separationthesis'.As we noted above, thereis oftenconfusionbetweenclaims about laws,on theone hand,and claimsabout thecriteriafordefinitionsor theoreticalaccountsof law,on the other.The formerinclude object level claimslike the 'Fallibility Thesis,' that'law does not necessarilyhave (positive) moralvalue,' whilethe latterinclude meta-levelclaimslike the 'NeutralRationaleThesis,'that'the rationaleforthedefinitionofbasicjuridical expressionsshould be morality-free.'84 Drawingattentionto theprofoundconfusionsevidentin debates about is onlyone ofFfiBer'saccomplishments. He also showshow legal positivism debatesin legal theoryoftenignoretheverydifferent approachesa theorist 83 AoJL, 182. 84 AoJL, 122& 134.
This content downloaded from 190.81.38.110 on Fri, 30 May 2014 11:33:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
THE MANYFACES OF LEGAL POSITIVISM 419
mighttaketo thestudyoflaw.Depending on whethera theorist'sapproach is 'epistemological,''sociological,' 'normative,''hermeneutical,'or someor whetherone is a conventionalist or essentialist(FiiBer thingelse entirely, is the latter)concerningthe natureand analysisof conceptslike 'law,' one willviewcertaintypesof argumentand certaincriteriaof theoreticaladequacy as eithervalid or misguided.In Fii3er'sview,debates betweenmodern positivists and anti-positivists oftenreduce to differences overwhathe calls 'criteriaforadequate conceptformation.'85 FiBer notes the tendencyof some positiviststo defend positivismon moralgrounds.We have alreadynoted the causal-moralargumentsof positivists like MacCormick,Bentham,and possiblyearlyHart. On thiskind of argument,it maybe recalled,(conceptualor descriptiveversionsof) natural law theoryare rejectedbecause theysupposedlylead to anarchistor reRecall MacCormick'sargumentthatnaturallaw theoactionarythinking.86 to 'manipulatethe idea of law' and that ryenables statesand governments the 'argumentof lastresorthere is an argumentforthefinalsovereignty of who pursuethisline of conscience,and howbestto preserveit.'87Positivists argumentdo not suggestthattheiropponent's theoriesprovidevalid theoreticalsupportfor anarchismor reactionarytheory.In other words,the claim is not thatthese theoriesin some wayfollowfromnaturallaw theory and are in some wayfalsifiedbypositivism. Ratherthe claim is thatnatural law thinkingwillcausallylead people to anarchistor reactionarythinking and behaviour.Positivism, by contrast,is thoughtto encourage a healthy middleground:a waryacceptanceoflaw'sauthority. A crucialpointhere is thatthesupposed causal effects ofpositivism and naturallawtheorydepend on theconceptualmistakesofthepeople who buyintothetheories.Neither thetheoreticaladequacyofthetheories,nor thetheoreticalacceptability of their implicationsare in question when these argumentsare mounted. Rather,we are being asked to rejecta philosophicaltheorybecause people mightbe led to screwup in applyingit. This is not an acceptable basis for rejectinga philosophicaltheory,unless theaim is to provideaction-guides, as one mightdo in developinga model penal code or a professionalcode ofethics.But thisis not theaim ofpositivists, or ofnaturallawtheorists. And so we are leftwiththefollowingquestion: be responsible forthemistaken conclusions ... whyshoulda theorist whichcoland other tend to draw from the theorist's own leagues people stipulations, provided thetheorist hastakenenoughpainstoprevent themfromdoingso?In thefield ofscholarly a validmoralprinciple be thatweshouldavoidwhat endeavour, might 85
86 87
AofL, 146.
For an argumentthattheyin factdo not,see Inclusive 95-8. LegalPositivism, MacCormick,'A MoralisticCase forAmoralisticLaw?',supra n. 65, 10.
This content downloaded from 190.81.38.110 on Fri, 30 May 2014 11:33:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
420 UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LAWJOURNAL
can be called'negligently definitions.'88 ButI thinkitis evidentthatscipersuasive entific discourse wouldbreakdownifone accepteda ruleofstrict here.89 liability FiiBer'squestionis applied to stipulativedefinitionsof law.But it can easily be extended to conceptual versionsof Inclusiveand ExclusivePositivism and theirtraditionalrival,naturallaw theory. In 'Positivism as Pariah',FredSchaueralso considersthenature,and the theoreticaland practicalvalue, of positivism.Schauer's sympathetictreatmentof positivismcontainsa numberofinsightswhichthoseconcerned to attackpositivismas an amoral,immoralor trivialdoctrinewould do well to considerseriously.Schauer'sexpressedaim is to addresstheview'nowwideis eitherthe cause lyheld byAmericanlegal academics,thatlegalpositivism of or the appropriatename forthe overwillingness of legal officialsto suspend moraljudgmentsand thusto applyand enforcebad laws (or to apply and enforcelawsbadly)just because theyare the law.'90In Schauer's view, 'only a distortedversionof legal positivismwithscant historicalor philosophical provenance fitsthe current American caricature ...'91 '[T] he rela-
tionship between this conception of positivismand the positivismof Bentham,Austin,Kelsen, Hart,and Raz is not much closer than the relationshipbetweenthe banksin whichwe depositour moneyand the banks thatlie beside our rivers.'92 Furthermore,'legal positivismas traditionally understoodis bestseen not as a cause of theproblemof excesscompliance but as a potentialsolutionto it.'93 In defendingtheseconclusions,Schauer showsa keen awarenessof the richnessof thepositivist tradition.He notes,forexample,thedifference betweentheconceptualand descriptive versionsofpositivism, as wellas thedifferencebetweenthe Inclusiveand Exclusiveformsof the theory.Schauer sees meritin theconceptualversionofInclusivePositivism and setsout to defenditbydevelopingwhatappearsto be a hypothetical versionof thecausalmoralargumentassociatedwithHart,Benthamand MacCormick.It is hypotheticalbecause itscentralclaimis thatifoneweresceptical,or wishedto remain neutral,about themoralvalue of existinglegal institutions, and thusifone wantedthemaximum amountofmoraldistance fromexisting social butnotlimited tolaw,thenonewouldwanttoassurethatthe institutions, including tolocatethoseinstitutions, forthepurposeofapplying somesceptical ability precisely 88 89 90 91 92 93
FiiBerclaims to have drawnthisphrase (loosely) fromStevenson'sEthicsand Language (New Haven: 1944), 210. AofL,140. AofL,32. AofL,32. AofL,44-5. Ibid.
This content downloaded from 190.81.38.110 on Fri, 30 May 2014 11:33:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
THE MANYFACESOF LEGALPOSITIVISM421
acidtothem,wasnottainted thatscepticism strains toavoid.In bytheendorsement otherwords,ifone werea sceptic,thenone wouldwantto be a positivist.94
Schauer is fullyawareofthemoralnatureofthisargument.He fullyaccepts 'the propositionthatthe definitionof law is a matterof choice ratherthan and thatmoralfactorsloom large in makingthatchoice.95'I am discovery, and notjustlinguistically thatitis actuallyattemptingto arguesubstantively morallyvaluable to recognizethe distinctionbetweenthe is and the ought thatlies at the heartof thepositivist tradition.'96 Thusthemoralquestionisnotoneaboutthemorality ofa definition, perse,butrather aboutthemoralconsequencesofa societyhavingthisratherthanthatunderthat,as is oftenthe case, standingof some social phenomenon, presupposing different of social a widerange understandingcomplex phenomenamayinfluence ofquiteconsequential decisionsabouthowsomesocialinstitution willoperateand makesa difference whether wedefine un(andtherefore develop.Justas itprobably as alcoholism a oras a moralflaw, disease orwhether wedefinesexuality derstand) as a preference oras an orientation, so toomight itmakea genuinemoralandsocial difference whether we define(and therefore theinstitution oflawin understand) onewayratherthananother.97 I fullyagreewithSchauerthattheadoptionofa theoryoflawcan havesignificantpracticalconsequences.These are in additionto thepurelytheoretical interestof the theoristin developinga philosophically enlighteningtheory. For instance,ifajudge wereto acceptExclusivePositivism, thenhe mightbe led, to interpreta document like the Canadian Charterof Rightsand in a parFreedoms,or thedue processclause of theAmericanConstitution, ticularway.He mightbe led to some versionof originalismbecause of his oflawcan neverhingeon moralques(mistaken)beliefsthatdeterminations tionsand thatdiscoveringthe intentionsof long-deadlegislatorsis a purely factual,non-moralmatter.But,once again,theimportantconsequencesofa theory'sadoption should not be confusedwithan argumentin itsfavour. That thereare significant consequencesattachedto the answerwe giveis a reason to getit right,not a reason to accept one answeroveranother.That weviewalcoholismas a diseaseor moralflawcan,as Schauerpointsout,have socialconsequences.Thisshouldlead us tosearchcarefully forthe significant natureand causesofalcoholism,because a good deal can depend on our unofthematter.Butwhatgood woulditbe to 'define'or 'conceive' derstanding ofalcoholismas a moralflawifin factitwasverylargelya matterofbiology? 94 95 96 97
AofL.,46. AofL,34. AofL,45. 34. AoJfL,
This content downloaded from 190.81.38.110 on Fri, 30 May 2014 11:33:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
OF TORONTO LAWJOURNAL 422 UNIVERSITY
Neil MacCormick's'The Conceptof Law and TheConcept ofLaw' is a revisedversionofhisHartLecture,deliveredin OxfordUniversity on May11, 1993. It 'commemoratesa greatjurist and philosopher'.98MacCormick's lecture highlightssome of the key elementsof Hart's analyticjurisprudence, elementswhichrevolutionizedthefieldof legal philosophyand set thestagefordecades offruitful debate about thenatureof law.In MacCormick'sview,the startingpointfordiscussionof Hart's monumentalcontributions to analyticjurisprudence'has to be in one of the focal ideas of Hart's legal positivism, thatof the conceptualdistinctionbetweenlaw and In his and engagingmanner,MacCorclear,systematic morality.'99 typically mickoutlinesthreesalientpointsof thisdistinction.He begins by noting thatlaw is institutional, and heteronomous.'The law speaks authoritative, institutional and these through agencies', agenciesspeak withan authority which'enables themto settledeterminaterulesforpracticalhuman guidance.' Their authority is 'establishedwithina systematic hierarchy'and 'enables themto settledeterminaterulesforpracticalhumanguidance.' In the spiritof Hart's doctrineof the minimumcontentof naturallaw, MacCormickgoes on to add that: It isimportant to humansto havesomewayofdoingthis,fortheyhavetosharesocialspaceandmustco-ordinate theiractivities andachievemutual forbearances and setup reliableframeworks forsomesortsofinterpersonal The very co-operation. features thatsetup contrasts between itandmorality arevitalfeatures totheseends. Butthesefeatures do entailthat,inmatters oflaw,eachindividual is nota finalauother.Thatis,lawisheteronomous.?00 thority coequalwithevery With the institutional, authoritativeand heteronomouscharacterof law, MacCormickcontrasts'the personal and controversial, discursiveand the autonomouscharacteressentialto morality.'101 ... lawisauthoritative wheremorality iscontroversial andpersonal;lawisauthoritawheremorality tive,settling isdiscursive, questions byactsofauthority, always open to freshargument on equal termsbyan interested in thediscourse; fiparticipant usfrom wheremorality isautonomous, without, nallylawisheteronomous, binding andwill.102 bindingus byourownreflective judgment MacCormick claims that the conceptual distinctionhe outlines is between law and 'autonomous morality'.Professionalethics,such as one 98 AofL,163. 99 AofL,163. 100 AofL,170. For Hart'sdoctrineof the minimumcontentof naturallaw,see The Concept of Law ch. 9. 101 AofL,164. 102 Ibid.
This content downloaded from 190.81.38.110 on Fri, 30 May 2014 11:33:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
THE MANYFACES OF LEGAL POSITIVISM 423
findsarticulatedin a corporationscode of ethicalconduct is, like law,institutional,authoritativeand heteronomous. Having thusdistinguishedthe core elementsof Hart's conceptual version of theseparationthesis,MacCormickgoes on to discussthemeritsand shortfalls ofHart's accountof them.Concerningthe institutional aspect of law, MacCormickendorses the view of Sartorius,Raz, and Schauer that Hart's analysisof rules mustbe modifiedin wayswhich Hart himselfacand EssaysinJurisprudence and Philosophy. knowledgedin Essayson Bentham Here rules are representednot as patternsof behaviourtowardswhichindividualsshare an internalpointofviewbut ratheras 'peremptoryreasons foraction.'103As forthe heteronomouscharacterof law,Hart's keynotion of 'acceptance also needs to be reviewed.'104 It needs to be replaced witha much richeraccount than can be generatedfromthe simple, relatively unanalyzednotion of acceptancefromthe internalpoint of view.An individual's 'stance towardslaw containsat leastthreeelements.'"05These are: first,theextentto whichtheindividualendorsesthecontentof a particular law,saya lawagainstmurder;second,theextentto whichtheindividualaca reason foraccepting cepts its enactmentbyan authorityas constituting the law as binding,apartfromanyquestionas to itscontent;and third,the extent to which the individualendorses the application of sanctionsfor breachesof the rule.Withinthesethreedimensionsa rangeof different attitudesof acceptance are possible. MacCormick'sstrongestcriticismof Hart's theoryconcernshis account of the authoritative natureof legal systems. The authoritative natureof law is established,accordingto Hart, by the union of primaryand secondary rules. More specifically, it is broughtabout by the union betweenprimary rulesof obligationand fundamentalrulesofrecognition,change and adjudicationwhichbringintoexistencethestructures ofauthoritative lawscharacteristicof modernlegal systems. The mostimportantrule,forHart's purposes, is the rule of recognition.'A legal systemis ... representedto be a rule of recognitionand thewhole structuredsetof primaryand secondary rulesthatare validbyitscriteriaof recognition.'"06 MacCormickexpressesserious doubts about the rule of recognition, Hart's mostfamoustheoreticalconstruct.He is impressedby the workof Greenawaltand thelateFrankDowrickin having'shownhownear-impossible itis to assembleand rankunequivocalcriteriaofvalidityor unitaryrules 103 See Hart,Essayson Bentham: and PoliticalTheory (Oxford:Clarendon Press, Jurisprudence and Philosophy 1982) and EssaysinJurisprudence (Oxford:ClarendonPress,1983). 104 AofL,164. 105 Ibid.
106 AofL, 179.
This content downloaded from 190.81.38.110 on Fri, 30 May 2014 11:33:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
424 UNIVERSITYOF TORONTO LAWJOURNAL
of recognitionforsuch salientinstancesof legal systemsas the law of the United StatesofAmericaor thatof theEuropean Union.'107There are also 'problemsof individuation'.How manyrulesdoes it take to create a set of and whatrole willbe played by Hart's judicial and legislativeinstitutions, secondaryrulesof change and adjudication?These 'mustexhibitbewilderor bewilderingcomplexity, or both,leaveaside theproblem ingmultiplicity of separatingthemofffromthe rule of recognition.'108 To this,MacCormickadds: Whenone examines thefoundational instruments ofstatesandtrans-statal commuone seesa striking fact.Aboveall,theyareconcerned toestablish andformalnities, of centralgovernment... Such instruments falla long lyempowermaininstitutions
criteriaof validity forthe wayshortof layingdowncompleteor comprehensive wholeensembleofthelegalsystem. Andyettheyareextensive and complexinstrunoteasilyconceptualized as amounting inanycasetoa single"ruleofrecogments, nition".109 If these foundationalinstruments cannot be conceived as a single rule of recognition,thenwhatmustwe suppose is goingon whentheyare adopted and followed? The answerseemstometobe thattheremustbe an ongoingcustomor practiceof
as an in-some-way coherentorderofvalidatreatingthefoundationalauthorizations tionoflegal acts,and hence ofpracticesofrecognitionofotherlegal sourcestreated as bindingby dulyauthorizedinstitutions, especiallycourtsof law ... Not recogniorjudicially,is fundation,but the competenceto determinelaweitherlegislatively mentalto a constitutional legal order.110
I mustconfessthatI failto followthethrustofMacCormick'scritique of Hart'sruleof recognition. If hisaim is to followthelead of Greenaand Dowrick in theplausibility oftherebeinga single rule walt rejecting ofrecognition in modern of operative legalsystems, particularly systems a federalnature,thenwe maygranthispoint.Buthispointis morethan this.It is thatthefoundational rulesofrecognition mustbe replacedby rulesofauthorization. The foundational rulesarenot,as Hartthought, rules of recognition whichset criteriaforvalid laws. Rathertheyare rulesofauthorization whichcreateauthoritative individualsand bodies 107 AofL,180. Greenawalt'sargumentis foundin 'The Rule of Recognitionand the Consti-
tution', and theU.S.',RatioJuris1 (1988) supran. 73;and 'Hart'sRuleofRecognition 40. Dowrick's critique appearedin 'A ModeloftheEuropeanCommunities' LegalSys-
tem',Y.B. Eur.L. 3 (1983), 169-237. 108 AofL,180. 109 AofL,180-1. 110 AofL,181.
This content downloaded from 190.81.38.110 on Fri, 30 May 2014 11:33:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
THE MANYFACESOF LEGALPOSITIVISM425
of individuals and empower them to make laws. 'Not recognition,but the competence to determinelaw eitherlegislativelyorjudicially,is fundamental to a constitutionallegal order.'111 law is MacCormickmaybe rightthatthe primarymeans of identifying via the authorizationof special bodies of individuals.But I fail to see how thisendangersHart's theory.Recall thefirstruleofrecognitionintroduced in TheConcept WhateverRex decreesis law.Here thecriterionofvaofLawu. lidityis thewordof Rex,who in virtueof thisrule recognizinghis authority and thusthe authority of his pronouncementsis empoweredor authorized to make law.AuthorizingRex to make law is in thisinstanceequivalentto establishinga criterionforvalidlaw.I see no reasonwhythe same mightnot be truein the more complexworldof modernlegal systems. Like MacCormick, JulesColeman setsout to furtherdevelop the notion of authoritycentralto the positivisttraditioninheritedfromHart. An explicitdefenderof the conceptualversionof Inclusive Positivismor 'incorporationism',Coleman's aim in 'Authorityand Reason' is to recon-
cile thisparticular brandofpositivism with'a Razianconceptionoflegal
authority.'Coleman's previous defences of Inclusive Positivism"2 have 'focusedalmostexclusively on itsconceptionsoflegalityand validityand on the role the rule of recognitionplaysin determiningboth.' This new defence 'switchesfocusto the conceptof authority.'113 Coleman setsthestageforhisreconciliationbysketching, in his typically clear and insightful manner,the theoreticalterrainin whichhis systematic, theoryoperates.He notes,forexample,thatDworkinand Raz are 'in fundamental agreementabout the character,if not the truthof legal positivism.'114That is,bothidentify withthe conceptualversionof legal positivism ExclusivePositivism. In contrast,Coleman notes,'Raz and I agree about the truthof legal positivism but not itscharacter.'115 Raz is an ExclusivePositivColeman also remindsus of his earlier ist,Coleman an InclusivePositivist. claim thatthe rule of recognitioncan be thoughtto servemetaphysical, semanticor epistemicfunctions.It is the latterwhichmainlyconcernsColeman. He urgesthat'we need to distinguishbetweentheepistemicconcepts, validationand identification.'116 The validationfunctionof the rule of recin lies its ognition establishingcriteriaenabling the relevantofficialsto the of judge validity officialactions,includinglegislation.In Coleman's 111 112 113 114 115 116
Ibid. See specifically, 'Negativeand PositivePositivism', supra n. 18. AofL,288. AofL,290. Ibid. AofL,291.
This content downloaded from 190.81.38.110 on Fri, 30 May 2014 11:33:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
426 UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LAWJOURNAL
view,Hart also intendshis ruleofrecognitionto enable ordinarycitizensto identifythe lawswhichare (held to be) bindingon them.This identificaofvaltionfunctionofHart'sruleofrecognitionrequireseasyidentification id laws,and is inconsistentwithcriteriawhichmake referenceto contenof the identification tious standardsof morality.Were fulfilment function essentialto theexistenceofa ruleofrecognition,thenDworkin'sargument thatpositivismis inconsistent withmoralcriteriain the rule of recognition would be sound. Positivistswould be committedto Exclusivepositivism whichrestricts the rule of recognitionto pure pedigreecriteria.117 But 'we have no reason to believe thata rule of recognitionmustserve an identification function.The rule of recognitionis fundamentally a validation, not an identificationrule; and a validationfunctionimposes no such [pure pedigree] constraint.'118 Coleman's reasonsforthisconclusion lie in his fundamentaldistinctionbetweenthe conceptsof legalityand auIflegalityis to exist,theremustbe a convergentpracticeof officials thority. as validlaws,standardswhichsatisfy identifying, agreed conditionsforvalida there standard or set of standardsthatjudgesand other ity.'[I]s binding relevantofficialsfollowin the relevantwaysto determinethevalidityof officialactions?If thereis, then the communityhas a rule of recognition;if not,the communityhas no rule of recognition.If it has no rule of recogniOf courseifthisstandardor setofstandardsto which tion,ithas no law.'119" the relevantofficialsappeal invokesmorality, then the identification function could not be satisfiedbyit. Indeed thereis reason to thinkthatunder theseconditionstherecould not be a ruleof recognitionat all. '[A] rule of recognitionwhich incorporatedmoralityinto law would create disagreement and divergence.'120 the identification Disagreementwould frustrate and threatens the existence of the rule of recogfunction, divergence very nitionitself.Givenitsnatureas a social rule,divergenceseems to eliminate the convergencenecessaryforthe veryexistenceof a rule of recognition whichis supposed to existwithinthe convergentpracticesof the relevant community. It is Coleman's contention,however,that divergenceis not in fact a problem. Contraryto Dworkin'sinfluentialview that Hart's social rules cannot withstandthe existence of divergentviews about their requirements,Coleman believes that '[d]isagreement about what falls under a 117 For an extensivediscussionof Dworkin'sargumentconcerningthe positivist's commitment to a rule of recognitioncontainingonlypure pedigree criteriaof validity, see my Inclusive Legal Positivism,pp.174-190. 118 AofL, 292.
119 AofL,294. 120 AofL,295.
This content downloaded from 190.81.38.110 on Fri, 30 May 2014 11:33:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
THE MANYFACES OF LEGAL POSITIVISM 427
rule is perfectly compatiblewithagreementabout whatthe rule is. The social rule thesisrequiresthe latterformof agreementor convergence,not the former.'Judgesmay'convergeon the same rule of recognitionat the same timethattheydisagreeabout whatthe rule validates.'121 Coleman is certainlycorrectthat,in manyinstances,people can disagreeabout what fallsunder a rule while agreeingabout what the rule is. This is obviously truewhenrulesexistin writtenform,or bywayofauthoritative pronouncement.But itis not abundantlyclear how thisis possiblewhentherule exists withinand because of theconvergingbehaviourand attitudesof thosewho use themand to whomtheyapply.Where thereis no canonical expression of the rule,it is difficult to understandhow the rule could be said to exist ifthe requiredbehaviourand attitudesdo not exist.How can a social rule of recognitionexistwhen thereis no convergentpatternof behaviourexvalid law?Perhaps the pointis thatthereis emplifiedin acts of identifying indeed (largely)convergentbehaviour,but different accountsor interpretationsof what that behaviouramounts to and correspondingdisagreementsabout penumbralcases,just as theremightbe different accounts of whatthewordsof a canonical statementof a rule amount to and disagreements about what it requires in borderline,penumbral cases. Whether such an analysiscould be developed in a systematic wayis an interesting question.It is a virtueof Coleman's argumentthathe bringsthispossibility to our attention. Accordingto Coleman, the possibilityof disagreementover what the rule of recognitionestablishesas valid law poses no more difficulty forthe InclusivePositivist thanthepossibility ofdivergence.And thisis because the rule of recognitiondoes not in factserve an identificationfunction.AlthoughColeman agreeswithHart thatthevalidationfunctionis essentialto a rule of recognition,he denies the claim thateasyidentification of law by citizensis also a functionwhichtheruleofrecognitionmustserve.The law's but not itsveryexistence,whichis all requireseasyidentification, authority thatthe rule of recognitionis intendedto establishand explain. Wehavetodistinguish between theconditions oflegality andauthority. reLegality as a validation rule.Authority quiresa ruleofrecognition mayrequirethattherebe a rulebywhichindividuals can reliably whichofa community's normsare identify itslaw.Butthatruleneednotbe a ruleofrecognition or thesamerulethatjudges thevalidity ofrulessubordinate totheruleofrecognition.122 applyin determining 121 AofL,296. For Dworkin'sclaim thatHart's account of social rules is flawedbecause it does not allowforsubstantive see Takdisagreementconcerningthe rule'srequirements, ingRightsSeriously, supra n. 1, ch. 3. For a responseto Dworkin'scritique,see P. NowellSmith,'Dworkinv. Hart Appealed: A Meta-EthicalInquiry',13 Metaphilosophy,no. 1 (1982), 1.
This content downloaded from 190.81.38.110 on Fri, 30 May 2014 11:33:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
428 UNIVERSITYOF TORONTO LAWJOURNAL
To illustratehis point,Coleman has us considera verysimplelegal system whosestandardoflegal validity, i.e., ruleof recognition,is:WhateverDworkinsaysis law.In such a system, however,themostreliableruleforidentifyto the law be: Listen Raz; he knowswhatthelawis. That Raz idening might tifiesR as a law does not make R law.WhatmakesR law is Dworkin'ssaying it is. But Raz's wordis nevertheless'the mostreliableindicatorofwhatthe law is -especially whenwhatDworkinsaysis not alwayseasilyaccessible to Or philosophers,I mightadd. ordinarycitizens.'123 Coleman's attemptto separaterulesof recognitionfromrulesof identificationis intriguing, and mayoffera promisingroutefortheInclusivePositivistin answeringDworkin'scharge thatpositivists are restrictedto pure criteria for one is a hostofquestions. left with However, pedigree validity.'24 Firstand foremostwould be: Whatwould an identification rule look like in a real,complexlegal systemsuch as one findsin contemporary Westernsocieties?Would itmake referencetowhattheSupremeCourtsaysis law?But theyare oftensilenton much of the law.Would it make referenceto what lawyersgenerallysay?Or to whattheauthorsofstandardlegal textssay?But theselawyersand legal theoristsoftendisagreejust as much as ordinarycitizens do about whatthelaw requires.Would itmake referenceto whatProfessorColeman saysthelaw is?An intriguing but even Professor possibility: Coleman would be forcedto admit,eventually, thateven he doesn't always get thingsright!Yet whateverforma rule of identification mighttake,we seem to be leftwitha more fundamentalquestion. If the validationrules themselvesdo not generallyprovideeasy,agreed answersto questionsofvalidity,then how are identificationrules,which are intended as guides to theseanswers,to servetheirfunction?Ifwhatis to be identified- validityis difficult, ifnot impossible,to determinewithanydegree of certaintyor because of the inherentuncertainty precision (perhaps even indeterminaof the criteria then rule whichattemptsto identhemselves, cy) validity any valid will standards suffer from the same and tify legal degree ofuncertainty In Coleman's Raz have a possiblyindeterminacy. imaginarysociety, may for Dworkin's is But it to difficult see special facility determining meaning. on whatbasisone could tell- exceptbyaskingDworkinwhetherRaz always or usuallygetshimright.But whomdo we ask ifwe wantto tellwhetheran identification rulein a realsocietygetsitright,i.e. actuallysucceedsin identhe standards valid according to the criteriaof validitycontained tifying withina rule of recognition?If we oftendon't knowwithcertaintywhat 122 AofL,293.
123 Ibid. 124 For a different defenceof the claim thatpositivist's are not committedto pure pedigree criteriasee myInclusiveLegalPositivism, especiallypp. 117-123,182-190.
This content downloaded from 190.81.38.110 on Fri, 30 May 2014 11:33:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
THE MANYFACES OF LEGAL POSITIVISM 429
those standardsare, thenit is difficult to see on whatbasiswe couldjudge success. If the validitycriterionwere:Whateverthe Supreme Court saysis law,thenof course therewould be a wayto get an answerto our question. We couldjust ask theCourt'smembers,justas we would ask Dworkinabout Raz's special skillin Coleman's imaginarysociety.But the SupremeCourt's wordis notwhatdeterminesthevalidity oflawsin westerndemocracies.The accountofwhatthelawis accordSupreme Court'swordis an authoritative ing to criteriawhichthey,along witheveryoneelse in thesystem, attemptto It is truethattheirauthoritative applyinjudgingvalidity. opinionsconcerning validitycannotusuallybe ignored.It is equallytruethattheiropinions cannot usuallybe overturned,except bylegislatorsor the Supreme Court itself.But it remainstruethata Supreme Court'sdecisionon whatthe law is does not (usually)makeit the law. As noted above,Coleman's main aim is to reconcileInclusivePositivism with a Razian conception of authority.The latter is characterized succinctly as follows:
In short:thereare timeswhen each of us willdo betterfollowingthe law than we would actingdirectlyon thebasisofrightreason.Typically, theseare cases involving coordinationand uncertainty. The claimto legal authority [whichis essentialto law] is based on the thoughtthatthe reasonslaw providesreplace the reasonsthatotherwiseapplyto us because actingon theformerwillenable us morefullyto comply withthedemandsofthelatterthanwe willbe actingon thebasisofthemdirectly.'25 Raz, of course, argues that this account of authoritypresupposes Exclusive Positivism.126Although he disagrees, Coleman is sensitive to the reasons behind Raz's position on this issue. Among these is the claim that citizens would not be able to identifythe authoritative reasons established in laws, and therefore be able better to act in accordance with right reason, if the validityand content of those laws - i.e. legal determinations - hinged on the controversial moral considerations the laws were intended to settle. In responding to this argument, Coleman once again draws upon his distinction between rules of recognition and rules of identification. For thereto be law theremustbe a validationrule- one thatis as broad as [InclusivePositivism]allows.For law to be authoritative, however,theremustbe an identificationrule - one thatmaynot be so broad. There is a problem for [Inclusive Positivism]only ifthose two rules mustbe identical.They need not be, however, and oftentheyare not ... Since mostordinarycitizensare able to determinethe law thatbinds them,whereasfew,ifany,are able to formulateor statethe prevailing
125AofL, 305.
126 That the authorityof law is compatiblewithInclusivePositivismis among the central claimsof InclusiveLegalPositivism. See especiallypp.123-141.
This content downloaded from 190.81.38.110 on Fri, 30 May 2014 11:33:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
430 UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LAWJOURNAL
is theruleofrecogruleofrecognition, itis unlikely thattheruleofidentification nition.127 Withoutan idea ofwhata real ruleofidentification mightlook like,itis difficult,of course, to determinewhetherthisis as an adequate response to Raz's chargeof inconsistency. Near the end of his paper, Coleman turnsto a slightlydifferent aspect of theauthority oflaw.It is not enough,he contends,to saythattheauthorin leadingus to act in accordancewithright ityoflawdepends on itsefficacy reason.It also depends on whetherthelaw,in so faras itis a public,reasonembodies the moral principlesof equalityand givingpractice,sufficiently which are autonomy presupposedin any'social or public practiceof giving of whichwithstandpublic scrutiny.'128 If this reasons, offering justifications is right,thenthe questionarises:Do we have here a fusionof moralitywith lawwhichthreatensColeman's positivism? The answer,ofcourse,is thatwe do not.First,naturallawtheoryclaimsthattheembodimentofcertainmoral ideals is essentialto the veryexistenceof law. This is not trueon Coleman's account. 'Autonomyand equalityare requirediflaw is to be authoritative.Theyare notrequiredbytheconceptoflegalityitself.'Second, these moralideals are not law owingto theirtruthas moralprinciplesbut rather because theyare presupposedbythepublic practiceofgivingreasons. ofa moralprinciple thatdetermines itsstatusas law. ... in naturallaw,itisthetruth In myview,themoralidealsofequality andautonomy arepartofthelawonlyifwe takelawtobe a framework within whichindividuals can discusswhatis tocountas thatmakes good or rightreasonforthem.It is nottheirtruthas moralprinciples themlaw;rather, itisthefactthattheyarepresupposed bytherelevant publicpractices.129
We have,then,no more threatto positivism thanHarthad whenhe defended his minimumcontentof naturallawon roughlysimilar'transcendental' grounds. AmongColeman's principalaimsis to reconcilea Razian conceptionof law'sauthority withdisagreementsoverdeterminations oflaw.In 'Law's Autonomyand PublicPracticalReason', GeraldPostemagivesus reason to believethatsuch a reconciliationcannotbe accomplished.His argumentposes a dilemma.The defenderof thereconciliationmusteither:(a) refinethe account of authorityto fitcertainagreed factsabout legal practice,or (b) attemptto characterizethoseagreedfactsin such a wayas to savehisRazian accountofauthority. In thefirstinstance,lawis robbed ofitsmediatingrole 127 AofL,308.
128 AofL, 313. 129 AofL,314.
This content downloaded from 190.81.38.110 on Fri, 30 May 2014 11:33:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
THE MANYFACES OF LEGAL POSITIVISM 431
in our practicalreasoningand we no longerhave an explanationof 'whyit is important to have it.'130In thelattercase, we end up witha highlyimplausible account of legal practice,of 'howlawworks.'131 Postema'sdilemmaapplies to anytheoryaccordingtowhichone oflaw's principalaimsis to servethemediatingrole ofwhichRaz providestheclearest and most sophisticatedelaboration.It applies to any theorywhichacceptswhatPostemacalls 'The AutonomyThesis' accordingto which is a viableandvitalformofpublicpractical thatis ableto legalreasoning reasoning servethetaskassignedtoitbecauseofitsautonomy frommoralandpolitical reasonin thefactthattheexistence, and consists, content, ing.Thisautonomy roughly, force of the which norms from determined are practical legalreasoning proceeds thatmakeno essentialreference to considerations ofpoliticalmorality, bycriteria andso legalreasoning canproceedentirely without inarguments ofpolitengaging icalmorality.132 On the Razian conceptionof law's authority, itsautonomyis establishedby threecore elements.Accordingto the 'LimitedDomain Thesis,'lawdefines a limiteddomain of practicalreasons or normsto whichofficialsand citizens can bothappeal. The 'Pre-emptionThesis' statesthatthe reasonswithin law's limiteddomain functionas pre-emptive, or exclusionary,reasons foraction.That is,theyfunctionas reasonswhichexclude decidingand actwe have the ing on reasonslyingoutsidelaw's limiteddomain.And finally, 'Sources Thesis,' thedefiningtenetofRaz's ExclusivePositivism, according to which membershipin law's limiteddomain of pre-emptivereasons or norms is a functionof non-moral,factualcriteriahavingto do withthe norm'ssource. traditionofacceptingthe Accordingto Postema,thereis a long-standing AutonomyThesisso understood,a traditionwhichstretchesfromCicero to Raz and includes theoristsas different as Aquinas and Bentham,Hobbes, Pufendorf,Locke and Hume, Hart,Raz, MacCormick,and JohnFinnis.133 In so faras Hart at least is an InclusivePositivist, we mighttake issue with Postema'slist.But he is rightto note that'the AutonomyThesis is not exdoctrine,'even ifit is not truethatall positivists clusivelya Positivist accept it. It is Postema'scontentionthatthe AutonomyThesis is seriouslythreatened by an agreed factabout legal practice:'that appeals to distinctively moral or evaluativeargumentcommonlyoccur in legal practice.'134As 130 AofL, 88. 131 Ibid.
132AofL, 80. 133 AofL, 80.
134 AofL,94.
This content downloaded from 190.81.38.110 on Fri, 30 May 2014 11:33:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
OF TORONTO LAWJOURNAL 432 UNIVERSITY
Postemapointsout,'it is notuncommonforcourtsto appeal to non-source based principlestojustifyinterpretations thatset aside the settledor plain or narrowing), meaningofstatutes,and tojustify distinguishing (modifying or even overruling, establishedprecedents.'135 In otherwords,judicial reasoning ofteninvokesnormsother than those source-based,pre-emptive, and exclusionaryrulesthefollowingofwhichis essentialto the Razian conas capturedbytheAutonomyThesis.Hence ceptionoflawand itsauthority Postema'sdilemma.A defenderoftheAutonomyThesismusteithermodify the thesisto fitthepractice,or providean accountofthepracticewhichfits the thesis.It is Postema'scontentionthatneitheroptioncan succeed. If the thesisis modifiedto allowsome measureofmoraland evaluativeargument to figurein legal reasoning,then the mediatingfunctionof law is threatened. Ifthemediatingfunctionoflawis to be maintained,and commitment to all threecore elementsoftheAutonomyThesisis to be affirmed, thenwe have equally unpalatable consequences. Since much of the reasoningin whichcourtsengage seems to invokemoral and otherevaluativeconsiderations,we willbe forcedto saythatmuch ofwhatgoes on in decidinglegal cases is not reasoningaccordingto law.We willbe forcedto saythatitis essentiallymoral reasoningwhich creates new law based on the contested moral considerationswhichlaw is intendedto replace. In otherwords,we willbe forcedto agree withRaz that'in some legal systemscourtshave discretion[to create new law] in every case,easycases as well as so-calledhard cases.'136It is unlikelythata theoristwillwishto accept an interpretation of legal reasoningaccording to whichit seldom occurs whenjudges decide cases. Mostaccept thatjudgessometimesmake newlaw,butfeware willing to accept a conceptionof law accordingto whichthisis whattheydo most of the time. It is crucialto observethatPostema'scritiqueapplies mostobviouslyto ExclusivePositivism.Commitmentto the latterforcesone to say that any appeal to a moralreasoncannotbe withinthedomain ofreasoningaccordBut to the extentthatone aling to law,but mustinsteadbe discretionary. lows,as the InclusivePositivist does, thatmoralfactorscan figurein determinationsof law,in decisionsabout whatthe law is and means,one avoids thisundesirableconsequence. This manoeuvrerequires,of course, rejection of Postema'sAutonomyThesis. The InclusivePositivistwillbe happy to accept two of its components,the Limited Domain and Pre-emption Thesis,buthe willwishto rejectthethird,theSourcesThesis.The manoeuvre also requiresa different account of law's authoritythan is providedin the Razian conception.This accountwillhave to explain not only'how law 135 AofL,99. 136 Ibid.,quotingRaz, 'Facing Up', 62 SouthernCaliforniaLaw Review(1989), 1204.
This content downloaded from 190.81.38.110 on Fri, 30 May 2014 11:33:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
THE MANYFACES OF LEGAL POSITIVISM 433
to have works,but also and more importantly, explain whyit is important it.'137 This is not theplace to providesuch an account.But perhapswe can say thismuch.First,itmaybe partof theveryraisond'etre oflaw to help us solve But to solve a 'social co-operationproblems.' helping problemis not identical withactuallysolvingit forus. It is certainlynot identicalwithproviding or exclusionaryreasonswhicharewhollyautonomousfromthe pre-emptive backgroundconsiderationswhichprompttheircreation.There maybe a hostofalternative forthebetter,our practical waysin whichlawscan affect, a host of in alternative which laws can servean authoritative, reasoning, ways role. there is little reason to believe thatallowingmoral Second, mediating factorsto enterlegal argumentwillinevitably lead to completefrustration of the law's taskof helpingto solvesocial cooperationproblems.Were any and social policyabout appeal to 'broad principlesofjustice,rights,liberty, which theremaybe deep disagreementin the community'allowed, then perhapswe would be forcedto agree thatlaw could not possiblyserveany sortof mediatingfunction,let alone the functionRaz ascribesto it.138But itis notuncommonforlegal systems to severelyrestrict appeals to such prinin a of For ciples variety ways. instance,courtsoftenclaim thattheywillnot disturba precedentor agree to a newor unusualreadingof a statuteunless failureto do so would resultin 'graveinjustice,'or in 'absurdity'or 'moral repugnance,'the implicationbeing thatmere injustice,inconvenienceor unreasonablenesswillnot do. Third,and finally,thatit is partof law's task to help solvesocial coordinationproblemsdoes not mean thatthisis law's onlytask,or even a taskwhichis a sinequa nonof legality.Consider,forexHart,whoinsistedthatlawsshould sometimes ample,theInclusivePositivist remainflexiblein theirapplication.Hartarguesquite convincingly thatthe of our blindlycommitting ourselvesto undesirableresultsin unpossibility reason forframinglegal standardsin anticipatedcases is oftena sufficient loose, open-texturedtermslike 'fair,''reasonable,' and 'foreseeable.'Now if the avoidance of unintendedresultswhichare unfairand unreasonable servesin the mind of a positivist like Hart as a sufficient reason to recommend thedeliberateframingofruleswhoseapplicationsometimesrequires appeal to the backgroundissueswhichlaw is intendedto help settle,then it is clear thatnot all defendersof positivism viewthe strictmediatingrole Raz ascribesto lawas ofoverridingconcern.Ifso, thentheInclusivePositivisthas the resourcesto escape the hornsof Postema'sdilemma. The concept of authorityalso figuresprominentlyin Philip Soper's 'Law's NormativeClaims.'Soper's aim is to showthatlaw'snormativeclaims 137 AofL,88.
138 AoL, 102.
This content downloaded from 190.81.38.110 on Fri, 30 May 2014 11:33:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
434 UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LAWJOURNAL are not those typicallyassigned to it by modern positivistslike Raz and Coleman; that these claims are much weaker than a claim to Razian authority; and that the paradoxical view,widely shared among modern positiviststhat law's normative claim (to authority) is almost alwaysfalse, can therefore be avoided. According to Soper, the law's essential normative claim, one which distinguishes it from Hart's gunman writlarge, is the claim to justice not to authority.The law claims not that it has Razian authority,and that its pronouncements thereforecreate content-independent, fullyexclusionary reasons with which citizens are under strictobligation to comply. Rather, the law makes only a claim to justice, that its decisions and actions are morally defensible 'by reference to its own conception of how state power should be used.'139 The law insiststhatitslegal normisjust, and thatit has the rightto create and enforcesuch normsforthe community.Because the law believesthe norm isjust, it also believescitizensshould complyforthatreason - the content-basedreason. If one askswhetherthe law also expectsobedience, even ifthe normturnsout to be wrong,the responseis likelyto reflecttheodd natureof the question.140 So the law believes its pronouncements are just, and that it has the right to decide and enforce its decisions. And although it does not claim a rightto compliance grounded on a claim to Razian authority,it nevertheless expects voluntarycompliance with its pronouncements. Whether, in addition to all this,a particular legal systemalso has Razian authority,even though it does not necessarily claim it, is a question which Soper leaves very much open. ... to "demote"theclaimsofthestatebyabandoningtheviewthatlawnecessarilyor even typically claimsauthority does notentailgivingup on the questionofwhether the lawdoes in facthave such authority. the argument... simply Quite thecontrary: restoresthatquestion to the positionit has alwaysoccupied - a matterof concern formoralphilosophy(not forbald assertionbythe law) and, of course,a primarily matterof concernforanyconscientiouscitizen.141 'If the duty to obey exists, it is probably the result of a theorybased on the respect that is owed the state ...' 142 There is much in Soper's paper that will be of serious interest to both positivistand anti-positivistalike. Anti-positivistscan invoke Soper's argument as follows:An essential tenet of modern positivismis that law necessarilyclaims authority;thisclaim to authority,which is integral to the positivist's 139 AofL, 221. 140 AofL, 237.
141 AofL, 240
142 AofL,239.
This content downloaded from 190.81.38.110 on Fri, 30 May 2014 11:33:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
THE MANYFACES OF LEGAL POSITIVISM 435
theoreticalaccountof thenatureoflaw,is notin factone whichthelaw typmustbe rejected.Positivists, on the other icallymakes;thereforepositivism hand, are likelyto respondin one of twoways.Those who are prepared to nor the Razian conceptionof authorgiveup neithertheclaimto authority ity,willlikelyappeal once again to Raz's reasonsforbelievingthatwe misconceivelaw's role in our practicalreasoningifwe viewit as claiminganythingless than strongRazian authority.They mightalso invokestandard argumentspurportingto showthatthe rightto rule entailsthe rightto be obeyed,withitscorrelativeobligationto obey. But thereis a second line of responseopen to the positivist. Instead of defendingthe propositionthatthe law necessarilyclaimsRazian authority, a positivistcan defendthe propositionthatthe authority whichlaw necesIndeed, thereis good reason to think sarilyclaimsis not Razian authority. thatrecognizingthe 'authority'oflawmaybe nothingmore thanrecognizing Soper's claimtojustice:thatthelawhas therightto decide and enforce itsdecisions,decisionswhichit claimsto be justified.143 Rejectingthe propositionthatthe law necessarilyclaimsRazian authorityis,ofcourse,notsomethingthatRaz himselfwouldwantto do. In his 'Intentionin Interpretation,' Raz sets out to providefurthersupportforhis theorythatlaw necessarilyclaimsauthority byshowingwhatit is to respect the authorityof legislation.Accordingto Raz, respectforthe authorityof legislation,and thusthe law ofwhichit is a principalvoice,requiresa particularapproach to its interpretation, thoughthisapproach is consistent witha wide rangeof interpretive practices- a pointto whichwe willreturn later.More specifically, theauthoritative statusoflegislation acknowledging requiresadherenceto theintentionsof thelegislators.One does not follow unlessone respectswhatRaz calls legislationin recognitionofitsauthority, the 'standardintentionof thelegislator.'144 It is, of course,a familiarthemeinjurisprudencethatthe intentionsof legislatorsshould in some waybe respected.But Raz putssome interesting twistson thisfamiliarstory.For one thing,his aim is not to develop an argumentin politicalmorality leading to theconclusionthatjudgesoughtto respecttheintentionsof legislatorswhentheyinterpretand attemptto follow legislation.Rather,his aim is to show thatjudges cannot help but be guided bylegislators'intentions.To theextentthatajudge attemptsto follow legislationhe must,as a matterof conceptualnecessity,respectthe intentionsof thelegislator.Ifthejudge does not do so (and accordingto Raz sometimeshe ought not to because legislationis not alwaysauthoritative, even thoughit necessarilypurportsto be) then he therebyfailsto follow 143 For an firststep towardsan analysisalong theselines,see Inclusive 129-41. Positivism, 144 AofL., 274.
This content downloaded from 190.81.38.110 on Fri, 30 May 2014 11:33:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
436 UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LAWJOURNAL
legislation.His decisionwillbe based on somethingotherthan the law establishedin legislation,thatis,establishedin the intentionsof thelawmakers. In Raz's view, -realorsupposed-ofentrusting whatever thejustification law-making powerstoany institutions are theywillnotmakesenseunlessthelawsmadebythoseinstitutions the lawstheyintendto make ... It makesno sense to giveany person or body lawto makingpowerunless it is assumed thatthe law theymake is thelaw theyintended 145 make.
In characterizingthe natureof thisargumentforwhathe calls theAuthoritativeIntention Thesis, Raz writes:'It is an argument about what the courts
have no choice butdo, about whattheycannotfailto do so longas theyfollow Where necessityreignsconsiderationsof moral and politicaldelegislation. have no role to play.'146 So Raz's argumentfortherole ofintention sirability in interpreting authoritative legislationis conceptual not moral. This featureof the argumentdistinguishesit frommanyotherargumentsof a decidedlymoralnaturepurportingto showwhyjudges should (not must) respectlegislators'intentions. So whatare theintentionswhichmustbe followediftheauthority oflegislationis to be respected?First,thereis thestandardintentionwhichis necessarilypresupposedin anyact oflegislationand whichmustgovernthe inof the legislatorsis terpretationof the act and itsproductsifthe authority to be respected.Briefly, thisis the intentionthatone's textbe 'understood as such texts,whenpromulgatedin thecircumstances in which[it] is promare understood in the culture of [one's] country...'147 Aculgated, legal to this intention is Raz, cording necessarilypresupposedin anyact of legislation, in so far as a legislativeact is an attemptto control,or at least influencein some way,some aspect of the law.Even more importantly, the standardintentionrequiresno specificknowledgeof how one's legislation willbe understood,and thereforeno knowledgeof whatpreciselyone has done in introducingthe standardone did. It is possiblefora legislatorto have Raz's standardintentionwithouthavingthe foggiestidea of the conintroduced.Nortent,specificor otherwise,ofthelawhe has authoritatively of have some idea what the content of theirlegiscourse, mally, legislators lation happens to be. This is because theywillhave knowledgeof whatit is theywill normallybe understood as saying,given the circumstancesin whichtheysaid it.And itis preciselyforthisreason thattheysaid whatthey 145 AofL, added. 258,emphasis 146 AoJL, added. 249,emphasis 147 AofL,267.
This content downloaded from 190.81.38.110 on Fri, 30 May 2014 11:33:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
THE MANYFACESOF LEGALPOSITIVISM437
did. But it is importantto be clear thata legislatorcould have the standard intentionand yetbe completelyin ignorance,or in error,about the meaning and effectofwhathe has introduced. It is a decided virtueofRaz's theorythat,in sayingthattheintentionsof legislatorsnecessarilycountin determiningthe law,he is not therebyfallathe meaningof legislationwiththe mentalstatesof legciouslyidentifying islators,withwhatthe legislatorsactuallyhad in mind when theyenacted thelegislationtheydid. Legislation,on Raz's model,has a kindofautonomy whichit lacks on manyintentiontheories.He does not share the concern of thosewho fearthatfailureto tie themeaningof legislationto whatlegislatorsactuallyhad in mindwilllead to rampantjudicialactivism.Raz's theoryrespectsthe conceptualdistinctionbetweenwhata piece of legislation, as a public documentintendedto guide people's activities, means and what itsauthorsmighthavemeantor intendedbyit.Of course,more oftenthan not the twocoincide:whatthe legislatorsmeantis almostalwayswhattheir legislationmeans.But Raz is quick,and surelyright,to add thatthe twoare not identical,regardlessofwhethertheone (meaning) is almostinvariably coextensivewiththe other (whatwas meant). So all acts of legislationnecessarilyexpressRaz's standardintention.In mostcases,of course,legislatorswillalso havewhatRaz calls 'furtherintentions,'about whattheirwordsmean or about the objectivesof theirlegislation.It is trueas well thatin some systems of law an interpreter's appeal to such intentionsmaybe legallyrequiredby the accepted conventionsgovBut Raz's thesisis thatthese furtherintentionsare erninginterpretation. not required,as a matterof conceptualnecessity, fora successfulact of legislationto occur.Consequently,appeal to further intentionsis not required in the interpretation of such acts or theirproducts.There is conceptually nothinginconsistentin supposingthatan interpreter might,in the approbe permittedor requiredto ignorefurtherintentions priatecircumstances, in interpreting legislation.He willbe requiredto do so iftheconventionally bar interpreters fromappealing to such accepted canons of interpretation intentionsin determiningthemeaningoflegislation.Anything in addition to the standardintention(necessaryforan act of legislationto occur) and thevariable,contingentconventionsof interpretation to whichthatstandard intentionmakesimplicitreference,is irrelevantin determiningthe law towhichauthoritative actsoflegislationgiverise.These conventionsmayreferthe interpreter to furtherintentions,but thentheymaynot. - muchwhichI There is much ofvalue in Raz's theoryofinterpretation havehad to ignoreforpurposesof thisessay.Ifsuccessful,itmanagesto isolate an intentionwhichnecessarilymust,in all cases, be respectedin interthe innumerapretinglegislation.And it does so withouttherebysuffering ble difficulties normallyencounteredbyintentiontheories.We need notbe
This content downloaded from 190.81.38.110 on Fri, 30 May 2014 11:33:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
438 UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LAWJOURNAL
concerned to providea theoryabout how to go about identifying specific and general intentions,or a theorypurportingto showwhich must take precedence when the twoconflict.We also avoid collapsingthe distinction between the meaning of legislation(an essentiallypublic matter)on the one hand; and whatthosewho introducedit mighthave meant or had in mind when theyintroducedthe legislationtheydid (an essentiallyprivate matter),on the other.This is a crucialdistinctionand it is quite a feat to have preserveditwithinthe confinesof an intentiontheory. Yet anotherdecided virtueofRaz's theoryis thatitaccommodatesa wide varietyof interpretive practices,withoutbeing completelyvacuous.A diffiis thatinterpretive cultyencounteredbyanytheoryof legal interpretation practicesseem to varyfromone systemto the next,and fromtimeto time withinone and thesame system.Sometimesliteralismseemsto be thedominantpracticeof the day,whileat othertimesjudges spurnliteralmeaning in favourof purpose or general intent.Conventionsseem (at least sometimes) to dictatewhichapproach is appropriatein the circumstancesand judges are admonishedforfailingto observethem.Lord Denning,forexcriticizedforviolatingaccepted canons ofinterpretaample,was constantly tion in favourof his own highlyliberal,purposiveapproach to legal interpretation.A theorywhich is able to accommodate variable interpretive practices,while explainingwhyit is not true thatjust anythinggoes, has much to commendit- and Raz's theorydoesjust that.The standardintention,itwillbe recalled,is alwaysto introducelegislationwhichmeans what it willnormallybe takento mean giventhe canons of legal interpretation prevailingat the timeof enactment.As theseconventionsvary,so too will the meaningofwhatis enacted and the means bywhichone is to discover thatmeaning- i.e. discoverthelaw establishedbylegislativedirectives. So in manyrespectsRaz's theoryis a highlyattractive account of legal at leastas it applies to actsof legislation.Nevertheless, I am interpretation, notcertainthatitis consistentwithhis commitment to ExclusivePositivism. make referenceto Briefly,if the prevailingconventionsof interpretation moral considerations,thendeterminations of law,necessarilyinvolveus in moral considerations,a possibility whichthe conceptualversionof ExclusivePositivism necessarilydenies. But theprevailingconventionsgoverning the interpretation of legislationoftendo seem to make referenceto moral considerations.Consider, for example, Judge Parke's statementof the 'golden rule' in Beckev. Smith(1836) thata statuteis to be interpretedin accordance withitsplain meaningunless this'leads to [any] manifestabor repugnance.'In determiningthecontentofthestatuteone must, surdity leads accordingto thisconvention,ask whetherthestatute,so interpreted, to repugnance.But is thisnot a moral question?If so, then accordingto Raz's accountof thestandardintention,the contentof law in thisinstance
This content downloaded from 190.81.38.110 on Fri, 30 May 2014 11:33:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
THE MANYFACES OF LEGAL POSITIVISM 439
where depends on moralfactors.Consideras wellcases likeRiggsv. Palmer, the followingobservationsweremade: Itisa familiar canonofconstruction thata thingwhichiswithin theintention ofthe makersofa statute is as muchwithin thestatute as ifitwerewithin theletter; and a thingwhichis withintheletterofthestatuteis notwithinthestatuteunlessitbe within theintention ofthemakers. Itwastheintention ofthelaw-makers thatthedoneesin a willshouldhavethe thata donee property givento them.Butitnevercouldhavebeentheirintention whomurdered thetestator tomakethewilloperative shouldhaveanybenefit under it.148
Notice twoimportantpointsabout thesepassages.First,thejudges did not viewthemselvesas determiningwhetherto ignoreor change the NewYork statutes.Nor was theirquestionwhethersuperiorprinciplesof law override thestatutesand so thestatutesneed notbe followedin thiscase. Theirquestionwas how to interpretthe statutetheywerebound to apply,how to determineitsmeaningor content.Secondly,partof theiranswerto thatquestion seemed to invoke evaluativefactors,probably moral ones. Their questionwas not whetherthe legislatorsdidinfactintendto allow murderersto inherit.Rathertheirquestionwaswhetherthelegislatorspossibly could haveintendedsuch a result.The answeris thattheycould not have,and the obviousreasonis a moralone: itwouldbe grosslyunjustand morallyrepugnant to allow such a consequence. It is forthisreason thatthe statutewas interpretedso as to exclude murderersfrominheriting.Morality,then, helped to determinethe contentof law. Appeals to the intentionsof the law-makersare, of course, often couched in such terms.The questionis almostneveran historicalone: rather thequestionis whetheritis reasonableto thinkthatpersonsin a position oflegislativeauthority could haveintendeda resultwhichtheyno doubt did not in factcontemplate.The assumptionis thatlegislatorsdo not intendto cause injustice,moral repugnanceor absurdity.Their legislationis thereforeto be read in lightof thisassumption.In otherwords,the contentof law is determinedin part by standardsof moralityand rationality. It may wellbe thatlegislationshould alwaysbe read in thisway,on theassumption thateverylegislatorintendsto avoid bringingabout injustice,absurdityor moral repugnance.If so, thenRaz's theorymaybe in even deeper trouble. It maybe in theverynatureoflegislation,as a voluntary, rationpurportedly al act intendedto effecta morallyand rationallyacceptable change in the legal statusquo, thatit manifestthisintention.If so, thenwe would be required to modifythe standardintentionso as to reflectthisfact.But then 148 115 NY 506, 22 NE 188 (1889).
This content downloaded from 190.81.38.110 on Fri, 30 May 2014 11:33:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
440 UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LAWJOURNAL
moral factorswould necessarily the configureas conditionsforidentifying tentoflaw (at leastlegislation)- something,I takeit,no defenderofExclusivePositivism would wishto accept.Whethera defenderof InclusivePositivismcould live with this consequence is another interestingquestion whichI willnot here explore.I have mydoubts. So itseemsthatRaz's Authoritative IntentionThesisleads to the conclusion thatmoralfactorsoftendo playa rolein identifying thecontentoflaw: eitherbecause theaccepted conventionsto whichtheessentialstandardintentionnecessarilyappeals make thisso, or because it is in theverynature of an intentionallegislativeact thata legislatorintendnot to bringabout morallyrepugnantor irrationalresults.In eithercase, ExclusivePositivism has a seriousproblem. Perhapswe should add one finalpoint.In mostsystemsoflaw thereis a constitutional hierarchyofbindinglegal standards.In commonlawsystems, law takesprecedence over statutory law whichitselfnormallytakesprecedence overcommonlaw rulesand principles.In such systemsit is, presumthattheirlegislationnotviolatetheconably,theintentionofall law-makers stitution.This intention,I wouldhazard to say,is necessaryin anysystemin whicha constitutionplaces constraints on validity.Now if,as appears to be the case in theUnitedStatesand Canada, theconstitution places moralconstraintson thevalidityofsubordinatelegislation,we seem again to have yet anothercase wheremoralreasoningmaybe necessaryto determinethe intentionsof legislatorsand thereforethe contentof law. Canadian legislation must,forexample, alwaysbe interpretedso thatits applicationdoes not violatethe equalityclause of the Canadian ConstitutionAct.And it is reasonable to assume thatParliamentalwaysintendsits legislationto be read in thatway.Ifso, we have anothercase wherefollowingthe intentions of the legislatorsinvolvescourtsin examiningmoral factors,in this inofequality.We also havereason to prestance,thenatureand requirements ferInclusivePositivismoveritsExclusiverival. V TheLegalTheory ofEthicalPositivism have been gettinga good deal of Accordingto Tom Campbell,positivists bad presslately.This is owing,in no smallmeasure,to the positivists themselveswho are oftenreluctantto acknowledgethe moralbases of theirtheinsteadto characterizethosetheories,and the arguments ories,preferring in theirfavour,as morallyneutralin variousways.As a result,Campbellconhaveinadvertently tends,thesepositivists deprivedthemselvesofthestrongestargumentsat theirdisposal.Theyhavealso opened themselvesup tomischaracterization, to varioustrumpedup chargesof theoreticalnaivet_ , and to the complaintthat,in arguingforthe separationof law and morality,
This content downloaded from 190.81.38.110 on Fri, 30 May 2014 11:33:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
THE MANYFACESOF LEGALPOSITIVISM441
they are advocatingan amoral or immoral doctrine. Positivism is now 'generallytakento be theview thatthe concept of law can be elucidated without referenceto morality'and thatit is the duty ofjudges to make determinationsof law without recourse to moral arguments.'49The formeris thoughtto be theoretically naive or amoral,while the latterhas been condemned as an immoraldoctrineencouragingblind deferenceto legal authority.We have seen in some detail above the varietyof shapes thesechargeshaveassumed.We havealso seen themanywaysin whichposcan and have responded.These include,forexample,Coleman's atitivists temptto distinguishquestionsof legalityfromquestionsof law's authority, MacCormick'sattemptto providean explicitly moralisticcase foramoralisticlaw,and claimsbyvariouspositivists thattheirtheoriesoflegalityare consistentwithany numberof theoriesofjudicial obligation.Campbell's response to the calumnyin whichpositivismhas been cloaked is to follow MacCormickin offeringan explicitlymoralisticcase forpositivism.His arfromMacCormick'sin one keyregumentis, however,cruciallydifferent moral arguspect.Whereas MacCormickfollowsBenthamin constructing mentsforseparatinglawand morality at theconceptualor theoreticallevel, and indirectly at thelevelof legal practice,the directand immediatetarget ofCampbell'sargumentis legal practiceitself.Campbell'sintentis to sketch and defenda thoroughly normativetheory,not about thebestwayin which to conceive or describe legal practice,butratherabout theshape thatour legal forceof LEP[the practicesoughtto take. '[T] he organisingand motivating Legal Theoryof EthicalPositivism]is a substantivepoliticalviewabout the moralsignificanceof the positivist visionof whata good legal systemlooks like and how it contributesto ajust, effective and democraticpolity.'150 In Campbell's view,the ideal to whichlegal systemsought to aspire is Raz's ExclusivePositivism. Ifajurisprudential is one which should theory judgesshouldfollowand legislators ratherthanone thatissimply or descriptively facilitate, accuratewith conceptually tocurrent thenRaz'ssourcesthesis canbe takentoencapsulate the respect practice, which Ethical Positivism as an model. possibilities posits aspirational The grandtaskofEthicalPositivism istoprovidea moraljustification foradoptoflawas theone on whichto baseourpreferred ingthisconception legalsystems. sucha position theseparability foritestablishes thatthe thesis, Clearly presupposes EthicalPositivist's makes but added to the of sense, objective conceptual feasibility theenterprise isthejustificatory taskofestablishing itsdesirability andgathering emthatitis,toa sufficient a realisable extent, piricalevidencetodemonstrate ideal.'51 149
150 LE,,1. LER 2
151 LER85.
This content downloaded from 190.81.38.110 on Fri, 30 May 2014 11:33:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
442 UNIVERSITYOF TORONTO LAWJOURNAL LEP is, therefore,'a highlypolitical theoryof law', a 'moral theoryabout the exercise of political power.' 152Campbell thus defends what he calls the 'prescriptive separation thesis,' according to which the identification and application of law ought to be kept as separate as possible from the moral judgments which go into the making of law.'153While the separation thesis, or what Campbell prefers to call the 'separability thesis,'154may be seen as a distinguishingfeature of legal positivism,'it is to misunderstand its import ifwe take it to mean that Positivistsdo not have moral and political reasons for favouring the adoption and guiding use of this analytic doctrine.'155 Campbell seems happy to acknowledge that, at some level or other, Inclusive Positivism provides the best account of our conceptual commitments. However, he goes on to add, ... the motivationbehind theanalyticpointis to preparetheconceptualgroundfor the viewthatno legal systemoughtto permitmorallyexplicitor othercontroversial standardsbeingused to establishtheexistenceoflawor determineitsimplications. We maylabel thisthe 'prescriptive separationthesis'. - theviewthatlawand moralsoughtto be sepThe prescriptive thesis separation arate at the pointof application- is not,of course,establishedbyconceptualanalysis,anymorethanitisdisprovedbyempiricalevidence.It is,however,made possible
fortheseparability thesissuppliesthesemanticschemewithin bysuch analysis, whichtostatetheprescriptive thesis.156 separation Campbell thus accepts the conceptual versionof InclusivePositivism. He is also happyto accepta descriptive versionaccordingtowhich,as a matterof observablefact,legal determinations oftendo relyon moral considerationsand actual legal systemsroutinelydo permitjudges to exercise
freshmoral judgments in deciding legal cases. 'LEP does not deny the realitythat specific rules are often absent or ignored, or that there are systems in which judges are encouraged to take rules as no more than tentative
guidelines...'157But,he adds, such statesof affairs'are to be portrayedas unwarranteddeparturesfromthe positivist model and deplored as unethical derelictionoflegislativeandjudicial duty.'158In otherwords,withinthe 152 LFE 2 & 58. 153 LEP,3. 154 Campbell distinguishesbetweenthe separationthesis,according to which determinationsof law can neverdepend on moralfactors,and theseparability thesis,accordingto whichsuch determinations can but need not depend on moralfactors.Exclusivepositivistsinsiston the separationthesis,whileInclusivePositivists opt forthe separabilitythesis. 155 LEI) 69-70. 156 LEP 71. 157 LEP,7. 158 LEP,7.
This content downloaded from 190.81.38.110 on Fri, 30 May 2014 11:33:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
THE MANYFACES OF LEGAL POSITIVISM 443
positivist's theory lie the resources for detailed moral arguments establishing that,in practice, systemsof law ought to be modelled on Raz's Exclusive Positivism. It is not Campbell's aim to argue that LEPis 'the dominant form of Legal Positivism,either historicallyor contemporaneously.' 59 Nor is it his intention to deny that positivismis 'standardly defended on conceptual and empirical rather than evaluative grounds.'160 Nevertheless, Campbell contends, 'the moral arguments for Legal Positivism are ... there in the tradition and are often openly declared.'161 His aim is to expose ... the frequently submergedmoralgroundsof Legal Positivism... Bringingwhatis oftenthehidden moralagenda ofall Legal Positivisms can be moreinteresting than them at their or scientific face value. This is so taking conceptual particularly ifwe examine the ideological or legitimating functionsof manyLegal Positivisms which flourishon the perhaps disingenuousassumptionthatwhatought to be the case about law actuallyis so as a matterof naturalmeaningor fact:a characteristic positivistexample ofarguingfromoughtto is,whichmaybe called thenormativefallacy. In thisway,the hidden agendas of Legal Positivists are readilyviewedas malign,if not dishonest,devicesthroughwhichthe role of lawyersand legal academics,to say nothingof the absolutepowerof thestate,is beingfalselylegitimated.162 Having thus set the stage for his defence of LEP,Campbell goes on to describe in some detail what he calls 'the paradox of politics'. This is 'the tension between the societal need for centralised coercive authority and the dangers involved in any human beings having such power over others.'163 The paradox is tragic, Campbell contends, because both the need for and the dangers inherent in government stem from the very same features of the human condition. These are 'the vulnerabilityof individuals and small groups in situations where scarcity,or perhaps human nature itself,generates the drive to dominate and control others. 64This tragic situation is exacerbated by 'contemporary uncertainties over the objectivityof values in general and the perhaps related incapacity to agree as to the basic terms of social existence in pluralistic societies ...'165 The paradox of politics, then, is that we need Razian authorityto remove us from the state of nature, but this same authority puts us at risk of domination and control by those in whose hands we place this authority.According to LEP, the only means of 159 160 161 162 163 164 165
LEP 73. Ibid. Ibid. LE, 74-5. LEiF,21. Ibid. Ibid.
This content downloaded from 190.81.38.110 on Fri, 30 May 2014 11:33:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
444 UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LAWJOURNAL
responsivelegislaturewith solvingthe paradox is to have a democratically the power to introduceauthoritative directives,coupled witha judiciary whose functionit is to implementthe democraticwillembodied in those legislativedirectives.Such a scheme requiresa sharpdivisionof labour betweenthe legislativeand judicial functions,and a correspondingdivision betweenmoral/politicaland legal reasoning.We ought thereforeto limit theopportunitiesforjudgesto engage thelegislativefunction.We do so by and interpretation call foras littlemorcreatinglawswhoseimplementation al reasoning as possible. Otherwise,as the various criticaltheoristshave stressed,we will thwartthe verypoint of introducingauthoritativerules. This is truewhethertherulesare 'coordinationrules,facilitative rules,conveniencerules,distribution rules,[or] outputrules.'166In addition,we lose the 'psychologicalcomfortand securityof regularity and predictableness' whichrulescan help create,as wellas their'symbolicfunction... as a focus for community identification and value commitment ...'167 Political power
must'be tamednotonlybydemocraticdecisionmakingbut also bymaking theoperationof thestatea matterofchoice and applicationof rules,rather thanan agglomerationof individualcommands...'.168 In illustration of theperilsinherentin failureto respecttheprescriptive separation thesis,Campbell considers in some detail, the area of free speech legislation.He providesa richand instructive analysisofvariousapproacheswhichhave been takenin dealingwithfreedomof expressionin democraticsocietieslike the United Kingdom,the United Statesand Australia.In his view,the 'justifying groundsof freedomof speech are so comand in the end incommensurablethattheyare no arena plex, intertwined forsimple slogans and evidentlegal applicationsof pre-establishedclear and simple rules.'169Nevertheless,workableruleswhich embodyspecific democraticchoicescan, and should,be fashionedbylegislators.'[I] tis possible to findwaysof institutionalising human rightsconsiderationswithout articulation.'170 makingthe courtsthe primelocus of theirsubstantive In Campbell's viewwe have a choice. We can endeavourto findappropriatewaysofdealingwiththeparadoxofpoliticsbymodellingour legal system on Raz's sources thesis,or we can choose insteadto allow determinations of law to depend on the judges' individualjudgments of political The tragiceffects ofthelatterchoice are ablydemonstratedbythe morality. 166 LEY 51-2.Campbell providesa detailedand enlighteningaccount ofthevarietyof different typesof ruleswithwhichlawcan performitstypicalfunctions. 167 LEr 52. 168 LEP 61. 169 LEP 214. 170 LEP, 185.
This content downloaded from 190.81.38.110 on Fri, 30 May 2014 11:33:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
THE MANYFACES OF LEGAL POSITIVISM 445
criticaltheoristswho,Campbellbelieves,willfindan agreeable allyin Ethical Positivismifonlytheycan overcometheirhostility to positivism.This is, whichis largelygeneratedby the dishonest Campbell believes,a hostility ofmanypositivist characteristic theories.In Camppretensionsto neutrality bell's view,'Legal Positivismis the presupposedorthodoxywhichprovides thestandardbackgroundagainstwhichcriticallegal theoriespresentthemis vulnerableto misrepresentation selves.As such,Legal Positivism and caricatureswhichserveto highlighttheclaimedsuperiority of itsmore daring However,'ifwe dissectthemanyinterwovenstrandsof this competitors.'171 movementit is possible to regardmanyof the powerfulcriticalanalysesof existing,legal systemsas connected with some underlyingassumptions about rulesand legitimacy whichconnectwithLEP.... This radicalthemeis, in itself,compatiblewithprescriptive positivism.'172 The above is but a thumbnailsketchof an elaborate defence of LEP. Campbell's account has a numberof virtues.He makes abundantlyclear thatsome positivists do relyon moral argumentsdespite the explicitendorsementbymanyof,e.g., theNeutralRationaleand NeutralDescription Theses. He providesa clear alternativeto the descriptiveand conceptual formsof positivism whichcan be validly,and in manyrespectspersuasively, defended using such arguments.And his moral defence is, to myknowledge, the most sustainedand sophisticatedof its typein the literature.Finally,Campbelldemonstratesthewaysin whichpositivists mightjoinforces withcriticaland feministtheorists, despitethefactthatthelatterare among the harshestcriticsof mainstreampositivism. Despite itsmanyvirtues,I findCampbell's account troublesomeon at least twofronts.First,I have reservationsabout the picturehe providesof thepositivist tradition.As notedabove,Campbellis clear thatTheLegalTheEthical 'does not argue forEthicalPositivismas a matterof Positivism oryof historicalexegesisor even as an illuminatingpostfactoreinterpretation of a greattheoreticaltradition."'73 he denies an intentionto arFurthermore, gue thatLEP'is the dominantformof Legal Positivism,eitherhistorically or contemporaneously."74 have alwaysbeen keen to deny 'Legal Positivists thattheirtheoryis morallydeleterious,butmoderncommentatorsare correctin assumingthatthetheoryitselfis standardly defendedon conceptual and empiricalratherthan evaluativegrounds.The moral argumentsfor Legal Positivismare, nevertheless,there in the traditionand are often openlydeclared.'175And when theyare not,we can neverthelessuncover 171 172 173 174
LEP,78. LEP,247-8. LER 75. LER,73.
This content downloaded from 190.81.38.110 on Fri, 30 May 2014 11:33:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
446 UNIVERSITYOF TORONTO LAWJOURNAL
'the frequently submergedmoralgroundsofLegal Positivism... whatis often the hidden moral agenda of all Legal Positivists...'176 Campbell's aim is to uncoverand utilize ... theideological orlegitimating ofmanyLegalPositivisms functions whichflourish on theperhapsdisingenuous thatwhatoughtto be thecaseaboutlaw assumption isso as a matter ofnaturalmeaningorfact:a characteristic examactually positivist of from In this ple arguing oughtto is,whichmaybe calledthenormative fallacy. arereadily viewedas malign,ifnotdisway,thehiddenagendaofLegalPositivists whichtheroleoflawyers and legalacademics, tosaynothhonest,devicesthrough ingoftheabsolutepowerofthestate,isbeingfalsely legitimated.'77 oftenclaim allegiance to the NeutralRationale and NeuSo, positivists tralDescriptionthesesbut argue on moral grounds.They also draw,from the submergedmoralpremisesof theirsupposedlyneutraltheories,moral conclusionsabout the propermodes of adjudicationand legislation.They thus leave themselvesopen to variouscharges of theoreticaldishonesty and/or confusion.Campbell's aim is to expose these submergedmoral premisesand use them to convertthe supposedlyneutraltheoryof legal positivisminto an explicitlymoral theorywhichtellsus whatlegal and legislativepracticeoughtto be like. For reasonssketchedabove,I fullyagree withCampbell thatitis invalid to defend a descriptiveor conceptual theoryon moral grounds.It is also invalid,perhapseven disingenuous,to drawmoralconclusionsfromwhatis depictedas a morallyneutraltheory,defendedon morallyneutralgrounds. Where I partcompanywithCampbellis overhow bestto respond to these points.Wishingto keep the moralargumentsand keep the moral implicaintoan explicitlymoral tions,Campbell setsout to convertLegal Positivism theoryand to argue thatthepromotionofsucha theoryhas oftenbeen 'the hidden agenda ofall Legal Positivists.' In myviewitis better:(a) to note and of themoralargumentsofferedbyBenthamand Macexplain theinvalidity Cormickand criticizedbyauthorslikeSoper and thepresentauthor;(b) reaffirmcommitmentto theNeutralDescriptionand NeutralRationaleTheses and then go on to showhow,nevertheless, moral and otherevaluative considerationscan playa role in developingessentially descriptivetheories; and (c) continueto insistthatPositivism is firstand foremosta theorypurwithrespect portingto revealour conceptualand theoreticalcommitments to the social practicewe call 'law'. Despite the claimsof itssharpestcritics, positivismis nota theoryabout howjudges should decide cases or about 175 Ibid. 176 LEP,74. 177 LER 75.
This content downloaded from 190.81.38.110 on Fri, 30 May 2014 11:33:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
THE MANYFACES OF LEGAL POSITIVISM
447
whatkindsof legal standardslegislatorsoughtto introduce,anymore than it is a theoryabout our moralobligationsunder law. In short,positivismis not,and has neverbeen conceivedbyitsdefendersas being,a theoryof adjudication, a theoryof legislation,or a theoryof compliance.In suggesting thatit is, or should be so regarded,Campbell does a disserviceto the positivisttraditionhe wishesto serve.In claimingthattheparticulartheoriesof viewedas positivist theoadjudicationand legislationhe defendsare rightly ries inherentin the positivisttradition,Campbell implicitly denies positiviststhe rightto defend other theoriesof adjudication and legislation.In suggestingthatthe separationthesisis in factthe prescriptiveseparation are committed,at the thesis,Campbellencouragesthebeliefthatpositivists level of legal practice,to theseparationoflaw and moralitytheywishto defendat theconceptualor theoreticallevel.But thereis no reason to believe thatpositivists are so committed,or thattheirargumentsand theoriesare bestviewedas leading to such a conclusion. This bringsme to the second respectin whichI have difficulty withLEP. Campbell has provideda strongcase forthemoraland politicaladvantages of systemsof law in whichthe functionof applyingrules to oneself,or to othersas in the case ofjudges, is separatedfromthe functionof creating rules.The latteris oftena functionbetterservedbydemocratically responsible legislators.Hence we mustacknowledgethe forceof Campbell's prehave been scriptiveseparationthesis.But as Hartand manyotherpositivists keen to pointout,thisformof separationis purchasedat a substantialcost. Amongtheseis theblindprejudgingofissueswhichcan veryoftenbe dealt withfairlyand rationallyonlywhentheyariseat the pointof applicationin particularcases. The need to promote fairnessand rationalityoften requires, in effect,a mergingof the legislativeand adjudicativefunctions throughthe enactmentof variablestandardsas opposed to hard-and-fast rules,or throughtheadoptionof ruleswhichemploytermslike 'fair','reasonable' and 'foreseeable'.Campbellis fullyawareof the 'tensionbetween theneed forprecisionand theneed forfairness.' itis clear that 178However, he thinksthatthe formerneed is byfarthe weightierof the two. '[I]f we take the dominantsocial and politicalfunctionof rules to be action guidthengood ruleswilltend ing,conductcoordinatingand powercontrolling, to fall into the categoriesof clear and specific."'79Legislationwhich emtermslike 'fair','reasonable' and 'unjust' tendsnot ploysmorally-charged to be clear and specificand 'representsan understandablebut regrettable passingof the legislativeburden fromgovernmentsto courts.'180 So does 178 LEP,118. 179 Ibid. 180 LEI, 119.
This content downloaded from 190.81.38.110 on Fri, 30 May 2014 11:33:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
OF TORONTO LAWJOURNAL 448 UNIVERSITY
adoption of constitutionaldocuments which empowerjudges to strike down otherwisevalid legislation'throughthe applicationof abstractand overridingprinciples,such as freedomof speech."81 Having said all this,Campbell does go on to acknowledgethatsometimesthe legislativeburden shouldbe shiftedto courts.Althoughon his scheme' theundesirableconsequences ofapplyingrulesin a par'positivist ticularcase 'should normallybe assessed and alteredlegislatively through the politicalprocess,'182 it is nevertheless'partof [positivist] judicial ethics to have recourse to consequential absurdityin order to amend evident senseless or meanings ... when the consequences are uncontroversially So utterseparationis not alwaysdesirable,so long as everyone harmful.,'183 is clear thatnothingless thanuncontroversial or harmfulness will absurdity do. Anything less would threaten'the rule of rules.'184 One wonders,however,whetherCampbell has gone farenough in acknowledgingthecompetingvaluesat stakewhensystems vigorously pursue the prescriptiveseparation thesis.Consider,for example, what is lost if courtsare prohibitedfromoverridinglegislationthroughtheapplicationof abstractprincipleslikefreeexpression,equality,or due process.Whatis lost is an importantpublic platformupon whichordinarycitizenscan affect, throughmoralargument,theexerciseofpoweroverthembylegal and legislativeauthorities.They lose a public platformon whichtheycan directly challenge,in an open and oftendramaticway,and on thebasisofimportant moral rightsexplicitlyrecognizedin theirconstitution, the legal validityof decisionsmade bytheirlegal and politicalauthorities.The loss of thisplatformhas a numberof consequences. For one, it deprivesthe individualof an importantsource of politicalpower.Withfewexceptions,it is verydifficultfora dissentingindividualwho believesthatlegislationfloutsconstitutionalvalues to bringabout a desiredchange bylegislators.It maybe not to convincea court.But perhaps thisis the problem. It quite so difficult mightbe arguedthatthemorepowerwe giveindividualsto thwartthedemof theirpoocraticwill,the lesswe can expectthemto accept the authority liticalinstitutions. And the less we can expect individualsto acknowledge the authority of theirpoliticalinstitutions, theless likelywe are to reap the benefitsof the rule of rulesoutlinedso clearlyby Campbell. Perhaps. But thereare reasonsforthinkingthatthedesiredacceptanceoflaw'sauthority mightin factbe encouraged byprovidingcitizenswiththe opportunityto challenge legislationin court on the basis of entrenchedabstractmoral 181 182 183 184
LEP,217. LE, 134. Ibid. LE, 142.
This content downloaded from 190.81.38.110 on Fri, 30 May 2014 11:33:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
THE MANYFACES OF LEGAL POSITIVISM 449
rights.A politicalsystemwhichformallyrecognizesits own moral limitations,whichrecognizesthatitslegislatorsandjudges maylegallyerrbyviolatingimportantrightsof politicalmoralitycontainedwithinthe constitution, is one whose authorityis likelyto earn the respect of a morally enlightenedand sensitivecitizenry.When individualsare shown respect, theyare more likelyto showrespectin return.Compare an alternativesystem,fullycommittedto theprescriptive separationthesis,whichdenies the individuala legal platformon whichto challengethe legislativepowersof itspoliticalauthoritieson groundsof moralrightsembodied in a constitution.Perhapsitis thissecond systemin whichtheruleofrulesis threatened. mostpeople are inclined When facedwitha claimto unrestricted authority to rejectthatclaim and to asserttheirmoralautonomyinstead.Individuals are preparedto accept theauthority ofothersbut onlyon termswhichreclimitationand providesignificant means ognize itsreasonableand rightful forresisting abuses.Ifthisis at all correct,thenwe havegood reason toquestion the prescriptive separationthesis,or at least the weightwhichCampbell places on it.This is not,however,reason to questionthe manyformsof withwhichthisthesisoughtnot to be identified. legal positivism
This content downloaded from 190.81.38.110 on Fri, 30 May 2014 11:33:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions